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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

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THE
CONTEMPORARY
REVIEW

VOLUME XXIII. DECEMBER, 1873—MAY, 1874.

BRITISH LIBRARY

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1884

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PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT.

IN TWO PAPERS.

I.

THE substance of these papers is contained in the following propositions:—

1. Parliamentary Government has been irrevocably established amongst us, and it is impossible to suppose that it will be seriously modified in any period to which we can look forward.

2. Defects which grievously impair its efficiency both in regard to legislation and in regard to the executive government are inherent in it.

3. Partial remedies may be suggested for these defects, though they are not capable of being removed at once by any single measure.

The proposition that Parliamentary Government has been irrevocably established amongst us, and that it is impossible to suppose that it will be seriously modified within any period to which we can look forward, is so clear in itself that to attempt to prove it is to weaken it. It is the first step in political knowledge to admit that upon all great national questions the ultimate decision must hereafter rest with the numerical majority of voters, expressing their will through representative assemblies. There is no use in discussing the question whether this is a good state of things or a bad one. For all practical purposes it is enough to say that it exists, and that it is the part of rational men to make the best of it, as they make the best of the climate, the soil, or the national character of

their country. It has been less generally remarked, though it is at least equally worthy of remark, that, owing to particular circumstances, the constitution of this country is very much more democratic than it would have been if the constitution had been expressly framed on a democratic basis. Public opinion here acts on the Government much more forcibly and directly than it does in the United States. The manner in which our constitutional changes have been made has been such as to give us a constitution which, though in some ways one of the most complicated, is in others one of the simplest in the world. Most of the parts which make it look complicated have long since been struck with paralysis, and have sunk into the condition of fictions. Theoretically, the Queen has boundless prerogatives; practically, she has no power. After making every allowance for the influence which an English Sovereign who made the best use of his position might in time acquire in the direction of public affairs (which is usually underrated), the power of an American President and his Ministers is out of all comparison greater than the power of an English King and his Cabinet. So, again, the power of the Supreme Court over the enactments both of Congress and of the State Legislatures is unlike anything which we have in this country. On the other hand, the power of a Parliamentary majority here is quite unlike anything which Congress, the President and his Ministers, and the Supreme Court, all together exert at any given moment in the United States. Very few Englishmen appear to see that the result of our passionate love for constitutional fictions, and of our determination in every case to maintain all the old forms untouched, whilst we alter the substance of all our institutions, has been to establish in this country one of the most direct, stringent, and unqualified authorities in the whole world. Making allowances for some institutions of a different character which are to a certain extent checks upon it, the majority for the time being of the House of Commons governing through a Committee of Ministers absolutely depending upon its favour, is the absolute master of every institution in the country, and of the lives and fortunes of all its inhabitants. The contingency that the House of Commons may abuse its powers need not, as matters now stand, be seriously considered. It is, however, worth while to point out how deeply, and indeed irrevocably, we are committed, not only to Parliamentary Government, but to a form of it which is singularly absolute and unqualified, so far as any legal limitations of its powers are concerned.

The second proposition is, that defects which grievously impair its efficiency, both in regard to legislation and in regard to the Executive Government, are inherent in our form of Parliamentary Government.

Before attempting to prove this, I wish to disclaim any intention to undervalue the institutions under which we live. A person who spoke of them with disrespect would prove his own incompetence to discuss public affairs of importance, and his want of acquaintance with political institutions, and the conditions under which they must of necessity work. Whatever faults our institutions may have, they, or at least we who live under them, have solved the problems which are throwing the greater part of Continental Europe into convulsions. If France, or Spain, or Italy had reached the points at which the defects of our system become visible, they would be infinitely better off than they are at present. We have at least arrived at a state of stable equilibrium. There is no serious question in this country of deciding political questions by violence. Everyone takes a strong interest in public affairs, and has a more or less intelligent opinion about them. A great number of political truths which in many parts of the world appear to be still in the nature of hidden mysteries, have with us passed into mere common-places. Moreover, the history and traditions of the country give a dignity to our institutions, which can hardly fail to make those who live under them feel that they have a character to lose and a position to keep up in the world. Above and beyond all, no nation in the world possesses anything like so large a class of intelligent, independent, and vigorous-minded men in all ranks of life, who seriously devote themselves to public affairs, and take the deepest possible interest in the national success and well-being. No one can understand the sense of stability, reserved force, and general power which English institutions derive from this circumstance, until he is able to compare life in this country with life in a country like India, where Europeans are but a handful—numerically so insignificant as to be almost imperceptible.

The character of our public men is the sheet anchor on which our institutions depend. So long as political life is the chosen occupation of wise and honourable men, who are above jobs and petty personal views, the defects of Parliamentary Government, however serious, may be endured even where they cannot be remedied or alienated. If, however, the personal character of English politicians should ever be seriously lowered, it is difficult not to feel that the present state of the constitution would give bad and unscrupulous men a power for evil hardly equalled in any other part of the world.

Upon the whole, those who think thus of Parliamentary Government are under a special obligation to speak plainly and without reserve of its defects. Flattery has at all times and in all places been the mortal enemy of every form of government to which it has been applied, and no form of government ever was more persistently

or more grossly flattered than our own. The proof is to be found in nearly every newspaper, and in nearly every speech made by a candidate to electors or by a member of Parliament to his constituents. It is needless to enlarge either upon the fact itself or upon the evils which it produces. They belong to the class of facts which everyone admits in theory and forgets in practice whenever it is convenient to do so, as it often is.

I come now to the main subject of this paper, which is to state and enforce the proposition that defects are inherent in Parliamentary Government which grievously impair its efficiency both in regard to legislation and in regard to executive action.

All the defects in question may be regarded as the result of putting the whole government of the country, both as regards legislation and as regards the control of the administration of current public business, into the hands of a popular assembly composed of many hundred members. In short, there are things which Parliament can and must do, and there are also things which it cannot possibly do well; the importance of business of the latter class has increased, is increasing, and may be expected to increase continuously; and great public evils result from the manner in which it is done, and must continue to be done so long as Parliament insists on doing everything itself.

Take first the things which Parliament can and must do. Parliament must of course decide questions on which different sections of the nation have conflicting sentiments and interests. It must, for instance, decide the question whether the suffrage is to be maintained at its present level or to be altered. The reason is, that the question "Who shall have votes?" is not at bottom a question of policy, but a question of power. In making a constitutional law, rational men consider what form of government is appropriate to a given nation under given circumstances at a given time, and with a population composed of such and such classes of persons, related to each other in this way or that. Throughout the discussions which preceded the last Reform Bill, for instance, the really important question was, how and to what extent to give votes to labouring men. Reasonable people did not suppose that the measure would increase the amount of political wisdom in the constituencies, or that it would necessarily lead to better legislation, or to a more skilful administration of public affairs. The measure was passed because it was felt universally that some such measure was necessary in order to adjust the form of our Government to the great changes which had taken place in the body of the nation. In short, a step was taken with a good grace which it would have been absolutely necessary to take somehow or other, sooner or later. Now,

considerations of this sort are precisely the considerations which address themselves to a representative body chosen from and immediately dependent upon the great body of the public at large. Every extension of the suffrage is a surrender by the existing constituencies of some part of their power. As by the hypothesis they have the power to start with, they, and they only, can possibly determine through their representatives when and to what extent they will share it with others.

Parliament, again, must decide all questions which have a strong and obvious bearing on questions of sentiment, and especially those which bear upon religion and morality. These, like the question as to the extent of the suffrage, are ultimately questions of power. There is a great deal to be said for an Established Church, and a great deal to be said against it; and if its advocates and its antagonists were left to convince each other by mere force of argument, they would wrangle till the end of time. Such questions are settled in rough times by physical force, or by the threat of it. We have substituted, as I have elsewhere remarked, the practice of counting heads for the practice of breaking them—at least in most cases. But minorities give way in reality, not because they are convinced, but because they are overpowered. On the whole, then, questions which affect the strongest feelings of men, or which are concerned with the distribution of political power, together with many others which it is unnecessary to particularise minutely, must be decided by Parliament, because the nation at large cannot delegate the decision of such questions to any body which does not directly represent it, even for the purpose of obtaining a wiser decision than a body which does represent it would give.

So much for what can and must be done by Parliament. I now pass to the question of the things which it ought not to attempt, because it cannot possibly do them well. I say, then, first, that Parliament is ill fitted for the task of elaborating the details of legislation, especially when it is complicated and relates to special subjects, and that it is perhaps even worse fitted for the task of keeping up a close and stringent control over the actual administration of public affairs.

First, as to legislation. The defects of Parliament, regarded as a legislative body, are so numerous that it seems hardly respectful to enumerate them, but at the same time they are so important that it is necessary to do so. To begin at the beginning, party government is so closely connected with Parliamentary government that Parliamentary government could not be carried on without it. A Parliament not divided into parties kept under a certain sort of discipline would be little better than a mob. If, how-

ever, we are to have party government, the following consequences from it are inevitable:—Public men and public measures of all sorts will have to be classed under the heads of Liberal and Conservative, or some other heads of the same kind. This, however, is a most imperfect and irrational distinction to take as the only one to which attention ought to be paid in choosing a member of Parliament, or supporting a measure introduced into Parliament. A very large number of public questions—a much larger number than most people suppose—have nothing at all to do with the distinction: and, as every one knows, the best and ablest men in the country are divided, not so very unequally, between the two parties. If we were at war, no one would admit that the political opinions of an admiral or general ought to prevent his appointment to the command of an army if he was specially fitted for it. No one would wish to see the governors of colonies or the Viceroy of India removed from their situations as soon as the Government which appointed them went out of office. Why, then, should the question between Conservative and Liberal be made the pivot upon which turns all electioneering and the whole conduct of public affairs? The results of attaching that degree of importance to it are manifold, and when the matter is fairly considered extremely surprising.

In the first place, it is the very essence of party government that one-half of the ablest men in the country should be compelled to pass the greater part of their public lives in fighting with the other half. The effect of this is to produce an extraordinary and lamentable waste of time and talent, and to encourage a way of treating measures which can only be compared to the way in which the advocates of opposite parties in a lawsuit treat their opponents' cases. It also possesses the minds of the public at large with the notion that to be a skilful Parliamentary gladiator is to be a great statesman, and that practical politics are rather a game than a branch of knowledge. People take sides in political struggles very much as they do at a race, and consider the question whether this public man or that gets the better of a sort of boxing-match with much more attention than they give to the merits of less exciting, though they may be intrinsically far more important questions.

A greater evil than these is the exaggerated prominence which party government gives to matters of which the intrinsic importance is small, by putting it in the power of any little knot of persons who take an interest in some one trumpery matter which just fits the calibre of their minds, to turn the balance this way or that in party struggles by promising their support to any one who will pledge himself as they wish on their special question. A man well fitted in every way to sit in Parliament may often lose his seat by differing

in opinion from the bigoted part of the constituency on some small question. "These fancies used, I believe, to be described in the United States collectively as "the isms;" and their influence on the government of the country long has been, and continually is, growing in strength.

Another effect of party government is that it produces an arbitrary connection between measures which ought to be considered upon their own merits. The Ministry as a whole being responsible, jointly and severally, for all their measures, the country is continually put in the dilemma of approving bad measures or renouncing good ones, when there is no reason whatever why the bad measures should not be rejected and the good ones adopted. It is difficult to imagine two really important proposals with less in common than the proposal to remodel the English Courts of Justice and the proposal to establish a new University in Ireland. Yet nothing is more certain than that the fate of these two measures was closely linked together last spring. If a Conservative Government had been formed when Mr. Gladstone resigned upon the defeat of his University Bill, Lord Selborne's Judicature Bill must have been lost; and whether it would have ever been carried, either by his own party or by his opponents, would have depended on a variety of party combinations as difficult to arrange or to foresee as the changes of a kaleidoscope. This is not the place to say anything on the subject of denominational education; but if we assume, for the sake of illustration, that the present Government are less favourably disposed towards it than a Conservative Government would be, it may be said with truth that the prospects of denominational education in the British Islands will be slightly improved if the Ashantees were to contrive to destroy Sir Garnet Wolseley and his staff. That the immediate prospects of the 25th clause of the Education Act will, for the next few months, vary inversely as the healthiness of the Gold Coast and the fidelity and courage of the Fantees and Houssas, is a reflection intrinsically as odd as Mr. Darwin's discovery that domestic cats are the patron saints of humble-bees.

A fourth result of party government is the total destruction of any approach to permanence, continuity, or system in the management of public affairs. The Government of the moment is never sure that it will continue in power for more than a few months. It would be difficult to point out all the consequences of this uncertainty upon every branch of public business. The most important result upon legislation is that every Ministry is obliged, for the sake of having a cry, and also for the sake of justifying its own tenure of power, to have some two or three great measures on which its existence is staked, and to which all other things are to be sacrificed. I am very

far indeed from agreeing with the do-nothing theory of politics, which in these days has numerous advocates; nor do I think that those who charge the present Government with what they describe as heroic legislation,—heroic in what is explained to be a strictly medical sense,—are more just to their antagonists than political speakers usually are. Apart from all passing and temporary politics, it is the inevitable consequence of the system of party government that every one who succeeds in dethroning his rival should fix his mind upon some prominent Parliamentary triumph, and strain every nerve to obtain it—laying aside, in order to do so, all serious attention to matters which it would require several years to establish, superintend, and bring into good working order.

I will not, however, insist upon this in detail, as it enters more or less into the general subject of the unfitness of a large popular assembly for the business of elaborating the details of legislation, and for the business of legislating at all upon matters which require great care, much constructive skill, and a large amount of special knowledge. I think it was Mr. Bright who once compared the progress of a measure through Parliament to the progress of a cab along Fleet-street on a day when the traffic is unusually heavy. If a horse falls or a wheel comes off, there is a block, which extends for a great distance, and which makes the question whether or not it will be possible to reach any particular point at any particular time one on which it is impossible to form even a plausible conjecture. The figure was perhaps better than the common run of figures, and it might even have been carried a little further. It might have been added that, apart from the inevitable friction and jostling of cabs and omnibuses going different ways, the street has not unfrequently to be cleared, all the traffic being stopped and thrust this way or that in the most unceremonious manner, in order that some party debate may be able to go charging along like a fire-engine, with the firemen shouting to everyone to clear the way, and a noisy mob roaring at their heels. It must also be recollected that our Parliamentary highway is open only for a part of the day, and that every vehicle which cannot get past a certain point by a certain time—the hour corresponding to the closing of the Session—finds the gates shut, and must return to the place from whence it came; not to speak of the possibility of their being shut at any time by a dissolution.

Dropping all metaphor, the following defects at least are incidental to Parliamentary legislation, quite apart from the system of party government, which, however, for the reasons already assigned, aggravates every one of them to an incalculable degree. In the first place, the effect of the right of every member to introduce any measure he

likes, and the rule that every Act must pass through all its stages in both Houses in some one Session of Parliament, together with the general uncertainty thrown over everything by the instability of the tenure of office, makes anything like continuous systematic legislation upon any subject practically impossible. The character of our statute-book is pretty well known, and need not be insisted upon, nor shall I here dwell upon certain views of my own relating to the simplification of the law, but I may remark that the statute-book as it stands bears upon almost every subject in which we are interested, with the exception perhaps of questions of pure science; and anyone may see that matters have got into a state in which two things are almost equally desirable—namely, first, that by obvious and well-known methods our existing laws, and the vast mass of miscellaneous institutions created by them, should be reduced into an intelligible shape; and next, that such amendments as they require should be made systematically and upon some kind of general plan. A system under which any one of a large number of persons is at liberty to occupy the attention of Parliament for a greater or less time, by proposing to it any little change—possibly good in itself—which happens to strike his fancy, really aggravates the existing evils more than it alleviates them. The statute-book is like a mass of tangled string which it is very important to disentangle. Modern legislation is like a set of persons engaged in disentangling it, each of whom has got hold of a separate loop, which he is dragging with all his might in his own direction, and upon which he is quite prepared to use his penknife to any extent if he comes across a knot.

I do not agree with the opinion that Parliament should, for a series of years, pass no laws except repealing Acts; but I can quite understand how the able and eminent person who expressed this opinion came to form it. My own belief is, that there never was a time or country in which careful, well-considered, systematic legislation was more urgently required than it is now and here; and I have no sort of doubt that it affords the only means by which the law itself, and the institutions which the law has created, can be put into a proper shape. But I am at least as firmly convinced that, under the present system, it is impossible that Parliament should either determine what measures ought to be proceeded with, or in what order they should be taken, or that when those questions are settled, it should bestow upon them anything like the amount of care and thought necessary to put them into proper shape.

Every one who has ever had occasion to read an Act of Parliament with care must know that even acts which are apparently very simple will almost always be found, upon examination, to involve a number of questions of detail which cannot be settled off-hand, which

it is essential to settle correctly, and which can hardly be discussed in set speeches by a popular body, inasmuch as it is difficult to see what the nature of the question is without close attention, repeated explanations, and careful weighing of words and comparison of passages. Moreover, the effect of amendments cannot be understood till the amendment is incorporated with the matter amended, and the result of the whole carefully considered. Suppose that when an artist had completed a picture or a statue, a committee of rival artists were to proceed to debate the question whether a little colour should be put in here or a bit of marble chipped off there; and suppose, further, that the alteration was to be made there and then, when the majority had declared its opinion, would the result be satisfactory? What again would happen if it were the avowed object of many members of the committee to destroy the merits of the work, and, if they could not prevent the artist from painting, at all events to jog his elbow as much and as often as possible?

The truth is, that as long as the present system lasts, the details of legislation must of necessity be ill done. If, on the one hand, a Bill is furiously debated clause by clause, it is apt to be pulled to pieces, till its authors would hardly recognize it; and this mutilation, be it remembered, is inflicted, not by way of intelligent criticism, for the purpose of improving the Bill, but often for the purpose of defeating it. It is directed almost exclusively to points of policy which are interesting, and not to points of working detail, which are often as dull as they are important.

If, on the other hand, a Bill does not happen to attract attention or to appeal to party feeling, it may be passed through Parliament with much less alteration and discussion than it deserves. Strange as it may appear, I believe that the measures which were passed by the Legislative Council in India received much more careful and minute criticism than Acts of Parliament which do not attract public attention, and which relate to special subjects, although the great difficulty with which the Government of India has to struggle at every turn is, that nothing which deserves to be called public opinion exists in the country. The reason is, that every effort was used by the Government of India to obtain as much of such criticism as they could. Copies of all Bills before the Council were forwarded to officers and others in all parts of the country, who would have to work them when they were passed into law, and they were called upon to criticise the draft as minutely as possible. These criticisms were afterwards carefully discussed, one by one, by a Select Committee of the Council, which was appointed for the purpose, and which, in the case of important Bills, would pass several hours a-day for several months together in the most minute and careful examination of every word of the Bill

before them. No one who has not seen the effects of such a process can tell how great they are, and no one who is not familiar with English law reports can judge of the extent to which such an examination is needed for Acts of Parliament.

I may sum up shortly what I have to say upon the defects of Parliament, considered as a legislative body, as follows :—The system of party government, the size and character of the two Houses, and more especially of the House of Commons, and the system of conducting public business by making speeches, combine with some other matters, which, for the sake of brevity, I omit, to make it almost impossible for Parliament to legislate in a satisfactory way upon the infinite variety of subjects which come before them. Parliament can and must decide upon broad questions of principle and policy, but as soon as they attempt, not only to lay down great principles, but to criticise elaborate schemes and to settle working details, they fall into every sort of mistake, and do their work with so little accuracy and with such a total want of system, management of time, and organization of labour, that their efforts to solve the different practical problems of the day often end in producing mere confusion and bewilderment.

But I will conclude this part of what I have to say by quoting a passage from Mr. Mill's *Autobiography*, which sums up in a pointed manner a view which he has stated more fully in his work on *Representative Government*. He says that in that work he discusses several questions which must soon be decided. "The chief of these is the distinction between the function of making laws, for which a numerous popular assembly is radically unfit, and that of getting good laws made, which is its proper duty, and cannot be satisfactorily fulfilled by any other authority; and the consequent need of a legislative commission as a permanent part of the constitution of a free country, consisting of a small number of highly-trained political minds, on whom, when Parliament has determined that a law should be made, the task of making it should be devolved, Parliament retaining the power of passing or rejecting the Bill when drawn up, but not of altering it otherwise than by sending proposed amendments to be dealt with by the commission." I should not myself be prepared to go to this extent. I give the extract because it shows how deeply the most distinguished advocate of Parliamentary Government felt the importance of the drawbacks to it which I have tried to sketch.

I now pass from the defects of our system in a legislative point of view to its defects in reference to the general control of the Executive. This is a very curious subject, and inasmuch as it affects all parties alike, it has attracted much less attention than it deserves. The theory of the Constitution is that the King is the

head of the State, and his constitutional adviser in the administration of public affairs is the Privy Council. Parliament is the great council of the nation called together to consult *de arduis regni*, and in particular to legislate when occasion requires, to see to the redress of grievances, and to vote supplies. In ancient times the actual management of public business appears to have been conducted somewhat as follows :—There were a certain number of high officers, such as the Lord Treasurer and the Lord High Admiral, who, by virtue of their office, were at the head of particular departments; but the great administrative body was the Privy Council, which was divided into committees. Thus, in the time of Edward VI. the Privy Council consisted of thirty-one members, who were divided into a Judicial Committee; a Committee which seems to have superintended the execution of penal laws and the punishment of offences; a Committee of State; a Committee of Revenue; and a Committee of “Bulwarks”—I suppose fortifications. In the time of Charles II. it seems to have been divided into four committees, viz.:—1. For foreign affairs; 2. Admiralty, naval, and military; 3. Petitions of complaint and grievance; 4. Trade, Colonies, Ireland, and Scotland. The Secretaries of State were members of every committee, and special committees were appointed as occasion arose. The King himself sat at the Council board, and took part in all that passed there. This was an intelligible, straightforward system. The King was at the head of affairs. He communicated with the people through Parliament for particular purposes and on special occasions. He managed his affairs through the Privy Council, and he had local agents in the sheriffs, justices of the peace, mayors, bailiffs, and other officers of corporations, who were dependent upon him in various degrees, but who in every case were in one way or another responsible for the discharge of their respective duties and the execution of any lawful orders which they might receive.

I need not enumerate the steps by which Parliament gradually possessed itself of the position which it occupies at present; but I wish to point out a consequence of the change, the importance of which has never been sufficiently recognised. This consequence is, that the country has no regular administrative constitution whatever. The Privy Council has become a dead-alive body of the strangest kind. Vestiges of its old constitution still remain in the Committee on Education, the Committee on Trade, and the Judicial Committee. The Judicial Committee is, of course, entitled to the high consideration which it enjoys as one of the most distinguished courts of justice in the world; but it is a court of justice, and in no real sense a branch of a council. The Committee on Education and the Committee on Trade are mere fictions, and I believe never or

hardly ever meet. Traces of their existence are to be found in the fact that the heads of these departments are called vice-president, and that the official letters of the department are written in the name of "My Lords." The Privy Council has some other substantial duties to which I need not refer specifically, as I am not writing an essay on the subject; but it seldom meets as a whole except for formal purposes, and its really important duty, that of advising and assisting the King in the general superintendence and management of public business, has ceased to be discharged at all, for the simple reason that the King has ceased to do that in which the Council used to help him, and that no one has taken his place.

The body which most nearly resembles the old Privy Council is the modern Cabinet; but before I say what I have to say about it, I must say a few words on the other great officers of State. Their history is as long as it is strange. To give the whole of it, it would be necessary to go back to the *Aula Regia* or Royal Court of the early Norman Kings, which, during the first period of English history, was Westminster Hall and Downing Street, and to a certain extent the Houses of Parliament, all in one. All that I need say of it is, that it had a variety of great officers, the Chancellor being the only one who still retains anything like his original importance. The Treasurer and the Lord High Admiral are, so to speak, held in solution by Commissions, but by a long and obscure process, the duties of most of them, or what we partly know and partly guess to have been their duties, devolved first upon the Privy Council and then upon the Secretaries of State.

Who and what these officers are, what are their duties, and what their legal character, has been on different occasions the subject of great legal controversy; but at present each of them is the head of a great branch of the public service. Each has a large number of important offices, subject to him to a greater or less extent, and a Secretary of State as such (for by a strange legal mystery, which has a sort of doctrinal sound, the five secretaries are only one officer in the eye of the law) has a variety of statutory powers. Besides these great offices of State there are, as I need hardly say, a very large number of offices, established for the most part by Act of Parliament, for the transaction of particular matters of business. On all sides we are met by commissioners, inspectors, boards of one sort or another, whose powers and relations to the Government depend upon the particular enactments by which they were created. Many of them are for practical purposes almost independent and self-contained. The aggregate of these institutions forms our administrative system. It is impossible for anyone who has not specially studied the subject to have an adequate idea of its excessive

intricacy and absolute want of system. The constitution of our Courts of Justice is not altogether simple ; but it is simplicity itself in comparison to the constitution of the public offices.

I have said these few words on a subject of extraordinary difficulty and intricacy for the sake of the remarks which it suggests as to the influence of the Parliamentary system upon the Executive Government. The first of these relates to the Cabinet. The Cabinet is a body altogether unknown to the law, invested with no legal power whatever. How far it is a governing council, and how far each individual member is master in his own department, is a question which no one can pretend to answer who has not himself been a Cabinet Minister, and which probably could not be answered very distinctly by those who have held that position. The point which seems to be clearest about the Cabinet is, that it is so contrived as to represent with the utmost possible nicety every fluctuation in Parliamentary opinion, and to be dependent for its existence upon the continuance of a general tacit understanding amongst its members as to the manner in which public affairs are to be managed, and, in particular, as to the policy, whether legislative or executive, which is to be proposed to Parliament. The Cabinet has none of the distinctive marks of a governing council. It makes no formal orders, it has no secretary or other executive officer. No official record of its proceedings is made ; they are mere private conversations (the effect of which is never known to the public), and the only way in which a minority or even a single dissentient member can relieve himself from full responsibility for all the acts of the Cabinet is by resignation. He cannot record his dissent or even state publicly and officially the fact that he dissents. This arrangement does not appear favourable to a vigorous central control of the different departments. It puts the Prime Minister in a position greatly less powerful than that of a king, and I believe a king of some sort, a king who really governs, subject of course to distinct and weighty responsibility, and it may be for a limited time, to be essential to good administration. An American President is a much nearer approach to a king than an English Prime Minister. Our system, which may be called the fictitious method of government, might have been contrived on purpose to render all administration weak, hesitating, and consciously dependent for every act and thought on the shifting currents of public and in particular of Parliamentary opinion. The truth of this view can hardly be distinctly proved by any person who has not had immediate personal knowledge of the interior working of Cabinets ; but facts known to all the world strongly suggest that the effect of the Parliamentary system upon the executive government of the country has been to deprive the king of all real power, and by the introduc-

tion of fictions and the creation of unconnected offices to convert the executive government into an aggregate of isolated institutions having no common centre, no clear and well-defined constitution or connection with each other, and no permanent heads.

I have little doubt that this is the true source of those frequent miscarriages and of that general inefficiency which has been so frequently, and in many instances so unjustly, laid to the charge of our public offices. It is not that the offices themselves are ill-arranged, or that the permanent officials connected with them are deficient in ability or zeal. On the contrary, I believe that no country in the world need wish for abler or better public servants than the heads of our public departments. The real evil lies in the want of a clearly-defined system, showing precisely the duty of each department and its relation to the rest, and in the nature of the relation between the Parliamentary heads of departments and their permanent staff; and this again is to be attributed to the circumstance that nearly the whole of the time and attention of the Ministry, as a body, has to be devoted, not so much to the transaction of the business of their offices as to the view which Parliament will take of their measures.

Much is said, and with justice, of the benefits of constant Parliamentary vigilance and supervision, but I do not think that Parliament is or can possibly be made a place for calm, careful, and comprehensive criticism upon the doings of public men and public departments. A Minister may be displaced, a special committee or a commission may produce a number of blue books; but a very large proportion of all the inquiries which take place end in very trifling practical results.

I will give one or two—they shall be only one or two—illustrations of what I have said. Within the last few months great Ministerial difficulties and wide changes have arisen entirely from the fact that several of the most important officers of the State differed as to the limits and natures of their respective duties. I have only to mention the names of Mr. Lowe, Mr. Ayrton, and Mr. Baxter to show to what I allude. To pass from this to what is now matter of history. We all remember the misfortunes of the Crimean war, and the cry for administrative reform which it produced, and which ended, as such cries do, in meetings and speeches, which I suspect will be found, should the occasion arise, not to have produced all the effects which could be desired. Long before the Crimean war, Sir James Stephen, who, in 1847, left the Colonial Office, of the permanent establishment of which he had been the head for many years, used to say continually that the war departments were so organized that if an European war occurred they would utterly break down.

The Colonial Office of those days was the office of Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. At the time in question I believe there was not, and had not been for many years, a single soldier in it. Its functions, and those of the Secretary at War and the Commander-in-Chief, were so strangely intermixed that I believe no one knew distinctly how they were related to each other.

I will content myself with a single additional remark on the chaotic condition to which our Parliamentary system has reduced the executive government. No one living man knows what the system is or where to get an account of it. Many years ago—more than twenty—I studied the subject with some care, with a view to writing a book about it. Engagements of other kinds caused me to lay the scheme aside; but my inquiries satisfied me that there was no tolerable account of the subject to be found anywhere, and that the only way of forming one would be by going through studies and making personal inquiries which hardly any one is in a position to undertake. The only book I ever saw which even professed to deal with the subject systematically, is, characteristically enough, a German one—“*Das heutige englische Verfassungs und Verwaltungsrecht*,” by Dr. Gneist. If it be asked what Parliamentary Government has to do with this result, I answer it has practically destroyed all unity in administration by reducing the office of king to a cypher, and by replacing him by a set of Ministers who shift backwards and forwards, who are equal amongst themselves, and are little kings in their own departments, and who are therefore neither competent nor inclined to attempt to give distinctness and unity to the whole system.

This, however, is only one part, and by no means the most important part, of the bad effects which the Parliamentary system produces upon executive government. To appreciate it fully, it is necessary to look at the interior of any great department. In each case there is a Parliamentary head of the office, and in many a Parliamentary under-secretary as well. Besides these, there is in every case a permanent staff—the most important members of which are, as a rule, appointed in mature life, after distinguishing themselves in other ways. The Parliamentary head of the office is its absolute master. He is responsible for what is done in it, and it is in his power, if he pleases, to treat every other member of it (except, perhaps, to some extent, his Parliamentary subordinate) as a mere clerk. On the other hand, he may, and he sometimes does, practically devolve upon his under-secretary the general management of business. Now, Parliamentary life is the only road to the great offices of State, and they are distributed mainly upon party considerations, and with very little reference to the actual management of the business of offices. Hence, the head of an office is put there

for Parliamentary reasons, and not on account of his special knowledge. If the chairman of a railway company, or the managing partner of a manufactory or house of business were appointed on account say of his literary ability, and having been appointed, were suddenly changed every few years, without the least reference to the state of affairs in the establishment, we all know what the result would be. Either the establishment would suffer grievously, or the chairman or managing partner would be only the nominal head of the business, or both. Since 1830, we have had sixteen Prime Ministers and fourteen distinct Ministries ; so that a Ministry on an average lasts just about three years. If we take into account internal changes in the Ministries—the shifting of particular officers from place to place—it will follow that on an average the head of every office holds office for less than three years. Sometimes a Ministry will last for a very short time—a year or less. In this case an office will probably have three different heads within a very short period indeed, and each of these must, from the nature of the case, be very much more interested and occupied by his Parliamentary duties than by departmental duties. It is indeed by their Parliamentary position almost exclusively that public men are really classed. A friend of mine used to say that whenever he heard a public man described as an excellent administrator, he inferred that the person who said so meant to express in a civil way contempt for his Parliamentary abilities. The way in which the public offices are organized under the party system is by no means unlike the way in which ships were officered in the days when the superior officers were landsmen relying for nautical information of every kind on the master and other inferior officers. This was not found by experience to be a good system.

Apart, however, from this, the effect of the constant change of management is that every administrative question of importance has to be taken up and broken off every few years. Few people know how important these questions are. Every department of State has to consider numerous questions of the utmost possible importance to the national wellbeing which really have no connection whatever with party, and which Liberals and Conservatives might discuss on common grounds, just as easily as members of the Church of England and the Church of Rome might discuss questions of geography. To take a few notable instances : Look at the Post Office. It is not easy to understand why the Postmaster-General should be in the Government at all. His office is not in any sense more political than those of the Commissioners of Customs, or the Commissioners of Inland Revenue. But be this how it may, look at the questions with which the leading authorities of the Post Office have had to deal. It may be doubted whether any political changes whatever have done so much directly

and obviously to add to the conveniences of life as the introduction of the penny postage and the taking over by the Post Office of the electric telegraphs. Now, between these questions and the subjects on which party conflicts are carried on there is no assignable connection at all. The strongest Tory and the most advanced Radical might well unite in regarding each of these measures as an important improvement. Look again at the numerous questions connected with the organization, discipline, and equipment of the army and navy. No doubt, some of these questions—for instance, the abolition of the purchase-system and the abolition of flogging—connect themselves with the general distinction between parties; but by far the most numerous and important of them are not party questions at all. Some are questions of pure science, relating to gunnery, the construction of armoured ships, the construction of fortifications, and the like. Others, again, are questions of judgment about common matters, such as the question of the distribution of business and the organization of offices. Others are special questions of the most unattractive and uninteresting kind, such as the relations of Consul Cameron to King Theodore, and of the authorities at Cape Coast Castle to King Coffee Calcalli. If such questions drop out of sight in the shifting of parties, they are capable of costing millions of treasure and thousands of lives. The most exalted loyalty to things as they are, the most passionate enthusiasm for things as they are about to be, will never prevent jobbery and mismanagement in a dockyard or give security that every matter of business connected with the management of a great establishment shall be brought in due time and in a proper form before the authority which is to decide it, or that the proper authority shall decide it in due course, and that his orders shall be punctually obeyed, and that a proper record of the transaction shall be kept for future reference.

There is only one instrument by which such reforms can be effected—the master's eye; and where the arrangements are such that there neither is nor can be any Master who is more than a bird of passage, learning his business and acquiring the special knowledge necessary to do his duty properly, you never will have good management. Public meetings about administrative reform, Parliamentary votes of censure, special committees and commissions of inquiry, always produce upon my mind the same sort of effect as an indignation meeting to find fault with a sick man for being sick. Sarcasm, reproaches, disgrace, cannot cure disease. They can and do intimidate and distress the sick man, and not unfrequently aggravate his symptoms. Nothing but patient study of the symptoms, and a systematic and thoroughgoing treatment of them, will effect a cure; and this study and treatment take time and require a permanent

interest in the subject, and personal responsibility on the part of the person who is to administer them.

The great defect of our administrative system, in so far as regards the management of particular affairs and the organization of particular offices, lies in the way in which we divorce special knowledge and experience from authority and personal responsibility. Those who possess the authority have comparatively little special knowledge and experience. Those who possess the special knowledge and experience have no authority and no responsibility. They may be, and usually are, consulted, but their names are never brought before the public. Their responsibility for what is done is to their own chief and not to the public, and their suggestions have in every case to pass into fact, if at all, through the minds and wills of others. Legally, most of them, though not quite all, are simply clerks whose duty it is to obey orders.

Of the evils which this state of things has produced it is hardly necessary to speak at length. Every one must be familiar with them; and I have given some indications in the course of this paper of their general nature. They are usually described as the price that we pay for Parliamentary Government, and it is said that we cannot seriously diminish it without incurring evils which would more than outweigh any diminution in the price. How far these allegations are true will be the subject of my next paper.

JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN.



PRAYER: "THE TWO SPHERES:" THEY *ARE* TWO.

ALTHOUGH this Review is not intended to be an arena for debate between opposite schools of philosophical thought, I have been asked to reply to the criticism of a previous paper of mine, on "The Function of Prayer in the Economy of the Universe," by the Duke of Argyll. His Grace entitled his reply, "The two Spheres: Are they Two?" I cannot better indicate the scope of the following pages, than by modifying his title thus, "The two Spheres: They *are* Two." *

Our provincial controversies pass, and are forgotten. Happily the features which disfigure them are soon buried in oblivion. But the eternal problem remains, and must confront our children's children, who will inherit its burden, and be perplexed by the mysteries that encircle it. It has been of late discussed almost to weariness; and those who have come to fixed conclusions may perhaps now turn from the controversy with distaste. But the reflective mind cannot lay up the data of its creed as we store treasures in a museum. Our convictions must be continually sur-

* I ought also to state that I have hitherto abstained from publishing this reply, out of respect to the Church with which I have been up to this time connected; a judicial process having been raised against me in consequence of my previous article. While proceedings were still pending, I was precluded from adding to the controversy by another essay in these columns.

veyed from fresh points of view, in the light of all knowledge and experience; and the thoughtful worshipper, who habitually consecrates his work by prayer, can no more cast aside the problem of its rationale, than he can cease to think, or to meditate, on his relations to the universe in which he lives.

The Duke of Argyll, "not having time or opportunity to write more fully on the subject, simply specified a number of propositions which are to be found in my paper, either directly asserted, or by implication involved, with a few comments upon each of these." I might validly object *in limine*, to this method of discussing a question of wide and varied significance; especially as it leads us into the heart of a historical controversy much larger than itself. It is quite foreign to the philosophic spirit of judicial calmness and comprehensiveness, to select short sentences or parts of sentences (the most casual of which are treated as if they had been announced in the form of independent aphorisms), and to criticise these in detail. Any reader of the Duke's paper who had not seen my essay might imagine that I had advanced a series of statements, like the successive propositions of Spinoza's ethics, and tried to deduce my conclusion by a lengthened *sorites*.

Those who have read the Duke of Argyll's treatise on "The Reign of Law" will be aware that the question raised in his paper in this Review is there discussed. And both in the treatise and in the article it is admitted, that "what are or are not the legitimate objects of supplication is a question which may well be open" (pp. 62, 63). That is the very question which has led to the formal distinction of the "two spheres," and in reference to it I humbly think there are materials for a clear and definite answer. But dealing with the treatise on "The Reign of Law," as its author deals with my essay on Prayer, we might find a score of sentences, which, taken by themselves, yield conclusions absolutely fatalistic. Thus, in the great controversy as to free-will, the Duke of Argyll appears as an advocate of the necessitarian scheme, saying, "by freedom I mean freedom from compulsion, *and nothing else*" (p. 415). Dr. Ward, replying in the *Dublin Review* in 1867, has clearly shown that this is not a real but only a fictitious freedom. Again, in his answer to Mr. Mahaffy, the author of "The Reign of Law" says, "I deny altogether that 'creating' of anything is the function of the will" (p. 427). Again (p. 304), "The will of the lower animals is, within their narrow sphere of action, as free as ours. A man is not more free to go to the right hand or to the left, than the eagle, or the wren, or the mole, or the bat." I cannot, in this brief paper, plunge into the vast metaphysical controversy touching free-will and necessity. It is important to note, however, that in his scientific treatise the Duke of

Argyll has explicitly taken the necessitarian side, though he calls it "the amended doctrine of necessity" (p. 313), because with the majority of his school he gives up the idea of compulsion; the only freedom which he admits being freedom from constraint. But with equal philosophical warrant an advocate of the counter theory of free-will might call his an "amended doctrine," if he admits (as the wisest do) that the causal nexus is nowhere broken, and that the will never acts without a motive. It is the Duke's necessitarianism in philosophy that leads him to identify the two spheres, over which he thinks that the same necessity presides. It would be ungracious, however, to attribute to him the logical consequences of that philosophy which seems to me to shut up the universe in the iron rigour of fatalistic atheism. But it is a relevant, and not I think ungracious, rejoinder to the charge of "those loose rhetorical terms which are now so common on the reign of law," to affirm that the rhetoric which attacks the physical doctrine of the invariability of natural law is loose, and quite valueless in its vagueness. His Grace admits, in the excellent work referred to, that "laws are in themselves, if not unchangeable, at least unchanging," and "the least uncertainty in them would render them incapable of any service" (p. 97). "Every law is in its own nature invariable, producing always precisely and necessarily the same effects, that is, provided it is worked under the same conditions" (pp. 96-7). But this last appended clause is really nothing to the purpose; for, by altering the conditions, we bring in some new phenomenal antecedent, or leave out some old one, and hence of necessity the result is different. When the Duke says, "there is no combination of forces which is invariable, none which are not capable of change in infinite degrees," and adds that, in these senses, "Law is not rigid, is not immutable, is not inviolable, but is, on the contrary, pliable, subtle, various," I am quite at a loss to see how he escapes from the very confusion of terms which he censures the physicists for indulging in. Surely it is *nature* that is "pliable, subtle, and various," not law. The phenomena are in incessant change, and new combinations of causes issue in new effects. But to speak of *law* not being rigid, seems to me to be mere confusion of speech.

The detached character of the Duke of Argyll's criticism makes it impossible for me to follow him into all the by-paths he has taken. I shall glance at several of them (and only those which charge me with "unsoundness," not where the charge is irrelevancy); and return to the main track of argument, and that central question round which all the rest revolve.

The statement that there is "a sphere to which prayer in the sense of petition is inherently inapplicable," is said to be very different

from the assertion that there are "many things that ought not to be prayed for, as manifestly unreasonable." Let "the spheres," then, be the spheres of the reasonable and the unreasonable. The problem is, Can these be defined? Can we indicate "a particular class of things" in reference to which a request for a change of the existing order is unreasonable? One aim of my essay was to define that class. The Duke of Argyll affirms that we cannot reasonably assert that the spheres of the physical and the spiritual are distinct, because we cannot tell where in our own organism the one begins and the other ends. "None such probably exists," he says; and adds, "many men are now in the constant habit of talking of thought as 'a cerebration.'" Were I to affirm that this is tantamount to the acceptance of a materialistic psychology, the conclusion would be quite as valid as the inference which the Duke draws from the next sentence he quotes. He asserts that I must maintain that "the will of man is not subject to law," because I affirm that the principle of evolution breaks down in the presence of free-will. I have nowhere maintained that "the operation of law" is "not applicable to the intellectual and moral nature of man." On the contrary, I have affirmed that we can never escape from the domain of law; and that "alike in the physical and the moral region the causal nexus is inviolate." Then, of the sentence in which I affirm that "the order in which phenomena appear is governed by the rigour of adamant law," it is said, "There is no intelligible sense in which this is true. The order of phenomena is capable of endless change." But is the change ever *lawless*? Grant that the order might be other than it is, are not the sequences that actually *do* emerge governed invariably by the rigour of law? By the invariability of law I mean, that underneath all seeming apparent variability there is, and must be, a real invariability that is absolutely necessary, that the apparent variability results from the weakness and inherent deficiency of our powers of observation, which are unable to detect the causes producing the variation, or those differences in the antecedent which produce differences in the consequent. To allege that "the laws of nature are variable" is a loose inexact way of speaking, indicating a want of clearness in distinguishing that which is apparent to the common eye from what is real to the scientific mind.

Next, the statement that "a spiritual antecedent will not produce a physical consequent" is adduced as if this were a general axiom of belief held by me (as it was apparently held by some of the Stoics), a doctrine contradicted by the influence which the will exerts over the muscles of the frame. This is the most conspicuous instance of the unfair method, to which I have alluded, of fastening on a passing explanatory clause in my essay and dealing with it as if it were a

metaphysical postulate. As used by me it was avowedly "another way of putting" the previous sentence, viz., that there "is no confusion of the spheres of moral and physical agency," so that as a man sows he reaps. It is simply a statement, in altered phraseology, of the truth that moral causes produce moral results, while physical causes determine physical issues. No physical antecedent can give rise to a spiritual consequent, though (as I expressly assert) it may co-operate with spiritual antecedents to ensure or to intensify it; and, *vice versâ*, no spiritual antecedent gives rise directly to a physical sequent. By pre-established harmony, they act and react continually. But it is not, for example, the morality or immorality of an act (a spiritual antecedent) that determines the physical consequences that result from the act. It is the physical habit (say intemperance) that alone produces the physical detriment, injury to the frame; while that which is spiritual in the act (*i.e.*, its character as moral or immoral) always has its own spiritual consequence within the moral sphere. This is the only sense in which the clause is used, which has been by so many critics dragged out of its legitimate context in the article. Next, I am told that I "give up the doctrine of free-will altogether," by the statement that it is vain to reply to the physicist who maintains the invariability of law, that "we are continually interfering with the seemingly fixed laws of the universe, and altering their destination," &c. And I am asked what other answer I have to give? I reply, the only answer that is possible, viz., the conscious fact of freedom. It is "a vain reply" to allege that we can ever escape from the domain of law; because the laws of the physical system alway encircle, and invariably rule us in the phenomenal sphere. It is not in *that* region that we are free. It is only in the possession of a transcendental or noumenal freedom, the autocratic power of self-determination. Then my sentence that "we are ourselves part of the physical cosmos" is quoted as if it implied that "we are parts *only* of the cosmos, all that is of us, and all that is in us determined by prior influence" (p. 472). I can only say that the whole drift and the express teaching of my article is that we are, at one and the same time, a part of the physical, and agents in the spiritual cosmos (these are the two spheres); and that in virtue of our being in the physical, we are under the domain of invariable law; while in virtue of our relation to the spiritual or transcendental, we possess the autocratic power of freedom. Next, the alleged statement that "the destination of a physical force cannot be arrested, and the otherwise inevitable result prevented by an act of divine volition," is interpreted by my critic as equivalent to the assertion that "the divine will cannot even *direct* physical forces to the accomplishment of particular ends." Those who have read the previous essay will have observed.

that I have not advanced the former statement as a proposition expressive of my own belief. I said, "it is supposed that the destination of a physical force can be arrested," &c. Then I affirm that "the antecedent force must spend itself and give rise to a new consequent." It would have been well had the Duke confined himself to a literal and relevant quotation. In quoting "a proposition" to be afterwards commented upon as "unsound," it is necessary to quote accurately. The question really to be determined is this:—Does the assertion that "every antecedent force must spend itself and give rise to some consequent" involve the further assertion "that the divine will cannot even direct physical forces to the accomplishment of particular ends"? Suppose a new and unfamiliar force to appear, breaking through the crust of familiar appearances, and influencing existing phenomena, the latter would not cease to act, although they would be modified by it. The introduction of the new element (supposing it to take place by the immediate fiat of the divine will) would have no meaning, were it not met by a previously existing agency, which still spent its energy around or against the novel element while modified by it. The function of the new agent would not be to uproot or to extinguish, but to blend with the existing agency and to determine a fresh result. Then the statement that "the fluctuations of the weather between two seconds of time are as rigorously determined by law as are the larger successions of the seasons," is said to be quite true in one sense, viz., that physical phenomena are never uncaused, and quite untrue in another, viz., that these phenomena are "incapable of direction." I am not aware of any one (not an atheist) who has had the hardihood to affirm that physical phenomena are "incapable of direction." The fundamental postulate of theism is that *all* phenomena are invariably under the guidance of a supreme Intelligence. We cannot even conceive a single occurrence undirected, if the universe be indeed pervaded by an infinite Mind and an omnipresent Will. The error consists in the isolation of any one phenomenon or class of phenomena from the rest, and predicating a special direction of these, while others are left out of the reckoning. And to request the infinite Administrator and universal Orderer of events to direct certain physical phenomena (which may seem more variable than others) to the accomplishment of specific ends,—while in reference to the rest of the system of nature (which seems fixed in established order) no such request is ever tendered,—is the practical error which follows in the wake of the speculative inconsistency.

The Duke of Argyll refers us to "the reasonableness or the unreasonableness of a petition" touching external nature. But who can judge of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of such

petitions? To make suggestions under the pressure of apparent calamity, that we would prefer the course of physical events to be different from what it is, or is apparently about to be—that we would like more or less rain, that we would prefer fewer storms, milder weather, earlier harvests, less piercing winds, in short, *an alteration of the course of nature*—who can reasonably judge of the wisdom of such petitions? A time of apparent physical disaster may bring temporary loss to a few, but it may tend to the ultimate gain of thousands. A wet season may destroy the crops of a district, but it may lessen the death-rate of a nation. A storm at sea may wreck some vessels, but the same storm on land may sweep a pestilence from crowded cities. And to suggest a change of that physical order, which is divinely and infallibly directed, is to presume that the hints of our finite intelligence are fit to regulate the divine procedure,—that wishes, which may be the dictates of selfishness or unenlightened caprice, should determine the supreme Will towards an arbitrary favouritism. The rational prayer of the devout mind in reference to the order of physical events,—which is invariably the outcome of providential goodness,—is in all cases, “Thy kingdom come, thy will be done;” while the fact that the actual course of nature and the fitful current of human wishes occasionally conflict, is one of the means of disciplining the human spirit, and educating us in trust, resignation, and dependence. The sequences of nature and the ordered evolution of events, are a perpetual revelation of the divine will, and it is for the creature modestly and patiently to discipline his wishes into accordance with it.

Further, I have been told by the Duke of Argyll (and many other critics) that by maintaining the invariability of the order of nature I make God less free than man, even although the Divine will be revealed in every beat of nature’s life and physical processes. I am met continually by the taunt, “Is man more free than God, because you say He cannot interfere with his own laws?” I accept the alternative. In one sense it is so: in the *non posse peccare* of the schoolmen. The divine will is necessitated to an absolutely perfect administration of the physical universe. The absolute Lawgiver, Artist, Mechanician, cannot undo what He has done, or do otherwise than He does. It is a simple contradiction in terms to suppose, that with a perfect foresight of the whole process of evolution, the divine Evolver should alter that which his omniprescience predetermined, and bring out an equally perfect result. Doubtless the phases which that perfection assumes may be very various: and a new manifestation, wholly different from the old, may be equally perfect, being the outcome of the same animating and directing Intelligence. It is on this ground that the occurrence of a miracle can be vindicated before

the tribunal of reason. But a miracle involves neither the violation of natural order, nor the uprooting of existing agencies.*

Again, I am charged with laying the stress of the exclusion of physical phenomena from the sphere of petition, not upon "the moral features" of the request, but upon its physical character. On the contrary, I rest the invalidity of the petition, as a power adequate to work a change in the order of external nature, upon its irrationality, and its contrariety to the spirit of creaturely submission and filial dependence. Let the petitions which solicit a change in the order of nature be tested by the standard of their reasonableness, or their moral character as humble, trustful, reverential, and in both respects they fail. The Duke of Argyll maintains that, according to my teaching, "any part of the chain of physical causation extending beyond our knowledge will cut off our communication with God." How this can be affirmed is one of those mysteries which occasionally perplex the mind in attempting to understand the position assumed by an opponent in controversy. The very essence of my whole contention is that the Divine Nature is so signally revealed in its omnipresence within every element or movement of the physical universe, that whatever comes to pass is the necessary outcome of its agency: every force and every change in nature being an apocalypse of God, and every link in the chain of its sequences attesting the indwelling Presence.

I will not retort in his own words to his Grace, that in the essay he has written he has "confounded the little knowledge we possess, in empty and confused logomachies," but I would certainly have been grateful had the logomachies he alludes to been clearly and calmly pointed out. I now turn gladly to some aspects of the question which have been overlooked in the discussion; and the examination of which is more important and satisfactory than the mere rejoinders of an ephemeral controversy.

The general charge brought against me is that I have drawn too hard and fast a line between the spheres of the spiritual and the material, in the doctrine that physical nature is not directly amenable to the influence of prayer, while human nature is: that in

* We are arrested and surprised by anything unexpected, startled as from a reverie. But what is the effect of the start or arrest? The surprise begets attention, closer scrutiny, and a more intelligent activity of the mind. The sudden or the rare may for a moment bewilder; but as the unusual glory of the sky reveals nature in one of its heightened moods, disclosing the presence and the power of a living Agent,—a presence that is always real, though not always realized—so with the unexpected action of the Divine Spirit in history. In both cases we come to believe in the constancy of law, by a closer scrutiny of what is apparently inconstant, or has broken away from its customary course; the seemingly irregular giving us the hint of a deeper regularity underlying it, while the monotone of nature is broken by the momentary flash of its sleeping powers.

giving up the physical I surrender that which the religious world is reluctant to concede : that in retaining the spiritual, I keep what the scientific world will not allow me to retain. Now, I draw no harder or sharper line between the two spheres than is implied in the proposition that the one is the sphere of fixed cosmical order and the other that of moral freedom. While the creature may pray with reference to *both*, his prayer ought in the former case to take the form of thanksgiving, adoration, acquiescent trust, and creaturely submission ; while in the latter it ought to take the form of incessant and fervent petition : or, if petition be offered in reference to the former, it should be for the simple *accomplishment of the divine will*. The immanence of God in nature is quite as much a first principle of theism, as is the balancing doctrine of his being also extra-mundane ; and the difference between his manifestations is but a difference in the way in which He announces himself to men. The gist of the whole argument in my previous essay is, that as God is the universal and omnipotent worker, all power and energy (physical and spiritual) being his, He is as fully revealed in those phenomena which go before and in those which follow after, as He is in the intermediate and unwonted ones, which by their infrequency or peculiarity arrest attention.

No answer has ever been given to the demand of the scientific world why we should separate a class of physical phenomena from the rest, and offer petitions in reference to the one in a way we do not in reference to the other,—why we should regard the rain-law as more amenable to fresh direction, than the sun-law, or the force of gravitation. The whole question is thus reduced to a very narrow issue. Is there, or is there not, a department of nature in which the processes are variable, and in which we may reasonably believe that they are in any sense amenable to our wishes ? Requests for a particular adjustment of the weather are irrelevant, unless the petitioner believes that the prayer he offers may co-operate to the production of the effect. Now, as has been again and again remarked, the physical processes which we see repeated at regular and fixed intervals (such as the succession of day and night, and of the seasons), or after an average limit (such as the death of the body), seem to us so inevitable, that we never presume to solicit that they should be other than they are. But what to our vision seems endlessly diversified (such as the kaleidoscopic changes of the weather), we are apt to imagine fitful, and therefore amenable to fresh direction and special interference. If the rain descended, and the temperature rose and fell, as regularly and steadily as the tides ebb and flow, the dull monotony of the law would deaden our sense of wonder, would check the fluctuations of hope and the excitement

of possible surprises; and we should no more think of petitioning for its change than of asking that the sunset should be hastened or delayed. It is therefore simply because we do not know what is to happen in the weather of the future, that we venture to ask that it should take one course rather than another. But if the science of meteorology were as advanced as astronomy is, and our predictive power as great in both cases (and it may, ultimately come to be so), our requests would in both cases take the form of petition simply for the accomplishment of the divine will. If, however, what the petitioner means is simply to express his desire, or his hope, that out of the infinite diversities of possible weather those should actually emerge which coincide with his wishes for himself, or his district, or his country, the expression of that desire is legitimate enough. We continually do so to one another in the colloquial speech of the day; and we may rationally hallow our wishes, by presenting them to God in an act of devotion. It is altogether different if we presume to imagine that, but for the presentation of our wishes, the natural process would be other than it is.

The invariability of the laws of Nature has a theological equivalent or corollary, which is the immanence of God in Nature, "working all in all," according to inviolable laws which are the expression of his eternal will. Whatever, therefore, be the way in which He announces his presence, He is everlastingly within creation as its inmost life, omnipresent and omniactive. There can be no possible interference with his laws, because his agency must be equally manifest in that which precedes and in that which succeeds the alleged interference, as in the interference itself. Being himself within all phenomena,—the great Mover unmoved, He is not only the fountain-head of all the streams of force, but the very essence of the forces themselves. Inasmuch, therefore, as in all the processes of nature we see the agency of this omnipresent Mind, and all-prescient Love, whatsoever comes to pass (except what is disorderly, inharmonious, or evil) being the expression of the divine will, the attitude of the creature towards the Creator's providence ought not to be that of a petitioner for change, but rather that of a dependent child, accepting whatsoever is divinely given. But in so far as Nature (whether human nature or the physical world) is abnormal, diseased, disturbed, or inharmonious, the creature may request the Creator to remove the discord and the evil, and petition for change. I have taught that the range of petition in the spiritual sphere is simply immeasurable, but that in the physical it is bounded, by the fact that divine Providence has already arranged the evolution of nature, and is not only superintending it, but is Himself inseparably within every link of the chain of causation which He has established.

Thus the doctrine of the persistence of physical force, and the invariability of natural law, is a physical truth of which the theological phase or corollary is the uniformity of divine operation and the inviolableness of divine love. "The permanence of the order of nature" is the scientific equivalent of the divine constancy, "the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever." * All the laws of nature are the outcome of will, or the expression of the way in which a living divinity is working in his omnipresence. In the contrary conception of them as created existences apart from God, to be bent and manipulated at pleasure from without, God is separated from the Universe ; creation is regarded as an iron framework underneath him, to be animated or not as He pleases, and with which He may occasionally interfere, if so disposed. What we call the laws of nature are, however, but the expressions of the divine will, because He is for ever behind and within the chain of physical sequence as the omnipresent Life, of which they are the outward revelation.

Thus it is that one limitation of the sphere of petition emerges, for the evolution and succession of phenomena are so infallibly adjusted, the balance is so perfect, that when what we desire to be present around us is absent, it is because it (or its equivalent) if present would be misplaced ; and we are not fit judges when we presume to suggest its presence, any more than we are competent to criticize the physical order of nature. What seems to us disastrous turns out to be a blessing in disguise, and would be always seen to be so, were the range of our vision perfect. A request for a particular adjustment of the conditions of physical existence may proceed from ignorance, or it may proceed from selfishness. When devout men offer up these petitions, they fail to realize that the balance of physical nature is adjusted with inscrutable perfection and the completest mastery of all possible emergencies ; and that they cannot know whether the rain or the sunshine they wish are really needed, because they cannot estimate more than a fragment of the conditions of the case.

But it is said, "If the living Spirit of the universe stands in a parental relation to the petitioner, may not the latter ask him so to administer his laws as to meet special cases and secure special ends ?" Doubtless he may. The Divine Father will not despise the crudest suggestions of his creatures, even when they arise out of a forgetfulness of his administrative wisdom. And we might ask him so to regulate the machinery of nature in this or that province,

* In nature there are a thousand laws, forces, agencies, crossing and recrossing, blending, interlacing, co-operating ; but all may be generalised under one central law, because each may be interpreted as the outcome of one supreme and all-dominant Force. None of them can be overborne by this central Power, because they are all its expression, its radiant and many-faced manifestation.

as to secure the most desirable results to certain individuals, were it possible to think of him as ever indifferent to particular cases, or oblivious of special ends. But the supposed specialty vanishes if his administrative agency takes in the whole area of nature and the entire cycle of her laws, and if its exercise be incessant, uniform, and impartial. To ask, Is not the order of nature amenable to divine influence, and open to fresh direction? is not to state the problem accurately. The plasticity of nature is conceded the moment you admit the agency of a living Spirit within the whole, and interpret its laws as the mere indices of his activity. But that theistic axiom carries with it a consequence which makes the assertion of flexibility, and a possible variation of the order of nature, barren and useless. For if the existing order be changed, the changed and the previous order being equally the outcome of the same governing Intelligence immanent everywhere in the whole, they would together afford but a slightly varying evidence of one and the same Supernaturalism. There is no difficulty in supposing a change to occur in the common order of events, which we may call "miraculous;" but the events preceding it and those which follow would be equally the result of divine preadjustment, as the particular change which arrested and elicited the wonder or the admiration of men. The specialty in some, which we call "extraordinary," to distinguish them from others which we term "ordinary," is due, not to a superabundance of divine agency within them, but to *such a significant display of it* as rivets and awakens us by its unwontedness. Were our vision perfect, we should discern specialty in all.

As regards the power of prayer in effecting changes within the spiritual sphere, and its impotence in the physical, I trust I shall be pardoned for again quoting from myself in a footnote.*

* 'I shall now try to translate, out of the phraseology of which I have made use in my article, the truth which I hold and have taught as to the immutability of the laws of Nature.

'Looking at it from the doctrine of the divine decree, God has made "a decree for the rain," says Job. What science calls the rain-law, theology interprets as the rain-decree. "Looking unto the ends of the earth, and seeing under the whole heavens, He made a weight for the winds, and weighed the waters by measure. He made a decree for the rain, and a way for the lightning of the thunder:" and in so doing He "saw, declared, prepared, and searched out wisdom." And so in the Proverbs of Solomon, the Eternal Wisdom, set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was, is represented as with God when He "prepared the heavens, the clouds, the fountains of the deep, and when He gave to the sea his decree." In these statements God is represented as giving a decree to the rain and to the sea, just as He gave a decree to the sun and the planetary bodies. One aspect of the decree for the sun is that it should rise and set with daily regularity. And though I do not affirm that it *must continue* to do so, apart from the will of God, experience of the fact that it does do so, informs us that such *is* the divine will: and therefore we could not, for any reason whatsoever, presume to ask that

If we suppose that prayer has a causal power to work along with physical processes, or with the means used (say, for recovery from

it should not do so. We would deem it sheer irreverence to ask God to deflect or prolong the daylight, in order to enable his creatures to accomplish any bit of their terrestrial work, because we perceive that it would interfere with vaster plans that concern millions of his creatures. We would not presume to ask him to change his sun-decree. And I maintain that, *for the self-same reason*, we cannot rationally ask him to alter his rain-law or rain-decree: for though its temporary outcome may seem to us to be inconvenient or destructive, our utter ignorance not only prevents us from knowing that the cessation of rain would not be more destructive to other creatures than its continuance would be, but that ignorance of ours prevents us from knowing that a change would be really beneficial to *ourselves*. But whether beneficial or not, we abstain from the suggestion. Why? Simply because we trust in a Providence that is inscrutably wise. Even then, however, I cannot see anything to forbid the offering up of our *desires* (if they are *mere desires or wishes*) to God for a change of that which is—a change in our physical experiences. It is a totally different thing, if we venture to solicit him for an alteration, believing that we are either fit judges of its expediency or that we will receive it because we ask it. If an east wind is blowing, and men would like a west wind, the wish, like every other wish, may be expressed in prayer. If men express it to one another, they may express it to God. But to suppose that the wish has any influence *then and there* in effecting a change in the course of Nature is what I deny; for the course of all the seasons of all the years of all the ages I believe to be adjusted by God with as much fixity from the beginning as the law of gravitation is adjusted, and our prayers cannot now arrest, or hasten, or change, or modify it. We are not workers together with God now, in time, and on the earth, for these ends. But the case is different in the spiritual region within ourselves. It is in this sense that I maintain that there are two "spheres," in one of which our petitions effect an alteration and accomplish change. We are "workers together with God" in that spiritual region. In such prayer, the feeblest wrestler, like Jacob at Peniel, prevails. But the accomplishment of the divine will in nature is not dependent on the forthputting of *our* efficiency. Again, to use theological terms, in the accomplishment of his spirit-decree, his grace-decree, it is different. We receive it not unless we ask it; we find it not unless we seek it; whereas God's "sun ariseth on the evil and on the good; and his rain falleth on the just and on the unjust."

'Now, it is that wide-spread notion that we are able to accomplish similar results by our petitions within the realm of the physical, as we are able to accomplish in the region of the spiritual, that I am combating in the introductory paragraphs of my article; and it is that which many physicists oppose. I maintain that it would be equivalent to a power placed within the hand of man to work miracles in nature; and that power does not exist: whereas in the spiritual sphere the petitioner does effect an alteration, whenever he puts forth the inwrought energy of spiritual prayer. It is in that region alone that he is able, still working according to law, "to remove mountains." To put it otherwise still, the transmission of messages along the telegraph wire may be taken as a symbol of the power of prayer in the spiritual region; though all such symbols are utterly inadequate. In answer to the requests of the petitioner a definite response is vouchsafed that would not be granted *but for the petition*. It is otherwise in reference to the course of physical nature. We need transmit no request for that; because the system is already divinely pre-arranged, and our requests cannot hasten, or hinder, or touch, or modify, or alter it.

'I know it has been said that, if this be all, the question is a mere word-dispute—that there is no real difference between the two positions. But what I have been opposing in that article (as a mere preliminary to an attempt to induce those who discredit it to recognise the verifiable might of spiritual prayer) is really a wide-spread notion—viz., that God, in answer to human prayer, deflects, re-arranges, or

sickness), so that the one could not be effectual without the other, and that both have been predetermined from the first (the petition foreseen and fitted as a link in the chain of secondary causation)—that supposition reduces the prayer to the sphere of mechanical agency. It cuts away the freedom of the petitioner, and interferes with the spontaneousness of his request. But this is not the common belief of devout suppliants. It is the after-thought of a philosophy which, in trying to meet the difficulty by reason, drifts into a mechanical solution of it.

The popular notion that prayer for physical change, when devoutly offered, *can then and there* determine the course of the event (regulate the rain-fall or avert disease), we deem irrational and unconsciously irreverent. That the otherwise inflexible course

alters the otherwise inevitable course of nature. What, on the contrary, I urge men to do is to trust God for that physical course or order, and to believe that in reference to it there has been a vast system of pre-arrangement and pre-adjustment, absolutely perfect, eternally good; and I think that with such confidence there is absolute security that all prayer in accordance with the divine will shall be answered. What I have combated is the notion that God "interrupts the working of his own machine to prove his supremacy to it," and that He does so in reply to our requests. I dare say it might have lessened the risk of misconstruction had I added a clause to the sentence, "There is a sphere to which prayer (in the sense of petition) is inherently inapplicable," to the following effect: "Illegitimate in the sense of seeking an interference with, and inapplicable in the sense of accomplishing a change in, the existing order of nature." But that such is my meaning is abundantly plain from many passages in the article. Then I have explicitly asserted that if, through the weakness and infirmity of our natures, we make requests for change in the undisciplined or less reflective stages of the religious life (not distinguishing things that differ), these are not despised by the Hearer of Prayer; and that as He is the universal worker, and has pre-adjusted the whole economy of nature, *whatsoever we receive* is an answer to the prayer—"Thy will be done."

'It has been said to me, however, that if we can interfere with nature, much more can God; and that as we work in and through it, freely changing its course, much more can He. I assent to this; but I remember also that there is no "before" or "after" with God. Time is "an eternal present" to the eternal Mind; and, as He saw the end from the beginning, with him there is no change of plan effected in answer to prayer. Prayer is answered in the evolution of Nature through pre-arranged, pre-established harmonies. But "the alteration of the conditions under which laws operate," "bending them to meet the wants of petitioners," would be the sign of a changeful purpose, not the index of an immutable Mind. Let me, therefore, say again explicitly and distinctly that I do not deny (1) the lawfulness of bringing all our *desires* to God for all things whatsoever. On the contrary, I affirm and enforce the duty of so doing. Nor (2) do I deny the legitimacy of petition for physical things, *as the evolution of the divine* and benignant will. On the contrary, I affirm and enforce the duty of doing so. Nor (3) do I deny the legitimacy of petitioning God for the removal of disease, or of all that is interfering with the perfection of terrestrial life. On the contrary, I affirm and enforce the duty of doing so. I maintain, however, the unlawfulness of seeking alterations of nature which are interferences with existing law; while I believe (as already stated) that all prayers for things physical, which in spirit and substance are petitions for the accomplishment of the divine will, must be answered.'—(Statement to Free Presbytery of Dundee, March 25th, 1873.)

of nature is perpetually interfered with and re-adjusted, by a fresh edict sent forth in reply to the suppliant, that, in short, the sovereign Ruler issues a new order when He approves of a request for it, instead of carrying out his transcendent purposes and the behests of his everlasting will, is a notion which must be abandoned. In addition to its being philosophically untenable, it is noteworthy that it is opposed to the *consensus* of the Catholic Church, and especially to the theology of Augustine and Calvin.

The other notion, however, of a pre-established harmony between our petitions for physical blessings and their reception, is a widely different one; but results do not prove the existence of any such pre-arrangement. The thousand, the million of unanswered petitions touching external nature effectually negative it. While were it a matter of pre-arrangement and pre-determination that there should be a coincidence between the petition and the reception of the benefit, the former automatically performed would invariably coincide with the latter, like the beat of two pendulums, stroke for stroke, or the working of two wheels, cog fitting into cog, with mechanical regularity. This idea, then, of pre-adjustment between the prayer (say, for the recovery of the sick), and the physical sequences that tend to the result, helps us no way towards a solution. What we wish to know is whether the one is to any extent causal of the other. Suppose the petitioner knew the entire course which the disease was *certain* to take, his request would simply be, "Thy will be done:" but, inasmuch as he cannot know its course with certainty, he is tempted to ask that it may be as he wishes it to be, hoping that his request may be helpful toward the desired result. I have already indicated how it may be so in the subjective region of our own personality; how a suggestion darted into the mind of a physician may be the direct cause of the use of a remedy which results in the preservation of life. It is our absolute ignorance, however, of what is about to happen, that prompts the expression of any strong desires we may have in reference to it. Now it may seem superfluous to remark that no one would think of praying for the non-occurrence of an event which had already taken place, any more than he would then ask that it should occur; though he might validly request that its influence over the minds and hearts of those who had experienced it might accomplish certain definite results. But this very obvious truth will cast light on the meaning and value of similar requests, while the petitioner is in ignorance as to whether the event about which he prays has or has not occurred. "If I know a friend is dead, I do not ask that his life may be spared; but if he is dead, and I am ignorant of it, but believe him to be still alive, I pray that he may continue to live; and such prayer is not

irrational. When we pray for those at sea, our ignorance of their state does not throw an arrest upon our petitions. On the contrary, it is the very ground or reason of them. And the cry or ejaculation of the heart—prayer thrust out, or rather directed upwards, at a time of crisis (who has not experienced it ?)—is not only instinctive, it has its origin in a region that is deeper than reason. Still, its utterance ought to be under the control and discipline of the reason. And being so, the request that is made, or the wish that is expressed, must be in its inmost essence submissive. Could we venture to split up the request into two parts (and distinguish them as form and spirit, or outer husk and inner germ respectively), we would find that the particular things we seek, along with the petitory features of our prayer, are the mere husk or envelope ; while the accomplishment of the divine will, and the acquiescence of the creature, is in all cases the inward germ, out of which the life of devotion springs. The one is the accidental form, the other the essential soul of our petitioning. Doubtless the two things invariably go together, for the analyses of our reason are the syntheses of living experience. But the difference between them ought never to be forgotten ; while our ignorance as to whether the particular thing we seek be really a boon, and as to whether it will ever be granted, might itself suggest this distinction to the petitioner.

I repeat that no theory of the universe, no philosophy of human nature, and no conclusion of science, can ever lay an arrest upon the instincts of the universal heart in the presence of calamity, and with the prospect of its increase. Let men philosophize as they will, and let science march where it will (conquering realm after realm, and reducing all under the rigour of law), the human spirit will always "cry unto God" in times of crisis, and will find immeasurable solace in "committing its causes" unto Him ; for the instinct to pray for relief in times of anxiety, or of peril, is one which can never be exorcised from the heart of man. But it does not follow that it will always (or that it ought ever) to imagine that by so doing it can deflect the order of nature or induce God to alter his pre-arrangements. The relief obtained is in the act of *submission* and of filial trust, not in the notion of being able to persuade an infinitely powerful and sympathetic Listener. We may be sure that whatever takes place subsequent to our petition is not an after-thought of God, suggested or obtained by dint of our continued solicitation ; while it is the shallowest of solutions to imagine that the condition of the petitioner and his request were uniquely pre-adjusted to the precise physical occurrences which ensure a reply to his request. Were these two things the *only* ones that were pre-adjusted ? Are not all the antecedent phenomena, both of the material and the

spiritual spheres, adjusted with minutest correlation to *all* their subsequent issues? every thought and feeling in the spiritual adjusted to every turning of the wheel of the physical? The causes that tend to the recovery of the sick are correlated to the petitions which solicit it, but are they not also correlated to everything else in the universe, in both hemispheres (the physical and the spiritual)? In short, the adjustment is either universal, or it is non-existent; it is either everywhere, or it is nowhere. To maintain (as has been lately done) that we may pray for what we know to be an impossibility, is to degrade prayer and to render it utterly futile. It is even to disgust men with a paradox, instead of consoling them with a verifiable truth, offering a stone in place of bread. If we wish not merely to augment the spirit of devotion but to increase the habit of actual prayer to God, the advocacy of such a doctrine must operate directly the other way.

When we ask, What is the warrant for presenting petitions for physical benefits which amount to an alteration of the order of nature? the answer usually is, the felt wants of the suppliant. But, if he has any modesty or humility, he will admit that he can never be sure that he is not interpreting an utterly selfish desire as a divine suggestion to his spirit. We have obviously no right to infer, for example, from the absence of rain for a time in a particular district, that when our crops begin to suffer in consequence, a change is desirable for the universe at large. Who are we, or what is the measure of our wisdom, that we presume to solicit a change in that which *by its very occurrence* is a sufficient indication of the divine will? The question is thus narrowed to a very simple issue. Some of my opponents in this controversy affirm that we have no right to infer the divine will from that which actually happens: we merely know that it has been permitted to occur, but we cannot be sure that something different might not have been preferred by the eternal Arranger of events. Admit (as we must) our ignorance of the best of all possible arrangements, who is to determine this hypothetical state or condition of affairs? If we are not to take the actual course of events as an indication of the "best of all possible ones," what help are we to obtain from our own conception of one more perfect? Is not the very notion of a better physical adjustment analogous to the profane suggestion of king Alfonso,* if it does not savour of his arrogance? Does it not elevate our most capricious or selfish desires into a higher position of authority and of reasonableness than the actual arrangements of nature revealing the will of the Arranger? Who can venture the assertion

* Who affirmed that, if he had been consulted, he could have suggested improvements on the solar system.

that the order of nature does *not* reveal the will of the Supreme ? or that the will (thus revealed) is not perfect ?

At the root, however, of all irregular petitioning in reference to external nature lies a crude conception of the character of him to whom the petition is addressed. If the notion of a Sovereign is more dominant than that of a Father, the wish to solicit the sovereign for such favours as he may be pleased to confer will be proportionally strong. But if the whole economy of nature (the fluctuations of the weather as well as the order of the seasons) is the outcome of an infinite Mind, whose fatherliness is his supremest characteristic, then the creature, who is also a child, will not venture to suggest (any more than he will presume to dictate) the means by which he or others around him should be externally blessed. *To whom* do men pray, whether in times of disaster or of prosperity ? Is it not to the infinite Wisdom and the absolute Righteousness, the perfect Purity and the eternal Love, to one who is the omnipotent Administrator truly, but whose regulation of the affairs of the universe has no parallel in the statesmanship of a ruler, who has to make the best of circumstances, to decide on cases as they emerge, and regulate his actings accordingly ? Our prayer is not the importuning of a dictator, any more than it is an appeal to a despot, or a suit before a judge. It is the voice of a child to its father, the cry of aspiration directed towards the accomplishment of that father's will, and therefore in its very essence submissive, and therefore essentially unselfish. Being unselfish, it can never be an attempt to bring pressure to bear upon one who may or may not be *induced* to respond.

The difference between the two spheres of the physical and the spiritual is most obvious. In the latter we offer suggestions, we ask for an absolute change and reversal of what is. And reason of the difference is abundantly plain. In the one case it is unquestionable that much of that which exists is inconsistent with the divine will, that all error, evil, blight, and transgression are out of harmony with it ; in the other we know that whatever *is*, is right. In the former case we co-operate with God to change the order of that which is—and the results accomplished are verifiable answers to prayer, as clear and authentic as are our sense-perceptions of a world external to self. In the latter we cannot co-operate, or touch a single spring by which the machinery of causation can be either accelerated or retarded. Even in the former sphere, we dare not proffer a purely selfish request. For the pain, disaster, and loss, from which we shrink, are often the best of all things for us, and continually form a part of the divine plan for the education of men. We can never be certain that, if we receive any particular physical blessing, others, who

have a better right to it than we have, may not be deprived of it; but we may be sure that the addition of light to our minds, and the quickening of our wills in righteousness, cannot interfere with the possession of these things by others, but on the contrary may be directly helpful to their enlightenment and progress. It comes to this, that the essential end of prayer is not the gratification of our wishes, but the subordination of the human will to the divine, or the gratification of the former only in so far as its caprice and irregularity are extinguished, and its correspondence with the latter perfected. That correspondence can be attained only by patient submission, resigned trust, and acquiescence in whatsoever the sovereign will ordains. The end sought is not the extinction of the human will, nor the absorption of the individual in the universal life, with *nirvana* as its goal. It is rather the development of the creaturely will into intensest vigour, because freed from caprice, under allegiance to a Lawgiver, "whose service is perfect freedom." The difference between the pantheistic merging of the universe in God, and the theistic subordination of it to him, is not speculatively greater than it is practically momentous.

There is another anthropomorphic notion which, though occasionally helpful to the mind (as all parables and symbols are helpful to it, and sometimes even necessary), is apt to interfere with a rational conception of God, as well as with the tranquillities of devotion. I have said that it is the extra-mundane conception of God (while his immanence is overlooked) that leads to the farther notion of his interference from without, readjusting the order of events. We forget that his agency could not be more truly manifest in the alteration than it is in the order that now is. And so the idea of a sovereign, occupying some vast semi-physical, semi-spiritual throne in the ærial regions of the universe, whither our petitions ascend and whence his responses come, destroys both the grandeur and the spirituality of his omnipresence. The throne is not more truly in the upper heaven, than it is in the lower earth, and within the heart of the petitioner: for the divine Presence being necessarily universal cannot be localized upon a spot. Thus the idea of distance between the suppliant and him to whom he prays is abolished. The divine infinity does not remove God to a distance from the creature, on the contrary it abolishes the distance between them. As truly as finite and infinite are correlatives in thought, so truly are the divine Presence and the human inseparables in fact. "*Whither* could we flee from his presence?" says a psalmist. Thus the replies that are vouchsafed are not transmitted from a distance as messages would be flashed along a wire. They are the intellectual rays, the spiritual suggestions, the inward inspirations, the fresh disclosures, the new-

born desires, the onward energies in righteousness, the aims ennobled and motives etherealized, the heightening and the quickening of the petitioner's life, all of which have their origin in God, and their destination in the heart of man. The answer comes along the channel of the petitioner's life just as normally as a brook is fed by subterranean springs or by a fresh rain-fall in the mountains. Within the Petitioned, the petitioner "lives and moves and has his being;" and the pulse of his life beats quick or slow, according to the fulness of his inspiration and his receptivity.

Stress ought also to be laid upon the non-verifiable character of all alleged answers to prayer for physical good:—That is to say, our interpretation of special events as *specific* answers, while in the so-called "general course of providence" no such specialty is recognized, cannot be vindicated. Why should I arbitrarily isolate a few phenomena from the general chain, and because they happen to coincide with my wishes, interpret these as a divine reply to my entreaty, while I fail to see an equally beneficent response in all the other links, in special phenomena I did not seek, and could not foresee, when I simply asked "Thy will be done"? No record of *coincidences* can prove a causal connection, or even suggest it,—unless the instances are exceptionally numerous, and unless other causes leading to the result are excluded by the rigid methods of verification. In the inner sphere, however, verification is possible. In the realm of our spiritual freedom the request and the reply are alike definite and clear. And the one is causal of the other, in the only sense in which causality can belong to a request, viz., that it leads to its fulfilment.

On the necessitarian theory of the universe, prayer as petition is manifestly an excrescence. It might be the pathetic cry of the heart in pain as the nerves of sensation shrink before inflicted suffering; but it could not be an intelligent and conscious appeal. If our freedom is but the absence of constraint, and not a positive power transcending necessity, we need not present our suit at all. For the question which both the heart and the intellect raise is not, "May we, if we choose, offer up petitions for a special destination of the physical forces?" But it is, "What is our warrant for expecting that certain responses will follow which would not be ours save for the requests which solicit them?" Now the only sphere or field of manifestation in which replies of this kind are *verifiable* is the life of the petitioner, or other kindred natures in society, or humanity at large. You cannot suppose the divine presence and all-sustaining energy increased within the physical realm. But wherever there is a moral nature or an aggregate of such natures in society, there is room for increase, scope for incessant change, with endless modifications and additions. If the human nature be distinct from and yet

kindred to the divine, if human society or the Church be amenable to a "power that worketh in it," there can be no limit to the efficacy of petition directed to that end. The sphere of petitionary prayer will thus cover the whole area of human life, and be verifiable throughout that area. There can be no possible pursuit, enterprise, or vocation, in reference to which a man ought not to pray, if in the course of it he needs the help of God; but even then the essence of his prayer will be *aspiration tempered by submission*. The accomplishment of the divine will must in every case form (as I have already said) "the undertone of all devout petitioning;" and the distinction drawn between the contrasted "spheres" arises simply from the fact, that in the one we co-operate towards the production of results, while in the other we "stand still" and witness them. An essential condition of bestowment in the former sphere is humble petitioning for the benefits desired. That is *the law of their occurrence*, and, under its operation,

"More things are wrought by prayer
Than this world dreams of."

But in the latter sphere "the sun rises on the evil and on the good" impartially, and "the rain falls on the just and on the unjust," whether men pray for it or abstain.

I must, however, notice an objection which has more force than any I have seen urged against this doctrine of "the two spheres." I have objected to requests for specific physical details on the ground that we are absolutely ignorant whether rain or sunshine, storm or calm, be really the best thing for any particular district of the earth at a particular time. But neither, it may be said, can we know that the illumination of our minds and hearts in a particular manner at a particular time is the best for us; and, therefore, if the objection be valid in the one case, it holds equally with regard to the other. We must consider this. Every man is presumably aware of what he most needs in the way of light and personal help. He may miscalculate much. That is inevitable. But as self-knowledge grows, he learns his weakness, frailties, and temptations. He can therefore ask for the rectification of what is amiss or disorderly, with more or less assurance that his request for particulars is wise. But whatever may be his subjective state, he always stands in need of intellectual light, and moral steadfastness, strength of will, purity of heart, uprightness, humility, and charity. He will not in this case, any more than in the former, specify minute details with excessive unreserve. But he cannot err in petition for spiritual good, or the control of all his wayward tendencies, the regulation of his passions, the removal of every bias, and the discipline of his soul in righteousness.

The change which he seeks is in himself, not in God, or in the order of the divine administration. It is personal; it is intelligible; it is verifiable.

There is one other special point to be noted in connection with the general statement that the accomplishment of the will of God is "the undertone, or the suppressed premiss," in all true prayer.* Since this Will is manifested throughout the whole economy of nature, its entire compass and detail naturally becomes a fit subject for petition. If the course of nature is seemingly adverse to the petitioner, his desires may find expression in such words as these: "Let Thy good and holy and merciful will be done, in all these our troubles and adversities: In Thine own time, grant us deliverance from them, and from all evil: Be pleased to supply all our earthly wants and all our human needs: We cast ourselves upon Thy gracious care: We put our trust in Thee." In praying, therefore, for our daily bread, without any suggestion of details, we virtually include within the request all the specific particulars by which the petition could possibly be answered. And our request is substantially, though indirectly, met by whatsoever comes to pass. In short, since all unselfish prayer touching outward things contemplates the universal good along with the individual benefit, our special requests (say for rain, or an abundant harvest) may be responded to by the descent of the former, or the ingathering of the latter, *anywhere over the whole area of the globe*. We petition for rain, and it falls amongst the Andes; we ask for fair weather, and the sun shines out upon the plains of India; but our requests are fulfilled as truly, and much more wisely, than if we experienced what we sought at home.

I cannot close this second article without remarking that if Prayer be absolutely powerless as a spiritual agency in human life, there is not only a logical inconsistency in all the Christian litanies, there would also be a latent hypocrisy in their use, most withering to the heart. To practise prayer, without belief in its efficacy, is the most shallow of delusions, the most miserable of mockeries. On the other hand, if this conviction of its inutility be accepted as a foregone conclusion, and the practice abandoned as fanatical, the spirits of men must sink to the level of the lower creatures. Religion must deteriorate, if it is not extinguished; and all the heroism of morality, all ardour in the practice of difficult virtue, be paralysed in the very

* "It is," (as I have elsewhere said) "in different aspects, the essence, or pre-supposition, or appendix of every request worthy of the child on earth to its Parent in Heaven. But it is not a mere cry of ignorance, couched in the modest phraseology of submission. It is an intelligent assertion, the embodiment of a rational conviction, that the Divine Will is infallibly working out its remote transcendent purposes."


moment of its birth. For prayer is the supernatural lever of the spiritual life; nay (to speak in various figures), it is the lung by which it breathes, the atmosphere in which it floats, the wing by which it speeds its flight, and the language in which it communes with its own Original. To deny the accessibility of the human spirit to the secret influences and inspiration of Heaven is the coarse negation of materialism. But no one who believes in God as the inward Light, as well as the outward glory of the universe, can have any overpowering difficulty in seeing how He answers prayer. Whether as a sigh of aspiration, or an act of surrender, or as the hunger of the soul for an immortal consolation, it brings with it its own evidence unsought.

It may be the lot of no one finally to bridge the gulf which has so often separated the scientific from the religious mind, and kept them at unsympathetic distances and in alien territories, or as rival competitors for the homage of mankind. He would be more foolish than bold who hoped to do so, by a theory, or an essay, or a treatise. The reconciliation will be accomplished by the slow developments of eclectic thought, when generations happier than ours learn to avoid the "falsehood of extremes." But every attempt to throw a plank across the chasm—if made with reverent purpose—may tend to lessen the misunderstandings and to heal the estrangements of our time. It would be something gained, were those whose creed is a simple *laborare orare* to suspect that they may be ignoring a mystic power within themselves,—that they may possess

"a faculty which they have never used ;"

and were those, on the other hand, who imagine that the course of nature can be altered at the request of a creature, to perceive that the invariability of her laws is but the synonym of Divinest Constancy. Our theoretic belief that "all things are possible" with God, must be limited by the practical conviction that He does only what is best; and our individual requests must follow the example of the Highest: "*Si possibile transeat calix, sed non quod ego volo, sed quod Tu.*"

WILLIAM KNIGHT.



LIMITATION OF STATE FUNCTIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

AMID the endless discussions that have taken place as to the sphere and duties of Government, all parties are agreed that there are two great and primary functions which every efficient Government must perform if it deserve the name: it must guard the country against the attacks of foreign enemies; and it must make such arrangements for the administration of the laws, that every man may obtain justice—as far as possible free and speedy justice—against wilful evil-doers.

The fact that there is an absolute unanimity as to these two important functions of a good government, while almost everything else that Governments do, or attempt to do, has been denounced by great thinkers as beyond their proper sphere of action, renders it probable that these are, at all events, the primary and most important functions of the State. It may not, perhaps, be easy to determine which of these two is of the greatest importance; for even admitting that conquest by a foreign foe is an evil incalculably greater than any wrong which individuals may suffer, yet the one is of so much more frequent occurrence—every member of society being daily exposed to it, while attempts at conquest occur only at distant and uncertain intervals—that repetition in the one case may make up for magnitude in the other. We are therefore pretty safe in assuming that they are of equal importance; and in affirming that

it is as much the duty of Government to protect its individual subjects from wrong to person or property committed by their fellows, as to protect the entire community from foreign enemies.

But if we look around us to see how these primary duties are performed, it becomes evident, either that existing Governments do not consider these duties as equally imperative upon them (even if they are not of absolutely equal importance), or that the former duty is a very much more difficult one than the latter. In every country we find an enormous organization for the purpose of national defence, which occupies a large portion of the wealth, the skill, and the labour of the community. No cost is too great, no preparations are too tedious, in order to deter an enemy from venturing to attack us, or to secure us the victory should he be so bold as to do so. For this end we keep thousands of young and healthy men in a state of unproductive activity, or idleness; for this we pile up mountains of debt, which continue to burthen the country for successive generations. New ships, new weapons, every invention that art or science can produce, are at once taken advantage of, while the less perfect appliances of a few years ago are thrown aside with hardly a thought of the vast sums which they represent. If we now turn to see how the other paramount duty of the State is performed, we find a very different condition of things. Here everything is antiquated, cumbrous, and inefficient. The laws are an almost unintelligible mass of patchwork which the professional study of a life is unable to master; and the mode of procedure, handed down from the dark ages, is often circuitous and ineffective, notwithstanding a number of modern improvements. It may be admitted that in criminal cases tolerably sure, if not very speedy, punishment falls on the aggressor; but the sufferer receives, in most cases, no compensation, and often incurs great expense and much trouble in the prosecution. He gets revenge, not justice. That relic of barbarism, the fixed money fine, the same for the beggar and the millionaire, though almost universally admitted to be unjust, is not yet wholly abolished. It is, however, in cases of civil wrong that individuals find the greatest difficulty (often amounting to an absolute impossibility) of obtaining justice. This arises, not only from the enormously voluminous and intricate mass of enactments and precedents, and the tedious mode of procedure, involving grievous delay and expense to every applicant for justice, but also to the vast accumulation of cases which are allowed to come before the courts, many of which are of such a complex nature as to some extent to justify the strict forms of procedure which bear so hardly on those who seek relief in much simpler cases. The result is, that it is often better for a man to put up with a palpable wrong than to endeavour to obtain redress;

and the assertion that in our happy country there is "not one law for the rich and another for the poor," though literally true, is practically the very opposite of truth, since in a large number of cases the wealthy alone can afford to pay for the means of obtaining justice.

Our system of law is, in great part, the product of times when the security of property was held to be of more importance than protection to the person. The legislators being almost always the great landowners, a large part of the law was adapted to secure them the power of dealing with the land (the most important of all property) in any imaginable way; and in their bungling attempts to do this, they have produced a system of law of real estate of almost unimaginable intricacy. To interpret and carry out this and other branches of the law of property, occupies a large and influential portion of the legal profession. Lawyers exist upon the complexity of the law. It is not to their interest that we should be able to obtain cheap and speedy justice; nor is it their interest to reduce the number of suitors at the courts. We cannot reasonably expect them to do either of these things, which are yet of vital importance to us who are not lawyers. They may, indeed, so modify, and to some extent simplify, procedure as to take away a portion of the terrors of "going to law" in the estimation of aggrieved parties, and so induce a larger number than before to seek their aid against oppression and wrong;—but they will never make any radical reform, or attempt to do what every intelligent suitor knows might be done. Our interests are directly opposed to theirs, and it is mere madness to expect any thorough simplification of the law from lawyers. Such a reform requires the common sense of minds untrammelled by legal technicalities or legal interests. The people must be shown that such a reform is possible—nay, easy—and they will then demand that this matter shall be taken altogether out of the hands of lawyers. It is in the hope of showing how one great branch of this much-needed reform may be made, that the present writer ventures to attack a problem generally considered far beyond the reach of laymen.

A first step, and a very important one, towards rendering cheap and speedy justice possible for every man is, so to simplify the law of property as to free the courts from a large proportion (perhaps one-half, perhaps much more than one-half) of the cases which now occupy them. This would not only render it far easier to dispose promptly of the much simpler cases—which, however, are those which are often of more real importance to the parties affected—but it would allow of the whole method of procedure being altered to suit those simpler cases which would then form the bulk of the business of the

courts. Now, this great diminution of cases can be effected without denying redress for any grievance, or a remedy for any wrong, by simply putting out of court a host of matters which ought never to have been taken cognizance of by the law. Here, as in so many other instances, it will be found that reform must begin by a "limitation of State functions;" and that it is because Governments have undertaken to do much that is unnecessary and even injurious, that they are not able to fulfil one of their first and plainest duties—that of giving free, speedy, and substantial justice to the weakest and most indigent, as well as to the most powerful and most wealthy, of their subjects.

The first, and perhaps the largest, group of cases which ought to be taken out of the cognizance of our courts of law, are those which may be comprised under the general term of "trusts." At present any one may place property in the hands of another, either during his own life or to take effect after his death, for certain specified purposes, and if these purposes are neither illegal nor positively immoral, the law will compel the trustee to carry out these purposes to the very letter. They may be trivial, or absurd, or even injurious, but the man who once gets a trustee to accept a trust (and even this is not necessary when it is created by a will) becomes thereby an absolute potentate, who has at his command the whole power of a great State employed to see that his most minute directions are carried out. The number of cases of this kind is enormous, including all those which involve the interpretation and carrying into effect of the provisions of trust-deeds, settlements, and wills; so that a considerable portion of our machinery for administering justice is devoted to ascertaining and giving effect to the whims of individuals for years, and often for scores of years, after they are dead. Under the same general head may be included the power of determining by deed or will the contingent succession to property, and of creating any number and kinds of disqualifications with regard to it. The supposed necessity for providing for every imaginable exercise of this power, has led to such endless complications in the law relating to the transfer of land in all its forms and modes, that years of study are required to comprehend them. They furnish the materials for perhaps the majority of the cases that come before our civil courts, and give occupation to a very large section of the legal profession.

But in the whole group of cases here referred to there is no question of administering justice. For a Government not to carry out a man's wishes after his death is not a wrong, but quite the reverse, since it may with much reason be maintained that, for any Government to occupy itself with carrying out the whims of every man (whether he be sage or fool) who may wish to make his relations

or successors subject to his orders in the application of property no longer his, is a positive wrong to the community, inasmuch as it is incompatible with the performance of duties of a paramount nature. What the law should do, and all that it should do, is, to recognize and enforce gifts or transfers of property of all kinds, to living individuals, absolutely. It should utterly refuse to recognize any desires, whims, or fancies of individuals as to the applications of the property, or any limitation to the future owner's absolute possession of it. It should not even recognize any alternative applications of the property in the case of the death of the legatee before that of the testator, who could in that case have altered his will, and if he has not done so the legacy should pass to the legal representatives of the legatee. Property should always be considered by the law to be in the possession of some person absolutely, who can transfer it to another person absolutely, but cannot enforce any stipulations whatever as to the use of it on the next owner. Life interests in landed and other property, with all their attendant evils, would thus never exist.

The wishes of the donor or testator of property, although not a proper subject for the interference of the law, could be in many cases carried out by means of what may be termed a voluntary and amicable trust. The trustee (who would be really the legatee) would be chosen on account of friendship, integrity, and sympathy with the objects and desires of the testator, and he would give just so much effect to those desires as his reason and his conscience impelled him to give. The law would consider him only as the owner of the property, and would in no way interfere with the manner in which he thought proper to interpret the wishes of his friend. To provide for children and minors, property might be either left absolutely to their nearest relative or friend to stand to them *in loco parentis*, or it might be left to themselves, in which case an officer of the court would be their official trustee, and would prevent any misappropriation of their property by relations or guardians till they came of age. We should in this way greatly simplify wills, and almost abolish will-cases, while the courts would be relieved from that great mass of causes of the most tedious kind, in which trust-deeds, settlements, legal estates, shifting uses, entails, and trustees bear a prominent part.

It has been so long and so universally the practice in civilized countries for the law to recognize and enforce the wishes of individuals as to applications of their property other than the simple transfer of it to individuals, that to many, perhaps to most persons, it will at first seem to be a positive injustice to take away from them the power to do so. Yet the law itself recognizes that the practice is beset with evils, and from a very early period legislative restrictions have been applied to it. Hence the laws of mortmain,

and the long series of amendments, relaxations, or restrictions of those laws; as well as the limitation of the power of entailing estates for any longer period than a life in being and twenty-one years afterwards. These restrictions prove that the unlimited power of disposition of property has been held to be a law-given custom, not an inherent right; for if the latter, every restriction of its exercise must be a wrong to the parties restricted, which it has never been held to be. The whole question is, however, so very important, and has so many and such wide applications, that it deserves a somewhat fuller discussion.

The establishment of the Endowed Schools Commission has struck the first real blow at the system of a perpetual and blind submission to the wills of dead men; but the new principle, even in its limited application to endowed schools and charities, often excites much opposition. Many liberal and intelligent men still look upon the "intentions" of those who in past ages endowed churches, schools, hospitals, almshouses, and other institutions, as something sacred, which it is almost impious to ignore, and which it is our plainest duty to carry out with only such slight modifications as the changed conditions of society absolutely necessitate. But it is here contended that this notion is not founded on any true conception, either of what is just or what is politic, but that it is, on the contrary, altogether erroneous in principle and mischievous in practice; whence it follows that the sooner it can be got rid of the better for society.

Let us, then, seriously ask, what sufficient reason can be adduced why the State should interfere to carry into effect the desires, whims, or superstitious fancies of any man, for generations or perhaps for centuries after his death? Why should the more enlightened future be bound by the behests of the less enlightened past? Why should we allow, and even encourage, men to hold and administer property after they are dead? For it really comes to that. A man may, justly and usefully, be allowed full liberty (within the bounds of law and order) to use his property as he pleases *during his life*; but why should we go out of our way and make complex arrangements enabling him to continue to do the same after he is dead? During a man's lifetime he can *give* property to whom he thinks fit, or he can apply it to any purpose that he has at heart, without the State's interference; but he absolutely requires the State's assistance in order that his property may continue to be applied precisely in accordance with his ideas of what is best, after his death. The question is, *why* the State should take any cognizance of the matter? It is here contended that this is one of those things quite beyond the proper functions of a Government, and that it has produced, as such

excess of authority always does produce, a vast amount of evil. When a man dies he generally has what may be termed natural heirs, that is, children or relatives dependent upon him for a provision in life. For these he is first morally bound to provide, and any surplus beyond their needs, and beyond what the law may give to the State, he may rightly claim the power of bequeathing to any living individuals; and the State on its part is bound to exercise that minimum of interference necessary to secure the property to the respective persons indicated by him. But on what grounds can the testator claim the interference of the State for the purpose of compelling the recipients of the property to do with it what *he* pleases? claim—that is—that *he* shall still be considered to be the real owner of the property *after he is dead*? The thing is so intrinsically absurd, and perhaps even immoral, that nothing but long and universal custom could blind us to the absurdity of it.

What a man may do, and ought to be enabled to do, either during his life or at his death, is to *give* property, and *recommend* (not command) what use he wishes to be made of it. If his morals and his intellect are both good and his judgment sound, his chosen legatees will, at their discretion, carry out his wishes. But to compel them to do so absolutely is monstrous. It implies that the *right* to property continues after death, and that when a man can no longer use it himself he *ought* to be enabled to restrict the freedom of others in the use of it. It implies also that a man with much property to leave is necessarily wise, so wise as to know what will be best for people years after his death. A living agent can modify or supplement his plans as occasions arise or as circumstances require, and he generally does see reason to modify them after a few years' experience. Even acts of parliament, the concentrated essence of the nation's wisdom and foresight one year, often require alteration in the next. But that every man who chooses to do so should be encouraged to make his little "act" before he dies, minutely directing what shall be done with his property for years after his death, and that this "act" should be held to be a fixed law, against which there can be no appeal, all changes of circumstances notwithstanding, and should be enforced by the whole power and authority of the State, is a circumstance which will one day be looked back upon as an amazing anachronism, since it would seem only fitted to exist in a country where the established religion was the worship of ancestors.

We English are wisely jealous of too much government interference in the details of our social life; yet our rulers are living men, imbued with all the ideas and habits and feelings and passions of the age, and are often men of high intellectual attainments, and

far in advance of the average of the community. Such a government interferes, at all events, with full command of the most recent knowledge, and with open eyes; yet we will not submit to such interference. But, strange to say, we do submit, and almost pride ourselves in submitting, to have various important social matters determined for us by self-chosen dead men, who are therefore necessarily *behind the age*, and who were sometimes too ignorant, conceited, or superstitious to be up to the intellectual level even of the age in which they lived. It is by such blind guides that we to this day submit to be, in great part, governed in the all-important matters of religion, education, and the administration of charity; and in submission to the immutable laws of these dead rulers we have allowed vast wealth to be misemployed or wasted in the hands of irresponsible and antiquated corporations, which, well bestowed, might have enlightened our people or beautified our land. Who can doubt that the nation would have greatly benefited had our churches and colleges, our schools and charities, our guilds and companies, been free to develop, from age to age, in accordance with the wants and feelings of the living, untrammelled by any slavish adherence to the expressed or implied wishes of the dead?

From the considerations now adduced, it will be evident that the cessation of State interference in the way here objected to, would produce other beneficial results besides that of facilitating the administration of justice. These may be briefly summarized as follows:—

It would take away one of the existing inducements to a life-long devotion to the pursuit of wealth, for if a man could neither make use of it himself nor enjoy the sense of power felt in directing absolutely how it should be employed by others, he would pause in his career of accumulation, and perhaps endeavour to do something useful with it during his own lifetime rather than run the risk of having it all go entirely beyond his control.

It would have the effect of inducing many who now leave their wealth for charitable and philanthropic purposes at their death, to found such institutions as they wished to have established, during their own lifetime, in order to see the working of them, and so adapt them to the fulfilment of an admitted good end as to ensure that they would be preserved by future generations. This active charity or philanthropy would have a most beneficial effect on character, and would undoubtedly lead to more good results than the mere passive bequeathing of money to be employed in some fixed, but often ill-considered and comparatively inefficient manner.

It would prevent the establishment of institutions not adapted to the requirements of the age, and would thus abolish a great bar to

mental and moral progress. For the notion of "sacredness" attached to the wishes and commands of the founders of religious, educational, and charitable institutions has done a vast amount of evil, in confusing our notions of what is right and what is useful, and in keeping up the obsolete ideas and practices of a bygone age, long after they have become out of harmony with a more advanced state of society.

There is no fear, as some may imagine, that under the modification of the law here suggested, such institutions would want stability and would be subject to constant fundamental changes in accordance with the ideas of each successive body of governors, for the conservative tendencies of mankind in general, and especially of all governing bodies, are very strong, and customs or practices, even when pernicious or absurd, seldom get changed till long after their hurtfulness or foolishness are universally acknowledged. In proof of this we may adduce the case of our own representative government, which attaches no idea of sacredness to old laws, and is subject to the powerful influence of public opinion; yet we do not find any dangerous instability in our legislation, but rather a slow, many think far too slow, march onward in a tolerably well-defined course of reform.


The change here advocated would also be beneficial, by helping to rid us of the notion that a man can infallibly prescribe what is good for his successors, or that even if he could, he ought to be allowed so to prescribe; for the next generation will be quite as well able to attend to its own affairs as the last was, and will certainly not be benefited by being debarred from the freest action. Once this notion is abolished, our truest philanthropists would be more willing than heretofore to devote their wealth to public purposes, because they would feel confident of its being permanently useful. They would know that each succeeding generation would watch its application critically, and insist that no obsolete customs or erroneous teachings should be perpetuated by means of it,—that it should never become a drag on the wheels of progress, as has been the case with many such institutions, but rather resemble a powerful engine capable of helping on the necessarily slow march of society towards a higher civilization.

If the main principle here advocated—namely, that it is intrinsically absurd and morally wrong that a dead man's will or intention should have power to determine the mode of application of property no longer his—be a sound one, it will have a most important bearing on a question that is now much discussed, as to how far endowments of the National Church by private individuals may be properly claimed by the State. Even writers of very liberal views see in this a stumbling-block to the complete disendowment of the Church of England, because they cannot get rid of the notion that it is some-

thing like a robbery to take property given for one purpose and apply it to any other purpose. It is, therefore, a maxim with them, that when any change in the application of such a fund is demanded by public policy, it should still be kept as near as possible to the intentions of the original donor. It is, however, to be remarked, that when the property in question has already been forcibly applied to other uses than those originally intended, the most scrupulous do not propose that it should be brought back to its ancient use; and this seems to imply a doubt of the soundness of their principle. A large part of the existing endowments of the Church of England, for example, were certainly intended to maintain the teaching and services of the Roman Catholic religion. If the donor's intentions are "sacred," these should be given back to the Roman Catholic Church. If it be said that the intention was to maintain the religion of the country, whatever that might be, then the revenues should be fairly divided among all existing sects for the time being,—but that is "concurrent endowment," and is almost universally repudiated. The only consistent, and it is maintained the only true, view, is, that dead men should have no influence (beyond their personal influence on their friends) other than what is due to the intrinsic value of their opinions; and that property cannot be left in trust to carry out dead men's wishes, on the common-sense ground, that the living know better what is good for themselves than the dead can do, and that the latter have no just or reasonable claim to coerce a society to which they no longer belong. To hold the contrary view is, practically, to allow men to continue to be the possessors of property after they are dead, and to give more weight to the injunctions of those who had no possible means of knowing what is best for us now, than we give to the deliberate convictions of men who still live among us and who have made our welfare their life-long study.

The dead are not truly honoured by sacrificing the interests of the living to their old-world schemes; and if, as we may reasonably suppose, the future state is one of progress, at least as rapid as that which obtains on earth, it may be that they are afflicted with unavailing regrets at our blindness, in insisting on being guided by the feeble and uncertain light which they once had the presumption to imagine would for ever be sufficient to illuminate the world.

ALFRED R. WALLACE.



THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL.

Autobiography. By JOHN STUART MILL. London:
Longmans. 1878.

IN some respects the autobiography of John Stuart Mill is one of the most important and instructive pieces of self-portraiture that ever were given to the world. It is thus important and instructive, first of all, for its daring candour and (as far as the reader can judge) its truthfulness; then, again, for the picture which it presents of a mind of unusual thinking power, though not of any striking originality; and further, as an illustration of the effects of a training entirely unlike that to which boys and young men are ordinarily subjected, either in this or any other country. It has, further, a special interest of its own, as exhibiting the formation and perpetuation of a character unquestionably devoted to the realizing of a high ideal, accompanied by an entire rejection of all positive belief in the existence of a God and of a future life beyond the grave, together with an aversion to the very idea of religion, as the supposed source of misery and immorality to mankind. Apart, therefore, from the fact that Mill, as a thinker, has exercised a profound influence upon his generation—an influence whose ultimate issues we have yet to see,—his “Autobiography” deserves a careful study, as an illustration of the many surprising varieties of which our modern human nature is susceptible, made known to us with a fulness which in every age is as rare as it is curious.

To those readers who are given to the study of the growth of mind and character it will be impossible, in reading this Autobiography, to avoid comparing it and contrasting it with the histories of two other lives; I mean one's own life, and the “*Apologia pro vitâ suâ*” of Dr. Newman. Far inferior as may be the value of the records of

ordinary men's life-growth, as compared with that of either of these two great potentates in the world of thought, it is difficult to avoid the perpetually recurring question, Did I grow as either of these men grew? and in what respects is my history, however worthless to the world at large, the same as or different from theirs? For this is one merit of the genuine autobiographies of great and representative minds, that they include within them the stories of the stages by which lesser men attain their humbler maturity, and paint to us, with true poetic force, the features of those hidden lives which we all of us have been living, however inferior we may be in the power of self-analysis, and however feeble may be the outlines with which we represent ourselves, both to our own eyes and to those of others. There are many people, indeed, who can hardly be said ever to think at all. Their thoughts and feelings follow one another in a sort of mechanical succession, each external circumstance producing its own immediate impression, while no processes of reasoning or observation ever pass through their heads, and it never once occurs to them to ask themselves why they believe any one of the notions which have rooted themselves in what they call their minds. To such persons, both Mill's "Autobiography" and Dr. Newman's "Apologia" will be among the dreariest of books.

As an attractively painted portraiture, Mill's "Autobiography" cannot, indeed, be placed on a level with Dr. Newman's "Apologia." Setting aside all question as to the different characters of the two thinkers, Mill, though one of the most lucid of writers, is never brilliant, while his style is occasionally almost lengthy and ungraceful. The "Apologia," on the contrary, is as brilliant in style and in treatment as it is full of living personal details. Mill's transparent clearness of expression seems to be the result of an elaborate effort to make himself perfectly understood, just as the clearness of his own inner conceptions seems to be the result of elaborate processes of thinking, in which he felt his way from one truth, or apparent truth, to another. As in so many other instances, his style is the natural outgrowth of his mind, exhibiting an unconscious representation of himself. And I suspect that Mill himself would have been quite willing to admit that this is the fact. Indeed, in one passage he speaks of his earlier style having been "jejune," and of the improvement which he felt it was at length undergoing. Unquestionably, as soon as he was beginning to think for himself and not to reproduce his father's teaching, his style never could be charged with jejuneness. It rapidly became full and nervous, sedate with a sustained energy, though rarely terse or enriched with telling, epigrammatic sayings.

Here, too, I cannot help somewhat anticipating what I have to say concerning his education, so far as to remark that though he

learnt Greek from his childhood, and almost from his infancy, his style never showed any traces of his having absorbed into his nature the exquisite beauties of the Greek language, as the most perfect of vehicles for the expression of thought. This very autobiography, so far as style is concerned, might be the work of a thinker to whom Greek was an unknown tongue. It is lucid, full, and forcible, but of beauty and grace it has none. I imagine, indeed, that Mill never became what we call a scholar. He read an immense number of Greek books, but only for their contents in a general way. Of Greek as a language I think he must have known little, and I cannot conceive that if he had ever felt its exquisite perfections, both in prose and in verse, he would have been satisfied until he had attained some power of expressing himself as the Greeks expressed themselves. As it was, if I may venture on so decided an opinion, he had not a Greek style because he had not a Greek intellect.

In another important respect Mill's "Autobiography" differs from Dr. Newman's "Apologia." The latter is professedly a defence of himself; the former is a history of himself; and the difference is very great. Each writes with a full confidence in the value of the communication he has to make to his fellow-countrymen; but each has a special object of his own. Dr. Newman cannot endure the thought of being regarded as one who trifled with truth and paltered with his own conscience; and he knew that, if he could only get the world to hear what he had to say concerning the changes in his religious opinions, few persons would remain incredulous as to his perfect honesty, or persist in thinking that he was still to be charged with a want of straightforwardness or openness. He never, notwithstanding the implied promise of his title, pretended to lay bare himself to the world. As the leader of the great Oxford movement of 1833, he vindicated his reputation, and regained much of his former hold upon the respect and affections of his old friends. But of himself, as Mill has told us concerning himself, Dr. Newman told the world nothing. In truth, it was out of the question that he should do more than he did. No man of any delicacy of feeling could think of photographing the secrets of his inner life, and hawking the picture about in the streets and booksellers' shops, to be bought by anybody who chose to pay a few shillings for the same. The publication of Mill's "Autobiography" was naturally delayed till after his death, and, after all, it is to a certain degree reticent in various details. We learn from it a good deal concerning himself, but we are conscious that all the while there is more to be told, and we close the volume somewhat with the feeling that we have been watching the movement of a mighty thinking machine rather than the inner life of a human being of the same flesh and blood as ourselves.

His father's intention in fact, from the first, was to invent a new

and prodigious thinking-machine, quite as much as to train a purely human nature to its utmost possible perfection. I have no special means for knowing what James Mill was in his living personality, but judging from his son's account of him, I imagine that most people would have found themselves—to use an expressive Italian word—somewhat *antipatico* in regard to him. Of his great powers of analysis there can be no doubt, and his “History of India” must be ranked among masterpieces. There is also something almost affecting in the sketch of his sad and weary personal history, as drawn by his son, at pp. 48 and 49 of the “Autobiography.” His life had been on the whole prosperous ; but “he thought human life a poor thing at best, after the freshness of youth and unsatisfied curiosity had gone by.” He did not often speak on this subject ; “but when he did, it was with an air of settled and profound conviction. He would sometimes say, that if life were made what it might be, by good government and good education, it would be worth having ; but he never spoke with anything like enthusiasm, even of that possibility. He never varied in rating intellectual enjoyments above all others, even in value as pleasures, independently of their ulterior benefits. The pleasures of the benevolent affections he placed high in the scale ; and used to say, that he had never known a happy old man, except those who were able to live over again in the pleasures of the young.”

All this is surely very significant, and it seems wonderful that such a mind could rest absolutely satisfied with an early conviction, that there is no possibility of ascertaining the origin of the existing universe, material and mental. Brought up in the creed of Scotch Calvinism, and designed for the ministry of the Kirk, in throwing off Calvinistic orthodoxy he not only threw off all Christianity, as being identical, in his view, with that orthodoxy, but all belief in the existence of a God, and came really to detest the religious idea, as such. Yet there was nothing in himself or his conduct which could lead his judgment in this direction. His was simply one of those strangely constituted natures which positively dislike the idea of a controlling Deity, and the conception of duty which that idea involves. In his later years, he grew more tender towards his younger children, and they loved him in return ; but there is nothing in this volume which shows that he ever gave any serious attention to the question of the origin of all things, when once he had thrown aside the Calvinism in which he was bred. All his elder children lived in fear of him ; and even the eldest, John Stuart himself, never could love him, though he says he was loyally devoted to him, adding, “as regards my own education, I hesitate to pronounce whether I was more a loser or gainer by his severity.”

Nevertheless, it is impossible to read this account of the son's

education, without being satisfied that if young Mill had not been a man of a quite unusually strong physical, moral, and intellectual nature, he would have died under the process. He would either have proved a hopeless intellectual failure before he was out of his boyhood, and the father would then have given up the manufacture of the prodigy in despair; or the prodigy himself would have sunk under a softening of the brain, while yet in early manhood. Mill here says that he does not remember the time when he began Greek, but he was told that it was when he was three years old. To the unlearned reader this seems wonderful, but there is nothing more remarkable in beginning Greek at three, than in beginning French or German, or any other modern language, at three, as do the children of many rich families, especially in Russia, who are committed to the simultaneous charge of two or three nursery governesses of different nationalities. The little Mill thus learnt Greek from his father, only it was by the direct learning of written words, in Greek and English.

And it was this that must have put the heavy strain upon his unformed brain. Everything was made a work of careful memory and book-learning. He learnt nothing, as most children learn nearly everything, by the imitation of others and free intercourse with other children, for he had no playfellows, no toys, and no children's books. As soon as he learnt a certain number of Greek words, he was set to translate *Æsop* and *Xenophon*; then came the whole of *Herodotus*, *Diogenes Laertius*, *Lucian*, and *Isocrates*, though not their whole works. When he was seven years old, he read the first six dialogues of *Plato*; telling us now that he thinks the "*Theoctetus*" had better have been omitted, as he could not possibly have understood it, thus gravely asking us to believe that he did really understand the rest. All this Greek reading, he records, was done with the personal aid of his father, "as in those days Greek and English lexicons were not," and he had not yet begun Latin. Here, however, he is wrong. *Parkhurst's Greek and English Lexicon* was first published in 1769; nearly forty years before *John Stuart Mill* was born; and other editions had followed, as it was indeed a standard book. But then it was a *Lexicon of the New Testament*, and its existence was thus unknown to the father, and as it appears even to the son himself, to his last days. So far, then, *Mill's* abhorrence of Christianity and everything appertaining to it proved a real hindrance to his learning.

Having survived his course of *Plato*, lightened by the elements of arithmetic, as a trifling evening entertainment, the child proceeded on his way under the paternal guidance, evidently, except in the matter of the arithmetic, nothing loth. I have, of course, the utmost possible respect for the veracity of the Autobiographer, but it is just possible that his memory may be slightly at fault. It is not, there-

fore, with anything like absolute belief that I accept his statement, *verbatim et literatim*, as to the books which he really read. He says that he read Robertson's Histories, Hume, and Gibbon. Hume, let the reader remember, is in eight octavo volumes, and Gibbon in eleven. Also, he read Watson's "Philip the Second and Third," Hooke's "History of Rome," part of Rollin, Langhorne's "Plutarch," Burnet's "History of his own Time," and the historical part of the "Annual Register," from the beginning down to 1788. It should not be forgotten, too, that in his frequent walks with his father, which constituted his sole bodily exercise, he had to give to that most exacting of parents a clear account of what he was reading, receiving from him in return "explanations and ideas respecting civilization, government, morality, mental cultivation," which he afterwards had to repeat in his father's own words. He also had to read and to give an account of a few other examples of light literature, such as Millar's "Historical View of the English Government," Mosheim's "Ecclesiastical History," McCrie's "Life of Knox," and Sewell and Rutter's "Histories of the Quakers." Among others of a different stamp, he read Beaver's "African Memoranda" and Collins's "Account of the First Settlement of New South Wales." He adds that he often read Anson's "Voyages," and a Collection of "Voyages round the World," in only four volumes. "Robinson Crusoe" was lent to him; and his father so far condescended to the infirmities of human nature as to borrow for him the "Arabian Nights," "The Arabian Tales," "Don Quixote," Miss Edgeworth's "Popular Tales," and the "Fool of Quality."

After a slight pause to take breath, I proceed to repeat what happened next. John Stuart was now "in his eighth year," and the time for beginning Latin was come. "This I did," he says, "in conjunction with a younger sister, to whom I taught it as I went on, and who afterwards repeated the lessons to my father; and from this time, other brothers and sisters being successively added as pupils, a considerable part of my day's work consisted of this preparatory teaching." Here, then, is another element of the marvellous introduced for our unquestioning acceptance. If the preparation of lessons for still smaller undeveloped prodigies formed a considerable portion of the elder brother's day's work, where were the hours left for the accomplishment of his own preternatural studies? These studies, between his eighth and eleventh year, included the following:—First of all he went through the Latin Grammar and a considerable part of "Cornelius Nepos," and Cæsar's "Commentaries," with his little sister; but in his own reading he got through the "Iliad" in Greek, Pope's translation (which, by the way, he adds that he read from twenty to thirty times through while young), Euclid, and algebra, or at least some Euclid and algebra; Virgil's "Bucolics," and the first six books of the

"Æneid;" all Horace, except the "Epodes;" Phædrus, the first decade of Livy, all Sallust, a great part of Ovid's "Metamorphoses," some plays of Terence, two or three books of Lucretius, several of Cicero's "Orations," his writings on Oratory, and his "Letters to Atticus." All these were in Latin; while in Greek he read the whole of the "Iliad" and "Odyssey," one or two plays of Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes; Xenophon's "Hellenics;" a great part of Demosthenes, Æschines, and Lysias; Theocritus, Anacreon, part of the "Anthology," a little Dionysius, several books of Polybius, and Aristotle's "Rhetoric." During the same years he says that he learnt elementary geometry and algebra thoroughly; and the differential calculus and other portions of the higher mathematics not thoroughly, for his father could give him no help, though he continually scolded him for not solving difficult problems. Meanwhile, for his "private reading," he read Mitford's "Greece" "continually," Hooke's and Ferguson's Roman Histories, and "The Ancient Universal History." He also compiled treatises and wrote verses of his own. Of poetry his father allowed him to read but little. But, by way of filling up his leisure hours, he had great delight in reading about experimental science, and "devoured treatises on chemistry." When he was twelve, he began logic, with the "Organon" and "Analytics," also "the whole or parts of several of the Latin treatises on the scholastic logic," together with the "Computatio sive Logica" of Hobbes. Then came Tacitus, Juvenal, and Quintilian, and more Plato and Demosthenes; and at last, when he was supposed to be well up in Political Economy, Adam Smith, Ricardo, and the Bullion Controversy; and then, being about fourteen, he concluded "what can properly be called his lessons."

Here, then, I cannot help pausing to ask to what extent this extraordinary story is to be believed. As I have said, I do not doubt the Autobiographer's veracity; but, to speak the truth, I do not believe that he has given a correct account of the process to which he was subjected. I do not believe that, in any real sense of the word, he "read" the books which fill up the amazing catalogue. Take one of them, Mosheim's "Ecclesiastical History." Can any one who knows what that book actually is, in six octavo volumes, believe that a child of eight years old could read it, so as to acquire any sort of ideas of the persons and subjects there described? I should as soon believe the old legendary mythologies of Greece and Rome. What Mill here calls "reading" a book, must have been nothing more than turning over the pages and running his eyes through certain passages, some of which may have conveyed some vague ideas to his precocious brain. And, in truth, the condition of Mill's mind when he first emerged from obscurity into a small society, and down to the very last, was a proof that he had learnt wonderfully little in

the way of realities from the innumerable Greek, Latin, and English books, through whose pages his eyes were made to run. I cannot see that he ever came to comprehend human life as a reality, or the actual course of human affairs, beginning with Greek life down to our own. Men and women were always with him more or less of the nature of abstractions. From all this enormous mass of books, he learnt a wonderful power of analysis, for which he was by nature surprisingly fitted. But his education was narrow, just where his own mind was originally deficient. He was educated solely through books, for his father was never a companion, his brothers and sisters bored him, he had no playfellows, and of his mother not a word is said in his Autobiography.

Of mediæval history and of arts he knew little, and in one passage he makes a statement with respect to them, which singularly shows how visionary were the conceptions of human life which he formed from this galloping through of hundreds of volumes. Between his eighth and his eleventh year, he says, his father's friend, Bentham, "lived during half of each year at Ford Abbey, in Somersetshire" (or rather in a part of Devonshire surrounded by Somersetshire), "which intervals I had the advantage of passing at this place. This sojourn," he goes on, "was, I think, an important circumstance in my education. Nothing contributes more to nourish elevation of sentiment in a people than the large and free character of their habitations. The middle-age architecture, the baronial hall, and the spacious and lofty rooms of this fine old place, so unlike the mean and cramped externals of English middle-class life, gave the sentiment of a larger and freer existence, and were to me a sort of poetic cultivation, aided also by the character of the grounds in which the Abbey stood; which were *riant* and secluded, umbrageous, and full of the sound of falling waters."

Here, surely, is a proof of the very mythical character of the record of Mill's early education. Between his eighth and his eleventh year he was engaged, as he tells us, in the very disagreeable work of teaching Latin to a sister, and also, after a while, a brother, besides undergoing a systematic personal drill on all sorts of great matters from his father. How, then, was all that compatible with a six months' absence from home for three successive years at Ford Abbey? It may be assumed that the father also passed his short annual leave of absence from his India House duties at Ford Abbey; but how is the rest of the six months to be accounted for? What, however, is so curiously shown by the passage, is the writer's complete ignorance of the actual mediæval and, indeed, of all ancient life. To contrast the baronial splendour of Ford Abbey with "the mean and cramped externals of English middle-class life," is simply absurd. The English and all other middle classes always lived in the midst of "mean and cramped externals," while the habitations of those

below them were mere hovels. Every one is now, on the whole, far better lodged than he ever was before. What, again, could have been Mill's notions of the habitations of the Greek and Roman worlds? Pompeii and Herculaneum alone would have shown him that in comparison with the houses of the Italian people even under the empire, we are now living in spacious palaces.

The manner, again, in which he writes of the effect of mathematical studies in training the mind to think, is another illustration of his inability to realize facts which did not come within his own special class of subjects, with all the force which was applied to his thinking faculty by his father. He depreciates this effect in the most offhand and ignorant manner. It is evident enough that he never really studied mathematics so as to qualify him to give any opinion as to their value in enabling the mind to think accurately, and to learn where our capacity for acquiring a certain knowledge of truth, both divine and human, really ends. He learned algebra and elementary geometry thoroughly, he says; which I believe, if he simply means that he read through some treatise on algebra and Euclid's Elements; but if he means that he thus acquired a facility even in the solution of difficult quadratic and cubic equations, I make bold to disbelieve him. When he was set to work upon the differential calculus, he confesses that he was beaten; in fact, that he could make neither head nor tail of its elementary principle. And yet until this principle is mastered, not a single step is taken towards the comprehension of mathematics as a training for the reasoning faculty; nor is any material influence exercised upon the mathematical student himself. Of the wonderful influence of the higher mathematics in enabling the mind to see clearly what is the real point in dispute in any complex question, Mill knew nothing; and it was partly for this same reason that both Mill and his father sat contentedly down in the conviction that nothing whatever could be known of the origin of the universe, and whether or not there does exist a God. The younger Mill thus sat down, partly through the early convictions impressed on him by his father, but partly because, with all his powers as an analytical thinker, he was not a profound abstract thinker at all. He reasoned most acutely about abstract men and women and politics, but among the ranks of the profound thinkers about abstract truth he can claim no place.

That Mill remained a negative atheist to the end of his life was doubtless also due to that marvellous want of interest in the solution of the most momentous of all questions, which is to be seen in many minds which would seem otherwise predisposed to the inquiry. Dogmatic atheism—that is, the positive belief that there really is no God—he scorned as ridiculous. But the wonder is, that men like Mill, in whom the sense of duty and the capacity of conceiving

and loving a high ideal were conspicuously present, should have been so indifferent to the relationship between this world and its Divine Author, and should have been content to contemplate the life after death as a matter of almost profound indifference. That he was possessed with an excessive self-complacency, from his boyhood till his death, or at least till his Autobiography ends, is clear beyond a doubt. Whether as preaching the doctrines of political economy, as he first or afterwards understood them; or as writing in Reviews; or as expounding his views on women, on liberty, or on general politics; or as a member of Parliament; or as absenting himself from society, because great intellects like his, who have a mission, should only mix with inferior minds in order to do the work of "an apostle;"—everywhere there is the same intense conviction that he and his friends were not ordinary mortals, and that he himself was first among the greatest.

That such a mind should be unfitted for a calm and thorough investigation into the tremendous mystery of being, involving the duty of an utter repudiation of all intellectual self-sufficiency, as the first work of the enlightened intelligence, in the event of the discovery that there is a God, cannot, I believe, be reasonably doubted. The ablest men are indisposed for inquiries which they know may possibly compel them to a line of conduct from which they are deeply averse. They turn away from them, unless they are forced to undertake them by irresistible circumstances; and their opinions upon such matters are as worthless as those of the stupidest or the most ignorant. But in reality Mill never had a chance for entering without prejudice into the question as to the origin of man and his destiny. He was brought up by his father utterly to hate all religions, as mischievous, and to entertain the most extravagant veneration for a small knot of thinkers, culminating in the most unswerving self-esteem. His real education—that is, his education which taught him men and things, and, above all, himself—was narrow, with all the huge catalogue of books which he imagined that he really read. Of the phenomena of the intelligence and the feelings, when concerned with God and eternity, he was totally ignorant. It never even occurred to him that these phenomena are as essentially an element in human nature as those other elements on which he based his theories on economics, on liberty, on utilitarianism, and on the equality of the sexes. He might hold that men are religious because they are violently prejudiced against those non-religious views of which they know nothing. But it was the same with himself. He was violently opposed to the religious idea, because of his father's teaching, and because he knew nothing whatever of the real facts of the case. Of the whole literature of religion he knew nothing; and of the action of the

human intelligence, under the conviction of the existence and presence of an infinitely great and good God, he was as uninformed as if the very idea of a God had never been conceived by man.

And thus it was that he never rose beyond the condition of those intelligences which cannot conceive of anything divine, except in some sort of impersonation or incarnation. He was not like his father, in being able to exist without any species of religion whatsoever. He had his divinity, but his divinity was a woman; and when she died, her memory, he confesses, was "a religion" to him,—unconscious that in using such words he was uttering sounds as destitute of meaning as any of those commonplace, senseless phrases whose worthlessness he had often so ruthlessly exposed in his former days. Religion, he implied, is an essential element in the development and perfecting of man's nature; but knowing nothing of Christianity, except in its corruptions, nothing of the history of other religions, nothing of modern Biblical criticism, nothing of the inner life of practical believers in God, he set up a divinity for himself, and that divinity was his wife.

The history of Mill's actual life, so far as he has thought fit to make it public, is little more than the history of the modification of his early opinions, and of the books and essays which he wrote, together with a record and glorification of his Parliamentary career. It includes an interesting, if not remarkable, sketch of a period of melancholy into which he fell, some time before he knew Mrs. Taylor, which was quite natural in a young man brought up as he had been, but which is common enough in both young men and young women, who are not strong in health and whose circumstances do not draw out the full strength of their characters. With Mill it had the healthy effect of setting him to read poetry, especially Wordsworth, and generally to "humanize" his studies of life, or rather of books, for he was always too impatient of human dulness to allow him to be a lover of individual men and women, as his brethren in humanity. By degrees, also, he became acquainted with a good many of the notable young enthusiasts of the day, and his accounts of Frederick Maurice and John Sterling are among the most genial and pleasant paragraphs of the Autobiography.

Of his writings themselves it is impossible as yet to form any decided opinion as to their future and permanent influence upon English thought. For myself, I am disposed to think that it will be within the range of that subject on which I am myself most disposed to agree with him that his thoughts will assist the thinking of the coming generation; I mean his arguments in favour of the utilitarian as opposed to the intuitional theory of morals and opinions. The utilitarian theory being generally misunderstood, and its more prominent teachers in recent times having been those who cared

nothing for religion, or who were even negative atheists, it has come to be supposed that it is essentially irreligious in its nature, and especially that it is unchristian. To myself, on the contrary, it appears that it is the recognized basis of Christian morals, as taught by Christ himself; and that when he said, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," he was simply stating a principle of action which recognized "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," as the one test of what is to be regarded as morally right.

For it is evident that the principle of action which Christ thus laid down, and which he declared was the principle upon which the old Jewish legal and prophetic teaching of details was based, is quite a different thing from that division of definite actions into the categories of right and wrong, without which morality is an empty name. No man can pretend that the New Testament furnishes such details. It has itself to be interpreted by an enlightened casuistry, founded on the principle of loving one's neighbour as oneself; and there is no possible rule upon which this casuistry can guide itself except that of aiming at the greatest happiness of the greatest number. How, for instance, can we so modify the doctrine of the forgiveness of injuries as to go to war, even in self-defence, except by holding that such wars do, on the whole, tend to promote the happiness of the greatest number; in other words, by adopting the utilitarian basis of morals? The Sermon on the Mount altogether must be interpreted by what people popularly call common sense, or else it becomes impracticable or mischievous; and what is common sense but the application of the test of general utility?

Conscience, which is so frequently in men's mouths, really tells us nothing as to what particular acts are right and what particular acts are wrong. Its office is to sting our sense of duty into practical activity when we are tempted to transgress some detailed law already acknowledged. It does not inform us what those detailed laws are; for otherwise it would tell one man of one law and another of another. When we speak of our conscience telling us this or that duty, in reality it is our conscience reminding us that this or that action is forbidden by the law which we have beforehand recognized as obligatory.

Thus only, again, it is that we can understand the full meaning of the words of Christ, when he said that upon the absolute love of God and the love of our neighbour as ourselves hang all the law and the prophets. Until we see that He thus recognizes the fact that humanity is ever in a state of progress, and that in an advanced stage of moral and intellectual culture the details of right and wrong actions must vary from those which are expedient in earlier ages, we shall never be able to see that what He said was historically true. Only by observing that at the time of the Exodus, and afterwards, the Jewish race were incapable of better things, and that a lawgiver

must study the test of utility in all his positive enactments, can the Ten Commandments be accepted as a foreshadowing of the doctrines and morality taught by Christ himself. They do not teach the love of God ; they do not even teach the unity of God, as we mean it ; they assert that the world was made in six times four-and-twenty hours ; they make a few definite prohibitions, such as the forbidding a man to take another man's undivorced wife, at the same time allowing a freedom of intercourse between the sexes, compared to which the licence of Mahometanism is a rigid restriction ; while of the fundamental duties of Christianity, that is, humility and charity, they say absolutely nothing. All this, on the principle of utility as the basis of morals, is intelligible enough. Moses could do no more. The ignorance, the habits, and the passions of the fiery people whom he had to govern with an iron hand forbade him. As it was, his morality was a great advance on the prevailing religions of the day, though how great, in our ignorance as to those religions, it is impossible to determine.

In the gradual enlightening of the Christian intelligence on this momentous subject, Mill's influence will, I think, be most permanent. When once the Christian world comes to see that the fundamental principle taught by Christ must not be interpreted by a traditional collection of fanciful rules of detailed duties, Christian thinkers will learn that there is no other possible test except that of utility ; just as in the regulations of the methods in which the soul is to approach God, in obedience to the principle that she shall love Him with all her heart and strength, we must adopt this same utilitarian test, and ask only what actions and habits do practically tend to promote this supreme love.

J. M. CAPES.



CO-OPERATIVE HOUSEKEEPING.

NO season of the year can be more fitting than Christmas time, in which to consider the various questions concerning our home life. Cold winds, dreary rains, and gloomy fogs incline those whom necessity does not drive abroad to remain within doors; while those who are compelled to leave home for a time return to it with a keener appreciation of the comfort and shelter it affords.

It may fairly be admitted that our colder climate and generally uncertain weather has had more to do with making our home life what it is, than any special peculiarity in the English character or disposition. We enjoy out-of-door life as much as those living in a more genial climate, when warm dry weather allows us to enjoy it; but as we have comparatively but a short period of fine weather, we are compelled to pass the greater part of our lives, under the shelter of some house or home. Therefore we, of all people, should be most anxious to gather into these homes all that is useful, healthful, and agreeable.

However superior our home life may be, none I think will affirm that it is perfect and without defect, or that it stands in no need of improvement. Taking the most cursory glance at the condition of our home and social life, the most superficial observer cannot fail to see defects which lie immediately upon the surface. Further observation will show that what we consider so necessary and valuable to our comfort in life is not extended to all classes and members of society, as there are in the middle ranks hundreds of

single men and solitary women to whom lodging and boarding-houses supply but a miserable imitation of home, while to the poor, in their wretched habitations, the name of home is but one of mere mockery.

Even to the rich, home would seem to be but a dull place, judging from the way men forsake it for their clubs, and women for balls and parties; and so it appears that, in this ungenial climate, even those who have the best means of making home pleasant have to seek away from it, what is most desirable to find within it, namely, agreeable and cheerful society. Any plan, then, having for its object the making of our home life more adapted to our needs, and extending its benefits to those who have never yet experienced them, is certainly worthy the attention of those who are dependent on the perfect and harmonious arrangements of home for their greatest enjoyment of life.

It is a true saying that our greatest good comes to us in trying to do good to others. Nothing would tend more to improve our homes than placing all those who minister to our daily wants at home in a just and right position in life. That we have failed to do this can be easily proved, and to this failure can be traced that most clearly seen and often talked-about defect, the want of good

DOMESTIC SERVANTS.

This is a subject of trouble and perplexity in the present, and of probably greater trouble and perplexity in the future. Who is to blame? and What is to be done? are the two questions which everybody asks. One person says the servants are to blame. Another that the mistresses are to blame. The happy-medium people say both are to blame. It would be nearer the truth to say that neither is to blame. Conditions of society in the past have placed servants in the position we now find them, and they are even now in the position of semi-serfs. But we shall be to blame if, seeing our injustice to them, we continue to practise it. And also, from the inharmonious relation which this condition of semi-slavery produces in modern times, between mistress and servant, there is no possibility of satisfaction on the part of the mistress, or contentment on the part of the servant, until this is altered.

It is the want of liberty which is making servants discontented with domestic service, and it is a feeling sure not only to continue, but to grow stronger. The women working in our homes hate the very name of servant, and though they may not know that a dawning love of liberty is causing this dislike to their position, yet those who will examine that position and their behaviour will not fail to see that this feeling is at the root of their discontent. In the life of a

servant her subordinate position is constantly made apparent to her, and that in a manner calculated to jar most upon her feelings. As soon as she enters a house she finds everything of value locked up from her, which implies that she is looked upon as a thief. She is told she must have no followers, and if she is seen walking with or talking to a man, or she lets one into the house, she is probably severely reprimanded, or even perhaps dismissed; this again implies that she is looked upon as a bad character. She sees the members of the family stay out till one, two, or three o'clock in the morning; yet on her few and far-between holidays she must return home without fail at nine at night, or ten at the latest. In fact, she has not an hour in the day she can call her own. "Selfish things mistresses are," say the servants; perhaps others may say the same.

But look on the other side, at the position of the mistresses. If order is to be maintained in a house, certain rules and certain hours must be observed; and the same discretionary power which the members of the family may take cannot be extended to the servants without causing inevitable confusion. Some servants are dishonest, and as a mistress has no means of gauging a servant's character, for "characters," so called, are of no value, she must in self-defence lock up her valuables and her stores, or, by-and-by, what will then be called her careless habits will entail loss to a greater or less extent, and she will be told that, as the phrase goes, she has "thrown temptation" in the way of her servants. True is it that servant-girls have as much right, naturally, to enjoy the society of men as their mistresses. But if the mistress allows discretionary power to the servants in this also, she suffers girls under her protection to incur many risks and dangers; or if she allows admittance to the house of men of whom she knows nothing, the safety of the family is endangered. We see, therefore, from the relative position of mistress and servant one must almost inevitably injure the other; and any position which creates faults proclaims itself from that very fact to be a false and unnatural position. A servant is *in* the family, not *of* the family; having to see and hear talked of things which she also would like to enjoy, yet is debarred from enjoying only, as she thinks, because she is a servant. We introduce into our homes a class of women who, from their birth, nurture, and education, are likely to have but little capacity for thought, little refinement of feeling, and little power of self-restraint; we place constantly before their eyes objects of envy and desire, and then expect them to be models of honesty, sobriety, and contentment. On the other hand, by making servants for the time being members of our households, we assume a responsibility of protection towards them which we can only carry out by depriving them of nearly all liberty and of any natural enjoyment of life.

I have set down here both sides of the question, as fairly as I can, not drawing a picture of home with exceptionally bad servants, or exceptionally bad mistresses; but showing how, with average specimens of both, their relative position must produce a feeling and system of antagonism which is hurtful to both.

I have seen but one sort of remedy proposed for these admitted evils, and that is by the going-back process instead of the going-forward one.

A passage by Mr. John Morley shows this:—

“It is demoralizing to masters and mistresses, and especially to the young of a house, to have constantly by their side, and under the same roof, persons to whom they recognize no obligation beyond those of payment of a small wage, and the use, not by any means invariable, of a certain frigid politeness of speech: what can we say of the effect on the mind of the servant of a life which is physically laborious, and in which the labour is relieved by no friendly and gracious recognition? So long as service is interpreted in this brutal sense, and relegated to a caste, instead of being performed by the members of the family, either born or informally received in some sort into it, so long will there be many women in a dense population who will deliberately prefer prostitution as a trade, without trying domestic service, whose condition they know by hearsay, and many others who will drift into it after trying this service and finding it as cheerless a life as life can be.”*

I fully admit the evils here enumerated by Mr. Morley, but deny they can be met and remedied in the way he, and many others, propose. The remedy is to go further back in the state of serfdom, taking the good of it and leaving the bad; but such a work is not possible, except in imagination.

Servants have their own interests in life, and mistresses and masters have separate and different ones, and by no process can the servant be born again into the family, and share with it the same feelings and the same interests. Neither do servants want this absorption of their lives. Their wants and aspirations lie quite in a different direction—that is, in obtaining greater liberty to work out their own lives and follow their own interests and inclinations.

The only remedy for the “demoralizing” influence of domestic semi-slavery is to place servants in the right and just position of

FREE WORKERS,

It will no doubt be asked—How is it possible to make domestic service free?

There is but one way, and that is—by *not* making the home of the employer the home also of the employed—that is, servants should no longer live in our houses, and be members, in name only, of families they do not belong to. Let us have done with fiction and

* Copied from “Words of Weight on the Woman Question.”

fancy in the matter, and see in what way the conditions of home must be altered in order to do justice to our servants. I do not know how the change can be effected till we agree to substitute for the present isolated homes and separate establishments a system of

CO-OPERATIVE HOUSEKEEPING.

In domestic work the labour is constant, requiring to be kept up with more or less energy, all day long, in some instances far into the night. But, instead of keeping one unfortunate set of women to do over these long weary hours of toil, we must divide the hours of labour, and distribute them to different workers.

Taking it for granted that we agree to a system of combination of households : one set of workers should come at, say, six in the morning and remain till one or two o'clock ; a second set would then come, and remain till nine or ten o'clock ; after that one or two guardians of the night should come and remain till the following morning. During their hours of work the servants should be under the control of a responsible superintendent. After that—just as Mr. Lowe said respecting the civil servants employed by Government, so we should say to our domestic servants—You “are engaged to do certain work, or to serve for a certain number of hours daily, in consideration of certain salaries.” The co-operative housekeepers, “like other employers, do not find it to their advantage to purchase the whole time or the entire energies of their employées, and of course they have no control over the remainder which they do not purchase.”

It is only in such a way that people who respect the liberty of others ought to engage their services, or that any having arrived at the dignity of self-respect ought to agree to serve.

Moreover, it is only in such a way that servants can be defended from being kept as a “caste,” for only by having some time of perfect freedom to follow their own inclinations or interests, and cultivate any talent they may possess without feeling that they are eluding the eye of their master or mistress, or defrauding them of the time they have purchased, can they be enabled to pass from one class to another.

Though the plan of having relays of servants would increase the number daily employed, the probability is that the cost on the whole would be diminished. There is first the reduction in cost sure to be effected when labour is performed in combination. Also by employing women for half a day only, many who could not otherwise leave their homes, would gladly engage every day in a few hours' remunerative work ; and when the system of co-operative housekeeping becomes general, and confederated homes established for poor as well as rich, many young girls would be spared to work in the homes of the richer

class, returning afterwards to the care of their parents. Moreover, when the profession of labour is raised by being made a free one, many now who would never dream of entering domestic service and putting themselves under the petty tyranny of a mistress or master might accept it under these altered conditions ; and by thus attracting to our work people of superior minds and manners, great advance would be made both in the work done and in the character and social status of the workers.

We have now for many years tried the experiment of the present system of domestic servitude in isolated homes, and we see that, from one cause or another, the system is a failure. We cannot help seeing also that, with the direction in which society is now tending, the failure is likely to prove more conspicuous. It comes to this, then. There are plainly only three ways of meeting this difficulty : either we must have perfect and real slaves, or we must be prepared, every lady, to be her own cook and her own housemaid, or, finally, we must resolve to alter and reform our whole system of domestic service, and adopt some system of combination in work which shall bring order and harmony out of the chaos in which female domestic labour now remains.

Before leaving the consideration of the domestic arrangements of home, we must look at another department of it, in which another great imperfection has been discovered, and to remedy which the attention of the public has latterly been directed ; I mean the want of schools of cookery. The attempt to found these is a step in advance from the hitherto slipshod, haphazard way in which all matters relating to house work have been considered and practised. But that the direction in which the promoters of these schools are tending is a mistaken one, I shall here attempt to demonstrate. Cookery is not a branch of general education for women or for men, but for technical instruction—for those who are to follow the profession of cookery ; and those who attempt to make it a branch of study for women generally will be but helping to waste time and money, and add to that sort of amateur tinkering in domestic work, which is one of the principal causes of the inefficiency of our domestic workers.

We shall have no well-ordered homes, no well-supplied and contented households, till we have brought to female domestic labour that system of organization which has overcome difficulties, supplied wants, and multiplied a hundredfold our comfort and luxury in every other department of life's work.

ORGANIZATION OF DOMESTIC WORK.

The domestic department of social life, as compared with other

departments, is in its primitive and most imperfect stage. It has no order, no system, no genius to direct in it, no skilled hands to work in it. It is so backward that what Herbert Spencer calls one of the "cardinal truths of sociology" division of labour is still unrecognized. There is as yet no proper division of labour in women's work. Mistress and servants, amateur and professional, are both attempting to do it, and neither of them do it properly. The servant enters a place, and thinks the mistress will tell her what her work is; the mistress gets a servant, and thinks the servant ought to know what her work is; when the fact is that neither of them knows what the work is, for neither have been properly trained to it. And this I say, that as long as the mistress is expected to know the servant's work, the servant never *will* be properly trained. If servants knew that they, and they alone, were expected to know their own work, and could get no situation unless they had the requisite training, there would soon be trained servants to be had. Of course, I do not mean that servants, more than any other class of labourers, will perform their work diligently and carefully without being directed. The only question is, who ought those overlookers and directors to be? The director of any work should be the one most thoroughly acquainted with it in all its branches. But men, even those most in love with the domestic-wife ideal, only affirm that a wife should understand enough of domestic work to enable her to direct her servants. She is still to be the refined and accomplished "lady," but at the same time to pick up anyhow and anywhere "enough" superficial knowledge of housework to direct the workers. And then we expect to get good work executed, to obtain order and regularity, in fact, perfection generally in house work, by placing the amateur worker over the professional one! Should we arrive at good work by so doing in any other trade or profession?

Some women have not the requisite talent for directing and controlling a household, while others have it in a remarkable degree, and nothing pleases them better than to exercise it; and it is very possible that owing to the want of a wide-enough range for the exercise of this talent women of this disposition often become bullies and scolds at home. But women such as these, at the head of the profession of housekeeping, when the position becomes an honourable and distinguished one, would superintend the domestic arrangements of a hundred confederated homes, and keep in order a whole army of well-disciplined servants. Women themselves seem to have but the faintest idea of the real cause of their housekeeping failures. I am glad, therefore, to be able to quote from two sources in confirmation of what I advance.

The author of "The Industrial and Social Position of Women" writes :—

"Rather than engage a superior servant, many ladies will themselves act in the capacity, or will supplement by their own care the labours of an inferior. . . . The time of many women in the middle classes might be turned to much better account; and it is a benefit to the servant that the mistress throw on her as much management and responsibility as possible." *

The second extract is from a letter in the *Times* by "An Old Housekeeper." It shows a far clearer idea of the state of the case than the former passage. The writer entirely agrees with those who expatiate on the value of good cookery in promoting the health and comfort of a household. She continues :—

"I also admire the foresight which, looking to the probable rise of wages, and independence among female servants, and the increasing difficulty of getting good ones, would provide substitutes so convenient as wives, who would receive no wages and be unable to give warning. But what I wish to point out to these gentlemen and the many others of their sex who hold the same views, who raise a cry on behalf of cookery whenever the higher education of women is discussed, is, that education is the most direct and certain means of attaining their object. This may seem a paradox, but it will turn out sober truth if we inquire what are the intellectual and moral habits necessary to form a good cook and housekeeper. I add the latter qualification, taking for granted that the gentlemen whose anxieties about their future domestic comfort I am endeavouring to relieve, though they give the first place to the interests of their palate, are not indifferent to the interests of their purse, and desire that their wives, in addition to skill in cookery, should possess skill in domestic management. The habits required, then, are, intellectually, thoughtfulness, method, delicacy, and accuracy of perception, good judgment, and the power of readily adapting means to varying circumstances, which with our cousins over the water is termed 'faculty,' and with us bears the homelier name of 'handiness.' Morally, they are conscientiousness, command of temper, industry, and perseverance. Now these are the very qualities a good school education must develop and cultivate. The object of such an education is not, be it remembered, to put into the pupil so much history, geography, French, or science, but through these studies to draw out their intelligence, train them to observe facts correctly, and draw accurate inferences from their observation, which constitutes good judgment, teach them to think, and to apply thought easily to new forms of knowledge. Morally, the discipline of a good school tends directly to form the habits I mentioned above. The pupils are trained to steady industry and perseverance, to scorn dishonest work, and to control temper. The girls who leave school so trained, though they may know nothing of cooking or housekeeping, will become infinitely better cooks and housekeepers, as soon as they have a motive for doing so, than the uneducated woman who has learnt only the technical rules of her craft.

"I assume that the gentlemen, if quite secure in the matter of cookery

* From "Words of Weight on the Woman Question."

would not object to their wives being also well-informed and cultivated women, though I can see that this may be a disadvantage when the husbands have neither information nor culture. There remains only one fear which I cannot remove—namely, that such women, with all their splendid capabilities for cooking and housekeeping, might, in their turn, object to placing them at the disposal of men in whose eyes these formed their chief attractions, and might decline to become the helpmates of those who wanted help only in the kitchen and the store-room.⁷

How often are we told that cookery is a science and an art. No doubt it is, and so is house-work—that is to say, there are principles and laws relating to each which must be learned, and there is an application of these, which can only be acquired by care and practice. A knowledge of the science of cooking would include all the information collected by Dr. Edward Smith, in his work on “Foods,” besides many others, showing what substances are fit for human food, how they affect the health or constitution, and what are the various changes they undergo from the action of heat, &c. The application of this knowledge might well fill a lifetime in the practice of the art of cooking; and, like all other arts, can be successfully pursued by those only who have a special aptitude for it, the aptitude in this case being a naturally keen and delicate sense of taste, a sense which, like all other senses, requires cultivation and education in order to attain perfection.

Much the same may be said with respect to the science and art of house-work. The nature and properties of many different materials have to be studied; and in practice each material requires a different treatment for its preservation and cleansing. Many fine qualities are required to make an accomplished house-worker: a quick eye, a light and ready hand, a naturally neat and order-loving disposition, and withal, something of an artistic perception of colour and arrangement; with the power of bringing all these qualities to bear with a quiet promptitude, which nothing but constant practice can give, and none but those possessing a certain amount of delicacy and refinement of character can attain. Those who have had coarse, common servants in their houses well know how incapable these are of even seeing what ought to be done in a house, and how by their rough, awkward handling materials of all sorts are injured and defaced in their attempts at cleansing them. But where are the schools to teach these arts and sciences of domestic life? And where is the money to enable those who would enter the domestic professions to pay for their proper education? Men say to us, “Here are certain arts and sciences you ought to understand.” But they have never founded any school where they are taught, and never placed sufficient funds in the hands of those who would learn, to enable them to enter such a school, and remain in it till their education was completed. The

difficulty in establishing schools for teaching domestic work is, that the instruction can only be given where the work is required to be done. There can be no schools of cookery where there are no dinners to be eaten, and no schools for house-work where there are no households. Lectures will no more teach these things than they can teach playing the piano. Nor will even the knowledge of how to make a few dishes make a cook.

Perhaps it may be set down as a proof of women's superior stupidity that they have not before organized their own department of labour. But two things have hitherto effectually prevented them from so doing. One is the rooted dislike which men have to any domestic work, other than the most menial, being paid for.

As "An Old Housekeeper" says, as long as men think they can get the chief part of housekeeping done for nothing, they will refuse to give for it that money medium of exchange, by means of which alone division of labour can be pursued. But it is as false political economy, as it is false domestic economy, to suppose that loss of either personal or national wealth would accrue, if women, the same as men, exchanged the fruits of their time and labour by means of the circulating medium, which is money. Certainly wealth would not be created by a better-ordered system of housekeeping industry, but it would be economised or conserved; and as the old saying tells us, "A penny saved is a penny gained," and many a penny and many a pound would be saved by proper division and exchange in household labour. The other bar to our advance in the first step of organized progress in women-work is the want of an

ASSOCIATION OF HOMES.

When a person devotes all his time to one particular branch of industry, in order to supply in the best possible manner one particular want of the society in which he lives, a great many purchasers must be found, who, in return for the one want which he supplies to many, will place in his hands money power to buy for himself all those fruits of the industry of others, which, his time being fully occupied, he cannot gain by his own work.

Other trades can send away the results of their labour; purchasers of their goods may live at the other side of the globe, and exchange can be effected across lands and seas. But the domestic female labourer has not this advantage. The purchasers of her work must come round her: she cannot send abroad the fruits or results of her labour. Therefore till society agrees to some sort of association or co-operation in homes and housekeeping, no advance in the direction indicated can be made.

But it is a mistake to suppose that *all* need be forced to accept such

a mode of home life, though most certainly all would be benefited by its adoption. Railways could never have been used till people agreed to associate in travelling. Yet still those who dislike personal association can, if they like, and can afford it, hire a whole first-class carriage to themselves, and travel in superb isolation. Neither do railways prevent any one from travelling in their own carriages, and being dragged along by their own horses, and driven by their own coachman ! But though none are obliged to travel by rail, all are benefited by the railway system.

An association for a better system of home life would be an exactly parallel case. Dukes and duchesses need not have their isolated homes interfered with, except that their domestic arrangements would be improved after our united model. Besides, our associated homes would afford them all the pleasure of contrast, making their isolated ones appear all the more grand and delightful, and the society in them all the more "select." What, for instance, can more increase the happiness of the gracefully-reclining occupants of an elegant and luxuriant carriage than to drive by a toiling omnibus filled with closely packed middle-class folk ? Moreover, those who entered the confederate homes might have a suite of apartments entirely to themselves, and never enter the public rooms unless they chose. So also might they have their own band of servants, if they liked the trouble of them, either to supersede or supplement the labour of the general house-servants.

Let us see then some of the benefits of a confederation of homes, both on those inside and those outside the Association.

In the first place, it affords the best, I might say, the only way of giving technical instruction in domestic work, as in these large establishments so many pupils or apprentices, both in cooking and house-work, could be taken in with but little inconvenience, and parents should pay for their daughters' instruction in these trades, as they now pay for their sons' instruction in their trades. The means thus offered of thoroughly instructing servants in their work would be an advantage to every separate household, and a source of revenue to the co-operative householders. It has been remarked that people would hardly like the experimental cooking of these apprentices ; but we receive experimental work in every other trade, whether it be in dress or coat making, bread or beer making, wherever apprentices are taken their work is used, but it is used and directed in such a way that no articles are spoiled by their unskilled efforts. So would servant-apprentices be directed, and their work used.

Another benefit of association would be that the best mechanical arrangement could be adopted, the expense of which would be too

heavy if applied to small private houses. These are principally for heating and lighting, water supply, and waste pipes. In all but the first mentioned we have arrived at an organized system of supply. It is greatly to be desired that heating could be placed in the same list. We sadly want a method of circulating heat from house to house—one not injurious to health, and regulatable like light according to the will of the occupier of the house or room. But there is a greater degree of prejudice to be overcome in this matter, and a little more of the selfishness of home isolation to be broken through. In carrying water to sleeping or dressing rooms—and be it remembered the weight of water is a pint to a pound—very little economy of labour is thought of, because it is only women's labour that is expended, and economy of labour means only economy of money, not economy of muscle, health, or strength. Very little care or thought then is there as to how many pounds a poor servant girl has to carry up and down stairs. The same may be said with regard to carrying coals. But when housekeeping becomes, by co-operation and division of labour, an organized trade or profession, women's labour will then be thought worth economising. Hot and cold water ought to be obtainable in every room where required at the will of the person who requires them. So also as water should be conveyed into rooms should all waste and refuse matter be carried off from rooms as from houses. There is but one servant who ought to perform certain offices for us, and that is, machinery; and by its agency all waste matter should be sent out of the room, by a turn of the hand of the occupier of the room.* We make domestic service degrading by giving it degrading work to perform, and so effectually prevent a higher class from entering into it. Besides the mechanical arrangements already enumerated, speaking-tubes or some other method of communicating messages would be of great use, in

* I insert here the following "statement" made by Col. Clinton in 1858, which has lately been sent me, and in the truth of which I fully concur :—

"The principal evil which afflicts society, is the enormous quantity of repulsive work required by the needs of society, but which might be dispensed with, if society would set itself in proper order.

"Menial service must be classed under the head of repulsive work.

"The command of universal beneficence (justice and mercy included)—Do unto others as ye would that others should do unto you—will not allow us to look calmly on while any individual, needlessly and wantonly, is compelled to pass under the yoke of avoidable repulsive employment.

"No one *willingly* sees his own mother or his own sister, his own father or his own brother, undertake menial service; no one, himself, *volunteers* to undertake menial service.

"This is THE LAW which points to the need for endeavours to reduce the quantity of repulsive work throughout the world. But the object of lessening the quantity of repulsive work, *required by the needs of society*, cannot be attained, so long as people continue to dwell in isolated houses."

diminishing by exactly one-half the labour of stair journeys over the house. The best system of ventilation, also, should be adopted, and a "lift" introduced if the building was of many storeys.

But the isolated homes of the rich would also receive benefit from this, as from there being a greater demand for perfect machinery for domestic purposes, better would be invented. The *Spectator* says, with regard to my proposed sanitary arrangements, "She (Mrs. King) is all wrong, as any doctor would tell her, and her theory very nearly killed the Prince of Wales." I am very sorry if in any way I helped very nearly to kill the Prince of Wales; but I should be inclined to think it was an imperfect way of carrying out the theory, rather than the theory itself, which was to blame; and I think also if the attention of both medical men and clever mechanicians were more closely directed to this "theory," neither the lives of valuable princes nor those of the common people would be so often jeopardised. Besides the greater efficiency to be secured by a well-organized system of associated homes, its economy also would be great. The waste of food in cooking for small families is only exceeded by the waste of fuel, and, in these times of dear meat and dear coal, economy in both is not only a personal but a national question of grave and earnest consideration. Besides economy in the consumption of materials, the economy in purchasing in large instead of small quantities is very great. The home society could procure all manufactured or imported goods wholesale and at first hand. Fresh provisions also might be obtained direct from the country; or if there were sufficient capital and enterprise among the members of the society, a joint-stock farm, with laundry attached, might be set up for the benefit of the homes.

Economy of land is also an affair of no small moment in this little island of ours. It is horrible to see in and around London the dense agglomeration of houses stretching out further and further every year. It gives one the impression that by-and-by town will meet town, and city, city, till not an acre of ground will be left for field or garden. There is no country so extravagant of land as this. One would think that instead of being about the smallest kingdom in the world we were nearly the largest, and had a territory equal to Russia to cover, to see the way we waste our land. Travelling by rail on a level with the chimney-pots, one looks down on rows of ugly little brick houses, each with its narrow strip of perfectly useless garden ground, separated by high brick walls, effectually shutting out the bright healthy rays of the sun and the free circulation of air. The inhabitant of two or three of these unsightly rows might find infinitely better accommodation, at the same, or a less, cost in one large building, while the rest of the rows being cleared off, and the

useless garden grounds thrown into one, a fine healthy breathing-space might be obtained, for play or pleasure ground ; or, if carefully cultivated, the land might be made to yield enough vegetables to supply the kitchen of the establishment, besides giving many a day or half-day's work to men, women, and children.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION.

Society is about to take upon itself a new form of life. The social atoms are about to unite to form a social body.

To Herbert Spencer, who is doing for the Science of Life what Mill has done for the Science of Thought, I owe the little knowledge I possess on this subject. He says : "A society as a whole, considered apart from its living units, presents phenomena of growth, structure, and function, like those of growth, structure, and function in an individual body ; and these last are needful keys to the first."

Let us then try and find these keys in order to understand the social organization we are here contemplating.

Herbert Spencer shows how certain terms we constantly use metaphorically, and look upon only as metaphors, are strictly and literally true to fact. Such terms as body politic or political organization, social body or social organization, which were first applied from a dimly seen resemblance these states of society bore to a living creature, are literally true, in that a body politic or a social body must undergo similar changes from a simple to a complex organization if it is to rise in the scale of existence. Such an advance in the development of our domestic organization we have now to work out, and if the method I propose is similar to the one nature follows, it is the one not only which we *may* adopt, but the one we *must* adopt if we are to advance in the scale of social existence or civilization. The steps in this process of development are—first, separation, in order to remove particles or circumstances which injure the body, individual or social, and retard its growth. (What this separation should be in the domestic organization I have already shown.) This leads to the second step, which is combination or reconstruction ; which prepares for the third, which is division of labour, or function ; which again leads to the fourth, which is distribution, or circulation.

The daily widening separation of class from class is a fact patent to all, and many moans and laments are uttered by those who observe the fact, and many a reproach is heaped on that bad animal, Human Nature, for the supposed heartlessness, cruelty, and selfishness which this fact is thought to display. But poor human nature would be praised, instead of blamed, if it were known that this apparent heartless separation was only her first almost unconscious effort to advance to a higher stage of organization.

There is neither kindness nor wisdom in trying to check this necessary separation. The greatest kindness and the greatest wisdom lies in helping it forward. Especially is this the case with regard to the effort to organize female social life, as its attempts at advance have been so retarded by the weight of circumstances. It is hardly ever considered that female life has two sets of laws to contend with, instead of one only—viz., the laws of nature and the laws, or will, of men. If, therefore, men would help us in this, women would have cause to thank them, and they also would be gainers by our gain. The American author* of a little book on co-operative housekeeping writes a very harsh sentence:—"That men will not promote it (co-operative housekeeping) there, indeed, is room for fear. *Had men ever done anything directly for the happiness and development of women*, one might hope that they would set forward this"! Well, let us wait and see. One man at least has so directly helped us; perhaps others may receive his spirit.

Separation is no evil or misfortune when, the organization being complete, circulation begins. Freedom of motion is what we want, not to be tied in one place, or one class, or one position, if nature gives us power to advance to another. Let there be division and subdivision and separation, however distinct, but no bars to progress. Removing bars would not produce equality, but contentment in inequality.

To continue this question further would carry me too much away from my particular subject.

Any social organization which pretends to be formed in accordance with the laws of nature must prove itself adapted to all the wants of society. A domestic organization, therefore, must be in accordance with all the relations of domestic life, particularly with regard to

THE CHILDREN.

It may seem difficult at first sight to carry out the rule of not making the home of the employer the home also of the employed with regard to children, especially to infants. But I think it can be shown to be not only practical, but that the plan would be highly beneficial to parents, children, and nurses. We must divide our children into three groups—for nursery, Kinder Garten, and school-rooms.

In the nursery the plan of changing servants could not so fully be carried out, but still sufficiently to give some time for liberty to the nurses; and in no work is relaxation more absolutely necessary, both

* Mrs. C. F. Peirce.

for the sake of the children and for those who have the care of them, for no other work is so trying to temper and patience, and, from the constant strain on the nerves, to health and strength also. Besides the ordinary routine work of the nursery, young children require a constant motherly care and supervision. Guardians of the children, giving this care, should be ladies in the best sense of the term; and none but those who have a certain amount of medical knowledge should be thought qualified for such a position. Women of this description should not be considered as servants, but more as the companions and guides of mothers, especially of young mothers, to whose ignorance, carelessness, or foolish fondness, or to the neglect of servant girls, to whose tender mercies young children are often entrusted, may be traced many a life-long injury both of body and mind. And if such an arrangement would be productive of good results to people in easy circumstances, how much more valuable would it be to hard-working mothers and to their little-cared-for and hardly-treated children!

The question of what to do with the infant brothers and sisters of those who attend the Board schools is becoming a difficult question. Shall the elder children be left at home to take care of them, while their own education is neglected? or shall we, or can we, force the mother to stay at home and look after them, and so force her to lose the money she could otherwise earn to help to feed them, leaving her still more at the mercy of a possibly drunken, idle, brutal husband? Or shall they be placed in a crèche, where the mortality of infant life is said to be greater even than in their wretched homes? Would not the plan I offer be better than either of the former proposals?

The children would remain in the Home, instead of being carried outside of it. The mothers, instead of being strangers to one another, as probably those who send their children to a crèche would be, would know and speak to one another, and so ill-treatment of the infants would be instantly known amongst them. Neither would they be left to the care of children little older or wiser than themselves, as would be the case at home—neither need any child lose her education, nor any mother her wages.

In the Kinder Garten the necessary division of labour could be easily made.

The third division is the school-room. Assuming that those willing to adopt a plan of combination in domestic affairs would be people of advanced and enlightened minds, I will assume also that they would approve of the education of boys and girls together. Many do so in theory, but as the system of "mixed education," as it is called, is, in England, an untried one, both teachers and parents are timid in making the first experiment. The Confe-

derated Homes offer the best and safest opportunity for making this trial, as the parents would be enabled from day to day to observe the effect of the system upon the growing characters of their children. Moreover, the children would receive the benefit both of school and home training, and the well-known defects of each would be counteracted. The children should be strictly kept to their own public school or play-rooms, and to the private apartments of their parents, the other public rooms of the house not being open to them.

THE SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT OF THE CONFEDERATED HOMES Have next to be considered. Of course we cannot make English people sociable if they will not be sociable. But it would add greatly to the cheerfulness and pleasure of the inhabitants of the Confederate Homes if they would promote a neighbourly intercourse with one another. Sociability is a bloom of social life, which can by no means be forced. It must spring up naturally, or it is neither beautiful nor healthy.

The failure so often commented upon in our costly entertainments to afford either pleasant or elevating social intercourse, may be attributed chiefly to their being laborious efforts to produce forced gaiety. In our Confederate Homes we might, if we chose, have society without laborious effort or extravagant expenditure, and gaiety and pleasure arising therefrom.

Another reason why our social intercourse fails to give pleasure is, that vice has in the minds of some become so inseparably connected with pleasure, that pure social intercourse has become insipid to them, and in entering into it they either communicate to it their sense of bored weariness or they affect it with their morally poisonous breath. One of the chief causes which produce this morbid taste for vicious pleasures lies in the solitary life hundreds of young people have to live; suddenly cut off from all home influence, and having hardly any means of social intercourse unconnected with dissipation. In our united homes the want which young men and women feel of social intercourse and due variety of amusement, which they can from the first enjoy together, would be met naturally and healthily.

But, wherever there is society, there must be some rules or laws to guide and regulate it. And the necessary though slight restriction upon personal liberty which would be required in this case, is felt by many to be the greatest bar to its adoption. The man expands his chest, throws up his head, plants his feet firmly on the ground, and exclaims, "Do you know, madam, that an Englishman's house is his CASTLE?" The lady might reply, "Sir, what do you want with a 'Castle' in these days?—we do not live in feudal times. If you want protection you will find more in a Confederate Home, than in

an isolated one? But if your idea of a 'Castle' is a modern house in which you can tyrannize over all the inmates like a feudal lord, I, as an Englishwoman, shall not be sorry to be quit of your 'Castle' as soon as convenient."

But, putting aside the idea of lawlessness and tyranny which the word Castle suggests, an organization always must bring with it certain restrictions on personal liberty, which, however, are in a very short time cheerfully submitted to for the sake of the general good order and harmony which they produce.

The name "Confederated" suggests the method of government—a union of independent States, or Homes, whose individual arrangements are in no way interfered with, but for the general good. The form of government should be representative, voted by each proprietor of rooms or sets of rooms. By married people the vote to be given by *either* husband or wife.

The American lady before quoted, writes :—

"Men are very fond of twitting us women with desiring to leave our own 'sphere' in order to lord it over theirs in a high-handed manner. I believe that nothing would induce the majority among us to enter their dusty, noisy, blood-stained precincts; but we should be exceedingly obliged if they would just step out of ours."

I disagree with the writer on both sides of the question. Much as separation of classes is desirable, so much is union of sexes desirable (one of the greatest evils of servant-girls living away from their own class, is their being separated from the men of their own class). Instead of keeping two sorts of lives distinctly apart for the two sexes, each, if they really understood the value of the other, would use their utmost endeavours to draw the influence of the one sex rightly to bear on the life of the other.

Men, if they were wise, would invite women to enter their political sphere, to make it less "noisy, dusty, and blood-stained."

Women, if they were wise, would invite men to enter their domestic sphere, to make it more noble and intellectual.

This would not be introducing any *new* element into either life, but only using rightly what *is* there already, and changing it from an abnormal and unhealthy influence to a normal and healthy one.

Women exercise in the political sphere a secret, underhand influence, *and are not responsible for any of the mischief they may so create.*

Men exercise a tyrannical influence over the domestic sphere, *and are not responsible for any of the mischief they may so create.*

Be it also carefully marked that the irresponsible influence of both sexes increases the bad and weak points of both spheres. The women's underhand (because ignorant) influence increases the con-

fusion, heat, and contention in the political world. The man's tyrannical (because ignorant) influence increases the meanness, littleness, and unintellectuality of the domestic world. Ignorant is both the man and the woman's action so exercised, neither understanding rightly the conditions or peculiar position of either sphere.

It is utterly impossible to get rid of this mischievous influence until ignorance is removed and responsibility attached to action on both sides. For these reasons it is earnestly to be desired that in any reformed system of domestic living, men and women will together be its joint managers and directors.

THE CRISIS.

There is one possible consequence which may follow from this change in the method of conducting domestic labour which is a very serious one to face. It is, that when women's work is organized, men will take it. That there is this danger lying in the way is an undoubted fact, and we must well consider it before we approach it. Not for the sake of deciding whether we *will* approach it, but to determine *how* to approach it.

The interests of all women are in one way or another bound up with the final settlement of the domestic servant question.

Every species of industry originally executed by women *in* the home, which it was found possible to perform outside the home, men have taken; they live by these industries, they have amassed fortunes by them, they have gained honours and titles through them, they hold the reins of power by reason of them, and will they appropriate the remainder of them when the brand of servitude is taken off, and when an adequate price can be obtained by working in them?

I am not going to accuse men of injustice either for what they have done, or what they may do in the matter. I still say, let those who can best perform the work of the world, by all means take it, be they men or women. But surely those who arrogate to themselves the supreme possession of the highest sentiment of justice, cannot without a blush of shame continue to put every facility for the best performance of work before their own sex, and every barrier against the best performance of work before our sex. It remains with parents, but especially with the stronger parent, to decide whether their daughters, as well as their sons, shall by general as well as technical education have equal facilities afforded them for performing the many and various labours of life.

This organization of domestic work *must* come, whether now or in a hundred years' time, and then the last "protective" cork is taken from under our shoulders, and we sink or swim in the wide ocean of

life. If, then, freedom is not given us, our degradation begins, and with it that of the whole race. There will be but one "profession" left us, with Matrimony at the top and Prostitution at the bottom,—the latter increasing (both in fact and feeling), the former decreasing (both in fact and feeling). All we can then hope and pray for is that there is "another and a better world," where we shall have no "natural protectors" to rob us of everything in life, that makes life worth having!

This is the "kill" side of the crisis; what is the "cure" side?

That domestic work must be executed in the home, and cannot be moved out of it, is one great safeguard. We know little and care less about the sort of human tools who work for us outside our homes. We see only the rich, powerful masters; but we must see and come in contact with the home-workers; and we should not like to have them about us, coarse, passionate, sulky, or ill-looking. Therefore, a woman, if properly trained, might make up for the want of physical strength, by a greater quickness and tact, by a more pleasant and obliging manner and temper, and (if a free worker) by being more to be relied upon as a conscientious worker. It is fashion, not use, that gives us those cumbersome, expensive, ridiculous creatures, men-servants.

Another safeguard in the association of home life, would be that men would see and know when they were exercising a degrading influence over women, and would not remain so ignorant of the mischief they were doing.

I agree with Mrs. M. Peirce in the following sentence:—"Were women deliberately to discuss it, I think they would rather conclude that first, being excessively absorbed in themselves, men forget us; and second, acting always together in large masses, while every one of us is solitary, they are not aware that any strictly feminine rights and privileges exist which they should respect."

If we were less solitary in our domestic life, men would not so easily forget us, nor be so carelessly unjust to us. Most of the suffering inflicted by women as well as men, is due to our not being able to trace the results of our actions or mode of life upon others. We not only forget the sufferers, but we have never seen or known them, and so do not realize their sufferings. At the same time the possibility of secrecy which isolation affords, encourages many to inflict evils which shame would hold them from, if no little corner of secrecy could hide them. The greater publicity of associated-home life would help greatly both to defend and to prevent us from injuring others. Honest-lived and unselfish people would rejoice in this: only the mean, sulking, selfish ones would dislike it.

Our best safeguards are the light of one another's eyes. Publicity

is the natural Confessional followed by its natural Penance. Here a man's actions tell of his character, without morbidly probing and prying into his thoughts and feelings. Here Confession is made without words, and secrets disclosed without questions, and this open-air confessional is as healthy and bracing to the character as the secret-closet confessional is unhealthy and enervating.

Another good influence I hope to see growing within this new social organization is that gained by the education of the two sexes together. It is the natural grafting and budding of the human stock. We must look to America for the proof of this good influence. Mr. Harris, superintendent of the public schools in St. Louis, Missouri, says:—

"Within the last fifteen years the schools of St. Louis have been remodelled upon the plan of the joint education of the sexes, and the results have proved so admirable that a few remarks may be ventured on the experience which they furnish.

"I. Economy has been secured. . . .

"II. Discipline has improved continually. . . . The rudeness and *abandon* which prevail among boys when separate, at once gives place to self-restraint in the presence of girls, and the sentimentality engendered in girls when educated apart from boys disappears in these joint schools, and in its place there comes a dignified self-possession.

"III. The quality of instruction is improved. Where the boys and girls are separate, methods of instruction tend to extremes that may be called masculine and feminine. Each needs the other as a counter check.

"IV. The development of individual character is far more sound and healthy."*

Dr. Fairchild, president of Oberlin College, gives the same testimony:—

"Apprehension is felt that character will deteriorate on the one side or the other, that young men will become frivolous or effeminate, and young women coarse and masculine. That young men should lose their manly attributes and character from proper association with cultivated young women, is antecedently improbable, and false in fact. It is the natural atmosphere for the development of the higher qualities of manhood, magnanimity, generosity, true chivalry, and earnestness. The animal man is kept subordinate in the prevalence of these higher qualities. We have found it the surest way to make men of boys, and gentlemen of rowdies.

"On the other hand—the natural response of women to the exhibition of manly traits is in the correlative qualities of gentleness, delicacy, and grace."

No influence could better fit men and women for associated home-life than this. And associated-home life is the logical and natural sequence to this associated school life. It is a matter of wonder to me that Americans have not thus followed on what they have so well begun. It is in view of the sacrifice of the fruits of education

* "The Education of Women in America," *Westminster Review*.

and talent which Mrs. Peirce observes in her country-women when married that she writes her little book on co-operative housekeeping, in order to recommend the creation of a new and separate world of life for women, not seeing how, even if it were possible (on this earth), it would have the very worst result on social life, increasing instead of decreasing the folly, weakness, and wickedness of both sexes.

With social union would come in time sociability, even amongst English people. We are still a growing nation, and can therefore, notwithstanding our much-talked-of "national character," adapt that character to altered circumstances.

With this sociability within the social union would come less ignorance in men and women of each other's "spheres;" they would learn that there is much less difference between them than they imagined; that the same talents which command success in the one would command it in the other; that the same principles which can only rightly regulate the one must regulate the other also; and that the same disposition which produces order and harmony in the one is equally required to produce order and harmony in the other.

"There is no such actual division between the social and political worlds as people seem to imagine. The political world is but an extension of the social world.

"It is the name merely, which has been given to that particular system, which society has created, and by which men have agreed that social life shall be governed or regulated. There is no such thing as a political world existing apart from the social world. Those who constitute the so-called political world, are part of the social world, and the laws they or their representatives make are to act upon the social world." *

An associated home is wanted to fill up the gap between the isolated home life and the organized political one—and may be the stepping-stone or bridge between the one and the other.

The *Times* remarks on the paper on Co-operative Housekeeping I read before the British Association, with regard to the servant question:—"Perhaps it will be found that the real value of her suggestion lies in warning people beforehand, how they are to deal with changes coming upon them with the force of necessity." I accept this opinion as a perfectly true one, and in publishing this paper most earnestly hope and desire that some of our best thinkers may consider the subject one worthy of their attention.

But if they would consider it fairly, they must divest their minds of Sex-"Bias."†

* Lecture on "Women's Suffrage and Female Conservatism," by E. M. King.

† Mr. Spencer's preparatory work on "The Study of Sociology" can hardly be said to be complete till he gives us a carefully studied account of the causes and effects of

CONCLUSION.

That intellectual ladies' newspaper, *The Queen*, was kind enough to remark respecting my paper read at Bradford, that "Whatever was new in it was not true, and whatever was true was not new." This criticism is more true than, at the time of the meeting at Bradford, I had imagined. The plan of Co-operative Housekeeping I have since found to be no new idea, but that many gentlemen in England have for several years tried to make the public see its advantages. I may indeed have to thank these pioneers for any success which my re-introduction of the subject has had or may have.

I propose, therefore, in the short space I have left, to insert a few passages from the papers which have been kindly sent me on this subject.

The first I extract from were published by the promoters of a "Residential Hotel Company." They proposed—

"To form a Company for the erection, in various parts of London and its suburbs, of buildings arranged suitably for letting in flats or suites of apartments, and for the erection and management of residential club-houses or private hotels, to be conducted on a co-operative principle, so as to afford to the residents the greatest possible comfort and convenience at the smallest possible cost."

The advantages of this plan were detailed in the following manner:—

"However desirable it may be that every family should have exclusive occupation of a certain portion of the earth's surface, in the present crowded state of our cities such an arrangement is clearly impossible. As a matter of fact, there are immense numbers of persons, even in comparatively comfortable circumstances, who are obliged to content themselves with the occupation of a part of a house. The great mass of people now living in London, do not need houses, but apartments. It is certain that ordinary London houses are very ill adapted for any kind of joint residence. With one narrow staircase for general communication, with one kitchen, and one set of domestic appliances, there is every opportunity for joint occupants to annoy one another, but very little facility for promoting their own or each other's comfort. A single man, who is not very fastidious, can find tolerably comfortable lodgings in most localities of London; but it is very hard to find lodgings where a family, or even a married couple, can be comfortably accommodated. In general, there is no sufficient guarantee of the respectability of the people living above or below. You can hardly feel at home where, in passing from one of your rooms to another, you are apt to come in contact with all kinds of strangers. If you want more than the orthodox 'two rooms,' you will probably have to put up with the back attic or a room in the next street.

Sex-Bias. Neither can he himself study the science with a clear eye and mind until he learns to divest himself of it.

It may be taken as a proof of the strength and blindingness of this bias, that Mr. Spencer either ignores, or is totally ignorant of its very existence, whereas it is the most warping and misleading bias in the whole range of social science and social action.

"The advantages of large buildings, comprising a great number of residences, as compared with separate houses, in large cities, are so numerous as to take up some space in the mere enumeration, and so obvious that it seems hardly necessary to name them to a reasonable being. • The comfort of having the precise number of rooms that one requires, conveniently situated altogether on one floor, and in case of an increase in family, being able to obtain additional accommodation under the same roof; the saving in ground-rent; the greater facility for having dwellings constructed in a sound and substantial manner; the greater privacy afforded by sound-proof walls and floors, so that musical people can indulge their tastes without annoyance to neighbours; the great safety from robbery; the better security in respect of fire; the better sanitary arrangements; the increased facilities for ventilation and for the adaptation of warming apparatus; the satisfaction and self-respect arising from the living in a noble building; the utilization of the unoccupied spaces between the buildings as ornamental grounds, in place of our hideous 'back-yards,'—these, and many other advantages afford a series of topics upon which many volumes might be written."

Some letters, published by Colonel Clinton, written by himself and Mr. Vansittart Neale, are valuable as showing the good principles we must proceed upon. The following are extracts from one or two of these:—

"*First*, in speaking of the injustice of which men are guilty habitually at the present day, I do *not mean* injustice knowingly and wilfully committed.

"The reformation of any society would be quite hopeless, if its members had no desire to act justly towards each other. And my hopes of success in well-directed efforts for the improvement of the relation existing in England between the richer and poorer classes, rest on the persuasion that a desire to act justly in the ordinary relations of life, is widely spread and deeply rooted in our country; and that the injustice of which I complain, is due to the *imperfection of our institutions* for carrying on the great businesses of domestic service, and the production and exchange of commodities, rather than to the *imperfections of the individuals* acting under them.

"An undisciplined army is liable to disgraceful panics, although it may be composed of men individually brave. So society among us is suffering, in my judgment, from an all-pervading element of injustice, although the individuals composing it are, as I believe, individually, for the most part, desirous of being just.

"That the external advantages of united Homes will one day be attained, I fully believe. But I am satisfied also, that the Homes must themselves grow out of a higher principle than any desire of personal advantage.

"The inward forms the outward for itself. The outward may, and must, react upon the inward, furthering or impeding it, but it cannot give rise to it; and if it be not formed round the inward, I should rather say, developed out of the inward, as the bark out of the sap, it will have no life in it, and will fall to pieces from the action of surrounding agencies."

The next is a letter sent me, cut from the *Builder*, which very well, and in a short space, sums up the advantages of Associated Homes:—

"ASSOCIATED HOMES.

"SIR,—I have long urged the social necessity of these adopted Homes to a vast number of persons in the middle and lower classes, combining (as they might be made to do) all the privacy and independence of the individual home ; the stringency and selectness of, say, a West-end club ; the order, domestic arrangements, and committee of management of our great London and Continental hotels, and, like them, erected by companies ; lastly, economy, enormously less ; affording that social and intellectual intercourse of society not otherwise attainable ; diminishing (that refuge for so many) evening amusements, drinking, abuse of tobacco, the social evil, idleness, and dissipation ; and avoiding that source of all ruin to young people, the life and solitude of lodgings, chambers, and isolation of living.

"AUGUSTUS JOHN HARVEY, F.S.A."

In November, 1868, Mr. Doxey published a letter in the *Co-operator* ; and the *Co-operative News* of January and March, 1872, had articles on the subject.

A gentleman living at Honor Oak, who has for many years advocated the plan of Associated Homes, writes to me that he has "something over two acres of freehold land," and is anxious to build upon it "a small experimental establishment."

The business arrangements I must give in the gentleman's own words, and leave them to be tested by a better business capacity than mine :—

"To facilitate this introduction of the new principle of association, I am willing to deal with this small property—in either one of three ways. I would either sell the freehold, or I would let it on a building lease, with power to purchase, or I would retain the freehold in my own hands, and give debenture bonds as security on the property for the necessary capital required for building. In this latter form the necessary capital could be subscribed by ten people contributing 300*l.* or 500*l.* each, according to requirement, so raising a capital of from 3000*l.* to 5000*l.*, for which, instead of receiving percentage, they could have one or more private rooms, and the use of the general rooms rent free.

"To meet the cost of a much larger building the necessary capital might be raised either in shares under the Industrial Society's Act, or the Joint Stock Act."

I give these extracts to show those who are anxious for some plan of Co-operative Housekeeping to be commenced, that there are many others ready to meet them if they will come forward and join one another, so taking the first step in Social Union. I give them also, in justice to those who, long before any thought of mine had been directed to the subject, had devoted time, thought, and money to promote it. There always seems to be plenty of money to be found whenever any new undertaking is started, provided the honesty and good sense of the promoters is known (even *without its being known*). And in this undertaking there could be no greater difficulty in discovering these points than in any other. But, then,

the bait in these "companies" is to make money, and nothing seems to "draw" but this (except, indeed, that miserable mistake, charity). It never seems to occur to people that to make money, and to make comfort and luxury, are really very much the same thing. All we want money for is to buy comforts and luxuries, or we put it out at interest, to enable us to command an increase of comfort and luxury. Therefore, if a plan or undertaking enables us to gain comfort and luxury, have we not got hold of the very effect for which we desired money? All the difference is that we arrive at the comfort and luxury at first hand instead of at second hand. If we add to this that Co-operative Housekeeping will save money to enable us to command future increase of comfort and luxury for ourselves or others, does not this undertaking offer to an investor as much return for his money as if he had put it into a company offering 15, 20, or 30 per cent., which he might or might not get?

In my opinion a *small* establishment would afford but a bad experiment. We have not had sufficient social training to enable us to meet amicably in such close quarters. The larger the establishment we could set up, the better would be its chance of success. Judging from the calculations before me, I should say that, fairly to test the plan on the whole, two large buildings would be required, costing from 20,000*l.* to 30,000*l.* each. One for families with incomes ranging from 100*l.* to 500*l.* per annum. Another, from whence houseworkers for both establishments could be taken, and where families with incomes of 100*l.* a year or less could live.

Who will come forward and inaugurate this great social reform?

E. M. KING.



THE RELATION OF THE CLERGY TO POLITICS.

"Come la osservanza del culto divino è cagione della grandezza delle repubbliche, così il dispregio di quella è cagione della rovina d'esse. Perché, dove manca il timore di Dio, conviene che o quel regno rovinati, o che sia sostenuto dal timore d'un principe che supplisca a' difetti della religione."—MACHIAVELLI, Discorsi, l. 11.

THERE is one very remarkable distinction between the Church of England and the Church of Rome, as well as the various sects of Nonconformity, apart from directly theological divergencies. It is that it has for the most part proved impossible at any period of its history to convert it into a homogeneous political faction. Of course, there have been times, especially under Charles I. and at the era of the French Revolution, when there was a strong preponderance of one form of political thought amongst the clergy; but even then the collective Church did not act on a preconcerted policy. It should not be forgotten that a powerful body of Anglican clergymen, sympathizing with the school of Abbot rather than of Laud, sided with the Parliament in the great struggle of 1640-9, and did not find out till too late that the victorious Presbyterians and Independents had no thought of tolerating an episcopate, however maimed, or the Prayer Book, however mutilated. But it required a species of Terror to drive the liberal clergy into reaction; and even when the vengeance of the penal laws against Dissenters marked the Restoration, those laws were not even indirectly the work of the returning priesthood,

but were the means which the Commons of England, in their first free Parliament after the military dictatorship was set up in 1653, took to protect themselves against any possible revival of the intolerable social, civil, and religious tyranny under which they had suffered at Puritan hands.

Looking at the whole question in the light of the present day, we recognize the unwisdom of the legislation in 1661-4, and our sympathies must needs be with Sir Matthew Hale in his unsuccessful attempt in 1669 to obtain some mitigation of the laws against Non-conformists; yet the answer of the Commons was an address to the king to issue a proclamation against conventicles, which was in fact done; but as five thousand out of the seven thousand non-episcopalian ministers who had been intruded under the Commonwealth into Church benefices had conformed immediately on the Act of Uniformity coming into use, and a very large proportion of the two thousand who at first seceded afterwards retracted their opposition, it is hardly necessary to point out that there were far too many clergymen bound by old ties of association with Nonconformists to have permitted the Church's policy to be as intolerant as that of the State was. And in the latter years of the eighteenth century, it is not singular if the public repudiation of Christianity made by the victorious Mountain in France, rallied the great body of the clergy to the side of the Holy Alliance. But at all other times in English history, save under the Tyranny of the House of Tudor, the Church of England appears as a mainly non-political body, though marked at intervals, as under William II., John, and Henry IV., with a liberal bias. The Tudor despots made the Church a mere subordinate department of State, and even the partial reaction under Mary I. did not lift it out of this rut.

But there never has been at any time in England a clerical party as opposed to a national party, such as France, Spain, Belgium, Austria, and Italy show us as the normal working of the Roman Catholic Church in politics; nor, on the other hand, is there anything in the Anglican system to be compared with the consummate drill which gives Nonconformists their Parliamentary strength, which makes every chapel a committee-room, every minister an electioneering agent, every deacon and office-bearer of Dissent a canvasser; and which, until the Ballot came, virtually disfranchised every Nonconformist who was unwilling to accept the political platform of his sect.

That which is now a characteristic of the English Church only, was once the heritage of the Church Catholic. The East, under the influence of Byzantine Cæsarism, lost it first, and became fossil and despiritualized. The West retained it far longer, but the fatal error

which rejected the reforms of Pisa and Basel, which left the work of Trent half finished, which narrowed the great promise of the Counter-Reformation into a mere reaction, has in our own days culminated in the Italianization, or rather the Vaticanization, of Latin Christendom, the political ideas of the Syllabus, and the identification, in the minds of both friends and foes, of Roman Catholicism with the cause of despotic authority, or, as it prefers to call itself, Legitimacy.

I have never heard how those ardent champions of the divine right of kings, who look on the Count of Chambord as the purest representative of Legitimacy in Europe, get over the initial difficulty of the revolution, for it was nothing less, which put Hugh Capet, his ancestor, on the throne of the Karlings, although their line was not extinct. The nearest parallel in modern history is the substitution of the Bernadottes for the Wasas in Sweden, but we cannot quite fancy a genuine Legitimist going into loyal hysterics over Oscar II.

The peculiarity of rather trying to guide the springs of political action than to operate directly in politics is retained by the daughter communions of England. It was noteworthy, during the Civil War in America, that the Episcopal Church contained within its pale so many advocates of both parties, even at the North, that it was impossible to use it as a political engine in either interest, whereas the sects in the Northern States threw themselves with acerbity into the struggle, did very much to embitter the rancour with which it was carried on, and materially impeded the final pacification and amnesty.

To so great an extent has this habitual abstention from political strife marked the Church of England, that her nominal position as the Established Church has not prevented her from being treated by the State as the least favoured communion for a long time past. This policy received its chief impetus from the quasi-official religious statistics appended by Mr. Horace Mann to the census of 1851, whereby it was made to appear that the aggregate of Nonconformists slightly exceeded the numbers of the Church of England, and that in a rapidly increasing proportion. It was alleged on the Church side that these returns had been carefully cooked, and that the principal agency resorted to was the selection of a time of year when rural churches are most scantily attended, while private notice was sent to the various Nonconformist bodies to organize a special whip for their congregations on the Sunday fixed for the census, whereas no corresponding warning was given to the clergy.

I have no means of testing the truth of this demurrer, but it is only a few months since a leading Nonconformist newspaper attempted a religious census of its own, in the interests of its party.

but found every item of its statistics not merely challenged, but refuted; while the steady opposition made by Dissenters in 1861 and 1871 to having an unimpeachable census of the kind included in the State returns establishes beyond question one of two things—either that they do not themselves credit the tables of 1851, or that they believe themselves to have lost ground very considerably since. There is, to be sure, a third possible explanation: that a great proportion of Nonconformists are not at all proud of their Dissent, and are reluctant to declare themselves unconnected with the Church of England. But that would prove theological enfeeblement, more fatal than numerical loss.

But whatever the facts may be, there is no question at all of the entire political success of the manœuvre of 1851. Several Bills which owe their origin mainly to polemical hostility, and have not any nobler source, have passed into Acts solely because of the belief of Government that it was siding with the stronger party. Amongst them the Church-Rates Abolition Bill, the Universities Tests Bill, the Endowed Schools Act, and the Elementary Education Act, may be specified as the most remarkable. Nor has the most cynical change of face as to the grounds on which some fresh demand was made altered the position of affairs. Thus, the reason for which Dissenters asked for the Abolition of Church-Rates was that the church and churchyards were the *private* property of a body alien to them, and that it was unjust to ask them to pay for their maintenance. Having thus got rid of any pecuniary liability, they next claimed, in Mr. Osborne Morgan's defunct Burials Bill, that the churchyards are *national* property, and that they who refuse to give a penny for keeping them up, are nevertheless to have equal powers and rights over them with those who not only possess their freehold at common law, but have all the cost of their maintenance besides. I do not propose to go into details here, but it is clear that if the two Bills, that for Burials and that for Church-Rates, had been launched in the same Session, they would have destroyed each other by their total incompatibility of principle, and neither would have passed.

So, too, the real meaning of the organization which calls itself the "Society for the Liberation of Religion from State Control" is the liberation of the State from the control of Religion; for it has never made one solitary step in the direction of its nominal programme. If it were in earnest, it would set itself to loose the fetters of the State wherever they press on any religious body whose existence is not contrary to morals and social order. For instance, one of its chief aims is the expulsion of the Bishops from the House of Lords. Now, I attach exceedingly little value to that privilege, because it has never been usefully employed within living memory.

But it is certainly not a mark of control exercised by the State over the Church. On the contrary, it is a relic of the great social power of the Church in days when she forced the fierce Barons of the Plantagenet Kings to acknowledge her prelates as their equals and superiors, and to see unarmed Bishops placed in Parliament above the whole body of temporal peers.* I may be pardoned a moment's antiquarian digression to say that the present order of precedence, whereby, while Archbishops rank before Dukes, Bishops rank after Viscounts, and merely before Barons, is an innovation of Henry VIII.'s in 1540. Before that date "baronage" and "peerage" were convertible terms, so that spiritual peers thus took rank before *all* temporal peers. It is curious that the position of the Bishop of Durham, who, though Count Palatine from 892 † down to 1836 (whence the coronet on the Durham mitre), and thus Premier Earl of England, ranked below the Bishop of London, who had no temporal title, did not teach heralds this. The truth is that if Bishops were freely elected—I do not mean by a little jobbing clique of gentlemen in a Cathedral chapter, but by the open vote of the clergy and laity of their dioceses,—they would be just such a popular element as the House of Lords wants, and less open to suspicion than any nominated life-peers. The real liberation would be, not to deprive them of their seats, but to deprive the Crown of its power of nomination to sees. I am not here entering on the question of the goodness or badness of such a change, but it is obvious enough that it would come fairly within the scope of the Liberation Society, while to abolish a privilege which hurts nobody, except perhaps its willing recipients, is not justly within its programme. So, too, I have never heard of Liberationists suggesting that Crown patronage should be abandoned (apart from general disestablishment), and an end be thus put to the indirect control exercised by the State over all clergymen who are looking for promotion. I have seen no effort of theirs to allow of Convocation reforming itself; I do not know of a Dissenting protest against the refusal to allow Churchmen to found or endow new dioceses, collegiate churches, or canonries, without asking Parliament for permission; I have not found any Nonconformist motion for the repeal of the disabilities which forbid a clergyman from sitting in the Commons, where as many Nonconformist ministers as can get constituencies to choose them may take their seats,—surely a full set-off to the Episcopal votes in the less powerful chamber. On the contrary, the call for the disendowment of the Church of England is a demand for a very tyrannical act of control to be exercised

* The form in which the Bishops and mitred Abbats enforced their claim has been recorded: "Nos Barones, vos Barones, hic sumus pares."

† The See was then, and for a few years afterwards, at Chester-le-Street.

by the State over religion, by impoverishing its ministers and stinting the means available for carrying on divine service. So far back as 1854 I was an advocate for the disestablishment and disendowment of the Irish Church. I have never wavered in opinion on that head. But one of the main reasons which led me to that conclusion was that I saw that the funds of the Irish Establishment were chiefly derived from money and endowments paid by the State as its hire for certain work to be done ; part of which was entirely bad and indefensible, and part of which was good. As the State had become thoroughly ashamed of the bad part of the work, I saw that it was justified in declining to pay for that any longer ; and as the Irish Church did not attempt to do the good part of the work, the State was equally justified in exacting forfeit of the remainder on that ground. As a fact, this second argument was not imported into the debates of 1869, but it ought to have been, and the practical result was much what the exposure of the truth on this head would have produced.

But the case of the Church of England is entirely unlike. No State funds can be traced to her possession, save the moneys raised for the rebuilding of St. Paul's after the Fire of London, and two Parliamentary grants, about three millions of money in all, against which must be set fifty millions stolen by the State under the Tudors, and devoted, not to national purposes, but to the creation and enrichment of a pinchbeck nobility. Every attempt to prove the national origin of her funds, or the Parliamentary origin of her status, has failed, and must fail, because no statutory or legal tittle of evidence in favour of the view can be produced, and rebutting proofs are superabundant.* She has never made any political contract, expressed or understood, with the State, which can therefore be rescinded on the score of inexpediency, immorality, or failure in execution. And whereas there was even less to be said in favour of the practical efficiency of the Irish Church of 1868 than for English Cathedrals forty years ago, the main difficulty now of political Nonconformists is that the revival of the spiritual activities of the Church of England has made their own collective efforts seem tame beside her rapid and vigorous progress. Disendowment, therefore, would be a mere envious fraud on the largest scale ; and would rank at best with Spain's repudiation of her financial obligations.

Nevertheless, even threats of this sort are not enough to compact English Churchmen into one political school. It would seem, on the

* The State does pay certain clergymen, but only such as are specifically hired for Government work, as diplomatic, military, naval, prison, and workhouse chaplains. But this is a private contract with individuals.

face of things, as though the ranging of all the intending spoliators on one side of the House of Commons, and the tendency shown by Liberal Governments to work the will of the sects, would necessarily identify the English clergy as a body with the Conservative party. Nothing looks more plausible than the argument, "Why should we help to keep a party in office which abuses the power of the State over the Church by stripping her of one privilege and right after another at the bidding of foes who will never be satisfied till she is naked, wounded, and half dead? Why should we not rather organize and consolidate all the vast latent social power of the Church, and utilize it politically for her defence, as Dissenters do their forces for her injury and overthrow?" Yet no such reaction has as yet been feasible, none such will, so far as I can judge, take place under any stress short of formal persecution. And the reason is just because the Church is not, and cannot afford to be, a sect. She inherits, in this particular, the instincts of primitive Christianity. The double attitude of Christians in the first century towards Judaism and the Empire is hardly estimated as it should be. Looked at from its Hebrew side, the Gospel was an Evolution, conserving and developing all the essential verities of the Mosaic system, but giving them a wider basis and a more permanent life. From the Gentile side, the Church was a Revolution, a challenge to the whole social system of Roman politics and law. That fact, seen clearly by the statesmen of Rome, is the key to the ten persecutions. Mr. Fitzjames Stephen has quite failed to see this truth in his incidental discussion of the Pagan struggle in his treatise on "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity." He looks on the quarrel as merely religious, and expresses surprise that the Roman authorities, knowing Paganism to be dead or dying, did not say so, and accept the Christian platform as far as it was a protest against idolatry. He does not see that the worship of the Empire was not a question of Jupiter or Mavors, of Vesta or Quirinus, far less of the rout of exotic divinities, Isis and Serapis, Astarte and Cotytto, but the deification of the State. *Fortuna Romana*, *Roma Æterna*, the Capitol, as the shrine of Roman nationality, such were the true objects of Roman reverence and worship; and when the *Numen Imperatoris* was substituted as the favourite cult in somewhat later days, it was only in virtue of the fiction which identified the mortal Augustus with the undying Genius of Rome. Military prowess and discipline, legal precision and authority, a dependent chain of conquered and despoiled provinces adorning the neck and ministering to the wants of the imperial city, an oligarchy of force resting on a vast basis of slavery; an iron despotism which left a fugitive no place of safety within the civilized world, such was the system which found its rival in another

organism which set up the pen as the opponent of the sword, which taught a law of equity that could not always be reconciled with the inflexible statutes of the Civil Code, which struck at the whole theory of Roman centralization by its graduated representative system, ranging through congregational assemblies and diocesan synods to provincial councils, soon to be crowned by the Œcumenical convention of deputies from every province ; which by recognizing brotherhood with the slave, the pauper, the outcast, and the felon, alarmed a government always in nervous dread of a servile war chancing to coincide with danger on the frontiers.

I have never seen anywhere sufficient stress laid on that magnificent proof of original statesmanship which the synodical system of the ancient Church afforded. It is a commonplace to remark how Christians availed themselves of the civil divisions they found established—how the parish, the diocese, the province, the patriarchate, were mere copies of political distributions familiar to Roman law ; but the fundamental unlikeness of a Church council to the Senate has, I think, been overlooked. The Senate was not, even under the Republic, a genuinely representative body, except so far as it consisted of past officials who had been elected by the local Roman Comitia, and when under the Empire it was packed with Court nominees, of course it was still less so. And it was purely local from first to last. Even when it became possible for a provincial to be a Senator, it was necessary to begin by dissociating himself from his former ties, and attaching himself to Rome only. If he were elected, it was by local Roman votes ; if nominated, it was by the Censor under the Republic and the Emperor at a later day. And yet the assembly thus constituted ruled all the provinces, appointed their governors, and levied their taxes. If local wrong were done, there was no person to speak from personal knowledge in defence of the oppressed provincials. Their best hope was to persuade or hire some Senator to take up their cause, as we have seen done in our day by Indian princes who thought themselves wronged by Government, and succeeded in getting a member of Parliament to raise the question in the House of Commons. But the Conciliar system of the Church was devised with consummate ability on a perfectly opposite theory. It was based on the principle of combining local representation and freedom of election with the choice of the fittest candidates, to form a legislative assembly, wherein no mere second-hand information should be the basis of legislation.

That object was attained in this wise : Every diocese in a province elected its Bishop by the free vote of the clergy and laity, subject, in the case of a disputed election or an unwise choice, to the casting vote or the veto of the other Bishops of the same province, and sent

him as its delegate to the synod. Every diocese had an equal representation, and the vote of the Bishop of great cities like Milan or Cæsarea, unless he happened to preside as Metropolitan, counted for no more than that of the diocesan of mere villages such as Nazianzus or Tagaste; while the manner in which the Bishops were chosen not only insured perfect local knowledge, but also clothed them with full representative powers, and provided, as a rule, the most competent men. It is a noteworthy fact that of the Fathers of the great literary ages of early Christianity, only three, Tertullian, Origen, and St. Jerome, were not Bishops, and there were very adequate reasons in these three cases to account for the exception. It would be no great exaggeration to invert this statement as regards the most eminent English theologians since the Reformation, especially if Charles II.'s little galaxy of famous Bishops be omitted from the list. And this, I think, is a sufficient vindication of the ancient method.

It would be difficult to devise any scheme on paper, after all the accumulated experience of centuries, which could better attain the proposed ends than this did; and its fundamental Liberalism is unquestionable. The franchise was all but universal; that is, all the male laity who had not forfeited their rights by offences against the disciplinary canons, were in early times entitled to vote. That gave the element of popularity. But the clerical vote was co-ordinate, and not merged in theirs. That gave educated thought its due weight, and lessened the probability of a mere plausible quack being chosen. And the Court of Revision, consisting, it is to be remembered, of men themselves freely elected in this same way, provided against the chances of a combined mistake in the choice. What is more, great local powers were conceded. Every diocese could regulate its own finance, and within certain easy limits its own liturgy; every province could settle a code of discipline for its own union of dioceses; but nothing short of a general council could enact anything new which bound all. Even a large majority at such a council could not do this. There must be actual or virtual unanimity before a dogmatic decree could pass.

Now, the reason for this union of centralization and decentralization was twofold. In allowing all minor changes which might be locally expedient to be made freely in diocesan and provincial synods, the Church made provision for growth and expansion, for continual adaptation of means to ends, for the invention and application of new machinery to new needs, and made it the interest of the office-bearers to do what was popular in the best sense. It thus gave full play to the dynamic power of the local bodies, and was markedly Liberal or centrifugal.

On the other hand, by refusing the power of altering the mode of stating doctrines to anything save the unanimous vote of an assembly fairly representing all the provinces of the Church (and not then unless validated through subsequent acceptance by the constituencies), the greatest conceivable obstacle was brought to bear against any change in the historical belief of Christendom, and thus the statics of the Church were maintained, and her Conservative or centripetal aspect manifested. The Divine right of Revelation, the popular right of free government, the moral right of education over ignorance, were thus combined and reconciled. No doubt this fair ideal was soon marred by attacks from opposite sides, by State interference on the one hand, by episcopal encroachments on the other, but its outlines remain clearly legible still, as the liberal constitution of ancient Christianity.

Wherever and whenever the Church is true to herself, these two factors will be evident in her policy, and it will be impossible for her loyal members to throw themselves unreservedly into the arms of any political party. I do not mean that they may not often most righteously give their fullest aid to a specific political movement, just as it was Stephen Langton who had most to do with forcing Magna Charta from John Plantagenet; as it was the Seven Bishops whose action precipitated James II. from his throne, albeit the majority of them had no desire for such a result; but it never can be right for the clergy to be dragged, *quant même*, behind any partisan chariot whatever.

Now, it is impossible for Nonconformists to adopt this middle attitude without a sacrifice of logic and consistency. Protestantism has no statics, no historical connection with the past of Christianity. It may have—nay, it undoubtedly has—a certain surface community of names and ideas therewith, but no more; it never can have any closer relation to the Apostolic Church than the Empire of Napoleon I. had with the Empire of Karl the Great, or with that of Augustus Cæsar. I do not pretend to discuss here the question as to whether it is a better or a worse thing; it is enough for my purpose to point out that it is a different thing; and that not different as modern Roman Catholicism is, by accretion and development, but by entire disconnection lineally, and entire change of front intellectually. When Protestantism is at rest, as in Sweden for instance, that is not due to the maintenance of statics, but to the exhaustion of dynamics. It stops, not because it wishes to stop, but because it has not vitality enough to go on. So long as it has any life in it, change is a necessity of its existence, and Liberalism must needs be the political index of its theological progression in the direction of unbelief. Whenever it becomes Conservative, it means that it is

dead as a religious energy ; witness Orangeism, which is for the most part nominally Tory, but which is merely the fossil of an extinct species of Whiggery.

Now this motive power of Protestantism has often done most valuable service to society, in aiding to overthrow oppressive despotisms, physical or moral, and in sending powerful currents of fresh air into stagnant and malarious atmospheres in politics and religion. But it lacks constructiveness, and what watch-makers call "maintaining power." In England, too, it does not work with entirely clean hands. It had, as I have observed, its heyday of success, which it abused, and was consequently punished with a speedy and irretrievable fall, with social depreciation, and with the graver suffering of having its customary rights forfeited, and made the privileges of a rival system. So complete was the overthrow, that the most fervid enthusiast of the older sects has no hope whatever of seeing his communion take the place of the Church of England. Such a thought does float before the mind of many a zealous Roman Catholic, perhaps before that of some exceptionally credulous Irvingite or Swedenborgian. But no Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist, Independent, believes for a moment, I will not say that his communion can ever become the Establishment in England, but that it can ever compete socially with the existing Church. Consequently, as each sect is singly nothing like a match for the Church, and though their quarrels with each other are quite as far from a settlement as their quarrel with the Church, they unite for the purpose of dragging it down to their own level, as they have no expectation of rising to the higher plane themselves. It is not a very statesmanlike, but is a very natural sentiment, yet they quite fail to see that the change they desire, even if effected, would do nothing towards redressing the social balance, unless they could offer some inducement which would draw to them those wealthy, leisured, and cultured classes on whose adhesion, and not on any accident of legal enactment or privilege, the social precedence of the Church is based. In Scotland, where the Church was forcibly disestablished and disendowed two centuries ago, it holds, even still, the first rank socially—the Established Kirk is a long way behind ; in the United States, where it was never established at all, save very partially in Virginia, and where it had to contend, after the Revolution, with strong political hostility, it holds already the first place socially, though far exceeded in wealth and numbers by several other bodies. Thus the only result of Disestablishment in this direction would be to unchain the controversial energies of the Church of England, and induce her to take a spiritual revenge for a temporal injury, by organizing a proselyting crusade against Nonconformity, instead of doing what she now does,

living on peaceable terms with it, and drawing to herself its members only individually and by the exercise of that curious fascination which she has for cultured English Dissenters; a fascination like in kind, and much stronger in degree, than that which the Church of Rome exercised over the imaginations of the Tractarians of 1838-45. How this fascination works in one way may be expressed by a proverbial phrase cited the other day by Mr. Winterbotham, who admitted its truth, but declared himself unable to account for it: "No Dissenting family keeps a carriage for three generations." I think I can help him to one or two of the reasons which escaped his inquiry. First, stands the natural human craving for something to reverence and admire. Augustness and beauty are necessities to a large class of minds, antiquity and mystery not less so. Now it is almost unnecessary to point out that these qualities are not to be found in the aspect of English Nonconformity. They may be done without, but only under two conditions: conspicuous religious superiority, or the memory of great wrongs gallantly endured. In the days of Whitfield and Wesley the former condition was fulfilled in favour of Dissent as compared with the Church; in the annals of the Waldenses, the Huguenots, and the Covenanters, the other is found. But now, on the one hand, the revival of the Church of England is such that no Dissenting body can plausibly point to itself as presenting an edifying contrast to the Establishment; and on the other, the persecution of Dissenters in England since the Restoration has often been petty, vulgar, and irritating, but never sweeping, vigorous, and cruel enough to give dignity to the sufferers. There is thus no romance about them, and whether there is or is not any encompassing the Church of England, at all events a great many people think that there is, and act on their persuasion. Next, Dissent in all its forms in England is a class-religion. If it have, which I am not going to dispute, the virtues of that great lower middle-class which is its backbone—nay, its whole skeleton and most of its flesh—it has also the accompanying faults and defects of the class. I shall not discuss them now: it is enough to remark that persons who are especially sensitive to these faults, as most who have achieved a certain level of culture usually are, become exceedingly impatient of them, and endeavour to dissociate themselves from all that suggests or embodies them. But the last reason is, in my belief, the most powerful of all. It is that Nonconformists have sacrificed spiritual energy to political organization.

The very men who believe themselves the champions of an Anti-State Church policy on the lofty ground that civil interference in religious matters is necessarily hurtful and degrading, look themselves for every victory over the Church to the votes they can bring to bear on a division in the House of Commons. Now having regard to the

source of power in our day, this policy is as distinctly an appeal to the civil authority, as completely Erastian in spirit, as that which made the Jesuits obtain the revocation of the Edict of Nantes from Louis XIV., or the Stewart bishops enforce their monitions in the Star Chamber. It is an abandonment of spiritual weapons, a confession that Nonconformists have no hope of becoming, by dint of argument and by religious merits, the dominant theological school in England. To achieve their object, they have been compelled to unite themselves exclusively to that political section which is most jealous of privilege, and most intolerant of authority, and have thus alienated the affections of all those of their own members who are either conservative in temper, or, what is much better, broad and sympathetic in political vision; and have weakened fatally the fervour of those devout enthusiasts, the salt of every communion, who believe in the ultimate triumph of their convictions, and cannot bear that the glory of that triumph should be dimmed by any ascription of it to mere civil accident; just as an Ultramontane devotee is shocked by the scepticism which admits the occurrence of some fact alleged as miraculous—say, the liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius—but insists on attributing it to purely physical causes.

However that may be, the result is that Nonconformists are almost passionately Liberals in politics, so much so that they have lately claimed to be the Liberal party, and to have all legislation which can be conceded the title of Liberal devised and carried out in the polemical interests of the sects against the Church. The only outcome I have as yet seen of this claim are some ominous tokens that they may bring about an entire change in the relations of political party, and make Churchman and Dissenter the main divisions on the hustings and in Parliament, to the exclusion of the present terms of Liberal and Conservative.

The Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, unlike Dissent, is, when free to act on its habitual convictions, ultra-Conservative in policy. In countries like the United States and Switzerland, where no dreams of an absolutist restoration, such as is desired in France and Spain, can be entertained, the clergy and their adherents are as compact in their political drill, and as unanimous in their party organization, as their Legitimist allies. In each case, the aggrandisement of the ecclesiastical system to which they belong is their first and only care, and they have, naturally enough, persuaded themselves that the victory of Ultramontane principles is identical with the highest welfare of the people.

That is because the force of the modern Roman Church lies in her vast statical power. She not merely opposes an enormous *vis inertię* to the progress of the revolutionary spirit, but she exerts all her

comparatively scanty dynamical force in striving to force back the current of public opinion by sheer direct resistance, an operation in which, as yet, no great success has attended her efforts. During her early days of illustrious success in taming and civilizing the barbarian conquerors of the Empire, she was content to be multinational, to adapt herself to the needs and capacities of each wild tribe or fierce people to whom she brought the Gospel and the notion of fixed law. In the Middle Ages, when she had federated the numerous Churches which her missionary zeal had founded, and recognized the ecclesiastical equality of their status and franchise, when she drew her Popes from Spain and France, from England and Germany, from Flanders and Burgundy, she was international. Since Trent and the counter-Reformation, she has been consistently Anti-National, and has steadily aimed at Italianizing every local Church over which she has authority.

It is needless to point out what an intense spirit of revolt and resistance she has thus roused, with what a bitter intensity she is hated, not merely by Red Republicans, Communists, and propagandist Atheists, but even by most of those orderly and religious people whose convictions are Liberal, and who have most interest in national and individual development.

These two examples, then, of Liberal Protestantism, which cannot win the love or respect of its own adherents, and Tory Romanism, which goads whole nations into angry hostility, are not encouraging to those who would fain urge either political extreme upon the Anglican clergy; and so far their corporate abstention from party strife is a good thing.

But it is a good thing of which it is quite possible to have too much, and I think the ratio of excess has been more than attained. The new forms which social and political problems are taking; the as yet undiscerned issues of the Reform Bill of 1867 and its complement the Ballot; the dimensions which the strife between capital and labour is assuming; the theories of the International; the remarkable change which recent events have produced in the current view of the mutual relations of Church and State;—all these enforce the need of something more than neutrality on the part of those who have so large a share in the education of English citizens.

There is one simplification of the problem. Real Toryism may be left entirely out of account. Not only has it been a logical impossibility here since Culloden, but even the fossilized Whiggery which has passed for Toryism ever since the fall of Lord North's ministry in 1782, has ceased to have a definite policy, other than that of occasionally putting its rivals into Opposition and taking its own seat on the Treasury benches.

By genuine Toryism I mean that form of political thought which upholds the divine right of a legitimate king, which considers that the monarch ought to govern personally, and have the power of choosing, directing, and dismissing Ministers at his pleasure; that the royal prerogative should be extended, and concessions to the people be regarded, not as the recognition of rights, but the bestowal of revocable privileges; that the advisers of the monarch and the occupants of all high offices should be, as a rule, selected from a wealthy and privileged hereditary caste; that there ought to be a dominant State Church with restrictive, if not coercive, powers over other forms of belief; that the press should be gagged; and that representative assemblies should have little more than consultative power, and the duty of providing taxes. In a word, the English Tory ideal would be Mr. Froude's—the Tudor tyranny. But whatever eccentric notions of the sort may be speculatively held by a few antiquaries and some devotees of the Syllabus, no one seriously imagines that a Carlist programme could be so much as drafted, not to say carried out, in England. The acquiescence of the whole country in the Act of Settlement, in the Bill of Rights, and many leading pieces of subsequent legislation, is too complete to admit of reversal within any conceivable cycle of politics. It is true that this is not all pure gain. No impartial thinker can doubt that the feeling of loyalty to a legitimate sovereign, where it really exists, is a very important and useful element in social statics; and no student of history can doubt that the sentiment which passes for such in England now is not the genuine article, but only a clever imitation, which needed the first sixty years of the eighteenth century for its manufacture. It is quite arguable, as a matter of discussion in a debating society, whether the abandonment of legitimacy and the importation of the House of Hanover was not a mistake, and whether any possible revival of James II.'s policy by his son and grandson could have done as much political harm as the insane obstinacy of George III. wrought in America and Ireland. But the practical result is that the final acceptance of the change has made real loyalty impossible to accurate thinkers. None of the several conditions under which it becomes possible exist in England to-day. Where the Sovereign is, as in Turkey, the undoubted heir of the line of chieftains who raised a petty Ugrian tribe to the rank of a powerful Empire, there the feeling may and does exist. Where he represents, as in Germany and Italy, the embodiment and realization of a national idea and policy, it may be found also; and yet again, where the Sovereign, as in Russia, is really the depository of supreme power, especially if he have used that power as wisely and benevolently as Alexander II. There are two other possible conditions:

the Chinese, where the monarch is regarded as the heir of a divine lineage, as being something above and apart from mere mortality; and the occasional one, when the brilliant powers of a particular sovereign, whether ill or well employed, extort admiring submission. Personal devotion of this sort to a St. Louis, a Cromwell, a Washington, or a Napoleon I. is natural, and easy of comprehension.

The sentiment with which an average constitutional Sovereign, holding his throne by Parliamentary grant, is and must be regarded, is quite unlike any of these; nor is the undoubted good-will with which the Queen is viewed by English citizens an exception to this truth. Toryism has, therefore, no political basis to work upon here, and I need not digress further to show that it has no religious platform either. Hence we have heard for many years past of Conservatism rather than of Tories. This is what I mean by fossilized Whiggery. It accepts, because it cannot help itself, or even because it approves, all the results flowing from the main current of legislation ever since 1688. But it desires to stop or to delay the further progress of that current so far as it can. That is, in short, to keep things as they are. History, however, refuses to stand still, and persistent opposition to the sequence of events means permanent exclusion from office. This is not pleasant enough to be borne with, and consequently the result we actually see is, that when Conservatives become the Government, they are not only obliged to carry on their rivals' measures instead of reversing them, but actually to outbid them in their own line. The Reform Bill of 1867 was a sweepingly Radical measure as compared with that of 1832, though introduced and carried by a nominally Conservative Cabinet, whose one motive, as frankly avowed by the late Lord Derby, was to "dish the Whigs." It is part of the heavy, though by no means inadequate price, we pay for a representative Government by party, that the question of Ins and Outs is more constantly before the minds of politicians than the real needs of the country. I, myself a Liberal of the Liberals, think that there are some particulars in which the legislation of past years ought to be reversed, and others wherein existing tendencies ought to be turned in a direction other than that which popular opinion prefers, but I quite fail to see any marks of clear conviction on such matters in the Conservative ranks. To conserve indiscriminately, to aim at fixing permanently everything which may be found floating in the political, religious, or social theories of the hour, is highly unphilosophical and unpractical, because much of what exists may be positively hurtful and inconsistent with the welfare—nay, the very being—of elements whose utility is unquestionable. There is thus no Tory party, and there is no Conservative policy. Does that solve the riddle? Not at all, because of the new complications which have grown up on the Liberal side.

As the Syllabus proposes the revival of Despotism in politics and religion, so the theories of the Commune and a very slight exaggeration of the principles laid down in Mr. John Stuart Mill's *Essay on Liberty*, aim at the abolition of the State. This, as a political conception, is wholly new. No Jacobin nor Pantisocratist of the last century dreamt of such a thing, albeit it is the natural and inevitable outcome of the principle of Individualism logically construed. Even in its more modified form, it has raised entirely fresh issues as to the sphere, functions, and extent of Government. How far Liberals may be divided on this question may be seen by comparing the views of Sir Arthur Helps with those of Mr. Herbert Spencer. The former, as is perhaps to be expected from an official of long experience, has great faith in Ministries and bureaux. He believes that as civilization becomes more elaborate, and society more complex, the duties and functions of government expand, ramify into fresh directions, and require a more detailed official machinery for their adequate discharge. The State is, in his eyes, the fatherly schoolmaster of a large body of very dull, very ignorant, and very wrongheaded boys; amongst whom a few brighter ones are found, who may be usefully employed as prefects and monitors. Mr. Spencer, on the other hand, holds (and I agree much more with him than with his opponent) that the less the State interferes with private enterprise and with individual citizens the better; that there are many things which the State cannot do, and ought not to try to do, which it actually attempts with consequences more or less disastrous, not only to the things which are not its business, but to those other things which are its business, but which it is forced to neglect or scamp in order to snatch a little time for "meddling and muddling." But this wide divergence of opinion is not barely speculative. It is intimately bound up with the solution of this question, which I take to be *the* social problem of the day: "What are to be henceforward the sanctions of civil authority?" It is the amazing difficulty of finding an answer to this question which has put the Church and State controversy on a new basis. Thirty years ago it was thought that Macaulay had demolished Mr. Gladstone's theories on that subject. But it was thought only by those who accepted the Whig premises, and could not avoid taking the conclusion also. No true Whig, least of all a clerical Whig, has ever been able to conceive the Church as other than a very inconvenient factor in politics, encumbering the path of statesmen, and much better suppressed, if it were not for the number of comfortable jobs for which its revenues and dignities may be employed in rewarding Whig voters. It is thus not strange that Lord Macaulay never asked himself or his readers on what basis Government was to rest whenever any social upheaving might take place. Even if Mr. Mill's view be taken in its broadest result, which

is that a Government of the future ought to be, and will be, a mere matter of police, including under that head civil courts and military insurance of countries against foreign aggression, still there will be, then as now, only one possible basis on which an Executive can work, and that is Force. That the dangerous classes, of whatever social grade they may be, may be kept from violent aggression on peaceable citizens, physical force will be needful. That these classes may be kept numerically weak by constant drainage from their ranks, and as constant stoppage of any leakage towards them from the laxer members of the other sections of society, moral force will be needed also. And as the physical force wielded by any Executive, save that of a military despotism, must needs be far weaker than that of the aggregate dangerous classes (just as the London police are much fewer than the roughs), moral force is the more essential of the two, especially in checking evil example on the part of the wealthier and more conspicuous members of society.

Now, where is this moral force to come from ?

I can see only one possible answer. European morality, such as it is, has sprung out of the teaching of the Christian Church. If the State destroy, or even ignore, this Church, and determinedly disassociate itself from it, we have no guaranty for the continuance of that moral influence on which most of the peace and well-being of society depends. I do not mean, of course, that civil non-recognition would annihilate, or even materially weaken the Church, but I think there is no doubt at all that it would very seriously damage the State, and make its tenure as precarious as that of Spanish governments ever since Spaniards, in disgust with the vices of their sovereign, overthrew one system before they had another to replace it, forgetful, despite the national love for proverbs, of that homely adage, "Never throw out dirty water till you get in clean." There is no other widely accepted moral code ready to replace Christianity. Therefore a statesman must take that, at least now, as his working hypothesis.

When it becomes possible to divide each human being symmetrically, so that all his thinking and spiritual faculties shall subsist apart from his physical and practical energies, then it will be possible to lay down a clear line of demarcation between Church and State. Not only have they to do with the same individuals, but they have often a common, if not a co-ordinate jurisdiction over the same acts of these individuals. In the good citizen, in the man who is to do his duty to God and his neighbour, there is a double personality, a twofold allegiance. To enlist religious feeling and Christian morality on the side of the State is such an unspeakable advantage to Government, if it is to do anything beyond mere putting up palings to keep

the wild beasts from breaking bounds, that thinking men, though by no means enthusiastic believers, are beginning to cast about for a solution of the difficulty of reconciling the retention of this great instrument of national well-being with the maintenance of the principle of religious equality.

Various solutions have been tried already in different countries. Only three are on a sufficiently large scale and sufficiently long at work, to be useful for inquiry. One is the plan common to France and Germany, of recognizing certain confessions, to the practical exclusion of all others, and concurrently endowing them. This may be dismissed as incompatible with liberty of conscience, because it inflicts disabilities on all persons who cannot conform themselves to any of the favoured communions. Another is the American system, of what may be called friendly non-recognition of all societies alike, while a sort of polite admission of the superior claims of Christianity is made on certain public occasions. But the results, even in such a law-abiding and politically capable nation as the Americans, are not encouraging to statesmen. There is no question that the Federal Government has little moral influence, and that the tone of public life in the United States is lowered, demoralized, and damaged by the absence of a common bond of religious feeling and a recognized standard of ethics. It would, moreover, be unsafe to import the American system into the crowded States of Europe, which have no such outlets for population and energy as America possesses. The third scheme is where the State selects one communion as the most favoured, while allowing full toleration and civil recognition to all others, and avails itself of that agency to exert the moral influence over society which it requires. That is the theory in England, though it is far enough from having been the practice, since, as I have pointed out, the Church in this country is in many particulars the least favoured communion; the only one which is legislated for by persons alien and hostile to her system; which sees her chief rulers—and such rulers!—chosen for her without her consent, and often against her will; which is refused the power of altering her own formularies and regulating her own internal discipline; which is forbidden to reform her own deliberative assembly; which may not act in any corporate capacity; which alone is told that the churches she has built, the schools she has established, the endowments she has provided, are not her own, but national property, which may be taken from her at any time, and shall be taken some time; the only one to which even a journal of the usually high moral tone of the *Daily News* is not ashamed to address a homily in this tone:—"As a National Church, you have duties to every one, but rights over no one. You are, and must be, bound to give your ministrations to every English

citizen ; you have no shadow of a claim to expect that any one who avails himself of your services, shall contribute a penny to your support, submit himself for a moment to your discipline, or refrain from doing you all the harm he can."

Against all these drawbacks, and the incessant worry of Parliamentary squabbling over the hide of the living lioness, the only set-off is the geographical conformity of Her Majesty the Queen, the titular Churchmanship of such Lord Chancellors as Lord Campbell, Lord Westbury, and Lord Cairns ; the seats of the Bishops in the House of Lords ; and the Act of Uniformity, which last, in some degree, prevents the Low Church clergy from mutilating the Prayer-Book, and the Broad Church from openly denying the Creeds. That is all. Some people may think the game worth the candle. I don't.

If the State, then, wants the help of the Church in the new posture of affairs, it will be necessary to give a much more liberal price, and it must decline to be made any longer the tool of sectarian hostility, for the sufficiently obvious reason that if it fetters and enfeebles the organism to which it looks for the discharge of a great public function, it not merely alienates the good-will of the oppressed body, but to some extent incapacitates it for accomplishing the given work. Nor, supposing the Ministry at any given time to be Conservative, and by hypothesis consisting mainly of active Conformists, would the condition be much altered ; since it is the permanent interference of the State with the free action of the Church which is felt as the principal grievance, rather than any specific injustice of which a particular Cabinet may be guilty.

Neither can the State safely accept such a theory of impartiality as would involve its declining to have an opinion on morals, or a right to decide for itself and its members on practical matters involving religion. Mr. Fitzjames Stephen has pointed out how this has been proved in our Indian Empire by the impossibility under which Government has found itself of maintaining that attitude of impassive neutrality towards the rival creeds of India with which it began, and which it desired ardently to continue.

The reason why the State cannot safely hold aloof from religious and moral questions is twofold. First, the interest felt by mankind in such questions is abiding, perpetually rejuvenescent, and intensely personal ; and has seldom been so widespread and vividly passionate as it is now. Next, the issues involved are much vaster, nobler, and loftier than those mixed up with mere physical problems.

If the State declines to have a view on these matters, and thereby cuts itself off from all sympathy with that great mass of its citizens to whom they are of primary importance, the result must be that

the Church will rival and overshadow it, because all these citizens will yield their allegiance preferably to the organism which does give an answer on such points, and a divergence of national interests is at once thus created, just as there was in the strife between the Church and the Empire fifteen centuries ago. It is this circumstance which makes the real peril to more than one Continental State from the clerical party. In France, for example, the Ultramontane clergy hold to a man, I suppose, that the blood and treasures of France could not be better employed than in a crusade for the restoration of the temporal supremacy of the Pope. It is certainly the current impression that such an opinion was one of the main causes which brought about the war of 1870. If this had been merely the speculative view of a priesthood, however numerous and compact, it would have had little practical force. Its influence lies in the large measure of popular support which the clergy possess, and whenever it is in their power to point to the tone and action of Government as Voltairean and hostile to religious interests, a very powerful lay body is made for the time anti-national, and more than ready to subordinate civil well-being to the supposed exigencies of their creed. It is noteworthy that the plan of paying the clergy by the State, as in France and Germany, instead of leaving them to their own private revenues, as in England, entirely fails to buy their loyalty. They are on the footing of hired mercenaries, not of naturalized citizens; and yet the State payment damages their independent testimony to the value of law and order, as they are held to be merely giving value for cash. A Government which could prove its hearty goodwill to the Church, and thus be trusted when it alleged that paramount difficulties made any policy indicated by the clericals impossible of adoption, would be free from this risk of divided loyalty.

That is one side of the peril, perhaps not a very formidable one in England. But there is another side, which touches us more nearly. The Liberal party is no longer homogeneous. Omitting minor shades and subdivisions, it may now be classified under the following heads: I. The Finality Whigs, of whom Lord Russell and Sir George Grey may be accepted as types, who think that Liberal reforms have been carried out quite far enough in principle, and that nothing more need be done except adjust and round off a few details. II. The Nonconformist and Secularist contingent, which asks for such further legislation as may operate against the Established Church. III. The rising section which looks to the time when the artizan class shall wake up to the consciousness of the power bestowed on it in 1867, and which includes on its programme schemes which are not easily discernible from the confiscation of property (disguised as "free trade in land"), from the entire incidence of taxation on the small minority

of the nation, from the necessary exclusion of trained intellects from the task of administration, and from the legal enactment of several of the socialist fallacies which are the despair of economists and practical statesmen.

Those who know anything of the remarkable political and economic ignorance of English working-men, and of the character of the doctrines on such matters which are current in their favourite newspapers, cannot look forward with any great cheerfulness to the speedy exercise of their new influence in the State. As the besetting fault of Conservatives is willingness to stereotype unquestionable evils rather than venture on any change, so the chief error of Liberals is to mistake words for things, and means for ends. Nothing is commoner, for instance, than to find expressions of passionate admiration for a republic, as such, quite apart from the kind of republic, or the mode of its working. There are actually people so *doctrinaire* as to prefer the anarchic despotisms of Central and South America, because they are styled republics, to a true republic such as Great Britain, Belgium, or Norway, because veiled under the forms of monarchy. And there is a compact body of young literary Catilines, enamoured of phrases which they have never analysed, ready to cram the working-man with theories based on an exaggeration of Mr. Mill's views, which may very conceivably pass from their inchoate stage of trades-union picketing and rattening to the full-blown excesses of the Parisian Commune, some of which, I may observe, have been flatly denied, and others—including the murder of the hostages—condoned and even lauded by educated men in reputable journals. Now, as the old Whigs are fast dying out, and as the school of Mr. Miall, which calls out for Free Church, must, to gain its ends, coalesce with that of Mr. Chamberlain, which adds Free Land and some other items to the programme; and then in turn must coalesce with the young gentlemen who combine admiration for the ethics of Baudelaire with sympathy for the politics of Delecluze, in order to get itself written up in the clever organs of their little clique,—there is a very pretty time-fuse ready to be put to the explosive mixture of working-men's political theories.

Here, then, is the peril. The widest moral and social licence is likely to be demanded on the plea of individual liberty, and although Mr. Mill's canon that there must be no infringement of the rights of another in the exercise of this licence may be more or less observed at first, yet no one who knows aught of human nature can have any doubt that the permitted indulgence of selfish and vicious passion would not long respect any such conventional barrier. The demand for unfettered unrestraint is the demand for the abolition of the State, for the resolution of society into chaos. On the hypothesis

that the checks on the dangerous classes are removed, and the means of forcibly suppressing anarchic disturbance taken from the State, there is, further, at least the possibility of a Terror. The claim to ratten may be extended easily from a single industry to a whole grade of society. If, then, the State—and I should say that by the State I mean the nation putting itself into commission that its concerns may be intelligently managed by trained experts—is not prepared to abolish itself, but prefers to listen to Mazzini's dying counsels, it must meet fallacy by logic, licence by authority, cynical vice by a moral and religious code, force by superior force.

The perilous tendency being that of violent and unregulated motion, the correcting moral force must be sought in a mainly statical body. But as continued motion somehow is necessary to vital energy, this body must exhibit healthy dynamic power also. It must be old and deeply rooted, because a newly-formed organism would not be solid or august enough for the necessary resistance. It must have already a vast constituency, for the movement it will have partly to oppose and partly to guide will be, nominally at least, popular. It must be extremely plastic and many-sided, and include, or be able to include, the sympathies of widely different classes, temperaments, and intellects. Where can this body be found?

It may be theological and professional prejudice on my part, but I can see no entity fulfilling the required conditions except the Church of England. That its statical character is unquestionable, its survival for nearly thirteen hundred years is evidence enough; that its dynamic resources are not exhausted is proved by its conspicuous progress during the last forty years; it includes within its pale at least twelve millions of English citizens, probably much more, and the existence within it of at least four clearly marked schools testifies to its plasticity and tolerance. But that it may be really effective in the great work of national preservation, it must be free from the unjust artificial restrictions which cramp its action and lessen the credibility of its moral teachings. The State is drawing near a great peril, and if it desires its only possible ally to be helpful in the crisis, it must aim at encouraging unity of religious and moral purpose, must set the champion free from long binding fetters, and restore the arms and weapons stolen by advantage taken in a time of temporary weakness and slumber. Fifty years ago, had the danger of Socialism been at hand, there would have been little use in looking to the Church of England for aid. She was in a state of coma, partly induced by respectability and partly by Protestantism. She was little loved by her own children. She was not only hated, as she is now, by aliens, but heartily and in a great degree deservedly despised. The Evangelical revival had this noteworthy feature about it, that it

left the Church as an organism entirely unaffected and unreformed. It was altogether a matter of personal feelings and experience, and had no corporate idea or influence whatever. So long as an Evangelical clergyman could preach his favourite doctrines and get others to do the like, he was quite indifferent to all else, and his ends were just as well attained if what he called a "Gospel ministry" were available in a district through Nonconformist agency as if the parish church took the same line. I am not blind to the good side of this view, but it is unquestionable that exclusive regard to it prevented any attempt at reform of the most crying practical abuses, such as pluralism; and though it made many Church clergymen more pious believers than they were before, it did not make the Church at large one whit more efficient, for such fresh energies as it brought into play were all in the form of new organizations and societies, external to the Church, and often not directly connected with it. It was as though in a time of utter military disorganization, a few officers should content themselves with taking fencing lessons instead of trying to reconstruct the army. It was reserved for the remarkable movement which first took life and shape at Oxford in 1833—although its germs were visible elsewhere long before—to show in its gradual development from the first literary Tract to the practical objectivity, popularly called Ritualism, of the present day, how to combine Church statics and dynamics, how to be at once Conservative and Liberal.

This is the secret of its steady advance and gradual conquest of one position after another, under the converging fire of the allied batteries of the press, the mob, and the humble servants of these two powers, the Bishops. It has not been, as casual and inattentive observers think and say, a mere matter of hysteric sentiment or dilettante finery. Its strength lies not in accidents, but in principles. It says to the Conservative,—“You are bound to side with us, because we maintain that teaching and those usages which are not merely bound up with the ancient history of the Church, but which have continued through the ages as the living use of the great majority of Christians, and thus we aim at no mere archæological revival of obsolete fashions, like the Eglinton tournament, but at the recovery and the rightful enjoyment of useful and beautiful things unjustly taken from us. We ask you to look back beyond Guelph and Stewart, nay, beyond Tudor and Plantagenet, to the far distant past, to a religious system more ancient and august than any can be which traces its pedigree at best to the sixteenth century.” To the Liberal it says:—“Look at the practical working of our system, see how it puts life and vigour into what was feeble or dying, how it multiplies energies, how it initiates reforms, how it aims at putting the whole activity of the Church on a more reasonable and popular basis. See

how it opens daily the buildings which its opponents close for six days in the week ; how it has warred against pluralism ; how it has contended for the republican free-seat as opposed to the plutocrat private pew ; how it has made services congregational instead of taking them out of the people's hands by restricting them to parson and clerk ; how it has vindicated the principle of representative assemblies as against despotism by compelling the revival of Convocation, which it desires to reform thoroughly ; how it has striven for the higher education of clergy and laity alike by the multiplication of schools and colleges. See, in short, what a healthy, active, vigorous, respected Church of England it has made of that effete body to which Cobbett scornfully bequeathed his 'Legacy to Parsons.'

As to the Broad Church section, it has done nothing as yet in this field. No schools, no colleges, no hospitals, no sisterhoods, no missions, no reforms, look to it as their originator. It has no static character whatever, for it does not possess even the brief pedigree of Evangelicalism, it has not more than half a creed, and it has not as yet discovered a policy. Unpractical as it thus is, it fails even more from the theoretic side. It has at best a vague Theistic philosophy to offer its adherents, and all historical experience tells us that a religion to enlist its millions, or even its thousands, must be of a less intangible kind ; so that this school has not, and never can have, the broad basis needed for resistance to the disintegrating political theories of the day ; and what is more, several of its leaders are united by ties of strong literary sympathy with the very clique of writers whose unscientific treatment of social problems is actively furthering those theories.

If then the Anglican clergy are to prove themselves a useful bulwark against the tide of revolution, they must first throw themselves into the great spiritual movement which is transforming the Church before our eyes. None other is at once Conservative and Liberal, permanent and progressive. The Church Association, endeavouring to suppress reforms by force and to return to abuses, the Church Reform Union, unconsciously aiming at the destruction of the past—witness its favourite idea, one of the most incurably foolish pieces of sheer mischief ever devised, Mr. Cowper Temple's Occasional Sermons Bill—these are what Low Church and Broad Church have to show as their contributions to the common stock :

*Misericordia e giustizia gli sdegna,
Non ragioniam di lor, ma guarda e passa.*

It remains then for the Catholic school to vindicate its right to teach the people by its success in planning and carrying out salutary reforms. That by no means insignificant section of the High Church

party which is eager in condemning what it calls the "follies and extravagances of Ritualism" is just in the position of the old Whigs. It owes its own existence to the enunciation of principles whose logical outcome is exactly what it is so loudly deprecating, and it endeavours to establish that there is no connection whatever between the early Tractarians and the advanced school of to-day. It is enough to observe that three competent authorities, Dr. Newman, Dr. Pusey, and the late Mr. Keble, have taken the contrary view, and confessed the identity and continuity of the movement. I am the last to deny the existence of fools, and plenty of them, both clerical and lay, in the advanced High Church ranks. What I would point out is that a movement which is to come to any good, should not be started by fools,—and the Common-room of Oriel in 1833 was no Earlswood—but if the movement is to come to anything, and to be more than an esoteric clique, above all, if it aims at leavening a whole vast society, it must draw fools into it, or it will have entirely failed to do its work. So, too, one of the reproaches cast at Christianity by Pagan philosophers, was the number of bad characters it laid hold of; harlots, thieves, gladiators, and the like, who never crossed the door of a Stoic or Epicurean lecture-room. "Exactly so," retorted the Christians, "you can do nothing for these poor creatures with all your philosophy. We will show you that we can." And they did it. And so, too, when the follies of Ritualists come to be examined, they prove that even the feeble members of the school think earnestly and work diligently, peculiarities which mark them off sufficiently from the rank and file of the two other sections.

Now, the fundamental idea which lies at the root of all true political science is that which is found formulated as a principle by the Church alone, which is that the individual life is not only the index of the community life, but that the community life is not something apart from and independent of the individual life, but is the sum of all individual lives co-ordinated. This is a conception which is totally absent from our legislation. Parliamentary government by party, albeit the only one under which civil liberty and order appear to be simultaneously attainable, is a wonderfully clumsy, complex, and imperfect instrument for legislative and practical purposes. True, if there were no party, and every man ran wild after his own crotchets, we should have neither legislature nor executive in fact, whatever we might have in name; since strength and action depend on co-operation; and if there were only one party in Parliament, that would become true which Rousseau says,—“The English people thinks itself free; it is much deceived; it is only so during the election of members of Parliament. So soon as they are elected, it is a slave, it is nothing.”—(*Contrat Social*, iii. 15.) Only the

balance of parties and the Damocles sword of dissolution kept thus hanging over the members' heads, prevents the Commons from being a more prying and oppressive despot than a military emperor, and with the additional weapon of the best possible intentions and motives.

To disabuse the minds of men as to the rights, the powers, and the capacities of Parliament, to make them see that immutable laws of morality and of social science cannot be set aside by the chance-medley voting of a chance-medley assembly ; to teach that it is not in crude, intricate, and intolerably multiplied statutes that national regeneration must be sought, but in the inculcation of self-sacrifice instead of selfish promotion of class-interests, and in the moral regulation of the springs of individual action ; to urge the need of extreme simplification of our political system instead of ever-fresh complication of it ;—these are some of the lessons the clergy ought to impart. What they have to do is not to swell the ranks of party, but to mitigate the evils of party ; and above all to teach that freedom means conformity to an absolutely perfect law, equal and universal in its incidence, and therefore unfelt by those who conform themselves to it, just as the enormous pressure of the atmosphere is imperceptible to our bodies, because it is uniformly exerted in all directions at once. The great danger in any time of violent social upheavings is the belief which is sure to seize on crude intelligences, that salutary changes can be suddenly produced by sweeping abolition of old laws and customs, and sweeping enactment of new ones. The fallacy has been practically refuted a hundred times in history, yet it is as new, as plausible, and as attractive as ever to half-thinkers in every generation.

The clergy cannot and ought not enter into the sphere of mere party politics, but should address themselves to national and social politics instead. As there are great evils to be redressed, great abuses to be reformed, they must appear as progressive Liberals ; as the reforms can be achieved only by a return to first principles, they must show themselves Conservatives in the truest sense by adducing and enforcing those principles, primæval and immutable, but buried under the light, shifting opinions of the day, like megalithic Egyptian statues beneath the sands of the Thebaid.

It is no business of theirs to do what they were loudly called on the other day to undertake : namely, to thrust themselves as arbiters between agricultural capital and labour, and to give their award at once in favour of the latter without the formality of previously inquiring into facts. Not only would they have no right to assume an office to which neither of the contending parties invited them, but if they were invited, their interference would be of little use without

a much more specialized knowledge of economic laws than there is any reason to suppose they widely possess.

Their work is at once wider and higher. It is to inculcate political principles which spring naturally out of Christian morality, out of that Christianity which, as Sir Edward Coke said long ago, is part of the Common Law of England. First, I conceive (and here I am in accord with M. Le Play), the sanctity and permanence of engagements must be inculcated. The righteous man of the Psalter, who "swaureth unto his neighbour and disappointeth him not, though it were to his own hindrance,"* is the true censor of those morals of trade which are so hurtful to the country, and which tend to become more so as the stupid plutocrat element increases in Parliament, and further affects legislation. It is also the surest basis of rights to lay down that a man may not take back with one hand what he gives with another, and it is the more necessary doctrine for these times, because the immoral view of the ethics of subscription which has been avowed by a certain school of late years has gone far to justify that saying of a great writer of the last generation, that Oxford, and in a less degree Cambridge, are the head-quarters of national perjury.

Next, that such engagements may not be one-sided and oppressive, they must teach the other old doctrine, Biblical and economic, that the labourer is worthy of his hire, and that it is a crime as well as a blunder to deprive him of it.

It is necessary to add a caution, too, that the hire due is not invariably identical with the lowest tender which the state of the market may force the labourer to accept, but should bear some closer ratio to the value of the completed work to the employer.

Another great political law, which needs to be explained, is the interdependence of all social functions. This is about the last thing that can be driven into the heads of trades-unionists, or of great landed proprietors, who are a sort of trades-union too. They always fall into the error of supposing that their own special industry can be indefinitely and safely developed at the cost of others, and without any mischievous reaction on themselves. Take an illustration. A bricklayers' union forbids its members to use both hands when working—

* I may have readers who regard the Psalms as obsolete and superstitious, but who think much of the revived Paganry of the Renaissance. Perhaps they will listen to Catullus :

"Siqua recordanti benefacta priora voluptas
Est homini, quum se cogitat esse pium,
Nec sanctam violâsse fidem, nec fœdere in ullo
Dixim ad fallendos numine abusum homines ;
Multa parata manent in longâ ætate, Catulle,
Ex hoc ingrato gaudia amore tibi."

this is a fact—in order to compel the building contractor to employ twice as many workmen. That means, of course, the addition of all the extra cost of labour to the prime cost of the house to the owner. He recoups himself by advancing the rent. The bricklayers themselves thus must pay more for their own lodgings, and the butcher, baker, tailor, grocer, shoemaker, publican, who supply goods to the bricklayer, charge him a fraction more on every article in order to pay this higher rent, and thus quite swallow up the apparent gain he acquired by artificially rigging the labour-market. The old Apostolic rule surely applies here to the body politic as well as to the body spiritual: "Whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it." It is unnecessary to dwell on the bearing of this law on the question of privileges disconnected from duties.

Once again, a very important contribution to political stability may be made by teaching the origin and value of custom. This is what an intelligent and vigorous Conservative party in the State ought to do, but which is certainly not done either in the press or in Parliament by the present Opposition. There is a notion well-nigh universal in France, doing much mischief now in Spain, very widespread in America, and a great deal too common amongst ourselves, that when a thing is shown to be old it is proved to be bad, and ought to be replaced at once by some brand-new contrivance.

The clergy, as the custodians of the most ancient of European systems, are specially bound to show how unphilosophical such a tenet is; to point out the just causes which have originated custom; the proofs of utility afforded by its long survival in any given case; the time and manner in which it may be wisely modified. Take such an example as a hereditary caste of nobility. The notion seems indefensible to most contemporary thought; but when it is remembered that nobility meant originally leadership of a conquering race, which proved its superiority over another race by conquest, and that "good blood" denoted freedom from admixture with the defeated race, it becomes clear that the nobles were at first the capable officers of an occupying force. When one race is markedly higher than the other, as Englishmen in regard to Hindoos, and Americans in regard to negroes, membership of the higher race is a patent of nobility for that instance; but where, as in England after the Norman Conquest, the invaders blended readily with the natives, it became impossible to retain caste distinctions, and the peerage ceased to be a foreign exotic. It is beside my purpose to trace its subsequent history and functions, it is enough to show that there was a valid reason for its origin, and to observe that an equally valid reason can be shown for that of every existing custom. And where the

custom can further be shown to discharge some useful function still, the case for its retention is made out.

On the other hand, the converse duty of reviewing laws and customs on the principles of modification and simplification should be enforced. The unhappy demoralization of feeling on the subject of voluntary contracts of which I have spoken as exhibited at the Universities, grew out of the conservative habit of swearing obedience to obsolete and impracticable statutes, which no one ever dreamt of keeping, or could have kept had he tried. Hence the loss of the sense of sacredness in pledges ; which would have been, I doubt not, retained, had a periodical review, say even once in every fifty years, been made, to ascertain which statutes had ceased to be useful and salutary, and therefore needed repeal. Mere prescription, involving nothing beyond itself, and fulfilling no purpose, does nothing but cumber the ground. Once again, Scripture gives us the key-note: "Every scribe which is instructed unto the kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is an householder, which bringeth forth out of his treasures things *new and old*." Here is where the majority of failures are made in politics. One school will have nothing but the old, another nothing but the new ; and though the resultant of the two forces is progress, yet it is diminished progress, or too often in the wrong direction.

So true is Milton's way of putting it :


"Statists indeed,
And lovers of their country, as may seem ;
But herein to our prophets far beneath,
As men divinely taught, and better teaching
The solid rules of civil government."—(*Par. Reg.* iv. 354.)

And that, as Coleridge observes, "because to divinity belong those fundamental truths, which are the common ground-work of our civil and our religious duties, not less indispensable to a right view of our temporal concerns, than to a rational faith respecting our immortal well-being. Not without celestial observations can even terrestrial charts be accurately constructed." (*Essay on Church and State*, chap. v.)

Hence, the greatest of all political functions which the clergy have to discharge, is to make war on the current Parliamentary theories of Education, as formulated in the foolish Act of 1870. The belief in reading, writing, and arithmetic as sufficient training for the mass of future English citizens, the absurd notion that there is any necessary connection between crime and ignorance of these elements—which might at once be refuted by a comparative survey of the criminal statistics of Europe—the happy-go-lucky way in which the now powerful artizan class is left to pick up its views on morals and

politics as it can and pleases : these are simply noxious fallacies. In truth, the intelligent artizan is further advanced as it is in knowledge than the elementary standards of 1870 would bring him ; and it is precisely the crude, unscientific, socialist theories of his class which constitute the chief political danger of the future. The real elements of knowledge are not reading, writing, and arithmetic : they are what they were in Eden—good and evil. No greater political boon could be granted to any people than trustworthy information on this head. France has been looking for it since 1789, with what results the world knows. To teach this, and to do so thoroughly,—which no Board school is likely to do—to show the relation of cause and effect which is bound up with the practice of one or the other, would do much to spread the best political knowledge, that of the true ends, functions, and limits of government ; and by simplifying public life would do much towards checking the useless skirmishing of party, and the stifling mass of ever-increasing legislation which results far more from sectional intrigue than from national requirements. In a word, it is needful to look at Christianity once more in the light in which it appeared to the Gentile world, not that alone of a mystic creed, nor of a mental philosophy, although it exhibited both those characters, but in that of a vast scheme of social reform, the shape it took alike for Rome and the barbarians who conquered Rome. It taught the abolition of caste, yet too many clergymen inculcate deference to social superiors as the first of virtues ; it taught the inferiority of wealth and material pleasures to noble thought, and yet the Industrious Apprentice and the heroes of “Self-Help” are the usual models offered to Christian lads for imitation ; it went down to the very depths of human actions, and showed how idle was any mere ruffling of the surface, such as is the most usual aim of homilies ; it showed, as no other agency ever did, the true relation between form and spirit ; and yet there is one school which thinks the first sufficient by itself, while the other expects the steam to act without boiler or piston. Consequently, if Christianity has been rejected in our own day by many persons on the ground of its unsuitability to modern European wants and ideas, if its morality has been gainsaid and its benefits disputed ; this is because one set of expounders has suffered it to become stagnant, and another has striven to evaporate it. It ought to be treated neither as a pond nor as a vapour, but as a clear, perennial, and fertilizing stream, banked, indeed, by historic custom on both sides, but flowing swiftly and steadily on to the ocean, ever old and ever new, and thus symbolizing its own permanence and variety. So I would regard it, so I would say with Lacordaire, “Je veux mourir en Catholique pénitent, et en Libéral impénitent.”

RICHARD F. LITLEDAL.



ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BELIEF.

THE ROSCOE LECTURE, DELIVERED BEFORE THE LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL
SOCIETY OF LIVERPOOL, NOV. 24TH, 1873.

THE progress of Thought has been likened, by an able writer of our time, to a succession of waves which sweep over the minds of men at distant intervals :—

“ There are periods of comparative calm and stagnation, and then times of gradual swelling and upheaving of the deep, till some great billow slowly rears its crest above the surface, higher and still higher, to the last ; when, with a mighty convulsion, amid foam and spray, and ‘ noise of many waters,’ it topples over and bursts in thunder up the beach, bearing the flood line higher than before.”

“ In the eyes of those who have watched intelligently the signs of the times,” continued Miss Cobbe,

“ It seems that some such wave as this is even now gathering beneath us, a deeper and broader wave than has ever yet arisen. No partial and temporary rippling of the surface is it now, but a whole mass of living thought seems steadily and slowly upheaved, and the ocean is moved to its depths.” *

The experience of the last ten years has so fully justified this grave warning, that it clearly becomes all who duly care for their

* Preface to the Collected Works of Theodore Parker, 1863.

own and their children's welfare, to look well to the foundations of their Beliefs, which are likely soon to be tested by such a wave as has never before tried their solidity. New methods of research, new bodies of facts, new modes of interpretation, new orders of ideas, are concurring to drive onwards a flood which will bear with unprecedented force against our whole fabric of Doctrine; and no edifice is safe against its undermining power, that is not firmly bedded on the solid rock of Truth. How, then, are we to prepare ourselves to meet it? Shall we, like Canute and his courtiers, rest secure in our own supremacy, and try to keep back the waves by simply forbidding their advance? We need not go as far as Rome for examples of this mode of dealing with the difficulty; for we have a good many minor popes at home, who can scold quite as well—and just as ineffectually. Shall we go out, as Mrs. Partington did, with pattens and broom, to try and sweep away the Atlantic? Such seems to me the method of those who aim to put down a great Scientific hypothesis by citing a text or two;* setting themselves up on the pattens of Authority, and using arguments that are no more capable of holding water than the incoherent twigs of a besom. Or shall we imitate the able Engineer, who, without experience of the power of a Channel-sea driven onwards at highest spring-tide by a S.W. gale, thought to protect his railway-embankment by a massive wall? That wall was broken down, that embankment washed away, by the very first storm that tested its security. And so will it be with any barrier which the Intellect of Man may try to erect against the progress of other Intellects than his own; for it is only the Source of all Thought who can say "Hitherto shalt thou come, and no further, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed."

To what example, then, can we look? What better can we wish for than is supplied by that wonderful Edifice, which, for more than a century, braving the violence of the most destructive storms, has calmly and unintermittingly displayed its guiding light to the wave-tossed mariner, and which has furnished the pattern of every similar beacon elsewhere erected for the direction and warning of the navigator. I need not tell you to what I refer; for Smeaton and the Eddystone are household words to every Briton. But I would show you something of the mind of the man who executed what has been characterised † as "the most arduous undertaking that had fallen to any engineer, and than which none was ever more successfully executed;" and something of the way in which he prepared himself for his great work.

* See "Priests and Philosophers," by the Rev. W. Greswell.

† Introduction to the first volume of the "Transactions of the Institution of Civil Engineers."

The mind of Smeaton is made known to us in that admirable series of Reports on Engineering subjects, which were described by the same competent authority "as a mine of wealth for the sound principles which they unfold, and the able practice they exemplify; both alike based on close observation of the operations of Nature, and affording many fine examples of cautious sagacity in applying the instructions she gives to the means within the reach of Art." It was to Nature, not to the time-honoured traditions of his profession, that this great practical Philosopher went, when he had to deal with the problem of the Eddystone. He saw in the bole of the oak which had stood the blasts of centuries, the shape that would not only give to his tower the greatest inherent strength, but would project upwards, instead of directly resisting, the dash of the impetuous waves. And he then brought all the resources of constructive skill to carry out this sagacious design; erecting on a broad and solid foundation that beautifully-formed superstructure, which not only bears aloft the far-shining and welcome light, but serves as the dwelling-place for those who are charged with its maintenance.

And this, it seems to me, is the way in which we should endeavour to erect our own fabric of Thought, if we wish it to be enduring in itself,—withstanding alike the rude assaults of external force, and the gradual weakening of internal decay,—and to afford a guiding light to others. Our foundations must be laid broad and deep in the Intellectual, Moral, and Physical Constitution of Man, and his relation to all that is outside him. Those fixed and immutable principles of Reason on which all Knowledge is based, must be solidly and patiently built up, course by course; each securely bolted-down to that which supports it. We must learn early "to distinguish what is just in itself, from what is merely accredited by illustrious names." We must cultivate the insight which shall enable us to detect a fallacy of observation, or a weakness of deduction; and determinately reject from our ground-tiers every stone that is not fit to bear the weight of the superstructure we intend to raise upon them. Recognising it as a fact in the History of Human Thought, that every great Error contains some admixture of Truth, from which its power over men's minds is essentially derived, we must so shape our fabric that it shall direct, rather than oppose, the force of the aggressive wave. And then, though our skill may not suffice to give permanence to our weaker superstructure, though our lantern may be shattered and our light may for a time be extinguished, we shall retain a secure basis on which to rebuild our tower, crowning it with a new and more enduring dome, and setting in it a lamp of yet brighter lustre.

Such, I persuade myself, would have been the mode in which we should have been counselled by the calm wisdom and richly-stored historic experience of that illustrious Man, whose memory you are now met to honour ; had he lived into these times, and been brought face to face with the problems we have now to meet. Accustomed as I have been from boyhood to hear his name mentioned with affectionate respect, counting some of his descendants among my most-valued friends, and not unfamiliar with the general bearing of his historic writings, I cannot be ignorant of the life-long consistency with which he advocated the cause of human freedom and human progress ; of the grave severity with which he reflected on the intolerance of those Reformers, who, while struggling against the absolutism of papal Rome, endeavoured to make themselves scarcely less absolute ; and of the true philosophy and lenient charity with which he attributed that intolerance to the habit ingrained in their nature by their early training, of which it was scarcely in their power to divest themselves.

And in now inviting your attention to that most important question of practical Psychology,—the mode in which our Beliefs are formed, and the degree in which we are personally responsible for them,—I am but following a path which he marked out, towards a conclusion in which I persuade myself that he would have concurred.

Our Beliefs must be carefully distinguished from our Knowledge ; and they seem to me to bear much the same relation to it, that our furniture has to the building in which we put it. The walls are (or ought to be) solid and enduring ; so is everything that deserves to be called Knowledge. Each stone supports, and is supported by, the rest ; and nothing but a weakness of its foundation or a decay of its material can make our fabric of thought uninhabitable. But the Beliefs with which we furnish it have not the same durability. Adapted to meet our temporary needs, they may be either poor in material, or but slightly put together. A carpet wears out, and, when past shifting and patching, must be replaced by a new one ; a table or a chair breaks down, and, after successive repairs, is discarded as no longer serviceable. Or perhaps our own requirements change : and some article which was at first made expressly in accordance with them, proves no longer suitable to our needs ; so that, finding it in our way, we wish to get rid of it. Some pieces of our furniture, again, originally of more substantial make, have become faded and old-fashioned ; but they may be family heirlooms, or we may have ourselves become attached to them ; and so, not liking to discard them altogether, we put them away in some dark corner, or perhaps consign them to a seldom-visited lumber-room, where they

rest almost forgotten in their obscurity. But at last some ray of sunshine throws a brighter light than usual upon our dark corner; or the opening of the shutters of our lumber-room lets into it the unwonted light of day; and we then find our old sofas and four-post beds so moth-eaten and decayed, that we turn them out of our house *instantly*.

I shall not pursue this comparison at present, but propose to resume and develop it hereafter.

Although Belief, as Dr. Reid truly says, "admits of all degrees, from the slightest suspicion to the fullest assurance," yet we commonly use the term to designate that form of Assent to any particular proposition, which, while falling short of positive certainty, is yet sufficiently complete not only to serve as the basis of our further reasoning, but to direct our course of action. And it is chiefly in this sense that I shall use the term on the present occasion; distinguishing Belief, on the one hand, from that complete assurance which constitutes positive Knowledge, and, on the other, from that merely speculative or provisional acceptance of a proposition, which neither shapes our thought, nor governs our action, and which really constitutes little more than an absence of *disbelief* in it.

You are all familiar with that current doctrine in regard to the nature of Belief, which assumes that we "try" every proposition in our Court of Intellect, just as we try a prisoner in a Court of Law. We are supposed to listen with equal attention to the evidence adduced on each side, and to give our best consideration to the arguments which the opposing advocates erect upon it. Holding our Intellectual balance with eyes blinded like those of Justice, we poise against each other the two aggregates of *pro* and *con*; and according as one or the other scale is made to go down by the "preponderance of evidence," do we accept or reject the proposition. But how comes it, if this be the whole account of our procedure, that the judgments of different men on the very same evidence are so notoriously diverse? The great Tichborne case, for example, cannot be brought up in any society, without eliciting opposite verdicts from self-constituted jurymen, who profess to have followed the course of the whole trial with the greatest care, and whose judgment cannot be supposed to have been swayed by the least admixture of partiality or self-interest. The clue to this diversity is found in the further fact, that even those who agree in their conclusion, will often be found to have formed it on dissimilar grounds; the respective weights of the several evidentiary facts being very differently estimated by different individuals. And thus we are led to this result; that the weights or probative values of such evidentiary facts are *not absolute quantities*, but *matters of personal estimate*; being—like our sensations of heat

or cold as compared with the indications of the thermometer—the expressions of their effects upon our own consciousness. For while there are some things as to which the common consciousness of Mankind is in perfect accord, there are others which impress different individuals so diversely, that we are forced to regard what may be termed the *personal equation* * of each recipient, as a factor whose importance is at least equal to that of the impressing force, in the determination of the resultant Belief.

The nature of this “personal equation,” and the degree in which its determination lies within our own power, constitute, therefore, an essential part of our enquiry.

No one can attend to his own habitual course of Thought, without recognizing it as a fact, that the judgments which determine his Beliefs in regard to a very large proportion of the propositions that are constantly coming before him (as, for example, in the reading of his daily Newspaper), are so direct and immediate, so little governed by any processes of conscious ratiocination, as to have much of the *intuitive* character. We estimate the worth of each statement, partly by our appreciation of the external evidence on which it rests, but still more (in most cases at least) by what we call the internal evidence of its *intrinsic probability*. But this intrinsic probability, like the respective weights of the several facts which make up the aggregate of the external evidence, may be estimated very differently by different individuals; the “personal equation” of each being often its most important factor. For while there are some propositions which are at once decided with absolute unanimity by an appeal to the “common sense” of Mankind, there are others on which very different decisions are given, with no less directness and assurance, by different individuals, according to the respective mental state of each at the moment; the response of every individual Mind to any such question asked of it, being as much the result of the antecedent condition of that Mind, as our feeling of heat or cold when we plunge our hands into a basin of lukewarm water is dependent upon their previous thermal condition.†

Let us take as an example of an immediate judgment in which there would be a general if not an universal accord, that which any person of average intelligence would give upon the case put by

* This term is used by Astronomers to mark the quickness of Sight by which each of several observers is characterized; any visual phenomenon that is being watched for by two observers at once (as, for example, the contact of a star with the wire of the transit instrument) being usually seen appreciably sooner by one of them than by the other.

† Thus if we immerse the right hand for a short time in cold water, and the left in hot, and then transfer them both to water of medium temperature, this will be felt as warm by the right, and as cold by the left.

Paley in the opening sentence of his *Natural Theology* :—" In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there : I might possibly answer that for anything I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever ; nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer." Now what is it that determines our immediate rejection of a proposition, which, as Paley says truly, cannot be easily refuted by any strict logical process ? Perhaps neither the child nor the savage would have anything to say against it ; yet no member of an educated community could entertain it for a moment. For what we call our ordinary Common Sense pronounces its adverse decision in the most distinct and explicit form, immediately that the proposition is brought before its tribunal ; its judgment being an *acquired intuition*, which may be regarded as the general resultant of a great aggregate of familiar experiences, embodied in each individual's Reason.

But in a large proportion of cases, the matter is one which lies outside the range of ordinary "common sense ;" some special preparedness being required for the right appreciation of the inherent probability of the statement. One among my audience, for example, who has no previous information on the subject, happens to read the entertaining and (in certain aspects) very suggestive Autobiography of Robert Houdin the Conjuror, and meets near its conclusion with the following passage :—

" The furnace (of an iron-foundry) was opened, and a jet of molten metal, about the thickness of my arm, burst forth. Sparks flew in every direction, as if it were a firework performance. After the lapse of a few minutes, my companion walked up to the furnace, and calmly began washing his hands in the metal, as if it had been lukewarm water. I walked forward in my turn ; I imitated my companion's movements ; I literally dabbled in the burning liquid ; I took a handful of the metal and threw it in the air, and it fell back in a fire-shower on the ground. The impression I felt in touching this molten iron can only be compared to what I should have experienced in handling liquid velvet, if I may so express myself."

Any ordinary reader would be fully justified in treating this wonderful narration as Houdin's account of some new kind of conjuring trick, like the "inexhaustible bottle," the "aerial suspension," or the "second sight," mentioned in his previous pages. For he would scarcely be more able to conceive of a man literally and actually immersing his hands in molten iron, without any special preparation, and withdrawing them unharmed, than he could suppose an unlimited quantity of several different liquids to be poured out of a single bottle.

Another reader, however, finds no inherent improbability in the narration ; for he knows that a special study had been made by

M. Boutigny of that "spheroidal state" of bodies, of which we have a familiar example in the rolling and jumping of drops of water upon a red-hot iron plate; and that between this phenomenon (which is in itself sufficiently wonderful, when we come to think of it,) and the harmless immersion of the hand in molten iron, M. Boutigny had worked out a continuous series of experimental marvels, all of them referable to the same simple and intelligible principle,—*viz.*, the interposition of a film of vapour between the heated plate and the water thrown upon it, or between the molten iron and the hand immersed in it,* which prevents absolute contact between the two. Our second reader might himself, perhaps, have been present at the Meeting of the British Association in 1845, at which M. Boutigny gave an account of these investigations, and publicly exhibited the freezing of *water* in a red-hot platinum crucible (an experiment which Faraday afterwards "capped" by freezing *mercury* in a like vessel); and at which, also, one of the workmen at Messrs. Ransome and May's foundry, in the presence of a large number of competent witnesses, did exactly what Houdin describes. Or, if he was not himself present, he knows that M. Boutigny's experiments were fully accepted as genuine at the time by the whole Scientific world; that they have never in any way been called in question; and that the doctrine founded upon them is now universally recognized as an established principle in Physics. Thus he has been prepared by his previous training for the ready acceptance of Houdin's narration; he feels assured that the occurrence *might have* happened exactly as it is described, this very M. Boutigny being named by Houdin as his companion and exemplar; and looking to the reason assigned by Houdin for inquiring into the subject,—*viz.*, his desire to account for the wonders he had himself witnessed in the performances of the Arab conjurors, whom he was sent by the French Government to outdo (these men walking with bare feet upon red-hot bars of iron, and licking red-hot plates with their tongues),—he sees no reason for discrediting Houdin's statement that it really *did* happen.

To the well-informed Physicist, the *internal* evidence of conformity to a general principle is here so satisfactory, that he needs but a very small weight of *external* testimony to justify his belief in the particular fact narrated. But to anyone who comes freshly to the subject, the affirmation seems to rest on external testimony alone; while the negation afforded by the inherent improbability of the statement is to his mind so decisive, that he deems himself fully justified in repudiating it altogether. Supposing, however, that a scientific friend points out to him that he has no title to set up a

* If the hand be naturally moist, there is no need of any preparation whatever; if it be dry, the hand should be previously dipped in water and wiped on a towel.

judgment which has no other basis than his own ordinary common sense, against that of men who have given special attention to this department of inquiry, and who agree in asserting, not only that the fact is true, but that it admits of a satisfactory explanation; he then, if not over-confident in his own judgment, withdraws the negation, and accepts the affirmative, in deference to the authority by which it is supported; still, however, without feeling that assurance which constitutes "conviction." But, further, if he can then be induced to go, step by step, through the whole series of experimental researches which lead up to this wonderful climax, he comes to feel the full force of that internal evidence, which not only removes all difficulty in the acceptance of the asserted fact, but shows that it has an inherent probability of its own, as a particular case of a well-established general principle. And yet I suspect that, however strong his mental conviction as to the safety of the act, there is not one of us who would venture to hold his hand in a stream of molten iron, until he had previously seen another person do so with impunity.

Another illustration, in a very different line of inquiry, may be drawn from the recent case of Louise Lateau, a Belgian peasant girl, who has exhibited the curious phenomenon of "stigmatization,"—that is, a spontaneous periodical bleeding, without any actual wounds, from the hands and feet, the forehead and the side, which were pierced in the crucified Saviour. By Catholics, this occurrence (like previous cases of the same kind) has been trumpeted as miraculous; while by Protestants, it has been denounced as an imposture. Here we at once see how completely the antecedent condition of each mind has determined the response; the external testimony as to the facts of the case which satisfies the former, being altogether repudiated by the latter, on account of what they regard as its inherent improbability. But to the Physiologist who has carefully studied the local effects which concentrated attention can exert on bodily organs, especially when coupled with a strong expectation of a certain result (such expectation being peculiarly efficacious when coupled with strong religious emotion), the case presents no difficulty whatever. The testimony of the numerous and competent Medical witnesses, fully on their guard against sources of fallacy, and determined to detect the cheat, if cheat there were, affords as strong a body of external evidence as could be brought to prove the reality of any occurrence whatever. And so far from finding any inherent improbability in their narrative, I can only say for myself, that its internal evidence is to my mind quite as strong as its external. The subject of it was obviously one of that class of young women who are known to every medical practitioner as peculiarly liable to "possession" by dominant ideas;

and this possession manifested itself in a periodical "ecstasy," a form of natural Somnambulism, in which the mind, entirely closed to the external world, is given up entirely to its own contemplations. Her current of thought and feeling in this state uniformly ran in the direction of the Saviour's Passion, the whole scene of which seemed to pass before her mind, as might be judged from her expressive actions; and a strong evidence of the reality of the condition was afforded by the fact that, according to the testimony of the medical witnesses, each fit terminated in a state of extreme physical prostration, which could not have been simulated,—the pulse being scarcely perceptible, the breathing slow and feeble, and the whole surface bedewed with a cold perspiration. Now the transudation of blood from the skin through the orifices of the perspiratory ducts, under strong emotional excitement, being a well-authenticated Physiological fact, there seems to me nothing in the least degree improbable in the narrative; on the contrary, anyone who accepts the "charming away" of warts, and the cure of more serious maladies, as results of a strongly excited "expectant attention," will regard the stigmatization of an Ecstatica as the natural result of the intense concentration of her thoughts and feelings on a subject that obviously had a peculiar attraction for them.

Thus the Belief of the Catholic partizan in the "miraculous" theory, that of his Protestant opponent in the "cheat" theory, and that of the scientific Physiologist in the "natural" theory, all of which have the same external testimony as one of their factors, are severally governed by the "personal equation" which constitutes the other factor,—namely, *that antecedent mental state* which really settles the value to be assigned to the external testimony, by what it regards as the inherent probability or improbability of the fact, and thus indirectly determines the "preponderance of evidence." Either may, if he thinks proper, accuse each of the two others of being "prejudiced" in favour of his own particular belief; but the "prejudice" is simply, in each case, a resultant of previous training. I, on the one hand, who accept the scientific explanation, have no right to charge the devout Catholic with absurd superstition, because, having been brought up in the belief that miracles are worked at the present day for the authentication of Divine truth, he accepts this particular case as belonging to the "miraculous" category; but he, on the other, is not entitled to brand me as a sceptic or an infidel, because, having been brought up in the belief that the age of miracles has ceased, my scientific studies lead me to a rational explanation of the facts which I agree with him in accepting. I may fairly, however, deny the right of his Protestant opponent to question either the honesty or the competence of witnesses, whose prepossessions were

obviously rather against than in favour of the genuineness of the phenomena; merely because, while refusing to admit their "miraculous" character, he has not given sufficient attention to the body of evidence relating to the influence of mental upon bodily states,* to be able to recognize their "naturalness."

I would now ask you to accompany me in the examination of a still more remarkable phenomenon, which attracted considerable attention some years ago, but of which nothing (so far as I know) has been lately heard; that, namely, which the late Mr. Braid of Manchester termed "Human hybernation." It is known to most persons who have resided long in India, that certain Hindoo devotees are reputed to have the power of passing at will into a condition of death-like torpor, and of remaining for days or even weeks in that condition without the loss of their vitality, so that they may be resuscitated by appropriate means, although they have been all that time buried so securely in a vault, as to be absolutely cut off from supplies of food, and almost entirely secluded from air. But I suppose that there are few who have regarded such statements as deserving of any serious attention; the wonderful jugglery by which the celebrated "tree trick" is performed, being, it may be supposed, quite adequate to impress witnesses of no extraordinary penetration, with a belief in the genuineness of phenomena that were merely contrived for the purpose of deceit. But the narratives which Mr. Braid obtained from witnesses not only of unimpeachable veracity but of the fullest competence, to whom every facility for the most careful scrutiny was accorded, put the matter in an entirely different light. In one of these cases, vouched for by Sir Claude Wade, who was long our political agent at the Court of Runjeet Singh, the Fakeer was buried in an underground cell for six weeks; and having been twice dug out by Runjeet Singh during that period, was found on each occasion in precisely the same condition of apparent death as when first buried. In another case, mentioned by Lieutenant Boileau, in his "Narrative of a Journey in Rajwarra," in 1835, the man had been buried for ten days, in a grave lined with masonry and covered with large slabs of stone, and strictly guarded; and he assured Lieut. B. that he was ready to submit to an interment of a twelvemonth's duration, if desired. In a third case, cited by Mr. Braid, the trial was made under the direct supervision of a British Officer, a period of nine days having been stipulated for on the part of the devotee; but the Officer, fearing that he might incur blame if the result should be fatal, had the Fakeer dug out on the third day, without any previous notice. In each case we have the testimony of British Medical officers as to the condition of the body when exhumed; and in this

* See Dr. Tuke's work on the "Influence of the Mind on the Body."

all the narratives agree. Its appearance was perfectly corpse-like ; no pulsation could be detected either in the heart or in the arteries (there was no stethoscopy in those days) ; and there were no perceptible movements of breathing. The means of restoration employed by the attendants of the Saint were just what we should ourselves employ in a case of "suspended animation ;" namely, friction of the surface, the application of warmth, and the administration of stimulants as soon as the power of swallowing returned.

Still it may be said that it is so intrinsically improbable, not to say impossible, that a state of apparent death could be self-induced in the first instance, and could then endure for weeks (to say nothing of months) without the absolute loss of vitality, that it is more likely that even these most competent and trustworthy witnesses were deceived, than that the facts really happened as narrated by them. And a determined sceptic might feel himself justified in likening their narratives to the wonderful stories told by Marco Polo, as to the chain thrown up into the air, the climbing-up of this chain by a boy until he was out of sight, the falling to the ground of his head, body, and limbs in separate pieces, and their spontaneous reunion, so that the boy got up and walked alive and whole in the presence of a circle of spectators.

But the scientific Physiologist, as in the preceding instance, sees a clue to the rational explanation of the cases of the buried Fakeers ; which leads him to view the testimony given in regard to them by the cautious, sceptical, and well-informed witnesses who vouch for them, in a very different light from that of the wonder-loving Traveller of the middle ages.

In the first place, the state of "suspended animation" or "apparent death" is one of which the existence cannot be denied ; since it is continually produced by drowning, and sometimes occurs spontaneously. And that such a state might be maintained in India under the circumstances described, for a much longer period than in this country, may be fairly attributed to the warmth of the tropical soil ; which will prevent any considerable reduction of the temperature of the body buried in it, notwithstanding the almost entire suspension of its internal heat-producing operations. Again, it has been experimentally ascertained that even warm-blooded Mammals, whose hybernation is profound, can be kept under water for an hour or more without injury ; although, in their ordinary condition of activity, they would be killed by a submersion of three or four minutes. And thus there is nothing, in the almost complete privation of air, that militates against the probability that the buried Fakeer might remain enclosed in a narrow vault, without suffering from the want of it ; for the nearly complete suspension of all the

functions of life will reduce the demand for air, as for food, almost to zero.

But, secondly, there is to the well-informed Physiologist no inherent improbability in the self-induction of this curious condition. For, in the first place, he has the standard case of Colonel Townsend, which no medical authority has ever ventured to call in question, so high was the authority of Dr. Cheyne, the eminent physician by whom it was recorded. And Mr. Braid, in the course of his experiments on that form of artificial Somnambulism which he termed Hypnotism, met with several cases (of which I myself saw more than one) in which the self-induction of that state produced a marked lowering of the pulse and respiration; the reduction being such in one instance as seriously to alarm Mr. Braid, and to necessitate the immediate termination of the experiment.

The inherent improbability of the asserted phenomena, then, being thus weakened or even removed by Scientific inquiry, we are free to attach whatever weight to the testimony in their favour we may think it deserves on its own account. And I long since expressed my own conviction, that though we may scarcely accept that testimony as affording a satisfactory basis for positive assurance, we have no right whatever to refuse to believe it. The case seemed to me to be one fairly calling for that "suspension of the judgment," which our great Faraday used to advocate, as preferable in many instances to that premature "making up of our minds," which often involves either our *un*-making them again at some subsequent time when fresh evidence has been adduced, or our persistence, from mere obstinacy, in a belief which we should not have adopted in the first instance, if the whole case had been then before us.

But having happened long since to speak on the subject to Prof. Max Müller, I learned from him the additional very important fact, that this condition of self-induced suspension of vital activity forms, as it were, the climax of a whole series of states, with two of which I was myself very familiar—"Electro-biology," or artificial Reverie, and "Hypnotism," or artificial Somnambulism; both of them admirably studied by Mr. Braid, through whose kindness I had many opportunities of investigating their phenomena. The self-induction of these states, practised by the Hindoo devotees, is part of a system of Religious Philosophy which is termed the Yoga; and by the kindness of Prof. Max Müller I possess a very curious account of this Philosophy, printed at Benares twenty-two years ago, by Sub-Assistant Surgeon Paul, who had carefully studied it. It appears from this that the object of the whole system is to induce a state of mystical self-contemplation, tending to the absorption of the soul of the individual into the Supreme soul, the Creator, Preserver, and Destroyer

of the World ; and that the lower forms of it consist in the adoption of certain fixed postures, which seem to act much in the same way with the fixation of the vision in Mr. Braid's methods. The first state, *Pránáyáma*, corresponds very closely with that of Reverie or Abstraction ; the mind being turned in upon itself and entirely given up to devout meditation, but the sensibility to external impressions not being altogether suspended. The second state, *Pratyáhára*, is one which—the external senses being closed, while the mind is still active—corresponds with some forms of Somnambulism. Those who have attained the power of inducing this condition, then practice *Dharána*, a stage of complete quiescence of body and mind, corresponding with what is known as Catalepsy,—the body remaining in any posture in which it may be placed. From this they pass into the *Dhyána*, in which they believe themselves to be surrounded by flashes of external light or electricity, and thus to be brought into communion with the Universal Soul, which endows them with a clairvoyant power. And the final state of *Samádhi*, which they themselves liken to the hybernation of animals, and in which the respiratory movements are suspended, is regarded as that of absolute mental tranquillity, which, according to these mystics, is the highest state which Man can attain ; the individual being absolutely incapable of committing sin in thought, act, or speech, and having his thoughts completely occupied with the idea of Brahma, or the Supreme Soul, without any effort of his own mind.

From this point of view, then, the history of the buried Fakeers presents a new significance ; for so far from being an exceptional phenomenon, this self-induced state of suspended animation is one towards which the whole of their system of Religious Philosophy tends, and for which it provides, as it were, both the physical and the mental education. And the evidence thus derived from an entirely independent source, of the inherent probability of occurrences whose narration first called forth nothing but incredulity, seems now, in my judgment, sufficient to give a very decided preponderance to the scale of positive belief.

Now it is obvious that the state of Belief of each one of yourselves, to whom the subjects of the three cases I have now discussed may be entirely new, will be mainly determined by the confidence you may be severally predisposed to place in *my* scientific knowledge. You may reasonably conclude that, although not a professed Physicist, I should not declare to you my conviction that a man may hold his hand unharmed in a stream of molten iron, without having the strongest grounds for that assurance which the confirmation of *a priori* scientific probability can furnish to the testimony of competent and unprejudiced witnesses. And those of you who may

know me not only as a Physiologist, but as one who has for thirty years made a special study of the border ground between Physiology and Psychology, will perhaps be disposed to think that I should not, without adequate reason, speak to you of the stigmatization of Louise Lateau, and of the buried life of the Hindoo Yogé, as not to be lightly put aside as cheats, but to be entertained as matters of serious investigation. In each of these cases, however, the question is obviously one as to which the decision between Testimony and the dictates of Common Sense depends upon *special* knowledge; the negative verdict which almost every person of average intelligence would almost unhesitatingly pronounce, being liable to reversal by the lightening of the scale of general experience, while fresh weights are put by special investigation into the scale of testimony. And the "personal equation" which determines the belief of each individual who does not work out the inquiry for himself, here consists mainly in his confidence in the knowledge and judgment of another person. The evidentiary facts on which his scientific guide relies, may be utterly meaningless to himself; but he accepts them, as the merchant would a bill of exchange, on that guide's assurance of their worth; and the "preponderance of evidence," like the balance of an account, is decided accordingly. If any one who is either disqualified by ignorance from rightly appreciating the value of the evidentiary facts, or is unwilling to take the trouble of investigating the case, claims to dispose of it in an off-hand way in accordance with his "common-sense" notions, we, who *have* studied the subject, take leave to tell him that it is a case requiring the *uncommon* sense that only special culture can bestow, without the possession of which his judgment is altogether worthless.

But I have now to direct our inquiry to that class of Beliefs, which relate to matters lying within the scope of ordinary reason, upon which every thoughtful man feels himself not only competent but called upon to decide for himself, and yet as to which there is no less a diversity in the judgments formed upon the same evidence, than there is in the cases we have already considered.

While the world has been too ready to charge with Moral culpability those who depart from the beaten tracks of Religious or Scientific orthodoxy, independent thinkers seem to me to have often been unjust as well as unwise in flinging back the accusation, and in imputing to those whose mental development has taken place under a particular system, and whose whole intellectual and moral nature has shaped itself into conformity with that system, either a wilful blindness to evidence which at once carries conviction to their own minds, or an intellectual incapacity to appreciate it. For, as I shall

now endeavour to show you, the ordinary Beliefs of every individual are mainly determined by a "personal equation" not less definite than that of the man who has studied some particular subject, though it is the exponent rather of his *general* than of his *special* culture. Here we shall find it convenient to resume our former comparison, and liken the Mind of each individual to an Edifice,—palace, dwelling-house, or cottage, as the case may be,—which, though partially furnished, still has some of its rooms entirely empty, while in others there are recesses, nooks, and corners remaining to be filled, or perhaps only a few pegs on which some lighter articles may be loosely hung.

Now it seems to me that our immediate acceptance or rejection of the propositions daily coming before us, as to which our judgment does not need to be *specially* informed, but which the *ordinary* Common Sense, or acquired Instinct, of an average man is quite competent to decide, is determined on exactly the same principle, as our acceptance or rejection of (let us say) a bookcase, which may be offered as likely to suit a certain recess in our library. For just as our decision is guided in the latter case by the *fitting-in* of the piece of furniture to the vacant nook, so does our Intellectual *assent* to a new proposition depend upon its *fitting-in* to some appropriate place in our existing Fabric of Thought. The *fit* of this new bookcase may be so perfect, that we have no question whatever about retaining it; and it gradually, by use and habit, becomes to ourselves as much a part of the library, as if it had grown into its walls. And so a new Belief, for which an appropriate place is ready in our Fabric of Thought, and which precisely fits-in to that place, not only obtains immediate acceptance, but ere long (if not called in question) is adopted into the fabric itself.

But, again, the fit of the bookcase may not be perfect in the first instance, and yet we may think so well of its general suitability as not to like to let it go; and we then consider whether by some slight alteration either of the bookcase or of the recess, we can bring about an adjustment. If this can be done, we keep the bookcase; if it cannot, we send it back. Even so, the new proposition may not in the first instance find any place in our fabric of thought into which it can be received; and yet its want of accordance may be so slight, as to lead us to examine whether we cannot make it fit by some process of accommodation;—either our recess being widened by argument and discussion, or the proposition being narrowed by the limitation of its terms. If we can thus bring about a satisfactory "fit," we accept the proposition as part of our Intellectual furniture; if not, we dismiss it,—at any rate for a time.

Now in this Intellectual judgment, it seems clear to me that the

Will is no more involved at the moment of making it, than it is in that which is determined by the "preponderance of evidence." For if there be a complete suitableness, or a complete unsuitableness, between the new proposition and the vacant recess in our fabric of thought, we accept it without hesitation in the one case, we feel compelled to reject it in the other. So far, then, it is true that "we are no more responsible for our opinions than we are for the colour of our skin." But, whenever the proposition comes to be subject of *discussion*,—whether we are simply canvassing the practicability of fitting it into our recess, or are carrying it through the whole procedure of a trial on its merits, the Will comes to exert a powerful influence on the result; as is truly expressed by that proverbial embodiment of universal experience, that "we easily believe what we wish." How, then, upon the theory of the instinctive or automatic nature of Assent which I have been endeavouring to establish, is this influence exerted?

In those old Political Trials, which are now happily—so far as our own country is concerned—only matters of history, it not unfrequently happened that the Prisoner's life or death, whilst determined by the verdict of a Jury honestly meaning to be impartial, really depended on the partizan conduct of the presiding Judge. For though the Jury were all sworn, and really intended, to give a "true verdict according to evidence," yet the Judge had it largely in his power to determine which way the balance should incline. In the first place, he might refuse even to consider the objections which the prisoner's counsel was fully justified in taking to the indictment, and might accept the reply of the Crown-lawyer as all sufficient, when it did not really meet one of the points raised for the defence. Again, while treating the witnesses for the Crown with the utmost consideration, assuming the truth of every statement they may make, and placing every obstacle in the way of the sifting of their testimony by cross-examination, he treated the witnesses for the defence as if they were utterly unworthy of credit, and allowed the Crown-counsel the utmost licence in his endeavour to lower the value of their testimony by unjustifiable insinuations or bullying assumptions. And in his "summing-up," he would so forcibly present to the jury both the law and the evidence on one side, and so determinately keep down the force of law and evidence on the other, that the jury might be honestly compelled, even against their own prepossessions, to give a most iniquitous verdict.

And so in the discussion of a question of Intellectual Truth, the Will has the power of keeping some considerations more or less completely out of view, whilst it increases the force of others by fixing the attention upon them. Another familiar proverb, that "there are

none so blind as those that *won't* see," precisely expresses the way in which the Will thus exerts its influence. For as the opponents of the Copernican system refused to look at the Satellites of Jupiter through the telescope of Galileo, so there are too many who wilfully turn away the eyes of their minds from inconvenient truths ; or refuse to let a gleam of sunshine into the dark chambers of their intellects, where they hide as sacred treasures the antiquated beliefs of past ages, the worthlessness of which would be at once apparent if the full light of day were permitted to shine-in upon them.

On the other hand, the Will, when inspired by the habitual desire to act on the highest principles of *right*, determinately blinds us to the direct promptings of self-interest, but to those arguments which we instinctively *feel* to be sophistical, though we may not be able logically to expose their fallacy ; just as Nelson at Copenhagen turned his blind eye to the signal for his recall, which he did not think it for the honour of his country to obey.

But we must now carry this inquiry a step farther back ; and consider where the responsibility lies for the construction of that Fabric of Thought, the shape and dimensions of whose recesses determines the admissibility of the Beliefs that constitute its furniture.

The general plan of that fabric may be said to be determined by our congenital Constitution. Every being is, in the first instance, what Nature made him ; and however much his capacities and tendencies may be developed and modified by subsequent influences, these cannot build up any superstructure that was not, as it were, sketched-out in the original design. The foundations are laid, and the basement-story reared, by the education and training we receive ; and while we are in no degree responsible for this in the first instance, we gradually come to be so more and more, as we acquire that power of Volitional selection, by which we can regulate the action of our Intellectual faculties, and determine the choice of its objects,—so far, at least, as this may be left to ourselves. But it is during this period of our lives that we are most powerfully, though unconsciously, influenced by that *aggregate* of external influences which the ancient Greeks designated as the *Nómos*,—a term we sometimes translate as "custom" and sometimes "law," and which may be considered as expressing that custom which has the force of law, and which has become so completely a "second nature" as to be less easily changed than any written law. Of this *Nómos* the "caste" of India is doubtless the most conspicuous example ; but no observant mind can fail to recognize the applicability to our own social condition of the admirable account given by Mr. Grote of the Greek conception of that "King of all" (to borrow the phrase cited by Herodotus from Pindar), which

“Exercises plenary power, spiritual as well as temporal, over individual minds ; moulding the emotions as well as the intellect, according to the local type,—determining the sentiments, the belief and the predisposition in regard to new matters tendered for belief, of every one,—fashioning thought, speech, points of view, no less than action,—and reigning under the appearance of habitual, self-suggested tendencies.”—(*Plato and the other Companions of Sokrates*, vol. i p. 249.)

The Physiologist who believes that during the whole period of Growth the Brain is shaping itself according to the mode in which it is habitually exercised, and that the nerve-tracks then laid down are maintained through life, even though disused, far more persistently than any that result from subsequent mental modifications, will most fully realize to himself the extreme importance of this *Nómos*,—the influence unconsciously exerted by the family life, the public opinion of the school and college, and the usages and habits of thought and feeling of the particular social class as a member of which the youth makes his first entrance into the world,—not only in moulding the Moral character, but in building up the fabric of Thought. And it operates in this special way,—that it shapes our Mental recesses to the forms and dimensions of certain ancestral pieces of furniture that are waiting to be put into them ; so that as the Fabric is growing up, and one room is ready after another, these respectable Beliefs find their appropriate places ; the recipient never dreams of questioning their inherent use and value, because they “fit” in so perfectly ; and so long as nothing occurs to make him doubt the security of his walls, and he does not experience any special inconvenience from the antique awkwardness of his furniture, he continues to give it a place, to the exclusion of articles of newer fashion and more attractive exterior.

In so far, then, as the Fabric of Thought of each individual has been built up by influences external to himself, he cannot be regarded as in any sense responsible for his acceptance of Beliefs which that fabric has been shaped to receive ; but he does become responsible, when the time comes for him to think for himself, to examine into the foundations of his Knowledge, to test the goodness of its materials, and to try the security of its construction. Anyone who is restrained from doing this, whether by passive indolence or by timorous apprehension of the possible results of inquiry, either to his own worldly interests or to those of others, is liable some time or other to find his fabric of thought overthrown, and himself buried in its ruins ; and even though no wave should dash, no lightning-flash should shatter, it may ultimately fall to pieces from sheer decay. Everyone, on the other hand, who recognizes his obligation to make the best use in his power of the faculties with which he finds himself gifted, and who looks at the search for Truth as his noblest object, the attain-

ment of it as his most glorious prize, will be constantly on the watch for opportunities of *improving* his fabric of Knowledge, and of perfecting its furniture of Beliefs. Now in doing this, he will find that as his fabric is altered (or rather, alters itself), his furniture must be changed in accordance with it; for the enlargement of one of his apartments may enable him to give place to some article which he was formerly obliged to reject, whilst the reduction of another may crowd-out the fittings which were once most perfectly suited to it. Every one who has gone through a sufficiently long course of Intellectual experiences, and has been accustomed to reflect upon them, must be conscious that this has often occurred to himself. He is surprised, on turning over the records of his earlier Beliefs, to find how many of them he would now absolutely reject; not because they have been disproved by additional evidence, but because *he has himself grown out of them*.

And it is, further, by the use of the power which every man possesses of *enlarging*, as well as improving, his fabric of Thought, by applying himself to the acquirement of new Knowledge, that he gains a vastly increased capacity for the reception of a nobler and grander order of Beliefs, such as he would have previously thought it impossible that he could ever come to possess.—Suppose an American Professor to have come over, a dozen years ago, to announce to the Scientific public of Europe, that he had devised and perfected a method by which he was enabled to recognize in the incandescent atmosphere of the Sun at least seventeen of the component elements of our own globe; that he had discovered the most notable of these to be Hydrogen, which, heated to redness, forms a glowing envelope ordinarily at least 5000 miles thick, whence fiery tongues are shot forth from time to time, sometimes to the height of 50,000 miles in a few minutes, their disappearance being often as rapid as their projection; and that he had ascertained the sun-spots to be the centres of circular storms, sometimes revolving at the rate of 120 miles per second, which are set in motion by a downward rush of metallic vapours, dependent on a local cooling that can only be measured by thousands of degrees;—what would have been our mental attitude? These propositions would to most of us, whether scientific or unscientific, have seemed so completely inadmissible into our Fabric of Thought, that we should have suspected our American friend of amusing himself by trying upon us one of those ingenious hoaxes for which his countrymen have shown a special aptitude.

Let us suppose our Professor to have further assured us that he was able by the same method to determine the existence of many of the Terrestrial elements even in the Fixed Stars; that he had found Hydrogen not only to be universally present, but to perform the

leading part in those changes which give rise in certain cases to the known variations in their brightness (a star previously invisible to the naked eye suddenly blazing out with a lustre surpassing that of Jupiter, and declining almost as rapidly); and that he was further able to prove that many of these luminaries have a motion of approach-to or recession-from us, such as no measurement of their angular positions could detect, no telescopic scrutiny would lead us even to surmise, though its rate may be fifty miles per second;—we should scarcely have been unreasonable in regarding his statements as ingenious inventions devised to try how far our credulity might extend.

And if, not satisfied with this, he ventured a still higher flight, and had assured us that he had obtained by the same simple method the solution of that grand Astronomical problem,—the constitution of the Nebulæ, —which the ablest observers, armed with the largest and most perfect instruments, had declared to be beyond their ken; and that he could classify the irresolvable nebulæ with certainty into those which are mere whiffs of vapour, and those which are aggregations of Stars too remote to be separately discerned;—we should, I think, have begun to respect his imaginative power for the sublimity of its conceptions, while the extravagance of this last assertion would have seemed fully to justify our repudiation of the whole series as utterly destitute of any claim on our belief.

But suppose that our Transatlantic visitor, instead of laying his claims before an incredulous Public, had privately brought together some half-dozen of the most eminent Physicists of Europe, who were acquainted with all that had been previously learned as to the constitution of the Solar Spectrum, and the modifications produced in flame by the presence of certain Chemical elements;—he would have been able in a brief space, not only to satisfy them of the soundness of his basis, but to erect upon that basis a new and substantial addition to their Fabric of Knowledge, culminating in a lofty “heaven-kissing” tower, of which every stone should be so firmly and variously knitted to every other, as to leave no room for any suspicion of insecurity. And having, by the strictest methods of observation and experiment, verified his statements—step by step—as to all those facts which are capable of direct demonstration, and having become fully assured, in the course of their inquiries, of their visitor's personal good faith, they would have found no difficulty in crediting his accounts of those celestial marvels of rare occurrence, which it would be altogether beyond his power to reproduce.

I do not know any more remarkable fact in the Psychology of Belief, than the universality with which even the most wonderful—I might say the most romantic—results of Spectrum Analysis have

been accepted as sober truth, not merely by the whole Scientific World, but by the general Public. And this universality is, I think, to be attributed to these two conditions:—first, that the absolute concurrence of Scientific men on this subject gives to their statements the value (if I may so express myself) of Bank Notes, which any one may convert into the standard gold of personal knowledge, merely by inquiring into the matter for himself;—and secondly, that these results are additions to our previous Knowledge, and do not run counter to any established Beliefs. But suppose they *had* done so, would they have been the less true in themselves, or have possessed any the less claim on universal acceptance? The old Beliefs would clearly have had to give place in this instance, as they have had to do in many previous cases, to the new Knowledge.

With one more practical application of this method of studying the Psychology of Belief, I must bring this discourse to a conclusion.

I alluded at its commencement to a great Scientific Hypothesis, which is now on its trial at the bar of public opinion, and which, if adopted as a principle of construction, will give a new shape to a large part of our Fabric of Thought; and I would say a few words on what seems to me the spirit in which that trial should be conducted. There are many of our securest Beliefs, which depend on the convergence of a number of separate *probabilities* towards a common centre, while none of them are complete as *proofs*; the whole of what is commonly termed “circumstantial” evidence being, in fact, of this character. And just as the value of the “circumstances” depends on the testimony of experts,—a case of poisoning, for example, requiring the analysis of the chemist, and the examination of the morbid appearances by a pathologist,—so must the hypothesis of Evolution be ultimately either established or disproved by its accordance or disaccordance with a vast aggregate of facts of Nature, which belong to different departments of Scientific inquiry. The Geologist traces the succession of Plants and Animals in Palæontological order, and finds, as he advances in his studies, less and less evidence of interruption, and more and more of continuity, Biological as well as Physical. The Zoologist and Botanist, who have been accustomed to classify their multitudinous and diversified forms of Plants and Animals according to their “natural affinities,” find a real meaning in their Classification, a new significance in their terms of relationship, when these are used to represent what may be regarded with probability as actual community of descent. The Morphologist who has been accustomed to trace a “unity of type” in each great group, and especially to recognize this in the presence of rudimentary parts which must be entirely useless to the animals that possess them, delights in the new idea which gives a perfect *rationale* of

what had previously seemed an inexplicable superfluity. And the Embryologist, who carries back his studies to the earliest phases of Development, and follows out the grand law of Von Baer, "from the general to the special," in the evolution of every separate type, finds the extension of that law from the individual to the whole succession of Organic Life, impart to his soul a feeling of grandeur, like that which the Physical philosopher of two hundred years ago must have experienced, when Newton first promulgated the doctrine of Universal Gravitation. And lastly, when the doctrine of Evolution is looked at in its Moral aspect, as one which leads Man ever onwards and upwards, and which encourages his brightest anticipations of the ultimate triumph of Truth over Error, of Knowledge over Ignorance, of Right over Wrong, of Good over Evil, who shall presume to say that the convergence of all these great lines of Thought, each of them the resultant of the patient toil of a whole army of Scientific workers, is a fact of no account? *Absolute* truth, no man of Science can ever hope to grasp; for he knows that all human search for it must be limited by human capacity. But he denies the right of anyone else to impose upon him, as "absolute truth," his own fallible exposition of the Revelation conveyed in the teachings of Religiously-inspired men; for *he* claims an equal right to be accounted a true expositor of the Revelation conveyed in the Divine Order of the Universe. And the real Philosopher, who fixes his hope on a perpetual approximation to that absolute Truth which he may never actually grasp—who, forgetting those things which are behind, is always reaching forth to those which are before,—who tends towards perfection, without ever *pretending* to it,—and who is constantly striving upwards, so as either himself to reach, or to help his successors to reach, a yet loftier elevation,—believes that he is thus best fulfilling his duty to the Great Giver of his own powers of Thought, and to the Divine Author of that Nature in which he deems it his highest privilege to be able to read some of the Thoughts of God.

W. B. CARPENTER.



LETTERS FROM ELIZABETH BARRETT BROWNING

TO THE AUTHOR OF "ORION" ON LITERARY AND
GENERAL TOPICS.

A LADY with whom I have the honour to be acquainted—the authoress of a recently published volume of poems, containing some true poetry—is in the habit of excusing herself to her correspondents for the rare and scantling appearance of her notes, on the ground that “letter-writing” is one of the lost Arts. The present day seems to have become “too fast” for it. In running the eye of memory over the celebrated letter-writers of a more leisurely literary period, such as Madame de Sévigné, Madame de Staël, Lady Mary Wortley Montague—(omitting, of course, all those who, like Rousseau, wrote entire novels in the form of letters), and among men, the more highly finished and future-eyed letter-writers, such as Pope, Addison, Cowper, and others—especially clergyman, philosophers, and philanthropists—one begins to see that there is much truth in the foregoing assertion. The “loss” of the Art is mainly attributable to an impatient sense of the loss of time. And it looks still more like a fact, if we bring our view down to the nearer dates of the admirable letters of Robert Burns, of Southey, of Mary Russell Mitford, Leigh Hunt, Charles Dickens, Harriet Martineau, Sara Coleridge—just published—and those of Elizabeth Barrett Browning, a portion of which are now about to be given to the world for the first time.

The whole of these last-named productions of one of the finest and most cultivated minds of our age, have been in my possession since the year 1839. When a few of them shall have appeared in these pages, many readers will be ready to blame me for keeping locked up in darkness so interesting a mine of literary wealth during all these years. Long absence from England, occupations of a bush-life in Australia, added to motives of delicacy in the fear of intruding upon unclosed wounds in the loss of such a spirit, must be my excuse. And the delay would have been yet more prolonged but for my sudden discovery that many of Mrs. Browning's letters, having been written with some bad kind of ink, were beginning to fade. Her graphic lines were, in several instances, on the borders of the vanishing point. Under these circumstances, I asked permission of my friend, Mr. Robert Browning, for their publication; and this was granted at once, and in terms that enhanced the favour as much beyond my means to express, as it would be beyond his wish that I should make the attempt. He had never seen the Letters, but trusted in my good feeling.

Reverting to our opening words, the question now arises as to what constitutes the "Art of Letter-writing"? Putting mere fine talk and eloquent twaddle out of court, and taking some brains, study, and experience for granted, my immediate opinion is this,—the art of letter-writing is just the art, so to speak, of being natural. In other words, it is not an *art* at all. Inasmuch as nobody comes to *read* with facility till a good deal of reading has been done; so in writing with facility, a considerable amount of previous writing is to be understood; and this being clear, we may safely repeat that the finest Letter-writing is no set and specific art, but varies with the individual writer, as it ought and must. In its highest forms of success, it is the natural and spontaneous outpouring of a well-stored intellect, a genial spirit, fine taste, judgment, toleration, the wit and humour that comes unsought, and in its entirety the *abandon* of a soul and heart which give vent to their inward breathings, in the full belief—and generally with the conviction—of addressing a congenial mind, and of being in sympathy with a nature of sufficient similitude to be in accord with these unpremeditated models of penmanship. And, withal, such letters are the perfection of refined colloquiality. (Those of the late Miss Mitford carried the carelessness of implicit confidence to an amusing, and almost absurd, extent, innumerable letters and notes from her having been written on any scraps of paper at hand, old envelopes turned inside out, and blank edges of newspapers, while I have many letters, the outsides of which were frequently half covered with postscripts and after-thoughts. Those of Mrs. Browning's had no

external signs of this easy, off-hand carelessness, but *within* they were the perfection of ease, confiding frankness—firmness of opinion, also—and the undisguised and complete expression of the writer's nature, and her thought and feeling upon every subject she touched.

Three years ago I published in a monthly magazine,* by permission, one of Mrs. Browning's letters, preceding it with the following remarks, containing certain matters of which my present readers should be informed:—

"My first acquaintance with the authoress of 'Our Village' was by a note from Miss E. B. Barrett (whom I only knew by literary correspondence, and had never seen), both so much regarded in private and in public, and now so lamented. This note enclosed one from Miss Mitford, expressing a wish to have a dramatic sketch for some annual, or other dramatic thing, which she found it her interest, but no particular pleasure, to edit.

"Both these notes were models of fascinating colloquial elegance and simplicity, more especially that of the, at that time, invisible poetess, and they should both be here presented to the reader, but that, at present, they have not been extricated from amidst the accumulations of bygone years." (And I am still unable to discover them.)

"That occasion, however, was my first introduction to Miss Mitford; and my first to the learned and accomplished poetess—the greatest lyric poetess the world has ever known—was by a note from Mrs. O——, enclosing one from the young lady, containing a short poem, with the modest request to be frankly told whether it might be ranked as poetry, or merely verses. As there was no doubt in the recipient's mind on that point, the poem was forwarded to *Colburn's New Monthly*, edited, at that time, by Mr. Edward Bulwer (the late Lord Lytton), where it appeared in the current number."

That which led to my acquaintance with Miss Mitford will be seen in the first letter from Mrs. Browning, which will here be given. But with respect to Mrs. Browning a few words should be added:—"It may be generally understood that this equally gifted and accomplished lady, having been for years confined to her rooms, like an exotic plant in a green-house, being considered in constant danger of rapid decline, occupied her time, not only in the arduous study of poetry, but also in acquiring a knowledge of the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew languages. She was also well acquainted with all the greatest authors of France and Italy, in the original, and, apparently, with the poetry of the Portuguese. But it is not so generally known, and

* "Macmillan's Magazine," Sept., 1870, Art. iv., "Portraits and Memoirs."

perhaps very little known, that she was a most assiduous reader of English literature, and conversant equally with the earliest authors, and the best of those of our own day. Her criticisms in the *Athenæum*, and in her private letters, are among the most exquisite ever penned; discriminating and applauding all the power and beauty; lenient to errors and shortcomings, and rich with imaginative illustrations. She had also a subtle instinct as to character, the more remarkable considering her years of seclusion from the world. But these things can only be known to few, the very few who enjoyed the privilege of being in her society, or ranking among her correspondents. In the opinion of some of them—and of one, at least—nobody ever wrote such letters and notes, not even the most celebrated of the lady letter-writers handed down for the world's admiration. The general knowledge, varied learning and reading, fine taste, and the noble heart and mind, were only to be surpassed, if that could be, by her utter simplicity and charming colloquial carelessness. Of course no single letter would display all these qualities, but it would be difficult to produce half a dozen which did not." And let me also request the present reader to bear in mind that those letters which would best justify the foregoing opinion have not been selected for this first collection, the editor thinking he should rather be governed by the dates, or the approximate dates, so as to make them illustrative of certain literary men and women of her day (now thirty years ago, and upwards), and of certain books and other literary work with which she was occupied.

Something else, important to my own feelings, I am anxious to explain. It will have been seen that it was my happiness, and it is not without a just pride, that I was instrumental in the first introduction of Miss E. B. Barrett to the literary world; in the next place, I was many years her senior, and thus, besides such works as I had published, and other literary engagements, with the whole of which in that seclusion of hers, she was fully conversant, she also knew of my varied experiences in foreign lands of a very different kind; and all these things, acting upon her imagination in solitude, together with a most unexampled over-estimate of all reason to be grateful for my slight services, and off-shoots of correspondence, have caused expressions of gratitude and deference far beyond any adequate cause, and which, with profound respect to her memory, I beg to disclaim. For the frequent reference, also, to my Tragedies and other works, let me ask the reader to grant me his pardon—the more necessary, if, as will be likely with so many readers of the present day, they have never read a line of them; and it may add to my excuse for the inability, for obvious reasons, to omit such passages, that the books

in question, with only three exceptions, have all been long out of print, and, so far as I can see into the "forlorn hopes" of the tragic drama, likely to remain so. For the compliments, then, and other kind remarks in these letters, once for all, let me ask the reader's forgiveness. I cannot erase them without causing a mist and confusion in matters very clear in these letters as they stand.

The first letter here given had been preceded by several others, as will be perceptible; but they cannot as yet be found. This first one will prove that my apologies were no "piece of affectation." It is unlucky for my modesty—such as it is, or is not—that so glaring a need for excuses should have broken through the dark clouds of thirty years at the very outset. I am glad to say, however, that there is no other compliment that goes quite so far as this.

It refers to something written by me, at Miss Barrett's earnest request, in one of Finden's Illustrated Annuals, which was to be edited, and in fact "furnished," by her friend Miss Mitford. I did not at all like these ornamental efflorescences of passing literature, as both ladies knew; the thing was done, nevertheless, being cast in the shape of the most concise trilogy ever written—viz., a tragedy founded on the German legend of the Death-Fetches. I have never seen it since, nor anybody else in all probability. One knows the fate—the deserved fate—of these annual gildings.

"BEACON TERRACE, TORQUAY,
Nov. 20th, 1839.

"MY DEAR SIR,—In passing to the immediate occasion of my troubling you with these lines, allow me to thank you—to join mine to the thanks of many—for the pleasure of admiration (surely not the least of the pleasures of this world) with which I have read your trilogy. It is so full of fine conception that its brevity grows into a fault,—one would so willingly see it brought out into detail and consummation. But, even as it is, believe in my contentment—speaking for myself.

"The moonlight scene is exquisite, and there is (particularly distinguishable in that) a music of *broken cadences* which I have seldom observed out of Shakespeare. It is the Fetch of a great tragedy—for all the briefness.

"I should not have ventured to trouble you with opinions you might so easily take for granted, if it were not for another circumstance. Two months or more ago, you will remember asking me to send you a short poem by return of post, for a particular purpose. I was ill able to write at the time, but still worse able to endure the appearance of discourtesy towards you in such a trifle, and therefore I sent you two MSS. which I had by me, the shortest I had, but evidently too long to suit you. I did it just and only that you might not think me ill-natured;—and the event having proved their uselessness to you otherwise, perhaps you would be kind enough to enclose them back to me—that is, if you can readily put your hand upon

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them. The 'Madrigal of Flowers,' is one title, and the 'Cry of the Human' the other. I am afraid of involving you in some trouble of search for which you may well reproach me. So, pray if you cannot readily put your hand upon them, put the subject out of your head.

"Very sincerely yours,

"ELIZABETH B. BARRETT."

To R. H. Horne,
75, Gloucester Place, London.

It is thus apparent that a good many previous notes are, in all probability, wanting; and equally so that there must also be still more missing, which were received between the foregoing and the following notes.

The next letter refers to the unusual circumstance of a "hooping-cough" being caught a second time. But so it was. Having been engaged as one of the Assistant Commissioners in the Government inquiry into the "Employment of Children and Young Persons in Mines and Manufactories," I chanced one day to be seated for a couple of hours, during an east wind of the winter months, taking the evidence of some children, in a newly plastered church ante-room, with the accompaniment of a thorough draft from doors and windows; and a first-rate cough, with all the "hooping" convulsions, like "laughter holding both his sides" (with a difference), was the consequence. But a very much more important subject, *viz.*, the struggles of an heroic spirit in a most fragile and fluttering frame, will be discovered in the following profoundly interesting and touching letter:—

Post-mark—TORQUAY,
June 12th, 1841.

"MY DEAR MR. HORNE,—I am so sorry about the hooping-cough. As a means of 're-juvenescence,' why, one might as pleasantly pass into and through Medea's kettle. Do try to remember when you write again, and tell me how you are; if the change of air perfects the good it has begun. For my own part I never had the hooping-cough at all. I stood alone in my family, and wouldn't have it when everybody else was hooping.

"Mind, if you please—I wrote two notes to you instead of one, and had it not been for the fear of teasing you beyond bounds, should certainly have written a third to ask about the cough. The first was put into a dangerous envelope—out of perverseness and faith in the right measure, and perhaps glided away. But I have sent a hundred of those little letters, and received still more, and never missed, or was missed, till now—*if* now. So, why shouldn't I be perverse?

"I am revived just now—pleased, anxious, excited altogether, in the hope of touching at last upon my last days at this place. I have been up, and bore it excellently—up an hour at a time without fainting—and on

several days without injury,—and now am looking forward to the journey. My physician has been open with me, and is of opinion that there is a good deal of risk to be run in attempting it. But my mind is made up to go; and if the power remains to me, I *will* go. To be at home and relieved from the sense of doing evil where I would soonest bring a blessing—of breaking up poor papa's domestic peace into fragments by keeping my sisters here (and he won't let them leave me)—would urge me into any possible 'risk'—to say nothing of the continual repulsion, night and day, of the sights and sounds of this dreary place. There will be no opposition. So papa promised me at the beginning of last winter that I should go when it became 'possible.' Then, Dr. Scully did not talk of 'risk,' but of certain consequences. He said I should die on the road. I know how to understand the change of phrase. There is only a 'risk' now—and the journey is 'possible.' So, I go.

"We are to have one of the patent carriages, with a thousand springs, from London, and I am afraid of nothing. I shall set out, I *hope*, in a fortnight.

"Ah, but not directly for London. There is to be some intermediate place where we all must meet, papa says, and stay for a month or two before the final settlement in Wimpole Street,—and he names 'Clifton,' and I pray for the neighbourhood of London, because I look far (too far, perhaps, for me), and fear being left an exile again at those Hot Wells during the winter. I don't know what the 'finality measure' may be. The only thing *fixed* is a journey from hence :—and 'if I fall,' as the heroes say, why you and Psyche must walk by yourselves. *She*, at least, won't be the worse for it."

The last sentence alludes to a mutually projected lyrical drama on the Greek model. An outline of the design, and the proposed "division of labour," will subsequently be given.

"Who taught this parrot its 'How d'ye do?' and so much irrelevancy? You would be tired of me, even if you hadn't the hooping-cough.

"Is it true that Mr. Heraud's magazine is downfallen? And why?

"But don't answer my questions—don't indeed write at all until you are better, and able and inclined to write. Writing is so bad—leaning to write is so bad—and I don't suppose that you could write in the way I do, leaning backwards instead of forwards—lying down, in fact. I write *so* 'to the Horse Guards.'

"How you would smile sarcasms and epigrams out of the 'hood' if you could see from it what I have been doing, or rather suffering, lately! Having my picture taken, by a lady miniature-painter who wandered here to put an old vow of mine to proof. For it wasn't the ruling passion, 'strong in death,' 'though by your smiling you may seem to say so,' but a sacrifice to papa.

"Are you tossed about much by the agitation of political matters—or

indifferently calm? I hear nothing from London except what Lord Melbourne has done, or the Queen said.

"Dear Mr. Horne, don't let me mar anything in your conception, with regard to the Drama" [referring to the design of 'Psyche']. "Push any foolishness aside which seems to do it.

"I did *not* understand your particular view. I thought that our philosopher (Medon), having laboriously worked himself blind with the vain, earthward, cramped strivings of his intellect, was suddenly thrown upon the verge of awaking in, and to, the spiritual world, by a casualty relating to his body itself. It was something of that sort which I seemed to discern in what you wrote. Don't mar anything for *me*, dear Mr. Horne.

"Truly yours,

ELIZABETH B. BARRETT.

"Perhaps we may not be gone from hence so soon as a—a fortnight, after all. If you are inclined to write, do not hesitate about directing *here*, as usual, until I say more. I remember something of Broadstairs, deep in a cloud of childish thoughts."

It will have been noticed that while the very life of the suffering writer of these Letters is about to be imperilled by a long journey, how kindly considerate she is of others—her father, sisters, the occupation of my time,—and in other notes she again alludes to that "hooping" torment which lasted me, "on and off," nearly a year and a half.

The next two Letters refer to the "legitimate drama," and the Patent Monopoly once possessed by three special London theatres. This is not the place to say much upon the subject, *viz.*, the prominent part I took in destroying that monopoly. Let me merely repeat that I considered it right that all such monopoly should be destroyed, and (as I put it in the Petitions to both Houses) "that every theatre should be permitted to enact the best dramas they could obtain." From the ashes of that monopoly I, and those who worked with me at the destruction, expected to see a new race both of dramatists and actors arise. Never were sanguine hopes more utterly defeated—made a mockery of—and far worse idols set up in the temples than those which had been cast down. And here we shall see a young lady, living in utter seclusion, and precariously hovering on the brink of the grave, who had far keener instincts and far wiser foresight than the man to whom she was writing with so much modesty and deference. She was requested to place her name, among other signatures of eminent persons, to the Petitions in question. I could not but be charmed, at the time, with the elegant humility and kindly regrets, mixed with unalterable firmness, conveyed in her replies; but how must I admire all she said, now that

I look around at the great majority of the stages of London, knowing that they have spread their pestilence all over the world ever since we destroyed those Patent Monopolies ?

"TORQUAY, (not dated, but the post-mark
looks like 1841.)

"Nothing of the 'tragic subject' to-day, dear Mr. Horne: I am going to get into a scrape instead.

"I tremble to do it, take a long breath before I begin, and then beg you to excuse me about the signature, and forgive me, if possible, afterwards.

"Have I done it? Is it all over with me? Oh! I feel the shadow of the great Gregory's hand, to match the foot, even at this distance."

Alluding to what is said in my tragedy, of the hand and foot of Hildebrand.

"As to the Petition, the justice of the claim lies upon the surface, and its policy not much deeper, and therefore in writing, and predicting all success, I need not stir from the common sense of the question. You are sure to gain the immediate object, and you ought to do so, even though the ultimate object remain as far off as ever, and more evidently far. There is a deeper evil than licenses or the want of licenses—the base and blind public taste. Multiply your theatres and license every one—do it to-day. And the day after to-morrow (you may have one night) there will come Mr. Bunn, and turn out you and Shakespeare with a great roar of lions. Well!—we shall see.

"You know far more than I do, and you seem to hope more. If the great mass in London were Athenians, I might hope too.

"But I do *not* like giving my name to anything about the theatres. It is a name unimportant to everybody in the world except just myself, for whom the giving of it would be the sign of an opinion;—and I should not like to give it in any one thing favourable to the theatres. At their best, take the ideal of them, and the soul of the Drama is far above the stage; and according to present and perhaps all past regulations in this country, Dramatic poetry has been desecrated into the dust of our treading,—yes, and too often forced to desecration, and drawn down morally in turn, by the stage. When the poet has his gods in the gallery, what must be the end of it? Why, that even Shakespeare should bow his starry head oftener than the former nodded—and write down his pure genius into the dirt of the groundlings, for the sake of the savour of their 'most sweet voices';—and even so, be out-written in popularity for years and years by his half-brother noble geniuses, Beaumont and Fletcher, *because* they stooped still lower.

"Well, but, dear Mr. Horne, if you shake your head ever so much over this, and call me ever so many names—don't be really angry: I can't afford to let you be angry with me. People will have their fancies and perversities,—grant me mine. If the name you asked for were not 'bosh,' I

should be still more sorry than I now am to say 'no' to your asking. And yet even now, even as it is, I didn't like writing—either yesterday or the day before—nor do I to-day!

"The 'Monthly Chronicle' has not reached me yet. I am eager for the added scene of 'Cosmo.'

"And glad, dear Mr. Horne, that you could like anything in the volume where there is more to forgive than like, for the kindest.

"Ever truly yours, E. B. B."

"Cosmo" alludes to my tragedy; and the remark about the "volume," referring, no doubt, to her first publication, shows that many letters and notes are missing. Not being sure they may not yet be found, let me ask permission to defer my explanation of how such literary treasures may have been lost.

"TORQUAY, (no date given.)

"Thank you, dear Mr. Horne, for the 'Statesman,' which is returned by the present post. So, dramatists can't originate under the Guelphs—can't 'call their souls their own'—and nothing is originated in your tragedies. Such nonsense shouldn't provoke us as it does—but it does.

"Now, there is that Mr. Darley who has written a 'Dramatic Chronicle' ('Thomas à Beckett'), to prove that, nature being exhausted, there can be no more tragedies. No; the 'Chronicle' was not written to prove it: the Preface was. But he might more safely have left it to the 'Chronicle'—q. e. d. A clever, picturesque composition—powerful in a certain way, though not in the tragic. If Mr. Darley stood alone as a tragedian, his proposition would be irrefutable. Not that I disesteem him. He wrote a beautiful, tuneful pastoral, once—'Sylvia, or the May Queen,' but the missing thing is passion—pathos—if not a *besides*.

"How wonderful that such ideas should be taken up by people with one!"

Part of the foregoing denunciation is attributable to a friendly championship, Mr. Darley, it was said, having wielded the pen that made an attack upon me in a critical journal. Justice is done to his pastoral poem, but only a stinted justice to some of his dramatic writing. In one of his Chronicles, there is a fight described between the High Chancellor; "tower-heavy Turketul" and "Gorm," a Scandinavian sea-king, worthy of the most heroic bardic power. Turketul at last strikes Gorm a finishing blow with his mace, and merely makes this terribly grim comment upon the affair—

"Fell—laughed—and died! He made a goodly end!"

The letter alludes in a complimentary way to the critical journal in which Mr. Darley was writing his dramatic heresies (though I got him to sign our Petition, notwithstanding), adding humorously, however,—

"But as to *poetry*, they are all sitting (in mistake), just now, upon Caucasus for Parnassus—and wondering why they don't see the Muses! He hasn't a heart even for Beaumont and Fletcher; and, to his mind, the cause of the abundance of poetical genius in the old times was—the difficulty they had in writing! We spell too well for anything! Here's a discovery!

"It comes to this. If poetry, under any form, be exhaustible, Nature is; and if Nature be—we are near a blasphemy—I, for one, could not believe in the immortality of the soul.

* Si l'ame est immortelle,
L'amour ne l'est-il pas ?

"Extending *l'amour* into all love of the ideal, and attendant power of idealizing.

"But, ah! there may be another mistake! Dear Mr. Horne, do you fancy that directly you have opened the minor theatres, 'Cosmos' and 'Gregories,' unwritten by you, will pour through the doors? I don't; though the present system is iniquitous, and everything involving a patent odious, and your reformation is always desirable. I don't believe in 'mute, inglorious Miltons,' and, far less, in mute, inglorious Shakespeares. Van Amburgh's new elephant will take turn with 'Gregory the Seventh'—you will see.

"Which reminds me of another sort of taking turn—the sort you propose—in cruel jest as I must suppose. You think it would be a good joke to take 'the click of small machinery' into your Gregorian chant. Well, I can only answer, in sober sadness, that I should like. . . . and everybody would talk of want of proportion."

The concluding passage, the entire humility of which I cannot bring myself to copy, refers to the Greek subject we had in contemplation to write as a lyrical drama.

"Where do you go in July?—for *me* I can't answer. I am longing to go to London, and hoping to the last. For the present—certainly the window has been opened twice—an inch—but I can't be lifted even to the sofa without fainting. And my physician shakes his head, or changes the conversation, which is worse, whenever London is mentioned. But I do grow stronger; and if it becomes possible, I shall go—WILL go! That sounds better—doesn't it? Putting it off to another summer, is like a 'never.'

"Oh! I was so glad to have your note. I really thought you had gone to America, or were tired of me—worse still. I never thought of 'neglect,' that being such a wrong word—but, otherwise, I lie here fancying all sorts of things in heaven and earth.

"It is a shame to expect all this stuff to be read by any person with their time filled up as yours must be. Never mind throwing aside what I

write for your leisure. Never let me be in the way. Pray don't. To prove myself not quite inconsiderate, I wanted (should have preferred it) to send you something meant for the M. C., to know from you whether it should be some thing or another thing ; but I enclose it by this post to the Editor, that I may not wear you quite away. Now, if you are tired, you are avenged, for I am too.

" Ever truly,

E. B. B."

The spiritual strength, the force and fortitude of mind, combined with the modest self-estimate, and the temporary forgetfulness of her own dangerous state, both in the full play of her intellect and in her considerateness for the occupation of other people's time, can require no comment ; but the intensely interesting circumstance of the immediate struggle, not only for emancipation from solitude, but *for life*, as recorded by herself *at the moment*, has never before been made known, and would furnish materials for a beautiful homily, which I must leave to more worthy hands than mine.

The next Letter has no date, but internal evidence shows that it was written some time after the one last given. It is very valuable as displaying the opinion of one learned lady of another learned lady of her own day, *viz.*, Mrs. Sara Coleridge.

"Thank you, my dear Mr. Horne, you are kinder than kind. I am delighted with the engravings, and shall have the poets (at least Wordsworth, Tennyson, Browning, Talfourd) framed, and hung up in this room. I only wish the editor had been one of them.

" No more superfluous words, and thank you again.

" E. B. B."

" *Wednesday.* By the way, or rather out of the way, I hope I did not seem to infer any disrespect to Sara Coleridge in a general remark made in my letter yesterday. I forgot her while I wrote it. She is not a poet—she does not pretend to the faculty—but she has a lively fancy, as she has expressed it in her prose fairy-tale, and possesses perhaps more learning, in the strict sense, than any female writer of the day. A theological essay, in appendix to the late edition of her father's philosophical works, is remarkable for its erudition, and its calm and candid ratiocination. A little wire-drawn, but of sturdy metal. I have a high respect for Mrs. Coleridge !

" And you will please to recollect, Mr. Horne, that when I talk of women, I do not speak of them (as many men do, and as perhaps you yourself are somewhat inclined to do) according to a separate, peculiar, and womanly standard, but according to the common standard of human nature.

" There is a postscript scarcely proportionate to the antescrypt ! "

With reference to all the expressions of thanks for kindness, and so forth, in the commencement of the foregoing Letter, one of the

very earliest I received, and which cannot at present be found, would have made the cause clear enough. The correspondence having originated, as previously described, Miss Barrett briefly mentioned her state of health, and her isolation; frankly adding that "the opportunity of some mental relief" (in the way of literary communication and talk on general topics of the outer world) "was irresistible." What literary man could have felt otherwise than glad to give any time he could spare to such a correspondent (though, at the commencement, quite unknown to fame) and under such touching circumstances? A grateful nature caused her very much to over-estimate every little attention. I continually expected to hear of her death.

We will conclude this first of the series of Letters, by a choice morsel of graphic criticism,—showing how that faded little arm, being put forth from a sofa (whereon, as Miss Mitford used to tell me, the fair sufferer used to lie enveloped in large Indian shawls), could wield a gleaming scimitar, and strike home, either with impassioned eye, or, as in the present instance, with a forehead beaming with mixed indignation and irony.

The first part of the Letter, which is missing, but not lost, alludes to the election of Miss Strickland as an Honorary Member of the Literary Institute; the concluding part deals with one of "a discerning" public's tip-top favourites of the hour, *viz.*, Robert Montgomery. And if anybody wishes to know who is meant by "Flushie," he is informed that it was the lady's favourite dog.

Date about 1842.

"Talking of poets—no, not talking of poets, but thinking of poets—are you aware, O Orion, that the most popular poet alive is the Reverend Robert Montgomery, who walks into his twenty and somethingth edition 'like nothing'? I mean the author of 'Satan;' 'Woman;' 'Omnipresence of the Deity;' 'The Messiah;'—the least of these being in its teens of editions, and the greatest, not worth a bark of my Flushie's! My Flushie is more of a poet, by the shining of his eyes! But is it not wonderful that this man who waves his white handkerchief from the pulpit till the tears run in rivulets all round, should have another trick of oratory (as good) where he can't show the ring on his little finger? I really do believe that the 'Omnipresence of the Deity' is in the twenty-fourth edition, or beyond it,—a fact that cannot be stated in respect to Wordsworth after all these years."

Thirty years have elapsed since "all these years," and can the above fact be stated even now? We are speaking of the last thirty years.

Can it be said of Milton? It may be doubted, with reference to

his "Paradise Regained," and other unsurpassable Poems, nearly all of them being equal (in *poetry*) to the "Paradise Lost"; and certainly it cannot be said of Chaucer and Spenser. Whose works, let us ask, among the greatest poets of the last thirty years and more, have reached their twenty-fourth editions up to this time? Not one; while those most read at the present period have not reached much beyond half that number. And out of these facts a very curious, though, I fear, a very unprofitable, as well as unpleasant, question arises in the mind. Those tens of thousands, so many of whose eyes ran rivulets at the waving of the theological cambric—just as it is said that a popular preacher of a previous date never pronounced the word "Mesopotamia," but nearly all his hearers melted into tears—these goodly folks were all in various degrees of earnestness; all, more or less, affected; and they thronged in bleating droves to the purchase of the dear-one's poems in the full fervour of fashionably, as well as seriously, devout readers. The same classes of persons exist at the present day; but what has become of those sacred poems? Whither have vanished all those thousands upon thousands of expensive books, since none are ever seen in shops, or book-stalls—not even in the sixpenny side-baskets? They may have been packed off to the backwoods of America and Canada, or the convict colony of Western Australia,—for surely their very paper was too costly for trunk-linings or groceries? And why are not additional twenty-fourth editions printed by enterprising religious booksellers up to the present hour? Will anybody venture to reply that the "Omnipresence of the Deity" has had its day?—and the "Messiah" has had its day?—and "Satan" and "Woman" have had theirs? But as these subjects are inexhaustible, it only requires another similar kind of pulpit-fascination to treat them in an equally popular way! Put the cloven foot into a fashionable boot, and the wearer may, as Miss Barrett says, "walk into his twenty-and-somethingth edition, 'like nothing,'" as easily now as it was done thirty years ago. *Can* this be true? I do not entirely believe it. For lo! the Rev. Stopford A. Brooke, a chaplain to the Queen, and a critical lover of true poetry, has given a public Lecture in honour of Shelley, and quoted him for high praise in the pulpit. A change has come, and is advancing; slowly,—still, as Galileo said, "it moves." But I *do* believe we have not yet moved so far but that if another preacher, and that of the present day, equal in popularity to the Rev. Robert Montgomery, were to uplift his stentorian voice in pouring forth from the housetop an oration in verse upon some startling text of general application, that the issue of that so-called Poem would run through more editions in the same space of time than those of the Laureate

and all the other first-class living poets put together. If quantity were the test of quality, the most popular living poet would be Mr. M. F. Tupper. The same average immobility (with regard to the highest works of imagination), and the same average concurrence, seem to have existed at all times; and exists still. The public, as a body, really do not know one thing from another (so far as *poetry* is concerned) during at least twenty years; and even then, our truc-Briton public does not bend and soften towards any given instance until inspired by some ruling spirit of the hour—whatever spirit that may be. Obviously it could not arise from the old-fashioned, common-place cauldron of the *Quarterly Review*. In the number for July last, of that Caucasus, whereon a critic “sits by mistake, taking it for Parnassus, and wondering he does not see the Muses,” we find a would-be ruling spirit, fated by nature and careful culture not to know one thing from another (as to *poetry*), endeavouring, as the *Spectator* says, “to take us back to the leading-strings of the last, and the beginning of the present century.” In one of her Letters, reserved for next month, Miss Barrett speaks of Tennyson as “a divine poet,”—and the same might be said, with similar truth, of Keats and Shelley;—and here we find a gentleman of the old school, who would take our day back to the couplet-system of the time of Pope, with its melodious monotonies, or the hard-featured and often painful realities of Crabbe. *Chacun a sa marotte*, and we should not quarrel with a gentleman because he has a fixed devotion to antiquated styles and old modes of thinking; but we must object to the staring self-contradiction of the principal poets of the time being first assailed as the introducers of new modes of thinking, and picturing thought,—and, in the next breath, accused of sacrificing thought to style and “external form.” After admitting that the Laureate’s style is “exquisite”—not without a sneer—the critic quotes a passage from Crabbe, as being good, wholesome English, as no doubt it is—every farmer’s man would say so—and then makes an extract from Tennyson, describing a similar event, but treated poetically,—in fact, with certain additions (which he no more sees than the farmer’s man would be likely to see), and politely designates it as “Celestial Chinese!” Nor is this gentleman sparing of epithets on the most finished of styles, calling its art “artifice”—“gross mannerism”—“trickery”—and he once allows himself to perpetrate the accusation of “charlatanry.” In order to prove the superiority of the old couplet-system, he selects one of the most nobly graphic passages from Chaucer, but foisting-in triplets and Alexandrines, the “artifice” of which the readers of the *Quarterly*

Review are assumed to be quite unlikely to perceive. As for Mr. Swinburne, the melodiousness of his verse is admitted, but the critic would obviously prefer by far the "real poetry" of Roger Cuff and Peter Grimes, to such "unmeaning music as Swinburne's 'Hymns' and 'Litanies.'" We believe the objection is generally made that they mean much more than is agreeable. In fine, the greatest living poets are accused of sacrificing the dear old style to the new thoughts—which is true—and of sacrificing "thoughts to external style"—which is a direct contradiction. They are devoted to "word painting," and then we are sagely informed that "a picture represents *nothing* to us but the outward form." We are thus satisfactorily shown at once, by the critic himself, how very worthy he is to have looked upon the pictures of Francia, Leonardo da Vinci, Raphael, Ribera, Titian, and other great masters of the expression of intensities of thought and emotion; and how very fit a critic he is to take his place upon the judgment-seat with the delinquents before him, whom he has so dogmatically condemned.

Miss E. B. Barrett's contributions to an edition of "Chaucer Modernized" (in conjunction with Wordsworth, Leigh Hunt, Robert Bell, the present writer, and others), together with her remarks on Agnes Strickland's "Queens of England;" on Harriet Martineau; on certain contributors to *Blackwood*; on Miss Sedgwick (after her return to America, to "print the notes" she had "taken") on English Versification and Rhymes; with other topics, will constitute the substance of the next selection from our authoress's Letters.

R. H. HORNE.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR.

10, DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL,
Nov. 3, 1873.

MY DEAR SIR :

I observe in the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for October, p. 670, that the following words are quoted from an address of mine at Liverpool :—

“Upon the ground of what is termed evolution, God is relieved of the labour of creation : in the name of unchangeable laws, he is discharged from governing the world.”

The distinguished writer in the REVIEW says that by these words I have made myself so conspicuously the champion (or exponent) of the anti-scientific view, that the words may be regarded as typical.

To go as directly as may be to my point, I consider this judgment upon my declaration to be founded on an assumption or belief that it contains a condemnation of evolution, and of the doctrine of unchangeable laws. I submit that it contains no such thing. Let me illustrate by saying, What if I wrote as follows :—

“Upon the ground of what is termed liberty, flagrant crimes have been committed : and (likewise) in the name of law and order, human rights have been trodden under foot.”

I should not by thus writing condemn liberty, or condemn law and order ; but condemn only the inferences that men draw, or say they draw, from them. Up to that point the parallel is exact : and I hope it will be seen that Mr. Spencer has inadvertently put upon my words a meaning they do not bear.

Using the parallel thus far for the sake of clearness, I carry it no farther. For while I am ready to give in my adhesion to liberty,

and likewise to law and order, on evolution and on unchangeable laws I had rather be excused.

The words with which I think Madame de Staël ends *Corinne*, are the best for me:—*Je ne veux ni la blâmer, ni l'absurder*. Before I could presume to give an opinion on evolution, or on unchangeable laws, I should wish to know more clearly and more fully than I yet know, the meaning attached to those phrases by the chief apostles [of the doctrines; and very likely even after accomplishing this preliminary stage, I might find myself insufficiently supplied with the knowledge required to draw the line between true and false.

I have then no repugnance to any conclusions whatever, legitimately arising upon well-ascertained facts or well-tested reasonings: and my complaint is that the functions of the Almighty as Creator and Governor of the world are denied upon grounds, which, whatever be the extension given to the phrases I have quoted, appear to me to be utterly and manifestly insufficient to warrant such denial.

I am desirous to liberate myself from a supposition alien, I think, to my whole habits of mind and life. But I do not desire to effect this by the method of controversy; and if Mr. Spencer does not see, or does not think, that he has mistaken the meaning of my words, I have no more darts to throw; and will do myself, indeed, the pleasure of concluding with a frank avowal that his manner of handling what he must naturally consider to be a gross piece of folly is as far as possible from being offensive.

Believe me,

Most faithfully yours,

W. E. GLADSTONE.



PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT.

IN TWO PAPERS.

II.

I DESCRIBED in my first paper the defects which, in my opinion, are inherent in Parliamentary Government in relation both to legislation and to the administration of public affairs. As I also expressed the opinion that the country is irrevocably committed to Parliamentary Government, the result would appear to be that the disease is incurable; and it is natural to ask, what is the use of dwelling upon the symptoms of an incurable disease, and whether it is not better to console the sufferer and to point out the good side of his constitution. Though the disease in question is not wholly curable, it is, I think, capable of alleviation. I do not see why it should be regarded as a hopeless task to convince those who take an interest in the subject, of the limits which the nature of the case imposes on the power of parliaments and other popular assemblies. The acknowledgment of these limits would of itself in course of time more or less alleviate the evils complained of. The first step is to get people to understand that the defects which I have been pointing out are real, and that their importance is likely rather to increase than to diminish. The great difficulty of effecting this lies in bringing people to understand the urgent importance of the subject, and in preventing them from being led away by a variety of exceedingly plausible commonplaces which are directed to show that the evils to which I have referred are not really evils at all.

The general character of the commonplaces in question may be indicated in a very few words. They insist upon the advantages of local self-government, and contrast these with the fatal effects of centralization, and, above all, they insist upon the maxim that it is far better that public business should be ill done, if a large number of persons get the education and training which our method of doing it gives them, than that it should be well done at the price of being put into the hands of a small knot of officials forming what is called a bureaucracy. The prejudice which has been created by the prevalence of these commonplaces against schemes for any systematic improvement of the administrative or legislative institutions of the country is so strong that I doubt whether the question to which I wish to direct attention has ever been made the subject of serious discussion. I am sure that it has never received anything approaching to the degree of attention to which its real importance entitles it. My principal object in this paper will be to try to remove the prejudice which has thus been created upon the subject and to show that the evils to which I refer are real and growing, and that the bad consequences which are apprehended from any systematic attempt to remove them are imaginary.

The evils which arise from legislative and executive weakness are self-evident. They consist of bad laws and bad management of public affairs, and when I speak of bad laws I mean to refer not only, and indeed not principally, to the class of laws which are most commonly referred to in courts of justice, but to that great and continually increasing mass of laws which apply to nearly every part of our daily life. There is hardly a subject on which people do not legislate or attempt to legislate in these days. We pull down and build up, we disestablish churches and establish schools with almost equal vigour; we regulate mines, factories, drainage works, and shipping; we protect sea birds and land birds, so long at least as they are not fit to eat; we encourage and protect salmon, and greatly hesitate as to whether we shall not put deer, hares, and rabbits on the same footing with rats; we forbid steam trumpets, and cover the whole land with the sound of steam whistles. In a word, we have laws little and great, good, bad, and indifferent, on pretty nearly every subject which can be mentioned. I am not one of those who complain of this, and who habitually speak and write of it as if a sort of madness had come over parliament and the nation which it represents. I believe that every age has its own problems, which it can no more avoid than any individual can avoid the problems which come in his way at the different periods of life. If a man of forty were to expect to have no more cares or anxieties than a lad of twenty, and were to ask the question, Why cannot I

take as little thought now as I did then about a great variety of rather tiresome subjects? the answer would be, Because you have surrounded yourself with interests and duties which make up your life, and which you cannot neglect without great discredit and great moral wrong.

The comparison between nations and men may be ridden to death, but there can be no doubt that they resemble each other to this extent, that the affairs of both nations and individuals who are at all active and successful constantly tend to become more and more complicated, and to require greater attention and management. The English nation, like a merchant in large business, has got into a position in which special knowledge is acquiring a constantly increasing importance, and in which we shall be unable to bring our national concerns to a good result, unless we make use of it to the utmost and in the most skilful and, therefore, most economical manner. It rather seems to me as if the course of political speculation and the actual practice founded upon and corresponding to it were tending towards the strange result of causing the amount of real political wisdom applied to public affairs to be diminished, in proportion to the growth of the importance and intricacy of the affairs which have to be administered. The condition of political thought and sentiment in this country, generated and stimulated to the utmost by Parliamentary Government and the party system, appears to me to be becoming daily more and more serious, quite apart from the specific effects of which I tried to give a sketch in my last paper both upon legislation and upon the administration of public affairs.

In attempting to explain my meaning, I must protest against being misunderstood. I am very far, indeed, from thinking that the age in which we live is worse or more foolish than its predecessors. In many respects it is probably wiser; but, however this may be, every age has its own special dangers and failings, which in every case are serious enough, and which not unnaturally appear to those who perceive them at all specially unpleasant, as is usually the case with present dangers or evils of every description. Let me not, therefore, be understood to compare our days with other ages or other countries in a disparaging manner. I mean simply what I say, and no more—namely, that I see or think I see special evils in the present state of political opinion and thought flowing directly from institutions to which we are deeply attached and irrevocably committed.

They may be summed up by saying that thought upon political affairs seems to be running into a paltry form. One principal reason of this, I think, is, that our ablest men devote themselves to devising measures which can be made intelligible and

interesting to the great bulk of the constituencies, while the great mass of speculative men, for reasons upon which I cannot now enter, have set themselves either to challenge the right of Government to meddle with anything but police subjects, or to prove that in point of fact they can never do so with advantage. The result appears to be that political opinion falls into the form of an immense number of essentially small, narrow, isolated, contradictory opinions upon all sorts of subjects, most of which are of no very great importance in themselves, though their importance is ludicrously overrated by those who hold them, and which involve, as a necessary result, endless and acrimonious controversies. This state of things is usually made the subject of a great deal of self-applause. We are told that it fosters noble qualities, that it is a splendid education, that it teaches men lessons of independence and self-reliance, gives vast numbers of persons an immediate interest in public affairs, and enables the government of the country to be carried on by the general consent of the persons governed. All this and much more of the same sort is continually repeated amongst us in every tone and on all possible occasions.

There must be many ears in which such commonplaces have a very false and hollow sound. I have on general grounds the greatest possible reluctance to believe in the good moral effects on any one whatever of habitually doing things ill. If there is (and how can there fail to be?) a right and a wrong way of doing every sort of important business, the moral effects of doing it well and in the right way are pretty sure to be better than those of doing it in the wrong way. If there are—and hereby there must be—such things as true and false principles in politics, and good and bad kinds of political establishments, it would be contrary to all experience to believe that it is a matter of little importance whether those principles are or are not understood and applied, and whether those establishments are or are not set on foot. This is self-evident if we look at any great work which has a definite object pursued by definite means. Suppose an army in the field to be governed with a view to the moral improvement of the soldiers by the means which it is said contribute so powerfully to the moral improvement of ordinary men in daily life. If, in order to train the officers and men as much as possible in habits of self-reliance and mental independence, and in order to interest as many of them as possible in the affairs of the army in general; every regiment chose its own officers, enforced its own discipline, and discussed every question as to the management of the campaign in public meetings called at frequent intervals, it is obvious that the army would not hold together for a day. Try by the same means to carry

out an engineering scheme, to take precautions against the cholera, to perform surgical operations—to do anything, in a word, which requires knowledge and skill not commonly possessed, and any sort of unity of plan, and the same results—feeble confusion and hopeless anarchy—will always be produced.

To share in such proceedings has no good moral effects whatever, and has innumerable bad ones. It is, indeed, difficult to find a worse school to resort to for any purpose, than a school in which the great lesson to be learned is the lesson that you may get your own way in matters about which you know very little, by adopting and repeating the cries of people as ignorant as yourself, whom you persuade to join with you in your irrational demands. No doubt by stimulating to the utmost the habit of what is called self-government (though it is really only the government of a number of small majorities over a number of small minorities, instead of the government of one large majority over one large minority), by a long course of public meetings and committee-rooms, people may come to acquire an extraordinary proficiency in the arts of electioneering, wire-pulling, and the construction of political platforms. They may come to acquire great tact in seeing what combination of opinions will secure most votes, what way of putting a case will be most acceptable to the House of Commons or any other representative body, and so on. This habit may be diffused by well-known means through every section of the community. It may be introduced into towns, parishes, trades' unions, public companies of every sort, associations for all purposes, literary, scientific, social, and religious, and may thus exercise an incalculable influence, and give to those who have acquired the knack every sort of important position, from that of Prime Minister and leader of a great Parliamentary party, to that of the fogleman of some small knot of people or other which disposes of a few votes at a borough election. But when all this is said and done, are the people trained in such a school really wiser than their neighbours? Are their characters really raised to any special strength or beauty? Does any look up to a man who has acquired supreme dexterity in these arts as a real guide and leader in the difficulties of life? Do we not, in our hearts, rather despise him as an essentially commonplace person who has got his position, not by really improving or teaching his neighbours, but by flattering their weaknesses, and teaching them to take collective folly for wisdom, and collective weakness for strength?

Comparing the extraordinary compliments which are heaped (especially by French authors) on the moral effect which our institutions ought to produce on the character of those who live under them, with the effects which they actually do produce

in practice, I am often inclined to say, with a slight modification of the famous sentiment about Robespierre—"Avec ton *self-government* tu commence à m'embêter." A man who by real patient study has mastered real difficulties and acquired real knowledge—a professional man who really knows his business, for instance, whatever it may happen to be, is for most purposes incomparably superior as a human being to a man skilled in public meetings and committees, and accustomed to their management. The best proof of this is to be found in the case of persons who fulfil each of these conditions. Compare, for instance, a clever attorney with a turn for politics as he is when he is occupied in his professional business with what he is when he stands on a platform and makes political speeches, and the difference between the two manifestations is the difference between strong good sense and what is too much the reverse for me to describe it in appropriate terms. I do not deny, nor am I indifferent to the great value of a widely diffused interest in public affairs, practical acquaintance with them, and government by consent. I had too much experience of the results of their absence in India to have any particular illusions about absolute government. The point upon which I wish to insist is, that it is a great mistake to treat public business to any considerable extent as an educational process, and to set to do it not those who are best qualified to transact it, but those for whom it is supposed to supply the best education. It appears to me that such a policy is not only mistaken, but also defeats itself. The work to be done is too important to be spoiled for educational purposes, and if it were not, no education can possibly be worse than one which consists in setting people to spoil work.

This suggests a question of special importance and difficulty. After all it may be said, what is this public business to which you attach such high importance? Vague generalities apart, what is the work of the nation? What sort of things do you wish people who are to direct the legislation and the executive government of the country to have in their minds which at present is neglected by them? What is your idea, in a word, of the sort of knowledge which should be required of those who take an active and leading part in public affairs—who ought, in short, to govern the country? I will try to give a general sketch of the way in which I think this question should be answered, but it must, for the most obvious reasons, be very general indeed. In order to do so, I must begin by attempting to give a sketch of the business which collectively makes up the public business of this country, so as to show the sort of knowledge which is required for dealing with it properly. In order to do this, I will go very rapidly through the

principal branches of the executive government, indicating the subjects with which each of them is concerned, and observing that whatever finds a place in the executive government is sure to have its bearings more or less direct and important upon legislation as well. Indeed, legislation and the executive government are like the two sides of the national heart—the same fluid circulates through each, though at different stages of its progress.

I made some remarks in my last paper upon the general character and constitution of the Executive Government. I need say no more on that subject, but will pass at once to the particular offices into which it is divided. The first of these is the Privy Council, which is now reduced from the general superintendence of public affairs, which was its old function, to the position of a body composed of three Committees—the Judicial Committee, the Committee of Education, and the Committee of Trade. The Judicial Committee and the Courts of Justice generally I pass over for the present, though I shall have to make an observation upon them immediately; but each of the other Committees has duties of the most important nature. I doubt whether any better instance could be given of the good which can be done by a wise central department than is to be found in the history of the Education Committee of the Privy Council. I do not propose to enter upon questions of current politics; but I may say, by way of avoiding misapprehension, that I am very far indeed from being an admirer of what is called the denominational system of public education, nor do I mean by anything I say in favour of the Committee of Council to express a favourable opinion of that system. I acquired my knowledge of the proceedings of this department as secretary to the Duke of Newcastle's Education Commission, which sat from 1858 to 1862, and I can hardly say how much I was struck by the manner in which the department had contrived in the course of a long series of years to build up a system of education which, though intricate and complicated to the last degree—though ineffective in many respects and open to all sorts of objections—did nevertheless do an amount of good which it is hard to over-value. The distortion (for such it was, and to a certain extent still is) and the inefficiency of the system was due, as far as I could judge, to the jealousy and prejudices of the only persons in the country who took much interest in the subject.

The history of public education in England, in a few words, is this. Different clerical bodies, for reasons of their own, set up elementary schools. Parliament voted a lump sum for the promotion of popular education, and a committee of the Privy Council was

appointed to spend it as it thought fit. The committee, with infinite perseverance and ingenuity, and by the exercise of a wonderful amount of tact and temper, gradually persuaded one religious body after another to be graciously pleased to accept the public money for their institutions. The history of the committee from its first establishment downward, is a history of patient investigation, careful experiment, the continual suggestion of improvements, and the constant accumulation and publication of experience on all matters connected with popular education. In a word, nearly everything that is good in the denominational system appeared to me to come from the Committee of Council, whilst the defects of the system come almost entirely from the narrow-mindedness and prejudice of the clergy of all denominations, who, however, did really care about popular education, and the utter indifference upon the whole subject of the rest of the public. Here, then, is one of the functions which the public service not only ought to discharge, but which, as far as the backward state of the public mind upon the subject has permitted it to do so, it certainly has discharged with conspicuous success. Its importance is now just beginning to be understood.

From the Committee of Council on Education I pass to the Committee of Council on Trade, or, as it is commonly called, the Board of Trade. This office, amongst other things, has to advise every other department of the Government upon all matters connected with trade—a duty which brings it into close and varied relations with the Foreign Office in relation to the reports of diplomatic and consular agents, and the Colonial Office in relation to colonial legislation. It has to watch the interests of the public in regard to private bills brought before Parliament. It has to exercise important functions of a semi-judicial kind with regard to merchant shipping, and also with regard to railways. It has to criticize, and in some cases to prepare, legislation upon all these subjects; and it has also to collect and arrange an immense mass of statistics. In short, there is no branch of political economy or the theory and practice of commerce which is not continually brought under its notice in connection with questions of the deepest practical importance, though they are, and from the nature of things can be, but very imperfectly known to the great mass of people who take a general interest in political questions. What can and ought to be done, and what cannot and ought not to be attempted, by the public in relation to such subjects as the management of railways and the superintendence of merchant ships, are questions which are in themselves not much less special than the questions on which you consult a lawyer or a physician.

Passing from the Privy Council to the Lord Chancellor, I see before me a field more inviting to myself than to my readers, whose patience I will not abuse by expatiating on a favourite subject. I wish, however, to point out how on one side the reform of the law is a special subject, and how on the other it pervades every department of life. Some branches of law—the law of contracts and torts, or, to take a wider expression, the law of personal duties voluntarily assumed—is nothing less than the deliberate judgment of mankind upon all the principal moral and social duties which arise in actual life. A friend of mind who for several years was a reporter in one of the Equity Courts used to be fond of saying that he had heard an infinitely greater amount of wholesome moral teaching and of practical enforcement and illustration of the leading moral duties from the bench than he had ever heard from the pulpit; and I have no doubt that if the grain could be separated from the chaff, and if the real essence and meaning of law libraries could be thrown into a consecutive and comprehensive form, freed from irrelevant details, and from the intricacies of particular groups of facts, the result would be a body of wisdom and justice applied to everyday events and transactions which would be a *Κρήμα ἐς αἰῶν*, an invaluable and permanent treasure for the world at large, and for this nation in particular. Its practical as distinguished from its moral and intellectual value needs, I think, no observation from me. With regard to the statute as distinguished from the common law, my belief is that, I will not say what, but certainly an extremely large portion of the difficulty which attaches to it might and ought to be absolutely removed by repealing and re-enacting large masses of it. The mere repeal of obsolete Acts has reduced eighteen huge quartos to three royal octavos, and my belief is that systematic repealing and re-enacting might reduce the rest to very reasonable dimensions. An Act, passed last session (as far as I know without much discussion or alteration), reduced to a single enactment of 30 sections no less than 47 Acts of Parliament relating to the Slave-trade. The one subject of Law Reform, taken by itself, requires an amount of special knowledge, not connected in any appreciable degree with any party question whatever, which no one person possesses or could acquire, but which might be employed to the incalculable advantage of the whole community by people specially employed to use what they had and to acquire more.

Passing from the Lord Chancellor, we come to the offices of the five Secretaries of State. I do not wish to attempt an enumeration of the various subjects with which they have to deal, but I may very rapidly refer to the principal heads of their duties. The Foreign Secretary and his officers have to know—at least they

ought to know—all the relations of all the principal nations of the world to each other and to ourselves, together with the principles on which they depend, and the laws, customs, and treaties out of which they arise. They ought to be able to apply this knowledge to every question which arises from time to time between nation and nation; and in order that they may be able to do so, they ought to have in the diplomatic and consular services the eyes of the nation, so to speak, for all these purposes. The Colonial Secretary has to deal with all the different relations to this country of colonies, ranging in importance from the rock of Heligoland up to the Dominion of Canada, and including semi-independent States, with constitutions modelled on our own, districts governed by the direct power of the Queen in right of conquest, and fortresses like Gibraltar and Malta held for military reasons alone. These colonies are inhabited by men of every colour, of all religions, races, and languages, of every stage of civilization, and with laws and institutions of the most heterogeneous origin. In Canada you will find relics of the France of Louis XIV.; in Trinidad, relics of old Spain; in the Cape, the Roman-Dutch law; and in the Mauritius the Code Napoleon; and on many a savage frontier and burning desert there is no law except "The good old rule, the simple plan, that he should take who has the power, and he should keep who can." All these constitutions, and all these relations of each colony with England, with other colonies, and with its savage neighbours, the Colonial Office is bound to know, and from time to time and in various ways to regulate.

The Secretary of State for India has to control every proceeding of a Government charged with the duty of keeping the peace and enforcing the elementary principles of law and order over an empire as large as Europe without Russia, with the collection and expenditure of a revenue of about £50,000,000, with the management of an army of 200,000 men; with the management of relations, half diplomatic, half authoritative, with numerous semi-independent Powers, and with almost as many foreign Powers; with the construction of public works on which depend the very lives of many millions of human beings; and with the legislation necessary to carry out these various duties in a regular manner.

The Secretary of State for War, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Admiralty, have upon their hands questions of discipline and organization, upon the proper treatment of which, as a recent terrible example has shown us, the honour and the very integrity of the nation, to say nothing of the security of its property, may depend. They have also to dispose of scientific questions—such as those which are involved in the matter of armoured ships, fortifications, artillery, and small-arms, which in these days are hardly of less importance.

than the question of the organization of the army and the navy, and which are as distinctly a closed book to the great mass of mankind as a table of logarithms.

As for the Home Secretary, he is answerable for every question as to the administration of justice, the maintenance of the peace, the management of the police and prisons, the inspection of mines and factories, and innumerable other matters, all involving one part or other of the great problem, how a vast mass of all manner of people, many of whom are great rogues, and more of whom are great fools, are to be kept from treading on each other's heels and interfering with each other's comfort.

I will not go further. I might show how the single question of finance, in a certain sense, includes in itself all other political questions, as everything sooner or later and more or less must be a question of money; and I might also point out that, apart from this general control, the special questions more peculiarly connected with the revenue are as intricate and difficult as any of those to which I have referred. I might add something as to the charge lately assumed by the State of the public health, I might refer to the great question of pauperism and the Poor-law Board; in a word, a large book might be written on the general theme which I have tried to illustrate, but I think I have said enough to give some idea of what I understand by the business of the nation.

I understand by those words the aggregate of all the matters mentioned, and of a variety of similar matters of nearly equal importance which I have not mentioned, merely because it would be tedious, and would answer no special purpose to enumerate them. When I am asked what in particular is the work which I think so important, and which I wish to see performed by the public service, I reply, I wish to see all the questions suggested by the topics I have mentioned and referred to, carefully studied on their own merits—handled as well as the nature of the case admits by those whose special duty it is to deal with them. I will ask any one who cares for the subject to say whether, if this was done, the effect upon the nation at large would not be infinitely more important and salutary than the effect of deciding this way or that nearly all the party questions which at the present moment absorb popular attention—indeed, many of them would be disposed of in a far more satisfactory manner than is likely to be the case under the present system, inasmuch as they would be considered not merely upon their party merits, but as parts of a larger whole. It is often almost impossible to solve what is apparently a small question if it is treated by itself, but easy to do so if it is treated along with others, just as it is impossible to make a coat sit really well

after the coat has once been cut in a wrong shape, though it would be easy in making a new coat to avoid the old wrinkles. Thus, for instance, it is open to doubt whether the Law of Conspiracy will ever be put in a perfectly satisfactory position by mere cobbling, but if a properly drawn Penal Code were to be substituted for the present Criminal Law, the subject might be reduced to a reasonable shape with comparatively little trouble—at all events its true bearings and its connection with, and analogies to, other kindred subjects would be much better understood than they are at present, and this would be a great step towards the treatment of the particular points which now cause so much irritation.

Let us suppose that by any means this great task had been accomplished, and that the different matters referred to had been studied as patiently, and the results applied to practice as carefully, as is the case with topics which are not usually regarded as political at all—questions of medicine, or astronomy, or geography—would not the results upon the nation at large be felt in every department of life? If all the work in question were done as well as in the nature of things it can be done, would not this in itself strengthen and elevate the whole moral and intellectual tone of the nation, by bringing together a vast body of recognized and systematized knowledge, which would have a weight and authority of its own, and would show a great deal of the miserable little political squabbling of the day in its true light, which in plain truth is wretchedly insignificant.

The only cure, so far as I know, for poverty or thought, with all the narrowness and paltriness which is its inseparable companion, is to be found in the discovery and arrangement of masses of true knowledge, and in the general recognition of its character as such. In the face of great professions—such as law, medicine, engineering, and the like—mere quacks and pretenders disappear, inasmuch as everyone, however ignorant he may be on such subjects himself, has the means of knowing that those who do really study and practise these professions have actually learned and do actually know something worth knowing. A man who, having no legal knowledge, sets up his opinion upon a legal question against that of a professional lawyer, would be laughed at. Yet upon scores of other subjects which require at least as much special knowledge and study, pretty nearly every voter in the kingdom regards his own opinion as being just as good as that of any one else, and probably much better than that of a man who has passed years in official life, and had every sort of opportunity of informing himself about it.

It has always appeared to me a most instructive fact that the only great branch of public business which is universally recognized as

having a definite body of doctrine of its own, which is to be presumed to be right, and is not to be pulled about at the discretion of every one who chooses to give a passing thought to it, is also the only branch of public business which has been organized in such a manner as to be quite independent of party contests. I mean the administration of justice. You take Judges of various grades from a body which is supposed to possess the necessary kind and degree of special knowledge; you make them absolutely independent of all party discussions and questions whatever; and you trust them to decide the questions which arise between man and man and between society and individuals—in so far, at all events, as they are questions of law, and to a considerable, and I may add to an increasing extent, in so far as they are questions of fact. Has not the result been satisfactory? Is there any part of our institutions which on the whole works better, or which it would be less desirable to change radically and in its principles, for the details of our political organization might no doubt be improved? Would any reasonable man wish in regard to the administration of justice to substitute party discussion for trained special knowledge, acting under the responsibility which attaches of necessity to the public and open discharge of functions in which the public are deeply interested?

I have no doubt that it will be urged, in answer to all this, that my argument points towards the establishment of what has been called bureaucracy, and that the evils which attend upon that form of government, in the way of destroying the vigour and originality of the bulk of the nation, and in subjecting them to what is denounced as the leaden rule of a small body of officials, are so great that no conceivable amount of improvement in the management of public business could be regarded as affording any appreciable compensation for them. It is very hard, if not practically impossible, to argue against a nickname, and I am quite conscious of the difficulty of removing the impression which has been caused by the one to which I have just referred. I must, however, observe that I am as well aware of the evils of giving unrestrained power to officials as any one can possibly be; and that I do not suggest for a moment that Parliament ought to be asked in any way to surrender or to limit the sovereignty which it at present exercises. All that I wish to point out is that the sovereignty of representative bodies and of the nation at large as represented by them being fully admitted, the sovereign ought to be reasonable, and to understand that, if his work is to be well done, it must be done through agents, who must, from the nature of the case, be greatly superior to their principals in special knowledge, who can hardly have interests hostile to those of their principals, and whom the principal, when he has once chosen

them, would do well to trust, subject, of course, to a very careful general control. I do not for a moment suggest that the servants of the public should be its masters, or that any sort of difficulty should be interposed in the way of bringing them sharply and promptly to account for any neglect of duty or undue assumption of power. I can understand the fear of centralization and bureaucracy which I have often had occasion to observe in the people of this country, though I think it is irrational. I believe it to be due principally to the manner in which these ill-famed institutions are, and are supposed to be, worked in foreign countries, and in particular in France and Germany—France more especially. I admit the force of the precedent if it is properly limited.

As far as I have the means of knowing, I should say that the whole mode of procedure adopted by authorities of all kinds in France would be simply intolerable in these islands. It is utterly opposed to the whole genius and bent of the national character and habits, and if it were conceivable that it should be introduced I should be as much opposed to it as any one else; but that is not because it is so arranged as to produce the efficient and careful management of great public questions, but because it is intrusive, fidgety, and worrying in many of its manifestations to the very last degree. A system which assumes that everybody in all the important actions of his life ought to be looked after and supervised in one way or other by the authorities is, I freely admit, odious and utterly intolerable; and I may add that it appears to me as ill-calculated to produce results worth having in the way of good administration as to produce qualities worth having in the nation at large. Recent French history, indeed, does not suggest any very favourable conclusions as to the manner in which their system has worked. It does not, however, follow that, because in France public officials have always had a taste for undertaking more than they could by any possibility do well, and for interfering in all manner of subjects which they had much better have let alone, we in England ought to mistake the opposite of wrong for right, and leave in confusion a very large number of departments of public affairs which must be done, and which ought to be done, properly and thoroughly. It is a confusion of ideas to suppose that because it is undesirable on many grounds that we should adopt the French system of criminal procedure, for instance, or the French system of public education, we ought to leave the English public departments, or the law of England, or its whole system of local government, in their present confused and unintelligible condition. It is, indeed, unworthy of a great nation to say we will not have the ablest servants we can get, and we will not give our servants the powers necessary to enable them to do their

work properly, for fear that our servants should become our masters. The very first condition of being able to carry on great affairs in an adequate manner is the power of choosing good agents, giving them the necessary powers, and seeing that they do not exceed or abuse them. Those are precisely the duties, as it appears to me, which Parliament ought sedulously to discharge with regard to that large department of public affairs which by its very nature it is quite incompetent to transact directly.

To give the country a really efficient Government it would be necessary in some way, and under some form, to restore a considerable degree of real power to the King; and this cannot be done either by popular agitation or by Acts of Parliament. You cannot by votes infuse vigour into a paralysed limb. You may see clearly that the feature which a landscape requires is wood, but you cannot go out and buy an avenue of oaks two centuries old as you might buy hot rolls for breakfast. In the present state of public opinion and feeling you cannot make one person in a thousand understand the want. To propose a practical reform in the constitution of the Cabinet—to discuss, for instance, the question of substituting a real Governing Council for it—would, under present circumstances, be mere pedantry and Constitution-mongering, for which I, at all events have no taste. It appears to me that, things being as they are, the English Government will for years to come have to suffer the evil of having a weak heart and a languid circulation, though it has lungs and voice enough for anything. This makes a radical cure impossible, at all events for the present, but considerable alleviations may be suggested which would possibly produce effects of increased importance. Their general object would be to establish a distinction between Parliamentary questions, and questions which, like the administration of justice, have little or no connection with party, and ought to be considered on their own merits. In short, I should wish to see set up by the side of Parliament, though of course subject to its general control, departments for the management of those public affairs, which can be severed from party struggles. I should wish to see a time when the management of the Navy would not be more affected by the fortunes of denominational education than the decision of any case in the law courts is now affected by the success or failure of the Permissive Bill. As matters now stand, a disaster on the West Coast of Africa would very probably alter the complexion of popular education in this country, by changing the Ministry, which appears to me about as rational as changing your lawyer because you discharge your cook.

In order to give a definite answer to the question, Which particular departments could be thus set free from party? it would be necessary

to examine minutely the whole constitution of the public offices, and to show, in reference to each, where and when and to what extent party changes ought to operate. Of course I cannot pretend to undertake such a task or even to glance at it in the most cursory manner on the present occasion. I will, however, mention one subject by way of a specimen. I read to you in my last lecture Mr. Mill's suggestion of a Legislative Commission, to which the actual making of laws should be referred. It seems to me that this suggestion goes too far. Parliament could not, I think, in practice limit its powers to anything like such an extent. My own views upon the subject would be very much more moderate. I think that a legislative department, the duty of which would be to prepare for the decision of Parliament numerous matters which it is quite impossible for Parliament to decide upon properly without a great deal of preliminary preparation, would be a most valuable body. Indeed, if it were once established, I think people would wonder how they ever got on without it. I have on many occasions gone into this subject at considerable length and with reference to the special question of the reform of the law, and I will not now go into details upon it; but every year's experience confirms the views upon the subject which I formed and expressed many years ago, and to which I have made many endeavours (with no great success) to get the public to attend.

I also think that the permanent heads of all important departments ought to be put upon a totally different footing, in regard both to pay, rank, and responsibility, from that which they occupy at present. Such officers ought to be the ablest men in their own lines who are to be found in the country, they ought to be paid upon the same sort of scale as judges (whose duties are, generally speaking, much less important). They ought not to be mere clerks to Cabinet Ministers, who, in many instances, are greatly their inferiors both in knowledge and in power. They should be rather in the position of councillors, whose opinion the head of the department might overrule, if he saw fit for practical purposes, but whom he should be obliged to consult, and whose opinions should be recorded, so that Parliament and the public should know who had given what advice, and upon what ground important decisions were taken. Precedents for such an arrangement might be found in the Council of the Secretary of State for India, and in other offices to which I might refer.

I think, too, that the upper ranks of the Permanent Civil Service might with great advantage be made the scene of a little more change and variety than is usual at present. The appointment of an Under-Secretary is practically for life. Mr. Hammond was fifty years in the Foreign Office, my father was thirty-five years in the Colonial Office, and these are by no means exceptional instances. In India they go

into the other extreme. In twenty-five years a man will perhaps fill eight or nine different appointments, involving all sorts of different duties. This has its evils, but it gives men great experience, accustoming them to every sort of change, to various forms of responsibility, and to the reception of new ideas. If our Permanent Civil Service were recognized as one of the most important professions in the country, and if it were made, as it ought to be, lucrative and honourable in a corresponding degree, it would soon show as much energy and originality as any other, and I believe that no reform can be suggested which would be so important a step towards the solution of the great question as to what can and what cannot be done by legislation. This is a question which nothing but experience can really solve, and whilst nations are on their present footing the requisite experience is not to be had, and the subject is abandoned to those who teach, on the one hand, that organized social force can do nothing at all beyond keeping the peace, and to those who indulge on the other in all the dreams of Communism.

1



DOGMATIC EXTREMES.*

I.

ONE of the most marked features of our age is a prevalent *tendency to extremes in respect of religion*. There are times when a lull seems to come over men's higher thoughts, and they are content, or seem to be content, with the spiritual inheritance which their fathers have left them ; but there are other times—of which the Present is one—when men's thoughts are violently agitated, and they either cast from them this inheritance with scorn, or hold it in mere desperation, without enjoyment or enlarging use. Men seem to get tired of moderation and quiet growth, both in the sphere of opinion and of action. Religious parties lose patience with one another, and pursue their opposing aims to the bitter end. Even philosophy becomes violent, and science propagandist. The voice of urgency, the clash of conflict, are heard on all sides—the “still small voice” of reason is only whispered in corners. It may seem strange to hint at any lack of reason in an age like ours, distinguished by so many triumphs of intellect and industry. But Reason is by no means a mere product of intellect. It embraces many moral qualities, and, above all, a certain balance and largeness of thought, in which a strong intellect is sometimes signally wanting. Whatever may be

* The substance of this paper was delivered as an Introductory Lecture at the opening of St. Mary's College, in the University of St. Andrew's, 13th October, 1873.

the true intellectual glory of our time, it may be fairly questioned whether a period which has given birth to such singular extravagancies of opinion—philosophical, scientific, and religious—can be held to be eminently reasonable.

The exaggeration of opinion to which I refer is observable in all directions—at home and abroad—in politics as well as in speculation. It is a tone, in fact, running through men's minds, and vibrating in many chords. It shows itself in Germany in Ultramontaniam on the one side, and Bismarckism and Straussism on the other; in France in pilgrimages in honour of "the Sacred Heart," and Atheistic rejection of religious rites in the most solemn moments of life and death; in Legitimists and Communists, in "Extremes of the Right" and "Extremes of the Left." It is rife at home in Ritualism and Anti-State Churchism, in Evangelicalism and Darwinism, in the dogmatism of Orthodoxy, and the no less violent dogmatism of Unbelief. The old lines of caution, which used to mark parties in some degree even in their antagonism, are being effaced. The *via media* is disappearing. The *Whig*—the genuine type of the older liberalism—is heard of no more. All sides are disposed to push their conclusions to an extreme length, and have all or nothing. And the result is, that our oldest institutions—and our Churches above all—are deeply moved with undefined apprehensions of what may be coming upon them. They are crying out for freedom, and yet are afraid to be free. The very lustiness of the liberal cry provokes an answer of defiance and determination to hold faster to the old ways. For many good and thoughtful men, who know that true progress seldom comes by noise, and that *growth is silent*, it is hard to breathe amidst this atmosphere of disturbance.

Such is the general tendency. There is a new impulse of *passion* moving in human affairs, and driving men, some backwards and some forwards, in an extreme direction. It may be said that in religion at least this is nothing new. A spirit of religious bigotry is as old as religion itself. It has been unhappily the human shadow of the Divine reality everywhere, casting its malign influence over the fairest fruits of Christian energy and piety, withering them at the root, and scattering their blossom in the dust. In this respect, if things are no better than they were, they are no worse, and if there are extreme parties in all our Churches, there are also signs in all of them of a higher spirit, and a disposition to promote "a more excellent way." This is thankfully acknowledged, and it must fairly be admitted that religious parties are no longer the loudest in their dogmatism. There are others in the meantime striving more loudly, and making their voice to be heard in the streets. By comparison indeed Orthodoxy may be

said to be quiescent, save when roused in its lurking place by the unguarded assault of some vigorous or unwise heretic.

The special feature which at present claims attention is not the zeal of Churches, nor the dogmatism of Orthodoxy—which are old and familiar phenomena—but the zeal of Atheistic schools, and the dogmatism of a new philosophy and culture, whose watchword is the denial of that Divine Personality which has hitherto been supposed to constitute the pith of all religion. It is impossible for any man who knows anything of our present literature, or who mingles much in intellectual circles, not to be struck with the quiet assumption prevailing in them that not only the old religious forms, but the old religious ideas, are worn out. It is certainly quite as true, as it could have been in Butler's time, that it has "come, I know not how, to be taken for granted by many persons that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry, but that it is discovered to be fictitious.* And accordingly," he adds, "they treat it as if in the present age this were an agreed point among all people of discernment." Nor is this all. The peculiarity of the present time—a peculiarity to which the age of Butler cannot be said to furnish any adequate parallel—is not only that our new schools of thought and culture have discarded Christianity, but that they have warmly espoused a species of anti-Theism, which, varying, as it may do, in its expression, from the literary generalities of Matthew Arnold, to the sentimentalism of the late Mr. John Stuart Mill, or the blank Materialism of Strauss, is identical in its violent antagonism to the old ideas of God and of religion. It is not too much to say, on the one hand, that it passionately hates these ideas, while, on the other hand, it no less passionately believes that it has got something to put in their place better for mankind and the world. To substitute the "new" for the "old" is, or ought to be, the earnest endeavour of every man who has attained to the true insight.† There is a genuine enthusiasm—an unfeigned bigotry—in this Modern anti-Christianism which leaves no doubt of the sincerity of its advocates, and fails in no opportunity of advancing their cause. They have a missionary zeal. Their propagandist fervour meets one everywhere. Their voice, urgent at times with a strange solemnity, almost always seriously argumentative, is heard in the most unexpected quarters. Its hum mingles with the buzz of evening talk in the saloon, or the smoking-room; it will hardly let one rest amidst the solitude of the Alps, where the wearied student may have gone in quest of peace—to banish for a while all the jargon of the schools, philosophical or religious.

* Advt. to 1st Ed. Analogy.

† Strauss, "Old Faith and New," ii. 40.

This passionate and contentious dogmatism on the side of Unbelief is, if not wholly new, new in the extent to which it prevails in our time. Hitherto, at least in this country, Unbelief has been reticent. It has held its tongue save in grave discussion, or vented itself (as with Gibbon) in elaborate inuendos. And nothing is more curious in its way than the manner in which Mr. John S. Mill relates that his father imposed upon him a cautious reserve in the avowal of his opinions. All this, however, is now changed. Unbelief no longer keeps its thoughts to itself. It babbles all around us in the elegant volume, the monthly or weekly review, and the daily newspaper. This "great advance in the liberty of discussion" is noted by Mr. Mill as one of the most important differences between the present time and that of his childhood. Upon the whole the change must be confessed to be an advantageous one, whatever may be its inconveniences. It is better far that men should everywhere honestly say what they think, than cherish in secret opinions which they shrink from avowing in deference to society or the world. The "moral disadvantages" of the latter course, to which Mr. Mill confesses in his own case, are too obvious to be insisted upon. Increased liberty of discussion, however, has doubtless tended to foster that habit of dogmatism which has sprung up so rapidly on the side of Unbelief. When men meet freely in schools of new opinion and have their popular organs circulating widely, they encourage one another in intellectual confidence, and in carrying their conclusions to their extreme results. Weaker members are drawn around them, who learn the jargon of the school without any capacity themselves of entering into the speculative or spiritual difficulties out of which it may have grown. They sectarianize, in short, just as naturally as Churches, and for the same reasons,—the protection and defence of favoured opinions. The great object with them, as with all sects, is no longer What is Truth? but "*This is Truth*, and we are its prophets."

II.

The evidences of this new growth of Sectarianism are more or less abundant in all the productions of Modern Unbelief. In Strauss's volume it is rampant. No Church teacher ever made more of the "We" than this great teacher of Modern Materialism. There is something, indeed, ludicrous, as well as painful, in the tone of egoistic authority into which the author of the famous "*Leben Jesu*" has fallen in his last brochure. Even his greatest admirers will hardly say that this, or indeed the general character of his argument throughout, indicates a growth of reason or strengthening force of

intellect. We would wish to speak with all respect of one who will be a remarkable figure in the history of 19th century opinion, when that history comes to be written,—we are not in the meantime dealing with the substance of his thought in its finally elaborated form; but we do not see, all the same, how we may not smile at the infallible tone of a Germanized Darwinism as well as at that of an old-fashioned Popery. The true inquirer, the rational thinker in Theology, can be as little affected seriously by the one as by the other.

The same spirit of Sectarian authority is largely present in a book which has seen the light this last year—I mean “*The Personal Life of George Grote*.” It is not for me to venture to criticize Mr. Grote’s great intellectual position in a field of knowledge as to which I have no right to express an opinion. I gladly allow all that his contemporaries and admirers are disposed to concede to him in this respect; but, if anything had been needed to show how remarkable are the limits of the greatest faculties, and how a mind, that was able to thread its way, with keen appreciation, through the intricacies of Greek parties, and the phases of Greek speculation, may fall into the most singular misappreciation of phenomena before its eyes, and in zeal for one side of thought may forget all that is due to another, the narrative of his life, drawn by the most friendly hand, is enough to show this. The spirit of coterie more or less painfully pervades the book throughout—(I have read the lives of famous evangelical teachers, in which it was hardly less prominent, however different in expression); but in the case of Mr. Martineau’s candidature for the Chair of Logic in University College, London, it bursts forth in full and undisguised blossom. No theological despots or party ever laboured to gain their end in the appointment of a candidate of “sound” views—in other words of views similar to their own—than Mr. Grote and his allies laboured on this occasion, for such an end. No hierarch ever more persistently ignored all merit in an opponent or heretic, than he does in speaking of Mr. Martineau’s claims as a Thinker—claims which, though of a very different order from his own, may possibly be judged by many in the future to be of a far finer and subtler and truer kind.*

* What can well be more petty or unworthy of a large-minded intelligence than the following language, apparently Mr. Grote’s own—“To have endured Hoppus for a quarter of a century was bad enough, but, when a ray of light was about to break upon that benighted chair, to be threatened with an eminent theologian, with an Unitarian minister!” (“*Life*,” pp. 279, 280). The struggle is represented in his letter as a “mortal” one, and men of the “younger generation,” for no other reason apparently than because they opposed Mr. Grote in this matter, and recognised something more in Mr. Martineau than a “Unitarian minister,” appear to him “to

III.

I need not carry these illustrations of what I mean further. The spirit of partizanship is an unfortunate development of Modern Thought. To some extent, no doubt, it is inevitable and must always exist where the "conflict of opinion" is active. It is nevertheless an evil. It narrows the vision as much at the "Extreme Left" as the "Extreme Right." You cannot draw the line of human thought in any direction, especially in the direction of the higher speculation, to its extreme length without limiting the sight of those who stand at each end—their sight both of one another, and of the great matters over which they contend. And nothing is more hostile to the interests of truth than this narrowness of vision. We are accustomed to hear of the narrowness of the theological and the clerical mind. In these days, at least, the Clergy enjoy no monopoly of narrowness. It has been my fortune to know a great deal of all sides of thought both at home and abroad—and I feel bound to say that, apart from the more vulgar manifestations of party spirit on both sides, the true inquirer, who is deeply moved by the speculative or spiritual perplexities amidst which he lives, will sometimes find as much rational sympathy with the Church, as with either Science or Philosophy. All extreme positions are narrowing, but hardly one more than another, while there is in the very novelty of the position of Modern Thought a freshness of bigotry which, in some degree, outvies the old-fashioned sort. The novelty is indeed far less than it is supposed to be. But to many it has all the intoxication of a draught of new wine.

This spirit of partizanship is not only narrowing. It is essentially unjust. It not merely limits—it distorts the vision. It leads to wilful exaggerations of opinions on the opposite side, and in all the writings of the non-Christian schools there is nothing more painful than this persistent exaggeration. It used to be a complaint, and so far a true complaint, that Orthodox Theologians often grossly caricatured the heretical or infidel opinions which they engaged to refute. No one who knows the literature of controversy from the ancient conflict of Gnosticism and Catholicity to the Deistic conflict in the last century will deny that there was much foundation for the complaint. But here also the tables are turned. The Theologian now proceeds cautiously in the statement of views to which he may be opposed.

be of a cast essentially feebler and more prejudiced" than "such colleagues as Belper, Ryan, Booth, &c."!—No "eminent theologian" could have been surer of his own opinion on slenderer grounds—or banned his opponents with more supercilious ignorance.

The literary or philosophic unbeliever hardly ever hesitates to carry his point by setting forth the Christian dogmas in their harshest and most vulgar form—and even the modern apostle of culture and “sweet reasonableness” in other directions does not shrink from presenting to his readers in his last volume unworthy caricatures of the doctrines of the Trinity and the Atonement. This is an exceptionally painful illustration of what I mean; but a spirit of crude and unintelligent exaggeration in dealing with the great conceptions of Christian Theology is more or less a common feature in all the writings to which I refer. The whole analysis of the Articles of the Apostles’ Creed in the first part of Strauss’s book is a specimen—in his case more astonishing because he has really studied, although never from a spiritually appreciative point of view, the history of Christian opinion, and understands with all German thinkers how the forms of this opinion are necessarily varying with the ages which produce them and set them in circulation. Not to speak of minor examples of the same kind, there is a striking passage in Mr. Mill’s Autobiography in which he describes his father’s objection to the idea of God as set forth, according to him, in the Christian system, which significantly illustrates this tendency.* The passage is a sad one from any point of view, but especially so from the manner in which it shows how an able and acute mind may first impose upon itself by a figment, and then in the course of natural reaction, not only throw away the figment, but the reality of which it is the shadow. It may be that the idea of God, which the elder Mill considered to embody, in the language of the Autobiography, “the *ne plus ultra* of wickedness,” may have been suggested to his mind by teaching or preaching he may have heard while a youth in Scotland. I have no means of knowing what measure of truth there may be in such a

* “His (Mr. James Mill’s) aversion to religion in the sense usually attached to the term was of the same kind with that of Lucretius: he regarded it with the feelings due not to a mere mental delusion, but to a great moral evil. He looked upon it as the greatest enemy of morality: first, by setting up fictitious excellencies, belief in creeds, devotional feelings and ceremonies, not connected with the good of ‘human-kind,’—and causing these to be accepted as genuine virtues; but above all by radically vitiating the standard of morals; making it consist in doing the will of a being on whom it lavishes indeed all the phrases of adulation, but whom, in sober truth, it depicts as eminently hateful. I have a hundred times heard him say, that all ages and nations have represented their gods as wicked in a constantly increasing progression, that mankind have gone on adding trait after trait, till they reached the most perfect conception of wickedness which the human mind can devise, and have called this God and prostrated themselves before it. This *ne plus ultra* of wickedness he considered to be embodied in what is commonly presented to mankind as the Creed of Christianity. Think (he used to say) of a being who would make a Hell—who would create the human race with the infallible foreknowledge, and therefore with the intention, that the great majority of them were to be consigned to horrible and everlasting torment.”—(“Autobiography,” pp. 40-41.)

view. But surely we are entitled in the case of such a man as Mr. James Mill to look for some wider thoughtfulness and power of discrimination than such a passage implies. Every thoughtful man, even in these days, has to bear with much over-statement of Christian dogma, with much ill-considered handling of Christian verities. The Pulpit, as an organ of popular instruction, is naturally given to emphasis. But it is the business of the philosopher, if of anybody, to read below the line of emphasis, and to recognise what veritable beauty and grandeur there may often be under the most imperfect representations.

IV.

This *tendency to dogmatic extremes* appears to me not only bad in itself and unfair to religion—but inconsistent with the true law of human progress. On the one side it ignores this law. On the other side it misunderstands its true character. That there must be a progress in religious ideas, as in all other ideas, is, to my mind, an axiom which underlies all true conceptions of theology. If there are those who still doubt or deny this, they hardly claim to be argued with. It is simply beyond all question that the thoughts of men grow, whether they always widen or not, with the growth of the ages, on the higher subjects of religion as on all other subjects. It is no more possible to fix thought here than in other departments of knowledge; and all Creeds and Confessions, from the Apostles, downwards, are nothing else than men's thoughts about the Christian religion. They are the human moulds into which the Divine substance has been run in times of spiritual quickening. They have claims, therefore, upon our reverence—the true reverence of every religious mind. I have never ceased to enforce this, and more frequently of late because of the rapid growth of a freer spirit in theological matters. A freedom which dispenses with reverence, or even with sympathetic appreciation of ancient creeds, is a very poor kind of freedom, the end of which will certainly not be enlargement of thought. But reverence does not imply subjection, and still less unreasoning adherence. The higher reverence is indeed only possible in an atmosphere of free criticism. I have never forgotten what Dr. Beck of Tübingen, whose reputation for orthodoxy in an unorthodox country may, with some, lend weight to his words, once told me,—that in Germany they only came fully to understand the Augsburg Standards after Theologians had acquired the full liberty of criticising them. In so far, therefore, as in any Church, this liberty is still hazardous—in so far, in short, as it is supposed possible or right to bind men's faith in the present age absolutely to the forms of

Christian thought of the 17th century, or the 4th century—in so far such a Church is opposing itself to an inevitable law of human life and history. It is, therefore, as a consequence, weakening and even desperately imperilling itself in a time like this. The essential condition of the prolonged life of any Church is freedom for the growth of Christian opinion, and such independence to the Clergy as will enable them frankly to help and forward this growth. Creed-Subscription, in as far as it interferes with this freedom, is a wrong at once to the people and the Clergy. There is nothing so urgent, therefore, as a fair adjustment of this matter—and the longer it is of being faced, the more serious may be the wrench it will involve, and the more fatal possibly the attempts made to deal with it.

On the other hand, progress is never revolution. Because men's thoughts change about religion it does not follow they are to turn backwards, and, discarding Christianity, and the great living idea of a Personal God and Father in Christ which has so long guided and blessed with joy unspeakable many human hearts, take up once more with the rags of Stoicism which fell to tatters in the second century. It appears to me astounding, in reading such a book as Strauss's, with its galvanized Darwinism and devout enthusiasm for the "Cosmical Conception," that he as well as many others should not see that this is an unlikely mode of human development and hardly consistent with the idea of progress at all. It is admitted by him that all historical religions hitherto, not even excluding Buddhism (p. 153), have embraced the worship of Divine Beings. In other words, the human heart has only been able to sustain itself religiously in communion with a personal Life like its own—the perfection of its own ideals of truth, righteousness, and love. This has proved itself a necessity, not merely of crude or infant intelligence, but of the highest intelligence in the best forms of civilization in which the spiritual instincts have continued to ripen, along with the intellectual and industrial activities. The present re-action in certain clever or powerful minds is no evidence that the great and comforting thought of a Personal God and Father is less welcome, or less realized as a rational necessity. If there are some men, in an over-stimulating and artificial atmosphere of culture, who have learned to walk before Heaven with unmoved mien, and to face the sternest realities of life and death without fear or hope, this is no proof that such an attitude is either good in itself, or an advance upon that spirit of worship which has inspired in the grandest periods of their history alike the noblest and the weakest of our race. Philosophy, criticism, and science may yet do much for religion—they may purify its conceptions, enlarge its aims, and even broaden and render more true to fact its moral aspirations—but that any or all these in their

onward course should subvert its very character and change its whole meaning is surely a delusion as wild as that of any Apocalyptic dreamer, and far more mischievous. The law of all true progress is continuous and not revolutionary. It preserves the line of the past while it stretches it towards a higher goal in the future.

V.

The same tide of passion which is everywhere swelling and drawing men to such extremes of superstition or irreligion is, more or less, felt in Scotland as elsewhere. For long, and indeed always, as I read its history, there have been in the Scottish Church a party of advance and a party rigidly conservative. Of late there have been ominous symptoms that these parties are becoming impatient of one another. There have been outbreaks on the one side, and repression, or attempts at repression, on the other. The steadily increasing activity of one section and their rise in popular favour have been met by powerful encouragement of the other. And one man of more than usually tender and sensitive thoughtfulness has felt the Church system in which he lived too intolerable to be borne any longer. I merely note facts. I pass no judgment upon them. I should regret deeply if this antagonism should grow for the present more sharp and urgent. For I see no hope for a solution of Christian difficulties save within the Churches. Once outside of the Church, in fact, these difficulties no longer need solution. They may be said no longer to exist. The problem of our time is not at all how to be in a position to think as you like. Any man may be in such a position by simply disowning authority, and casting himself on the world of speculation. Nothing in the present day can cost less, I mean in a material sense, than leaving a Church. The very fact of doing so would go far to make the fortune of any man of ordinary brain-strength and popularity. And therefore nothing can be so mean as the insinuations from any quarter that men whose views have ceased to be in unison with the Church are only kept within it by considerations of pecuniary advantage. To one, indeed, who is conscious of any power, the idea of pecuniary considerations being a snare in any of the Scottish Churches is too great an absurdity. The question which is really interesting and pressing is not how to get outside of the Church, but how to enlarge and make room inside it for varieties of Christian intelligence and culture. That is the real problem for thoughtful Christian men. Disintegration is always easy. In Scotland, at least, we have been practising it now for nearly a century and a half in such a degree as to make our Church divisions a spectacle for Christendom. If we are to begin this sort of work over again, then we may give up the task of Christian civilization altogether.

If our parties will not learn to tolerate one another,—if the present symptoms of rising impatience are to intensify till they get once more beyond control,—then there will be a speedy end. But we hope better things, and will not cease to labour for them. Patience and largeness of aim are better than hasty movement, and a spirit of moderation wiser than the enthusiasm which would remove mountains at a stroke. The great lesson of Church history is the duty of waiting and helping development within the Church rather than of intemperately pushing forwards into new Sectarianisms even of a liberal kind. By waiting I am far from meaning inactivity. It is alway easy to stand idly by while the streams of thought are running swiftly on in many agitating whirls; to stand idly by, or take up our station with a blind tenacity on one side or the other. But ours should be the higher part—to breast the stream, and, while not losing ourselves amidst its agitations, to help to smoothen and direct its current into a broader and more beneficent channel.

VI.

In the foregoing remarks I may be said to have assumed that “Dogmatic Extremes” are bad—bad in themselves as the result of passion rather than of reason; and bad in their consequences as impeding the healthy and rational progress of religious ideas. I could hardly suppose it possible that any should confound such extremes as I speak of with manifestations of religious conviction, and on this ground venture to defend them. Whether or not there may be unwarrantable extremes, even of religious conviction, I am not called upon to consider. I should be far from saying anything against religious zeal, even when it takes forms most unlikely to be of service to the cause of religion. “It is good,” as the Apostle says (Gal. iv. 18), “to be zealously affected always in a good thing.” A man can never be too zealous for his own religious good, or the good of others. He can never too vehemently strive himself to lead a true and high life, or to help others to do the same. That is the right and only Christian form of religious zeal. But from the beginning it has been a cunning device of all religious parties to confound the maintenance of their own opinions with the promotion of religion. The centre of the religious ideal has been changed by them from *life* to *thought*—the most subtle and pervading error which has infested Christianity, and done more injury to the progress of Christian civilization than all other errors together. Within the sphere of life or conduct no amount of earnestness can be thrown away. The *passion* for human good—our own or others—can never in a sense swell too high,—although here it is also obvious that there are conditions of individual freedom which it can never pass without

doing more harm than good. But within the sphere of thought or opinion, especially in religion, zeal rapidly attains its limits. Let a man be as sure as he will of his own opinion, he has no right to dogmatize; and least of all has he a right to enforce his dogma upon others.

But it may be asked—Is there not then such a thing as true opinion in religion? Is Christian dogma incapable of verification? Is the Church not the depository of Divine Truth, and are not men bound to receive the “deposit” humbly from her hands? Is Dogmatism in short not an essential attribute of the Church—one of its characteristic “notes”? And if not, are we not cast on a sea of doubt without any rest for our mind or heart?

These questions well mirror the confusion of many religious minds on the subject of the Church and of Christian dogma. Let us try and make our position clear in relation to them.

The Church, we thoroughly believe, embraces Truth fitted to satisfy man’s mind and heart. The Scriptures contain this Truth. The Church gives voice to it. Every man, who is willing, may hear the voice and find peace in following it. But this voice is not a voice of authority, in any intellectual or logically affirmative sense, but a voice of persuasion and attraction. The Divine is nowhere something which any man, or any body of men (or Church), may fix and articulate once for all in definite forms, to be universally and authoritatively accepted. Simply because it is the Divine it cannot be expressed and contained in human symbols. Like new wine it is always bursting the old bottles, or escaping and leaving them mere empty and dry receptacles.

No Christian can well deny that there is such a thing as true opinion in religion, and that it is the duty of every one to try and find it. Nor can he doubt that if he takes the right way he will find it. “If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God” (St. John vii. 17). The Church is the sphere or home within which both the will of God is done, and the doctrine of God is known. But not to enter upon the thorny question, What and where is the Church? even the Church, supposing we could lay our hands upon her, has no right to claim for her *interpretations* of the Divine any absolute authority, and still less to impose these interpretations as absolute truth. The Church, in short, however zealously it may hold forth and teach what it believes to be the truth, has no right to dogmatize, and still less right to enforce its dogmatisms upon others.

There are two conditions, never to be surmounted, which render such a claim untenable. The first may be expressed in the words of the Westminster Confession of Faith. “All Synods or Councils (the

highest embodiments of the Church) since the Apostles' time, may err, and many have erred." Error may, and frequently does, cling to the most authoritative utterances of the Church. Every Protestant must admit this. But, secondly: imperfection or partial error is of the very essence of Christian dogma. Because this dogma in all its forms deals more or less with the insoluble. The (Divine) relations which it has to express are really inexpressible, or only proximately expressible in human language. Thought cannot contain them, and therefore human language cannot render them. And so all creeds are fallible, not merely in virtue of the fallible instruments (Synods or Councils), which made them, but moreover, and especially through the essential impossibility of making them adequate or perfect expressions of the Divine. The wine of Divine Truth in its ever renewing freshness is not only always bursting the old bottles in which our fathers sought to confine it; but, in its essential nature, it is not capable of being confined within any forms of man's device.

This, which is a fact, as far as the Divine itself is a fact, strikes, or ought to strike, for ever at the root, all Christian dogmatism. That which cannot be adequately expressed in human language (the verity of the Trinity, for example, or the verity of the Atonement), can never have any more than a persuasive or moral claim upon human acceptance. It can never take rank with a generalization of science, or proposition of logic, which equally addresses itself to all intelligence, and is capable of verification in all circumstances. It belongs to a different order of truth, and has its own tests of verification; but transcending the sphere of logic or scientific definition, it can never be formulated so as to demand universal assent. In other words, Christian dogma can never be anything but imperfect. It contains an element of fallibility by its very constitution, and the deeper a man's reverence for the Divine, and the larger and truer his recognition of it, the less will he be disposed to force his own notions of it upon others. It may be safely said that in every Church the extreme dogmatists are the men who have least hold of the Divine substance of which all dogma is but the faint adumbration. This has been the case from the beginning. It has been the Cyrills of Alexandria far more than the Chrysostoms, or even the Augustines, who have been self-confident in their own constructions of Divine*

* Divine Truth in its transcendental substance and relations cannot, like scientific or logical Truth, be *adequately generalized and propounded*. This is the difference noted in the text. But after all, scientific Laws, as Dr. Carpenter showed so well in his Address to the British Association in 1872, are nothing else than "Human conceptions subject to human fallibility." They have no more claim to be held absolute truths than the proposition of a Creed—and for the same reason that both are only the Human rendering or representation of Divine ideas which they *may* or *may not* express accurately.—(See Dr. Carpenter's Address.)

Truth, and unyielding and violent in imposing their constructions upon others. A case like that of Calvin may seem an exception—for no one can doubt Calvin's devout and awed apprehension of the Divine ; but there is no rule without exceptions ; and while no one would deny Calvin's deep religiousness, there are none with any knowledge but would admit that this religiousness was narrowed by his legal education, and by the tremendous social and spiritual exigencies with which he had to contend. Extremes of dogmatism, or of anything else, may be excused when nothing but hardness and violence will save the ark of social or religious order ; but the very necessity for such an excuse in the case of Calvin is the highest condemnation of dogmatic extremes in all ordinary circumstances. At variance with reason, they are equally at variance with the very nature of spiritual truth. False to human life, to every broad and enlightened interpretation of human experience and conduct, they are false in themselves. They misrepresent the very truth which they seek to vindicate, and degrade the Divine which they aim to glorify.

But are we to halt betwixt two opinions, or only have half opinions in religion ? This is a favourite retort both of the extreme theological and the extreme infidel schools in our day. They say—here, as in so many cases, joining sides in the great controversies of the time—that religious thinkers must come out of the haze in which they are so apt to hide their thought. Men must have clear definitions of what they are to believe and hold. They must know conclusively whether there is “One God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity, &c.,” whether there is a Hell and a Heaven, and what these phrases really mean. It is interesting to notice how in the case of a writer like Mr. Leslie Stephen the coarser forms of unbelieving dogmatism exactly answer to the coarser forms of orthodox dogmatism—how the *Fortnightly Review* echoes the hardened voice of the *Record*. Even Mr. Fitzjames Stephen, in his recent work on “Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity,” says that “Hell (he evidently means in the dogmatic popular sense) is an essential part of the whole Christian scheme.” *

To all this we have no hesitation in answering that true religious thought is always and necessarily indefinite. “Haze,” if you choose to use the expression, is of its very nature. Divine verities, just because they are *Divine* verities, cannot be clearly seen and understood. No adequate definition of the Godhead *can* be given. No true idea of the Future in its good or evil aspect *can* be formed. It hath not entered into the heart of man to conceive it, nor can it do so, from the very character of the supposed fact. All this craving for definite knowledge in the sphere of the spiritual is not healthy, but morbid—not rational, but irrational. The religious thinker must walk by

* P.315.

faith and not by sight. What he cannot see clearly in his own highest visions of the Divine, he cannot make clear or definite to others; and to call in (with our scientific dogmatists) the coarser conceptions of popular religion, those forms of thought as to Heaven or Hell, or any other aspect of the spiritual world, to which the religious mind naturally falls from sheer inability in most cases to preserve any ideal of thought—to call in such coarser types of the religious imagination as the normal dogmas of Christianity, entering into its very life and substance, is as poor and unworthy a device of controversy as was ever attempted. Popular Christianity is no product of religious thought. It is a mere accretion of religious tradition. And the whole function of thought is to purify and idealize inherited traditions here as in every other region of knowledge.

But has not the course of Christian civilization been by antagonism? Has it not been the extreme parties on one side and the other,—High Churchmen here and Low Churchmen there, Sacerdotalists on the one hand, Puritans on the other,—who have done most for religion, and through whose mutual conflicts it has in the main been advanced? This may or may not be the case. I do not myself think that it is the case; and in one notable instance—the conflict of religious parties in England in the 17th century,* I believe I have shown beyond all dispute that the highest results for Christian thought and freedom, and even in some respects the highest excellences of the Christian life, were owing to neither of the extreme parties in that century, much noise as they have made; but to the moderate, or rational party, which they both alike despised. All that is best, because all that is truest in the religious thought of England is the gradual growth of the Christian Rationalism which began with men like Hales and Chillingworth. And while I would by no means disparage the definite contributions to religious thought, and to a higher ideal of the religious life, which have come from both of the other extreme sides; and while I believe, moreover, that these extremes have been definite factors in our religious civilization, and that progression here as everywhere is largely by antagonism, this does not in a certain sense render the evils generated by such extremes less, or less to be lamented. God takes care of the world in many ways, and even the “wrath of man” is made to praise Him; but this does not make this wrath in itself less hateful or wrong, nor forbid us the aspiration that there may be a higher progress for the world in the future—a progress not by antagonism, but by tolerance, charity, and mutual co-operation.

JOHN TULLOCH.

* “Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the xviii Century.”—W. Blackwood & Son. New Ed. 1874.



THE POEMS AND NOVELS OF THE AUTHOR OF
"PAUL FERROLL."

*Poems by F., Author of "Paul Ferroll." Including the
"IX. Poems." London: Longmans, 1872.*

Paul Ferroll. A Tale. Third Edition. London: Chapman & Hall.

Why Paul Ferroll killed his Wife. London: Saunders & Otley. 1860.

John Greswold. In Two Vols. Hurst & Blackett. 1864.

IT must have occurred to every mind, which from youth up has found a vent for its finer and more subtly-woven thoughts in poetry, to institute an invidious comparison, upon mature reperusal, between the freshness of the earlier outcome, and the conventionalism and worldly-wise tone of the later. The ingenuous phase of poetry pleases most, and its soarings above the world of prose have the best title to the credit of winged words. The looker-back wonders at himself for his power, in years past and gone, to mint such unalloyed gold of frankness, to sing so boldly and so honestly, and to approach with such youthful daring problems and mysteries which the fear of society's sneer or frown, in after years, counsels us to check, repress, and let alone. The issue, in most cases, of setting one's present poetic self side by side with that other self, which we were, or seemed to be, in fervid, frank, and fearless youth, can hardly fail to be admiration of the former being, whilst the present is held cheap and light in the balance beside that which is now flown beyond power of recall. There may be more

finish in the later expression ; but it lacks fire and fervour, and the yearning towards truth which has been untaught by compliance with custom. It seems as if a great part of what is termed originality in writers and writings consisted in the freshness and fearlessness which, more or less, as the case may be, survive the influence of convention. When we have learned to think, talk, and write to the square, the result is apt to be commonplace.

But there are some minds which successfully resist this ironing-out process ; some few authors, whom native character and the force of circumstances encourage in trusting to themselves, and the more genuine promptings of their unconstrained muse ; and she, whose musings and works of fiction, ranging as far back as 1828, and published—the earliest of them—in 1840, are the subject of this article, is, in the verdict of those who are most familiar with her conversation and her writings, eminently entitled to a rank amongst the small and select number. Born—we mean in literary life—to be rather a rugged than an over-tender nursing mother to the creations and expressions of her fancy, she has produced works which will live—albeit they are here and there criticized as unnatural and misnamed morbid, because the chief characters in them have been wrought with unstinted psychological power—as long as there is value left for aught save commonplace, and as long as originality is reckoned a merit in prose or poetry. Paul Ferroll, and Elinor in the justificatory sequel, if we may so term it, “ Why Paul Ferroll killed his Wife,” are both characters rarely surpassed for originality and freshness of conception, and if the one is tabooed as an impossible monster, and the other demurred to as an equally impossible creation of simplicity and unworldliness, it is but just that those who object should admit that their own beau-ideals would be everyday creatures of convention, men and women to be met with in scores of novels which Mrs. Brown and Miss Smith carry out in their reticules upon the sands at Tenby or at Llandudno, on their summer excursions. Our present task, however, is not a comparison of one author with another or with others, but rather a comparison of the same author with herself, in her later works and in that which first brought her before the notice of the literary world. Thirty-two years ago the “ IX. Poems by V.,” at that time an anonymous candidate for a poetic wreath, were deemed worthy by a Review, which had the reputation of killing some precocious poets, and by a reviewer of taste and acumen second to none in his day, to be classed with those of Miss Barrett, Mrs. Bowles Southey, and Sara Coleridge, in point of merit and promise. The reviewer accurately detected in them a sad Lucretian tone : and paid a subtle tribute to the strength and force of thought which were interwoven in the fine verse-fabric

when he quoted a judge of assize's apology to Lady — in the Court at Exeter, "We beg your ladyship's pardon, but we really took you for a man." Not that there is aught unfeminine in them, except the calibre. Of this we shall endeavour to give our readers a sample, from a volume of collected "Poems by V.," published two years ago by Messrs. Longman; a volume which, by its additions to the original nine poems, as well as by the affix to the *nom de plume*, "Author of Paul Ferroll," attests the soundness of Lockhart's presage in the "Quarterly:" "We believe this is the first time the world has heard of V.; we are persuaded that it will not, cannot, be the last." (Q. R. vol. lxvi. p. 411.)

The first of the original poems shows us a fancy not content with themes and thoughts that lie upon the routine pathway of life, but more at home in starlight and stargazing, in a better sense than the cant one; peering out into the night to realize how there—

As Earth still dark and darker grows,
Shines out for every shade a world of light.

In the third poem, "The Grave," the world of shadows, the shrines of death, the sepulchres of nations, with the dust and ashes that represent earth's grandest and most memorable names, are scanned by a mind predisposed to approach the mysteries of life and death with a fascination that will not be repressed, and that yet in its revelations never descends to familiarity or trivial detail. Three stanzas from the opening will confirm this statement:—

Faint from the entrance came a daylight ray,
And distant sound of living men and things;
This, in th' encount'ring darkness pass'd away,
That, took the tone in which a mourner sings.

I lit a torch at a sepulchral lamp
Which shot a thread of light amid the gloom,
And feebly burning 'gainst the rolling damp.
I bore it through the regions of the tomb.

Around me stretch'd the slumbers of the dead,
Whereof the silence ached upon mine ear:
More and more noiseless did I make my tread,
And yet its echoes chill'd my heart with fear. (P. 4.)

There follows a wonderfully Lucretian survey of the secrets of the universal charnel-house, and of the relics in mouldering heaps, in urn, in stone, on half-obliterated tablets, of all them that have "gone down into silence;" but one special exception to the uniformity of the dust—

doom forms a grand relief to the weirdness of the conception; the fine presentment of our Saviour's victory over Death at His Resurrection—

One place alone had ceased to hold its prey :
A form had press'd it and was there no more ;
The garments of the Grave beside it lay,
Where once they wrapp'd Him on the rocky floor.

He only with returning footsteps broke
Th' eternal calm wherewith the Tomb was bound ;
Among the sleeping Dead alone He woke,
And bless'd with outstretch'd hands the host around.

Well is it that such blessing hovers here,
To soothe each sad survivor of the throng
Who haunt the portals of the solemn sphere,
And pour their woe the loaded air along. (P. 6.)

Well indeed, in the universal sense in which the gifted poetess enunciated the general thought; well especially for those who have so recently experienced the solace of such a sure and certain hope under the sudden dispensation of her death.

In power and grasp, if not in finish, these stanzas might match with another elegy, which the *laudatores temporis acti* would consider it sacrilege to attempt to corral. Of a kindred nature to them, however, is another and later piece of the same authorship, and on the same subject; a fragment about Resurrection, the main thought being the contrast of earth crumbling and collapsing on the one hand, and man coming together again, bone to bone, and limb to limb, in new life, on the other. As a whole, this fragment is very powerful, and owes simply its key-note to the famous passage in Ezekiel. The latter half must suffice for quotation, describing as it does the work of reconstruction at the precise point when "Heaven and earth pass away."

Earth reels and trembles to her base, beneath
Th' approaching trumpet's dread continuous breath,
Mountains dissolve, and oceans pass away
In chaos, whence erewhile they sprang to day,
Time ceases at its Maker's high command,
Strange spheres and other natures are at hand—
But still proceeds within the grave's rent span,
Amid a dying world, the birth of man.

That form is perfect now, but motionless ;
It stands a statue yet ; but see where press
Through swelling veins the tides of crimson glow,
Warmth, strength, and beauty, kindling as they flow.
He moves ! there's being now within his breast ;
He wakes ! that trumpet-blast hath burst his rest ;
A smile comes forth, the soul's dawn o'er the night,
And life looks sudden from the eyes in light. (Pp. 42, 43.)

One other piece must be cited, as a handling of another unconventional theme, a handling to our thinking eminently and exceptionally successful. We refer to the "Queen's Ball," a poem which bears the date of 1847. In the July of that year Mary Russell Mitford wrote thus to a correspondent, affixing the authorship to an individual, if indeed there was any secret till then about the matter: "Then I have seen Mrs. Archer Clive, who is also a great friend of mine. She sent me the other day her poem, 'The Queen's Ball,' of which the subject is most striking: one hundred and fifty persons were invited who are dead. She has made a fine use of this remarkable fact."* Now-a-days, we should say a *sensational* use; but the epithet would be unjust if it implied classification with any of the vulgar marvels which help to sell off a modern novel. The shades are supposed to be reached by those cards of invitation, so sought and schemed for in the upper world. Leave to accept is accorded by the ruler of the Hades. Some shades decline Pluto's "permit." Others, strange to say, are alive to the royal compliment, and "glad to be thought of once again." Surely, there is originality in the grouping of dead and living which results, and which a single couplet characterizes in its strangeness of contrast—

With robes of state the shrouds were blent,
And, side by side, upstairs they went.

In the crush of the State-Ball, the viewless shades have the advantage, such as it is, of "seeing without being seen," and of discovering, in different measures, how the gay world can do without them. The girl of eighteen years, whose dying ear had heard the solace of the love-lorn accents, "Not for long, my Life, we part," wakes up, for a night, to see her quondam *fiancé* gaily oblivious of her having ever existed (pp. 28, 29). The dead wit consents to mingle with the throng, under the influence of the flattering unction that the living can't get on without him. He gets one bare crumb of comfort to confirm his theory. After much hungry listening, he catches his own name:—

"Poor —," the speaker said, "his mô't,
The witty soul! was—so and so."
He heard—he drank the praise they gave,
And went the easier to his grave. (P. 31.)

The dead dowager sees her jewels on the bosom of the new owner of her name and state: the mother and chaperon watches unseen her living daughter's "gay imprudence," in her unguided walk through

* *Letters and Life of Mary Russell Mitford. Second Series, Vol. i. p. 233.*

the Circean ring; the ghost of a model son hovers about a living mother, who, in the crowded fête, is still in thought with her lost one, and sees him again in the forms of manliest grace around her; and the dead lord treads on the heels of the present owner of his broad acres, and realizes the sorrow and mourning which his reappearance—were it other than fitful and shadow-like—would cause to those whose black garb is complimentary. Touching pathos, quick-eyed fancy, quaint humour, succeed each other in these sketches. The most bold and powerful is that of a dead admirer in unseen nearness to a living intriguante, with whom in life scandal had connected his name. It will bear quoting:—

More ghosts ! before a lovely dame
 One passionate and trembling came ;
 And mark'd her easy, pamper'd grace,
 Her locks arranged, and flower-crown'd face.
 In one past hour those two had been
 The actors in a fearful scene.
 Oh, God ! what Tragedies pass o'er
 The great world's gilded Theatre !
 What deeds may they have wrought before,
 Who now so smooth and bland appear !
 And when the fatal scene is o'er,
 What different Fate for him and her ;
 She lightly skims the ball-room floor,
 And he is in the sepulchre !
 His shadowy hands catch hers, not now
 Her pulses throb, her fingers glow ;
 He says a word, but wakes no flame,
 Recalls no crime, renews no shame !
 The circling world admires and woos,
 The place with sights of joy is full,
 And she her dainty path pursues,
 Fastidious, courted, beautiful ;
 And yet across her heart there shot
 A sudden isolated thought ;
 A sudden sight her mind's eye caught,
 Places and shapes which once had been ;
 Herself, and him, and all that lay
 Behind, in that eventful day,
 And what was done and suffer'd then.
 To-night what made it reappear ?
 None *living* knew of it, save her ;
 And there was nothing to recall
 Such thoughts in that resplendent hall.
 No ; that bright lady knew not why ;
 Perchance the cause was—*He was nigh*. (Pp. 35, 36.)

These lines are not the offspring of a genius content to look at the mere outsides of things that do appear; and in more than one of the IX. Poems the author finds fault with time for its tendency to

detract from her high standard of feeling and fancy. Something of this breathes in the yearnings of a poem called "Heartsease." That which precedes it, "Former Home," pp. 14—17, ends with an analysis of traits lost, and feelings changed by time, which is very touching, whilst it exhibits the calibre and bent of the mind which exacts so high an ideal.

How changed are they !—how changed am I !—
The early spring of life is gone ;
Gone is each youthful vanity,—
But what with years, oh what is won ?

I know not—but while standing now
Where open'd first the heart of youth,
I recollect how high would glow
Its thoughts of Glory, Faith, and Truth—

How full it was of good and great,
How true to heav'n, how warm to men,
Alas, I scarce forbear to hate
The colder breast I bring again.

Hope disappointed, sin, and time,
Have moulded me, since here I stood ;
Ah ! paint old feelings, rock sublime !
Speak life's fresh accents, mountain flood !

Even the ghost of such fervour and freshness of faith as are here glanced at in retrospect, is better than to have lost the semblance with the reality ; and there are creations in Mrs. Clive's works of fiction which show that long after the date of this poem she could image as fresh and genuine a spirit as that which in the above lines is missed and regretted. In truth, this fresh and genuine ideal is *one* of the characteristics of all her work ; *the other* a distaste for all that is commonplace in the world around her, as well as in the brain-creations. Something of this comes out in the aspirations, which matter-of-fact readers might deem eccentric, of a poem, inscribed, "Written in Health ;" and among the later poems are some which approach mysteries and problems such as convention would bid a poetess let alone. A mother muses over her unborn child. A woman's indignation at the fatal and barbarous tyranny of a private schoolmaster at Eastbourne, whose name and the vulgar tragedy attached to it might better have been forgotten, expends itself in burning words and fancies too high for the grovelling subject (see pp. 56—58). But it is not inconceivable that in the preference of its author the poem to which we allude ranked higher than a short piece headed, "A Rainy Day," which comes next before it, and enshrines thoughts of far sublimer tone and cadence.

And yet it is not a violent or far-fetched effort of criticism to discern in Mrs. Clive's prose-writings the same mixed influences and characteristics which are seen in her poetry. Her ideals are high, and grand, and generous, though a bitter alloy of the fruits of the all not merely qualifies their perfectness, but imparts to their story the elements of a tragedy. If her heroines wear the Heart's Ease in their bosoms, either in the sweet freshness of opening life, or in the seemingly full heyday of wedded love, there is a withering influence hard at hand, though unseen, to blight it and to wither it. The mirror held up to life by this writer reflects more to ponder over and marvel at, than the inane trivialities and the petty irresolutions of the dramatis personæ of modern-day novels. It reveals heroic moulds and master forces of humanity, in man's form and shape, doing and daring with a tragic and Promethean self-reliance, yet mostly what Adam was, or what the Greek poets called *γυναικός ἥσσορες*, compromised as to their masterfulness by the influence of passion, and crushed, or destined to crushing, by the overruling might of love. We are aware that to take up the cause of Paul Ferroll will be regarded by many readers as a task only fit for a Devil's-advocate; and yet without the wonderful quasi-justification of his master-sin which the author put forth after the world had had full time to canvass and condemn him, it is far from inconceivable that a thoughtful and deliberate reader of his tragical story might discover in it the same pleas for "forbearing to judge" which the history of a magnanimous life, marred or stained by a fatal error, is apt to suggest; the mixed nature of man's qualities and impulses, the strain of original sin that still marks him, the claim of sympathy for weakness pulling down and undoing strength—pleas that extort the pity, at least, which a Greek critic called the chief element of tragedy. To this pity indeed it is only by slow degrees, and as it were in spite of himself, that Paul Ferroll appeals. The strong man is humbled, and the mighty man, so resolved, so self-contained, so reticent, driven to look on his one crime in the light of a sin in God's sight, only at the last. But meanwhile, in the action of the story, his purgatory has been going on; a shadow has constantly come between him and the love he had made his own at a terrible price; the cup of enjoyment has been bitter-sweet through a single ingredient not to be got rid of. *Culpam poena premit comes*; and though purists may raise their eyebrows when they find that Paul Ferroll is suffered in the end to "cheat the gallows," it may be doubted whether the full penalty had not been paid in anticipatory instalments of humiliation and bringing low. Assuredly no encouragement to follow Paul Ferroll's example can be drawn from the qualified success of his fatal yielding to a terrible impulse and temptation.

To give an abstract or analysis of the story, at this point of time, can scarcely be necessary. Paul Ferroll, a stalwart country squire, with mental endowments equal to his physique, rides forth from the "Tower," where he resides, on a summer's dawn to breathe the morning air and help a country overseer with his muddled accounts. Within an hour or two he is summoned home by the tidings that his wife has been murdered in her bed. The contrast between the life of a bright July morning outside the death-chamber, and the horror and mystery of the death within it, is consummately worked out in the opening of the story. With a stoical constraint on his feelings, no wise inconsistent with his character in the neighbourhood, Paul Ferroll makes his way home, and persists in forcing himself into the presence of death with a remark to those who would have kept him back, that "seeing it is not the worst part," a remark in which there lurks a truly Sophoclean irony. Though there had been tales of quarrels and coolness betwixt the dead woman and her husband, though a knife out of Ferroll's dressing-case was missing, and though one or two separate particulars might have pointed to another conclusion, a stupid and scared under-gardener and his wife come in for enough suspicion to cause their committal on the charge of murder; but at the Assizes they are defended by Ferroll's own lawyer, and after acquittal, shipped off by him to America. Ferroll himself, after declining to enjoy aught of his deceased wife's fortune, goes abroad for a lengthened term, and when he does reappear, on a sudden, in his own domain, is accompanied by a charming and devoted wife, and a young daughter. Able, strong-willed, and a man of commanding parts, he reasserts himself at once in his old neighbourhood, and, though he steadily declines all visiting and intimacy with the county families around him, becomes looked up to as a resolute and sound-judging magistrate, and one to come to the front in any county emergency. In cholera times, in a riot in the county town, in a critical struggle with a lunatic, he displays presence of mind and an almost contempt of danger to life; and in the second instance restores the rule of law and order which a temporizing major of cavalry had imperilled, by shooting a rioter dead, for which he is himself brought to trial, condemned, and eventually pardoned. These events are spread over the years during which Jeannie Ferroll, and a neighbouring heir, Hugh Bartlett, grow from childhood into adolescence; and in all that time Paul Ferroll and his wife, on whom he lavishes a devotion reciprocated by a love passing that of women, have looked to each other for the solace and enjoyments of life, which other wedded folk would deem imperfect without the element of society. Ferroll persists in an exclusive line of conduct. His wife lays the credit or blame of it to his love of books and literature. His growing daughter,

and her young neighbour and admirer, are puzzled by the persistency with which he frowns down any increase of intimacy between them, though such a match might have been in most parental eyes exceedingly desirable. Whatever the reason, it is not that Lady Lucy, Hugh Bartlett's mother, is a goose, a Mrs. Nickleby, and an inconsecutive old body, like the mother of the heroine in Mrs. Clive's later novel, John Greswold. After the trial, Mrs. Ferroll's health, never strong, gets seriously impaired, and Paul Ferroll takes his wife and daughter abroad. Two incidents mark their stay at Pontaubé, in the South of France: Ferroll meets with a terrible accident, and with fractured limbs, the shock of which brings the strong man face to face with death in other form than that which he had habitually contemplated; whilst it throws back the recovery of Mrs. Ferroll, whose fragile life depends intimately on the well-being of her husband. The other incident is the encouragement by Ferroll of the rather *fainéant* overtures of César Lahrotte, the French doctor's son, for the hand of Janet Ferroll, whose timely and heroic succour of her father in his accident had merited another reward than willingness to mate his only daughter with a silly hobbledohoy, of another nationality. Even Mrs. Ferroll, mostly acquiescence personified, cannot see the reason why such a "cub" should be preferred to Hugh Bartlett. The conversation between husband and wife on this question contains a passage reflecting light upon their own pre-matrimonial experiences of the course of true love. Paul Ferroll is leading up to César's candidature:—

"I like the way parents dispose of their children here. They still settle the marriage, and then show the children to each other; and being the first thing of the kind that has occurred to either, they of course agree."

"It is not the way *we* married."

"No, indeed! there are exceptions, of course; and our way would not do for the rule, let me tell you that."

"Except that I never for a moment ceased to love you, through all that bitter trial."

"Nor I you, Elinor."

"You only married another woman," said Elinor smiling, and caressing his hand.

"Yes; what a madman! How desperate, how frantic of me, and of that poor woman! Elinor, there are some things one has done, which as one grows older one feels could not be done again; no, not even for the blessedness of being your husband."

"It was not a good plan, with a view to that, to marry another," said Elinor, again smiling.—*Paul Ferroll*, p. 143, 3rd edition.

With Paul Ferroll's mystery solved, as it is with most of our readers, what a subtle "irony" underlies this conversation and situation. It is needless to delay the denouement. The party return to England sooner than might have been expected, through the unpleasant

nature of a letter, which Ferroll keeps to himself. He declines an invitation to stand for his county at the coming election, and it is well he does so, for the widow of Franks, the under-gardener whose name was mixed up with the murder, has come home from her banishment, and cannot be got to keep her tongue quiet. Her talk draws suspicion upon herself, and—after a brief interval, during which Paul Ferroll escorts his blooming daughter to a London ball at Lord Ewyas's, and takes pride in the admiration she attracts, though he still discourages to his face the suit of Hugh Bartlett, assuring him that "he does it for his good"—her trial and conviction impel him to make a full and frank confession of the murder he had committed eighteen years before. From his prison he writes to his Elinor, but the thread of her fragile life snaps sharply and shortly when the meaning of so many dark sayings, and the price of the union which for eighteen years had been an unbroken sunshine of love, are borne in upon her mind. The murderer is convicted, and left for execution, upon the witness of his own confession, and though the ignominy of a death on the gallows is averted by an escape carried out by the constant Hugh, and Janet, and the French doctor, with the connivance of the gaoler, Ferroll does but languish out a life without light or aim in his American exile, telling his devoted daughter in his dying accents, "Your mother was so deep in my heart that she has torn it in two."

The absorbing interest of "Paul Ferroll" centres in the hero and his secret; and, when that is revealed, the reader feels that his sympathies have been tampered with in favour of an unworthy object. And yet unless there is no repentance for sin, once and once for all committed, there is even on the face of this novel, and without reference to the *pièce justificative*, to which we shall come presently, much to be urged in extenuation, in abatement, in plea for merciful judgment. Paul Ferroll was no vulgar blood-shedder. His "hazard of the die" may have been deliberate, or reckless, or passionate. We do not learn all; and too much reliance is not to be put on his own words of vague allusion, which certainly point to the first of the three impulses. But in the very act of throwing it, he evinced an instinct of the most noble and generous natures, in his precaution that—unlike the course of crime in general, which repeats itself in a tangled web of concealment and deception, and makes no scruple of involving others—no aggravation of his crime might arise from rumour or suspicion fixing upon an innocent scapegoat. With the fatal knife and the bloody handkerchief, which he deposited in a sealed packet in the victim's coffin, was placed by him a confession that the deed was his and his only. This was designed to corroborate oral testimony, should a case of false accusation against another render confession necessary, so as not to add sin to sin by involving

the guiltless. To this forethought and consideration for his own moral self-esteem, as well as for his neighbour's freedom from seeming complicity, must be added his scrupulous, and at the time inexplicable, discouragement of intimacies, which it would have seemed to him palming off an acted lie, to have cultivated in the secret presence of blood-guiltiness. He exhibits this in declining the mediation of the Lord-Lieutenant and county magistrates, when he is condemned for the act which he rightly deemed bounden in quelling the riot. But it is shown most notably in his steadfast discouragement of a match for an only daughter, which a selfish man, in such circumstances, would have leaped at, and have been at pains to conclude, whilst the *destrictus ensis* of detection still hung suspended in air. In this strong, resolute, masterful man, too, there is an undercurrent of kindness and tenderness for his fellow-creatures, which argues some overweening wrong in the background, or ever the hand—that was so administrative and compassionate in the cholera days—could have been lifted in vengeance, or deadly wrath. This hand, like a woman's in kindness, exercised in acts and deeds that enlist unfaltering gratitude on the part of those to whom it has been helpful, is however guided or moved by so iron a will that it shoots down a misguided admirer at the assize-riot, though the man was bent on saving him out of the violence designed for the rest of the authorities. One finds herein a clue to the terrible act on which the story turns, in a will too iron, and a heart too steeled, to let go its purposed end. And yet the natural benevolence and gentle tenderness which underlie this strong and self-contained nature,—an inheritance perhaps from the mother, to whom his mind wandered in the crisis of his last illness, and to whom he reverted as if to a ministering angel,—soften into the most feminine solicitude in his relations to her for whose sake he had sinned so desperately. His whole conduct is regulated by a watchfulness not to overtax her weakness. His comparative indifference to his daughter, his almost jealousy of her possible interference with his Elinor's affection, are not inconsistent with a character which could secure such a prize at such a cost, and yet have the power of enjoying it, when so secured. Not that Ferroll forgets for a moment the inevitable issue, which indeed comes as it were by anticipation between them in their happiest tête-à-têtes. Two contingencies are present to his mind, and he cannot help coasting too near the shore of his fatal secret, in his anxiety to learn whether the love so precious to him would be forfeited if Elinor knew all ["Could you love me," he says, after the homicide, "if they hanged me? Could you not bear it, my Elinor? would it change me for you, though I had even done *that deed*?"], and in the kindred fear lest, though the love remained unchanged, the fond heart that beat only for him should snap and fail utterly,

when tried by so fearful a severance. These fears, which embitter the cup of otherwise perfect happiness in the present, add to the intensity of the irony of life and destiny, which we have more than once noted as so strong in this novel. Perhaps Paul Ferroll is oftener haunted by the dread of being lowered in his wife's unbounded and trustful esteem and veneration by the disclosure of his guilt, than by that of the danger of it to her bodily health; for his moments of completest calm are at such times as when circumstances seem to render probable another form of death, which shall cheat the gallows. His perfect composure, when he fancies that he is sinking, from the shock to his system of his accident at Pontaubes, leads the old French doctor to utter a paradox—of which the reader knows the explanation—to Janet, who is watching at the bedside :—

“The old man took her hand. ‘I really think he is so composed by the idea of dying, that he will not die. He seems to have got his will, and getting it will, I trust, lose it for him again. I suppose he’s so afraid of being infirm for life, that death seems to him preferable.’”

Preferable, indeed; but for a reason that neither watcher could know, nor any other save the survivor of the tragedy at the Tower, and the “eye that seeth in secret.” Yet surely of selfishnesses that one is most pardonable, which strives to keep to the end the idolatry of a trusting woman such as Elinor Ferroll, and fears death less than a dishonour of the ideal she so fondly worships.

The character of Elinor is perfect, within the limits of the canvass on which it is portrayed. She is, however, from the very beginning of the story, a mere reed shaken by the wind of any possible hazard or peril to Paul. An impression possesses the reader that the crisis of her life has antedated the story of “Paul Ferroll.” When the current of life is smooth, she enjoys a calm which is most delicious to those who have experienced the storm wherewith to contrast it; and the enjoyment is enhanced by the possession of her husband to herself. But the moment that aught betokens peril to him, “she is open to impressions of evil, and resembles the blossoms of a peach-tree, whose life depends upon no frost coming.” It is very pretty to note, however, how those blossoms luxuriate in the sunny weather, such as shone brightly on her return from abroad, when, though there was winter without, yet in the warmth of her own home and its surroundings she could say to her husband: “I am happy, Paul; I have a feeling of good about me, a kind of light of serene days. I am anxious about nothing.” And this serenity is in subtle contrast with her husband’s more gambler-like enjoyment, his hand-to-mouth happiness, across which the ghost of the past and the presage of the future are evermore flitting in mockery. What Elinor has been,

what the history of her life, and the secret of this thankfulness for rest, has to be seen elsewhere. In this part of a life-drama, it is but as a character of secondary interest that she appears on the stage. Janet, who at first promises to be a cipher, develops under trials into a domestic heroine, compounded of the best elements of both her parents. The rest of the *dramatis personæ* strike us as little more than outlines, or sketchings, though there is truth and observation in all the drawing. Of some not a little humour enters into the composition. Lady Lucy Bartlett, whom Paul Ferroll rechristens Dame Partlett, is as good as a play. The *nouveau riche* High Sheriff is a capital bit of farce; and the match-making French doctor with his match-marring, unequestrian son, constitutes a highly comic episode. There could have been no better *Deus ex machina* to deliver Janet from César Lahrotte's unwelcome proposal, than César's pony *showing a will* :—

"César felt that fatal feeling too well known to timid and inexpert riders, as if the hinder part of his horse were getting first; and the next moment he was mastered, and away went the pony full gallop. Janet laughed; she was much better mounted, and overtook her lover in a couple of minutes. Adroitly bending down, she seized his rein, and soon pulled up both horses; but she kept his in her hand and led him along the road. 'I will prevent him from running away again,' said she, 'and we'll talk of something else.'"—P. 166.

In truth some such episode is needed to relieve the brooding presence of a Nemesis that pervades the whole of the story, in which surely, as we said before, though with silent and unnoted foot, *culpa pœna premit comes*.

If, however, without prefatory enlightenment, we are led to seek and find extenuating circumstances in Paul Ferroll's favour, his defence, as offered, in afterthought, in the odd-named novel, "Why Paul Ferroll killed his Wife," relieves us of a difficult task by conducting it so much more satisfactorily and convincingly than it could have been done by any other than the conceiver of the original characters, that an excuse need hardly be made for recalling it to our readers. Into a luxurious country-house, where the squire, who should be its master, is a cipher, and his sister its real mistress and ruling spirit, has come, at the story's outset, a young man of the highest bodily and mental endowments, fresh from a successful career at school and college, keenly alive to the solution of all the problems of life, and by no means disposed to let others think for him, or to be led in a game of which he looks to be a leader and prime mover. In his early self-reliance there is a strong alloy of scepticism; and his whole tone indicates one who lives for the present, without much faith in aught beyond the enjoyment of it. For himself, rather than his social position, though as an orphan he is in absolute possession of a fair property, he is cultivated somewhat too pronouncedly by his host's

sister, Laura Chanson, who is two or three years his senior, handsome, fashionable, and already a woman of the world. "Her nature," we learn at a later period of the story, "had that bias which caused it to select and feed upon examples of self-pleasing, in the case of those who had brought her up, which were inconsistent with their professed principles, until at length, led away by selfishness and by uncontrolled passions, she had come to be, as one may say, two Lauras, the one who professed in theory whatever was good, and the one whose actions regarded simply what was convenient. It is a very common character."—P. 216.

Yet to this siren's voice we find Leslie, the young man who has been already introduced, provokingly deaf. Her fascinations only attract him so far as they enable him to confirm by study his low estimate of woman, and afford, as occasion serves, an agreeable pastime. With his fitful attentions the enchantress is constrained to content herself, and hope supports her until the arrival from a French convent of her brother's ward, an unsophisticated girl with gifts of rare beauty and a splendid voice, of which the Reverend Mother and the seclusion of her pupilage had effectually kept her in ignorance. It would be hard to find in English fiction a more perfect ideal of pure simplicity. So much is this the case that Elinor Ladylift's *naïveté* not unfrequently provokes a smile, even whilst it seems treason to discover anything droll in what is so 'perfectly natural. Though the little nun, who at first answers only in monosyllables need scarcely have seemed a formidable rival, it is perhaps not less to tease Laura than to please himself, and to study a novel character, that Leslie sows in the latter the seeds of jealousy, by undertaking the task of teaching Elinor confidence, teaching her to walk, and persuading her that, though in direct contrariety to the Reverend Mother's code, "pleasure is not wrong." Here is a sample of one of his early lessons. Elinor has been singing:—

"'That song,' he said, 'is one I shall never forget. I shall hear many more, I hope; but the first time one listens to a perfect thing, it is remembered for ever.'

"Elinor shook her head. 'My Mother told me you would say so.'

"'That I should say so? How could the Holy Mother know anything of me?'

"'Not of you, but of all.'

"'She could only say that all of us should be aware you have one of the finest voices in the world.'

"'Yes, she did say so, that you would try to persuade me of it.'"—P. 26.

Answers so transparently ingenuous could not fail to charm a young man, whose experience of womankind was founded on acquaintance with Laura's type of character; but neither could they fail to breed jealousy instead of contempt in that lady's regard to Elinor. And

this jealousy is fanned by the aptness with which the guileless pupil comes to learn by heart the lessons of her self-elected teacher, to whom she looks for that advice which would have been coupled with a snub if she had sought it from Laura. In point of fact, resort to Leslie, for advice or help, was Elinor's best proof that she was losing that "long-taught horror of man which she had recently been made ashamed of." The innocence and inexperience, which Laura meets with blind scorn or insolent laughter, attract and interest Leslie to such an extent that he is touched, beyond the limits of his original purpose of merely amusing himself; and when, after two or three tête-à-têtes and stolen interviews, he finds from Elinor that his attentions have provoked Miss Chanson's anger, he retires to his own estate, *at the Tower*, but only to find that the "little nun's" image is deeper graven in his heart than he had fancied; a discovery which leads him to return to the neighbourhood of Chanson Wood—the scene of the story—in disguise. A sketch of Elinor, as Leslie—himself unseen—watches her at the water-fall which had been their favourite trysting-place, will be appreciated for its truth to nature and insight into character:—

"The unconscious Elinor made her preparations for passing the burning hours in shade and a refreshing atmosphere. She laid aside her bonnet, put by her gloves, unfastened the cotton gown from her throat, and it charmed him to see she did not open a book, but unfolded a piece of household work, and industriously shaped, and hemmed, and sewed at the white jacket she was making. Sometimes she paused, and looked long at the lovely fall of waters, and once going down to the edge of the brook, took water in her joined hands, and drank from that pretty cup. Then returning, she resumed her work and gave no sign of thought within, except a few times singing some notes, like a bird alone in the sun, trying a passage taught by the impulse of its melodious throat. It was a fair picture of still life, and he looked at it with the passion of a lover and the eye of an artist; but at last he began to grow discontented that there was no sign of wanting, or thinking of, him, no looks cast upwards, no sighs, no restless movement which he might have interpreted into regret that he was not there. Should he suddenly appear, would he be welcome then? Yes, welcome perhaps as a novelty—not as the thing desired—welcome to come and go, but if she knew he had come all that way merely to look at her, she would laugh. He was a very young man, and little knew the patience of a modest maiden, nor the absence of all spoken words and speaking signs when she is with herself alone, and is occupied with her natural duties and works."—Pp. 79, 80.

But other visits to the same rendezvous give him better hope, until at last he beholds her actually writing a letter to himself, prompted evidently by some trouble at Chanson Wood, and, getting at the village post-office, by means of a bribe, this letter, which he learns has been already tampered with by Laura, he meets Elinor by appointment again at the waterfall. The trouble was about some bills, which he settles; but it confirms to her mind the persistent

hostility of Laura to what is now developing into a serious love-affair. At the meeting, indeed, things go so far that Leslie, kissing her hand, asks—"May I not love you, Elinor?" and she naively replies, "Indeed I think you do." Her absence on this occasion is noticed by Laura and her guardian; and in a conversation which ensues, Laura takes the first step in a tangled path of lying, by prejudicing her brother's mind against his ward, and pretending to him that Leslie is her own lover. Elinor, forbidden to go again on an evening walk, seeks the waterfall with a note to leave for her lover; but in the surprise ensuing upon an interruption of the accidental interview which follows, this little note is lost, and picked up by Laura, who preserves it carefully for her own purposes. From this point of time she resolves to keep the lovers well in hand, professes sisterly interest, and welcomes Leslie again to Chanson Wood, but, with guile in her heart, persuades the two to keep their engagement for the present a secret from Mr. Chanson, whose eyes, as well as those of a young cousin, Sir Peter Bicester, she succeeds in blinding. Hence arise awkward *contretemps*. Leslie's jealousy is provoked by Elinor's innocent heed to the assiduities of this Sir Peter, who is partly the dupe and partly the imperfectly informed ally of his intriguing cousin. Innocence for a while maintains its own superiority to libel and slander; and the coolness and scoldings with which Leslie visits the seeming volatility of his *fiancée* are more than made up for by his sense of her little *ruse* for raising him in his own self-esteem, after a poem, written by him for a magazine, has met rejection. Hereby her ascendancy is so completely secured, that Laura is driven to extremities of mischief. She works upon her brother; she engages the facile Sir Peter in another plot to compromise the so-called flirt by a tête-à-tête; and at the same time pretends a sympathy with Leslie's plans, only hinting to him that she has good reasons for wishing the engagement kept secret for the present.

So severe, however, are the demands of this consuming jealousy and the talent for plotting to which she gives full scope, that she cannot take part in an excursion that had been planned; though in her own room, where Elinor has come to nurse her, she adds to her tissue of falsehood by entangling the girl in a promise of silence as to Sir Peter's attentions, calculated to rekindle Leslie's suspicions of an undercurrent or byplot of flirtation. Also, when her room is clear, she bestows half the night on a trick of forgery, altering the name of "Chanson" into that of "Leslie" in the *billet* which, as has been seen, she had picked up at the waterfall. Thus altered, it ran, "I cannot come to-night. Mr. Leslie forbids me to go out. Elinor Ladylift." After this stormy interior the scene changes for a fine autumnal morrow, described with infinite poetic grace by the

authoress. Leslie and Elinor enjoy a delicious walk his jealousy entirely hushed, and his pleasure enhanced by the contrast of what he saw before him with his former doubts as to girlish innocence and guilelessness. The little episode of the hare released from a springe is very pretty, and so is the glimpse of these two walking homeward within the edges of the wood, through a colonnade of trees, "hand in hand, healthy, beautiful, good." "It was Adam and Eve moving through the Garden of Eden." (P. 201.) But this peace is not destined to last. Laura reassures Sir Peter, who, having come across the lovers, has had misgivings that they are in earnest, and that it is unhandsome in him to meddle, in the course he had begun of attention to Elinor, and promises to assist him in getting an assignation. At the same time she insinuates fresh doubts into Leslie's mind; and his gentle caution to Elinor, "that it is not fit for a young girl to let an idle young man like Bicester meet and follow her," provokes the artless retort, "So my Reverend Mother told me, and I did not, till you laughed, and made me laugh too, about it." Still all might have been well, for Leslie's retrospect satisfied him that his now serious purpose was pure and holy, nor could he bear to think of his former purpose of amusing himself with such guileless innocence. But from the Sunday of the week in which Sir Peter and Leslie are both to leave in different directions, Laura's plot thickens. A trap laid for Elinor to meet Sir Peter, and come in late for prayers with him on Sunday night, succeeds. The study of Laura's rising to her tangled web of mischief on the morrow is powerfully real. That evening Elinor refuses to go on an errand which she half suspects is made up to throw her in Sir Peter's way; but Laura, not to be balked, persuades her to keep to her room under circumstances which look damaging to her consistency and truth, and also lays a wager with Sir Peter that if he writes a *billet-doux* to Elinor, asking an assignation for the next night, he shall have an answer to it. He commits his missive to Laura to get it to its destination, and hears no more till at ten o'clock at night, as Sir Peter is walking in the avenue, a veiled figure brings him, as in answer, the note which Laura had picked up and tampered with. Sir Peter snatches it with the glove loosely held by the bearer, and, as a matter of course, note and glove (the latter Elinor's) are handed at once to Laura, and from her to Leslie. A terrible rupture succeeds. Leslie's words of wrath and "high disdain" to Elinor are followed by his hasty departure, which Laura makes her brother believe is the result of a tiff between him and Laura, whom he supposes engaged. Leslie, coming to himself, relents and returns only to find Elinor gone back to the convent under the care of Mr. Roundell, Chanson's man of business. A jealous suspicion, which he hints to Laura, that she may have gone off with Sir Peter, is

taken as a hint by the artful woman, who tampers with Mr. Roundell so that Leslie's enquiries lead to a seeming confirmation of his fears. A desperate illness follows. He is nursed five months, during which he hangs betwixt life and death, by Laura at Chanson Wood. By the time he is fit to remove to his own Tower, he has had so much leisure to reflect on woman's treachery, and to be puzzled with Laura's schemes,—for she has kept his secret, and she has persuaded him that his name is mixed up in the county gossip with her own,—that he has lost all faith in human happiness. Sick at heart, and secretly believing death to be not far off, he suffers Laura's pleas of the world's talk, and her unmaidenly proffers of her love, to extort the tender of a hand without a heart. Not without an eye to another scene, likened to Eden and its happy denizens, does the authoress describe the couple, after this interview. "Pale, unanimated, uncongenial, these two went slowly along the walk, while the clouds of a suddenly overcast spring sky veiled the light of day. It was like Adam and Eve wandering through the world after they were cast out of Paradise."—P. 290.

And so Laura's machinations won her a reluctant husband, disenchanted with life, sceptical of good, "longing for the dim chaos which, as he believed, surrounded on all sides the brief light of conscious being." But a union so purchased and so cemented could not but prove wretched. With no more field for plotting, and no specific to win aught beyond the name of a wife, she subsides into an incompatible, suspicious, ill-tempered partner, with whose irritability Leslie bears as best he may, until one day angry words provoke her to utter vague hints, which Leslie follows up until he arrives at a clear conception of the treachery of which he has been the victim. Then come fierce reproaches and recriminations. Leslie hurries off to France; seeks the convent; gazes once more upon the wronged child, between whom and him the wiles of Laura had placed so impassable a gulf; makes mad proposals, from which Elinor's self-respect takes refuge in the bosom of the Reverend Mother; and returns to his home to blank despair, or the fearful alternative, of which the story of Paul Ferroll works out the consequence. The last paragraphs of "Why Paul Ferroll killed his Wife" acquaint us with the connection between the two stories, or two parts in one drama, of which Mrs. Clive seems to tell us, as Tennyson in reference to the "Idylls of the King," in what sequence they should be read:—

"Violent were the passions of the strong but fettered man; fierce the hatred of the powerful but baffled intellect; wild was the fury of the man who believed in but one world of good, and saw the mortal moments passing away, unenjoyed and irretrievable. Out of those hours arose a purpose. You, reader, see the man and know the deed. From the premises laid before you, it does not indeed follow that even that man would do that

deed; but since it was told, in 1855, that the husband killed the wife, so now, in 1860, it is explained *why* he killed her."

So ends the key to a tragedy, in its entirety worthy to be classed with the intensely wrought creations of the Greek drama; a tragedy evoking strongest sentiments of indignation, pity, and sympathy; a tragedy in which, though convention will not suffer us to justify the chief actor, yet every one agrees that the wretched successor of the Clytemnestras and Lady Macbeths of the ancient and modern drama deserved her fate, or even a worse. The criticism of young folks upon Laura's fate is apt to take the form of regret that Leslie, or Ferroll, did not "lead her a life," instead of killing her out of hand; but this, it may be submitted, would have been a vulgar requital, to say nothing of the bar it would have interposed to the happiness of the sweet bird, who would have languished in a convent with no further taste of the brief liberty which she at least had enjoyed innocently. People talk of "Leah," or "Charles the First," on the stage, extracting tears from the most stony and philosophical of lookers-on; but what have these dramas so pathetic as Elinor's trials? or, for that matter,—though he, manlike, is less unselfish, and develops more of that self-reliance which the gods of Greece delighted to visit with a Nemesis,—Leslie's, or Ferroll's, either? Our remarks have taken the form rather of an analysis of plot, than of a study of characters, and a weighing of separate elements; and yet enough has been said—in narrative, as it were—to bear out the proposition with which we started, that, as in her poetry, so in her chief novels, the two characteristic elements of which Mrs. Clive evinced the most thorough mastery, are fearless tragic force, and a bold freshness in realising and depicting unconventionalised character. Her early poem, "The Grave," is brought by name into "Why Paul Ferroll killed his Wife," as if to show that the authoress clung to it as the type of poetry which she herself most affected. As in it, so in "Paul Ferroll," the interests, the fancy, the creations, are bold, and uncommon, and unsteretyped. In Elinor, and her new joy in scenes of nature to which the convent had not introduced her, one seems to discover a penchant in the authoress for reverting to the scenes and thoughts of childhood which charmed the reader of the IX. Poems in "Former Home."

Still stands the rock, still runs the flood,
Which not an eye could pass unmoved;
The flow'ry bank, the fringing wood,
Which e'en the passer mark'd and loved.

Add to these elements a fund of quiet observation, and a humour well husbanded but indicative of a store in reserve, and we have the qualities which entitle Mrs. Clive's chief novels to claim a high place in modern fiction. It would be idle to say that "John Greswold,"

or her other novel, are comparable with the two on which we have been dwelling. "John Greswold" has its bit of tragedy, powerfully wrought; it has its little touches of sentiment, that come home, up and down its pages; it has its quaint observation, *e.g.*, the account, at the beginning of one of the chapters, of the discomforts of the back settlements, and "the purgatory to men and animals" stable-ward, on the night of a ball at a great country-house. But Mrs. Clive's credentials to fame as an authoress may best be limited to her poems, and to the two-fold Ferroll romance, of which the first part has gone through several editions, although, in our foregoing remarks, we have striven to show that it is incomplete without the second part.

Six months ago we concluded this paper in manuscript, with the expression of a hope that in the calm leisure of a comparative old age, solaced by "honour, love, obedience, troops of friends," and the crowning blessing of seeing her children's children around her, Mrs. Clive might re-issue both parts of her Ferroll tragedy connectedly. Such work would have been meet occupation for a bright, clear intellect, linked to a feeble frame, in such wise that she must have had abundant time for the sort of musing she imagined so beautifully in a poem written as late as 1865:—

The past revives, and thoughts return,
Which kindled once the youthful breast;
They light us, though no more they burn,
Then turn to grey and are at rest.

That hope is rendered vain by the sudden and appalling accident which caused her death. The end was, indeed, as we have internal evidence from her poems, in its suddenness such as she would have prayed for: it was, too, so far not untimely, as she had lived long enough not only to establish the exceptionally high calibre of her mental and intellectual powers, but also to secure a host of genuine mourners, in all ranks, by the unselfish kindness and goodness of her heart. Her bright conversation, her fellow-feeling with literary workers, and thorough sympathy with all that was honest and truthful in their work, her singular ingenuousness of character, consisting with a very shrewd insight of the world and its motives, must have caused her memory to be cherished by many others, besides the writer who pens this faint tribute of his esteem and regard for the authoress and the woman. In a humbler sphere, in the cottages around her home, and on her husband's estate, she will be missed by numbers, whom she had endeared by her thoughtful and active charity; and any future historian of Herefordshire, her adopted county, will have omitted a portion of his task if, on the score of highest qualities of mind and heart, he do not accord her a place in the first rank of its "Worthies."

JAMES DAVIES.



A NEW VIEW OF THE HOMERIC QUESTION.

TILL recently it might have been thought that the present generation had resolved to steel itself against the charms of Homer, that the use of Homeric phrase or illustration had been exiled by rigorous decree from our literature, and that even school-boys were to be denied the privilege of mimicking in playful combat the exploits of the heroes before Troy. We know now that the pages of Homer still continue to furnish food for contemplation to the statesman burdened by the cares of office, and that the pleasure of recalling in after life those scenes of the Greek poet which had lent animation to the studies of youth, is a pleasure which, far from being confined to statesmen, extends in a greater or less degree to persons of the most diverse occupation and almost legion in number. We have become aware also, though not for the first time, that the vividness of his descriptions passes over unconsciously with a majority of his admirers into a firm belief, if not in the reality of the Trojan War and the wanderings of Odysseus, at least in the personal existence of Homer as a poet standing on the furthest confines of civilization and yet one of the foremost of poets. To assail, therefore, the antiquity of the Homeric poems, if it be done from a position of recognized eminence in learning, is to spread uneasiness far and wide among those whose early education remains fresh among the anxieties of daily occupation. Nor, when this happens, is the pain of doubt altogether removed by the fact that in the end champions are found equal to the emergency of defence.

There is, however, a class of students—in this country as yet a small class—whose faith in the traditional antiquity of the Homeric poems appears to be in no way shaken by the evil suggestions of Mr. Paley and his followers. We refer to the students of Greek art to whom we are bound to look for the solution of many very important questions in the pages of the poet. They alone can tell us whether the not unfrequent mention of works of art is in each case consistent with the condition of art in the early period to which the origin of our texts of Homer is assigned. If, for instance, it were proved satisfactorily that the condition of art which is implied in the description of the shield of Achilles, really obtained in the time of Homer, a well-known suspicion as to the antiquity of the poems would be removed. Or, again, if it could be affirmed and demonstrated in detail that Greek art had assumed as early as the commencement of the seventh century B.C., a phase for which no equivalent is to be found in Homer, it would be necessary to accept the Homeric poems as having been composed and cast in their present form previous to that date. The theory which regards them as having been compiled in the fourth century B.C., from floating fragments of ancient epics on the Trojan War, could only be maintained by assuming these fragments to have suffered in the lapse of years no distinguishable change in reference to matters which were subject to constant change, or failing that, by accrediting the compiler with unexampled skill in restoring them to their pristine state. It is surely, therefore, time to make ourselves acquainted with the grounds on which recent historians of Greek art rely in accepting as if it were unquestioned, the usual date of Homer, and if those grounds be justly tenable, to recommend them to the attention of scholars whose neglect of collateral evidence has been one of the most marked features in the controversy. It is true that Mr. Paley endeavoured to support his charge against the accepted antiquity of the poems by evidence from the painted Greek vases. But the evidence brought forward by him had been obtained confessedly at second hand, and failed under examination.

This neglect of the testimony of monuments of Greek art other than literary, is the more to be regretted, that in recent years Archæology may be fairly said to have vindicated its claim in this field, at least, to be regarded as a science, and now counts among its adherents in Germany a large and rapidly increasing number of men trained to methods of strict inquiry. The mood of pathetic admiration which once characterised students in this department of knowledge, and caused their opinions to be received with proper diffidence, has now yielded to a habit of scrutiny from which even their majestic beauty no longer shields the sculptures of

the Parthenon. The fortunate discovery of fresh monuments in the course of excavations in Greece and on the sites of Greek colonies has vastly enriched the material of study, and meanwhile the remains of ancient art previously existing in European museums have been industriously engraved, photographed, cast, and by these means made widely known. Apart, however, from the accumulated wealth of material, other circumstances have been exceptionally favourable to the new impetus to research in this direction. No feature in the ancient life of the Greeks has escaped being made the special study of some scholar or body of scholars. We are being daily made more familiar with the results of laborious discussion on the political organization of the different states, or the rights and religious beliefs of the people, their occupations and amusements, their temples, houses, and domestic arrangements, the influence of climate, education, and political events, in short everything that can assist to make the picture of ancient life more vivid as a whole. So that, while the student of art is engaged with the investigation of its phenomena, there is being raised by his side a structure from which the causes of these phenomena may ultimately be surveyed.

As it happens the period of art which has of late attracted most attention is the period before Pheidias, partly, perhaps, owing to a natural desire to trace the successive stages of its development to their remote origin, but in greater part, we think, because the phenomena of those early times admit more readily of exact definition and give little or no scope for the mobility of individual consciousness. From a purely artistic point of view the schools that succeeded Pheidias possess a paramount interest, for this reason that though failing to rival his grandeur they could still reproduce the grace of his figures in a variety of more captivating forms. With them *ethos*, to repeat the charge brought by Aristotle against the paintings of Zeuxis, had given way to *pathos*, and their works in sculpture, like an over-ripened fruit, beautiful by the variety of its tints, appeal to special tastes and seek new charms from sentiment. As might be expected, the difficulty of obtaining an unanimous verdict on the merits of such of these works as remain, is extreme. With regard to the sculptors before Pheidias, the case is very different. Fettered by the traditions of the schools in which they had been trained, and with no perfect example of statuary to inspire emulation, even the latest and boldest of them would seem to have never attained complete truthfulness to nature, if we may judge by the statement that Myron with all his perfection of form still rendered the hair in the stiff archaic manner of early artists. To this defect of Myron, who was in fact a contemporary of Pheidias, are added, the farther back we go among the early masters, graver and more apparent defects, until

at last we reach a stage at which the name of sculpture is given by courtesy to the productions of skilled workmen striving to be artists. The skilled workman may be detected by his love of ornament and his failure to appreciate at once the entire beauty of an object. In the case of the human form he admires the various parts, and while toiling most affectionately to render them with truth overlooks the unity of the whole figure, and, therefore, overlooks the first and grand consideration that it is a living organism. We might illustrate this from the history of Italian painting, as well as from that of Greek sculpture. Nor is it difficult to find the origin of this predominating love of ornament in early times. For it must be remembered that the earliest application of art, whether in sculpture or painting, was always to the decoration of articles of daily use, and not to the production of figures or designs which would only commend themselves by their truthfulness.

It will thus be seen, that in dealing with the early ages of Greek sculpture, the student is armed with a principle, according to which the farther back his researches are conducted, the more must artistic effect be found in a position secondary to mechanical skill. In other words, the origin of the art must be sought not in rude, helpless figures, but in the skilful decoration of objects of daily use. If the Homeric poems are to be received as evidence of the condition of Greek art at a date somewhere between 850 and 1100 B.C., they must submit to a rigorous application of this principle. Where reference to works of art occur, the objects in question must be of a purely decorative character. There must be no mention of statues, for the art of statuary did not come into practice till several centuries later. With what success the poems bear this ordeal will be seen. But meantime, it is necessary to consider the possibility of Greek art having been largely influenced, in the time of Homer, by the contemporary and more advanced art of Assyria and Egypt, of which we fortunately possess many monuments of the greatest importance. On this point we would cite the researches of an authority of the highest eminence in the person of Professor Brunn, whose "*History of the Greek artists*" * maintains the position of a standard work.

As the question stood previous to his entering upon it, there were two principal theories. According to the one theory, the Greeks had not only derived their first impulse to artistic activity from objects of art brought by Phœnician traders from Egypt and Assyria in remote early times, but had also remained for centuries after their artistic impulse was first awakened dependent on these countries for models to work by, and for technical instruction. The memorable

* *Die Kunst der Homer*, Munich, 1868.

incident with which Herodotus captivates the reader on the threshold of his narrative, was cited as an instance of what must frequently have occurred, at any rate as a proof of the sale of Egyptian and Assyrian wares in Greece, at a period of very high antiquity. From the pages of Homer evidence was advanced of the familiarity of the Greeks of his day with works in metal and weaving, obtained from the Phœnicians, whether of their own manufacture, or imported by them in the first instance from Egypt and Assyria. In the earliest Greek vases an oriental character was discovered, both in the style of decoration and the choice of subject, while, with regard to the higher art of sculpture, though no example of oriental influence could be brought forward, it was considered sufficient to point out the fact that Pausanias, in speaking of very early Greek statues, describes them occasionally as being of the Egyptian style.

The other theory insisted on the autochthony of Greek art, and was supported chiefly by men like Winckelmann, conspicuous for their intense admiration of the grand achievements of Greek sculpture. To them the spirit of Greek art, always, as they knew it, striving after truth and beauty, was utterly unassociable, even in its infancy, with the enslaved spirit of the Egyptian and Assyrian. They refused to accept any consequence of the early intercourse with the Phœnicians, other than such as an artistic nature would derive from the sight of foreign productions, and this they limited to the lower forms of art which we describe as industrial. The fact of the Greeks in Homer's time having prized the costly armour, utensils, and garments acquired from the Phœnicians was admitted to be proof of their having been behindhand in the production of such articles, but much short of proof that the appreciation of these objects gave birth in Greece to a race of workmen, more or less at first mere imitators. As to the phrase of Pausanias, it was readily granted that any particular example of Greek sculpture to which he applied it, may have possessed that rigidity of limb and lack of expression which characterize Egyptian art to the last, as they characterize the early art of all European nations. But this, it will be seen, is conceding very little, when we remember that though Assyrian sculpture presents but a small improvement on the Egyptian in this respect, there is no possibility of mistaking the productions of the one nation for those of the other, nor any certain trace of mutual influence between them. That the old *Periegetes*, who was after all no very penetrating critic, really intended to convey no more than this, is rendered not unlikely by the favour with which comparisons between the early Greek and the Egyptian sculpture have been received in modern times, by those who have bestowed no serious attention on either.

Such in general terms continued to be the position of the two rival theories until the Assyrian monuments, discovered by Mr. Layard, introduced a new element into the discussion. Here was a series of sculptures in stone, bronze, ivory, and precious materials executed at various periods not later than the middle of the seventh century, B.C. Those from the palace of Nimrod are confidently asserted to date from the ninth century, B.C., while some of the engraved cylinders reach back to the fifteenth century, B.C., and even to an earlier date. The frequent mannerisms which are observed in the monuments from the palace of Nimrod, as compared with some of the earliest cylinders, show that the art of sculpture in Assyria had already passed its culmination, and reached a stage which must have been preceded by centuries of development. Two centuries carry us back to about the time of Homer. Mr. Layard's fortunate discovery, therefore, offered, it was to be supposed, a golden opportunity for a final decision, in regard to the supposed Assyrian influence on Greek art during these early times. Such, however, was the scarcity of Greek remains, which could be described without hesitation, as contemporary with the Assyrian monuments, that a comparison in any degree fair to both sides could not well be made. Failing this, it was thought that Assyrian influence, if once exercised to the extent then supposed by some, could not have been shaken off by Greek artists, except by slow steps, and not completely until a stage of perfect freedom of execution had been arrived at, such as that attained for the first time under Pheidias. In accordance with this view, the conventional treatment of details, such as the hair, eyes, lips, and the stereotyped expression of face, which characterize early Greek sculpture, as we have observed, with diminishing effect down to the period immediately before Pheidias, was regarded as a lingering reminiscence of a pupillage under Assyrian masters. On the other hand, whatever points of resemblance may have been noticed in the execution of details, it was clear almost from the moment of their arrival in London, that the Assyrian sculptures differed fundamentally from known Greek works in the all-important matter of artistic conception. For while the former represent throughout, scenes from real life, from the chase, from war, and from peaceful occupations, the latter are, as a rule, occupied with the ideal presentation of mythological or religious subjects. While the Assyrian sculptor, capable of treating animals, such as the lion, horse, and dog, with admirable freedom and truthfulness both to their forms and habits, was confined in his treatment of the human figure to an unaltering formal type, the Greek sculptor, more regardless of animal life, bent his best energy to the glorification of man. It was precisely this admiration, and close study of the human form in its

surpassing beauty, that made Greek sculpture what it was. To that all its noblest works were due, and the lesson which they still teach, and probably will never cease to teach, is that the highest artistic aspirations are those which aim at reproducing the grandeur and living beauty of the human form. Compared with this, of what account is all that the Greek sculptors could have learned from the Assyrians?

Our present purpose, however, being to ascertain the extent of what they did learn, we will now turn to the researches of Professor Brunn, whose undoubted merit it is to have taken an entirely new view of the facts, and to have prepared the way for a reconciliation between the opposing theories of an esoteric and an exoteric origin to Greek art. He maintains that though we are not yet acquainted with examples of Greek sculpture bearing an unmistakeable likeness to the Assyrian, we nevertheless possess records and descriptions of Greek sculpture, which he has no hesitation in declaring to have been executed under Assyrian influence. But before proceeding to these records, let us define his position more fully. "The Greeks," he says, "who obtained from the Phœnicians that alphabet which they modified and employed for a language peculiarly their own, obtained through the same people from Assyria an alphabet, so to speak, of art which they also modified and employed for a language of art equally peculiar to themselves." In the convenient phrase, "alphabet of art," he includes a knowledge of the processes of carving in ivory and wood, of weaving and embroidery, which he regards as the foundation of pictorial art, of pottery, and of working in gold, silver, iron, tin, and bronze, with the exception of casting in the last-mentioned material. It is important to note that besides the art of bronze-casting, he also rigorously excludes the art of sculpture in the round in marble. For in a knowledge of these two processes is involved the whole art of statuary. He does not, we presume, mean to say that figures in the round were never executed in bronze until the art of casting was discovered, a proof that such feats were accomplished, being found in a bust obtained from a tomb at Vulci, and now in the British Museum. A better proof, at the same time, could not be desired of how such a method of working must obstruct the carrying out of an idea, and effectually stop artistic progress in that direction. We may, therefore, agree with him that until the art of bronze-casting was known, the Greek genius for sculpture, whatever its impulse may have been, could have made no sensible advance in the race in which it afterwards gained its best laurels. The invention of bronze-casting by Theodoros and Rhoekos of Samos, took place it is said in the seventh century, B.C., and it is curious to note that the first praiseworthy examples of statuary in marble occur

soon after that date. That this instance of striking out a new path on the part of Greek artists was coincident with the collapse of the Assyrian empire is a fact, the significance of which will become more apparent as we proceed.

Turning to the remains of Assyrian art, the first striking observation which Professor Brunn makes is, that in all its wealth of sculpture there is no work which can justly be described as a statue. There are, indeed, in the British Museum five figures in stone sculptured in the round, which, judged by the inscriptions accompanying them, represent in two cases the Assyrian monarchs Asshur-izir-pal, who reigned about B.C. 880, and Shalmaneser about B.C. 850. The third and fourth are duplicate figures of Nebo, and were executed about B.C. 800. In none of these examples is any attempt made to render the forms of the body, while as to the lineaments of the face, it is to be feared that without the aid of the inscriptions below, identification would have been hopeless, and this is the more striking in one of the figures on which the artist has bestowed great care on the neatly trimmed hair and beard, and on the borders of the drapery. The fifth figure dates from B.C. 1100, and, though headless, is of peculiar interest, on account of its being nude. But the sculptor has not taken the opportunity of showing his knowledge, if he possessed any, of the human figure, the result of his labours being nothing more than a mere doll or dummy, very probably intended to be draped. Yet contemporary with these miserable efforts at statuary, the art of sculpture in relief had attained in Assyria a high degree of excellence, and that this excellence could only have been arrived at after centuries of development, itself a reasonable conjecture, is amply confirmed, as has been said, by the engraved cylinders among which it is not uncommon to find examples reaching back to the 12th and 15th centuries B.C. We have, therefore, a right to assume that contemporary with Homer, there existed in Assyria, sculptors capable of no mean achievements in relief, though unacquainted with the art of statuary. Compared with this, what is the condition of higher art which we find in the Homeric pages? First of all, we find the same absence of statuary. For the figure of Pallas described (*Il.* vi. 302) as in the act of being robed, cannot be supposed to have been to any extent more artistically advanced than the rude Assyrian figures just mentioned, four of which would assuredly be improved by the addition of actual drapery. At first sight there is a difficulty in accounting for the living maidens of gold in the house of Hephaestus (*Il.* xviii. 407) otherwise than by assuming the poet to have seen statues, whether in gold or not, more perfect in form than the Pallas seems to have been. But as a miracle of art had to be produced for the sake of a suitable surround-

ing to the artist god, it was perhaps as easy for the poet to imagine living beings with flesh converted into gold, as to conceive a real statue of gold becoming automatus through the divine manipulation of Hephaestos. In the parallel case of the brazen Talos, whom Cretan legend described as running round the island of Crete and indulging in sardonic laughter at the cost of his captives, it would never be thought necessary to presuppose a knowledge of bronze statuary at the exceedingly early period to which the origin of the legend undoubtedly belongs. With regard to the dogs of gold and silver that watched the portals of Alkinöos, we are surprised that Brunn should have found it necessary to do other than accept them as having been reliefs similar to the colossal tigers and fabulous monsters which stood at the doorways of Assyrian palaces. The figures of torchbearers in the banquet-hall of the Phæakian king, admit less readily of explanation. It may be, however, as Brunn suggests, that they were the product of the poet's fancy acting on his possible knowledge of the fact that oriental monarchs employed living men to perform such offices.

That the Assyrians, gifted as they were with an artistic faculty strongly inclined to realism, and conspicuous as they were in their taste for costly draperies, should at an early stage of their civilization have considered that the best possible representation of one of their monarchs would be a figure decked out in the actual robes which he had worn, is not unnatural. But that they should have remained to the last possessed of no higher feeling in regard to statuary than that which in our day inspires the visitors to wax-works, is a phenomenon worthy of the attention of those who look for contrasts between the Oriental and the Western mind. If the proof that the Greeks in Homer's time were in no better condition, rested solely on the mention of a sacred image as in the act of being draped, it might be rejected on the plea that a religious ceremonial could have no more value as evidence in a question of art in Homer's time, than it could have in regard to the time of Perikles, when perhaps the liveliest day of the year was that in which a new robe was carried in procession to deck the sacred image of Athene, the age of which was lost in a dim tradition of its having fallen from heaven.

This absence of statuary which presents so singular a phenomenon in the widely cultivated art of Assyria, may appear less remarkable in the case of Greek art at that early Homeric period in which it has been usually considered to have been only in its infancy. To suppose, however, that Greek art was then really in a condition which may be compared with childhood, is a somewhat gratuitous proceeding, though it has served very well, and still serves the purpose of accounting in an offhand manner for the fact that the historical notices of Greek sculpture in the 7th century B.C., describe

it as even then still very backward. It is possible to conceive a relapse to have taken place, and it would be more charitable to do so than to assail the genuine antiquity of the description of the shield of Achilles, which obviously presupposes an advanced state of art. Fortunately there is no need of such a step. For the historical notices in question refer to works of statuary, and not to any other forms of sculpture. We will, therefore, assume for the moment that Greek artists in the time of Homer, like the contemporary artists of Assyria, though unacquainted with statuary, were yet not incapable of accomplishing considerable feats in the direction of sculpture in relief, whether in stone, bronze, the precious metals, ivory or wood. Indeed, the only Greek monument which can positively be assigned to Homeric times, happens to be a relief in stone. We refer to the sculptured lions above the gateway at Mykenae, a work which, though it may not possess the merit we might expect, is of the utmost value on account of its resemblance to the Assyrian sculptures in respect of the flatness of its relief, its choice of subject, and the Asiatic character of the column which stands between the two lions. Almost precisely the same motive occurs on the ornament of a scabbard found at Nimrod.

From the testimony of the Homeric poems, bearing upon the general condition of Greek art at the time at which they were composed, we gather that with the exception of casting in bronze, the various processes of working in that metal as well as in iron, gold, silver, and tin were then known, and that the arts of carving in ivory and wood, of pottery, and of embroidery, were practised. In all cases where works of art are mentioned, they are praised for preciousness of material and excellence of workmanship. The particular trades or professions of *τέκτων*, *χαλκεύς* and *σκυτότομος* are spoken of, and occasionally an artist's name is mentioned, as that of Tychios, who made the shield for Ajax (Il. vii. 222), and Ikmalios, who made the chair for Penelope (Od. xix. 57). At other times we read of the productions of amateurs, such as the beautiful bed which Odysseus fashioned with his own hands (Od. xxiii. 189), and the embroideries of Andromache and Helena (Il. iii. 125 and xxii. 441). So far we feel that we have here to do with the productions of skilled workmen rather than of artists. The art of sculpture such as it is, is employed solely for purposes of decoration, and is therefore a secondary matter. It carries off the surplus activity of the workman's fancy, which probably for the most part only played as yet with those floral patterns which abound in Assyrian sculpture, and are not infrequently referred to by Homer. At the same time the mention of Tychios and Ikmalios by name would seem to suggest

that there existed an upper rank of workmen to whom the title of artists might perhaps be fairly applied. And if Helena could depict in embroidery scenes from the war going on around her, it is not unreasonable to credit the higher order of workmen with the power of rendering similar scenes in the material and the forms in which they were accustomed to work, that is, in metal, ivory, wood, or stone.

Turning now to the evidence of the Homeric poems bearing upon contemporary foreign art, we find mention of Sidonian craters of bronze (Il. xxiii. 743), Sidonian robes (Il. vi. 290), Cyprian armour (Il. xi. 20), and an Egyptian spinning basket (Od. iv. 125). That these objects surpassed in certain qualities the corresponding productions of Greek workmen is very likely. But that they differed in the style of workmanship, there is no reason to suppose. The poet certainly makes no such distinction. On the contrary, he once fairly confounds native with foreign work by describing (Od. iv. 617) a Sidonian crater as the work of the Greek God Hephaestus. Such high-sounding praise would further imply that the object in question had been executed with marvellous artistic skill, not in its form, but in its decoration, from which we may perhaps be allowed to conclude that the foreign productions of which we are now speaking, fairly represented the artistic skill of the country from which they came. But where are we to find that country? There would be no hesitation in pointing to Phœnicia, were it not that the Phœnicians, so far as we know them, were rather carriers between the Eastern and Western nations, than manufacturers or producers on their own account. We know that the Greeks obtained through intercourse with them in remote early times a system of writing, of numbers, weights and measures. Their numerous factories or settlements in the Greek islands give additional proof of their practical turn of mind, while the absence of any important trace of them in the literature of Greece excludes them effectually from any claim to have influenced directly the polite side of the Greek character. From this estimate of the Phœnicians, it would follow that whatever works of art they may have produced in Sidon or elsewhere, could only have been imitations, more or less exact, of objects with which they had become familiar from contact with other nations. Their local position admitted readily of contact with Assyria, and it is now known as a fact, that it was from that quarter that they derived their system of weights and measures. That they obtained also from the same quarter articles of luxury, which they conveyed to Greece for sale, is as we have said, expressly stated by Herodotus, and when the Assyrian language is better known than it is now, it may be possible to confirm the statement of the historian by showing that the obviously oriental names retained in the Greek language for such

articles as perfumery, are really words of Assyrian derivation. At least there has been found in Greece and in Italy a considerable number of little round vases with small necks, clearly shaped to contain precious liquids, and ornamented with floral patterns and figures of animals, which, both in their style and disposition in parallel bands, strongly suggest an Assyrian influence in the country where they were made. Specimens of Phœnician sculpture, many of them, it appears, of a very early date, have recently been found in large numbers in the island of Cyprus, and in the various verdicts delivered upon them in public journals we find the similarity between them and Assyrian sculpture generally made the subject of remark. This remark, founded as we think in fact, will therefore relieve us for the present of any anxiety about the correctness of our opinion when we say that the works of art sold to the Greeks in Homer's time by Phœnician traders, may either have been produced in the busy workshops of Assyria, or failing that, must have borne a striking resemblance to objects of the same class produced there. To justify still further this opinion, we have only to turn to the remains of Assyrian art, to find ample illustration of the various articles of luxury referred to by Homer; ivories richly carved and inlaid, bronze vessels, beautiful for material and elaborate in workmanship, armour, and even some fragments of pottery. The dresses worn by high personages in the sculptured reliefs, show to what marvellous extent the art of embroidery had been carried.

So far our observations have been intentionally confined to works of a secondary order of merit, such as would properly have been executed by skilled workmen. We have, indeed, suggested, when speaking of Tychios and Ikmalios, that there may have existed in Homer's time a superior class of workmen to whom the title of artists might to some extent be allowed, though their efforts were doubtless restricted to the decoration of articles of daily use. That a transition from mere decoration to ambitious artistic designs had taken place in Assyria as early as the time of Homer, may be proved by simple reference to the sculptured reliefs from the palace of Nimrod, executed in the 9th century B.C., and manifestly pre-supposing centuries of practice in the higher forms of art. And unless on the theory that an order of artist-workmen existed then in Greece also, it will be impossible to account for Homer's description of the shield of Achilles. A fabric of the poet's fancy it cannot be. On the other hand there is no necessity for supposing that he had a particular shield before his mind, the probability being that he composed the various scenes on it from isolated works. The chief poetic merit of the passage, as it appears to us, consists in the admirable propriety with which a divine artist is charged with the design which is

nothing short of a summary of the various efforts of mortal artists, each striving to immortalize a separate phase of human affairs. In the case of the chorus scene, the poet distinctly expresses his indebtedness to a Greek artist by comparing it with a work of Daedalos. And, if this view of the question be correct, the mention of a Greek sculptor as the author of a work which served as a model for one scene, may entitle us to assume that the other scenes were drawn from similar sources. As, however, the scarcity of Greek remains from the Homeric times does not permit us to trace these sources, it will be satisfactory if, after having shown that in works of secondary merit a remarkable conformity of spirit obtained between the Assyrian and the Greek art of the time of Homer, we succeed in finding among the remains of the former, scenes analogous to those that occur on the shield. The poet begins :—

Then first he formed the immense and solid shield :
 Rich various artifice emblazoned the field :
 Its utmost verge a three-fold circle bound :
 A silver chain suspends the massy round :
 Five ample plates the broad expanse compose,
 And godlike labours on the surface rose.
 There shone the image of the master mind,
 Then earth, then heaven, then ocean he designed :
 The unwearied sun, the moon completely round :
 The starry light that heaven's high convex crowned :
 The Pleiads, Hyads, and the Northern team :
 And great Orion's more refulgent beam
 To which around the axle of the sky
 The bear revolving points his golden eye
 Still shines exalted on the ethereal plain,
 Nor bathes his blazing forehead on the main.

The usual method of explaining this passage from an artistic point of view is by assuming the elements of the world mentioned in it to have been represented by their respective mythological personifications. In favour of such a proceeding there is the extreme probability that a tendency to personify and then to worship as anthropomorphic beings the elements of nature had taken a powerful hold on the Greek mind at a period considerably earlier than Homer. On the other hand, it is very doubtful whether art could have kept pace with the activity of religious thought in these or even in after times. Setting aside these considerations and confining ourselves strictly to the passage, it would seem that the evidence is not unevenly balanced as supporting a personified or a realistic rendering of the subject. To quote the words of an ingenious writer,* “The notice that the Bear is *also named the wain* more than counter-

* Mr. W. Watkiss Lloyd on “The Shield of Achilles.” London, 1854.

balances the inference from the notice that it *observes Orion*; and so, again, the phantom of personification that rises in the *might of Orion* fades away by its association with other signs as *crowning the heaven*, and if the *unwearied sun* calls up an image of the celestial character, the *full moon* confines us to the simple image of a disc illuminated. As regards the constellations, the conflicting impressions are best reconciled by such a blending of personal and stellar representation as we see in the circular group of low relief in Flaxman's shield; but the treatment of Earth, Heaven, and Sea is not so easily conceived.

As it would obviously require only a small weight of fresh evidence to cause the balance to preponderate in favour of a realistic treatment, we would call attention to two Assyrian bronze bowls (Layard, pl. 61 and 66), on each of which is a representation in relief of a bird's-eye view of the surface of the earth, with its mountains, plains, woods, and animal life. In both cases the subject occupies the hollow interior of the bowls, and is surrounded by a band ornamented with figures of animals or of men. The work is in many respects conventional, as, for example, in the matter of the mountain tops, all of which are formed by three equally high peaks. But on the whole, there is a very striking amount of realism in the design. In the centre of both the bowls there is something which does not readily admit of explanation. In the one case it is an oblong band, which appears to rest on the mountains, covered with a pattern composed of stippled lozenges and studded with nine silver globules, one of which is larger than the rest. We had thought that it might have been intended to represent the firmament with the sun, moon, and seven stars, in which case the illustration of the Homeric passage would have been all but complete. In the other bowl (pl. 61), the centre ornament, which is rather circular than oblong, is thickly studded with silver globules and has at its four cardinal points a head apparently of a deity. Whether or not in both cases a representation of the heavens was meant to be conveyed, enough has been said to show that we have here to do with a realistic rendering of the earth's aspect such as the Homeric passage suggests. And, further, it should be observed that the shape of these bowls lends itself to such a subject exactly in the same manner as would the *umbo* of a shield, upon which it has been the uniform practice in interpreting the passage to place this scene. But while agreeing with Brunn as to the extreme likelihood of the poet's having had some such work of art before his mind, we have a difficulty in convincing ourselves that the bowls in question are really the productions of Assyrian workshops. The four heads of deities and the human figures which occur on one of them are of a most unmistakably Egyptian type. On the other hand, the

mountains, plains, trees, animals, and, principally, the style of workmanship are obviously Assyrian. The presence of Egyptian figures, it has been suggested, may be accounted for by the temporary influence of skilled workmen carried off from Egypt in the Assyrian raids. With this, as it appears to us, not unreasonable suggestion we will leave the question and hear the poet further :—

Two cities radiant on the shield appear,
The image one of peace, and one of war.
Here sacred pomp and genial feast delight,
And solemn dance and Hymeneal rite !
Along the street the new made brides are led,
With torches flaming, to the nuptial bed ;
The youthful dancers in a circle bound
To the soft flute and cithern's silver sound ;
Through the fair street, the matrons in a row,
Stand in their porches and enjoy the show.

There in the forum swarm a numerous train,
The subject of debate, a townsman slain :
One pleads the fine discharged, which one denied,
And bade the public and the laws decide :
The witness is produced on either hand :
For this or that, the partial people stand :
The appointed heralds still the noisy bands,
And form a ring with sceptres in their hands ;
On seats of stone within the sacred place
The reverend elders nodded o'er the case ;
Alternate each the attesting sceptre took
And rising solemn, each his sentence spoke.
Two golden talents lay amidst, in sight,
The prize of him who best adjudged the right.

The Assyrian reliefs, it must be confessed, furnish no very ample material for the illustration of the city at peace. This, however, need occasion no surprise, seeing that the design of these sculptures was to celebrate the triumphs of the monarchs whose palaces they adorned. At the same time we find in plates 24, 30, 36, 50, and 78 walled cities represented in a bird's-eye view with houses and tents, within which people are visible occupied in various ways. And, again, in plates 48 and 49, occur similar designs with the addition of a procession of women and children, headed by musicians, which for want of a better, may be taken as having furnished the notice for the marriage procession in the poem. As regards what took place in the forum, it would manifestly be absurd to expect among works of Assyrian origin a model for a scene so characteristically Hellenic. The poet proceeds :—

Another part (a prospect differing far)
Glowed with refulgent arms and horrid war.

Two mighty hosts a leaguered town embrace,
And one would pillage, one would burn the place.
Meantime the townsmen, armed with silent care,
A secret ambush on the foe prepare ;
Their wives, their children, and the watchful band
Of trembling parents on the turrets stand.
They march by Pallas and by Mars made bold ;
Gold were the gods, their radiant garments gold,
And gold their armour ; there the squadron led
August, divine, superior by the head !
A place for ambush fit they found, and stood
Covered with shields beside a silver flood.
Two spies at a distance lurk, and watchful seem
If sheep or oxen seek the winding stream.
Soon the white flock proceeded o'er the plains,
And steers slow moving, and two shepherd swains ;
Behind them, piping on their reeds, they go,
Nor fear an ambush, nor suspect a foe.
In arms the glittering squadron rising round
Rush sudden : hills of slaughter heap the ground ;
Whole flocks and herds lie bleeding on the plains,
And all amidst them, dead, the shepherd swains !
The bellowing oxen the besiegers hear :
They rise, take horse, approach, and meet the war,
They fight, they fall, beside the silver flood.
There tumult, there contention stood confessed ;
One reared a dagger at a captive's breast,
One held a living foe, that freshly bled
With new made wounds : another dragged a dead :
Now here, now there, the carcasses they tore :
Fate stalked amidst them, grim with human gore.
And the whole war came out, and met the eye,
And each bold figure seemed to live or die.

Turning to (Layard) plate 66, we find a city at war. Women and unarmed men are on the highest ramparts, hurling down stones on the assailants, or imploring with outstretched arms an end to the strife. In place of squadrons going forth to meet the enemy before the walls under divine leadership, we have, as the triumphal nature of these sculptures would lead us to expect, frequent instances of squadrons advancing to an assault, and led by monarchs, the splendour of whose armour is at once recognizable as worthy of the Homeric praise. Nor is it unimportant to notice with regard to the city on its defence that while the sculptor, from the nature of his art, could not present to us such a scene otherwise than by selecting some one point as that of the guard upon the walls, the poet on the other hand would not necessarily have restricted himself as he does to these limits, unless he had been describing an actual work of art which he had seen reproducing such a subject. More complete, however, in the vividness with which they recal the Homeric passage

are plates 45 and 46 with their scene of terrible slaughter taking place beside the banks of a stream into which man and horse are being hurled confusedly. The plain is strewn with dead or dying men who bite the dust. In one part of the field the conflict still rages; in another, where strife has ceased for a moment vultures hover above the glazed eyes of the fallen. It is clear that the ground had been selected for the sake of the shelter offered by the many trees that stud it, and, perhaps, also for the sake of a preliminary ambush. As the eye passes from where the confusion is greatest to the left, the ground becomes level and is quite bare of trees. On the extreme left is a huge mound, from the top of which bow-men maintain a fire upon the assailants. Unfortunately the sculpture breaks off at this point. But as the prize of so fierce a battle could not well have been less than the possession of a walled city, we shall be warranted in filling up the lacuna with one of those views of towns so common in Assyrian sculpture. Battles in woods and by the banks of streams are of very frequent occurrence in the Assyrian reliefs.

Before leaving this part of the passage we may observe that in pure Hellenic sculpture, so far as may be judged from the remains at present known, representations of walled towns do not occur. On the other hand, there will be no reason to suppose that the practice did not to some extent admit scenes of that kind in early times, if on referring to the description of the sculpture on the chest of Kypselos (Pausanias, v. 17), we find mention of a representation of the house or palace of Amphiaraos. But, perhaps, the most significant fact that can be adduced as tending to prove that these favourite designs of the Assyrian sculptures were not without influence upon the Greeks of Homer's time, is that the sculptured reliefs discovered in Lycia, a country memorably connected with the Trojan war, display an abundance of views of walled cities and forts. It is not to be understood that the Lycian reliefs, which we possess, reach back to anything like the Homeric period. Those, at least, which represent walled cities can in no case belong to an earlier date than the 5th century B.C., and may be as much as a century later. In point of execution they are so peculiarly Greek that we may go so far as to say that the artist or artists must have studied at Athens about the time of the second Attic school. But in point of subject, we observe a marked affinity to the Assyrian. How, then, unless on the theory of a powerful local tradition, are we to explain this singular mixture of a minimum Assyrian with a maximum Greek element? As regards the population of Lycia, it appears that it, too, comprised the mixed elements of early Greek settlers and a

primitive race whose origin, though undoubtedly oriental, cannot finally be determined until the Lycian language is made out. The real importance, however, in establishing a connection between the ancient art of Assyria and Lycia, lies in this that it involves a farther connection with the art of Greece, the earliest record of which is that the walls of the Prehomeric Tiryns were built by Cyclopes from Lycia, invited for the purpose, a record which derives additional weight from the manner in which what appears to be among the oldest legends of the Peloponnesus are interwoven with incidents that transpired in Lycia.

Next in order on the shield comes a series of scenes intended to present a contrast to the stir, turmoil and horrors of those that have gone before. In the first of these scenes we have a vernal picture of ploughing the land, in the second, a harvest scene, in the third, a vintage, and in the fourth, a representation of pastoral life and its most exciting incidents. Now without saying that all or anyone of these scenes can be illustrated with accuracy in detail from the remains of Assyrian sculpture, it may be emphatically asserted that the impression left on the mind by the Homeric passage finds an admirable counterpart in the Assyrian reliefs. For example in plate 17 we have a glimpse of out-door life, which, though the occupation be different, furnishes materials for a reconstruction of the ploughing scene. It is a sunny landscape with stream and plain and gentle upland grown with trees of various kinds. Workmen are proceeding leisurely with barrows conveying coils of rope or timbers to be employed in moving a huge piece of sculpture from a quarry in the distance. Again, if wood-falling be substituted for harvest operations, several examples will be found among the sculptures. This difference of occupation will be made light of, when it is found that a parallel can be produced (plate 35) for one of the most striking points in the harvest scene, the preparation of a repast in the open air. The animal happens to be a kid instead of an ox, and the occasion of the feast appears to be the ordinary demands of appetite produced by a long march. The persons who are to profit by it, are victorious soldiers. Behind them is a long string of captives, men, women, and children, carrying with them their household effects and accompanied by their scanty flocks and herds. The artist has no means at his command to express sorrow in their countenances, and failing this, he has resort to such simple touches of nature, as that of a mother stooping to give the tired boy at her feet a drink from the water-skin which she carries. The children busying themselves to help the sheaf-gatherers in the Homeric scene is another similar touch of nature.

Passing over the vintage, for which, though instances are to be found in the sculptures of men and women carrying baskets of fruit, no adequate illustration is to be found, we come to the following sketch of pastoral life :—

Here herds of oxen march, erect and bold,
Rear high their horns and seem to low in gold,
And speed to meadows, on whose rounding shores
A rapid torrent through the rushes roars:
Four golden herdsmen, as their guardians stand,
And nine sour dogs complete the rustic band.
Two lions rushing from the wood appeared
And seized a bull, the master of the herd :
He roared : in vain the dogs, the men withstood ;
They tore his flesh and drank the sable blood.
The dogs (oft cheered in vain) desert the prey,
Dread the grim terrors, and at distance bay.

As one of several scenes representing herds plate 60 may be mentioned. In plate 45 we have a lion attacking a bull, a subject which is by no means unusual in Assyrian art. Finally, we read :—

A figured dance succeeds: such once was seen
In lofty Gnosus: for the Cretan queen,
Formed by Daedalean art; a comely band
Of youths and maidens, bounding hand in hand:
The maids in soft cymars of linen dressed ;
The youths all graceful in the glossy vest ;
Of these the locks with flowery wreaths enrolled ;
Of these the sides adorned with swords of gold,
That glittering gay, from silver belts depend.
Now all at once they rise, at once descend,
With well taught feet ; now shape in oblique ways,
Confusedly regular, the moving maze :
Now forth at once, too swift for sight, they spring,
And undistinguished blend the flying ring :
So whirls a wheel, in giddy circle toss'd,
And rapid as it turns the single spokes are lost.
The gazing multitudes admire around :
Two active tumblers in the centre bound ;
Now high, now low, their pliant limbs they bend ;
And general songs the sprightly revel ends.

It would not be expected from the comparatively small extent of Assyrian remains that a parallel should be found for every scene in the Homeric description of the shield, even if it were supposed that it had been altogether inspired by the sight of Assyrian works of art. As it happens, however, that the chorus scene here described is expressly compared with the work of a Greek artist, Daedalos, we naturally have recourse for an illustration of it to the remains of early Greek art. Prepared, as we are for very limited success in so

doing, it is satisfactory to find on a vase discovered at Vulci, and now in the national collection, a representation which, considering the limits imposed on vase painters even in the best times of the art, may fairly be taken to be a reproduction of an original work such as the chorus executed by Daedalos may have been. That the vase in question is one of the very earliest examples of the potter's art may be confidently asserted. But lest we should fail in carrying conviction on this point to the minds of those who are aware of the divergency of opinion in such matters among archæologists, we may state first that the vase was found in a tomb, along with, among other objects of high antiquity, the bronze bust already referred to as having been executed in the fashion, styled *sphyrelaton*, which obtained previous to the invention of casting; and, secondly, that upon the vase itself occur several figures of Centaurs which by having human instead of equine forelegs conform with what is known both from Pausanias and from remains of early art, to have been their archaic appearance. It is further a singular coincidence that among the various other subjects on the vase there is one which represents Theseus struggling with the Minotaur inside the labyrinth at Crete made by Daedalos, Ariadne standing outside and holding the end of clue. The chorus, headed by a musician (*μετὰ δὲ σφω ἐμέλπετο θεῖος ἀοιδὸς, φορμίζων*) is composed of men and women alternately, holding each other by the hand (*ἀλλήλων ὑπὲρ καρπῶ χεῖρας ἔχοντες*). They are further alternately clad in white and purple, reminding us of the Homeric distinction,

Τῶν δ' αἱ μὲν λεπτὰς ὀθόνας ἔχον, οἱ δὲ χιτῶνας
εἰσ' εὐνήτους ἦκα στίλβοντάς ἐλαίῃ.

With regard now to the manner in which so many and so varied a class of subjects may have been disposed on the surface of one shield, it is interesting to observe that opinions have been hitherto almost uniformly in favour of a division of the shield into five concentric bands, the five plates of which it was composed so overlapping one another as to form each a distinct band. On the centre or *umbo*, would occur the cosmical scene with which the poet begins. The other scenes would occupy the concentric circles. That this method of arrangement, originally suggested by the long bands of sculpture which decorate the friezes of Greek temples and confirmed by the disposition of the reliefs on the chest of Kypselos in parallel bands, may well have been adopted on the shield of Achilles, is rendered highly probable by the discovery at Caere some years ago of several bronze shields ornamented with patterns disposed in concentric bands. From the very archaic character of the ornaments upon them, and of the objects found in the same tombs, these shields have

been presumed to reach back in date almost, if not quite, to the Homeric age. If, now, it be asked, whether in this respect also Assyrian sculpture may have furnished a model for the Greeks to work by, there will be no difficulty in answering affirmatively, seeing that it was a most frequent practice of the Assyrian sculptors to arrange their subjects in parallel bands. It will be seen that this interpretation of the arrangement of the shield proceeds on the theory that Homer had in his mind's eye a shield, whether real or imaginary, ornamented upon principles of art which are known to have been applied constantly in Greek sculpture, and more or less constantly in that of Assyria. On the other hand, though we are inclined to agree with this method of interpretation, it is possible to imagine a more realistic rendering of the subject as making up one entire design, the aim of which, as became the divine artist, was to present a view of the world and an average of terrestrial occupations. For instance, we could conceive the whole surface of the shield, except the *umbo* and the outer margin, occupied by such a view of the configuration of the earth as we have found on the true Assyrian bronze bowls. In the plains would be placed the cities, the combat, and other subjects. On the margin, surrounding the whole, as the poet says, the ocean would then be more obviously in its right place, as would also be the constellations on the *umbo*.

So far the points of resemblance which we have noticed between the shield of Achilles and the sculptures of Assyria, appear to be such as would imply a common origin for the art of sculpture in relief as practiced in ancient Greece and Assyria, while the points of difference appear to be such as would arise from the difference of local conditions under which the art existed in the two countries, such differences, in fact, and such points of resemblance as may be observed in the contemporary art of any two European nations acquainted with each other's productions. In both these ancient countries at the period of which we have been treating, the manner of working, that is to say, in relief, as opposed to sculpture in the round, the preference for naturalistic subjects and the choice of material in which to render them, seems to have been the same. There remains, therefore, only the claim of priority in the practice of this branch of art, and as there can be no hesitation in assigning the award to the country whose general civilization is so conspicuously the older of the two, as that of Assyria, we come round to the statement with which Brunn started, "That the Greeks had obtained from the Assyrians an alphabet, so to speak, of art, which they gradually modified and employed for a language of art peculiarly their own."

If, now, our estimate of the advance made by the art of sculpture in relief among the Greeks at the early date of the Homeric poems be correct, it becomes a question of immense importance to account for the condition of that art in subsequent times, to discover whether it immediately relapsed or whether it maintained a steady progress. As evidence on this point Brunn cites a work of art which, for other reasons, has a marked position in our recollections. We refer to the chest of Kypoclos, King of Corinth, and the simple tale told of it by Herodotus. The mother of Kypselos, to conceal her newly-born son from those who were hostile to his succession to the throne of Corinth, placed him in a box. Whether it was that the box had been carefully stowed away, or whether it was, as we prefer to think, that its very obviousness, as the familiar receptacle for the queen's robes, protected it, the child effectually escaped the observation of his enemies, and in grateful token of his safety, the box was afterwards placed in the temple of Hera at Olympia. It was there that Pausanias saw it and noted down the description of it which we now possess. Made of cedar, it was ornamented with a multitude of figures sculptured in gold, ivory, or cedar, and disposed in five parallel bands. Following the arrangement of Pausanias, we find that these figures constitute over thirty separate groups or subjects, including among them two armies and an athletic competition in presence of spectators. Taking the number of the figures at the lowest possible computation, we have still manifestly a work, which for mere power of composition and execution, must have taxed the artist much more than the shield of Achilles would have done. But we also become aware of a considerable advance which has been made in another direction since the time of the Homeric shield. Instead of the combats between nameless masses of men, we have here the encounters of familiarly known heroic personages whose names, as if the types were not yet quite established, were written beside them, says Pausanias, in quaint ancient letters. Instead of a dance of unknown persons, we have athletic games in which the heroic competitors may be singled out by their names. We have no more nameless cities at war or at peace. A powerful age of legend-making has obviously intervened, and under its influence the art of sculpture has profited to the extent, at least, of seizing the typical actions of many of the heroes and reproduced them in a more or less recognizable form. On the other hand, it is to be observed that the taste for variety and costliness of material remains, that the arrangement in parallel bands after the Assyrian fashion is retained, and that the art of sculpture is still confined to the decoration of articles of daily use, that, in fact, sculptors are still but skilled workmen, though, doubtless, very

superior in skill to those of the Homeric age. In dealing with the productions of skilled workmen in those remote times, the remains of early Greek sculpture have taught us what to expect. Thus instructed, it is with pleasure that we turn to the finest existing specimen of early Greek vase painting, the so-called François vase at Florence, to find not only the elaborate and tasteful workmanship, but also the very treatment of subject which we should look for on the chest of Kypselos. The subjects are chosen from the same field of ancient legend and myth, and the name of each hero or god is written by his side in a bold clear hand.

The year assigned roundly to the reign of Kypselos is 630 B.C. Adding twenty years for his growth to manhood we obtain 650 B.C. as the date of his birth, and consequently the latest period at which the chest could have been made. It should, however, be remembered that Pausanias speaks very emphatically of the archaic appearance of the work, the forms of the letters upon it and the fact that the verses in which explanations concerning the various groups were conveyed were written *boustrophedon*, that is, to be read alternately from right to left, a fashion which is known to have prevailed only in the earliest stage of Greek epigraphy. Again, it should be noticed, that to have escaped the search of those who were bent on accomplishing the death of the child, the chest must, as we think, have been a familiar object, and very probably, to judge from its wealth of ornamentation, a heirloom. It may, therefore, perhaps be regarded as not unjustifiable, if we move the date of its execution back to 700 B.C. If, now, we suppose both the chest of Kypselos and the shield of Achilles to have fairly represented the best artistic skill of their respective dates, we obtain an intervening period of over two or three hundred years, during which the progress we have indicated would have been made. With the question as to whether this period may or not have been of sufficiently long duration, we cannot, in the present state of knowledge, have any special concern. The main object of interest in the matter is the fact that we have here to do with a work from which it appears that Greek art, while retaining the elementary principles of a very early style, had by about 700 B.C. assumed a phase so different from that of the Homeric poems, that we are at a loss to conceive the possibility of the author of these poems, if he had lived after that date, successfully avoiding every word which, in respect of art, might betray the lateness of his lifetime. Or again, if we suppose our present text of the Iliad to have been compiled in the 4th century B.C. from epics till then floating among the people, and on that account at the mercy of every change which

took place, not only in language but also in such minor matters as works of art, we must do more than admire the success with which the compiler has restored them, so far as the mention of art is concerned, to what, from a comparison with Assyrian monuments presumably contemporary with Homer, we have seen must have been their original condition.

That this artistic change from naturalistic to ideal subjects was due to the influence of the legend-making spirit that prevailed in the centuries immediately following the time of Homer has already been remarked, and that the artists of that period would naturally have most sympathy with the new themes of their own day is suggested by the variety of new subjects on the chest of Kypselos, and the scarcity of subjects bearing upon the Trojan war. As time went on, the new phase of art became more pronounced, almost all trace of the naturalistic style having disappeared by about 530 B.C., the date of Bathykles of Magnesia, whose sculptured reliefs on the throne of Apollo at Amyklæ still survive in the pages of Pausanias (iii. 18, 9). At the same time, the wealth of subject which that throne displays clearly proves that the taste for rich decoration on furniture or other articles of daily use, which characterized the productions of the artist-workmen in the Homeric age, had not yet been abandoned. Nor was it abandoned by even Pheidias himself, as we gather from the description of the throne, on which was placed that ancient marvel of art, the chryselephantine Zeus at Olympia. It must, we think, have been some powerful tradition that suggested to the mind of an artist conspicuous, as Pheidias was, for the simplicity and unity of his compositions, the propriety of introducing so great a variety of isolated subjects on the throne of Zeus. By thus assuming a traditional necessity for decoration of this kind, as the throne of Apollo just mentioned, the chest of Kypselos, and the crowding of figures and groups on the earliest painted vases, entitle us to assume, we incur as the cost of explaining the somewhat workmanlike proceeding of Pheidias the duty of tracing the tradition to its origin. If we have correctly described the sculpture of the Homeric age as restricted to the decoration of furniture and objects of daily use, we shall have traced the tradition in question back to the furthest possible point in Greek history. And if Brunn is correct in declaring that the Greek sculpture of the Homeric age differed from the contemporary sculpture of Assyria only in certain local features, and in concluding from this similarity that the Greeks had obtained the elementary principles of their art by intercourse with the Assyrians, we must trace the origin of this traditional taste for decoration to that people.

That a taste of this kind prevailed to an extraordinary extent in Assyrian art, is perhaps the first thought that occurs on an inspection of its remains, while as to the remains of early Greek art, we have already said that their most obvious characteristic was the presence of this decorative spirit in a greater or less degree.

Of early Greek art we possess as yet unfortunately very few examples, and of that art during the Homeric age only one authentic specimen — the sculptured lions from the gateway of Mykenae. On the other hand, there have been found in recent years on the sites of the ancient cities, Caere and Praeneste, several tombs remarkable for the similarity of their construction to the tomb of Atreus at Mykenae. Of these, the so-called Regulini-Galassi tomb is the best example. Homeric in their construction, these tombs have yielded a class of objects which serve admirably to illustrate the general condition of workmanship as we gather it from the pages of Homer. In addition to the bronze shields already noticed as presenting by the disposal of their ornaments in concentric bands a parallel to the shield of Achilles, there have been found numerous articles, apparently the personal ornaments of the entombed, including necklaces of amber and gold, which recal the necklace presented by Eurymachos to Penelope, ivory carvings of most archaic appearance and objects in bronze and silver. More recently a series of excavations in Rhodes, on the sites of the two Homeric towns, Kamiros and Jalyssos, have brought to light many examples of rare painting and of ordinary workmanship in ivory, precious stones, gold, amber, glass, and porcelain, which, though the date of them cannot at present be positively determined, are with general consent assigned to a period of very remote antiquity. Among the engraved gems, for instance, all of a rude style, there is one with a design which bears a most striking resemblance to the lions on the Mykenae Gateway, and on the scabbard from Nimrud. A porcelain cylinder with a pseudo-Assyrian design, and found with the gem just described, points still more clearly to an acquaintance with the artistic productions of Assyria. Among the objects in gold, all archaic in appearance, is one with the figure of a Centaur, whose human, not equine, forelegs prove him to be of a very ancient type. One vase from Jalyssos is identical with a vase found under the lava at Santorin, and therefore of a high antiquity. Among the vases from Kamiros, one has already played a prominent part in the Homeric controversy by virtue of its design, which represents the combat of Hektor and Menelaos over the body of Euphorbos. Its value, however, for our present purpose, consists in this, that while its date may be assigned on palæographical grounds to about the 7th cen-

tury B.C., it is far from being one of the earliest examples of vase painting from that quarter. A remarkable feature in the results of these excavations is that, though objects of Egyptian workmanship have been found in considerable numbers, there is not the smallest trace of Egyptian influence perceptible in the articles found by the side of them. At the present day there are doubtless many who will not be surprised to hear that the productions of Egyptian art had no other charm to the ancient Greeks than that of mere curiosities, and were reckoned by them at much the same value as we attach to Chinese articles. By thus eliminating the possibility of an Egyptian influence on early Greek art, the evidence of early Greek remains pointing to an Assyrian influence, meagre as it must be confessed to be, will derive additional weight. Much as it is desirable that this evidence, if real, should be strengthened, and, if only apparent, be dispelled, there appears to be no reasonable hope of reaching that, until ancient sites in Greece proper, like those of Orchomenos and Mykenae, have been systematically explored. In the meantime we must be thankful for what is being done in the way of excavations on sites of ancient towns outside the present kingdom of Greece, where zeal for archæological explorations is still permitted to be indulged.

Conclusively, however, as Brunn's theory appears to us to establish the antiquity of our texts of the Homeric poems, it would not be proper to take leave of the subject without a word in reference to a branch of the Homeric controversy, which of late has been the source of an animated discussion in this country. We refer to the Greek painted vases and the attempts that have been made to extract from them evidence bearing one way or the other on the antiquity of the texts. At the outset we must protest against such a proceeding as that of seeking to obtain reliable testimony on a purely Greek question from objects produced as the vases are, by far the greater part known to have been, for an Etruscan market. We would further protest against the principle of making the painted vases or any other class of Greek monuments answerable for the character of the higher literature current at the time at which they were made. On what grounds, for instance, must we assume the famous paintings of Polygnotos in the Lesche at Delphi to have purposely illustrated the great epic poems of his day on the subject of the Trojan war, seeing that in point of fact there was nothing to prevent the painter from reproducing every memorable incident connected with the war, while the poet, on the other hand, could only sustain his narrative by a judicious selection? And if the painter, in order to present a complete picture of his subject is

compelled to collect his facts from different sources, it cannot be surprising if he should give a different version of some of the scenes which he reproduces in common with the poet. But even granting that the great Homeric epics must always have exercised a paramount influence on artists, and that the paintings of Polygnotos were but illustrations of them as they existed in his time (B.C. 460), it would surely be most unaccountably strange if a compiler living after his time, and while the paintings were still to be seen, should ignore the very valuable assistance they would have afforded.

We have said that the painted vases which have been introduced into the controversy were principally made for the Etruscan market, and we have now further to add that the particular class of vases on which the discussion has mainly turned, those with black figures on a red ground, have since been declared to belong, not to the 5th or 6th century B.C., but to the 2nd and end of the 3rd century B.C. Considering that the dispute originated in, and depended altogether upon, the supposed early date of those vases, it ought to be allowed to drop unless the facts on which the new theory rests can be refuted. That theory was proposed about two years ago in a paper by Professor Brunn, full of laborious research. It has frequently since been subjected to serious and even hostile criticism, but as yet without being shaken in regard to the fundamental truths which it asserts. Under these circumstances it would perhaps be as well to leave the evidence of the vases out of the controversy.

ALEXANDER S. MURRAY.



ETHICAL TEACHING *versus* RELIGIOUS TEACHING IN THE NATIONAL SCHOOLS.

FEW will assent to the opinion recently expressed by Mr. Forster, that "the famous and terrible religious difficulty has disappeared." There are many signs, besides the speech of Mr. Bright the other day at Birmingham, that it is still one of the burning questions of the time, and will for long occupy the attention of statesmen. But there are many perhaps who will think that it is too late, or at least inopportune, to advance a plea in behalf of any form or modification of the Secular system. The religious, or combined basis, has now, it will be said, been accepted by the Legislature, and the whole interest of the public is in the meantime concentrated upon questions of detail in connection with the combined system, so that nothing is now thought of but the amendment, or reconstruction at furthest, of the existing Act ; and the public is impatient of any attempt to re-open the more general question of principle, which has already been so frequently discussed, and with so little result. Others, again, may say that any attempt of the kind is premature, inasmuch as the public is not yet prepared, by a sufficient experience of the impracticable nature of the combined system, to give a candid hearing to a plea on behalf of the Secular system. But neither of these preliminary objections to the present plea proceeds upon a fair representation of the state of public feeling. It is notorious that

the two most powerful sections of the Church are expressing more decidedly, every day, their entire dissatisfaction with the Board schools, and that there is a growing dissatisfaction on the part of Nonconformists with denominational schools. It is evident, besides, that the time is not far off, if it be not come already, when Nonconformists will see that the hopes which they built on Board schools are quite illusory. But in spite of all such views of the situation, I am induced to offer this plea to the public, because I am convinced that, sooner or later, the secular principle, pure and simple, or some modification of it, such as that for which I plead, must be laid as the basis of the National system; and that the sooner this is done the better.

While expressing such a conviction, I wish to disclaim all sympathy with extreme views, whether secular or voluntary. If, as was once the case, the entire nation were to all intents and purposes of one faith and of one way of thinking in matters of religion, that way and that faith would be taught in the common schools as a matter of course, just because it was national. The very idea of calling in question the propriety of giving religion a place in these schools could in that case hardly occur to men's minds. It would be impossible to conceive what interest or inducement the State or the Church could have to separate religious from secular teaching.

But all that is changed now that the greatest confusion and diversity have been introduced into the creeds and opinions of the people, creating embarrassment to legislators and encumbering the administration of any system which attempts to combine the two elements of instruction. The separate system is now a mere logical necessity of the situation—a means of escaping from difficulties otherwise insurmountable. Unless the country is satisfied to remain in a chronic state of worry and agitation, or to drift into a policy of equal and concurrent endowment of all the sects, secularization is inevitable.

That it is vain to look for a satisfactory solution of the difficulty in any modification of the combined system, has become the conviction of many minds during the interminable discussions to which the subject has given rise. But, experimentally, the same conclusion has been demonstrated during the last three years by the growing dissatisfaction of the country with the operation of the Act of 1870. And finally, the glaring inadequacy of the Amendment to remove the grounds of dissatisfaction has made it apparent that, within the limits prescribed to him by the combined system, Mr. Forster's political inventiveness is exhausted, and that in that direction nothing more is to be expected.

What the country objects to in the Act of 1870 is not this or that

provision by which the combined principle is brought into play; it is the principle itself against which the objection is levelled. Even of those who advocate the combined principle, there are probably few who have not by this time some suspicion that denominational schools are in conflict with the national sentiment, and that so-called "undenominational schools, with the Bible," are altogether chimerical; and that it is hopeless for a statesman to deal with such materials, in order by their means to build up a truly National system. The Amendment Act was all that was needed to make more plain what, to those who had eyes to see, was plain enough before—that, to use Mr. Bright's expression, we are not yet on the right track, and that the Education difficulty can only be overcome by reconstructing the National system and placing it on an entirely new basis—that is, the separate, or secular basis.

But while I thus regard secularization as a logical necessity—a measure indispensable to the solution of the difficulty—I do not regard it, as it is commonly understood, to be a complete solution. If the common schools were merely secularized and the religious element handed over to the care of voluntary effort, many existing difficulties would be removed, but only at the risk of incurring a new and greater danger—the loss, I mean, of all security for the general training of the young in morality and religion. We have, therefore, to inquire whether some such security can be provided under the Secular system, or what is the nearest approximation to such a security of which that system admits. With the exception of Secularists, properly so-called, who regard religion as a fetter to the intellect and positively injurious to society, all men believe that the State has a direct interest in this matter. And I shall endeavour to point out an arrangement by which, under the Secular system, the State may obtain the security in question, and by which the Churches may possibly be reconciled to that system. I do not profess to ventilate any novel idea, but merely to develop an idea which has, I believe, occurred to many minds, and only not been prominently brought forward because, at first sight, it seems to offend against common prejudices.

By the proposed arrangement, the separate, or secular principle will be assumed as the basis of the National system; but, with the view of at once removing the popular objection to that basis and of providing the required security, the moral element of instruction will be retained in the common schools, and—with the alternative of separate religious instruction in the schools of the sects—taught compulsorily, as afterwards to be explained.

There are few, I think, who have followed the course of the lengthened discussions on the subject of national education, but must

between morality and religion is such, that the former may even be regarded as the content of the latter; the connection may be so close that the chief worth and office of religion may be to enforce morality and to *bind* it upon the soul; yet morality may be taught separately from it.

Let it be remarked, in passing, that it is one thing to say that morality may be taught separately from religion, and quite another thing to say that religion may be taught separately from morality. Nothing could be more mischievous than to inculcate devotion apart from morality, religion apart from self-restraint and benevolence. But in all ages these moral qualities have been exemplified in men who have had no recognized form of religion. The faculty of conscience by which man recognizes moral distinctions binds him to their observance and constitutes him a moral agent. Religion, it is true, lends a superadded sanction to morality; it teaches us to regard conscience as a revelation of the will of a power which is not ourselves,—as the consciousness of a destination impressed upon us, or of an ideal not yet realized in us. But it is of the very essence of conscience to speak with an authority all its own. The feeling of moral obligation may be engrafted on the fear of God, but it is rooted in our rational nature, and is as primary and underived as the feeling of the unseen itself. To rest that obligation on any extraneous authority, however high and sacred, cannot but be dangerous to the best interests of humanity. And men ought to be taught that, even if the claims of religion and the existence of God were doubtful, moral obligations would remain certain and imperative; that though religion extends the sphere of obligation and gives it a new sanction, the original sanction and basis lie in our own moral and spiritual nature. For this end there may be an advantage in having morality taught independently of religion, from the secular and scientific point of view, as well as conjointly with, and in relation to, the doctrines of religion.

If we turn from the basis of morality to its details or contents, we may perceive yet another reason for saying that there may be an advantage in treating it in common schools as a distinct branch. The ethical instruction that may be logically drawn from Christianity or its records is neither systematic nor complete, and cannot be held to render the separate and more methodical treatment of ethics superfluous. In Scripture there is no complete enumeration or system of moral duties, nor anything approaching to it. It is, I suppose, universally admitted that there are questions "on which men require moral guidance on which Scripture has left us no direction whatever" (*Ecce Homo*)—a circumstance which may be due to the unmethodical and occasional character of the canonical

writings, or to a certain one-sidedness inseparable from a presentation of morality from a too exclusively religious point of view. But whatever be the explanation, of the fact there can be no doubt. And therefore it is for the secular teacher to give to the child an outline, however faint and abbreviated, of the complete round of human duty; to teach him, for example, that the discipline of life is not wholly of an ascetic form, and that there is a time to assert, as well as a time to deny self; to state to him in temperate language what, owing to the oriental rhetoric of the sacred writings, is apt to be understood in a too absolute and rigoristic sense; and, above all, to fence from encroachment on the religious side that neutral space, or section of life, to which the categories of right and wrong do not apply, and within which our liberty consists, not as in the moral sphere, in obedience to a universal, unconditioned rule, but in the cultivation and free development of individual character and faculty.

Certainly the removal from the common school of ethical instruction conjointly with religious, is a condition which, until it can be shown to be necessary, the State would do well not to admit into the deed of separation between the secular and religious. It is evident that the moral lesson has its place in the secular as well as in the religious sphere; and it is in the field of morals that these two may be said to cross and overlap. The State has at least as much interest in the moral education of its citizens as the Churches in that of their members. And if it be doubtful whether it be competent or expedient for the State to apply the compulsory principle to *religious* instruction, there can be no manner of doubt that it has a perfect right to insist on the *moral* instruction of the young.

The State can only expect every man to do his duty to itself and to its citizens if it provide instruction as to what that duty is. In any plan of national education, therefore, the children must be instructed in their duties to each other as members of society, and in the common requirements of law and order. These plain and practical requirements are, as I have said, generally understood to be taught in connection with religion and under its sanction. But, in the case supposed, when religion is removed from the elementary schools, the State must still have some security that these principles shall be inculcated on the pliant and docile mind of the rising generation. And what security can be equal to that of retaining the moral or ethical lesson as an integral and essential part of the common school course?

To make the ethical lesson in the common school compulsory, like the other secular lessons, would be the most natural arrangement;

for, as I have said, the State has an indisputable right to enforce the moral instruction of all who are placed under its protection, and so to apply a remedy or preventive to that brutal ignorance of moral and social duties which is at once a menace and a nuisance to the community. Were such an arrangement to meet with general acceptance, the State might dispense with any further security of the kind I have spoken of, and the Churches might be left to extend the benefits of religious instruction as they best could. But though this would be the most natural and obvious arrangement, it is one to which the Churches would have a powerful dislike. If, in their desire to retain all knowledge as the handmaid of religion, they view with suspicion the severance from religion of such secular branches as writing and arithmetic, much more will this be their feeling with regard to a severance of morality from religion. By the *sects*, the connection between the latter two is deemed to be so close as to be indissoluble; and the almost universal sentiment is, that there can be no sound morality disjoined from religion. Probably the objection on their part to a severance is all but insuperable; and therefore at this point it is necessary that the State should submit to a compromise with the Churches, in order that it may not seem to set up the school as a rival or hostile institution.

The nature of this compromise is, I think, obvious—viz., that the attendance of the children at the ethical lesson should be compulsory indeed, but compulsory under a limitation. It should be obligatory that the children should be taught morals, but optional whether that teaching be obtained in the common schools or in the Church schools. In other words, a certificate of attendance on religious instruction in the latter should be accepted as a dispensation from the ethical class in the former. By this provision it is not implied that religious knowledge may serve in place of moral instruction; but only that the latter is generally understood to be comprehended by the other, and may either be imparted separately or in conjunction with it. It is also implied that the morality taught by all the sects is to all intents and purposes the same, and may be accepted by the nation in lieu of that which would be taught in the common schools. But to this last point we shall again return.

Without denying, then, that morality is closely and peculiarly connected with religion, I maintain that it is also an indispensable part of secular instruction. I would not be understood to deny that religion is able to give a higher consecration and sanction to morality; to raise it above the level of mere legality; to disclose heights and depths of our moral nature otherwise unapproached and undiscovered; or, to use the latest form of expressing the relation, to "touch morality with an emotion" derived from the sense of the

Infinite, which the mere ethical element can never awaken. All I say is, that there is a moral sphere, independent both of religious and external revelation, to which its just place must be assigned in secular instruction. The State may leave the Churches to give to the children of their communion, what higher views of morality, in connection with religion, they may deem necessary. But it is competent for the State to take order, that no child shall be sent forth, or let loose upon society, without some elementary knowledge of the plain and prosaic duties which he owes to his fellows. And for this purpose, the State must provide instruction in such duties, which shall be compulsory on all, except those who prefer to receive such instruction in conjunction with religious teaching.

According to this arrangement, there is no compulsion, direct or indirect, upon any parent to send his child to the schools of the Churches. But if a parent, for any reason, does not wish to have his children taught morality in the common schools apart from religion, this arrangement gives him the alternative of sending his children to the Church schools, in which religion and morality are taught in conjunction.

Since writing the above, my attention has been called to Professor F. W. Newman's paper, "On the right Curriculum for National Schools." In that paper he observes, without however stating distinctly what application he proposes to make of his observation, that "morals of necessity come earlier in time than spiritual religion, and that goodness must be loved for its own sake before we can love God for the goodness ascribed to him." Now, if he means by this, that while morality may be taught in the common schools, it would be premature to teach religion to the children during their attendance at such schools, I imagine that few, even of those who advocate the secular system, will follow him in such a view. The opinion of most men is, that morality and religion should be taught *pari passu*. The foundations of both are laid deep in the nature of man: and the minds of children are as early opened to religious as to moral impressions. The minds of the young should, therefore, be early familiarized with the idea of God, and taught to regard him as incorporating their highest conceptions of goodness. At all events, we have only to attempt what is practicable, and we know that the great mass of the people insist upon the religious training of the young being early begun: they regard the Bible as the source both of morality and of religion, and do not wish them to be disjointed. What I say therefore is, not that they *ought* to be taught separately, but that they *may* be taught separately, by way of compassing a great object. And I also say, that morality is only to be taught in the common schools, alternatively with religion in the schools of the

Churches. For whatever may be the opinion of this person or that, it is plain, that to make moral instruction compulsory without such an alternative, would constitute a new grievance for Roman Catholics and others to complain of in the Secular system.

The choice, which the proposed system would offer to every parent, cannot be objected to as being without precedent, or on the ground of involving any new principle in the administration of the National system. The alternative principle cannot be described as an innovation: nor is it adopted merely to meet this particular case. It is recognized as of universal application by the Act of 1870: and is a feature in fact which is necessary to bring that or any other Education Act into accordance with the idea of individual liberty. Any parent may entirely withdraw his children from the common schools, provided he can give satisfactory proof that he is educating them by some other agency. And this is all that is here stipulated for in regard to ethical instruction. It is stipulated that children, who receive moral and religious instruction elsewhere, shall have a claim for dispensation from attendance at the ethical lesson in the common school.

I am not unaware of the crowd of objections which will start up to the proposal of a secular and non-clerical, or non-religious teaching of ethics in the common schools. To many it will seem to savour of ignorance or presumption, to make such a proposal. To make it now above all may be thought inopportune, when we have just witnessed the example of an illustrious statesman judging it wise, even though it were only as a concession to sectarian jealousy, to pursue a course the very reverse, in proposing to exclude ethical science from the curriculum of the Irish University. But the lesson of that instance is capable of a twofold rendering. If Mr. Gladstone is a sagacious and successful statesman, widely appreciative in general of the tendencies of the age, and whose policy it is prudent to study and to imitate: it is no less true, that in this particular instance, his instincts misled him, and his determining motive was out of harmony with the national sentiment, which refused to extrude so vital an element of human culture from the supreme educational institute of a division of the empire. If, therefore, the general wisdom and insight of his measures constitutes them lessons for guidance, so may his particular failure be all the more significant as a warning. Besides, I would here submit, that whatever may be the objections, real or imaginary, to moral science in a mixed university, such objections do not apply to the teaching of practical, or if any one prefer the term, of empirical ethics, as adapted to the minds of children.

In such ethical teaching as is adapted to an elementary school,

there would be no occasion to stir up questions as to the genesis of our moral ideas, or as to the collision of duties. Such questions come up inevitably in the scientific treatment of morality; but the emergence of such questions forms a critical epoch even for the mature intellect: and, presented to the immature mind of a child, such questions would have an altogether pernicious effect, even if they could in any measure be apprehended by it. In an elementary school, therefore, there is room only for those maxims of universal application, which may be regarded either as utterances of the universal moral instinct, or as integrations of human experience for thousands of years: and which remain valid and invariable under all systems of thought, and revolutions of religious opinion. Almost all ethical questions, if pursued, lead up to theology, metaphysics, and casuistry, which are regions of mist and doubt. But such regions need never be entered in the teaching of such plain moral rules as are fitted for the juvenile mind. Such teaching has its range within a field, which is sacred from the intrusion of speculation and casuistry. In fact, it is a differentiating feature between ethics and theology, that, in the former there is, and in the latter there is not, a common and undebatable ground. You cannot advance a step in theology without encountering oppositions of science and variations of doctrine: and if you agree with one sect, you necessarily give offence to another. But in practical ethics there is a large field, in which it requires an exercise of ingenuity to find anything that will give offence even to the most sensitive and jealous of the sects.

I confess, I should not like to make such a statement, subject only to the judgment of a man like John Henry Newman. With his fatal command of dialectic resource, he would prove to demonstration, that a Catholic child stands on a quite different level of moral thought from a Protestant child, and that a fundamental distinction pervades their whole stock of moral ideas. But the world is not ruled in the long run by dialectic subtleties: it leaves behind, or throws aside systems the most impregnable in their logical consistency, just because they have ceased to satisfy the truth-sense of mankind. And I shall, therefore, appeal for the truth of my position to the judgment of moderate men of all sects and parties. There is, I assert, such an identity of moral sentiment between Catholics and Protestants, especially of the educated classes, that they can "associate in every walk of common life," and co-operate in all its affairs. An honourable and virtuous Roman Catholic does not differ in his conduct and sentiments from an honourable and virtuous Protestant. The difference between them is not so material as between the tone and manners of well-bred men of different professions and occupations. The rules by which they are guided in their relations to each other

are the same—the common rules, I mean, of virtuous conduct, without any metaphysical substratum, or casuistic subtlety: and these may be taught in the ethical class of the elementary school.

The metaphysics, and the casuistry, and I may add, the theology, which play a part in the scientific treatment of ethics may vary from age to age: but the moral laws, which are understood to regulate our relations to our fellow-men, remain substantially the same in all ages and in all the sects. What is true of the hidden life and devotional utterances even of those Christian sects, which seem to stand furthest apart from each other—of their spiritual experience, and their expression of it in hymns and prayers—that they are the same for all, holds still more of the plain and common rules on which they form their daily lives. If there be counsels of perfection, maxims of a higher expediency, rules peculiar to the ascetic and spiritual life, they are neither of universal obligation, nor intelligible to children, and not being fitted for the common school, they may be handed over, along with religion, to the inculcation of the sects.

I have in the immediately preceding remarks, anticipated objections which are likely to proceed from the Roman Catholic Church; for it is patent to the world, that it is that Church which takes the lead in obstructing the realization of the idea of a National system: and that the Reformed Churches do but ignominiously follow her lead in this matter.*

But it may be hoped, that the offence which even Roman Catholics may take at the teaching of ethics in the secular schools, may not be insuperable. In reason it can hardly be so, if they consider, that according to the proposal here made, no Roman Catholic child in any large town, or in any locality where there is a Roman Catholic school, need be under the necessity of attending the ethical class in the common school. At the most, the hardship or grievance would be confined to villages and country places, where

* I suffer these words to remain, though not quite sure of their correctness. Modern Protestantism is so untrue to the principles of the Reformation, that one is almost tempted to think that the spirit of exclusiveness and intolerance which was never perfectly cast out, has again returned with sevenfold fury to the empty house. In Ireland, it was the Protestant sects which took the lead in breaking down the original liberal platform of the Irish National School System. Dr. Rigg's account of this is very instructive. "The National System was," he says, "opposed from the first by Presbyterians, Episcopalians, and Wesleyans, because of its unsectarian character, and its broad indifference to dogmatic and ecclesiastical distinction, while the Roman Catholic denomination continued to support it for a dozen years longer." The account which Dr. Rigg gives of the change which came over the Roman Catholics towards the National System is also well worth attention. There may be sound reasons for regarding unsectarian teaching of religion as a mere chimera, which can never form an element in solving the difficulty. But the Irish Protestant objection to it rested not on rational, but on sectarian grounds: and so long as Roman Catholics were satisfied, it was surely not for Protestants to take offence.

no provision was made for the religious instruction of Roman Catholics.

One thing has to be specially noted : that the alternative which is here offered out of consideration for the scruples with which the Churches may regard the ethical teaching in the secular schools, is not open to objections which are usually made to the Conscience Clause in denominational schools. That alternative would not operate as this clause would, in keeping the idea of sectarian differences before the minds of the children, and in dividing them into classes—"the greatest misfortune," it was once said by an eminent Catholic layman of a former generation, "which can overtake a nation." The probability even is, that many parents would avail themselves both of the ethical lesson in the common schools, and of the religious instruction in the separate schools. Cases might even occur, in which good Churchmen might prefer to send their children to the ethical class, rather than to the separate religious school. If parents in any of the communions objected to the quality and tone of the religious teaching, they might take advantage of the alternative ethical class. And it would come to pass, from the occasional occurrence of such cases, that the children would not be marked off, or stigmatized, according as they did or did not attend the class in question. Children of all communions, as well as children of no communion, would be found sitting side by side, and the class would be a mixed one.

By their very nature, ethics are undenominational ; of no sect, and of no party. Even if we concede that they branch out in their extreme deductions into denominational forms : yet in root and branch they are a common heritage of humanity, and there is a moral community among all the sects. It would be little less for the common man, or even for any man, though he were but indifferently grounded in questions of casuistry, or wholly ignorant of the rules of the ascetic life, provided he had been early taught to do justly and to love mercy ; and it is all but superfluous to say, that the plain rules of practical morality are, equally with reading, writing, and arithmetic, adapted to a common school, and of even more essential importance to the well-being of the community. A man may serve his generation, in a humble and limited way, it is true, though he can neither use a book nor a pen ; but he must prove an unmitigated pest, if he is not alive to the evils of inhumanity and falsehood.

There is one very powerful argument in favour of this proposal to solve the Education Difficulty by means of an ethical class in the common schools, with an alternative as explained—powerful at least with those who are discontented at once with the Denominational

system and with the purely Secular system, and who, therefore, advocate an intermediate system of undenominational or undogmatic teaching—and that is, that the ethical lesson is probably the nearest approach to the only undenominational teaching which is possible in a mixed school.

If by way of removing all ground of complaint and offence we eliminate from the teaching of Christianity all debatable matter concerning which the sects take different views, there remains little to be communicated in the name of religion, except the more plain and obvious principles of morality, which are common to all forms whatever of religion, together with the doctrine of individual responsibility, and the idea of an Unseen Power, whose sovereign action our conduct must either harmonize with and subserve, to the happiness of ourselves and others, or vainly conflict with, it may be, to the injury of others, certainly to our own infinite damage.

Now unless what is meant by undenominational teaching of religion is reduced somewhat to this form, it will contain elements productive of offence to many of the sects, and on the other hand, if reduced to this residuum, it will, if not offensive to all, yet not be accepted by any as standing for religious instruction, excepting, it may be, by Unitarians, and the more negative sects generally.

Now I contend that the residuum which is thus left for perfectly undenominational teaching of religion does not substantially differ from the ground which may be claimed for moral teaching. The doctrine, that what a man sows, that shall he also reap, is absolute and irrespective, belonging to the secular sphere as much as to the religious, to the present as well as to the future state; and the other idea, that there is an Unseen Power which acts through that law of human life, and holds us to our responsibility, is not a doctrine exclusively of external revelation, but primarily a suggestion of our moral instincts. The *religious* instinct may postulate a subject in which that Power resides or inheres: but the veriest Moralist, pure and simple, does not question the existence of such a power, even though he may deny that it can be defined or verified otherwise than as "a stream of tendency by which all things fulfil the law of their being."

It must here be borne in mind—that all the more positive sects, object to that religious teaching which is vague, indefinite and defective, as much as to that which is positively erroneous. In fact, the former is regarded as the more dangerous to faith and morals, just because of its very plausibility and the readiness with which it blends or is confounded with the orthodox doctrine. It is of no use, therefore, to palm off any so-called undogmatic teaching upon the sects, by way of an Eirenikon, in attempting to supply the religious

element in education. The historical portions of the Old and New Testaments are interesting and suggestive of many valuable moral lessons: and the literature is, of its kind, transcendent: but apart from the dogma, neither the one, nor the other supplies the desideratum of religious instruction, as understood by the sects.

Far better, therefore, to confine the teaching of the common schools within its proper limits:—"within the limits of things received in common, and useful for the common purposes of life:"—and, instead of incorporating in the National system a denominational teaching of religion, which conflicts with the conception of these schools, and an undenominational teaching, which is a mere chimera, to be satisfied with an ethical teaching which is what it professes to be: which does not profess to occupy the place of religious teaching, and which will be compulsory only in the case of those, who have either no separate religious teaching provided for them, or such a teaching only as they do not choose to accept.

Two positions have now been established. First, that there is no practical difficulty in teaching morality apart from religion, such as there certainly is in teaching religion apart from Dogma. And secondly, that the ordinary universal principles of worldly and social morality, being the same for all men, may be taught in a mixed class to Catholics and Protestants, and all other religionists. And by way of soothing the alarms of sensitive minds, it is provided in the proposal here made, that morality shall be taught thus, only to those for whom lessons in religion and morality are not supplied by the sects. As a matter of course, the dominant and more exclusive sects will not accept of the system here proposed, guarded though it be, if they can help it. But let the culture, and common sense, and liberal thought, and moderate sentiment of the country, unite in brushing aside such fastidious religiosity: let the country hold this language to the sects, "You are all welcome to educate the children in your own way, provided you bring them up to a certain standard in secular instruction. But if you do not, the State will educate them in its secular way, and leave you to supplement its teaching as you see fit." If the State depart from this position, and make concessions to denominational scruples, it will involve itself in a sea of difficulty, compromise the principle of religious equality, and create grievances without end.

It would be easy to demonstrate that the chimerical character of so-called unsectarian, or undenominational teaching cannot be remedied by leaving its administration to the discretion of the teachers, as has been proposed; and, if such a plan as is here suggested, were adopted, I believe it would be highly inadvisable to entrust the ethical lesson, more than is absolutely necessary, to the teacher's judgment. We

cannot calculate, that the teachers of elementary schools will be superior to sectarian considerations, or possessed of qualifications requisite to observe the limit of moral teaching, and to avoid doubtful, that is foreign and outlying topics. Above all things, therefore, it would be necessary, for the due administration of such a plan as that now chalked out, that there should be a manual of elementary ethics put into the hands of the teacher: a code of those ethical rules and principles, which are an heirloom of humanity, and accepted by every civilized community—catholic in the true sense of the word, exclusive of everything of doubtful validity or of less general worth:—drawn up by the most competent men in the kingdom: representative of every shade of opinion, and sanctioned by public authority. It should matter little whence these rules have been derived, provided the universal conscience has endorsed them: and they have passed into universal credit, and found a place in the canon of human thought. A common manual of *religion* is plainly out of the question. A common manual of *elementary ethics* postulates nothing, I believe, for its compilation, but a spirit of good will on the part of the Churches to the interests of national education and morality. And if this be too much to expect from that quarter, it is well that the nation should know it.

Such a manual should confine itself within an area not vexed by religious contentions, and break off at the point where such contentions begin. I have already said that, whatever be the inter-relation of morality and religion, there is a common ground in the former, on which all the Churches (taking that term in the widest sense) may meet in peace. If there be rules and counsels of a higher order than would find a place in such a manual, they are not for the common life of man, with which we are here concerned; but for that spiritual life, which draws its nutriment from religion. A lie is a lie all the world over; and it is only for such common virtues as truth and honesty, that a place would be claimed in the manual described. If in the opinion of any there be such a thing as a pious fraud, or cases in which the end justifies the means, such exceptions to the plainer and more comprehensive rules may be left to the teaching of the Church, or of the University. Whether truthfulness be an unconditional imperative, or whether there be a right or duty to lie, or make an untrue statement in certain extreme cases, in which humanity may thereby be served, or crime prevented or danger averted—whether expediency, must in every case conform to right or right may in some cases conform to expediency; such determinations are of secondary, if not of questionable value, and are fitter to form subjects of controversy between a Kant and a Constant, than to find a place in the instruction of children. For such a pur-

pose it would be enough to place the several duties side by side, without entering into questions as to their collision, and order of obligation, which to the casuist and scientific moralist are a fruitful and important topic. The common, universal, personal, and social duties which "to the sorrowful experience of mankind" are, in a certain sense, the most uncommon, together with the doctrine of individual responsibility, and that other doctrine of an Unseen Power which presides over all, are, as I have pointed out, what the manual should include. These are subjects as needful for the conduct of the present life, and for the prosperity of States, as for the hope of a life to come.

Such a manual would lead up to religion, or place the children in its vestibule, but take them no further. If religion be, as is commonly reported, the basis of morality, it would be enough for the manual to indicate that fact in general, but not to enter or explore the domain of religion. Morality would thus be presented as resting upon that hidden basis, just as the ancient obelisk rested upon its platform of solid masonry, which appeared above the surface of the soil, but was not fully exposed to view, nor laid bare to the eye. The substructure was seen to be there, and to form for the monolith a foundation firmer than the surrounding sand, though its dimensions could not be measured nor its structure examined. Such a manual as I have described would bring the children face to face with mystery, but would make no excursion into that region. It could not specialize even the primary doctrine of religion without stirring contention, and broaching subjects of controversy which have never been settled, and without offence to sectarian susceptibilities on one side or the other. To indoctrinate the minds of the young in such subjects is a prerogative reserved for the separate teaching of the sects.

At the risk of touching upon details, which are out of place in this paper, I may here state that such a manual should inculcate the obligation which is laid upon every rational being of ascertaining and respecting so far as is in his power, not merely the moral law, but also the more simple and patent of those physical and psychological laws, which are God's ordinances, and on the observance of which our being and our well-being so much depend. It is time that men were early trained to feel that the observance of such laws is part of their moral and religious discipline. Every child should be instructed in the duty of paying heed to his own constitution and to that of the system of things of which he is a part; he should be impressed with the dignity of labour both mental and physical, and with the necessity of the diligent improvement of his rational faculties. He should, in short, be made to understand that moral

obligation encompasses and pervades the whole life, and that there are penalties for ignorance and imprudence, for inconsiderateness and want of reflection, hardly less than for crime and vice—a far-reaching thought which Butler and other moralists have thought worthy of special remark.

I am fully alive to the difficulty involved in the compilation of such a manual. But what I say is that, while the compilation of a manual of *religious* instruction for common schools is by the very nature of the thing itself impossible, the difficulties, on the other hand, however great, in the case of an *ethical* manual, are extraneous and accidental, and may all be got over, provided only the sects bring a spirit of goodwill to the attempt. If, indeed, the proposal of united education is met by hostility on the very threshold; if the sects make a point of deepening and perpetuating the lines which separate them from each other; if they view with jealousy every attempt to smooth down differences, and to extend the field of common action; if it be their object to keep society ranged in hostile camps, then, indeed, I acknowledge that the idea here propounded is utterly futile. But if such be the case; if society is thus to be divided for ever against itself; if a condition of things is to be maintained which is at variance with any higher advance of civilization, of what earthly use is it to improve our systems of education? Why not let our educational institutions remain on their former footing? Why not be content with the imperfect methods and partial results of the past? Why not give up at once the idea of the advancement of learning and confess the whole movement to be a sham?

If the country can only perfect its national system by lending itself to sectarian interests—by enlisting the services of that most embarrassing, exacting, and self-regarding ally, religious zeal—by paying studious deference to conflicting sectarian susceptibilities, and thus stamping these interests and susceptibilities with a sort of national authority and significance—this, to me at least, is such a damning drawback to any system, however perfect otherwise, that I, for one, would almost prefer to see the country withdraw the grants, abolish the rates, and revert once more to the old system with all its imperfections. If I hesitate to express such a wish, it is because there is a faint hope that, under the modifying influences of time, the present system may pave the way to a better system, in which, to use Mr. Morley's words, "the improvement of the intellectual resources of the people" will be the primary aim, instead of being kept secondary to sectarian purposes. And yet how faint that hope, if it be considered, that the sects have their hands upon the system, and have no intention to let go their hold upon it sooner than they can help.

It will be said by those who speak in the name of the churches,

and who take their stand on revelation, that such ethical teaching as is here pleaded for, is meagre and defective, and may be injurious to the interests of true morality, by reason of its scanty recognition of religion. But to such an objection there are several replies.

The treatment of morality in elementary schools cannot be exhaustive, both because it is intended for mere children, and because it is necessarily confined to duties which unite all suffrages ; but yet it may furnish a valuable provision, or, may I call it, viaticum, for that journey of life on which the children are preparing to enter. Were the plain and common principles of morality deeply impressed upon the juvenile mind, a firm foundation would thus be laid for all further moral and religious instruction ; and a test would be supplied to the young, which, in after life, they could apply to all high flown and doubtful speculations—too often misleading to men just for want of a few elementary principles.

I admit that the mere knowledge of duty is not everything, and that it does not secure the performance of duty until, again to use the language of the latest philosophy, it is reinforced by that impulse which is supplied by a touch of emotion. But, for that matter, even the mere knowledge of *religion* does not afford such a security. And after all the long experience which men have had of the motives which act on human conduct and control men's lives, it is questionable whether the knowledge of duty, the categorical imperative, be not the most permanently persuasive and effectually operative of all ; whether the sacred sense of right in the breast be not the highest authority to which appeal can be made ; whether, in fact, it be not that to which Scripture and revelation itself must ultimately appeal. The additional motives which revelation brings to bear upon us through the hopes, the fears, and the sympathies of our nature, can never supersede this ; perhaps even as they are necessarily refracted through our imperfect intelligence they may not add so much to it, as we are often told they do ; possibly, in the case of many of us, they may subtract quite as often as they add.

The relation subsisting between morality and religion is a subject which has given rise to much discussion, into which, as I have already said, it is not necessary that I should enter. Let me take this opportunity, however, to say that it was only in accommodation to popular usage that I spoke formerly of religion as the basis of morality, and compared it to the pedestal of the obelisk. It would, I think, be more in accordance with the actual relations of things to say that morality is the foundation of religion, and the more comprehensive of the two. This is implied in Mr. Arnold's definition of religion as morality touched by emotion ; and it is also implied when we regard religion as the form and character impressed upon morality

by the intuition of those relations which we occupy to the super-sensible world. But it is also implied less doubtfully, perhaps, in the admission, which is winning its way to men's minds, that the Divine claim on our love and reverence rests solely on the Divine goodness; that these affections are due to the Divine Being, only because His character is assumed to correspond with our ethical ideal; and that it is our moral nature which *binds* us to recognise and to imitate His goodness. That view of the relation, however, which seems best to meet the facts of the case is, that while morality and religion converse with different objects, or different aspects of the same object, they both spring from the same inner base, and lend mutual support to each other. And nothing is more certain, whatever view we take, than that if the plain and sober principle of morality be lost sight of, the greater lights of religion and revelation can never supply their place, or lead to anything better than those "morbid sentimentalities," which, in popular estimation, too often pass for religion.

Ethical instruction is so important, then, in itself and in its bearing on religion, that it would ill become anyone to undervalue it; and perhaps it would be difficult to overrate the influence which it is likely to exert upon the conduct and well-being of the community, if it were systematically taught in the common schools, as it has hardly yet been. In any case, the Churches have no right to complain of such instruction, for I maintain that, even if it be not all that is desirable, it has yet grown to be an absolute necessity, owing partly to the dissensions and jealousies of the Churches, which render *religious* instruction in mixed schools impossible, and partly to the nature of Christianity itself, which has given occasion to doctrinal differences and oppositions of opinion on all subjects, that lie beyond the plain and simple rules of ordinary human conduct.

Further, the Churches have no ground of complaint against such instruction, because, as I have already pointed out, according to the proposed arrangements, that instruction is not intended to interfere with the teaching of it by the Churches. It is not meant for children who belong to any Christian communion, or for those over whom the Churches yet retain a hold, except when their parents desire it; but for such only as have broken from ecclesiastical influence, and are of no Church. It is simply a provision, that those who have thrown off allegiance to the Churches, from whatever cause, may not be wholly uncared for as to their moral training—a provision which the State, for its own sake, is bound to make, and which, though it may not be the best of its kind, is yet better than nothing. Or are there Churchmen and Religionists amongst us so inhumanly ecclesiastical that they would rather have our arabs and

outcasts grow up in ignorance of morality than that they should derive their knowledge of it from a secular source? He would be a bold man who should dare to acknowledge such a sentiment. I know that when the ecclesiastical and dogmatic spirit takes possession of a man, he is apt to be indifferent to those means of ameliorating human life, which are not of a technically religious origin. But I think that moderate and reasonable men of all sects will have little sympathy with the spirit which such a sentiment breathes.

It would, then, not be creditable to the Churches to object to such a teaching of morality in the common schools, taken in conjunction with the proposed alternative. Rather let there be a peaceful rivalry between the Church schools and the common schools: that it may become apparent whether the morality which the Church inculcates, or the morality which the State inculcates, be the more efficacious; whether the Churches can teach the children committed to their care to do more, and to be better, than those who have nothing but the ethical instruction in the common schools. For this, I think, would be a more practicable test and touchstone of the power and efficacy of religion as administered by our Churches, and more capable of verification than that gauge of which we recently heard so much. And I cannot help thinking, too, that if such ethical teaching were pretty widely diffused, it would act beneficially on the Churches themselves by affording a much-needed corrective both to that form of Antinomianism which is peculiar to no Church, but common to all, of overvaluing the forms of technical religion—the tendency to regard these forms as ends rather than as means of the Christian life; and also that form of it which consists in laying exaggerated stress on faith and doctrine, and forgetting the necessity of the outward manifestation of religion in life and practice.

I remember here that the *Spectator* some time ago expressed a fear that the separation of secular from religious teaching—the handing over the latter to a separate jurisdiction—may operate in the direction of a mischievous divorce of religion from life. And I think I can at this stage answer such an objection better than I could have done previously, when perhaps I might have been expected to notice it. Leaving out of consideration that, under the operation of the Time Table, the separation of the two branches is as complete in the Denominational as in the Secular system, I yet venture to think that the *Spectator's* objector does not show his usual insight. If the divorce he speaks of may result from any special mode of teaching religion, as distinct from the truth itself which is taught, I think that it is very likely to result from that mode of combining religious with secular instruction in undenominational schools, of which the *Spectator* is an advocate. Much more likely indeed than from a separate administration of the two branches; for in this

case it is a mere local or mechanical separation, which will not intercept the spiritual union of the two factors in the child's mind; whereas the undogmatic teaching of religion by means of an eminently dogmatic book can only be carried on by placing the intellect under arrest, and by discouraging the child from following out the statements of Scripture to a definite conclusion; and so preparing the divorce of religion from the life, by first divorcing it from the intellect.

But it seems to me that the best security against that evil which the *Spectator* apprehends may be obtained just by giving due prominence to the moral element of instruction; and moreover, seeing that the ministers of religion, and ecclesiastical agencies in general are apt to sink the moral element in the religious, it seems to me further, that a system by which moral instruction will have a distinct and independent place assigned to it in the public schools, is the very thing to correct that baneful tendency.

It would be a gross misapprehension of my meaning to suppose that I undervalue religious teaching, or that, in the spirit which is alleged against the moderate party of the last century, I am willing to sacrifice the higher spiritual truths of religion, and to substitute for them the lessons of a cold and formal morality. My suggestion is conceived in the interests alike of religion and morality. My object is to conserve these interests by the alternative proposed. I would exclude religion from the common schools, simply because, if the idea of a common school is to be carried out, the exclusion of religion is an absolute necessity—an inevitable consequence of our religious divisions; and to refuse to accept of this consequence is to embroil the whole work of primary education in endless confusion.

The position now defined is, I believe, the only position at which the country can stop, short of pure secularism, and the only true rallying point for Liberals and Nonconformists in the struggle for National education.

The future of the common school is pre-eminently an imperial question—a question of equal moment for all the three divisions of the empire. The English Liberal may have his enthusiasm raised by the feeling that he is now engaged in a struggle for a common cause; and in such a cause an Irishman or a Scotchman, though to some extent an outsider, may range himself with his English brethren, and speak as one of themselves. He may turn hopefully to England as the true battle-field on which the cause of secular education is to be fought and won. The overwhelming predominance of Presbyterianism in Scotland, and of Romanism in Ireland, leaves little room to hope for a favourable result, so far as the issue is taken in either of these sections of the kingdom separately. But in England the balance of parties is such that, if the Liberal party

have but a basis on which it can unite, the cause of secular education may be carried ; and there is little doubt that the good cause, if carried in England, will ultimately triumph in the sister kingdom.

The country may, I think, look to the Church of England, famed as she is for national spirit and for moderation, to take the principal part in inaugurating some such system as that now proposed. It would be a splendid proof of self-abnegation were she to initiate such a system. At the same time, there is no doubt that Non-conformists will soon be unanimous in their demand for the separate system ; and the Church of England will not be able much longer to withhold her consent. Even if she had the political influence necessary to maintain her opposition, she would be in the unenviable situation of standing alone in obstructing a great and truly National system ; and her attitude could not but be regarded as an interested one, dictated by a desire to retain the school system as an engine which could be turned to account for ecclesiastical purposes, and for the augmentation of her prestige. Anything more fatal to her influence could not well be imagined. The bold and generous course would be the safe course for her. Better far to obey the generous impulse, which cannot but be stirring in the minds of many of her members, to make a noble sacrifice for the common good, and to deserve well of the country, than to turn away in sorrow from the inward monitor, because of her great possessions.

Were the Church of England magnanimously to give up all she may hope to gain from her insecure hold of the National schools, she would thereby furnish material for the brightest page of her history ; she would do more than all she has yet done to establish her ascendancy over the national mind, and to prove that she is worthy of her commanding position. She would show to an unbelieving world that her charity begins at home ; that she prefers national to sectarian objects ; and that she has the faith and the courage to rest her claims to a nation's confidence upon the inherent adaptation of her system to the needs and feelings of the people.

Were England, under the guidance of the National Church, to take the lead in the establishment of some such truly National system of education, the other divisions of the empire would soon follow her example. Were Ireland to suffer her schools to remain under priestly domination, she would but perpetuate the lot of her children to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for her wiser neighbours on this side the Channel. Were Scotland to cling to her flagrantly Denominational system, her schools would cease to preserve their boasted pre-eminence ; and the highway which leads the Scotchman to England would no longer be, as Dr. Johnson said it was, his finest prospect.

A supreme advantage of the arrangement here proposed is, that without compromising the interests of religion, it lifts the whole question of primary education out of the sphere of ecclesiastical politics and controversy. While both the English and Scotch Acts proceed upon the basis of a compromise between the sects, the arrangement proposed in the foregoing pages proceeds on the basis of a compromise between the Churches on the one side and the State on the other. By this arrangement, the State claims to have a security for the ethical instruction of her subjects, and she compromises what may be called this absolute right by accepting the teaching of the Churches, wherever it is given, in lieu of her own. According to the other schemes, the State stands aloof, as if she had no interest in the solution of the difficulty, and professes herself willing to accept, as the basis of the National system, of any compromise to which the Churches may come among themselves. But according to this arrangement the State feels that it is a question of her own which has to be settled. She requires reliable security for such teaching as she considers indispensable for all social purposes to the rising generation. She offers an alternative by way of satisfying the scruples of the Churches, and does her duty by all of them, by leaving each of them an equal liberty of teaching its special doctrines to the children of its own communion.

In conclusion, I would just say that the permissive system of legislation is the very worst possible to which the country can have recourse in its difficulty. The severance of the religious from the secular element ought either to be universal and compulsory, or not at all. Such a severance is safe only on a National scale. In that case adequate provision would be made for the religious instruction of the young, because the Churches would feel themselves responsible; but under permissive arrangements responsibility will not be clearly defined, much diversity of usage will arise, and the cause of religion is sure to suffer. We have seen, however, that the religious difficulty is not solved merely by secularizing the National system. All depends on what is meant by the word "secularization." The whole question resolves itself into one of boundaries—of boundaries between the secular and the religious. If the severance be carried out in the way generally understood, it will issue in evils that may well be dreaded both by Church and State; but if the true line of severance be observed, I submit that the Education difficulty will be solved.

I can hardly hope to convert the Churches to my views; but I shall be satisfied if these remarks attract discussion to a possible solution of the difficulty, which has been strangely overlooked, or had but scant attention paid to it.

WILLIAM MACKINTOSH.



MOTIVES TO RIGHTEOUSNESS FROM AN EVANGELICAL POINT OF VIEW.

THE views of religion supposed to be held by the "Evangelical School" receive rather a rough handling in the October Number of this Review. The writer of an article on "Purgatory, Heaven and Hell," describes the most fundamental of such views as "more immoral than the most debased of Paganisms." Not with a mere flippant sneer, which may be taken to mean less than it sounds, but with careful, thoughtful, and earnest reasoning does he express this verdict, and amplify on it through a deeply interesting dissertation upon the most solemn subjects which can engage the mind of man.

As the pages of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW have always been liberally open to representatives of every school of thought, provided their arguments were addressed to men's understandings rather than to their passions, I venture to hope that I may be allowed space to treat the subject discussed by Mr. Capes from an Evangelical point of view, and to show that the severe verdict he passes upon Evangelical religion is based upon a misapprehension of the nature of that religion, and upon an inadequate estimate of the various springs of moral feeling and action in the human heart.

Mr. Capes accuses the doctrine of "Justification by faith alone" of being "equivalent to the most absolute irreligion." By this he means, not that it is actually wicked or blasphemous (though he would hardly hesitate thus to designate some other so-called Evangelical doctrines), but that it is totally deficient in motive-power for

good. It repudiates, he considers, "the belief that this life is a period in which we are personally prepared for the future," and so falls into the ranks of the "endless variety of immoral creeds" which possess no force to reform the world or mould man's character into a nobler shape. He admits that by a happy inconsistency many who hold the doctrine lead devoted lives ; but they do so, he considers, in spite of their creed, and not on account of it.

This is a very serious charge, and should be seriously considered ; for it is either a cruel injustice, or a discovery of vital importance. Thousands of earnest men have lived lives of self-denial and laborious devotion to what seemed to them duty and right. They imagined that they were incited to their holy efforts, and constantly cheered and encouraged in them, by their belief in their justification through simple faith in their Saviour's merits. Was this belief all the time only a dead weight upon their moral nature ? The beginning of their efforts was indeed coincident with the beginning of this faith. In their hardest toils and struggles it seemed to sound in their hearts like a trumpet-call to courage and perseverance ; it seemed to be their rest in weariness, their stay in weakness, their hope and joy at all times. And yet was it in reality destitute of all power to do them good—was it a mere mist and glamour that floated around their eyes as they moved, instead of the power which, as they imagined, lifted them up and hurried them along their upward course ?

In order to debate the subject thus brought before us with fairness, we must analyze the motives which urge men to religious action, and consider how far and in what way they are likely to be influenced by that tone of conviction which is called "Evangelical," and especially by belief in the doctrine of "Justification by faith only."

Among the many strong instinctive tendencies of human nature, the tendency to religious emotion certainly holds a very important place. Like most other tendencies, it may be misdirected, it may be abused, or it may lie dormant, but it is there.

It is a great power, but a power which requires to be called forth, to be developed, to be guided in its action. And very many and very delicate are the mental springs which act upon this religious susceptibility, which stir it into intensity, and give both impulse and direction to its forces. Hope and fear, and a prudential consideration of the future, are, no doubt, among such springs, but they are neither the only ones nor the principal ones.

Even if it were true that the doctrine in question left out of sight the idea of the present life being a preparation for the future, it would by no means follow that it was necessarily powerless to rouse into energy the religious faculty ; for there are many other motives it might appeal to, even more effectual in stirring up the depths

of the spiritual being than these forecastings of a distant future. There are other keys on that complex instrument by which grand music could be evoked, even if these were passed over untouched. Reverence, admiration, force of example and personal influence, gratitude, affection, desire to please, the sense of duty—must not these be recognized among the most powerful of moral forces? Does Evangelical doctrine touch these springs and awaken them into activity? Does it thus rouse the religious faculty so as to make it practically influential upon man's life, and does the pressure it brings to bear upon it urge its energies into a useful direction?

If we can answer these questions in the affirmative, I do not say that we prove the Evangelical doctrine to be true. There are other tests of truth besides apparent usefulness to which it must be submitted; but I do say that we who believe that the doctrine has been emphatically taught to the world by our Lord Jesus Himself, find in this proved usefulness a confirmation of our faith. We find that the upward drawing influence we had always imagined our faith had had upon our lives was not a mere matter of traditional sentiment, but a result strictly in accordance with the known laws of ethical science. We find that the doctrines which we consider that God wishes us to believe, lead us to walk in the direction in which we know God wishes us to go. And I say further, that if we can show that there is power in Evangelical teaching to touch the deeper springs of our spiritual nature, such charges as are brought against it in the article on "Purgatory, Heaven and Hell," are proved to be as destitute of rational foundation as they are rash in expression and questionable in taste.

In describing Evangelical doctrine, I admit Mr. Capes to be right in making belief in "Justification by faith only" its leading characteristic; I cannot admit him to be correct in his description either of the idea from which the doctrine takes its rise, or of the tone of thought which accompanies it. It is always hard to give a fair representation of a view with which one has no sympathy. And in this case the difficulty is increased, because it is not easy to separate the doctrine in question from the arguments by which it has been often supported. They are really quite distinct. The doctrine, as it shines out in the pages of the New Testament, and the hard, cold theories by which Puritanic writers have tried to expound and enforce it—thank God, they are as different as light from darkness. But a thinker contemplating the doctrine from outside is apt, by an illusion of mental perspective, to confound together the objects that he so often sees in juxtaposition; and, consequently, "Justification by faith only" is supposed by many to be identical with certain theories of atonement or theories of eternal punishment, or theories of the character and

attributes of God. It is not identical with any of them. It is the declaration of a great fact. These theories may be true or mistaken explanations of the fact, but they are perfectly distinct from it. The fact stands on its own evidence, whether the endeavours to account for it are wise or unwise.

Now, according to Mr. Capes (and indeed in so speaking he only re-echoes a tone so common that we might almost call it the fashionable cant of the day), Evangelical teaching has for its foundation the idea of God's terrible wrath—wrath which planned punishment—wrath which required a victim—wrath which, being appeased by an arbitrary substitution, distributes its strange favours according to an arbitrary and unmeaning system.

Now it appears to me, on the contrary, that the foundation on which it rests is not God's wrath but God's love. Evangelical doctrine, as I learned it, as I teach it, as all the fellow-workers in its cause with whom I am acquainted teach it, starts from this great fundamental truth—"God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on Him should not perish, but have everlasting life." *

Dark and terrible facts there are in the world, in the human heart, in the strange and mysterious drama of existence in which we find ourselves taking our parts, but the "Gospel" is the remedy and the solace God's love has provided for them. Evil exists, misery exists, sin and suffering show themselves linked together by an iron chain of invariable sequence. Revelation teaches that that chain, whose beginning we see, extends further than our faculties dare follow, even into the infinite unknown future. The Gospel is God's merciful power interfering to break it. There is nothing here of vengeful wrath and arbitrary punishment. The "Wrath of the Lord" and the "Vengeance" of the Lord are often used in the figurative language of Scripture to express the unalterable opposition of good against evil, the inevitable certainty with which, sooner or later, in some form or other, pain follows wrong. But this, whether you are an "Evangelical" or whether you are a "Positivist," is a fact which, if you have eyes, you must see. The general law of Retribution in some form can be discovered by experience. The thoughtful mind can see also that this law, though sometimes stern and terrible in its application, is one which, on the whole, works good—one which lifts the human race to a higher sense of responsibility, raises its members infinitely in the scale of creation as moral beings, and makes them in

* In the quotations from the New Testament writings, which I may have to make in the course of this argument, I do not require to have any "theory of inspiration" granted. It is enough for my present purpose that they should be taken as "genuine documents of the Apostolic age, containing the substance of the Apostolic teaching." It is enough that they should be considered as giving us, on the whole, a reliable account of what our Lord, and his immediate followers, said and did.

the long run unspeakably better and happier than they could be if the sharp teaching of pain were silenced.

The existence, then, and the beneficence of retributive law, are discoverable by reason. Revelation, according to the "Evangelical" view, only connects the great Moral Law with the great Moral Being, shows us how it has its source in the awful Holiness of His nature, and how the extent of its action is, like Him from whom it proceeds, infinite. But, in truth, it is not with theories about punishment that Evangelical doctrine busies itself. Its great mission is the proclamation of a remedy. It holds that the same love which brings into prominence the danger and deadliness of evil, brings also into prominence a means of rescue from evil. That means of rescue, that Divine remedy, it does not hesitate to declare, is the self-sacrifice of Jesus Christ. In the providential government of the world it sees Love and Self-sacrifice as two great remedial powers, healing wounds, repairing errors, averting apparently hopeless catastrophes. In the Revealed Gospel it sees God's great remedy for man's errors and failures proceeding from the Divine love and working through the Saviour's sacrifice.

The key-note of its teaching is given by the Apostle who seems to have drunk most deeply of his Master's spirit, when he declares—"Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us, and gave His Son to be the propitiation for our sins."

Not in God's wrath, therefore, but in His love, the Evangelical Christian recognizes the foundation of that doctrine which he holds to be a revelation from God Himself, and a Gospel of good news to man. He sees a law great, wide-spreading, founded, he doubts not, on the very necessity of things, and on the whole beneficent, but He sees that law modified, balanced, mercifully checked, and limited in its operation by a higher law still, the law of love and self-sacrifice.

And from that same Divine love issues the tone of warnings, of invitations and promises, which is the authority for our central Evangelical doctrine of "Justification by faith only." With awful earnestness it is pressed upon us that there is but one way of escape from the stern law of Retribution, and that that escape is to be made now; that life is not (as Mr. Capes suggests) one of a long series of opportunities, but the only opportunity of preparing for eternity.

And mingled with these warnings, whose urgency arises not from arbitrary tyranny, but from distinct perception of the nature of the case, there come to us the generous invitations and glorious promises on which our hearts' hopes and expectations rest.

The original invitation was spoken by the lips of Jesus Christ when on earth. "Come unto me, all ye that are weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest." "Him that cometh unto me I will

in no wise cast out." We believe that this invitation was not meant only for those who heard the Galilean prophet, and became His followers at that time, but for those who hear the voice of the Son of God and believe it during all time. Still the invitation issues from the Lord Himself—such is our creed; and its terms are, that whosoever accepts it, that whosoever approaches in spirit to the Great Invisible Saviour and Lover of Men—whosoever, with a sense of his own guilt and danger, and with longings to be lifted up to a higher life, casts himself upon His Divine compassion, believes the revelation He has given of His own character and will, and trusts confidingly in the promises He has made—that he is immediately placed in a new relation to God—that his sins are forgiven—that he is received with the tenderest and most unhesitating welcome by the Father in Heaven, even as an erring and penitent child is clasped to its parent's breast.

Thus we believe that we are justified by faith only. Accepting the invitations God gives us, and simply trusting in the offers His Divine generosity has made, we "pass from death to life," we become "accepted in the Beloved." We have to wait for nothing—no "conditions" are exacted from us. We come as our Saviour bids us; we are received as our Saviour promises. Freely, completely, immediately, all past guilt is forgiven. The change in the attitude of our soul to God makes an entire change in all our spiritual prospects. The retributive consequences of the faults of the past are arrested through the influence of Christ's self-sacrifice—an influence which we cannot understand, but which we believe in nevertheless.

We ask for no special theory of atonement—Christ gave Himself for us and we are forgiven, that is all we want to know. We know the cause and we know the effect, although the link which binds them together is hidden.

Is there no moral force in this creed? Could we imagine stronger pressure to be brought upon the spiritual nature by any conceivable creed?

First the sense of guilt and the sense of danger are appealed to, in order to rouse from apathy and carelessness. The mind is impressed with the tremendous issues in the future depending on present choice. Wholesome fear, awe, a sense of the solemnity and responsibility of life, is awakened. With no uncertain tones—with no vague and dreamy theories—but with clear, straightforward declarations, which the dullest can understand, there are presented to the conscience the issues that lie before it to choose between—"the wages of sin, death; the gift of God, eternal life."

Then to him who chooses to accept this gift of God (whether the decision is, come to suddenly or gradually, in early childhood or in later years) there opens out a new horizon of hopes, aspirations, and

desires. "If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature; old things are passed away, all things become new." He believes himself to be in close, personal friendship with the Lord of heaven and earth. He believes that his life is consecrated to God. He believes that nothing is so important to him, he feels nothing so interesting, as to do the will of that Father who loves him and whom he longs to love and serve. Life has for him, as for everyone else, its natural joys and sorrows, but far beyond them all he sees the shining vista of heavenly glory. And so he goes through the world bearing a talisman that exalts him above its pettiness, sobers him amidst its excitements, and calms and cheers him amidst its bitterest sorrows. He is an heir of heaven, and must live a heavenly life. He is the ransomed of the Lord, and must keep unspotted the garments that have been washed in His blood. He is not his own, but bought with a price, so he must glorify God in his body and in his spirit, which are His. He has no abiding city here, so while living in the world must keep his heart loosed from the world, his affections set on things above.

Whether this sense of heavenly "citizenship" has or has not any solid basis of fact, yet the sense of it is a reality—a reality that exalts the lives of millions. Has this idea, then, which links the toiling and tempted inhabitant of the earth with the pure and holy heavens, no power as a moral motive? Could any one who believes that heaven is what the Gospel paints it, and who believes that it is to be his own home, and who has that hope as the lode-star of his life—could he be as selfish and mean and narrow-spirited as he would be without such hope?

But, above all, he who believes in the Lord Jesus as the free giver to him of everlasting life, is introduced thereby to an ennobling view of God. Nothing so intensely affects a man's character as his ideas about the Deity. When these are false, servile, superstitious, his life is degraded; when these are elevated, widened, enlightened, his whole moral being is lifted up to a higher platform. "As long as we look upon God as an exactor, not a giver, exactors, and not givers, shall we be." *

And to the believer in "Justification by faith only" God becomes known in the most attractive and glorious light. A Father receiving him at once, all unworthy as he is—a Saviour seeking for him amidst his sin and folly, following him, finding him, lifting him up out of his degradation, and overwhelming him with loving favours. Such is the aspect in which the Deity appears to him. All superstitious horror of God is done away with; all slavish ideas of propitiating the terrible Being with tears or anguish or toilsome struggles; all frantic efforts to shut the eyes and forget him,

* F. D. Maurice.

though defying him the while; all cold and chilling endeavours to philosophize him away into an impersonal abstraction—all this is changed into a passion of gratitude and an enthusiasm of admiration.

The idea of God that arises constantly before the "believer's" soul is the picture of Him presented in the life and character of Jesus. And Jesus is his own close personal friend. Jesus has toiled and died for him, Jesus knows all his difficulties and makes allowance for all his weakness. Jesus in His intense holiness and purity, and at the same time in His intense pitifulness and sympathy, is leading him through life. And dull as his heart may be naturally, it cannot but thrill with something of fervour and enthusiasm when brought face to face with such an idea of Divinity.

And this is the great power of the Gospel—the enthusiasm it creates for the Personal Lord. A well-known writer has called this power the "enthusiasm of Humanity."* But we may also call it the enthusiasm of Divinity. For if it results in hard work for man, it springs from warm admiration for God. An enthusiasm it is, deeply seated in the soul of every one who believes that he has experienced the generosity of God in the gift of everlasting life bestowed on him freely through Jesus Christ. It is an enthusiasm strong enough to sweep down before it all other passions of the heart. It is an enthusiasm which does not wear itself out in a temporary flash, but which takes an abiding hold of the purposes of the will, directs the steadily strengthening currents of habit, gives decision and character to the whole life, and lights up the dying eyes with the glow and the glory of its undimmed fire.

Most interesting it is to see how this enthusiasm for the Divine Saviour elevates all kinds of characters and throws a beautiful illumination over all kinds of lives. The ignorant, the toilworn, the refined and highly-educated, the sick and the sorrowful, the young and happy—all alike feel its wonderful influence, and are raised up by its spirit-stirring power. The constraining love of Christ is no respecter of persons. Once the conviction is wrought in any heart, "I have passed from death to life through my Saviour's merits, there is laid up for me a crown of glory through His love," a sense of duty and of affectionate loyalty to that Saviour becomes the "ruling passion."

The sense of duty has indeed a hard struggle with other tendencies—a struggle long and protracted, and in which it is not always victorious. It is sometimes lulled to sleep for a while. It is sometimes deluded and led astray, but strong in life and strong even in death—strong as the guiding principle of conduct—strong as the mainspring of thought, feeling, and action, that "ruling passion" remains.

* "Ecce Homo," Book ii., chap. xiv.

And nothing could thus remain, and nothing could or ever does thus work but a genuine enthusiasm. You cannot dam up the passions of men's nature, nor curb their eager impulses, nor bring their wild thoughts into captivity by any ordinary power. That surging torrent of impetuous desires will not stay or turn in its course at the bidding of mere prudence. Some voice there must be with a thrill of more sublime authority in its tones before the rude storms that rage in the hearts of rich and poor alike will obey its summons to be still.

Every movement for the regeneration of mankind must have in it the force of enthusiasm or it will fail. It may seem anomalous that this should be needful to make men good and happy. The moral apparatus, you may say, ought to be capable of regulation by its own mechanism without the aid of this strange extraneous pressure. Other animals are, on the whole, guided for their well-being by their instincts of self-preservation, and why not the animal that has got furthest in the scale of development? However this is accounted for (whether by our "obsolete" Evangelical doctrine of "original sin," or by any other theory) the fact remains. Try to move men by prudential considerations alone, and you will find that you might as well try to melt the ice with the moonbeams.

It was personal enthusiasm for Christ that made the little band of Galilean peasants the reformers of the world. It was personal enthusiasm for Christ that enlisted the noble army of Martyrs and kept them "faithful unto death" amidst insult and torture. Every really good and noble work that has been undertaken since Jesus went about doing good, every holy and beautiful character that has left behind it a track of light to gladden and purify mankind, what has been its strength and its inspiration? I may safely answer, personal enthusiasm for Christ. St. Francis among the sick and dying, Xavier among the heathen, Pascal and à Kempis in their lonely cells, Latimer and Ridley at the stake, Wilberforce toiling for the slaves, Judson and Schwartz, Martyn and Fox living and dying for their missionary labour, devoted bands of men and women at the present day spending and being spent in hospitals and reformatories, in dens and alleys haunted by disease and vice and misery—different as have been the views of these and thousand such-like labourers, different as are the external communions in which their names have been enrolled, what has been with them all the great constraining motive? Has it not been "the love of Christ"—deep personal affection, devotion, gratitude, loyalty, obedience to Him whom they believed to be their Saviour and Lord—in a word, enthusiasm for Christ? Now at the root of these feelings, at the root of this enthusiasm has lain the conviction, more or less distinctly

entertained, which receives its formal expression in the doctrine of "Justification by faith." Only dimly some of the workers have realized the fulness and freeness of the salvation with which Christ saves. But that all their hopes for the eternal future rested upon Him, that there was between Him in Heaven and them upon earth a bond of personal union, that the most intense gratitude and devotion was due from them to Him for His generous love and the greatness of His benefits—this they have all believed—this conviction has been enshrined in the hearts both of "Catholics" and "Protestants," "Anglicans" and "Nonconformists," who toiled as I have described. And what is the doctrine of "Justification by faith only" but a distinct putting into words of this conviction, and expressing in scriptural language the grounds upon which it rests?

And writing as I do, not from the quiet seclusion of learned leisure, but from the midst of the bustle of active life and daily contact with sin and suffering, and daily struggle with apathy and selfishness, I must say that I should be utterly at a loss to know what lever to use in order to raise men to righteousness of life if I could not use this one. If I come to a sinner in his sullen degradation and talk to him of his present life in connection with the future as "one of the many stages of his development," I can only mingle with his sullenness a vague hope that all will be right yet in spite of his wickedness, or a vague fear that leaves him more sullen still. But if I can tell him according to my "Evangelical" faith of the Shepherd who is seeking for the lost sheep in order to take him home on his shoulders rejoicing; if I can tell him, feeling as I speak that my words are infallibly true, that his Saviour loves him, pities him, offers him everlasting life, promises him immediate forgiveness if he will but turn to Him and trust Him; if I can tell him of the Father who sees the prodigal a long way off, goes to meet him, falls on his neck and kisses him; if I can set before him the prospect not of a distant and gradual progression towards something better, but of an instantaneous reception into a new and happy spiritual position, and of a new career of hope and gladness opening before him; if, in short, I can say to him, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved," then I can hope to see the sullen brow relaxing, and the sin-hardened lines softening, and the cold dull eyes beginning to glisten; then I can hope to hear the cry bursting out even with sobs and tears, "I will arise and go to my Father."

And I am glad to think that teaching of this kind is practically used by the highest of High Churchmen, as well as by "Evangelicals," in dealing with the masses. They hold other views, which in my judgment tend to obscure this teaching, but still they teach it.

When they strive to grapple (as they do in right earnest) with the brutalized multitudes that crowd our cities, they find it the only weapon that will go to their hearts. In the reports of the addresses at some of their "Missions" I have read statements of "Justification by faith only," promises of free and immediate forgiveness to the penitent believer, so clear and forcible as to put to shame the cautious and faint-hearted expression of the same truth in many "Evangelical" pulpits. Mr. Ryle could not preach the doctrine more distinctly than does "Father Ignatius." And the reason is obvious. Practical men who are hard at work trying to make bad people good, find that it must be done by appealing to the better part of their nature. The smouldering spark of pure and noble feeling must be fanned into a flame. And into their darkened lives elements of hope and joy must be introduced. Despair is a grim foe to reformation. Unless you can get people to feel happy, you have little chance of getting them to be good. Therefore, in dealing with the fallen, you must have a "Gospel." You must have "good news" which is felt as coming from the Author of all good, and which connects the ideas of relief and hope with Him. And what Gospel can you have worthy of the name, but the "old, old story of Jesus, and His love?" What can bring hope for time and eternity to the saddened heart, what can touch it with a sense of God's loving-kindness, like the simple faith that God forgives all sin the moment the sinner takes refuge in Christ Jesus?

Truly, we practical workers among men find this doctrine "most wholesome." It bears the brunt of rough contact with sin and misery. It lives and works in the atmosphere of the lane, the bovel, and the dungeon, as well as that of the quiet study and the curtained drawing-room. Whatever evidence of its truth it may have or may lack, it has at all events the evidence of being proved to work well. Whatever tests it may stand or fail under, it stands the test of trial and experience. No doubt the doctrine may be abused. Self-deceit and hypocrisy may use it as a shelter. Soft and easy lives may satisfy their conscience with the plea that, though doing no work, they are justified by faith. Men-pleasing preachers may gain credit for orthodox declaration of the doctrine, while crying "Peace, peace, where there is no peace." But as long as there are passions which require the force of enthusiasm to curb them—as long as there are wretched lives which want good news to cheer them—as long as there are guilty consciences, which need a message of forgiveness to give them hope—as long as there are low selfish tendencies which require some heavenly influence to elevate them—so long we cannot do without that plain enunciation of Christ's Gospel, which is contained in the doctrine of "Justification by faith only."

In no philosophy, and in no creed, can we find anything that would act as a substitute for it, or take its place as a healing, reforming, ennobling power.

Accordingly, we raise our protest against the statement of Mr. Capes, that "the fundamental principle of all religion is contradicted by the doctrine." Let the thinking public judge between us and him. Is not his view of the fundamental principle of religion a narrow and an arbitrary one? Are there not "more things in Heaven and earth than are dreamt of in his philosophy?" Are there not in man's spiritual nature many and powerful "Motives to righteousness" which his critique on Evangelical views ignores? Can any one who thinks of the doctrine of "Justification by faith only," with the train of grand ideas it carries along with it into the minds of those who teach it and those who believe it, consent to classify it as "equivalent to the most absolute irreligion?"

This is not the place for discussing the evidence on which our belief rests. It is the morality of the doctrine, and not its truth, which is now in question. We are convinced that we have in the teaching of our Lord and His apostles a Divine Revelation. We are convinced that the doctrine of "Justification by faith only" stands out in the forefront of that teaching. It seems to us that our convictions are grounded upon a firm intellectual basis. But over and above this intellectual ground of belief, we value the doctrine for that very quality in it, whose existence Mr. Capes denies—its morality, its tendency to make men good. Like the most earnest worker whom the world ever knew, "we are not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ," for we consider it the "*Power of God unto salvation.*" There is, we believe, a supernatural Power accompanying it, which I have refrained from touching upon in the present argument. But in the very declaration of the Gospel message, which appears to us to be the declaration of Justification by faith in the Lord Jesus, there is, we consider, a power brought to bear upon men's natural affections and emotions, whose influence for good is incalculable. Therefore we prize this doctrine still as "the Article of a standing or falling Church." Whatever views or opinions may be true or false, goodness is a great reality. Whatever mistakes may be made as to the unseen future, there can be no mistake as to the importance of being good now. We find we can help men to be good by preaching to them the doctrine of "Justification by faith only." We cannot conceive how we could effectually reach them or influence them without it. Consequently, as workers for the reformation and elevation of our fellow-men, we feel that if this doctrine were taken from us, "our occupation would be gone."

FREDERICK R. WYNNE.



LETTERS FROM ELIZABETH BARRETT BROWNING

TO THE AUTHOR OF "ORION" ON LITERARY AND
GENERAL TOPICS.

II.

A PROJECT was originated by Wordsworth, as I believe, though it seemed to crop out from another quarter, to produce a volume or two of choice selections from Chaucer, modernized upon a truthful plan. The undertaking presented considerable difficulties. The unscrupulous paraphrases of Pope, Dryden, Ogle, Betterton, &c., were to be entirely avoided; while the hard-favoured method of giving the original, with modern spelling, accents, and a glossary in foot-notes, was not to be, in any degree, adopted. Thus, there would be the loss of easy liberty, not to say the abominable licence, which attended the former,—and the loss of Chaucer's euphonious versification in the hybrid form of the latter. The best modernizations of the previous period, and out of sight beyond all others, were those of Lord Thurlow; yet even he interpolated a line or two in nearly every stanza of "The Flower and the Leaf." Not so with his admirable modernization of "The Knight's Tale," though he adopts the monotonously regular heroic couplets of the school of Pope and others, and never gives the varied *rhythm* which Chaucer continually introduces in the heroic metre. Briefly, several lovers of the great "father of English poetry" agreed to undertake the work—to wit, Wordsworth, Leigh Hunt, Miss E. B. Barrett R. Monckton Milnes

(now Lord Houghton), Robert Bell, Dr. Leonhard Schmitz, the present writer, and some others. After the first volume had been satisfactorily launched, a second was contemplated, the projectors intending to request the co-operation of Tennyson, Talfourd, Browning, Sir E. L. Bulwer (afterwards Lord Lytton), Mr. and Mrs. Cowden Clarke, of course, and Mary Howitt. Everything was soon settled, except to fix upon an editor. Wordsworth, being in years, and residing at a distance, would not accept the post. The next in seniority was Mr. Leigh Hunt, who was living near London, and in all respects suitable as a most accomplished reader and lover of Chaucer;—so we proposed it to him. But he was too wise; he “smelt the battle afar off,” which I did not; and, as Wordsworth, to whom several of us had sent poems we had modernized, had written to London to say that my rendering of “The Franklin’s Tale” was “as well done as any lover of Chaucer’s poetry need or can desire,” the editorship was offered to me. To my subsequent regret, hard work, thankless waste of time in verbal conflicts, countless vexations—yet pride, withal—I accepted the office, “little dreaming.” These things are incidentally mentioned, because they will presently display, in novel relief, certain characteristics, not unamiable, but minutely painstaking, provocative, and probably amusing (to present readers) of several literary celebrities of that day (1841) when the design was put into execution.

Miss E. B. Barrett, though still with so fragile a tenure of life that she might be said to have been really hovering near the grave, cheerfully, and indeed with enthusiasm, agreed to lend her aid to the work. And it is a great pleasure to recollect that everybody to whom I applied cordially consented, the only exception being Mr. Landor, who, however, conveyed his objection in a form that could not be displeasing to those who had an artist-like interest in this labour of love. His first reply was that he believed “as many people read Chaucer” (meaning in the original) “as were fit to read him.” As I took leave to doubt this, Landor again wrote to me, saying—“Indeed I *do* admire him, or rather love him. In my opinion he is fairly worth a score or two of Spensers. He had a knowledge of human nature, and not of doll-making and *fantoccini* dressing. ‘Imagination’ seems to our poets and critics to be the faculty of devising a rare quantity of small images.” And further on, he wrote—“Pardon me if I say I would rather see Chaucer quite alone, in the dew of his sunny morning, than with twenty clever gentle-folks about him, arranging his shoe-things and buttoning his doublet. I like even his *language*. I will have no hand in breaking his dun but rich-painted glass, to put in (if clearer) much thinner panes.” And thus,—with the true, but narrow

devotion of the best men on the black-letter side, and their resistance to all attempts to melt the obsolete language and form it into modern moulds,—and the stolidity of a British public on the other side, the Homer of English Poetry continues unread, and known only to the very few. As I said in the Introduction to the volume in question, “Had Chaucer’s poems been written in Greek or Hebrew, they would have been a thousand times better known.” They would have been translated again and again, year after year.

Writing to Sir E. L. Bulwer (Lord Lytton), the principle I proposed for acceptance or discussion was, that those contributors who could gracefully and poetically retain most of the original words should be considered as best doing the work. Wordsworth had at once coincided in this; so had Miss Barrett, and so did Sir E. L. Bulwer, and all the rest but one. I allude to Leigh Hunt, who did not altogether coincide. And the more he thought over it, or rather the more he worked at the modernization, the less he agreed with the principle, as we shall presently see. Be it understood that I fully admitted there was much to be said on his view of the matter. However, we all commenced. Wordsworth gave a version of “The Cuckoo and the Nightingale,” an extract from “Troilus and Cressida,” and he virtually modernized the whole of “The Flower and the Leaf,” by the re-writings, revisions, and general labour he bestowed upon it for somebody else. Leigh Hunt modernized “The Manciple’s Tale,” “The Friar’s Tale,” and “The Squire’s Tale;” and Miss Barrett modernized “Queen Annelida and False Arcite,” and “The Complaint of Annelida.” The remainder of the volume comprised the “Life of Chaucer,” by a learned German professor; Eulogies on Chaucer, by his contemporaries, and others; and the modernizations and other work, by the Editor and by Robert Bell.

The Poem selected by Miss Barrett presented one peculiar feature, being the first of its kind, systematically carried out, that is to be found in English Poetry. In the general execution, the lady adhered to the principle that had been laid down; but the peculiarity alluded to is to be found in two stanzas only of the present poem, which we will first give in the original, so that readers may judge of how the work has been performed.

**THE COMPLAINT OF ANNELIDA TO
FALSE ARCITE.**

VII.

But for I was so plaine to The Arcite,
In all my wordes and workis moche and lite,
And was so besy aye you to delite,
Myne honour only sabe meke, kinde, and fre,

Therefore Arcite ye put in me this wite,
 Alas! Alas! ye reckin not a mite
 Though that the percing swerde of sorow byte
 My woful hert, thorough your cruilte.

VIII.

My swete foe, why do ye so for shame?
 And thinkin ye that furthered be your name
 To lobin a newe, and ben untrewed age,
 And putin you in slaundir now and blame,
 And so to me aduersyte and grame,
 That love you most, God thou wotist alwaye.
 Yet turne agen, and yet be plaine some dape,
 And then shall this that now is mis ben game,
 And al forgebin, whilis I lybe maye.

The following are the modernized versions of Miss Barrett:—

STANZA VII.

Because I was so plain, Arcite,
 In all my doings, your delight
 Seeking in all things, where I might
 In honour,—meek and kind and free;
 Therefore you do me such despise.
 Alas! howe'er through cruelty
 My heart with sorrow's sword you smite,
 You cannot kill its love.—Ah me!

VIII.

Ah, my sweet foe, why do you so
 For shame?
 Think you that praise, in sooth, will raise
 Your name,
 Loving anew, and being untrue
 For aye?
 Thus casting down your manhood's crown
 In blame,
 And working *me* adversity,
 The same,
 Who loves you most—(O God, thou know'st!)
 Alway?
 Yet turn again—be fair and plain
 Some day;
 And then shall this, that seems amiss,
 Be game,
 All being forgiv'n, while yet from heav'n
 I stay.

Possibly the reader may not, at first, have perceived that in the foregoing arrangement of Stanza VIII. the rhymes exist, concealed in the body of the original just given,—and not addressed to the eye—the lines having the same ten-syllable measure as those stanzas in which, for the most part, the poem is written.

XV.

The longe night this wondir syght I drie,
 That on the day, for soche Affray I dye,
 And of al this right naught wyys ye retche,
 Ne nebirmore myne eyen two ben drye,
 And to your routhe, and to your trouthe I crye,
 But wel away! to ferre ben they to fetche,
 Thus holdith me my destiny a wretche,
 But me to rede out of this drede or gye
 Ne may my wit (so weke is it) not stretche.

Miss Barrett's modernization of the foregoing was placed by her in the same order of the rhymes as in the stanza previously given. Some persons rather blamed her for this, and wrongly; for she might, with equally true justification, have arranged them in the following order, showing how "cunning an artificer" was the "Father of English Poetry," who is fancied to be rough and crude only by those who do not know him in the original.

STANZA XV.

Through the long night,
 This wondrous sight,
 Bear I,
 Which haunteth still
 The daylight, till
 I die;
 But nought of this,
 Your heart, I wis,
 Can reach.
 Mine eyes down pour,
 They never more
 Are dry,
 While to your ruth,
 And eke your truth,
 I cry—
 But, weladay,
 Too far be they
 To fetch.
 Thus destiny
 Is holding me—
 Ah, wretch!

And when I fain
Would break the chain
And try—
Faieth my wit
(So weak is it)
With speech.

Miss Barrett had written the last verse in the form of the second (Stanza VIII.), as we have said, and it has only been altered to display not only Chaucer's skill in versification, but the care the lady displayed in attending to his concealed rhymes wrought into the body of each line. The first letter I can find on the subject we are now upon, may be thought to have been written after the volume was out; but this is by no means certain, as I continually forwarded proofs to her of various matters long before they were printed, as such things seemed to cheer her solitude; and the date of the Letter almost proves this to have been the case.

Post-mark, TORQUAY,
December 17th, 1840.

"I did not say half—not half—enough about the 'Introduction.' The apotheosis of Chaucer, or rather your witness to his poetic devoutness, is very beautiful,—and that passage, for instance, about the greenness of his green leaves, and the whiteness of his daisies (so true, that is!), and above all, a noble paragraph near the end, close to the end, testifying to the devotional verity of every veritable poet. I have read it again and again.

"Notwithstanding all the merit and the grace, do not some of the poems militate against the principle you set out with? I venture to think that the re-fashioners stand—some of them, and in a measure—too far from Chaucer's side—however graceful the attitude. You, yourself, and Wordsworth are devoutly near, and most devoutly! Most of the contributors are so, but not all, for even Mr. Leigh Hunt is sometimes satisfied with being with Chaucer in the spirit, and spurns the accidents of body. But Mr. Bell's 'Mars and Venus' is too smooth and varnished, and redolent of the nineteenth century, as appears to me, for spirit *or* body. I think people will say you might 'keep more Chaucer.' But, however, they mayn't; and if they are not (say what they please) delighted with this volume, this breathing of sweet souths over the bank of deathless violets, there can be no room for delight in their souls.

"Papa has been to leave his card upon you, as he tells me. He is a very bad visitor, or would have done it long ago—with his strong impression of all your kindness towards one of his family. Do go and see them in Wimpole Street, dear Mr. Horne, some day when you are in the neighbourhood—do—before I am there—if really it is not out of all order in me to say such a thing. But it would give them such real pleasure to know you, I am very sure; and, besides, I shall like to think that they do.

"Very truly yours, E. B. B."

"No, we don't agree; and I want to set up, not the contrariety, but the identity of the principle of Greek versification and ours."

The postscript alludes to our projected lyrical drama of "Psyche."

One of the printer's proofs of some part of my work in the "Chaucer Modernized" is now before me. I sent all my own proofs to Miss Barrett and to Leigh Hunt, asking for their comments and proposed revisions, in the same way that I had given mine upon their proofs. Some very slight notion of the literary, philological, and archæological queries and contests that attended this very proper process may be gathered from the following quotations, with the marginal and foot-notes on the proofs.

R. H. "Love will not be constrained by mastery.

When mastery cometh, the God of Love, anon
Beateth his wings—and, farewell ! he is gone."

E. B. In the second line "comes," says Chaucer, and more smoothly.

R. H. Yes, more smoothly, but not so Chaucerian in its variety of rhythm. Does your copy print it "comes ?" What edition have you ? Mine reads "cometh."

The above is a celebrated passage which has been copied, paraphrastically, by Pope, and others, without acknowledgment. To continue :—

R. H. "After a time there must be temperance
In every man that knows self-governance."

E. B. B. I don't think it means self-governance, but governance generally. If so, "that knoweth governance" would be right.

R. H. "His presence aye desiring, so distraineth,"

E. B. B. Why not,
"The yearning for his presence so constraineth,"

R. H. Yes, far better ; thank you.

R. H. "Progressively, as know ye every one,
Men may engrave and work upon a stone
Till that some figure there imprinted be ;
So long her friends have soothed her heart," &c.

E. B. B. "Men may engrave so *long* upon a stone," &c. Shouldn't it suit the other clause ?

R. H. Yes, no doubt.

R. H. "Or else the sorrow had her heart yslain."

E. B. B. Dare you say "yslain ?" Why not,—"*Thro'* sorrow had her heart been slain."

R. H. Yes, more prudently, and perhaps as good.

R. H. "The odour of flowers and freshness of the night
Would any heart have filled and made it light,
That ever was born," &c.

E. B. B. Is it not rough ?

R. H. No, it is Chaucer's harmonious wavy lift and roll, as explained in the "Introduction." It would of course be unwieldy if tried by Pope's regular, finger-scanning by syllables, instead of Chaucer's *beats* of time.

- R. H. "And home all wend with ease, and full of glee,
Save wretched Aurelius—none was sad but he."
- E. B. B. Rough—is it not?
- R. H. No; it is Chaucer's lifting rhythm. And if it *were* rough, I should retain it for its "wretched" effect.
- R. H. "Your blissful sister, Lucina the sheen, &c."
- E. B. B. Qy. the "Lucina." Don't you adjust Chaucer's bad quantities?
- R. H. I left that, and others in the proofs, to see what you and Leigh Hunt would say. I suppose we must alter false quantities. Would Landor retain them, black letter and all?
- R. H. "His brother weepeth and wailleth privately."
- E. B. B. The metre would be freer without the "and," I think.
- R. H. *Stet.* the "and," for Chaucerian reasons previously given. The same with regard to several others you have marked.
- R. H. "But that a clerk should do a gentle deed
As well as any wight of whom we read."
- E. B. B. Doesn't Chaucer mean as well as *either* of you—knight or squire?
"But that a clerk a noble deed should do
Is certain sooth, as well as either of you."
- R. H. Yes, you are right; and I like the Chaucerian rhythm of your second line at the close; "as well as *either-ðf yōu*," I propose to alter thus—
"But that a clerk a gentle deed should do
As well—ne'er doubt it—as this knight or you."
- R. H. "For, Sir, I will not take a penny of thee
For all my craft, nor aught for my travaille :
Thou hast sufficient paid by my vitaille."
- E. B. B. I hate and detest those words. Chaucer wouldn't use them *now*. Now, would he? Besides, I doubt the meaning given to the latter line being quite the right one. How impertinent! but this is *colophon* to the whole. I fancy something of this sort,—
"For all my craft, and all my labour given :
For hospitality, we two are even."
- R. H. Sorry to give up the two old words of the original; but, sighing my thanks, I adopt your suggestion.
- E. B. B. Last line of all stands thus in my black letter,—
"He took his horse, and rode forth on his way."
- R. H. Not so in mine. What is the date of yours—and its pedigree?

From the foregoing example of only a few selections from the proofs of a single Tale, modernized by the Editor, some faint conception may be formed of what occurred when Leigh Hunt dealt with my proofs, and I with his. By his seniority in years and literary start

long ahead of me, in addition to his early studies of Chaucer and critical essays, I was prepared for abundant difficulties ; but it will be seen how all these were increased when he announced—after we had all commenced upon the plan of as close a literal reading as was compatible with poetical as well as metrical requirements—that he was quite opposed to our leading principle. He announced this, in returning the proofs of my version of the “Prologue to the Canterbury Tales,” crowded with revisions on the opposite theory. Of course I accepted with thanks as much as I could, without violating my own ideas on the question of truthfulness ; and I am quite prepared to admit that in all difficult or doubtful passages, a rendering in the spirit would probably be far superior to adhering to the letter. The door, however, Leigh Hunt proposed to open, would let in all sorts of spirits—“black spirits and white,” true spirits and false ; and in dealing with a great author, it is right to be on the safe side. The translations of Shelley from the Greek, Italian, German, and Spanish, seem to me as near to perfection as possible. These are in many parts as fine as their originals ; and with respect to his translations from Goethe’s *Walpurgis Nacht*, and *El Magico Prodigioso* of Calderon, I consider them not only faithful, but finer than the originals. The same method was not so fitting in Leigh Hunt ; and it would be fitting to very few. Shelley was a great poet, and not unlike Calderon, in several characteristics ;—Leigh Hunt, though an elegant and delightful poet, was not a great poet, and not at all like Chaucer. As to the principle at issue, the close literal translations of Mr. Oxenford from *Calderon* seem to me very preferable to the fancies many a gentleman might indulge in, and call it the “spirit” of that poet (because it was his own spirit) ; while the nearest combination of the poetical with the all-but literal, in the present day, is to be found in Mr. Denis Florence MacCarthy’s translations from the Spanish, even though he does this “in the metres of the original.” Still, they do not approach what Shelley has done. To return to Leigh Hunt, the opinion of Miss Barrett as to his renderings of Chaucer seems to me quite correct ; and most gracefully as he did his part in the “Chaucer Modernized,” I prefer what was done by Wordsworth and Miss Barrett, with the understanding that the poems they selected would not be so interesting, in themselves, to most people, as those selected by Leigh Hunt.

Combined with one or two of the Letters on general topics,—the struggles of the “Syncretics” with a view to bringing a true dramatic literature upon the stage,—the discomfiture of poor George Stephens, and the fate of his tragedy of “Martinuzzi,” which mainly caused him to die of a broken heart ; combined also with Miss Barrett’s

most unselfish consideration with regard to my time, my lingering hooping-cough, and other matters,—the subject of the “Psyche” drama every now and then rises up like a vague form through a broken silver mist. I was so very glad to observe how this seemed to carry her mind away from the contemplation of her own painful, however necessary, seclusion.

“TORQUAY, August 14th, 1841.

“I would not hear your enemy say so, dear Mr. Horne—that you were a bad correspondent—much less say so myself. You are a bad *catechumen*, and that’s the worst of you, and I’m sure it doesn’t deserve a bad cough. Therefore, if you receive a jar of tamarinds from the West Indies *via* Wimpole Street—and you will, in the case of papa’s having received any himself, as he usually does—pray use them.” [Then follows the ‘prescription.’] “But the pilgrimage through the villages is the remedy. And, dear Mr. Horne, never mind ‘Psyche.’ There is plenty of time for ‘Psyche’—in the future, if not now. She is persecuting you, I fear. Remember—when one is tied with cords, to struggle only strengthens the knots. Put ‘Psyche’ away, out of thought for the present, and don’t fancy that I (for one) am even inclined to be impatient about it. I shall not expect any more news of her for six months, from this fourteenth of August, eighteen hundred and forty-one.

“And so your angelic sin is so rampant that ‘you’d be an abbot’ (and not a ‘butterfly,’ despite of Psyche) if you went into a monastery—an abbot of misrule—unless St. Cecilia, who ‘drew the angel down,’ did the like by your reverend desires. Ah! when I was ten years old, I beat you all—you and Napoleon and all—in ambition—but now, I only want to get home.

“Nevertheless, I fear I do fear the light words may be bubbles at the top—that it may be darker underneath. I know the secret of *that*, you see; and I fear that the hooping-cough and the pressure of business don’t go blithely together, and that you are walking your imaginary cloisters with a graver, perhaps sadder step than should be. Can it be so? Is it so? The louder the call then to the villages.” [For change of air.] “Neither cloisters nor graves are ready for you yet—nor you for them. So I do hope that ‘generally you don’t think’ about either. Whom should we have for Dramatic Professor in the great Genius-establishment,” [a humorous hit at the Synchretics] “where the moth will be sworn never to corrupt and the thief never to steal? Whom, if you were away? If you were only an abbot, or an organist, it would be very different. Do remember that if you are not so tranquil as they, you are [* * * *] and valued more.

“So, the *Monthly Chronicle* is gone—self-slain, because it wouldn’t condescend to be lively. There was power enough in it for three or four magazine-popularities—but the taste of *caviare* preponderated, and people turned away their heads. They said of it, as my own ears witnessed, ‘dull and heavy.’ Then it was such a fatal mistake to keep back the *names*!

I saw it to the last. God bless you ! I am going to think, in the face of the—*weather*, if it won't turn round.

“Truly yours, E. B. B.”

The last words convey a more satirical meaning than will be generally apparent. The brief literary career of the *Monthly Chronicle* is unique, curious, and amusing in a certain way. It was started under the joint auspices of three high celebrities of the time; *to wit*, Sir David Brewster, Sir E. L. Bulwer (the late Lord Lytton), and Dr. Lardner. Being all three proprietors and editors, and each too great to communicate his intentions to either of the others (or even give a definite reply to the Contributors, as I found), a beautiful confusion was the constant and necessary result. The magazine, however, was successfully advancing by reason, and no reason, of the *prestige* of the three names, when the following disastrously natural event occurred. The wonderful accident of “Murphy’s Almanack” had just burst through the wintry fogs of London, the astrologer having truly predicted the very coldest of all the cold days of that winter; and the sale of the Almanack was of a kind that compelled the publishers (Messrs. Whitaker) to have police to keep off purchasers from crushing-in the door and windows. This I one day witnessed. The next number of the *Monthly Chronicle*, therefore, came out with a very long article by Sir David Brewster, “On Murphy’s Almanack,” and another article by Dr. Lardner (no exchange of ideas having been deigned), consisting of fourteen pages, “On the Weather,” being founded upon the same “Vox Stellarum !” They occupied a third part of the whole magazine ! After this, the proprietor engaged Mr. Robert Bell as editor, who did all that a gallant and indefatigable editor of six feet four could do, but the poor magazine never recovered from that double dose of cold weather.

Since the appearance of these papers in the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for last month, another Letter on the subject of the old theatrical patent monopoly has come to light, of too interesting and peculiar a nature to be omitted. A passage in the following Letter shows how conscientious and unconcealing Miss Barrett was, and sheds an additional lustre, if any were needed, upon the nobility of her character,—the faintness of hold upon the branch of life still continuing :—

“TORQUAY (no date, but probably 1842).

“MY DEAR MR. HORNE,—So you write me down ‘dozing,’ in courtesy for a worse word ; and, indeed, I scarcely know another to recommend to you. Yet it has not been ‘dozing’ either—no—nor long-drawn consideration. The truth is, I have felt afraid [* * *] and do, and one day being the image of another to me, while the fear made me delay sending you my

fancies, I lost account of the time spent in delaying—took Saturday for Monday still, and built up so a dozing reputation. And, indeed, I, upon my 'rock,' have less time for anything good than is supposable. Half the day, all the morning, I am just able to read lazily in that low, spiritless, lack-lustre state which shows the quenched embers of opium and things of the sort, said to be necessary for me just now; and the uncomfortable, uncertain excitement before and afterwards, though pleasant as a sensation, is more congenial to dreaming—'dozing,' if you please, dear Mr. Horne,—than to any steady purpose of thought or fixed direction of faculty. So far to account, in part,—in some degree—for the rough sketch I send you, being 'very *un*-like a whale.' [Alluding, probably, to the projected Lyrical Drama of 'Psyche.']

"But it was thrown on paper directly I read your reminder—'a first foyn,' indeed. I didn't wait any more,—and if the mail coaches *do*, in the snow, it isn't my fault. Your letter came to me, most reluctantly, a day too late, and mine may 'copy its paces.'

"Thank you for the reproof from Hazlitt—in paragraph 'to suit'—for the beauty is the gentleness of the rebuke. Yet you and he could both have written as finely and forcibly upon the opposite evil of compromise," [alluding apparently to her refusal to sign our Petition against the Theatrical Patents] "of temporizing as to objects, and being indifferent to means—that 'fat weed' of the day—perhaps of the world on all days. More of us, you will admit, do harm by groping along the pavement with blind hands for the beggar's brass coin, than do folly by clutching at the stars 'from the misty mountain top.' And if the would-be star-catchers catch nothing, they keep at least clean fingers.

"This applies to nothing, you will understand, except to the passage from Hazlitt—suggestively.

"And talking of beggar's coins, will you believe me (you *MUST* believe me) that I never thought until I had finished my letter to you about the Petition, of my own self having something to do with the proprietorship of Drury Lane, by virtue of five shares given to me when I was a child? I really never thought of it. But I thought afterwards that if you ever came to guess at such a thing, why you might infer me into basenesses. The shares never reminded me of their being mine by one penny coming to my hands, nor are likely to do so—the National theatres being as empty of profit as of honour." [Written about the year 1842.] "But if it were otherwise, oh! you couldn't suspect me of being warped by such a consideration—you will trust me that half cubit of probity, without another word."

The concluding portion of the next Letter refers to a very opposite class of ideas. Although the projected Lyrical Drama must be reserved for a future paper, I cannot refrain from giving some crude idea of it in this place, as it belongs to the close of the previous Letter, and helps to fix the period of its origin.

"TUESDAY.

"DEAR MR. HORNE,—I was not quite well, and was forced to break off

writing, and begin again to-day. You will think me an 'eighth' sleeper now. Don't scruple to say what is in your mind about the subject. Remember, you suggested Greek instead of modern tragedy as a model for form. My idea, the terror attending spiritual consciousness—the man's soul to the man—is something which has not, I think, been worked hitherto, and seems to admit of a certain grandeur and wildness in the execution. The awe of this soul-consciousness breaking into occasional lurid heats through the chasms of our conventionalities has struck me, in my own self-observation, as a mystery of nature very grand in itself—and is quite a distinct mystery from *conscience*. Conscience has to do with action (every thought being spiritual action), and not with abstract existence. There are moments when we are startled at the footsteps of our own Being, more than at the thunders of God."

[That last remark might suggest an essay to Mr. Herbert Spencer.]

"Is it impracticable?—too shadowy, too mystic, for working dramatically ?

"Think of Faust. You could do anything. But you are judge as to what is to be done or tried. Say yes, or no—and I am prepared for 'no' most.

"Truly yours, E. B. B."

My reply was to the effect, that the subject could be worked dramatically, *i.e.*, in the spirit, and everything breathing of stage-action being clean out of the question; that I would devise the characters, interlocutors, chorus and semi-choruses; make a construction of the movement, or action, of the whole; propose the locality (some unknown Greek island), the scenery, &c.; that the part of Psyche should be left entirely to her, and nearly all the lyrical portion, and I would do the rest. When the design and construction were completed, Miss Barrett was to receive a duplicate of the whole, so paged and marked that the different portions of the writing could be carried on with a means of constant reference (and intercommunication), so as to move harmoniously under the two hands. The Greek form and a remote age were proposed as assisting to carry the drama quite out of present art, as the subject seemed rather to belong to *no* special time or place—if not to another world, at least to the world of spirits here below. This form was also proposed, because I fancied it would be most pleasing to her, if she ever lived to carry out the idea, which seemed to me very doubtful. The subject might seem to belong to modern thought; but she was reminded that she would have found among the old Greek philosophers most of the speculations we imagine to belong to modern times; and if she wished for further justification, and could not hope to find it in the Hebrew, she would discover its Shadow in the Sanskrit, as students of the Bhagavat Gita were fond of placing it as the earliest source of the mighty Nile of metaphysics which has flowed down to modern ages. With which piece of rather grim attempt at

archaic pleasantry, the lady was "left to her own devices." Nevertheless, I saw there was something new to be "worked," as she expressed it, out of her subject.

The same Letter concludes with a postscript, informing me that she was sure Miss Mitford would sign the Petition, as she was "personally interested in the theatres, and had a play" (at that time) "waiting to be acted." Among these Letters there has just turned up one from Mrs. Jameson, a celebrity at that day, who expressed herself ready to sign the same, and enclosing a few lines to an eminent medical practitioner (Mr. Travers, of Bruton Street), requesting he also would sign it. Mrs. Jameson's letter is very interesting, but must be omitted, together with many other collateral notes and circumstances; indeed it will have been obvious that I have to struggle against becoming chronographical, as well as autobiographical. Many celebrated persons signed that fatal document.

Miss Barrett's first publication was "An Essay on Mind" (1826); her next, was a translation of the "Prometheus" of Æschylos (1833); and her third, "The Seraphim and other Poems," in 1838. A certain critical work in which I was responsibly concerned, while fully admitting her genius, dealt very freely with what seemed to be her shortcomings, a *résumé* of which seems to have been condensed in a private note. The following Letter will show with how generous a spirit she bore all this:—

"Nov. 4th, 1841,

"50, Wimpole Street.

"My head has ached so for two days (not my temper, I assure you) that I thought it was beheading itself,—and now that 'distracted globe' having come to a calm, I hasten to answer your letter. A bomb of a letter, is it, to be sure!—enough to give a dozen poets a headache a piece. 'No sex—no character—no physiognomy—no age—no Anno Domini!'—a very volcano of a letter.

"After all, dear Mr. Horne, your idea of revenge is not tragic enough for a great dramatist, and I may criticise back to you, on such grounds. But then, again, I spare you on others. You needn't 'try to recant.' I am not angry—don't even feel ill used—(that feeling of melancholy complacency);—and beg you to extend your dramatic sceptre within reach of my subject hands, and with the 'diagram' at the top of it." [Referring, probably, to certain geometric figures I had suggested as private "working" illustrations for the "Psyche."]

"When Socrates said that it was worse to suffer, being guilty, than being innocent, wasn't he right,—and am I not like Socrates?—in the sentiment, which I am right in—not position, which I am wrong in. At the same time, it does seem hard—hard even for Socrates—to drink all this hemlock without a speech—to die, and make no sign. The general criticism is too true a one—also—lately true—but not equally, altogether true, perhaps, in

everything. I think, for instance, that my Page-romaunt, has some sex, and physiognomy, however the Anno Domini may be mislaid, even in her case. Well—but it's a true general criticism—and true particularly, besides—and do send the diagram, dear Mr. Horne,—and be sure that however lightly I have spoken, I must always be gravely grateful to you for telling me all such truths.

“Miss Mitford came to town last Thursday, in her abundant affectionateness, just to see me, and returned home on Saturday. She measures your dramatic stature by cubits. She prefers your ‘Cosmo’ to ‘Gregory.’ So do I, you know—although the artistic power is greater in the ‘Gregory’—and oh!—she told me that late struggle of the un-acted authors [‘the Synchronics’] has done good already in the theatres. ‘How?’ I asked. ‘Because it disproves the late idea of there being an immense deposit somewhere of excellent un-acted dramatic works. People say to one another—‘you see, they could find nothing more excellent than ‘Martinuzzi’;’—and thus the theatres open their doors a little wider to the *rare* virtue!’

“But you *could* have found something more excellent than ‘Martinuzzi.’ There was the —; well but do send the diagram. I wish I could ‘transfuse’ in my brother George, who talks of meeting you face to face this evening at Mrs. O—’s.

“Truly yours, ELIZABETH B. BARRETT.

“Of course I couldn’t object to listen to your arguments upon” [against] ‘the title page’ [of her forthcoming volume, most likely] “as long as they do not touch my ‘foregone conclusions.’ But those—pray, dear Mr. Horne, remember—are fixed as Danton’s hat.”

Knowing the aspen-leaf condition of the writer, it is difficult to express the peculiar charm there was in receiving these indications of a determined will, however humorously expressed.

As it must be obvious from the genius, learning, and elaborate reading of this lady, that her Letters are not what may be classed as “meet for the million,” it does not seem necessary to offer any apology for their dealing with subjects not suited to the taste or experience of every general reader of the day. Some persons may ask, “What care we whether Miss Mitford goes to Jersey or to Jericho?” It is very intelligible why they should not care. Another may say—“Well, I never read ‘The Seraphim’;’ and if I did read it, I should more probably prefer the Ethiopian Serenaders.” All of which is very natural, and, so far, reasonable in them. We may simply say, that these Letters are mainly intended for the readers of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, and works of similar scope and character.

“MONDAY MORNING,
(Date probably about 1843.)

“I ANSWER your note before you can answer mine, and it is the best so. Whatever may be said or unsaid, of me and mine in your work, [alluding to the forthcoming ‘New Spirit of the Age’], do not give a second

thought to any imagination of discontent as applicable to me. I shall know that you meant the kindest—and understand *awry* everything not the pleasantest. My head will not go round.

"For the rest, or rather under the whole, if I myself am not *tame* about the 'Seraphim,' it is because I am the person interested. I wonder to myself sometimes, in a climax of dissatisfaction, how I came to publish it. It is a failure in my own eyes; and if it were not for the poems of less pretension in its company, would have fallen, both probably and deservedly, a dead weight from the press."

I do not think I ever said, or inferred anything to this extent; or thought so disparagingly of the above Poem as the authoress here, in her nobly inward aspiration after excellence, so magnanimously declares as her verdict upon herself. What follows is grand and pathetic:—

"Something I shall do hereafter in poetry, I hope. Hopes which have fallen dead from all things, are thrown in a heap *there*—perhaps like withered leaves! We must hope in something however, if we live.

"Which I did not mean to say in beginning this note.

"Only you will see that I shall not be discontented at the effects of your" [comments, &c.]—"it is better too perhaps, so. The book" [the critical work in preparation] "will be in better odour for it, with the million.

"Ever truly yours, E. B. B.

"I heard from Miss Mitford this morning. She appears resolved to go to Jersey, as you know probably."

"SATURDAY.

"MY DEAR MR. HORNE,—I send you 'an opinion' on Tennyson. Use it, or do not use it. He is a divine poet; but I have found it difficult (in the examination of my own thoughts of him) to analyze his divinity, and to determine (even to myself) his particular aspect as a writer. What is the reason of it? It never struck me before. A true and divine poet nevertheless.

"Have you a portrait of him? I hope so.

"Yours, E. B. B."

Wishing to interpolate no more of my own writing with these Letters than what may be necessary for explanation, and connection, and the expression of strong sympathy, or dissent, I refrain from making any comment here, except that of a cordial agreement in the supreme admiration of the poetess with regard to the Laureate. And, once for all, as to interpolation, I venture to hope that some brief exceptions will, occasionally, be ungrudgingly permitted to an author who is one of the few remaining links between the period of Burns, Wordsworth, Shelley, and their great contemporary prose writers,—and the risen and rising stars of the present day—who are, in like manner, hurrying to join the "past," with all its extinctions

and oblivions. For many are "called," but a very small number will be "chosen."

A considerable interval occurred in the course of these Letters, owing to a tragic occurrence, the suddenness of which, and the profound grief that followed, caused the prostration, of every power. A dear brother of Miss Barrett was accidentally drowned while out on some boating excursion, and almost within sight of her windows.

"August 31st, 1843.

[Apparently from Wimpole Street.]

"Ah, my dear Mr. Horne, while you are praising the weather—stroking the sleek sunshine—it has been, not exactly killing me, but striking me vigorously with intent to kill. It was intensely hot, and I went out in the chair, and was over-excited and over-tired, I suppose; at least, the next day I was ill, shivering in the sun, and lapsing into a weariness it is not easy for me to rally from. Yet everybody has been ill—which, in the way of pure benevolence, ought to be a comfort to me; and now I am well again. And the weather is certainly lovely and bright by fits, and I join you in praising the beauty and glory of it: but then, you must admit that the *fits*, the spasmodic changes of the temperature from sixty-one degrees to eighty-one, and back again, are trying to mortal frames; more especially to those conscious of the frailty of the 'native mud' in them. If I had the wings of a dove, and could flee away to the south of France, I should be cooing per-adventure instead of moaning. Only, I could not *leave everything*—even then! I must stay, as well as go—under any circumstances—dove or woman.

"By the way, two of my brothers are on the Rhine at this moment. They have gone, to my pain and pleasure, to see Geneva, and come home at the end of six weeks, by Paris, to re-plunge (one of them) into Law.

"It pleases me to think of dear Miss Mitford reading my 'House of Clouds' to you, with her 'melodious feeling' for poetry, and the sweeter melody of her kindness; and it moreover pleased me to know that you liked it in any measure. To show the difference of possible opinions, Mr. Boyd told me that 'he had read my papers on the Greek fathers' [in the 'Athenæum,' I think], 'with the more satisfaction, because he had inferred from my "House of Clouds" that illness had *impaired my faculties*.' Ah,—but I hope to do something yet, better than the past. I hope, and shall struggle to it.

"I have had a great pleasure lately in some correspondence with Miss Martineau, the noblest female intelligence between the seas,—'as sweet as spring, as ocean deep.' She is in a hopeless anguish of body, and serene triumph of spirit,—with at once no hope, and all hope! To hear from her was both a pleasure and honour to me.

"Last week a voice spake to me out of a beautiful smile—'Ask Mr. Horne if he has given me up for ever?—and tell him that I still live at E—S—.'

"Very truly yours,

ELIZABETH B. BARRETT."

I should not—*could* not—pass on to the next Letter, without saying that, not very long since, a note came to me from Miss Martineau, then lying, and still lying in a similar state to that described above with such simple and pathetic grandeur (1843); and still taking her usual interest in a certain important question of early training and education, concerning which I had formerly corresponded with her.

“Dec. 16th, 1843,
“Wimpole Street.

“I am so glad to hear that nothing really very bad is the matter with Tennyson. If anything were to happen to Tennyson, the world should go into mourning.

“Did I ever tell you that I once wrote to him, and had a note from him? Thus it was. Some friendly American sent me last year a newspaper, containing a review of his poetry, and requested me to forward it to him, knowing my direction and not his. I was embarrassed to know what to do; and more especially so as the review was cautious in its admiration. At last I wrote a brief statement of the facts of the case, and sent the newspaper. I was quite ashamed of myself and my newspaper; but he was good enough to forgive me for an involuntary forwardness. The people in Yankeeland, I observe, think that we in England all live in a house together—particularly we who write books. [1843.] The idea of the absence of forests and savannahs annihilates with them the idea of distance.”

What induced the following remarks, I can only imagine:—

“I am content—in relation to poetry—I can understand perfectly. Perhaps, however, you have under-rated certain perceptions of an individual, of poetry in its highest order. The individual in my mind (probably different from the individual in yours) can appreciate Tennyson, Wordsworth, Keats, and your ‘Cosmo.’ Still, I admit that I should shrink a little from the suggested hot ploughshare of your magnificent

“Oblivion, crown’d with infinite blank stars;”

because certainly there is a mystical effluence of poetry (a highest height over the highest height) in Wordsworth, Tennyson, Keats, which escapes the individuality of *my* individual—always did, and must. But now, I think, we have written into about as thick a fog as obliged us to light the candles at noon a few days since. Only I don’t mean to light the candles here.

“I have not the *Blackwood* in question. I could send for the number, but cannot remember definitely. I think it came out just after the ‘Seraphim’—in 1839, was it not?—and I think the paper called itself ‘Our Two Vases,’ that being a current title of a series of critical papers by Christopher North. Mr. Milnes and I were reviewed together in the paper I refer to, and we had it to ourselves.

LETTERS FROM ELIZABETH B. BROWNING. 299

"No—I did not suppose that the opinion I sent to you amounted to much ; but I will send you one, since you care to have it. Also, he and I were associated together with Mr. Sterling, and one or two more *Blackwood* poets, in the *North American Review* of last year. Mr. Milnes was treated unworthily in it, I think, and overthrown for want of imagination and fire. They behaved very generously to me, and, after sundry admonitions, unquestionably founded, dismissed me with a laurel-branch. This paper was written, I have since ascertained, by the Head of Harvard College, Boston—or perhaps 'ascertained' may be too hard and self-satisfied a word—say 'believed' instead.

"So, Tennyson is 'pretty,' is he? Did I ever tell you that I heard a lady—a countess—by the order of St. Louis!—say 'The latter part of Homer is certainly very pretty.' These are your critics, O Israel!

"For my own part, I was going to observe (when I last wrote to you) that I should be satisfied, in the case of a certain mortal enmity, with such an execration as, 'Oh, that mine enemy would write a book!' I stopped the pen, because it struck me as too savage. I will say it now, though."

Who, or what, the above refers to, has no place in my memory at this moment.

"Mr. Lough is engaged on a bust of poor Southey, which is said to be fine, and resembling. His widow went to see it the other day.

"The anonymous 'Life in the Sick Room,' by an invalid, is by Miss Martineau, and worthy of her; full of noble Christian philosophy, and most affecting, through its very calmness.

"I cannot write any more—which is lucky, I believe.

"Yours truly, E. B. B.

"You will be glad to hear that dear Miss Mitford has been chosen Honorary Member of the new Literary Institute, under Buckingham. They have also chosen Agnes Strickland, to prevent any unpleasantness to Miss Mitford, from the circumstance of her being the only woman."

The next Letter refers to two volumes of literary criticism, which were to bear the title of "The New Spirit of the Age," and the assistance of Miss Barrett, Mr. Robert Bell, and two or three others, had been solicited, but without any very definite explanations till the projected work was more matured.

"Dec. 22nd, 1843.

"Just ten minutes before your note came, I held R. Monckton Milnes's volumes in my hands—the two first, at least—having bethought me of taking an opportunity of borrowing them from Mr. Kenyon. So, now if you please, I will make a few notes on them, which you will 'improve' (literally) to the edification of your readers afterwards. And in the meantime (I am very patient, you know), but in the meantime I should like to hear what you want me to do, and what this great subject to come, is. I confess to being moderately curious about it. 'Not Dr. Pusey.' Thank

you for the 'not.' And not a political economist, I hope—not a mathematician, nor a man of science—such a one as Babbage, for instance, to undo me. My dear Mr. Horne, certainly I am a little beset with business just now, being on the verge of getting another volume into print,—with one or two long poems struggling for completion at my hands, in order to a subsequent falling upon the printer's. But if there should be nothing likely to take much time, in the work you meditate for me, I shall be very happy, at present and always, to be of use to you, or trying to do it,—which, as I say it honestly, I hope you will act as if you believed. Thank you much for the promise of proofs, and you will tell me what the new subject is? Not that I am impatient. Oh, no!

"And so you heard of 'Tennyson and Mr. Sterling.' Well! there is no accounting for tastes, as we say with proverbial wisdom; and, what is quite as certain, there is no accounting for 'want of taste.' Mr. Sterling is admired by some, I am aware, and I would rather that you had your impressions of him from reading his book, uncoloured by hearing what I say. He was a contributor to *Blackwood*; and, some two or three years ago, published his contributed poems in an independent form,—just as Mr. Simmons has done. By the way, there are persons who think highly of Mr. Simmons—for instance, Miss Mitford does, praising him for terseness and vigour. To return to Mr. Sterling, I never read his book, although I have read many of his poems in *Blackwood*. He falls, to my appreciation, into the class of respectable poets; good sense and good feeling, somewhat dry and cold, and very level, smooth writing being what I discern in him. There are Mr. Sterling, Mr. Simmons, Lord Leigh, and one or two others, who have education and natural ability enough to be anything in the world *except* poets; and who choose to be poets 'in spite of nature and their stars,' to say nothing of gods, men, and critical columns. Moreover all these writers, by a curious consistency, take up and use the Gallic-Drydeny conception of versification,—so, at least, the passing glances I have had of their proceedings lead me to suppose. Now, you will judge for yourself, dear Mr. Horne, and I shall not be uneasy lest you should fall into prejudices in consequence of my hasty impressions."

"Dec. 28rd, 1843.

"I forgot, after all. Agnes Strickland is the author of the 'Memoirs of the Queens of England,' by which she is principally known. She did, however, write before—tales, I think—perhaps a novel; but, although one of the very best read persons of your acquaintance, in all manner of romances and novels—good, bad, and indifferent,—I do feel rather in a mist about her doings in these respects, only having a faint idea that I have looked through a volume or two of hers, and that I found them of the highly moral, didactic, and useful-knowledge-society description. But do not trust me an inch, for I feel in a mist, and in a sort of fear of confounding the maiden didactication of Mrs. Ellis when she was Sarah Stickney, and this of Miss Strickland's,—having been given to confound Stickneys and Stricklands from the very beginning. One or two volumes

of the 'Memoirs of the Queens of England' I have read; and they seemed to me to show industry and good taste in the selection and compilation of materials. But I did not read any more, just because I like the old *Chronicles*, and dislike the compiling spirit. Miss Lawrence, you are aware, has published *Memoirs of the Queens*, also,—and, moreover, the two ladies have stood at cock'd-pistol in relation to one another, because of this coincidence of subject. I have not seen Miss Lawrence's work, but from indications of extracts, I do more than suspect that she is the deeper-minded woman of the two, and qualified to take in literature, the higher place.

"By the way, either a Stickney or a Strickland wrote the 'Poetry of Life,'—prose (very) essays, which I couldn't get to the end of—full of words, and signifying nothing.

"I confess that I wondered a good deal at Mr. Buckingham's, or the Literary Institute's, selection of Miss Strickland as the second female Honorary Member. Nobody else to be found fit for the honour, except Miss Strickland! And Miss Martineau, Mrs. Jameson, Maria Edgeworth, Mary Howitt, and Lady Morgan all alive—with long-established European reputations! France and Germany will be a little astonished, I think; and, for my own part, although it gave me cordial pleasure to hear of the honour won by, and honourably paid to Miss Mitford, I should have been more pleased, even for her sake, and valued the appreciation more fully, if it had united her name to the names of these distinguished contemporaries, rather than severed it from them.

"Truly yours, E. B. B."

The following "attack upon the Government"—one of the very rarest things to be found in this lady's writings, if not the only instance, will rather amuse some readers when they learn that the angry outburst is attributable to a friendly indignation at my having caught the hooping-cough while collecting evidence for my blue-book reports as an Assistant-Commissioner, mention of which was made in the first of these papers.

"July 24th [of a previous year.]

"There was a blank, dear Mr. Horne, in your last notes when you ought to have said something about the cough. I hope the silence meant that you had quite forgotten all the cutting-up and boiling—the whole process of your 'rejuvenescence'—and that your present suffering is concentrated in the Parliamentary Reports.

"It is an atrocious system altogether—the system established in this England of ours—wherein no river finds its own level, but is forced into leaden pipes, up or down; her fools lifted into chairs of state, her wise men waiting behind them; and her poets made Cinderellas of, and promoted into accurate counters of pots and pans. We need not wonder at the selections. *Everything* 'is rotten in the state of Denmark.'

"Have you seen Miss Sedgwick's book, and heard the great tempest it has stirred up around you in London, without a Franklin to direct the

lightning? She was received from America two or three years since, by certain societies, with open arms,—none ever suspecting her to be the cheil ‘among them, takin’ notes!’ The revelation was dreadful. My friend and cousin, Mr. Kenyon—admitted to be one of the most brilliant conversers in London—fell upon the proof-sheets accidentally, just half-an-hour previous to their publication” [or rather, *printing* must be meant], “and finding them sown thick with personalities, side by side with praises of his own agreeable wit, took courage and a pen, and ‘cleansed the premises!’ Afterwards he wrote across the Atlantic to explain ‘the moral right’ he had to his deed. For my own part, strongly as I feel the *saliency* of Miss Sedgwick’s faults (it struck repeatedly and ungratefully upon some who had bestowed cordial and sisterly attention upon her, and ‘less as an authoress than as a friend’), I am not quite clear about Mr. Kenyon’s ‘right.’ The act was *un peu fort* in its heroism, and probably his American admirers may not thank him as warmly as her victims do.

“Not that I ever do, or could join in the outcry against Boswell and his generation: I like them too well. But there is a line—a limit—to their communicativeness; and such as pass it, dirty their feet.

“Yours,

E. B. B.”

Certainly the feeling of Miss Barrett as to her cousin’s act is the proper one. Any book or article might be completely thrown “off its balance” by such a proceeding. What writer could feel safe if wholesale and unauthorized erasures, or any, could thus be made in his books? And what should we think of any printing-office where this would be permitted?

The present paper having extended several pages beyond my calculation, the Letters on “English Rhymes and Versification” must be deferred, as they will re-open questions which have not been dealt with for many years,—and have never yet been treated with a clear recognition of the philological peculiarities, and, as foreigners so loudly declare—the perversities of the English language.

R. H. HORNE.



THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN FRANCE.

IT is often said, even in serious and well-informed circles, that in matters of religion the whole French people may be divided into two classes, Atheists or Ultramontanes. This belief, which is very generally received by foreigners, is entirely false, and this we hope to prove, by an analysis as accurate as can be made of the different shades of religious opinion in France.

In our judgment there are seven special categories.

The first is the *indifferent*. It is quite possible that this class might have a religious principle if they had time and the disposition to think on the subject. But they are either absorbed in business or politics, or they have that natural mental indifference which delights in frivolous and superficial sentiments entirely removed from all that is serious. Relatively, the number of the indifferent is considerable; but it is much smaller than is generally supposed. In France there are certainly many persons who would be indifferent, were they not obliged to make a profession of religion for the sake of their temporal interests. The influence of the Jesuits is very great, not merely over private persons, but over the Government, the aristocracy, and the higher clergy. But the Jesuits will not tolerate any indifference. When they have to choose between two persons of whom the one is religious and the other indifferent, they always give the preference to the one who is religious. Thus at the Bourse, in the very temple

of Mammon, religious considerations have a powerful influence. The motive has but little to do with real religion, but the fact itself, as we have stated it, is certain.

Among those who are occupied with religion and who try to scrutinise its mysteries, there are some who wish to reduce it to the least possible importance. They do not, like the Atheists, deny the existence of God, but they say that they cannot affirm it. These are the Positivists. It is commonly said that the starting-point of the Positivists is fact. But this is scarcely correct. It is certainly not fact, as such, strictly considered, that is their starting-point, but *material* fact. Everything which does not fall directly under the cognisance of the senses, is for the Positivists nothing at all. And so is everything which proceeds from reasoning, whether deductive or inductive, or which seeks to rise above mere material fact, and to take a place in the region of either first or final cause. The creation of the world, for instance, which is for all other people a logical fact, is not a fact for the Positivists, because they cannot prove it either objectively or materially. God in this system is neither denied nor affirmed, because the Divine existence is not a fact patent to the senses. For every Positivist, therefore, the religious question is only to be solved by a *perhaps*. It may be true. It may be false. No one can establish anything with certainty, and therefore the duty of philosophy is to let it alone. Such is the religious theory of the Positivists. It is not to be confounded with that of the Materialist properly so called, but it approaches it. If it is not a decided denial of the religious thesis, it is yet an effort to put it aside and to deprive it both of value and influence.

This method of considering religion is not very widely received in France. It has but few adherents beyond the disciples of M. Littré. It is, however, necessary to remark that in the Republican press there are many writers with a very pronounced tendency not to erect the theory of material fact into a scientific or religious criterion. They wish rather to set aside all deductions and inductions which can be logically supported by facts, especially those of history. This tendency, which is in reality that of the *République Française*, is certainly not participated in by all the readers of that newspaper. For some years past Positivism in France has been a favourite doctrine in the philosophical and scientific world, and some celebrated men of the upper normal school have contributed not a little to spread it in the universities. But it has so many deficiencies, leaves so many questions in suspense, is so evidently exclusive, gives such narrow limits to human reason, and altogether is so little in harmony with the French genius, that for some time the Positivist school has been retrogressing. The political party represented by the *République*

Française is too intelligent not to perceive that, while it retains the religious theory of the Positivists, it will alienate the minds of which politically it stands most in need. It will certainly end by putting its foot upon ground purely spiritualistic and even Christian. And this will happen just in the degree that it understands that a Republic exclusively Positivist and anti-Christian will be a Republic closed, a sort of little church not less condemned and not less condemnable than the Ultramontane sacristy of the *Univers* or the *Français*.

The category of Spiritualists, properly so called, is much more important than that of the Positivists. It is, perhaps, less in fashion, because it is more ancient, and French people always prefer what has novelty. It rests, however, on a more solid basis, and answers better to the sentiments and needs of the great majority of men. There are, in fact, but few minds which can seriously disbelieve the existence of God, of futurity, and the immortality of the soul. The admission of these three points makes the strength of the Spiritualists against the Positivists. But they do not admit that these three points really constitute their own weakness as against Christians. Certainly the Rationalist Spiritualists might have an increase of numbers, and their principles would be more widely received, if they had a practical religion and could give a positive form to their religious sentiments. But as they reject Christ, and do not receive Christianity in a positive form, they are deprived of public worship, and consequently their religion is private and merely internal. But this is a kind of religion which the French people can scarcely understand. If they are not disposed to be religious, they take their place among the indifferent or the Positivists. But if they want a religion at all, they want one that is public, external, and positive. And so it happens that Rationalist religion is regarded in France more as a philosophy than a religion. Notwithstanding the important religious truths which it sets forth as a religious school, it has but little influence.

The Christian Spiritualists are much more numerous and more influential than the Rationalist. By this name we designate those Spiritualists who, besides the existence of God, the immateriality of the soul, and the future life, admit in a general way the mission of Christ and the truth of Christianity. We say in a general way, because they reject not only as suspicious, but as erroneous, many dogmas taught by the Church. They believe in science and liberty. The Church condemns them, and the Christian Spiritualists in their turn condemn the Church. But in their eyes the Church is not Christianity. They can separate themselves from the Church and still remain Christians. If they could find a Church really liberal, which had a place for science and philosophy, they would be members of

it. But such a Church can nowhere be found, and therefore they are compelled to be without a temple, without public worship, and without religious rites. In this respect they hold a position analogous to that of the pure philosophic Spiritualists. If the question was asked—Do they believe in the Divinity of Jesus Christ? it would be difficult to answer. There are, doubtless, some who do not refuse to admit it. Many, however, say that it is quite incredible, because it cannot be reconciled with reason. Probably they admit it in the rational or philosophical sense set forth by many of the ancient Church Fathers. But the dogma, as explained by what they call the actual Church, they decidedly reject, and prefer to incur all possible anathemas, rather than believe a doctrine which appears to them absurd and anti-Christian.

The number of Christians in France who belong to this category is very considerable. They compare the dogmas which the Church teaches to pieces of money the inscriptions on which cannot be deciphered, so that no one can verify their value. The authority which has formed these pieces of money and stamped them with its image has so abused public confidence that people are persuaded there are counterfeit coins among them. What is to be done? Must they be like the simple persons who voluntarily shut their eyes and are willing to accept all, even the false pieces, as good money? Or is it necessary, like the negative Rationalist, to regard all as false, and reject even that which is really good? No, they say, we must hold by the Christianity which Christ Himself taught, and, to make a thorough reformation, set aside as much as possible the dogmas established by the Church. In the French press it is *L'Opinion Nationale* which is one of the principal organs of the Spiritualist Christians, as the *Journal des Débats* has been and still is the principal organ of writers purely Spiritualist and Rationalist.

In ascending the ladder, the first steps of which we have already mounted, we come next to the fifth category, which is that of the Protestants. Their principal organ is *Le Temps*. Protestantism in France is purely Calvinistic,—a rigid system, very cold and beyond measure exclusive. Many excellent French people have accepted this system, and have done honour to it by their personal qualities. It may, however, now be said that Protestantism has given evidence that it does not suit the necessities of the French character, and that France will never be Protestant. This is the opinion of M. de Pressensée himself. Moreover, in France Protestantism decreases instead of progressing. Without reckoning the loss it has sustained by the annexation to Germany of Alsace and Lorraine, its intestine divisions is one of the wounds which, if they do not cause it immediate death, condemn it to sickness and decay while it awaits

the fatal hour. It is not necessary here to trace the history of the Synod of 1872 nor that of 1873. These two Synods are sufficiently well known. They have shown the full depth and force of the differences which separate the other orthodox and the Liberals. On the one hand, the Liberals, by their letter of the 20th November last year, protested against the decisions of the Synod of 1872 in the name of forty-two consistories, and refused to take part in the deliberations of 1873. On the other hand, the orthodox have maintained the obligatory character of the Synod of 1872, supported by the Council of the State, which has recognised the legality of the Synod. They have consented to drive the Liberals to a schism rather than yield a letter of their creed.

Hitherto it is only Protestantism that has had the principle of free inquiry for its essential basis. By this principle it has gained the sympathy of many of the friends of free inquiry. But the proceedings of the orthodox Protestants of the present day demonstrate that free inquiry is not the basis of Protestantism. Its adherents are now forbidden to believe what they are convinced they ought to believe. The orthodox wish to impose on them the Declaration of Faith made in 1872. This intolerance certainly deprives orthodox Protestants of the reputation for liberality which until now they have possessed. That is not all. They have even appealed to the State. After using all their influence through M. Guizot and some other persons to be allowed to declare legal the Confession of Faith of 1872, they use this approbation of the State as an authority against their adversaries. *Le Christianisme du XIX^e Siècle*, the organ, according to M. Guizot, of the orthodox, expressed itself lately* in these words: "Henceforth our Church has legally a creed and an organization. We are now a Church." Until this present time many persons in France had believed that the authority of the State had nothing to do with the Protestant faith. But to-day the orthodox prove the contrary. They reject the Catholic principle of the authority of the universal Church in the matter of simple historical testimony, and yet accept as a legal and binding decision the civil authority of a council of State. This fact, as well as the negative Rationalism which prevails among the Liberals, and that kind of Ultramontanism which governs orthodox Protestants, is but little likely to gain adherents to Protestantism.

It is useless to cite here the lamentations which Protestants have themselves made over this state of things. They are only too near the truth when they see in their divisions a cause of decay and even of final ruin. They deceive themselves when they appeal to isolated conversions made either by the Right or the Left as a proof that their numbers are increasing. In the towns, and especially in Paris,

* Nov. 21, 1873.

many starving Catholics will consent to receive a Protestant Bible or to hear a Protestant sermon for the sake of temporal assistance. Many will even subscribe themselves as Protestants in the registers that they may have a right to Protestant charities. But the same persons will also subscribe themselves as Catholics in the Catholic registers. Their religion is only a question of a bit of bread. They will abandon Protestantism to-morrow and return to the Catholic Church if they find that Catholicism has more material advantages than Protestantism. In the country, Protestant conversions are less interested, but they are scarcely of more importance. The Catholics among whom the Protestant pastors find converts are those already disgusted with the priests and with Ultramontanism. This circumstance is favourable to the Protestants. They preach to these good people the necessity of breaking with Rome, with the Pope, and the Papal clergy. They also speak to them of the necessity of loving God, following Christ, reading the Holy Scriptures, obeying conscience, and praying for saving grace. To this kind of preaching the Protestant pastors generally limit themselves, and all this is simply Catholic—not Roman Catholic, but Catholic. If, after the preaching of the Protestant pastor, there were to come an Old Catholic priest who would explain to these good people true Catholicism, they would remain Catholics. At present they declare themselves Protestants, because they do not see how they can be true Catholics and yet reject Romanism. It is not their fault that they are called Protestants. They have been driven to Protestantism by the recent insanities of the Romanists.

Such is the exact situation of Protestantism in France. Speaking personally, we regard Protestantism and even Calvinism as nearer to true Christianity than Ultramontanism. We would therefore sooner see France become Protestant, yea, even Calvinist, than see it become Ultramontane. Yet, notwithstanding our appreciation of Protestantism and our desire to be friendly towards it, we must agree with M. de Pressensée and M. Monod that France never will be Protestant. We are rather persuaded that Protestantism in France must decline. It has prospered because of the unjust persecutions to which it has been subjected, and because it stands alone to protest against the abuses of Rome. But these two causes have now ceased to exist. Protestantism has no longer to fight with outward enemies. Its foes are those of its own household. It has to contend with schisms which are stronger than itself. On the other hand, in the degree that Old Catholicism is developed and effects an anti-Papal reform, it will deprive Protestantism of its *raison d'être*. These are our reasons for believing that the days of Protestantism are numbered if it does not reform itself and seek seriously to find a way of reconciliation between the orthodox and the liberals.

The vast majority of the French people are Catholic. But since the recent Council of the Vatican, there are two ways of being Catholic. One is that of the Old Catholics, and the other is that of the Roman Catholics.

If we are to judge merely by the numbers in official statistics, it is evident that the Old Catholics scarcely deserve to be mentioned. In statistics the custom has hitherto prevailed in France to regard as Roman Catholics all who briefly subscribe themselves as Catholics. But many Catholics, not *Roman*, prefer to subscribe themselves merely as Catholics.

The qualification, *ancient* or *old*, is not much in favour with a people who are disposed to be liberal and progressive. The title of Old Catholic is very well borne in Germany; but that is a reason why people do not wish to bear it in France, even though they are ready to proclaim their horror of the Papacy on the house-tops, though they reject Protestantism and wish to remain Catholic, they yet object to be called Old Catholics.

Under the Ministry of M. Jules Simon, we asked, in the name of the Old Catholics of Paris, if the French Government would consent to regard as Catholic, and consequently as having a right to all the privileges granted to Catholics by the Concordat of 1801, those who declared themselves Catholic and Apostolic, but not *Roman*. The answer was in the negative. As it is not possible in France to oppose Papal infallibility and incur the Roman censures without passing *ipso facto* for a non-Roman Catholic, it follows, from the answer of the Minister of Worship, that the French Government has decided to refuse all protection to the Old Catholics, and to leave only to Roman, that is, to Ultramontane Catholics, the use of the cathedrals, the churches, and all that is properly Catholic property. This decision at such an epoch was a terrible blow to Old Catholicism in France. The French people at the present time have nothing of the English or American ideas of passing from the State to their own resources in religious matters. They have been too long accustomed to receive everything at the hands of the State. The result is that the Old Catholics are paralysed. They cannot contend with the Roman Catholics, who are admitted to the sole possession of the churches, who have all the privileges allowed to Catholics, and are alone permitted to touch the forty-eight millions which forms the budget of Catholic worship.

Two other considerations have hindered the Old Catholics from rallying their strength and forming an external organization. The first is that not being recognized as Catholics by the Government, they have not the right to meet for worship with more than twenty persons present. The second is that Paris being always in a state of siege .

all public conferences were forbidden to them, even such as were lawful at other times. In such a state of things, deprived of every right, refused all help, being unable even to assist in the maintenance of the priests who offered their services, the Old Catholics were prevented from making any legal or public organization. Whilst the Jesuits and the Ultramontanes could meet at their will to cry "Long live Henry V. and long live the Pope our King," the Old Catholics could not even meet to pray, to read the Gospels, and to cry, "Long live France and down with Papal tyranny!"

The Old Catholics of France are not, however, to be reckoned by official figures. The official or visible number in religion is but a small matter. Religion is not an affair of legal figures, but of the conscience. We must place ourselves on the domain of the conscience, and then try to estimate the true strength of Old Catholicism, and to contrast the number of its adherents with that of the Roman Catholics. On this domain the Old Catholics are certainly much more numerous than the Roman Catholics, for this simple reason, that the Catholics in France who do not believe in the infallibility of the Pope are much more numerous than those who do. We must here remark that in the Roman system it is not enough to submit externally to the dogmas of the Vatican and the Syllabus. They must be accepted with all the heart and mind as truths taught by Christ Himself. In a word, they must be received with a divine faith. Whoever does not so receive them may be a Romanist externally or in appearance, but he is not one in reality. The laity cannot believe that on this point Rome is so rigorous. They think that if they submit to new dogmas by simple obedience and not by faith, that is all that is required. But they are deceived. Any Roman theologian whom they may consult will undeceive them on this point. The number of sincere Roman Catholics, when tried by this test, is really very small.

Who are the believers in Papal infallibility and the monstrosities of the Syllabus? The pilgrims? The readers of the *Univers*? The members of the fraternities? The admirers of the new miracles? Not at all. We know pilgrims who went to Paray-le-Monial, to Lourdes, and to Mount St. Michael, purely for a pleasure trip and to enjoy picturesque scenery at a reduced price. It is a thing perfectly well known that the greater part of the workmen and peasants who went on pilgrimage received, besides their expenses, two francs a-day. Who will maintain that such pilgrims believe in Papal infallibility and the Syllabus? As to the readers of the *Univers*, we know personally that they are arrant sceptics and believe nothing of these miracles. One of the celebrities of this journal, which Montalembert called "the journal of the clerical *canaille*," confessed to us that his

work for this journal had no other motive but the necessity of living. Among the members of the fraternities there are those certainly whose simplicity goes the length of believing whatever Rome teaches. But how many are there who are members of these fraternities merely for material interests? How many directors, especially at Rome, make use of these fraternities as the means of getting money? The history of the embezzlement of funds in many associations would be curious, if it were not sad. What shall we say of the physicians who pronounce the cures miraculous? Are they not for the most part physicians belonging to convents and seminaries, and consequently paid to speak as they do? Ask them about Papal infallibility, and they will answer with a sceptical smile, which is sufficient evidence of their unbelief.

But let us suppose that all the Roman Catholics of whom we are speaking really and sincerely believe in Papal infallibility and the contents of the Syllabus. Would the number be as considerable as people seem to think? Not by any means. The pilgrims who have been enrolled for Paray-le-Monial and La Salette were the same as those who had been enrolled for Lourdes and Pontmain. The readers of the *Univers* and other Ultramontane journals are recruited by the clergy. Deprived of the subsidies necessary for existence, these journals would perish. They are only sustained by the propaganda of the Jesuits and the purse of the Pope. They have no connection with the actual life of the French people, but are purely the work of a caste or sect. The same may be said of the fraternities, of those who drink the miraculous water, of the admirers of the young man of La Salette, of Bernadotte, and other visionary personages. And can it be denied that these are but an insignificant minority? In the towns the majority of Roman Catholics are so little disposed for new dogmas that intelligent priests, even those in nowise liberal, forbid their penitents to speak of them. They say, "Believe what the Church believes, and do not trouble yourself about the rest." Evidently they do not themselves believe in the doctrines of the Ultramontanes. In the rural districts, notwithstanding the proverbial simplicity of the peasantry, there are villages in which it would be impossible to discover a single Ultramontane. Such is the impression we received in a tour lately made in Burgundy, and by the banks of the Saone. In all these villages the peasantry go to the only church which is open to them because they cannot do otherwise. They submit to the sermons, or rather the chidings, of the Curé, because they cannot have a Curé of their own choosing. They are equally hostile to the opinions of the Pope, the monks, the Jesuits, and the whole generation that disport themselves in cassocks and birettas. The foreigner who places himself at the door of a church

on Sunday, and forms his judgment of the strength of Roman Catholicism by the number of worshippers, will be entirely deceived. To get at the real state of matters it is necessary to live among the people, to speak with the masses, and to learn their thoughts from their words. Whoever will undertake this work will find that France is in nowise Ultramontane.

It is thus necessary to distinguish between the official numbers which are found in the parish and municipal registers, and those which represent conscience and conviction. According to the first, almost all Catholics are Romanists. According to the second, the immense majority of Catholics is anti-papistical and anti-ultramontane. When M. Veuillot tried to console himself for the defeat of his candidate, Colonel Stoffel, he wrote: "It is no disgrace to have been beaten at Thermopylæ, and to have been but three hundred for our native land and for right against a whole army of Asiatics." The Old Catholics can return these words to M. Veuillot and the Ultramontanes. Whatever may be the form under which they will organize themselves for the future, they are sufficiently certain of a triumph over the Ultramontanes, to be able to console themselves for the want of any present official reckoning. The more faithful they are to conscience, to knowledge, and to liberty, the more they will gain public opinion in their favour, and hasten the ruin of their adversaries.

Sir Robert Peel said on the fall of Louis Philippe: "See what it is to regard the majority around oneself, and not the opinion of the country." In France, all governments of that kind fall, and in like manner shall perish the official Church of the Jesuits and Ultramontanes. In spite of all our efforts not to be deceived, and not in any way to under-estimate the strength of the Ultramontane party, it is impossible to believe that it can have a future.

Roman Catholicism in France at the present time, with a few honourable exceptions, is but a tissue of superstition, of scepticism, of intolerable absolutism, of ancient *régime* politics, and of gross cupidity. Superstition in the Romanist Churches! Is it necessary to speak of it when the chief occupations are worshipping statues, drinking waters, making pilgrimages, and obtaining papal indulgences? This superstition of pilgrimages and of papal indulgences is such that only yesterday the *Pèlerin*, an official organ of the pilgrimages, proposed "a pilgrimage to Purgatory." There had been great care to depict the horror of this prison, the vehemence of the flames, the terrible lamentations of souls, and other such things, in order to excite the faithful to obtain papal indulgences, and thus to spread abroad, indirectly, the belief that the Pope delivers from the pains of purgatory, and that he is consequently the master of the living and the dead—Jupiter and Pluto in one. All this is only a

religion of pilfering. Rome knows marvellously well the secret of frightening souls, in order to govern them. Hence, all the superstitions which abound among the faithful, and which are maintained as the "*Instrumenta Regni*" of papal dominion.

Naturally, and in fact logically, unbelief and scepticism accompany superstition. It is not of the whole of France, but only of Ultramontane France, that it has been accurately said, "Catholic by name, and in appearance, France is almost without religion, and what is still worse, the little which remains has only a deleterious influence." Lately, an Ultramontane journal said of Mr. Seward, that he wanted nothing to be perfect but the seal which Catholicism gives. In the eyes of this Romanist journal, Catholicism is only an affair of the seal. In a Parisian circle, where the young people profess Ultramontane piety, a Prelate having held a Conference on the existence of God, the *Semaine Religieuse de Paris* had the frankness to report that certain of these pious young people after the Conference cried, "Ah! I had need of this Conference." In Romanism, people are really pious, and often doubt of the existence of God! How many priests and bishops are there who in their private assemblies laugh at dogmas of their Church! People reproach them with making orders upon all the pious futilities of Ultramontane devotion, in order to recommend them to the faithful. But their conduct is very simple. Their end in this is to imitate Alcibiades, who caused the tail of his dog to be cut off, that he might hinder the Athenians from speaking of more serious matters. So long as the faithful are engaged with medals and amulets, they do not think upon the political and social perils of the doctrine of the Syllabus, and still less on the utility of separating the State from the Roman Church, and of suppressing the budget of worship. M. Veuillot is very much ridiculed by the "buffoons" of Frohsdorf and of Salzbourg. Alas! is there no one to ridicule still more the buffoons of Rome? Is M. Veuillot himself sincere when he preaches the "worship of the humanity of Jesus Christ," throwing his Church into the Nestorian heresy condemned at the Council of Ephesus? In its foundation, the Jesuit worship of the "Sacred Heart," which to-day sums up the whole worship of the Roman Church, is only a Nestorian worship, which implies paganism under the appearance of Christianity.

To teach such insanities in this age it is necessary to deny Science and Philosophy. Thus the Romanist Code of to-day, the Syllabus, contains all anathemas, possible and impossible, against human reason, against liberty and conscience. Human reason is called a perverse faculty, liberty the path to perdition, and the rights of conscience only the pretext to escape from the performance of duties. From this to the profession of absolutism there is but one step. Has

not the Church of Rome taken this step? Its religious constitution since the Council of the Vatican is a constitution essentially absolute. With much more reason ought it to declare itself for absolutism in politics. The Jesuits, since their expulsion from Germany, are too numerous in France not to have succeeded in propagating their tyrannical doctrines among their devotees. The demonstrations organized by them, have clearly proved that the last word of the Roman religion is a political word—the re-establishment of the Bourbon monarchy in France, in Spain, and in Italy, in order thereby to establish the temporal power of the Pope.

At the present day when a priest ascends the pulpit it is neither to teach dogma nor morality, but to speak politics. The bishops scarcely use the pen except to write pamphlets filled with political allusions and intentions. These intentions are no longer a secret to anyone. It is known by all the world that Ultramontanism in reality is but an electoral manoeuvre; that the miracles of these last months were only means to bring the Comte de Chambord to the throne; that the public prayers in the Ultramontane churches were only imprecations against the Revolution and the Republic; that the altar as well as the vestry was only a ballot-box for political elections; that the Pilgrimage, "that grand act of piety of the nineteenth century," according to the words of the Bishop of Carcassonne, is only a Legitimist manifestation with white ribbons. Even now, notwithstanding the letter of the Comte de Chambord of the 27th of October last, the Archbishop of Paris persists in recommending in the *Semaine Religieuse* of his diocese Legitimist and Bourbon pamphlets. Of the gospel there is not a word, but of all which favours the cause of the ancient political régime and of the Syllabus there is a most pompous eulogy.

Not only have the Roman Catholics of France put politics in the place of religion, but they have even made an alliance with the worst, the most unpopular, and the most detested of all political creeds. They are violent and illiberal. "Let the king decide by force and by flags," cried M. Veuillot; "all will be good that comes from his hand, all will be bad that comes from any other." La Veille, calling the Princes of Orleans merchant-kings, expresses himself thus: "Charles X. thought that these merchant-kings would bring about bankruptcy. He maintained that his grandson was a man of God, and at the same time a man of iron. That is often the *same thing*. To speak the truth there is nothing prudent or patient, or sweet or strong, but the man of iron who is at the same time a man of God." It is sufficiently well known that the expression "man of God" is only an excuse to cover the man of iron. It is known that nothing is conformable to the Romanist mind of to-day but the apology of the sabre. It is known that the French bishops, under the pressure

of M. Veuillot and the Jesuits, have desired nothing but the re-establishment of the temporal power of the Pope, even by arms, and at the price of a war with Italy. Besides, has not the *Univers* opened its columns for a subscription in favour of the bands of Don Carlos in Spain? It is to this work of pillage and of civil war that the Ultramontane clergy in France must, under the penalty of being marked by their superiors, consecrate a part of their revenue. Obligated thus, to please their superiors so as to deserve promotion, to take from their modest revenue, to subscribe to-day in favour of the Carlists, to-morrow in favour of the Church of the Sacred Heart, and the day after in favour of the penny of St. Peter, the clergy have felt a serious burden. Hence in many ecclesiastics there has been a development of a gross and extreme cupidity, such as has never been known before. One of the principal complaints of the peasantry against the clergy of the present day is their rapacity in questions of fees for masses, burials, or marriages. We know some curés who never say mass but where it is paid in advance, and yet often exact that it be chanted in order to raise the charge. This commerce in masses is scandalous, even in the best managed vestries. As to the diversion of fees, especially in Paris, it is shameful and iniquitous.

What other reproaches could not be made against the Ultramontane priests of the present day! But we do not wish to recriminate. Our office is that of the historian who states facts, and not that of the advocate who pleads a cause. All the friends of philosophy and of science, the defenders of liberty, progress, and civilisation, are decidedly hostile to the Romanist party. How many councils, both in the provinces and in the towns, have demanded the separation of the Church from the State! The whole French Liberal press, whatever may be their different opinions in religion, combats in every possible way Ultramontane Romanism and Papistry—that is to say, actual Roman Catholicism, which is regarded as an element of decay and ruin for the country. In Dec. 1872, during the presidency of M. Thiers, a Republican journal, at that time moderate, said, "The Roman question has pressed heavily on France, and in the most deplorable way, for the last twenty years: It was this question which destroyed the Republic of 1848. It was this question which influenced the destinies of the Empire, and hastened its fall. Supported by the experience of history, we may say that every government which cannot fairly solve this grave Roman question is destined to perish. A government may err in matters of taxation and finance. It may err in its military organization, and even as to civil and political right. These errors would be unfortunate, but an error on the Roman question will, sooner or later, end in destruction." If this could be said in 1872, what may we not say in 1873? There

is certainly not one Liberal journal which does not wish to have done with the theories of the Syllabus. Some politicians, very forgetful of the noble line of conduct pursued at other times by the French Government, are afraid to proceed against Jesuitism and Ultramontanism. Their sole reason is that they must not follow the course followed in Germany, and especially in Prussia. This is a piece of miserable *Chauvinisme* too wretched long to restrain a really reasonable and patriotic man. Hostility to Roman Catholicism, as defined by Rome and the servile bishops, is profound and general throughout the whole Liberal camp. Catholicism has succeeded in making superficial persons believe it to be a colossal statue, but to clear-sighted men it is only a gigantic image with feet made of clay.

It will be objected that in some solitary corner of the Roman Catholic Church in France there are to be found liberal men. From this it will be inferred that we have reasoned inaccurately concerning the weakness and the unpopularity of Roman Catholicism in France. But this objection is not serious. There was, indeed, until the end of 1870, a Liberal Catholicism in France. The proceedings of the Vatican Council did not meet the approbation of the whole of the French bishops. But now that the Council is regarded as œcumenical by all the bishops, and its dogmas published as the true dogmas of the Catholic Church, there are in France no more Liberal Catholics. The old school of Montalembert and Lacordaire is defunct. Doubtless, Monseigneur Dupanloup is still in the land of the living, but he is no more the Dupanloup of 1869 and 1870. That Dupanloup is dead. He does not dare to speak or write any more. There is no other alive but the Dupanloup of 1873, who intrigues in favour of the Comte de Chambord, who combats the principles of 1789, who falls on his knees at the holy will of Pius IX., who keeps silence in the presence of M. Veuillot, and who obeys every word of the orders given him, directly or indirectly, by the Society of Jesus. Doubtless also we have Monseigneur Maret still a dean of the Sorbonne. He is also the Head of the Chapter of St. Denis. This last title, which is accompanied with a great revenue, has just been given him as "drink-money" in the way of recompense for his submission to the Jesuits and Rome. He is now so far from maintaining the doctrines which he taught and defended in 1869 and 1870, that he has preached so well of Ecclesiastical retreats at Lyons and other places, as to win compliments from his old adversary M. Dom Guéranger. The other Liberal bishops, who in the time of peace were bold as lions and eager for the combat, have become timid as stags, and betaken themselves to flight in the time of war. There is also Perraud and some other Ecclesiastics who think and speak like Père

Gratry. But they prefer acting the part of their chiefs to fighting for victory and deliverance. This contemptible generation was formed for slavery. They put on the mask of sanctity, but that does not change their nature. They are still servile, and of all kinds of servility that of the conscience is the most impious.

The laity who pride themselves on being Liberal Catholics, have not been more dignified than the bishops and priests of the same school. Neither the Duke de Broglie, nor M. Arnaud, nor M. de Carné, nor the writers in the *Correspondant* and the *Français* have had the courage to remain faithful to the Catholic symbol, and to maintain firmly the Liberal flag against the political absolutism of the Syllabus. It avails nothing that the Duke de Broglie is to-day in power. The place which he occupies in politics is not of that kind which can permit the Liberal Catholicism of 1870. These gentlemen did well to conceal themselves and beat a retreat as soon as they heard of new dogmas. They did well to invent a system of hypocritical silence which the *Français* has brought to the highest perfection. They have deceived no one. The Pope has explicitly condemned them by two briefs. The official journals of the Roman Curia show them daily that it is not possible for them to be called Roman Catholics. Their position in other respects is logically untenable and their title only a deception; in fact, they dare not even maintain that they exist. All that people know about them is that they accept officially the new dogmas of the Vatican. Now and then they bark a little at M. Veuillot, to make people believe that they have still some of the old rancour, but their barks are those of the theatre, where the sole object is only to deceive the gallery. This mimic life cannot long continue possible. There is no true medium between Roman Catholicism and Old Catholicism. The latter is alone truly Catholic and truly Liberal.

In a word, the French Ultramontanes do not yet perceive the position which they occupy. For this position they have to thank the ignorance and dread of change which govern the masses; they have also to thank the protection accorded to them by the State to the exclusion of the Old Catholics, with the possession of all the churches and the revenues. In all these reasons there is not one which relates to conscience, and what is properly religion, so that any one would be justified in saying the Roman religion is not a religion which has any religious cause of existence. Is not a religion reduced to that stage of decay, a religion condemned? It has done well to organize for long years a system of crass ignorance and imbecile stupidity among its adherents. It has done well to maintain this even to this day by protesting against primary and compulsory instruction. It has done well to move heaven and earth to raise

of Mammon, religious considerations have a powerful influence. The motive has but little to do with real religion, but the fact itself, as we have stated it, is certain.

Among those who are occupied with religion and who try to scrutinise its mysteries, there are some who wish to reduce it to the least possible importance. They do not, like the Atheists, deny the existence of God, but they say that they cannot affirm it. These are the Positivists. It is commonly said that the starting-point of the Positivists is fact. But this is scarcely correct. It is certainly not fact, as such, strictly considered, that is their starting-point, but *material* fact. Everything which does not fall directly under the cognisance of the senses, is for the Positivists nothing at all. And so is everything which proceeds from reasoning, whether deductive or inductive, or which seeks to rise above mere material fact, and to take a place in the region of either first or final cause. The creation of the world, for instance, which is for all other people a logical fact, is not a fact for the Positivists, because they cannot prove it either objectively or materially. God in this system is neither denied nor affirmed, because the Divine existence is not a fact patent to the senses. For every Positivist, therefore, the religious question is only to be solved by a *perhaps*. It may be true. It may be false. No one can establish anything with certainty, and therefore the duty of philosophy is to let it alone. Such is the religious theory of the Positivists. It is not to be confounded with that of the Materialist properly so called, but it approaches it. If it is not a decided denial of the religious thesis, it is yet an effort to put it aside and to deprive it both of value and influence.

This method of considering religion is not very widely received in France. It has but few adherents beyond the disciples of M. Littré. It is, however, necessary to remark that in the Republican press there are many writers with a very pronounced tendency not to erect the theory of material fact into a scientific or religious criterion. They wish rather to set aside all deductions and inductions which can be logically supported by facts, especially those of history. This tendency, which is in reality that of the *République Française*, is certainly not participated in by all the readers of that newspaper. For some years past Positivism in France has been a favourite doctrine in the philosophical and scientific world, and some celebrated men of the upper normal school have contributed not a little to spread it in the universities. But it has so many deficiencies, leaves so many questions in suspense, is so evidently exclusive, gives such narrow limits to human reason, and altogether is so little in harmony with the French genius, that for some time the Positivist school has been retrogressing. The political party represented by the *République*

Française is too intelligent not to perceive that, while it retains the religious theory of the Positivists, it will alienate the minds of which politically it stands most in need. It will certainly end by putting its foot upon ground purely spiritualistic and even Christian. And this will happen just in the degree that it understands that a Republic exclusively Positivist and anti-Christian will be a Republic closed, a sort of little church not less condemned and not less condemnable than the Ultramontane sacristy of the *Univers* or the *Français*.

The category of Spiritualists, properly so called, is much more important than that of the Positivists. It is, perhaps, less in fashion, because it is more ancient, and French people always prefer what has novelty. It rests, however, on a more solid basis, and answers better to the sentiments and needs of the great majority of men. There are, in fact, but few minds which can seriously disbelieve the existence of God, of futurity, and the immortality of the soul. The admission of these three points makes the strength of the Spiritualists against the Positivists. But they do not admit that these three points really constitute their own weakness as against Christians. Certainly the Rationalist Spiritualists might have an increase of numbers, and their principles would be more widely received, if they had a practical religion and could give a positive form to their religious sentiments. But as they reject Christ, and do not receive Christianity in a positive form, they are deprived of public worship, and consequently their religion is private and merely internal. But this is a kind of religion which the French people can scarcely understand. If they are not disposed to be religious, they take their place among the indifferent or the Positivists. But if they want a religion at all, they want one that is public, external, and positive. And so it happens that Rationalist religion is regarded in France more as a philosophy than a religion. Notwithstanding the important religious truths which it sets forth as a religious school, it has but little influence.

The Christian Spiritualists are much more numerous and more influential than the Rationalist. By this name we designate those Spiritualists who, besides the existence of God, the immateriality of the soul, and the future life, admit in a general way the mission of Christ and the truth of Christianity. We say in a general way, because they reject not only as suspicious, but as erroneous, many dogmas taught by the Church. They believe in science and liberty. The Church condemns them, and the Christian Spiritualists in their turn condemn the Church. But in their eyes the Church is not Christianity. They can separate themselves from the Church and still remain Christians. If they could find a Church really liberal, which had a place for science and philosophy, they would be members of

it. But such a Church can nowhere be found, and therefore they are compelled to be without a temple, without public worship, and without religious rites. In this respect they hold a position analogous to that of the pure philosophic Spiritualists. If the question was asked—Do they believe in the Divinity of Jesus Christ? it would be difficult to answer. There are, doubtless, some who do not refuse to admit it. Many, however, say that it is quite incredible, because it cannot be reconciled with reason. Probably they admit it in the rational or philosophical sense set forth by many of the ancient Church Fathers. But the dogma, as explained by what they call the actual Church, they decidedly reject, and prefer to incur all possible anathemas, rather than believe a doctrine which appears to them absurd and anti-Christian.

The number of Christians in France who belong to this category is very considerable. They compare the dogmas which the Church teaches to pieces of money the inscriptions on which cannot be deciphered, so that no one can verify their value. The authority which has formed these pieces of money and stamped them with its image has so abused public confidence that people are persuaded there are counterfeit coins among them. What is to be done? Must they be like the simple persons who voluntarily shut their eyes and are willing to accept all, even the false pieces, as good money? Or is it necessary, like the negative Rationalist, to regard all as false, and reject even that which is really good? No, they say, we must hold by the Christianity which Christ Himself taught, and, to make a thorough reformation, set aside as much as possible the dogmas established by the Church. In the French press it is *L'Opinion Nationale* which is one of the principal organs of the Spiritualist Christians, as the *Journal des Débats* has been and still is the principal organ of writers purely Spiritualist and Rationalist.

In ascending the ladder, the first steps of which we have already mounted, we come next to the fifth category, which is that of the Protestants. Their principal organ is *Le Temps*. Protestantism in France is purely Calvinistic,—a rigid system, very cold and beyond measure exclusive. Many excellent French people have accepted this system, and have done honour to it by their personal qualities. It may, however, now be said that Protestantism has given evidence that it does not suit the necessities of the French character, and that France will never be Protestant. This is the opinion of M. de Pressensée himself. Moreover, in France Protestantism decreases instead of progressing. Without reckoning the loss it has sustained by the annexation to Germany of Alsace and Lorraine, its intestine divisions is one of the wounds which, if they do not cause it immediate death, condemn it to sickness and decay while it awaits

the fatal hour. It is not necessary here to trace the history of the Synod of 1872 nor that of 1873. These two Synods are sufficiently well known. They have shown the full depth and force of the differences which separate the other orthodox and the Liberals. On the one hand, the Liberals, by their letter of the 20th November last year, protested against the decisions of the Synod of 1872 in the name of forty-two consistories, and refused to take part in the deliberations of 1873. On the other hand, the orthodox have maintained the obligatory character of the Synod of 1872, supported by the Council of the State, which has recognised the legality of the Synod. They have consented to drive the Liberals to a schism rather than yield a letter of their creed.

Hitherto it is only Protestantism that has had the principle of free inquiry for its essential basis. By this principle it has gained the sympathy of many of the friends of free inquiry. But the proceedings of the orthodox Protestants of the present day demonstrate that free inquiry is not the basis of Protestantism. Its adherents are now forbidden to believe what they are convinced they ought to believe. The orthodox wish to impose on them the Declaration of Faith made in 1872. This intolerance certainly deprives orthodox Protestants of the reputation for liberality which until now they have possessed. That is not all. They have even appealed to the State. After using all their influence through M. Guizot and some other persons to be allowed to declare legal the Confession of Faith of 1872, they use this approbation of the State as an authority against their adversaries. *Le Christianisme du XIX^e Siècle*, the organ, according to M. Guizot, of the orthodox, expressed itself lately* in these words: "Henceforth our Church has legally a creed and an organization. We are now a Church." Until this present time many persons in France had believed that the authority of the State had nothing to do with the Protestant faith. But to-day the orthodox prove the contrary. They reject the Catholic principle of the authority of the universal Church in the matter of simple historical testimony, and yet accept as a legal and binding decision the civil authority of a council of State. This fact, as well as the negative Rationalism which prevails among the Liberals, and that kind of Ultramontanism which governs orthodox Protestants, is but little likely to gain adherents to Protestantism.

It is useless to cite here the lamentations which Protestants have themselves made over this state of things. They are only too near the truth when they see in their divisions a cause of decay and even of final ruin. They deceive themselves when they appeal to isolated conversions made either by the Right or the Left as a proof that their numbers are increasing. In the towns, and especially in Paris,

* Nov. 21, 1873.

many starving Catholics will consent to receive a Protestant Bible or to hear a Protestant sermon for the sake of temporal assistance. Many will even subscribe themselves as Protestants in the registers that they may have a right to Protestant charities. But the same persons will also subscribe themselves as Catholics in the Catholic registers. Their religion is only a question of a bit of bread. They will abandon Protestantism to-morrow and return to the Catholic Church if they find that Catholicism has more material advantages than Protestantism. In the country, Protestant conversions are less interested, but they are scarcely of more importance. The Catholics among whom the Protestant pastors find converts are those already disgusted with the priests and with Ultramontanism. This circumstance is favourable to the Protestants. They preach to these good people the necessity of breaking with Rome, with the Pope, and the Papal clergy. They also speak to them of the necessity of loving God, following Christ, reading the Holy Scriptures, obeying conscience, and praying for saving grace. To this kind of preaching the Protestant pastors generally limit themselves, and all this is simply Catholic—not Roman Catholic, but Catholic. If, after the preaching of the Protestant pastor, there were to come an Old Catholic priest who would explain to these good people true Catholicism, they would remain Catholics. At present they declare themselves Protestants, because they do not see how they can be true Catholics and yet reject Romanism. It is not their fault that they are called Protestants. They have been driven to Protestantism by the recent insanities of the Romanists.

Such is the exact situation of Protestantism in France. Speaking personally, we regard Protestantism and even Calvinism as nearer to true Christianity than Ultramontanism. We would therefore sooner see France become Protestant, yea, even Calvinist, than see it become Ultramontane. Yet, notwithstanding our appreciation of Protestantism and our desire to be friendly towards it, we must agree with M. de Pressensée and M. Monod that France never will be Protestant. We are rather persuaded that Protestantism in France must decline. It has prospered because of the unjust persecutions to which it has been subjected, and because it stands alone to protest against the abuses of Rome. But these two causes have now ceased to exist. Protestantism has no longer to fight with outward enemies. Its foes are those of its own household. It has to contend with schisms which are stronger than itself. On the other hand, in the degree that Old Catholicism is developed and effects an anti-Papal reform, it will deprive Protestantism of its *raison d'être*. These are our reasons for believing that the days of Protestantism are numbered if it does not reform itself and seek seriously to find a way of reconciliation between the orthodox and the liberals.

The vast majority of the French people are Catholic. But since the recent Council of the Vatican, there are two ways of being Catholic. One is that of the Old Catholics, and the other is that of the Roman Catholics.

If we are to judge merely by the numbers in official statistics, it is evident that the Old Catholics scarcely deserve to be mentioned. In statistics the custom has hitherto prevailed in France to regard as Roman Catholics all who briefly subscribe themselves as Catholics. But many Catholics, not *Roman*, prefer to subscribe themselves merely as Catholics.

The qualification, *ancient* or *old*, is not much in favour with a people who are disposed to be liberal and progressive. The title of Old Catholic is very well borne in Germany; but that is a reason why people do not wish to bear it in France, even though they are ready to proclaim their horror of the Papacy on the house-tops, though they reject Protestantism and wish to remain Catholic, they yet object to be called Old Catholics.

Under the Ministry of M. Jules Simon, we asked, in the name of the Old Catholics of Paris, if the French Government would consent to regard as Catholic, and consequently as having a right to all the privileges granted to Catholics by the Concordat of 1801, those who declared themselves Catholic and Apostolic, but not *Roman*. The answer was in the negative. As it is not possible in France to oppose Papal infallibility and incur the Roman censures without passing *ipso facto* for a non-Roman Catholic, it follows, from the answer of the Minister of Worship, that the French Government has decided to refuse all protection to the Old Catholics, and to leave only to Roman, that is, to Ultramontane Catholics, the use of the cathedrals, the churches, and all that is properly Catholic property. This decision at such an epoch was a terrible blow to Old Catholicism in France. The French people at the present time have nothing of the English or American ideas of passing from the State to their own resources in religious matters. They have been too long accustomed to receive everything at the hands of the State. The result is that the Old Catholics are paralysed. They cannot contend with the Roman Catholics, who are admitted to the sole possession of the churches, who have all the privileges allowed to Catholics, and are alone permitted to touch the forty-eight millions which forms the budget of Catholic worship.

Two other considerations have hindered the Old Catholics from rallying their strength and forming an external organization. The first is that not being recognized as Catholics by the Government, they have not the right to meet for worship with more than twenty persons present. The second is that Paris being always in a state of siege .

all public conferences were forbidden to them, even such as were lawful at other times. In such a state of things, deprived of every right, refused all help, being unable even to assist in the maintenance of the priests who offered their services, the Old Catholics were prevented from making any legal or public organization. Whilst the Jesuits and the Ultramontanes could meet at their will to cry "Long live Henry V. and long live the Pope our King," the Old Catholics could not even meet to pray, to read the Gospels, and to cry, "Long live France and down with Papal tyranny!"

The Old Catholics of France are not, however, to be reckoned by official figures. The official or visible number in religion is but a small matter. Religion is not an affair of legal figures, but of the conscience. We must place ourselves on the domain of the conscience, and then try to estimate the true strength of Old Catholicism, and to contrast the number of its adherents with that of the Roman Catholics. On this domain the Old Catholics are certainly much more numerous than the Roman Catholics, for this simple reason, that the Catholics in France who do not believe in the infallibility of the Pope are much more numerous than those who do. We must here remark that in the Roman system it is not enough to submit externally to the dogmas of the Vatican and the Syllabus. They must be accepted with all the heart and mind as truths taught by Christ Himself. In a word, they must be received with a divine faith. Whoever does not so receive them may be a Romanist externally or in appearance, but he is not one in reality. The laity cannot believe that on this point Rome is so rigorous. They think that if they submit to new dogmas by simple obedience and not by faith, that is all that is required. But they are deceived. Any Roman theologian whom they may consult will undeceive them on this point. The number of sincere Roman Catholics, when tried by this test, is really very small.

Who are the believers in Papal infallibility and the monstrosities of the Syllabus? The pilgrims? The readers of the *Univers*? The members of the fraternities? The admirers of the new miracles? Not at all. We know pilgrims who went to Paray-le-Monial, to Lourdes, and to Mount St. Michael, purely for a pleasure trip and to enjoy picturesque scenery at a reduced price. It is a thing perfectly well known that the greater part of the workmen and peasants who went on pilgrimage received, besides their expenses, two francs a-day. Who will maintain that such pilgrims believe in Papal infallibility and the Syllabus? As to the readers of the *Univers*, we know personally that they are arrant sceptics and believe nothing of these miracles. One of the celebrities of this journal, which Montalembert called "the journal of the clerical *canaille*," confessed to us that his

work for this journal had no other motive but the necessity of living. Among the members of the fraternities there are those certainly whose simplicity goes the length of believing whatever Rome teaches. But how many are there who are members of these fraternities merely for material interests? How many directors, especially at Rome, make use of these fraternities as the means of getting money? The history of the embezzlement of funds in many associations would be curious, if it were not sad. What shall we say of the physicians who pronounce the cures miraculous? Are they not for the most part physicians belonging to convents and seminaries, and consequently paid to speak as they do? Ask them about Papal infallibility, and they will answer with a sceptical smile, which is sufficient evidence of their unbelief.

But let us suppose that all the Roman Catholics of whom we are speaking really and sincerely believe in Papal infallibility and the contents of the Syllabus. Would the number be as considerable as people seem to think? Not by any means. The pilgrims who have been enrolled for Paray-le-Monial and La Salette were the same as those who had been enrolled for Lourdes and Pontmain. The readers of the *Univers* and other Ultramontane journals are recruited by the clergy. Deprived of the subsidies necessary for existence, these journals would perish. They are only sustained by the propaganda of the Jesuits and the purse of the Pope. They have no connection with the actual life of the French people, but are purely the work of a caste or sect. The same may be said of the fraternities, of those who drink the miraculous water, of the admirers of the young man of La Salette, of Bernadotte, and other visionary personages. And can it be denied that these are but an insignificant minority? In the towns the majority of Roman Catholics are so little disposed for new dogmas that intelligent priests, even those in nowise liberal, forbid their penitents to speak of them. They say, "Believe what the Church believes, and do not trouble yourself about the rest." Evidently they do not themselves believe in the doctrines of the Ultramontanes. In the rural districts, notwithstanding the proverbial simplicity of the peasantry, there are villages in which it would be impossible to discover a single Ultramontane. Such is the impression we received in a tour lately made in Burgundy, and by the banks of the Saone. In all these villages the peasantry go to the only church which is open to them because they cannot do otherwise. They submit to the sermons, or rather the chidings, of the Curé, because they cannot have a Curé of their own choosing. They are equally hostile to the opinions of the Pope, the monks, the Jesuits, and the whole generation that disport themselves in cassocks and birettas. The foreigner who places himself at the door of a church

on Sunday, and forms his judgment of the strength of Roman Catholicism by the number of worshippers, will be entirely deceived. To get at the real state of matters it is necessary to live among the people, to speak with the masses, and to learn their thoughts from their words. Whoever will undertake this work will find that France is in nowise Ultramontane.

It is thus necessary to distinguish between the official numbers which are found in the parish and municipal registers, and those which represent conscience and conviction. According to the first, almost all Catholics are Romanists. According to the second, the immense majority of Catholics is anti-papistical and anti-ultramontane. When M. Veuillot tried to console himself for the defeat of his candidate, Colonel Stoffel, he wrote: "It is no disgrace to have been beaten at Thermopylæ, and to have been but three hundred for our native land and for right against a whole army of Asiatics." The Old Catholics can return these words to M. Veuillot and the Ultramontanes. Whatever may be the form under which they will organize themselves for the future, they are sufficiently certain of a triumph over the Ultramontanes, to be able to console themselves for the want of any present official reckoning. The more faithful they are to conscience, to knowledge, and to liberty, the more they will gain public opinion in their favour, and hasten the ruin of their adversaries.

Sir Robert Peel said on the fall of Louis Philippe: "See what it is to regard the majority around oneself, and not the opinion of the country." In France, all governments of that kind fall, and in like manner shall perish the official Church of the Jesuits and Ultramontanes. In spite of all our efforts not to be deceived, and not in any way to under-estimate the strength of the Ultramontane party, it is impossible to believe that it can have a future.

Roman Catholicism in France at the present time, with a few honourable exceptions, is but a tissue of superstition, of scepticism, of intolerable absolutism, of ancient *régime* politics, and of gross cupidity. Superstition in the Romanist Churches! Is it necessary to speak of it when the chief occupations are worshipping statues, drinking waters, making pilgrimages, and obtaining papal indulgences? This superstition of pilgrimages and of papal indulgences is such that only yesterday the *Pèlerin*, an official organ of the pilgrimages, proposed "a pilgrimage to Purgatory." There had been great care to depict the horror of this prison, the vehemence of the flames, the terrible lamentations of souls, and other such things, in order to excite the faithful to obtain papal indulgences, and thus to spread abroad, indirectly, the belief that the Pope delivers from the pains of purgatory, and that he is consequently the master of the living and the dead—Jupiter and Pluto in one. All this is only a

religion of pilfering. Rome knows marvellously well the secret of frightening souls, in order to govern them. Hence, all the superstitions which abound among the faithful, and which are maintained as the "*Instrumenta Regni*" of papal dominion.

Naturally, and in fact logically, unbelief and scepticism accompany superstition. It is not of the whole of France, but only of Ultramontane France, that it has been accurately said, "Catholic by name, and in appearance, France is almost without religion, and what is still worse, the little which remains has only a deleterious influence." Lately, an Ultramontane journal said of Mr. Seward, that he wanted nothing to be perfect but the seal which Catholicism gives. In the eyes of this Romanist journal, Catholicism is only an affair of the seal. In a Parisian circle, where the young people profess Ultramontane piety, a Prelate having held a Conference on the existence of God, the *Semaine Religieuse de Paris* had the frankness to report that certain of these pious young people after the Conference cried, "Ah! I had need of this Conference." In Romanism, people are really pious, and often doubt of the existence of God! How many priests and bishops are there who in their private assemblies laugh at dogmas of their Church! People reproach them with making orders upon all the pious futilities of Ultramontane devotion, in order to recommend them to the faithful. But their conduct is very simple. Their end in this is to imitate Alcibiades, who caused the tail of his dog to be cut off, that he might hinder the Athenians from speaking of more serious matters. So long as the faithful are engaged with medals and amulets, they do not think upon the political and social perils of the doctrine of the Syllabus, and still less on the utility of separating the State from the Roman Church, and of suppressing the budget of worship. M. Veuillot is very much ridiculed by the "buffoons" of Frohsdorf and of Salzbourg. Alas! is there no one to ridicule still more the buffoons of Rome? Is M. Veuillot himself sincere when he preaches the "worship of the humanity of Jesus Christ," throwing his Church into the Nestorian heresy condemned at the Council of Ephesus? In its foundation, the Jesuit worship of the "Sacred Heart," which to-day sums up the whole worship of the Roman Church, is only a Nestorian worship, which implies paganism under the appearance of Christianity.

To teach such insanities in this age it is necessary to deny Science and Philosophy. Thus the Romanist Code of to-day, the Syllabus, contains all anathemas, possible and impossible, against human reason, against liberty and conscience. Human reason is called a perverse faculty, liberty the path to perdition, and the rights of conscience only the pretext to escape from the performance of duties. From this to the profession of absolutism there is but one step. Has

not the Church of Rome taken this step? Its religious constitution since the Council of the Vatican is a constitution essentially absolute. With much more reason ought it to declare itself for absolutism in politics. The Jesuits, since their expulsion from Germany, are too numerous in France not to have succeeded in propagating their tyrannical doctrines among their devotees. The demonstrations organized by them, have clearly proved that the last word of the Roman religion is a political word—the re-establishment of the Bourbon monarchy in France, in Spain, and in Italy, in order thereby to establish the temporal power of the Pope.

At the present day when a priest ascends the pulpit it is neither to teach dogma nor morality, but to speak politics. The bishops scarcely use the pen except to write pamphlets filled with political allusions and intentions. These intentions are no longer a secret to anyone. It is known by all the world that Ultramontanism in reality is but an electoral manoeuvre; that the miracles of these last months were only means to bring the Comte de Chambord to the throne; that the public prayers in the Ultramontane churches were only imprecations against the Revolution and the Republic; that the altar as well as the vestry was only a ballot-box for political elections; that the Pilgrimage, "that grand act of piety of the nineteenth century," according to the words of the Bishop of Carcassonne, is only a Legitimist manifestation with white ribbons. Even now, notwithstanding the letter of the Comte de Chambord of the 27th of October last, the Archbishop of Paris persists in recommending in the *Semaine Religieuse* of his diocese Legitimist and Bourbon pamphlets. Of the gospel there is not a word, but of all which favours the cause of the ancient political régime and of the Syllabus there is a most pompous eulogy.

Not only have the Roman Catholics of France put politics in the place of religion, but they have even made an alliance with the worst, the most unpopular, and the most detested of all political creeds. They are violent and illiberal. "Let the king decide by force and by flags," cried M. Veillot; "all will be good that comes from his hand, all will be bad that comes from any other." La Veille, calling the Princes of Orleans merchant-kings, expresses himself thus: "Charles X. thought that these merchant-kings would bring about bankruptcy. He maintained that his grandson was a man of God, and at the same time a man of iron. That is often the *same thing*. To speak the truth there is nothing prudent or patient, or sweet or strong, but the man of iron who is at the same time a man of God." It is sufficiently well known that the expression "man of God" is only an excuse to cover the man of iron. It is known that nothing is conformable to the Romanist mind of to-day but the apology of the sabre. It is known that the French bishops, under the pressure

of M. Veuillot and the Jesuits, have desired nothing but the re-establishment of the temporal power of the Pope, even by arms, and at the price of a war with Italy. Besides, has not the *Univers* opened its columns for a subscription in favour of the bands of Don Carlos in Spain? It is to this work of pillage and of civil war that the Ultramontane clergy in France must, under the penalty of being marked by their superiors, consecrate a part of their revenue. Obligated thus, to please their superiors so as to deserve promotion, to take from their modest revenue, to subscribe to-day in favour of the Carlists, to-morrow in favour of the Church of the Sacred Heart, and the day after in favour of the penny of St. Peter, the clergy have felt a serious burden. Hence in many ecclesiastics there has been a development of a gross and extreme cupidity, such as has never been known before. One of the principal complaints of the peasantry against the clergy of the present day is their rapacity in questions of fees for masses, burials, or marriages. We know some curés who never say mass but where it is paid in advance, and yet often exact that it be chanted in order to raise the charge. This commerce in masses is scandalous, even in the best managed vestries. As to the diversion of fees, especially in Paris, it is shameful and iniquitous.

What other reproaches could not be made against the Ultramontane priests of the present day! But we do not wish to recriminate. Our office is that of the historian who states facts, and not that of the advocate who pleads a cause. All the friends of philosophy and of science, the defenders of liberty, progress, and civilisation, are decidedly hostile to the Romanist party. How many councils, both in the provinces and in the towns, have demanded the separation of the Church from the State! The whole French Liberal press, whatever may be their different opinions in religion, combats in every possible way Ultramontane Romanism and Papistry—that is to say, actual Roman Catholicism, which is regarded as an element of decay and ruin for the country. In Dec. 1872, during the presidency of M. Thiers, a Republican journal, at that time moderate, said, "The Roman question has pressed heavily on France, and in the most deplorable way, for the last twenty years: It was this question which destroyed the Republic of 1848. It was this question which influenced the destinies of the Empire, and hastened its fall. Supported by the experience of history, we may say that every government which cannot fairly solve this grave Roman question is destined to perish. A government may err in matters of taxation and finance. It may err in its military organization, and even as to civil and political right. These errors would be unfortunate, but an error on the Roman question will, sooner or later, end in destruction." If this could be said in 1872, what may we not say in 1873? There

is certainly not one Liberal journal which does not wish to have done with the theories of the Syllabus. Some politicians, very forgetful of the noble line of conduct pursued at other times by the French Government, are afraid to proceed against Jesuitism and Ultramontanism. Their sole reason is that they must not follow the course followed in Germany, and especially in Prussia. This is a piece of miserable *Chauvinisme* too wretched long to restrain a really reasonable and patriotic man. Hostility to Roman Catholicism, as defined by Rome and the servile bishops, is profound and general throughout the whole Liberal camp. Catholicism has succeeded in making superficial persons believe it to be a colossal statue, but to clear-sighted men it is only a gigantic image with feet made of clay.

It will be objected that in some solitary corner of the Roman Catholic Church in France there are to be found liberal men. From this it will be inferred that we have reasoned inaccurately concerning the weakness and the unpopularity of Roman Catholicism in France. But this objection is not serious. There was, indeed, until the end of 1870, a Liberal Catholicism in France. The proceedings of the Vatican Council did not meet the approbation of the whole of the French bishops. But now that the Council is regarded as œcumenical by all the bishops, and its dogmas published as the true dogmas of the Catholic Church, there are in France no more Liberal Catholics. The old school of Montalembert and Lacordaire is defunct. Doubtless, Monseigneur Dupanloup is still in the land of the living, but he is no more the Dupanloup of 1869 and 1870. That Dupanloup is dead. He does not dare to speak or write any more. There is no other alive but the Dupanloup of 1873, who intrigues in favour of the Comte de Chambord, who combats the principles of 1789, who falls on his knees at the holy will of Pius IX., who keeps silence in the presence of M. Veuillot, and who obeys every word of the orders given him, directly or indirectly, by the Society of Jesus. Doubtless also we have Monseigneur Maret still a dean of the Sorbonne. He is also the Head of the Chapter of St. Denis. This last title, which is accompanied with a great revenue, has just been given him as "drink-money" in the way of recompense for his submission to the Jesuits and Rome. He is now so far from maintaining the doctrines which he taught and defended in 1869 and 1870, that he has preached so well of Ecclesiastical retreats at Lyons and other places, as to win compliments from his old adversary M. Dom Guéranger. The other Liberal bishops, who in the time of peace were bold as lions and eager for the combat, have become timid as stags, and betaken themselves to flight in the time of war. There is also Perraud and some other Ecclesiastics who think and speak like Père

Gratry. But they prefer acting the part of their chiefs to fighting for victory and deliverance. This contemptible generation was formed for slavery. They put on the mask of sanctity, but that does not change their nature. They are still servile, and of all kinds of servility that of the conscience is the most impious.

The laity who pride themselves on being Liberal Catholics, have not been more dignified than the bishops and priests of the same school. Neither the Duke de Broglie, nor M. Arnaud, nor M. de Carné, nor the writers in the *Correspondant* and the *Français* have had the courage to remain faithful to the Catholic symbol, and to maintain firmly the Liberal flag against the political absolutism of the Syllabus. It avails nothing that the Duke de Broglie is to-day in power. The place which he occupies in politics is not of that kind which can permit the Liberal Catholicism of 1870. These gentlemen did well to conceal themselves and beat a retreat as soon as they heard of new dogmas. They did well to invent a system of hypocritical silence which the *Français* has brought to the highest perfection. They have deceived no one. The Pope has explicitly condemned them by two briefs. The official journals of the Roman Curia show them daily that it is not possible for them to be called Roman Catholics. Their position in other respects is logically untenable and their title only a deception; in fact, they dare not even maintain that they exist. All that people know about them is that they accept officially the new dogmas of the Vatican. Now and then they bark a little at M. Veuillot, to make people believe that they have still some of the old rancour, but their barks are those of the theatre, where the sole object is only to deceive the gallery. This mimic life cannot long continue possible. There is no true medium between Roman Catholicism and Old Catholicism. The latter is alone truly Catholic and truly Liberal.

In a word, the French Ultramontanes do not yet perceive the position which they occupy. For this position they have to thank the ignorance and dread of change which govern the masses; they have also to thank the protection accorded to them by the State to the exclusion of the Old Catholics, with the possession of all the churches and the revenues. In all these reasons there is not one which relates to conscience, and what is properly religion, so that any one would be justified in saying the Roman religion is not a religion which has any religious cause of existence. Is not a religion reduced to that stage of decay, a religion condemned? It has done well to organize for long years a system of crass ignorance and imbecile stupidity among its adherents. It has done well to maintain this even to this day by protesting against primary and compulsory instruction. It has done well to move heaven and earth to raise

again the fallen thrones on which it depended for political, religious, and pecuniary help. It has done well to preach in the place of Christ the Saviour, the necessity of political deliverers and warriors. It has done well to draw upon the purses of the faithful by a system of religious tariff, of paid dispensations and masses for the eternal repose of souls. But notwithstanding all these things, civilization will be an enemy too strong for it. The light will penetrate through the clefts of these walls, and will end by making visible to our eyes the mysterious nothingness in which it lies concealed. Philosophy and science will bring to light the voluntary and involuntary errors on which the whole system is built. Liberty itself will be its destruction, for liberty is the friend of true authority and the implacable enemy of tyranny. Both money and politics will one day be witnesses against it. After abusing the first till every passion was gratified, it will be required for mere necessities, and after employing politics to satisfy its ambition, by politics it will be betrayed. It will desire to reign by culpable politics to the contempt of true religion, and by these very politics it shall perish that true religion may triumph.

Thus France, free at last from the yoke which presses upon it, will be restored to its ancient faith, which is truly Christian and truly Catholic. By this faith it will perpetuate its liberty and renew the strength of other days.

E. MICHAUD.



THE TREATMENT OF THE BODY AFTER DEATH.

AFTER Death! The last faint breath had been noted, and another watched for so long, but in vain. The body lies there, pale and motionless, except only that the jaw sinks slowly but perceptibly. The pallor visibly increases, becomes more leaden in hue, and the profound tranquil sleep of Death reigns where just now were life and movement. Here, then, begins the eternal rest.

Rest! no, not for an instant. Never was there greater activity than at this moment exists in that still corpse. Activity, but of a different kind to that which was before. Already a thousand changes have commenced. Forces innumerable have attacked the dead. The rapidity of the vulture, with its keen scent for animal decay, is nothing to that of Nature's ceaseless agents now at full work before us. That marvellously complex machine, but this moment the theatre of phenomena too subtle and too recondite to be comprehended; denotable only by phraseology which stands for the unknown and incomputable—vital, because more than physical, more than chemical—is now consigned to the action of physical and chemical agencies alone. And these all operating in a direction the reverse of that which they held before death. A synthesis, then, developing the animal being. The stages of that synthesis, now, retraced, with another end, still formative, in view. Stages of decomposition, of decay, with its attendant putrescence; process abhorrent to the living, who therefore desire its removal. "Bury the dead out of my sight," is the wholly natural sentiment of the survivor.

But Nature does nothing without ample meaning; nothing without an object desirable in the interest of the body politic. It may

then be useful to inquire what must of necessity happen if, instead of burying or attempting to preserve the dead, Nature follows an unimpeded course, and the lifeless animal is left to the action of laws in such case provided.

It is necessary first to state more exactly the conditions supposed to exist. Thus, the body must be exposed to air; and must not be consumed as prey by some living animal. If it is closely covered with earth or left in water, the same result is attained as in the condition first-named, although the steps of the process may be dissimilar.

The problem which Nature sets herself to work in disposing of dead animal matter is always one and the same. The order of the universe requires its performance; no other end is possible. The problem may be slowly worked, or quickly worked; the end is always one.

It may be thus stated:—The animal must be resolved into—

a. Carbonic Acid [CO_2], water [HO], and ammonia [NH_3].

b. Mineral constituents, more or less oxidised, elements of the earth's structure: Lime, Phosphorus, Iron, Sulphur, Magnesia, &c.

The first group, gaseous in form, go into the atmosphere.

The second group, ponderous and solid, remain where the body lies, until dissolved and washed into the earth by rain.

Nature's object remains still unstated: the constant result of her work is before us; but wherefore are these changes? In her wonderful economy she must form and bountifully nourish her vegetable progeny; twin-brother life, to her, with that of animals. The perfect balance between plant existences and animal existences, must always be maintained, while "matter" courses through the eternal circle, becoming each in turn.

To state this more intelligibly by illustration: If an animal be resolved into its ultimate constituents in a period, according to the surrounding circumstances, say, of four hours, of four months, of four years, or even of four thousand years—for it is impossible to deny that there may be instances of all these periods during which the process has continued—those elements which assume the gaseous form mingle at once with the atmosphere, and are taken up from it without delay by the ever open mouths of vegetable life. By a thousand pores in every leaf the carbonic acid which renders the atmosphere unfit for animal life is absorbed, the carbon being separated and assimilated to form the vegetable fibre, which, as wood, makes and furnishes our houses and ships, is burned for our warmth, or is stored up under pressure for coal. All this carbon has played its part, "and many parts," in its time, as animal existences from monad up to man. Our mahogany of to-day has been many negroes in its turn, and before the African existed was integral portions of many a generation of extinct species. And when the

table which has borne so well some twenty thousand dinners, shall be broken up from pure debility and consigned to the fire; thence it will issue into the atmosphere once more as carbonic acid, again to be devoured by the nearest troop of hungry vegetables, green peas or cabbages in a London market garden—say, to be daintily served on the table which now stands in that other table's place, and where they will speedily go to the making of "Lords of the Creation." And so on, again and again, as long as the world lasts.

Thus it is that an even balance is kept—demonstrable to the very last grain if we could only collect the data—between the total amounts of animal and of vegetable life existing together at any instant on our globe. There *must* be an unvarying relation between the decay of animal life and the food produced by that process for the elder twin, the vegetable world. Vegetables first, consumed by animals either directly or indirectly, as when they eat the flesh of animals who live on vegetables. Secondly, these animals daily casting off effete matters, and by decay after death providing the staple food for vegetation of every description. One the necessary complement of the other. The atmosphere, polluted by every animal whose breath is poison to every other animal, being every instant purified by plants, which taking out the deadly carbonic acid and assimilating carbon, restore to the air its oxygen, first necessary of animal existence.

I suppose that these facts are known to most readers, but I require a clear statement of them here as preliminary to my next subject; and in any case it can do no harm to reproduce a brief history of this marvellous and beautiful example of intimate relation between the two kingdoms.

I return to consider man's interference with the process in question just hinted at in the quotation, "Bury the dead out of my sight."

The process of decomposition affecting an animal body is one that has a disagreeable, injurious, often fatal influence on the living man if sufficiently exposed to it. Thousands of human lives have been cut short by the poison of slowly decaying, and often diseased animal matter. Even the putrefaction of some of the most insignificant animals has sufficed to destroy the noblest. To give an illustration which comes nearly home to some of us—the grave-yard pollution of air and water alone has probably found a victim in some social circle known to more than one who may chance to read this paper. And I need hardly add that in times of pestilence its continuance has been often due mainly to the poisonous influence of the buried victims.

Man, then, throughout all historic periods, has got rid of his dead kin after some fashion. He has either hidden the body in a cave and closed the opening to protect its tenant from wild beasts, for the

instinct of affection follows most naturally even the sadly changed remains of our dearest relative ; or, the same instinct has led him to embalm and preserve as much as may be so preservable—a delay only of nature's certain work ;—or, the body is buried beneath the earth's surface, in soil, in wood, in stone or metal :—each mode another contrivance to delay, but never to prevent the inevitable change. Or, the body is burned, and so restored at once to its original elements, in which case Nature's work is hastened, her design anticipated, that is all. And after burning, the ashes may be wholly or in part preserved in some receptacle in obedience to the instinct of the survivor, referred to above. All forms of sepulture come more or less under one of these heads.*

One of the many social questions waiting to be solved, and which must be solved at no very remote period is, Which of these various forms of treatment of the dead is the best for survivors ?

This question may be regarded from two points of view, both possessing importance, not equally perhaps ; but neither can be ignored.

A. From the point of view of Utility ; as to what is best for the entire community.

B. From the point of view of Sentiment ; the sentiment of affectionate memory for the deceased, which is cherished by the survivor.

I assume that there is no point of view to be regarded as belonging to the deceased person, and that no one believes that the dead has any interest in the matter. We who live may anxiously hope—as I should hope at least—to do no evil to survivors after death, whatever we may have done of harm to others during life. But, being deceased, I take it we can have no wishes or feelings touching this subject. What is best to be done with the dead is then mainly a question for the living, and to them it is one of extreme importance. When the globe was thinly peopled, and when there were no large bodies of men living in close neighbourhood, the subject was an inconsiderable one and could afford to wait, and might indeed be left for its solution to sentiment of any kind. But the rapid increase of population forces it into notice, and especially man's tendency to live in crowded cities. There is no necessity to prove, as the fact is too patent, that our present mode of treating the dead, namely, that by burial beneath the soil, is full of danger to the living. Hence intramural interment has been recently forbidden, first step in a series of reforms which must follow. At present we who dwell in towns are able to escape much evil by selecting a portion of ground distant—in this year of grace 1873—some five or ten miles from any very populous neighbourhood, and by sending our dead to be buried there :—laying by poison nevertheless, it is certain, for our children's

* "Burial at sea" is a form of exposure, the body being rapidly devoured by marine animals.

children, who will find our remains polluting their water sources, when that now distant plot is covered, as it will be, more or less closely by human dwellings. For it can be a question of time only when every now waste spot will be utilized for food-production or for shelter, and when some other mode of disposing of the dead than that of burial must be adopted. If, therefore, burial in the soil be certainly injurious either now or in the future, has not the time already come to discuss the possibility of replacing it by a better process? We cannot too soon cease to do evil and learn to do well. Is it not indeed a social sin of no small magnitude to sow the seeds of disease and death broadcast, caring only to be certain that they cannot do much harm to our own generation. It may be granted, to anticipate objection, that it is quite possible that the bodies now buried may have lost most, if not all, their power of doing mischief by the time that the particular soil they inhabit is turned up again to the sun's rays, although this is by means certain; but it is beyond dispute that the margin of safety as to time grows narrower year by year, and that pollution of wells and streams which supply the living must ere long arise wherever we bury our dead in this country. Well then, since every buried dead body enters sooner or later into the vegetable kingdom, why should we permit it, as it does in many cases, to cause an infinity of mischief during the long process?

Let us at this point glance at the economic view of the subject, for it is not so unimportant as, unconsidered, it may appear. For it is an economic subject whether we will it or not. No doubt a sentiment repugnant to any such view must arise in many minds, a sentiment altogether to be held in respect and sympathy. Be it so, the question remains strictly a question of prime necessity in the economic system of a crowded country. Nature will have it so, whether we like it or not. She destines the material elements of my body to enter the vegetable world on purpose to supply another animal organism which takes my place. She wants me, and I *must* go. There is no help for it. When shall I follow—with quick obedience, or unwillingly, truant-like, traitor-like, to her and her grand design? Her capital is intended to bear good interest and to yield quick return: all her ways prove it—"increase and multiply" is her first and constant law. Shall her riches be hid in earth to corrupt and bear no present fruit; or be utilised, without loss of time, value, and interest, for the benefit of starving survivors? Nature hides no talent in a napkin; we, her unprofitable servants only, thwart her ways and delay the consummation of her will.

Is a practical illustration required? Nothing is easier. London was computed, by the census of 1871, to contain 3,254,260 persons, of whom 80,430 died within the year. I have come to the conclusion,

after a very carefully made estimate, that the amount of ashes and bone earth, such as is derived by perfect combustion, belonging to and buried with those persons, is by weight about 206,820 lbs. The pecuniary value of this highly concentrated form of animal solids is very considerable. For this bone-earth may be regarded as equivalent to at least six or seven times its weight of dried but unburned bones, as they ordinarily exist in commerce. The amount of other solid matters resolvable by burning into the gaseous food of plants, but rendered unavailable by burial for, say, fifty or a hundred years or more, is about 5,584,000 lbs., the value of which is quite incalculable, but it is certainly enormous as compared with the preceding.

This is for the population of the metropolis only: that of the United Kingdom for the same year amounted to 31,483,700 persons, or nearly ten times the population of London. Taking into consideration a somewhat lower death-rate for the imperial average, it will at all events be quite within the limit of truthful statement to multiply the above quantities by nine in order to obtain the amount of valuable economic material annually diverted in the United Kingdom for a long term of years from its ultimate destiny by our present method of interment.

The necessary complement of this ceaseless waste of commodity most precious to organic life, and which must be replaced, or the population could not exist, is the purchase by this country of that same material from other countries less populous than our own, and which can, therefore, at present spare it. This we do to the amount of much more than half a million pounds sterling per annum.*

Few persons, I believe, have any notion that these importations of foreign bones are rendered absolutely necessary by the hoarding of our own some six feet below the surface. The former we acquire at a large cost for the original purchase and for freight. The latter we place, not in the upper soil where they would be utilised, but in the lower soil, where they are not merely useless, but where they often mingle with and pollute the streams which furnish our tables. And in order to effect this absurd, if not wicked, result, we incur a lavish expenditure! I refer, of course, to the enormous sums which are wasted in effecting burial according to our present custom, a part of the question which can by no means be passed over. For the funeral rites of the 80,000 in London last year, let a mean cost of ten pounds per head be accepted as an estimate which certainly does not err on the side of

* Value of Bones imported into the United Kingdom, of which by far the larger part is employed for manure, have been in

1866	£409,590
1869	600,029
1872	753,185

"Statistical Abstract," 20th Number. Spottiswoode, 1873.

excess.* Eight hundred thousand pounds must therefore be reckoned as absolute loss, to the costs already incurred in the maintenance of the system. Thus we pay every way and doubly for our folly.

What then is it proposed to substitute for this custom of burial? The answer is easy and simple. Do that which is done in all good work of every kind—follow Nature's indication, and do the work she does, but do it better and more rapidly. For example, in the human body she sometimes throws off a diseased portion in order to save life, by slow and clumsy efforts, it is true, and productive of much suffering; the surgeon performs the same task more rapidly and better, follows her lead, and improves on it. Nature's many agents, laden with power, the over-action of which is harmful, we cannot stop, but we tame, guide, and make them our most profitable servants. So here, also, let us follow her. The naturally slow and disagreeable process of decomposition which we have made by one mode of treatment infinitely more slow and not less repulsive, we can by another mode of treatment greatly shorten and accomplish without offence to the living. What in this particular matter is naturally the work of weeks or months, can be perfectly done in an hour or two.

The Problem to be worked is: Given a dead body, to resolve it into carbonic acid, water, and ammonia, and the mineral elements, rapidly, safely, and not unpleasantly.

The answer may be practically supplied in a properly constructed furnace. The gases can be driven off without offensive odour, the mineral constituents will remain in a crucible. The gases will ere night be consumed by plants and trees. The ashes or any portion of them may be preserved in a funeral urn, or may be scattered on the fields, which latter is their righteous destination. No scents or balsams are needed, as on Greek and Roman piles, to overcome the noxious effluvia of a corpse burned in open air. Modern science is equal to the task of thus removing the dead of a great city without instituting any form of nuisance; none such as those we tolerate everywhere from many factories, both to air and streams. Plans for the accomplishment of this have been considered; but discussion of the subject alone is aimed at here. To treat our dead after this

* Items comprised in the calculation—

1. Cost of shroud, coffin, labour of digging a grave—essential now in all burials.
2. Cost of funeral carriages, horses, trappings, and accoutrements.
Ornamental coffins in wood and metal.
Vaults and monumental art—more or less employed in all funerals above the rank of pauper.

The cost of simple modes of transit are not included in the calculation, because necessary in any case, whatever the destination of the body. The above-named items are only necessary in the case, of interment in a grave, and not one would be required, for example, in the case of cremation or burning of the body.

fashion would return millions of capital without delay to the bosom of mother earth, who would give us back large returns at compound interest for the deposit.

Who can doubt now that the question is one of vital economy to the people of this country? This is still no reason why it should not be considered from the point of view of sentiment. And what has sentiment to urge on behalf of the present process? Let us see what the process is.

So far as I dare! for could I paint in its true colours the ghastly picture of that which happens to the mortal remains of the dearest we have lost, the page would be too deeply stained for publication. I forbear, therefore, to trace the steps of the process which begins so soon and so painfully to manifest itself after that brief hour has passed, when "she lay beautiful in death." Such loveliness as that I agree it might be treason to destroy, could its existence be perpetuated, and did not Nature so ruthlessly and so rapidly blight her own handy-work, in furtherance of her own grand purpose. The sentiment of the survivor on behalf of preserving the beauty of form and expression, were it possible to do so, would, I confess, go far to neutralise the argument based on utility, powerful as it is. But a glimpse of the reality which we achieve by burial would annihilate in an instant every sentiment for continuing that process. Nay, more; it would arouse a powerful repugnance to the horrible notion that we too must some day become so vile and offensive, and, it may be, so dangerous; a repugnance surmountable only through the firm belief that after death the condition of the body is a matter of utter indifference to its dead life-tenant. Surely if we, the living, are to have sentiments, or to exercise any choice about the condition of our bodies after death, those sentiments and that choice must be in favour of a physical condition which cannot be thought of either as repulsive in itself or as injurious to others.

There is a source of very painful dread, as I have reason to know, little talked of, it is true, but keenly felt by many persons at some time or another, the horror of which to some is inexpressible. It is the dread of premature burial; the fear lest some deep trance should be mistaken for death, and that the awakening should take place too late. Happily such occurrences must be exceedingly rare, especially in this country, where the interval between death and burial is considerable, and the fear is almost a groundless one. Still, the conviction that such a fate is possible, which cannot be altogether denied—will always be a source of severe trial to some. With cremation no such catastrophe could ever occur; and the completeness of a properly conducted process would render death instantaneous and painless if by any unhappy chance an individual so circumstanced were submitted to it. But the guarantee against this danger

would be doubled, since inspection of the entire body must of necessity immediately precede the act of cremation, no such inspection being possible under the present system.

In order to meet a possible objection to the substitution of cremation for burial, let me observe that the former is equally susceptible with the latter of association with religious funereal rites, if not more so. Never could the solemn and touching words "ashes to ashes, dust to dust," be more appropriately uttered than over a body about to be consigned to the furnace; while, with a view to metaphor, the dissipation of almost the whole body in the atmosphere in the ethereal form of gaseous matter is far more suggestive as a type of another and a brighter life, than the consignment of the body to the abhorred prison of the tomb.

I do not propose to describe here the processes which have been employed, or any improved system which might be adopted for the purpose of ensuring rapid and perfect combustion of the body, although much might be said in reference to these matters. There is no doubt that further experiments and research are wanting for the practical improvement of the process, especially if required to be conducted on a large scale. Something has been already accomplished, and with excellent results. I refer to recent examples of the process as practised by Dr. L. Brunetti, Professor of Pathological Anatomy in the University of Padua. These were exhibited at the Exposition of Vienna, where I had the opportunity of examining them with care. Professor Brunetti exposed the residue from bodies and parts of bodies on which he had practised cremation by different methods, and the results of his latest experience may be summarized as follows: The whole process of incineration of a human adult body occupied three and a-half hours. The ashes and bone earth weighed 1·70 kilo., about three pounds and three quarters avoirdupois. They were of a delicate white, and were contained in a glass box about twelve inches long, by eight inches wide, and eight deep. The quantity of wood used to effect absolute and complete incineration, may be estimated from its weight, about 150 pounds. He adds that "its cost was one florin and twenty kreuzers," about two shillings and fourpence English. The box was that marked No. IX. in the case, which was No. 4149 in the Catalogue: Italian.

In an adjacent case was an example of mummification by the latest and most successful method. By a series of chemical processes it has been attempted to preserve in the corpse the appearance natural to life, as regards colour and form. Admirable as the result appears to be in preserving anatomical and pathological specimens of the body, it is, in my opinion, very far from successful when applied to the face and hand. At best a condition is produced which

resembles a badly-coloured and not well-formed waxen image. And the consciousness that this imperfect achievement is the real person and not a likeness, so far from being calculated to enhance its value to the survivor, produces the very painful impression, as it were, of a debased original ; while, moreover, it is impossible not to be aware that the substitution of such an image for the reality must in time replace the mental picture which exists, of the once living face lighted by emotion and intelligence, of which the preserved face is wholly destitute.

To return to the process of cremation. There are still numerous considerations in its favour which might be adduced, of which I shall name only one ; namely, the opportunity it offers of escape from the ghastly but costly ceremonial which mostly awaits our remains after death. How often have the slender shares of the widow and orphan been diminished in order to testify, and so unnecessarily, their loving memory of the deceased, by display of plumes and silken scarves about the unconscious clay. And again, how prolific of mischief to the living is the attendance at the burial ground, with uncovered head, and damp-struck feet, in pitiless weather, at that chilling rite of sepulture. Not a few deaths have been clearly traceable to the act of offering that "last tribute of respect."

Perhaps no great change can be expected at present in the public opinions current, or rather in the conventional views which obtain, on the subject of burial, so ancient is the practice, and so closely associated is it with sentiments of affection and reverence for the deceased. To many persons, any kind of change in our treatment of the dead will be suggestive of sacrilegious interference, however remote either in fact or by resemblance to it, such change may be Millions still cherish deep emotions connected both with the past and the future in relation to the "Campo Santo," and the annual "Jour des Morts." And many of these might be slow to learn, that, if the preservation of concrete remains and the ability to offer the tribute of devotion at a shrine be desired, cremation equally, if not better, than burial, secures those ends. On the other hand, I know how many there are both in this country and abroad, who only require the assurance that cremation is practically attainable to declare their strong preference for it, and to substitute it for what they conceive to be the present defective and repulsive procedure. A few such might by combination for the purpose, easily examine the subject still further by experiment, and would ultimately secure the power if they desired to put it in practice for themselves. And the consideration of the subject which such examples would afford, could not fail to hasten the adoption of what I am fairly entitled to call, the Natural, in place of the present Artificial Treatment of the body after death.

HENRY THOMPSON.



THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES.

PREFACE.

THE famous Episode of the Shield of Achilles in Homer is, in its conception, alike daring and simple, in its execution alike complete and gorgeous, from the nature of the topics, and the telling sharpness of outline with which they are presented. The employment of a Divine personage as the artificer of the Shield seems to show that the design went far beyond anything which the eyes of his countrymen had been wont to view, and was in effect conceived in the mind of the Poet, not founded as a whole upon experience, and not representative of, but very much more advanced than, the Art of the period in which he lived.

This introduction of the god has the advantage, too, of enabling the Poet, without extravagance, to push to its furthest limit the *vis viva*, the living and life-giving power, of his genius, and not only to introduce successions of events into one and the same scene, but to endow the things and persons represented with other incidents of vitality; as when the upturned earth darkens behind the plough, and we are made to see the actual progress of the dragging of the slain out of the battle.

The Art of the Shield is in thorough consonance with the spirit of the Homeric Poems; that is to say, its basis is thoroughly human, thoroughly objective, and thoroughly realistic. It does not seek aid

from the unseen; from the converse of man with his own spirit; from ideal conceptions; or even from history or legend. Human interest in the actual known human life, with its terrestrial abode, its pursuits, its simple institutions, its vicissitudes, is the keynote of the whole.

For us and for our time, it may seem that realistic means prosaic; and for corroborative emblems of this proposition may be chosen some of our statues in coat, waistcoat, and trowsers; some of our highly conventional painting; and the large measure in which our poetry, since the days of Scott and Crabbe, has quitted this field, like an animal flying from some recurrence of the glacial period in these latitudes to seek a more congenial clime. It is the voice of humanity, no longer young, which says to us,—

“The things which I have seen I now can see no more,”

and,—

“I know, where'er I go,
That there hath past away a glory from the earth.” *

But what is flat and stale to us was intensely poetical to the youth of our world. The cup which we have drunk was but just presented to its lips. The bloom was yet on the grape, the aroma yet in the draught. The first perception of the forms of beauty seems to have a life and force for the race, as well as for the individual, which is peculiar to itself, and which cannot be retained. We may be thankful that some of it, at least, has been precipitated into palpable and lasting forms for our behoof.

It appears to me, indeed, that the genuine realism of Homer not only is observable in this famous episode, but even reaches its climax here. Never was outward Fact so glorified by the Muse. Nowhere in poetry, to my knowledge, is there such an accumulation of incidents without crowding. The king is glad as he watches his reapers and his crop; but with this exception, there is hardly anywhere the description of a pure mental emotion. It is sometimes well to employ statistics in aid of criticism. Let us test the *Shield* by the number of its epithets. I have counted them, endeavouring to separate between those which belong to the *quid* from those which belong to the *quale*. The latter alone, I apprehend, are epithets proper: and I cannot reckon of these more than sixty-eight in one hundred and eighteen lines: a number surprisingly small, when it is remembered that the whole consists of strictly descriptive poetry. †

* Wordsworth, “Ode on the Recollections of Childhood.”

† The epithets in the corresponding episode of the *Æneid*, compared with the number of lines, seem to be nearly twice as many.

There is, however, one point in which, above all others, the Shield of Achilles is distinguished by its daring form from most, if not all, other poetical representations of a work of art. It is the degree in which it is charged with life and activity. Of the twelve pictures descriptive of scenes familiar to the eye, almost every one contains a narrative; and this narrative is made to pass before the eye with a vivid rapidity which is alike enchanting and impressive. There is but a single exception, and it is admirably chosen: the sheep at pasture give us a piece of still life, with a subject most appropriate to the mode of representation. Even the description of the heavens is animated with the spirit of movement. Orion is watched, or waited on, by the Bear. And the moon is a filling or waxing moon. So I have translated it, in opposition to Pope and to high lexicographical authorities, after consideration, and with confidence. The genius of the present participle (*πλήθουσιν*), to say the very least, seems to warrant that mode of rendering. But pictorially, I find it hard to believe that Homer meant to place a little round moon in competition with a large round sun. And, so far as poetry is concerned, it is surely in the spirit of this most animated episode to represent the moon as growing rather than as stationary in figure. We cannot fail to observe how much more this is in keeping with the Poet's treatment of the Sun. Here he has no change of shape to call in aid: so he touches him with the spark of life in another form, by calling him the unwearying Sun. This phrase at once brings before the mind his daily journey, how he climbs and then descends the heaven.

Upon the whole, I would venture to submit it, for the consideration of those who have a more extensive and accurate command of poetical literature than myself, whether any poet of any age has been so hardy and so powerful as Homer in the imaginative handling of material objects of Art for the purposes of Poetry? This hardness and power of Homer unquestionably reach their climax in the "Shield."

It has already been noticed that legend does not enter into the representations of the Shield. The short roll of nascent Greek history or tradition had already, at the epoch of the Trojan War, yielded at least two great enterprises of historical interest to posterity; the voyage of the ship *Argo*, and the War of the Seven against Thebes. But it was only thus making its beginning; it perhaps was neither rich and full enough, nor as yet familiar enough to the mass, to make it more suitable for representations like that on the Shield, than the purely unattached and impersonal representations with which it is filled.

It may be also that the Eastern character, still attaching to the god-artificer Hephaistos, would have presented an incongruity in the

treatment of purely national legends, which is not felt where the delineation of life, though thoroughly Greek, is still general, and where much of the subject-matter presented was probably common to Greece and to the Syrian and Assyrian East.

Virgil, on the other hand, has with perfect propriety adopted the basis of history and legend for his otherwise derivative representation of the Shield of Æneas.

But perhaps we are warranted in saying that the entire absence of tradition from the Homeric Shield not only accords with the recency of Greek national or quasi-national existence, but also with the belief that Art had not yet become, so to speak, endemic in Greece; as we may feel certain that the intense patriotism, which pervades the *Iliad*, would at a very early stage of development have impressed upon Greek art a national character by the free use of legend for the purpose.*

The materials used in the composition of the Shield deserve notice. The metals cast into the furnace are copper, tin, gold, and silver; and in one passage we find what may be a reference to *κῦανος*, or bronze, resulting from a mixture of tin and copper; but it is a question whether the mixed metal yielding the dark colour is intended, or the dark colour only. Nowhere else in Homer is there a reference to the making of a mixed metal. In general, to say the least, the workmanship of the Shield is employed upon the several metals, single and uncombined; and it is probable that the Poet meant, by their free intermixture, to aim at the effect of colour.† This likelihood is confirmed by his repeated use of the word *ποικίλλω*, to variegate, which seems to be taken from the sister art of embroidery, and which is applied with a peculiar propriety to the most brilliant of all the representations, that of the Dance at the close.

The reader, even in a translation, cannot fail to observe the highly archaic picture of life, presented by the scenes upon the Shield. The scene of the trial respecting the fine for homicide belongs to a stage of society anterior to law, though forms of polity have begun to exist; and when corruption, by the receipt of gifts other than the acknowledged public premium for superior judgment, (*dorodokia*.) had not yet come in. That of the harvest, where the master of the reapers is also the King, is yet nearer the patriarchal stage; but some difference is to be expected between the country and the town; which are distinct from one another in the Shield as they are also in

* I may refer to Mr. A. S. Murray on the Homeric Question, *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, January, 1874, p. 239.

† See Pope's Observations on the Shield, following his 18th book. But he goes greatly beyond what I have stated.

the *Iliad*.* In no particular do the manners of the Shield appear to differ from those of the Poems generally: they are certainly not less primitive.

In the main it may be said, as to the subject-matter of the episode, that the Poet represents, upon the surface offered by the great defensive weapon of the Warrior, first, through its outline, a figure of the universe, such as he conceived it; secondly, a collection of all those scenes and events of human life, which were at once the most stirring, the most familiar, and the most important.

A question may be raised, whether we ought to conceive of the form of the Shield as oblong, or as round. This is not the place for a discussion on the subject: no epithet is used, in the description of the process of manufacture, which determines it; but I have taken the Shield to be oblong; and I may observe that Pope, who treats it as round, in reliance apparently upon an erroneous rendering of a word (*ἀντρον*), assumes for it a diameter of no less than four feet.†

It is probable that the boss in the middle was meant, in the Poet's mind, to afford space and a suitable shape for the representation of the vault of heaven.

The scenes wrought upon the Shield are as follows:—

1. The Earth, Sea, and Heavenly bodies:
2. In a city at peace, we have
 - a. Marriage processions and festivities:
 - b. A judicial suit, tried by the people, under the presidency of the Elders.
3. In a city at war,—
 - a. A scene before the ramparts:
 - b. An ambush and surprise:
 - c. A bloody fight.
4. The ploughing of a field.
5. The harvest, and the meal in preparation.
6. The vintage, with music, and march (or something more than march) to time of the vintagers.
7. A herd of cattle attacked by lions.
8. Sheep at pasture, and their folds.
9. The Dance.
10. The great Ocean River, encompassing the whole; as, in the mind of Homer, it encompassed the surface of the Earth.

The two grand over-ruling conditions of human life, and the prevailing and elementary pursuits of human industry, are thus placed before us with a remarkable comprehensiveness. We see Peril and

* *Il.* xxiii. 835.

† *Observations*, &c.

Safety, Stir and Calm, Toil and Pleasure; the repast prepared to reward the one, music and movement enlivening the other.

The alternations of the scenes are both skilful and studied. From the bloody fight we pass to the activity of peaceful industry; from the furious assault of the lions to the deep repose of the pasturing flocks; and from these again to the rapid and sparkling animation of the dance.

We may however remark upon what the Shield does not contain as well as on what it does. We do not find on it any scene of

1. Navigation :
2. Hunting :
3. Any domestic art or trade :
4. Religious rite or observance.

As to the first, it is plain from the Poems generally, that Navigation had not yet become a characteristic or familiar feature of Greek life. We hear nowhere of a trading ship, except in connection with the Phœnicians.

As to the second, we must bear in mind that the hunting of the Homeric times was not a pastime, but a pursuit of direct utility, intended to rid the land of a nuisance, and to provide for the safety of property. When it is thus viewed, we have the substance of hunting given us in the singularly animated scene of the lions and the bull.

With respect to the third head, we may bear in mind that the useful arts of the period were for the most part homely, sedentary, and single-handed. Even for his similes, Homer has but little employed them: much less could they come up to the dignity of these more stirring exhibitions of life. Even the combined labour of the damsels in the Palace of Alkinoos—the only instance given us in the Poem of such combination—would have supplied but a tame and poor picture for the Shield. Moreover it is rather a Phœnician, than a Greek picture.

The absence of any scene representing the rites and observances of religion, opens much wider questions.

The great and standing institution of ancient religion was sacrifice.

We have this in Homer as associated with particular places, like the grove and fountain of the Nymphs near the town of Ithaka;* or with rare and solemn occasions, like the hecatomb to Apollo in the First Iliad,† and the sacrifice of Agamemnon in the Third.‡ Lastly, it is an incident of the common meal, as we see both in other places, and in this very description, where the Heralds had “sacrificed,” that is, had killed and cooked, a great ox for the meal of the reapers.

* Od. xvii. 204—11.

† Il. i. 446.

‡ Il. iii. 264.

None of these three occasions of sacrifice were available for a prominent position on the surface of the Shield: the first and second, because they were occasional, not ordinary; the third, because it could not command the requisite breadth and liveliness of interest as a separate or special subject. In truth, the observances of religion filled no large place in the Greek mind, even in the Homeric times. And this leads to a wider form and scope of observation. We find here, in this extraordinary poetic achievement of Homer, an early indication, an embryo, so to speak, of that principle which was to reach its fullest manifestation in the Greek of the classical period, the principle of the sufficiency of this, our human, earthly life; without any capital regard to what is before us in futurity, or what is above and around us in the unseen world. Hence the Shield contains no Birth, and no Funeral, of man. The beginning and the end of life are endowed for Christians with so intense an interest, that we are apt to forget how different an aspect they offered to those beyond the pale. Both of them are swathed in weakness or distress, and the Greek had no charm in his possession which could invest distress and weakness with beauty, or infuse into them the glow of life. Sorrow had not yet been glorified. Scenes like these, he would say, do not make up the completeness of life, but impair it: they are not to be acknowledged as legitimately belonging to it; we submit to them, for we cannot help submitting; but they form no portion of our glory, and we put them out of sight.

Fulness of energy in the powers of body and mind, and fulness of delight following their exercise; action rewarded in itself, and sustained by this reward; a sphere bright, brilliant, bounded, self-contained, self-supported, full of all things glorious, beautiful, and strong; such was the aim of life for the Greek, and all that tended to break and banish the illusion was carefully kept away from thought and view. The spirit which pervades the action of the Shield is therefore the spirit of joy: joy in movement, joy in repose; joy in peace, and joy in battle: anywhere and always joy, until the day that must come shall come, and the final plunge is made into the Darkness, where a Sceptre, ruling all the dead, is not worth as much as is the mess of a labourer for hire, though the master be poor, and can give but scanty cheer,* if only it be had beneath the cheerful sun and in the abode of the living.

In writing thus I am not unmindful of the Greek Tragedy. But I do not think it qualifies the general truth of my position; and I would recommend those who doubt, to consult the remarkable observations of Bishop Butler, in the *Analogy*, on passive habits.

* Od. xi. 489.

Upon the Translation I have only to say that I have aimed at great fidelity—in a word, at the representation of Homer as he is; though well aware in how slight a measure this object can have been gained: for in the effort to hold firmly by the bone and sinew of the Poet, the ethereal parts escape.

I have given to the obscure word *eirai* the sense of ramparts, which the context seems almost to require: and I have not attempted to render by any exact equivalent the expression *periclutos Amphigueeis*; even Chapman in this place recoils from the letter, and translates the phrase 'the famous Artsman.'

THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES, WROUGHT BY HEPHAISTOS.

IL. xviii. 468—608.

I.

So He spake, and left the goddess;
 Straightway to the bellows drew,
 Fixed them fireward, set them blowing;
 Mouths a score in all they blew,
 Reddening, whitening, all the furnace
 With their timely various blast,
 As the god and work required it,
 Slower now, and now more fast.
 Precious gold, and stubborn copper,
 Silver store, and tin, he cast
 In the flame. The ponderous anvil
 Next upon its block he tries;
 One hand grasps the sturdy hammer,
 One the pincers firmly plies.

II.

First of all, the Shield he moulded
Broad, and strong, and wrought throughout,
With a bright and starry border,
Threefold thick, set round about.
Downward hung its belt of silver,
Five the layers of the Shield,
And with skilful mind he sculptured
Rare devices o'er its field.

III.

There he wrought Earth, Sea, and Heaven,
There he set the unwearying Sun,
And the waxing Moon, and stars that
Crown the blue vault every one ;
Pleiads, Hyads, strong Orion,
Arctos, hight to boot the Wain.
He upon Orion waiting,
Only he of all the train
Shunning still the baths of Ocean,
Wheels and wheels his round again.

IV.

There he carved two goodly Cities
Thick with swarms of speaking men.

v.

Weddings were in one, and banquets,
Torches blazing overhead,
Nuptial hymns, and from their chambers
Brides about the city led.
Here to pipe and harp resounding
Young men wildly whirling danced ;
While the women, each one standing
By their porches, gaze entranced.

vi.

But the townsmen all assembled
In the forum thronging stood ;
For a strife of twain had risen,
Suing on a fine of blood.
All was paid, the first protested,
Pleading well to move the crowd ;
Nought was had, upheld the second ;
Each to obey an umpire vowed ;
And the hearers, as they sided
This or that way, cheered aloud.
And the heralds ordered silence ;
And, on chairs of polished stone,
Ranged in venerable circle
Sate the Elders. One by one
Each the clear-toned herald's sceptre
Took, and standing forth alone
Spake his mind. Two golden talents
Lay before them, to requite
Only him, among the Judges,
Straightliest who should judge the right.

VII.

But before the second City
Bright in arms two Armies lay.
Evil choice one gave the other :
Either half the goods to pay
In that smiling town, or see it
Given to fire and slaughter. They
Brooked it not, but armed for ambush.
Wives beloved, and stripling hands,
And with these the age-bound greybeards,
Guard the wall. Off march the bands.

VIII.

Arès and Athenè lead them ;
Gold, and golden-clad, they gleam,
Fair, and large in aims, and towering
Right and left, as gods beseem.
Dwindled either host beside them.—
One to ambush held its way,
Where the folk was used to water,
And along the river lay
Wrapt in swarthy armour. Yonder,
Twain for scouts they set, to keep
Watch for the expected booty,
Curly-hornèd beeves, and sheep.
Soon it comes in view. Two shepherds
Mirthful music heedless play
On their pipes. Forewarned, the army
Quick make havoc of the prey,
Snowy flocks, and droves of oxen,
And the swains beside them slay.

IX.

When the host before the ramparts
Heard the bellowing din from far,
Mounted each man on his chariot
Drove the prancing steeds to war :
Quick they came. They closed in battle
Ranged along the river's banks,
And they hurled the sharp-tipped * lances
Each athwart the other's ranks.
Strife and Tumult there were mingling,
There destroying Fate he drew ;
Some alive and still unwounded,
Some she grasped, with gashes new ;
Some, now corpses, through the turmoil
Draggling by the feet she bore,
And her shoulders had a mantle
Dabbled foul with human gore.
Like to living men they mingled,
Fought alive with might and main,
And, alive, to either army
Dragged the bodies of the slain.

X.

There he set a loamy fallow,
Three times wrought, full soft, and wide
Many a team, and many a ploughman
Down and up the fallow plied.
And as each, the boundary reaching,
Turned, would one that stood beside

* Literally, copper-tipped.

Give into his hands the wine-cup
Honey-sweet. So each more fain,
Wheeling down the deep soft furrow,
Eager strove the bound to gain.
And the darkening glebe behind them,
All along, albeit of gold,
New wrought earth in hue resembling,
Gave a marvel to behold.

XI.

There he set a field corn-laden.
In that field the shearers reap,
Grasping close their sharpened sickles.
Down the furrows, heap on heap,
Falls the grain to ground. The binders
Sheaves, in order following, bind ;
Binders three : to whom unwearied
Carrier-lads their armfuls bring.
Watching from beside the furrow,
Silent near them stands the King,
Staff in hand, and glad in spirit.
By an oak o'ershadowing,
Heralds, for the feast preparing,
Slay a weighty ox, and dress ;
And the women strew thick o'er it
Barley-meal, the reaper's mess.

XII.

There he set a goodly vineyard,
Laden with its grapes of gold :

Silver-pales the pendant clusters
 Glossy-black all through uphold.
 Moat of bronze * around the border,
 Round the moat a hedge of tin ;
 One small path, at time of vintage,
 Lets the gatherers out and in.
 And the train of youths and maidens
 In the wicker-baskets brings,
 Blithe of thought, the luscious fruitage.
 Daintily a stripling sings
 To his clear-toned lyre, amongst them,
 So as Linos sung of yore :
 They too, frisking, shouting, singing,
 Stamp the time upon the floor.

XIII.

There a herd of kine he moulded,
 Some in tin, and some in gold,
 Lowing they, with horns uplifted,
 Rushed afield from out the fold,
 Where the wavy reed-bed quivered,
 Where the sounding river rolled.
 Golden herdsmen four attend them,
 Nine swift dogs behind. When lo !
 Dread to see, a pair of lions,
 Mid the kine that foremost go
 Seized a bellowing bull, and dragged him
 Roaring. Dogs and men pursued.

* It is an unsolved question whether the word in the original (*κρυαειν*) refers only to colour, or to a metallic substance. In my opinion, if it refers to a metallic substance, that substance is bronze.

They, the huge hide tearing open,
Lapped the bowels and the blood.
While the herdsmen, void of purpose,
Chid the swift hounds to the proof,
These, as loath to grip the lions,
Bayed at hand, yet held aloof.

XIV.

There a pasture, broad, and gleaming—
White with sheep, in beauteous glade,
And with hut, and roof-clad pen, and
Stall, the mighty Master made.

XV.

There a Dance the mighty Master
In the broidered metal wrought.
Such to rich-haired Ariadne
Daidalos in Knossos brought,
Spacious Knossos. Youths and maidens,
Maidens grown of age to wed,
Hand on wrist, each one with other,
Through the mazes lightly sped.
These are robed in rarest muslin,
Those fine-woven tunics wear,
Soft with glaze of oil, and glistening.
These are crowned with garlands fair,
Those their golden poniards, hanging
From their belts of silver, bear.

Now with trained feet careering
 All the troop in circle* flies,
 Like the potter's wheel† and gearing,
 Which for speed he sits and tries ;
 Now each rank in backward movement
 On the rank behind them fall.
 Charmed with those bewitching dancers,
 Throngs a gazing crowd. Mid all
 Harps and sings the sacred minstrel :
 Ever, as his notes begin,
 Tumblers twain are wildly whirling
 Round the open ring within.

XVI.


Ocean's might, resistless River,
 Last of all, his labour sealed,
 Rolling round the outmost border
 Of the deftly-fashioned Shield.

1867.

W. E. GLADSTONE.

* The simile of the potter's wheel has led me to describe the dance in terms as circular ; and I have been influenced in rendering this passage to a certain extent by dances as I have seen them practised by a Greek village population of this day.

† "My thoughts are whirled like a potter's wheel."—1 Henry VI., 1, 5.



CONTEMPORARY EVOLUTION.

PART II.

IN the first part of this Essay * an endeavour was made to investigate the meaning and tendency of that great process of social change which has been going on since the thirteenth century, and which still continues.

This process was explained as a prolonged struggle between the Mediæval Theocracy and a reviving Paganism,† the latter succeeding in more and more thoroughly rejecting the domination which at an early period the former had obtained. The anticipation was also expressed that this repudiation would be carried to a much further point than it has as yet reached.

* See CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for September, 1873, p. 595.

† In the valuable and interesting essay by the Rev. A. M. Fairbairn, which appeared in the very next number of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW — namely that for October — views are put forward singularly harmonising with those above referred to. The religious belief prevailing in Europe is represented by him as being a synthesis of Hebraistic and Hellenistic elements (p. 806), and it is shown how the old, pre-Christian, "Indo-European mode of conceiving and expressing Deity is in almost every respect a contrast to the Semitic. The general terms" in Indo-European religions "were primarily expressive of physical qualities" (p. 797), and "all the Indo-European religions bear the stamp of this primitive naturalism" (p. 799). By the Pagan revival spoken of in the first part of the essay on Contemporary Evolution was meant an increasing action expulsive of the Hebraistic elements, and the "Paganism" referred to is equivalent to the Indo-European "Naturalism" of Mr. Fairbairn, with its degraded conceptions of God, its divorce between religion and ethics, its state absolutism and the slavery of the individual conscience.

The consideration of two questions was deferred from want of space. These were :—

(1) The "*effect on Christianity of the further development of the great movement.*"

(2) The probable "*result of the renewed conflict between such a modified Christianity and a so revived Paganism.*"

It was, however, by anticipation, observed that it was necessary to the successful consideration of these questions, that the "enquirer should have both the Theological and the Anti-Theological bias reduced to a minimum degree," but that he should at the same time know "what developments are really congruous with Christianity," since without such knowledge it must be manifestly impossible for him to judge of the effects of Contemporary Evolution upon it.

Before proceeding to attempt the solution of the two grave problems which are here to occupy us, it may be remarked that the question as to the *truth of Christianity* is here left entirely on one side, the obvious or admitted tendencies of known natural forces and laws being alone taken into consideration.

Assuming that "Paganism" or "Aryan Naturalism" is playing the great part here assigned to it, and is likely to produce yet greater effects in the future, it is manifest that Christianity must be thus profoundly modified or entirely destroyed, unless it contains latent powers and capacities calculated to meet such attacks and provide for such trials. If, however, Christianity does contain such powers in a high degree, it is evident that resurging Paganism may but be the occasion for the outward manifestation of such latent capacities, and that to its hostile action Christianity may be indebted for the most startling and prodigious of its triumphs.

To investigate, then, the question whether Christianity is likely to be utterly destroyed, or more or less enfeebled, or slightly or greatly strengthened by the further development of the naturalistic movement, we must examine that movement in its (1) POLITICAL, (2) SCIENTIFIC, and (3) PHILOSOPHIC aspects.

The questions of the effects of contemporary scientific and philosophic evolution on Christianity, may be deferred to a future occasion. Here it is proposed to consider CHRISTIANITY AND POLITICAL EVOLUTION only.

Some of the political effects of the further development, in our own day and hereafter, of the humanistic Renaissance were briefly indicated in the first part* of this essay, but as a necessary groundwork for estimating the future, it will be well here to begin with a somewhat fuller though brief survey of past and present socio-political changes.

* See *loc. cit.* p. 597.

At the period of Innocent III. the Christian Theocracy in Europe had proximately attained its greatest actual development.

The social institutions and whole political fabric avowedly reposed upon an all but universally accepted divine authority, and upon a Revelation the declarations of which were interpreted and systematically applied to all circumstances as they arose by spiritual authorities recognised as the revealed system's God-appointed administrators, of whom one Supreme Pontiff was the acknowledged head.

The Christian political system having thus temporarily organised itself and grown up into this near approach to a universal Theocracy, began slowly to disintegrate.

Incipiently resurging Paganism first showed itself politically in a spirit of religious "Nationalism" opposing itself to the cosmopolitan religious conception embodied in the Papacy. Paganism was especially national, and the principle of "Nationalism" in religion when once introduced into Christendom by legislative impediments to the free exercise of the Christian central and controlling power, rapidly developed itself and expanded fatally to the Christian Theocracy.

In France that "eldest son of the Church," Philip the Fair, dealt the first great blow to the Christian political system in the persons of Boniface VIII. and the Knights Templars. Thenceforward the anti-Theocratic spirit manifested itself now and again in opposition to the Church, and when this action was apparently reversed by the Royal protection extended to Christianity against the revolt of Luther and Calvin, it was in reality but intensified by a surrender of control in spiritual things as a return for such protection.

The cessation of the subsequent religious troubles through the accession of the politic Henry IV., was the occasion of the yet further domination of the Church by the State, culminating in the despotism of Louis XIV., who avowed himself as not only resuming in his own person the whole civil power of the State, but as the God-giver and sacred Vicegerent of Deity, against whose will *no* right, whether of privilege, property, or conscience, should under any circumstances assert itself.

The wide divergence of such a social system from the old Mediæval Theocracy is patent enough, nevertheless that system continued to exhibit a considerable deference to older forms, and attempted to constitute a sort of national Theocracy of its own, founded on the king's "Divine Right."

The leprous Regency and the crowned infamy which succeeded, could not however but greatly weaken the force of the alleged supernatural authority of the Royal autocracy, which authority was at the same time further enfeebled by the advance of the "Philosophic" spirit.

Thus, before the unhappy Louis XVI. opened the States-General

he had come to be regarded by an influential part of the nation as merely *its* representative, and "divine right," so far as recognized at all, had passed to the nation as a whole. Nevertheless, the old laws continuing still, gave him power over the consciences of his subjects in the form of State control of the French Church.

When the sovereignty of the French people through their representatives—or those who asserted themselves to be the representatives of such representatives—succeeded to the Royal power in the State, they not unnaturally assumed and exaggerated that ecclesiastical supremacy which had been conceded to the monarch, and the "civil constitution of the clergy" was the result. Thus the singular anomaly presented itself of one section of citizens claiming to dispose of the consciences of their fellow-citizens by imposing what was in fact a new State religion in the name of *liberty*.

It is plain then that the diminution and destruction of the Royal power, instead of reversing the current which had accompanied its augmentation, actually intensified it.

Still, as long as any profession of religion remained, there was always at least a nominal and professed respect for liberty of conscience; but it is interesting to note that the extreme of intolerance and persecution attended the proclaimed atheism of Hebert and the Commune.

In the rise of what afterwards became "Imperialism," that most cynical and unscrupulous of tyrants, the first Napoleon, availed himself of the rising tide in favour of freedom of conscience, to legislate for the restoration and support of the French Church, and here some historical students might suspect that we encounter a really Theocratic reaction. Such a suspicion, however, would be groundless. Not upon the old basis of "revelation," but on that of the common rights of different religions to the support of an indifferent State, was the re-establishment effected, and while the lay power thus asserted its supremacy and independence more than even under the old kings, privileges conceded to the really Christian monarchs were retained by the man whose treatment of Pius VII. proclaimed at once his Paganism and his brutality.

The Restoration did, indeed, more or less ally itself with the strong desire entertained by an influential portion of the nation for a reversion in the Theocratic direction, especially under Charles X.—with speedy loss of his throne as a result. Nevertheless that even this monarch was animated by the prevailing Anti-Theocratic spirit, is shown by that expulsion of the Jesuits which so shortly preceded his own exile.

During the reign of the "Citizen King," Theocratic tendencies were notoriously in disfavour; while under Napoleon III. and through his act the mediæval Theocracy of Christendom has received its

supreme blow in the revolutionizing of Italy, with loss to the Pope of his civil principedom as a result.

The last hopes of all those in France or elsewhere who sigh for the re-elevation of the tattered and disfigured banner of the Mediæval Christian Theocracy have long centred in the Count de Chambord. But the head of that government which lately seemed so near accomplishing his elevation to the throne, has in distinct and memorable words disclaimed in the name of his party and of the French clergy any desire for mediæval reaction, and the Count de Chambord himself has accepted liberty of conscience, freedom of worship, and the other articles of modern constitutionalism, so that his accession, if it takes place, cannot have any other effect than that of lending to modern civicism the halo of his legitimacy.

The Mediæval Christian Theocracy then in France may be said to be definitively at an end, and attacks on freedom and conscience are to be apprehended from the friends and favourers of Communistic fanaticism alone.

In England a parallel series of changes has been differently effected.

Henry VIII. (that incarnation of the dominant English spirit of his time) completed by his despotism a process which had been gradually developing itself in preceding reigns by the formal absorption of ecclesiastical authority in the person of the king made "Head of the Church." But the Theocracy in England, though thus changed as to its base, far from being overthrown, was for a time augmented, and it was not until it had transformed itself into the despotism of the Commonwealth, that its vigour began slowly to relax. The very slowness was, however, one cause of the continuity of its ebb, for the resistance of the Protestant Bishops to the tyranny of James II. (itself sustained by the Theocratic sentiment) powerfully aided in bringing about the expulsion of one who, had he remained, might have effected a strongly reactionary transformation.

The government of the Dutchman, with its terrible penal laws, was despotic enough; but its tendencies were distinctly anti-Theocratic, and such thenceforward has been the general direction of our legislation:

Nevertheless, so conservative are we that to this day the Christian Theocracy remains exceptionally erect in England. We have not only a National Church still in possession of its territorial endowments, but a multitude of our positive enactments (such as those respecting the observance of Sunday) repose on a distinctly Theocratic basis, as also do our conspicuous state ceremonials, from the coronation of the Chief Magistrate downwards.

There can be little doubt, however, but that these last relics will, more or less, gradually disappear. Ominous was the recent discourse

of Mr. Bright at Birmingham, and the federation of 600,000 labourers at Newman Street is a threatening portent for that last venerable mediæval relic irreverently termed by the late Dr. Wilberforce the "Squarson."

If we turn to Spain we find there a very interesting and instructive example of the same process under very different forms and with very different results. The prolonged Moorish wars caused Christianity to entwine itself so intimately with the Spanish social structure that the Mediæval Theocracy remained in full force to the end of the reign of the great Isabella. Nevertheless it was taking a peculiar direction, not found in other countries in Europe.

As elsewhere, so also in Spain, the monarch came to share in that exaggerated authority and dignity which Kings acquired, in the sixteenth century, as the patrons or as the vanquishers of the Church within their borders. But in Spain the monarch had to share his power with another for a time co-ordinate, independent, and invincible authority—the frightful Spanish Inquisition.

This institution, which originally, indeed, took its rise in a development of the official Christian system, soon became so powerful, owing to local conditions, as to be able to defy and successfully resist that Theocracy in which it took its rise, and the singular spectacle presented itself of a power professing to have for its one object the complete and minute enforcement of Church authority, itself refusing to obey the supreme head of the very Church it professed to serve.

Overshadowing and obscuring both Royal and Papal authority, this monstrous Christian parasite offered a peculiar obstacle to overt manifestations of reviving Paganism, although itself hostile to the true Theocratic spirit. That it was not the true representative of the latter was shown by the unerring instinct of resurging Paganism, which first expelled not the Inquisitors but their occasional victims the Jesuits—ever in closest and most sympathetic union with the head of Christendom.

Again, the Anti-Theocratic changes in Spain were mainly brought about by foreign influences. So that small tentative returns towards some of the old laws and practices were, as being national, more or less popular and practicable, down almost to 1868.

Now, however, the extremely radical measures since adopted show that the forcible repression of the Anti-Theocratic movement in Spain has in the end but intensified its action and given rise to a spirit of antagonistic fanaticism akin to, if not in excess of, that of the Parisian Commune.

Hardly a fragment of the Christian Theocracy remains in the Madrid Government of Spain to-day, but many hope or fear that a return to that Theocracy may be effected under the sovereignty of

"Charles VII." Some of those, however, who are personally acquainted with "His Most Catholic Majesty," positively affirm that nothing is further from his thoughts or intentions than the re-introduction of Mediæval Theocracy into Spain—earnest as he is in maintaining the freedom of the consciences of his Catholic subjects and, as therein necessarily involved, the freedom of the Spanish Church.

It seems, therefore, that in all cases, the end of the Mediæval Theocracy in Spain has come, and it only remains to be seen whether the rights of conscience and the freedom of the individual citizen will have to be gained through suffering under a democratic tyranny, or be allowed to grow and expand under the shelter of a sovereignty which can claim obedience from the most reactionary elements of Spanish society.

If we pass from the mountains where the old Spanish Monarchy is struggling to assert itself, through Southern France to the Alps, we come to another nation which may seem to constitute the very political antipodes of Spanish Monarchism, namely Switzerland.

Yet in Switzerland we find a singular fundamental resemblance to Spain under a strangely different exterior.

The United States and Switzerland are Republics—Spain and England Monarchies. Thus are they classed in popular apprehension. Really, however (as most readers of this REVIEW are doubtless aware), it is Switzerland and Old Spain, the United States and England, which ought to be classed together.

When, after the religious disruption of the sixteenth century, the Swiss Confederation settled down into a certain number of Catholic and a certain number of Protestant communities, an intimate union of Church and State became the rule in the respective Cantons. The rigid Theocracy of Geneva is well known to all, but in the Catholic as in the Protestant Cantons, Church laws were enforced by secular authority, and thus much of Mediæval Theocracy has been preserved down to the present day by these small communities.

Now, however, repudiation of the Christian Theocracy is making its way in Switzerland, but by a singular inversion it is the non-Christian part of the nation which is seeking to prolong its forms, while those who are *par excellence* the very representatives of that Theocracy are being gradually driven to take up a position hostile to them. This inversion has arisen through changes by which, owing to the union of Church and State, power over the Church has come into the hands of those most hostile to her, and we have as a result the grotesque exhibition of an ex-friar who has violated all his own vows in the name of liberty of conscience, becoming the willing

agent of an Anti-Christian Government in robbing and oppressing Christians amongst whom that Government has enabled him to intrude.

In Berne we also find an Anti-Christian Government taking upon itself to decide what doctrines its fellow-citizens are to accept, to whose guidance they are to commit their consciences, and also to draw geographical boundary lines on one or the other side of which citizens are or are not to be allowed to make use of each other's religious ministrations.

There can be little doubt but that this tyranny will so arouse consciences in opposition to it, that a separation between Church and State will have to be ultimately effected, and thus in Switzerland, as in France, England, and Spain, the Christian Theocracy on its old basis will have ceased to exist.

Descending the Alps and Apennines to Brindisi, we traverse a country now undergoing changes peculiarly interesting in reference to our present enquiry, since there the Christian Theocracy has its head-quarters.

It may at first be thought singular that Italy, which was the *fons et origo* of the modern humanistic spirit, and which in physical science (as especially in Anatomy and Geology) was so far ahead of more northern nations, should have so continued, from Turin to Naples, subject to a system of Government which appeared so decidedly Theocratic.

But, in fact, it was much less so than it seemed. Thus in Tuscany the Revolution of 1869 caused a dukedom to disappear which nominally, indeed, supported Christianity, but which did so much more in the interest of the dukedom than of the Church. The profoundly Anti-Theocratic Leopoldine laws were in full force, and now under Victor Emmanuel if there is no longer that State support for the Church which formerly existed, the impediments to its action have also disappeared.

To the popular mind of England the penultimate King of Naples was the very representative of priest-ridden Monarchy. Really, however, though glad to make use of Church influence for the support of the throne, not many Catholic Monarchs have been more Anti-Theocratic than the sovereign in question. Not only intolerant of the Jesuits, he would not even listen to Pope Pius, when as his guest at Gaeta he petitioned for a modicum of freedom for the Sicilian Church.

The destruction then of such systems of government in Italy was more the making apparent of what was before latent, than any really considerable advance in the Anti-Theocratic direction. That advance had been made long before.

While the Pope's Civil Princedom remained, and any community, even that of a single city, continued subject to his direct civil sway, the Mediæval Christian Theocracy might be said still to exist. With its disappearance, should it be final, disappears the logical basis of that system; then "Christendom" exists and can exist no longer, however some shreds and patches of it may for a time linger amidst the social phenomena of the succeeding period.

It is true that we see a curious and interesting example of "Survival" in the Russian Empire. There a very peculiar Christian Theocracy still remains erect—perhaps in full force and destined to further development. Signs, however, are not wanting that it is really a tottering structure—deeply undermined and honeycombed as it is by the efforts of religious dissidents. Nevertheless the future of Russia is a subject full of uncertainty and a problem not less perplexing than abounding in interest, about which a word or two may be said later.

We now come to the last region which need occupy us in our brief survey of the leading features of the action of social political evolution on Christianity from the middle ages to the present day. This last region is Germany. Under existing circumstances it is the most interesting of all; for there before our eyes is being played out on a magnificent scale, a remarkably involved struggle, in which mediæval and modern, Christian and Pagan conceptions are entangling and disentangling themselves with singular complexity and forming a labyrinth, the clue to which seems to have been strangely missed by most of the leaders of English public opinion.

Under the head of Germany must be included not only the New German Empire under Prussia, but Austria also. Austria must be so included on account of the important part played by Southern Germany in the national evolution from the thirteenth century to the present day.

In Germany the Christian Theocracy attained in one respect a development which it reached nowhere else—namely, in the number of its spiritual rulers who held direct civil sway—the various Prince-Bishops and Archbishops, such as those of Cologne, Mayence, Salzburg, &c., &c. Besides this, the Kaisers had a certain sanctity of authority recognized by the ecclesiastical power beyond that of any other temporal ruler. According to the generally received opinion of the middle ages there was but one supreme temporal Lord of Christendom—the Emperor,—as there was but one supreme spiritual Lord—the Pope; and it was in this widely diffused belief that the Emperors in their struggles with the Pontiffs found, perhaps, their main support.

With the weakening of the Christian Theocracy waned also the power of the Holy Roman Emperor, the independence of subordinate Princes in Germany increasing, while elsewhere the central powers were strengthening themselves at the expense of the various subordinate local authorities.

The movement of the Reformation, the subsequent religious struggles, and the rise of Prussia, completed, as everyone knows, the real destruction of the old system. Thus, when the Corsican Despot finally put an end to that venerable Imperial dignity, he really caused to disappear but the shadow of a shade. He little thought, however, of the Nemesis he was conjuring up, and how the chronic disease of Germany would be cured, and its feebleness invigorated by the sharp cautery of his merciless invasions.

The old historic Christian German Sovereignty, with its majestic hierarchical system, in the State as well as in the Church, in the early part of the middle ages, as powerful as it was magnificent, was indeed at an end; but with marvellous rapidity arose that strong instinct and sentiment of Unity, of which we see the result to-day—a unity not based on Christianity (and now, indeed, in deadly contest with it), but reposing on race and nature only, and in perfect harmony with that reviving Paganism which the first part of this essay endeavoured to describe. Of this latent power Napoleon I's aggression elicited the manifestation, but the full force of it was reserved for the overthrow of Napoleon III. The course of evolution in Germany, then, has been substantially similar to that we have seen elsewhere—out of Prussia, though so complex that an exposition of the causes of local differences in its development would alone form a work of the highest interest. After the final religious effect of the Reformatory movement had subsided, the old Imperial Authority was strange to say, amongst the first to evolve and develop the further growth of that spirit which was most fatal to its own foundation. The profoundly Anti-Christian policy of Joseph II. anticipated that of the French Revolution and of the Pagan German Government of to-day.

The spectre of sans-culottism at Paris frightened back the European sovereigns into a temporary reversal of previous action, and made them seek to revitalize the rapidly decaying Mediæval Theocracy, in the selfish interest of their own power. The experiment has been short-lived, Austria has thoroughly changed her policy, and Christianity, whatever its future may be, ceases to suffer from the incubus of so damaging a support. The equally selfish and essentially hypocritical system of Prussia has also ended, and given place to an antagonism capable of putting the vitality of German Christianity to the proof. Even then, by those two powers—Austria

and Prussia,—which in different aspects may claim to be the nearest existing representatives of the old temporal Head of Christendom, the Christian Theocracy is finally disavowed. The Northern Kaiser has been ostentatiously welcomed in the old Imperial city as the just avowed author of a letter to the supreme head of that Theocracy, in which the claims of that head are repudiated and his authority defied.

It is true that the Southern Emperor is the *crowned* King of Hungary, and that his present conduct seems only to have been forced on him by circumstances, after years of fruitless efforts to found his Empire on some modification of the old Theocratic basis, much of which, indeed, still remains within the bounds of his Empire. His failure is but a still greater proof of the irresistible force of the adverse current he has in vain tried to stem.

It is true, again, the Northern Emperor is the *crowned* King of Prussia, he has repeatedly protested that his power has a divine sanction, and he has been ever personally opposed to the Anti-Christian policy in which he is now engaged. His crown, however (like that of Napoleon I.), was placed upon his head by his own hand—an act in itself virtually amounting to repudiation of a Christian Theocratic basis, while the actions of his government are rapidly becoming more and more profoundly Anti-Christian.

To sum up, then, the results of our survey, it may be asserted that since the days of St. Lewis one movement has in the main continued almost uninterruptedly in spite of actions of an apparently conflicting tendency.

This process has been one of continuous disintegration of the mediæval Christian Theocracy, proceeding with very varying degrees of rapidity over the whole area of what was once Christendom.

This movement, since it first displayed itself, has been aided and accelerated not only by processes manifestly in harmony with it, but also by others which were intended and seemed calculated to arrest, or even reverse it.

The whole current of events became turned in one direction, and whether here or there Princely power was augmented or diminished, whether popular liberties were curtailed or increased, whether aristocracies arose or decayed, all has aided in diverse ways this, which seems to have been the great dominant movement from mediæval times to our own.

Every effort which has been made to stem the current has failed, every power which raised itself in opposition has been broken.

In vain the Pilgrimage of Grace, with its banner of the five Holy Wounds, strove in fair fight to maintain the established system; in vain the misguided efforts of the Powder Plot sought by nefarious

measures to restore it ; in vain the virtues and conscientious efforts of Mary of England tried to retain the English Crown to the Church ; in vain the winning graces of Mary of Scotland sought similarly to retain the Scotch. Priests bled at Tyburn ; English and Irish citizens suffered confiscation, exile, and death, in fruitless efforts to reverse or to impede the Anti-Theocratic course of events. The very atmosphere which repelled the Armada favoured the Dutch invasion, and blood flowed unavailingly at Culloden and the Boyne.

The efforts of the French League were as resultless (in their intended direction) as the infamous Dragonnades of Louis XIV. or the Heroism of La Vendée.

The White Cockade of the Restoration but intensified the Anti-Theocratic hatred of France, and the apparently strong bands imposed by the Holy Alliance and Treaty of Vienna proved really but cobwebs to the expansive efforts of advancing Paganism, while the last Napoleon, powerful in invoking it in Italy and Austria, proved utterly impotent in his efforts to exorcise the spirit he had raised. The loyal troops of Francis Joseph, though momentarily all but triumphing against both France and Prussia, nevertheless actually failed against both, and the success of Germany in the recent war, instead of confirming and extending over the whole Empire that modified Theocracy which existed so peacefully and prosperously in Prussia, has had a directly opposite result.

It would seem that an action so wide-spread, so continuous, and so deep, proceeding as it is with accelerated rapidity, cannot easily be arrested, but rather must continue to proceed much further.

Nevertheless, there are many who believe that a reversal will at length ensue, and some modification of the old Theocracy be again generally established. At present the only power which seems to contain enough of the old material is Russia. It may be that, instead of politically assimilating itself to Western Europe (like the manners of its highest class), it may come to exercise a powerfully reactionary tendency. It does not seem impossible that, availing itself of the mutually enfeebling wars and revolutionary disintegrations of Western powers, it may hereafter come to play that part in Europe which was played of old by Macedon in Greece.

Such a Western expansion might be greatly aided if, carrying out the idea of a former sovereign, it united itself to the Roman Church and made itself the agent of the most powerful religious feelings and of all the Theocratic reactionary tendencies latent in Western Europe. It does not even seem impossible that a Roman Pontiff effectively restored to his civil Princedom by such Russian agency might inaugurate, by a Papal consecration in the Eternal City, yet a fresh dynasty of "Holy Roman Emperors," a Slavonic

series succeeding to the suppressed German line, as the Germans succeeded in the person of Charlemagne to the first line of Cæsars.

Nevertheless, such a transformation would be so great a reversal of the course which history has now pursued for six hundred years, that it can only be regarded as a remotely possible solution of the problem offered to us by the peculiar social and political divergence of Russia from the rest of Europe.

Again, if the expectation of continued social evolution in the path now so long followed be disappointed, and if Christian Theocracy, but slightly modified from what has before existed, be restored, Christianity *can* of course have nothing to fear from such a change from subordination to supremacy. We may here, therefore, neglect all possibilities of reaction in a Theocratic direction, since the subject of our inquiry concerns the probable result of the continued progress of resurging Paganism, on the hypothesis that it continues to follow the same course as heretofore.

It is difficult to believe but that further progress in the course hitherto pursued can mean anything else than the entire cessation of political support to Christianity, whether in schools, the legislature, the heads of the State, or the formalities officially recognized as concerning the birth, sexual relations, or death of citizens. Each man will then be everywhere free without political penalties of any kind to live, marry, carry on all social relations, die, and be buried in open rejection of the Church and her agency if he be so minded; and no State recognition or favour will tend to bribe individuals to simulate the acceptance of a creed which in their hearts they reject.

What, then, must be the effect on the Christian Church of such a universal repudiation of the Christian Theocracy? Clearly, if that Church be essentially bound up with Society as it has existed since mediæval times, such repudiation must be simply fatal.

It is not wonderful that so very many Christians view with alarm and dismay the progress of this great Pagan movement. In the first place the Christian Church has intimately connected itself with the Christian State—in the liturgy of Royal Coronations; in the past sanction of and sympathy with Aristocratic Institutions; in the tradition to the secular arm; in the Christian origin of so many Universities; in the congregations devoted to instruction; to the sick, the aged, and the poor, through the accepted intervention of the State; in the general tendency of the altar to ally itself to the throne, as in the France of to-day, in Spain, and in Austria.

Secondly, the enemies of the Theocracy are the avowed enemies of Christianity itself, as in Spain, as with the French Radicals, as in Austria and Germany, and as with the most free-spoken democrats here in England.

Thirdly, in the past the destruction of the Theocracy has undeniably been often the precursor of the destruction of Religion itself, by the expulsion of citizens who have taken religious vows, the sequestration of their property, the restraint of their persons, occasionally by their actual slaughter.

Fourthly, vast religious changes have so often been due to political passion, as in England and Germany in the sixteenth century, and in Germany now; while sometimes national prejudice, as in Prussia and the United States in the present day, acts powerfully to render minds hostile to particular creeds. These considerations may well cause Christians to dread the further advance of modern political change. But the question then arises, Is there any compensating and restorative action which, not being obvious, escapes the notice of these alarmists?

It may be that the existing social fabric is but one of several or of many political modes, with each of which Christianity can co-exist, and that the disintegrating changes are harmless to it, since they will but occasion the evolution of a new power.

If we regard the Church as a complex organism, it must, like every other organism, live by a series of actions responsive to the effects produced on it by the environment.

The action of the environment may be either to disintegrate and destroy or to consolidate and perfect it, and such action will destroy the Church if it is not able to effect internal modifications adequately responding to external changes.

It is manifest that a great process of *external disintegration* has taken place as regards the Church's social relations—a process crippling its power of action on its old basis. The question, then, is, Has this action been or not been accompanied by a process of *internal integration* which has more and more perfected and strengthened the Church's power of action on a new basis, and fitted it better than ever before for the struggles of the future?

To ascertain the probable efficacy of such integrating action, if it exists, we must first endeavour to find out what is the social system likely to replace that which seems to be passing away, and must pass away if the existing Anti-Theocratic movement continues to augment and develop itself. We must thus inquire in order to see whether the integrations arising in the Christian Church are or are not calculated so to meet the effects of the disintegrations as to place the ecclesiastical organism of the future in harmony with its new environment. Every social fabric, every considerable aggregation of mankind, must, since men are rational animals, repose upon some reasonable principles resolvable ultimately into one of two ideas, "expediency" or "right," or into some combination of them.

A community of savages may perhaps continue to exist on the simple principle that infringement of the accepted tribal customs is equivalent to a broken head or a spear in the thigh. But this is a form of expediency. More highly organized social States may be conceived, under certain circumstances, to indefinitely cohere from force of habit and a perception of utility essentially like the preceding. On the other hand, such a persistent condition may be largely indebted for its persistence to a respect for ancient custom which, if explicitly or implicitly enjoined on citizens, becomes essentially the acceptance of some such *moral* aphorism as "It is proper to maintain ancient customs;" and "This is a form of right."

As soon, however, as civilization has in any community attained a considerable development, the question of the basis of the social fabric will be sure to address itself to an increasing number of its component units.

A highly complex social system like that of England to-day reposes partly on perceptions of Utility, but far more on moral ideas of two kinds—one being that of a divine appointment, the other that of absolute right.

The idea of Utility or expediency may frequently be much more prominent and obtrusive, both in explanation and precept, than the Moral Conceptions. But it would be difficult to deny, however, that a belief in "divine appointment" widely prevails, at least in our agricultural districts, and that the conception of "absolute right" is a considerable, if not a main agent, in the diffusion of democratic ideas amongst our artisans.

Though it is manifest that our social system is largely maintained through a belief that things "work well;" yet much that is put down to "expediency" will, when fully analysed, be found really to repose on a "moral" basis. Thus, Mr. Mill's so-called "Utilitarianism," aiming, as it professes to do, at the greatest happiness of *all sentient beings* is really a distorted and exaggerated form of "absolute Morality."

It seems indeed, to say the least, very doubtful whether any social fabric could enduringly repose upon simple and naked expediency, and real utilitarianism—that is, that the temporal welfare of the individual should be to him his only end, and that there is no obligation on any citizen or section of a community to regard the welfare or desires of others in the smallest degree beyond what self-interest may dictate. The moment any one asserts that a citizen ought to restrain his actions within such bounds that they do not impede the purely self-regarding actions of his fellows, he steps beyond Utilitarianism into the region of absolute "Morality." All he can con-

sistently urge is that *it is expedient for each man to seek to establish and maintain a social system in which all actions are free to every citizen which do not directly infringe the similar freedom of his fellows.* This may be asserted to be expedient, since thus alone can each man best secure the steady and least impeded exercise of his own volition.

But whether or not a social fabric could be maintained in which it could not be proclaimed that to disregard others is *wrong*, as well as *inexpedient*, certain is it that if maintained it might become the most fearful of tyrannies. In such a social system the extermination of a harmless minority could only be opposed on the ground that it might be prejudicial to the majority.

Turning then to the other idea, that of "Right," it is manifest that it may repose upon either of two bases.

(1) A *Supernatural revelation*, if a belief in that revelation be all but universal in any given society.

(2) A common belief as to *Natural absolute right*, if any sufficient ethical proposition can be found which will command the assent of the overwhelming majority.

Social systems based on an asserted divine revelation—*i.e.*, Theocracies—have played a most important part in Social Evolution up to this day; and no Theocracy has played so great a one as that, the disintegration of which we are engaged in considering.

It is evident that naked self-assertion is a relatively feeble base for a National Theocracy, and that some objective testimony is requisite to sustain, for any prolonged period, the claim of any man or body of men to Supernatural Authority.

This testimony did exist in Mediæval Christendom. The government of each nation could appeal to a venerated external witness, namely, to the Church as existing in other nations, and to the supreme head of that Church, whose decisions were accepted as final. No such testimony exists for any of the competing systems which claim a divine authority to-day—such as that of the Russian Czar or of the Prussian Monarchy, as understood by its king. It is also difficult to conceive that any similar testimony can come to be made use of by any non-Christian Theocracy hereafter to arise.

It would thus seem that the social systems of the future must come to repose merely upon natural and intuitive right, unless mankind should revert to some form of Christian Theocracy.

But what basis of Natural Right can be devised which the different races will agree to regard as of unquestionable solidity?

Those who agree in affirming that Man's intellect has a power of apprehending "right" and "wrong" as distinct from "pleasurable" and "painful," may for all that differ widely as to what are and

what are not the dictates of conscience in matters of even little complication. Nevertheless, however great may be such divergence, there is one dictum which they will generally recognize as indisputable: namely, that *no citizen has the right to deny to another a liberty which he, as a citizen, claims for himself.*

This is the converse of that principle which we have seen may be based upon a utilitarian foundation, and it is essentially the same as the fundamental principle of social ethics enunciated by Mr. Herbert Spencer* in his "Social Statics"—the right of each man to do all save that which limits the similar rights of others.

If Mr. Herbert Spencer had no other merit, eternal gratitude and honour would be due to him for having with such vigour and efficiency vindicated this fundamental principle, of natural sociology.

The utilitarian maxim, when impregnated with the moral aphorism, becomes a sure ground whereon the rights of minorities and of the individual may repose. Without that aphorism, however, they have no security. The absolute distinction between the "right" and the "pleasurable" being denied, inconvenient minorities cease to have any shelter from the *absolute* dominion of the majority—a frightful doctrine long latent and now become apparent in modern "liberalism."

Such sentiments are, strange to say, the logical outcome of that philosophical system favoured by the London University and so popular in this eminently free country—a system which denies all absolute truth and all distinctions of kind between "right" and "pleasure."

Such a system—the Monistic Philosophy—recognizing no distinction of kind between God and Nature, Man and Brute, the Good and the Pleasant, naturally and logically asserts the *absolute* right of the state to control all and everything in the life of every individual citizen, and necessarily denies all rights to individuals or minorities. In principle it warrants the performance of acts incomparably more atrocious than the Massacre of St. Bartholomew or the burnings of the Spanish Inquisition.

The perpetrators of those crimes, however bloody their acts, never put forth a *theory* which denied *all rights* to their victims. But there is no principle on the view advocated by Professor Huxley's school to which a minority might appeal in bar of utter extermination by a majority, if unable to convince the majority that it would injure *itself* by that minority's destruction.

Such is the natural political development of the Monistic Philosophy. It was so in the old Pagan days, and it is tending to

* Absence from England unfortunately renders it impossible for me to give the references and quotations I should here desire to give.

reappear with the revival of Paganism as was before asserted* in the first part of this essay.

But if a freer social system results merely from the addition of the idea of "absolute morality" to that of "expediency," all those who go yet further and assert the existence of a Personal God whose essence is absolutely moral, have a yet securer and wider basis for freedom. All such must also assert that each Man has a right freely to perform all such actions as God through his conscience has enjoined him to perform, provided they do not deprive other men of similar freedom to fulfil what they believe to be their duty.

Thus the greatest amount of personal freedom comes to rest on a basis of "Divine Right," since, in the absence or non-recognition of a divine revelation limiting its exercise, such personal freedom becomes God-given and absolute.

Similarly all who hold such belief must assert that all the citizens of a state combined together save *one*, are morally incompetent by their joint authority as citizens to compel that *one* to perform an act against his conscience such as would be an outward act of Adoration to a Deity in whom he disbelieved, or of insult to Him whom he conceives to be his Creator and his Lord.

Similarly they must allow that if two citizens agree in believing that one of them has a God-given jurisdiction over the other, the one must be free to yield voluntary obedience to the other in all that does not affect the equal rights of other citizens.

They must also admit that those citizens who agree in holding similar views as to their relations to God, must be free to exert such combined actions as do not interfere with the analogous rights of combination of other citizens.

Again they cannot logically deny to citizens freedom to declare their belief to those who ask them, and especially to teach their children themselves or to select other citizens to whom they may choose to delegate that office.

ST. GEORGE MIVART.

(To be continued.)

* CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, September, 1873, p. 599.



ART IN ITS DRAMATIC ASPECTS.

IN Alfred de Musset's play of "André del Sarto," there occurs a passage worthy to be quoted as an admirable summary of the highest aims of Art. The artist is addressing some of his favourite pupils:—

"Vous êtes peintres, mes enfants : que votre bouche soit muette, et que votre main parle pour vous. Ecoute-moi cependant, Césario. La nature veut toujours être nouvelle, c'est vrai ; mais elle reste toujours la même. Es-tu de ceux qui souhaiteraient qu'elle changeât la couleur de sa robe et que les bois se colorassent en bleu et en rouge ? Ce n'est pas ainsi qu'elle l'entend. A côté d'une fleur fanée naît une fleur toute semblable, et des milliers de familles se reconnaissent sous la rosée au premier rayon du soleil. Chaque matin l'ange de vie et de mort apporte à la mère commune une nouvelle parure, mais toutes ces parures se ressemblent. Que les arts tâchent de faire comme elles, puisqu'ils ne sont rien qu'en l'imitant. Que chaque siècle voie de nouvelles mœurs, de nouveaux costumes, de nouvelles pensées, mais que le génie soit invariable comme la beauté ; que de jeunes mains pleines de force et de vie reçoivent avec respect le flambeau sacré des mains tremblantes des vieillards : qu'ils la protègent contre le souffle des vents cette flamme divine qui traversera les siècles futurs comme elle a fait les siècles passés : . . . Et maintenant va travailler : à l'ouvrage ! à l'ouvrage ! La vie est courte !"

Here the fidelity to nature in her normal beauty, the silent quest after her secrets, and the necessity of work as opposed to dreams and talk, are inculcated with that perfection of diction which was the fruit of

the poet's inspiration and of the artist's study. These things are distinct yet inseparable. By what means that inspiration comes which we call divine, because it is creative and intangible, we cannot explain; physiological science has not yet ascertained what texture of the brain produces the poetic thought, with its power of rapid combination, of extended vision, and of that perception of hidden beauty which to the less gifted appears miraculous. How these things come and grow in the mind remains a mystery, but the process by which they are shaped so as to be interpreted to the world at large, falls within the province of Art and is better understood. Art is the exponent of the ideal; it is that which gives an outward form to the spiritual essence of thought or knowledge; according to its power of exact interpretation, it is perfect or imperfect; according to the degree of elevation of the subject it deals with, it is insignificant or important; and the highest value must be attached to those arts which are capable of influencing the emotions, and through these the thought and progress of mankind. Every art represents labour—the most noble must entail the most ardent work. If the poet's thought comes to him he knows not how, the effort which shapes it into sounding music is painful, severe, and sometimes cruel. Sleepless nights and toilsome days are given to the beauty which is the summer joy of the tranquil reader. It is his business to perceive and appreciate the fine idea, not to consider the degrees of labour by which it has reached its beautiful expression. Not to consider the degrees. Yet if he brings no work of his own to meet that of the author, he will never reach the depth of the poetic thought. Some effort, some power in the recipient must exist, bearing an analogy, however distant, with the creative force. A great poem is not written for an indolent reader. This is true of every work of art. The painter, the musician, the sculptor, the player, all demand patience and study to obtain a just appreciation. The representative arts, those of the painter, the sculptor and the player, may exact less mental devotion in order to be understood, than those which address themselves mainly to the suggestive faculties of the mind; but this will after all be more dependent upon the nature of the special example than upon the whole scope of the art itself, for directly the representative art lends itself to the ideal, it appeals to something beyond the mere faculty of perception. Perhaps no idle stroller who lounges into a picture gallery would fail to see that William Hunt's primroses are as exactly like the real flowers as an image on a flat surface possibly can be. He would see that they have everything except life; but it is possible that he might, at the same time, fail to discover that suggestion of life itself which constitutes the ideality of these pictures;

that hint of fresh country which a little corner of a grassy bank could suggest, that peep of blue sky which with his skill in aërial perspective the artist knew how to throw back, so that a sensation of pleasant air steals upon you as you look at his work. To possess one of his representations of nature, whether it be a spray of hawthorn, a bunch of blackberries, or a bird's-nest, is to keep a little bit of bright rural existence within your walls. You do not feel this when you have an artificial flower on your table, although the imitation may be even more exact in this case than the other; what you miss, then, is the something beyond, is the suggestion of the painter's mind, the ideality, that which we may call the poetical element in the representative art. It is this which produces emotion, and the feeling excited, depends partly upon the idea conveyed, and partly upon the sense of the artist's skill.

Those who have studied Chardin's pictures at the Louvre know with what ability he can put together a pot and a saucepan, or a glass and a table-cover or a plate of fruit, and a loaf of bread, with such combinations of light and colour as to charm the eye. An ignorant spectator may pass them by as mere reproductions of uninteresting objects, but the artistic mind will pause and dwell upon the harmonies and sweetness lent by a fine perception of beauty to the things of everyday life. Take the evidence of that perception away and the picture will become vulgar. A young student's imitation of the master will show this—he will, if he is clever, get the forms and perhaps the local colour of each object correctly, but he will miss that which is the crowning excellence, the last that is obtained: the tints which harmonize in light, the delicate, thoughtful touches which indicate the presence of the surrounding atmosphere, and which suggest a vital beauty. He will look at his meritorious attempt if he has the true artistic sense with disappointment, and feel it common. After this he will begin to work with a view to something beyond exact imitation. Why do we not only tolerate but admire the ill-proportioned limbs, the twisted shapes, and monotonous action, which are to be found in the works of the pre-Raphaelite painters? It is because these masters were seeking after the divine—because in some sweet touches they nearly reached it—because in the expression of the faces, and sometimes of the action they represented, there was the reflection of their own religious thought, and the abstraction of true worship: the reverential handling, the tender grace of a fine idea were present, lending to the whole a suggestion of infinite beauty. There have been some modern imitations of these curious examples of early excellence which have exaggerated their disproportions, their grotesque action, and occasional crudity of colour, and which have substituted for the evident and often successful striving

after the beautiful, an equally ardent and more completely successful endeavour after the ugly. The religious inspirations which acted upon those old masters not working upon the new ones, they sought to obtain the missing effect by overdoing peculiarities of workmanship and bringing into excessive prominence the elaboration of insignificant detail which is to be found in most of the beginnings of art. The most important part of the performance was omitted—the mental emotion of the painter, that which inspired him with glimpses of miraculous grace, and touched the hearts of his spectators with reverential wonder. Consequently these reproductions of the early manner, although a certain force of handling in some of the examples gave them vogue for a time, could take no permanent hold upon the sympathies of humanity; the predilection for them which became a fashion was confined to one country and to a short period. But they had the great merit of directing general attention to the existence of beauty in the earliest painters whose works were heretofore only known to a few enlightened students of Art. Now this beauty, though incomplete, is of a nobler order than that which has been just described in finished representations of the ordinary objects of still life. The aim of the artist is so much higher that one felicitous touch, one happy moment of success in it is worth the most perfect result proceeding from a lower thought. The glimpses of a glorious aspiration act upon the imaginative faculties and elevate the soul, they appeal to the finest human affections; out of the repetitions of such effects grew at last the exquisite perceptions and perfect handling of Raphael.

Raphael himself had his early manner with its accompanying defects. Let any one compare that sombre Holy Family painted by him at twenty-one years of age, lately on view at our National Gallery, with the bright glory of the Sistine Madonna at Dresden, and he will at once see what work does for genius. The severe and somewhat stiff production of the young painter has true feeling in it, and shows singular power, but it is only a presage of the subsequent achievement. The Sistine Madonna is of all pictures the one which excites the most constant and the deepest emotion. It affects the unschooled and the scholar, the unbeliever and the Christian, if not in the same way, yet with the same force, and whether the spectators assembled in front of it be American, English, or German, the same reverential, almost awe-struck, silence will be observed—the same breathless adoration. On a brilliant morning of last October, with a sky of unclouded blue showing through the long window at the right of the picture, a party, most of whom were German, with a sprinkling of Americans, and one or two English, sat speechless gazing at the Madonna and her divine infant, with concentrated thought; pre-

sently an old woman, thinly and meanly dressed, accompanied by a man, probably her husband, rough and dirty, smelling of fish and sausage and garlic, joined the group; the old woman sat down by one of the two English people, the man stood by her side. Neither spoke. Neither moved. The woman gazed for five minutes intently, and tears rolled down her yellow cheeks. The man whispered in German, "Can you leave it now?" the woman replied in choked accents, "I will come," and they disappeared noiselessly; the rough man walking delicately, as if dreading to interrupt the stillness. What was the source of the woman's tears? was it religious devotion exclusively? was it the divine childhood? or the sublime thought revealed in an infant's face? or was it a tender earthly maternal thought? Probably not either of these singly, but a mixture of all—an instinct of every sentiment which moved those more artistic Americans and English, the only element of admiration absent being the idea of the painter's power.

That impression is supplied by the teaching of Art and the habit of comparison which grows out of it; it is the last to come and the last to go. It would astonish and shock many minds to consider the Sistine Madonna as in any sense dramatic; yet when representative Art affects the emotional side of our nature it holds a distant relationship with the drama, whether in its highest poetic or its early religious forms. The old sacred mysteries of the stage aimed at exciting the same kind of feeling in a more realistic way as that inspired by pictures of Crucifixions, Resurrections, or Holy Families, although the specimens of these dramas best known to us in print, are disfigured by an element of what may be called broad farce introduced into scenes from the Old Testament; but such things came by degrees as a concession to the prevailing taste of the public who required a relief from seriousness and a substitution of action and dialogue for contemplation. Directly this took place the mystery exhibited qualities of representative Art very different from those which belong to painting. The interest of movement became their main object. Painting can be dramatic by two forms of suggestion: either it may create the deepest emotion by a sublime aspiration, as in Raphael's great work already quoted; or by an actual imitation of mental and physical action. Titian's *Triumph of Bacchus* is a grand example of this last kind: it is instinct with joyous life without overstepping the limits to be observed by pictorial Art. It is easy to overpass those boundaries, though they are not so rigid as the law of repose, which binds the sculptor. Sculpture cannot appeal as painting may to the passion of the soul. It must depend more largely upon the æsthetic sense. Working in a hard material, it presents no glow of colour, no brilliant expression of life. A statue is something more

tangible than a picture, for it has the actuality of solid form; but it is cold and distant: it fixes blind eyes upon you, its countenance is rigid: a man who looked upon you so, would strike you dumb with fear. You enter a gallery of sculpture, not to see semblances of humanity, but to contemplate the ideal beauty of the human form in the abstract.

An imaginative perception, which generally includes an educated taste, is necessary for the enjoyment of such contemplation. Ideality is so largely drawn upon by the sculptor that the student passes readily from his admiration of a perfect whole to an equal delight in a mutilated fragment; the mutilation is suggestive,—what seems to the untutored eye a cold, cruel representation of a cripple, reveals to the enthusiastic disciple of Art a perfection of intention which is as dear to him as the image would have been in its entirety. The Milo Venus, without arms, and with a broken foot, inspires a sense of beauty which approaches worship. It is the sovereign of statues; imposing reverence and stirring the whole soul by its majestic presence. The perfection of the Medicean Venus is small in comparison; the Diane de la Biche weak; the Apollo Belvedere melodramatic.

It is even true that the most perfect pictures of the Louvre lose something of their interest if you look at them too soon after your contemplation of the great Venus, which so impresses the mind as to make it incapable of further immediate sensation, and for this reason you should go straight away after seeing it, and let some interval of time elapse before visiting the pictures. Sculpture, then, has the power of exciting wonder and admiration in the highest degree; by perfection of proportion, dignity of pose, and by the sublimity of rest it can exalt the soul; the essence of its grandeur is its ideality; it should not attempt to address an imagination unprepared for it; dramatic action ill suits with its characteristics of rigidity and durability—a passion which is evanescent fixed in marble is an incongruity, and it is only those emotions which are permanent that can be fitly idealized by sculpture,—a severe, undying grief may be felt in the expression of a statue's limbs,—there may be a fine marble image of the stricken Cain, or of the deserted Ariadne, yet, on the whole, the exhibition of feeling is not the intention of this high art, its claim is not upon our sympathy, but upon our admiration; out of the vast number of monumental widows for ever inconsolable, or widowers eternally in despair, how many have stirred the depths of tender thought within us? An imperishable record in bronze or marble of a great man by a great sculptor is a noble possession for a nation, and if the man and the artist be of the highest worth it is a treasure for all humanity. But a portrait, statue, or bust should

still preserve the ideal, not striving to render too much of physical life. A chiseled smile or sneer are equally painful; the general expression of characteristic attributes is to be sought after. In modern art admirable examples of this kind are to be found in the busts of Thomas Woolner, nor would it be easy to point out anything of Greek or Roman workmanship surpassing in execution his Thomas Carlyle, grand and vigorous, or his Frederick Maurice, refined and subtle. The whole nature of the most divine of theologians reveals itself in this marble portraiture; it is full of that compassionate humanity, of that solicitous benevolence which all who knew him loved to dwell upon in his face.

All this is within the rightful domain of the sculptor's chisel. The combination of the mental qualities is finely indicated, not any one of them being so expressed as to pass into emotional action. Neither sculpture nor painting have so strong a hold on human emotion as music, which has no direct representative aim whatever; in wideness of scope and force of action it is akin to poetry—and like poetry it is in its simplest forms the most universally loved of all arts, while in its highest it is of all the most difficult to understand. Inspiration and science compose its harmonies, Art reveals them. The gifted man who creates an Oratorio, a Mass, or an Operatic Drama is not necessarily a great executant; he seeks other artists to interpret him fully to the world, and those artists are rarely themselves capable of musical composition. An exact knowledge of the rules of harmony, and a fine ear to distinguish tune, time, and emphasis, are necessary to the perfect comprehension of the composer's meaning; but a performer endowed only with executive skill, and with that general perception without science, which may be called musical instinct, may be able to interpret the author's idea partially for general apprehension. There are many more people subject to the emotional influence of music than to that of painting or sculpture. A tune may rouse a nation or move an army, or set a sad assemblage dancing. The action on the mind of man is universal, and its effect extends even to the brute creation; dogs, cats, and much more evidently birds, are greatly stirred by it. One of our most charming Italian singers had a pet dog who used to howl at each high note, and when corrected for his noise the animal took to begging at every sound above the approved pitch, with paws so prettily bent and eyes so beseeching as to convince its mistress that either she must herself leave off or the dog must be dismissed. Finally the animal acquired the habit of leaving the room whenever the first symphony commenced. So determined is the result of particular harmonies upon human affections, that a child of three, finely organized, will cry at a melody in the minor key. But these sensations come by inheritance. They are evidently derived

from ancestral lineage, since different systems of harmony prevail beyond the limits of Europe, and what is delicious music to the Japanese is a series of abhorrent discords to us, nor can the most delicate European perception discern its melody or even its measure. Therefore, though music is an universal delight, its mode of operation is not the same throughout the world.

The Red Indian dances to a yell and a tum-tum, impelled by some strange form of rhythm which rouses his senses, while the pale infant of the London alley stirs its thin legs, keeping time to the dismal grind of the Savoyard's organ; which for the misery it inflicts upon our educated classes, upon writers, readers, artists, and above all upon sick people, may be justly described as the curse of our capital.

And surely the savage and the child resemble each other more nearly in their sensations than either approaches to the manner of delight experienced by an instructed audience listening to the compositions of Handel, Beethoven, or Bach, led by their perfect interpreter Joachim. Beethoven's wide and complicated harmonies awaken the mind to enthusiasm with a sense of vastness, and lead it to grand contemplations, recalling all the while images of half-remembered sweetness, the joy, the tenderness, the beauty of human life. Thus music acts by induction, striking fire into thought beyond the limits of definite significance. The actual imitation of physical things suits ill with its attributes, and when a composer forgets this, as Haydn did when he tried to represent the wriggle of the worm by musical notes, he deviates into false Art.

The abstraction of instrumental is opposed to the directness of vocal music, which shapes itself in words and appeals to the heart by distinct utterances. No extended musical science is required for the composition of an agreeable song. A simple melody allied to a graceful sentiment may charm a nation. Most of the famous Irish melodies poetised by Thomas Moore are of this nature—and some of the most tender songs of Italy, France, England, and even Germany are not accompanied by scientific harmonies; they are intelligible, therefore, to the uninformed, and as almost everybody is open to the influence of a tune and a sentiment, they affect not merely a few audiences, but whole countries; there is probably no remote village in Great Britain where there would not be found some heart to give an echo to the plaintive airs of "Auld Robin Gray" or "The Last Rose of Summer." The direct emotional action of song widespread and various brings it into close alliance with the drama, and in countries where Art is cultivated it is natural, almost inevitable, that the two should seek a close union, and that vocal music should become incorporated with dramatic representations. The Greek

tragedy with its musical chorus and its chartered recitation led the way to modern opera, and the dramas of ancient Rome became still more operatic, the size of the Roman theatres demanding the sustained notes of recitative to make the performers audible. Gradually passing through other forms, the operatic drama was finally developed out of the dramatic recitative of ancient Rome ; and from the time of Henri Quatre of France, when in celebration of his marriage with Mary of Medicis in the year 1600, the opera of "Eurydice" was produced at Florence, the words by Rinuccini, and the music by Jacopo Peri, Italian opera has advanced in importance and beauty, and has become throughout Europe a favourite form of artistic entertainment.

It entered France in 1646, it appeared in England for the first time in 1703, when "*Arsinoë*," translated from the Italian, was performed by English singers. This piece consisted of recitative and song with a meagre instrumental accompaniment, and was brought out at Drury Lane, where, in the following year "*Thomyris, Queen of Scythia*," was produced with a company half English, half Italian, each singing in their own language. In 1710, at the Haymarket Theatre, "*Almahide*," wholly Italian, made its appearance, and the Italian opera, not without considerable opposition from the best critics of the day, soon became an important institution for London society, but the foreign language and the high prices which the importation of Italian singers required made it an exclusive diversion, and it became the fashion with the aristocracy. It is no longer especially aristocratic, but its audiences still represent the most wealthy, if not the most refined, classes of London and its environs.

The Italian opera, as it grew, attached to itself every kind of art. Rich orchestral music rose out of the bare feeble accompaniments of its early beginnings, a grand scenic display and beautiful costume were added, dancing was frequently introduced, the dramatic movement became more pronounced, and the greatest singers were expected to be also distinguished actors. All the emotions are attacked at once, and all the senses charmed. The imagination stirred by music follows with breathless interest the tragic movement, while the eye is fascinated by decorative magnificence. The captivation of a sensitive musical spectator is complete when such a performance is finely given, but any falling off in either of the arts which conduce to the delight of this entertainment mars the work, and gives rise to the idea of an incongruity in the attempted union of different arts. You then say, why should music and acting be bound together ? Let the vocalist sing, and let the tragedian undertake the drama.

There is so much to be reasonably urged on this score, that it is only in cases where the singer has the highest gifts both of music

and dramatic power that the discrepancy between the two things can be wholly forgotten. Words constrained to adapt themselves to music are for the most part feeble, and to make their weakness seem strong the singer must either have such vocal skill as to force the passion of the music upon his hearers, or such histrionic ability as to supply an imaginative meaning in spite of the restriction of a meagre language. Italy, Hungary, Sweden, Germany, America, France, and England have in turn supplied singers capable of leading great audiences in this way; artists who have had the one or the other gift strongly marked, and in some rare instances possessing in an equal degree the qualities of actor and vocalist. M. Faure is the greatest living example of such a combination. Those who have seen him in *Peter the Great*, in *Caspar*, in *Don Giovanni*, in *Mephistopheles*, and in *Hamlet*, know that he can sing beautiful music with such full perfection that every modulation of his voice is a lesson in art, and that his acting exhibits the most noble and varied expression of passion. He fills the character of *Hamlet* with all its Shakespearian meaning, and supplies much more than its actual excellence to the music of M. Thomas. In the play scene and the cabinet scene he moves his audience to the utmost sympathy; few tragedians have been able to excite stronger emotion.

In some cases then an operatic performance may rouse passion as the acted drama does, but these instances are exceptional, and on the whole the influence of the drama upon the feelings is more direct and complete. The attention is concentrated upon the passion of the characters without the diffusion, the lull, and the retardation of music, in the place of which in the highest form of acted plays we have poetry addressing itself definitely to the understanding, the imagination, and the feelings. Schlegel has defined the drama to be the compendium of whatever is animated or interesting in human life; this, of course, infers a system of selection which casts off whatever is unworthy of representation, a process of sifting which too many playwrights forget to use, but which is the essential element of the drama whether it take the form of tragedy or comedy. In the epic or the novel, one omniscient narrator tells the story of his characters, and talks about their inward thoughts; the dramatist, on the other hand, develops his meaning by the action and emotion of a group of characters who influence each other, working out the story of their passions, as in real life, without the apparent intervention of the author. The art which is called upon thus to interpret a poet to an audience is evidently a difficult and an important one—difficult because it requires at once the power to understand and to represent the idea of the poet; important, because it affects humanity more extensively than any other art whatsoever. Painting, still and flat,

makes a greater demand upon the imagination of the spectator in order to be felt. For one person capable of appreciating the solemn significance of Giovanni Bellini's picture of the Agony in the Garden there are a hundred ready to rouse and stir with beating hearts at the performance of the tragedy of Christ's life by the villagers of Ammergau. The movement and the intelligible words of acted passion insist upon immediate sympathy, and wherever human beings are congregated they will instinctively answer the appeal to share in the emotions of mankind, strongly represented before them by action and speech.

There is no great strain put upon their understanding, for the actors are there to explain the poet's idea, and assuming them to be fit for their office, any man capable of true emotion may, through the medium of the players, reach the conception of the most complicated passion and of the highest thought. To understand these things without the help of acting, merely by reading, is only possible to people of literary education, and even to these it is often too difficult a task to be agreeable. The dramatic author imagines his characters moving on the stage, and addressing themselves to an audience; he trusts to the aid of stir and sound simulating life, and without it his intention cannot be fully carried out; it is needless to say that a bad performance will mar rather than promote his aims, and that in speaking of the stage as the best ally of the dramatic poet the existence is assumed of a well-directed company of players to do him justice. Each part should be adequately performed from the highest to the lowest. The poet's own sense of proportion should be followed out, and every actor should administer something towards the perfect fulfilment of his conception. But there are managers who seem desirous of renewing the fashion of the very beginning of Greek lyrical drama, said to have been introduced by Thespis, where one performer was stationed on an elevated platform to recite a religious myth to a chorus grouped around the statue of Bacchus far off and below him, who replied to his inspirations in sympathetic chants. When the star-system in theatres is at its height the one tragedian does not always demand even an answering chorus, and the exalted player is content to go on without anything that can be called a response. This is unhappily the most common and the worst form of dramatic art, if Art it can be called. It is injurious to the genius of the actor, who, in order to make himself wholly independent of the rest of the company, is tempted into the exaggeration of every striking passage, and seeks to hold the attention of the audience by perpetual climax. It is no less detrimental to the play-writer, who, finding that only one of his characters can be acted, is induced to construct dramas which are little more than

monologues; and it has a pernicious influence on audiences, who gradually learn to withdraw their attention from all but the principal performer, and even acquire the habit of talking about indifferent matters whenever he is off the boards. They grow more and more listless about the business of the scene, till at last their sole aim is to applaud the favourite of the day without taking the trouble to consider what he is doing, or trying to do. Thus the evil spreads, and the beautiful art perishes.

How is a clever artist induced to lend himself to this deterioration of his craft? By two powerful motives—vanity and the desire to make money. Why does an intelligent director give way to the exhibition of bad Art? For money, because he cannot afford so dangerous a speculation as a well-acted drama. The star-system is not peculiar to England. It prevails to a great extent in all theatres which have no independent funds to support them under the expenses necessarily incurred, and under the occasional caprices of the public. It is difficult to understand why a national drama should be thought less important to a people, and less worthy of support, than an academy of painting. The drama, in its best form, appeals to the imaginative faculties, illustrates the poet, and touches the human heart more fervently than painting—less permanently is the evident reply; and it is true that the actor passes away and is heard no more; but if the player passes the drama remains. Shakspeare only came to be known through the medium of the players; nor is it true, where a national drama exists, that the special interpretation of the greatest artists is forgotten. Where there is a proper storehouse for such treasures, they are kept in remembrance, as cherished traditions. Thus the poet's creations are exhibited in continually increasing excellence. Molière might well return to earth, and take up his troubled life again, for the sake of seeing his best comedies performed as they are now at the Français. "*L'Ecole des Femmes*" seemed to rise into new importance this season, when it came out with Got as Arnolphe, Delaunay as Horace, and the pretty and charming Mdle. Reichemberg as Agnès. It was followed by the celebrated "*Critique de l'Ecole des Femmes*," with Bressant as the Marquis; and the whole performance was one of the best that has been given at the most artistic theatre in Europe. The audience was worthy of the players, and the house is crowded at every repetition of the comedy. None who have seen can ever forget it. The scene seems to live rather than to be acted. It lives in the simple grace of Mdle. Reichemberg's Agnès, in the finely spoken dialogue of Thiron's Chrysalde, in the brilliant sunshine of M. Delaunay's Horace. This is a character which actors inferior to M. Delaunay might think beneath them, and it is well known to the *habitués* of the Français

that when Delaunay first undertook this part, many years ago, the critics of the day were unanimous in saying that the young artist was full of promise, but that the character was not equal to his powers. There are few performers in France, and there are probably none in England, who would not have accepted such an assertion as a welcome truth ; but Delaunay did not receive it so ; the admiration of Molière and the love of Art were paramount with him ; and setting aside all the promptings of vanity, he meditated upon this suggestion. He reflected that on the amorous raptures of the young lover the main action of the play depended, that without his gay movement the suspicious gloom of Arnolphe would want its proper contrast, that without his chivalry the comedy would miss that bright touch of romance. He read the play over and over again, till he satisfied himself that the deficiency was not in the character of Horace, but in the young artist who had been pronounced too good for it. His study brought fresh ideas continually before him, and the final result is the admirable performance of this season. Horace is welcomed now from the first to the last scene with fond appreciation. He is understood and he is loved. The glimpses of his brilliant dress, as he steals through the dusky shrubberies surrounding Arnolphe's house, are eagerly desired. His gaiety, his playfulness, in telling the devices of his love, engage not only a lively sympathy, but cordial affection, which is increased by his respect for the girlish innocence which throws itself upon his honour. Nothing can exceed the fine chivalry of Delaunay's manner when he confides Agnès to Arnolphe's care, or when he reveals to that miserable old man her celebrated love-letter ; the melodious tones of his voice are subdued to a murmur low yet distinct ; the exquisite harmonies of all his notes seem to flow out of his reverential emotion ; he will not have a single syllable lost, yet the thing is too precious to be given out in ordinary accents ; it is to be uttered for himself and his old friend alone. The same skill which lends unspeakable tenderness to the reading of the letter gives such exuberant mirth to the account confided to Arnolphe (unknowingly) of his own defeat, that the audience reaches the highest point of merriment in the progress of his narration. Delaunay accompanies his recital with a delicious laugh, low at first, growing in intensity as he proceeds ; a laugh which no listener can resist ; all present take it up with him ; he is followed by an echo ; his hilarity is universal. The sympathy between the actor and his spectators is complete ; it reaches not only those in front of the curtain, but his comrades off the scene. They habitually assemble to hear him read the letter and to hear him laugh. He plays upon Arnolphe too, as he plays upon the rest. The old man is made to feel the whole bitterness of his situation by the very charm

of the young lover's enjoyment. M. Talbot, who takes the part of Arnolphe when M. Got is prevented by any chance from filling it, is not a sympathetic actor, but he does not fail to gain some inspirations from Delaunay's performance, and is almost natural in his despair after the reading of the letter. The perfection of the scene at the Français, the completeness of the relative parts, the study of stage traditions since the time of Molière, the careful drilling of the company, its unity, and the attention bestowed upon every production as a whole, make it possible for a play still to go on satisfactorily after the withdrawal of a favourite actor from one of its principal parts. The performance of the "*Ecole des Femmes*" attracts a large and a happy audience, even though Arnolphe is not played by M. Got. Such a comedy so mounted, if only a single character were well filled, would in London infallibly run its consecutive 300 nights, till the one actor was worn down or delirious, and till the public was satiated. Happily the laws of the Français do not admit of this system. Racine must have his turn; and by these alternations the public has learned to expect a variety in the entertainments. Thus the actors get trained both in learning their words and in adapting themselves to different authors. To pass from Molière to Racine is still to be on classic ground, but with very different surroundings. Molière is rich, abundant, and natural. Racine is architectural, if not positively artificial, but his edifices are nobly built—lofty, imposing, and true in proportion. There is considerable beauty in his composition, yet an English taste cultivated in the natural school can rarely perceive it without the aid of an interpretation from the players. The present moment is a happy one for receiving a just impression of the poet. Racine's tragedies are now well acted throughout, with M. Mounet-Sully as the young hero, Mdle. Sara Bernhardt for his counterpart, Maubant admirable for the dignified fathers, and Boucher, a meritorious young performer, filling the parts of young seconds. M. Mounet-Sully has in him the true tragic element. He is imaginative and enthusiastic, vigorous and picturesque; his voice is full and passionate; his aims are high, his presence is noble. Racine represented by him is far from cold. He has been lately playing both in "*Britannicus*" and "*Phèdre*." His Néron and his Hippolyte are fine poetical performances, and quite distinct in their qualities. Mounet-Sully studies character and develops it, so as to give his audience the full fruit of his labour; his only fault is an inclination to excess of fire—a fault which the severe style of Racine holds in check, but which betrays itself when the exuberance of Victor Hugo's genius gives it room to burn and blaze. Too much warmth, however, is the proper fault of youth, and M. Sully will no doubt grow calmer by practice.

Mdlle. Bernhardt is perfectly fitted to give grace and dignity to Racine's young heroines—just a little stilted, just a little artificial, statuesque rather than flowing in movement, well proportioned in figure, handsome, with a clear voice, excellent in elocution, and capable of pathos, though tenderness is not her characteristic. Mdlle. Rousseil evidently knows what Phèdre ought to be, and works hard to reach her aim, but falls short, with only a few successful moments. The recollections of Rachel are still vivid, and an actress who fills one of her great parts is in a trying position; but it must be admitted that in the days of Rachel we used to see that one great actress alone, whereas we now see Racine in his harmonious structure as a well-composed whole.

This harmony, which is the truest art, for it is complete, prevails generally at the Français at the present time, and equal as the acting is and careful in detail, a high standard of excellence is always maintained, so that a player who arrives at the Français as a great star from some other house may find himself lowered to third or fourth parts, and require a good deal of drilling even in those. The slight graceful pieces of "*Au Printemps*" and "*L'Été de la Saint-Martin*" may be cited as examples of finished perfection. They dwell on the mind as charming pictures without a blemish.

Passing from these pretty ornamental pieces to the romantic and poetical drama, Victor Hugo's "*Marion Delorme*," taken up again after a short interval of suspension, deserves comment. It makes a strong impression as a portion of actual history; the actors all seem characters of the Louis XIII. epoch; it is not Bressant, but the infirm king; not Delaunay, but the gay courtier; not the company of the Français, but so many men of the past come back and moving out of old chronicles, whose adventures and passions excite the interest of the audience: it is the historical truth of the representation which relieves the subject from its offence against taste; but the termination of the tragedy, which was not the poet's first idea, but was substituted to please a celebrated actress, is an error in Art which degrades an otherwise powerful and poetical play. The two most distinguished poets of the present century in France offer striking contrasts in their manner of dealing with imaginative Art. Michael Angelo and Raphael are not more unlike. Alfred de Musset is finished and perfect in proportion. He has neither the vastness nor the vagueness of Hugo, nor the unbounded imagination and immense resources. De Musset is never immense, but he is deep in emotion, piercing in satire, and perfect in expression. His most exquisite interpreter is certainly M. Delaunay; yet all the distinguished artists of the Français, especially Madame Favart and M. Got, have added lustre to some of his best characters. It is

true enjoyment to see one of these brilliant pieces so rendered. The "Nuit d'Octobre" gains additional beauty as it goes on. Can it still acquire more? or was the utmost achieved when on the 9th of October last its performance excited an amount of enthusiasm hitherto unknown, surpassing all the delight experienced at previous representations? It had seemed before to have reached the highest point, but now it appeared so kindling with awakened life, so glowing with fresh fire, so full and strong in passion, that the poet seemed to be working there himself with all his creative energy. Delaunay's movement and action were changed; an inspiration that would not be gainsaid, evidently impelled and exalted him, yet never urged him too far. The sense of Art in the perfect performer holds its constant sway and forbids excess. That impetus which the spectators looked upon as a spontaneous prompting of emotion was probably the result of devoted study, for a fine actor is always a thoughtful inquirer, and the work of a true poet continually reveals new secrets.

Such revelations are the highest rewards of labour. Delaunay, on this occasion, received a full tribute of enthusiastic appreciation from an audience worthy of his performance, but no amount of applause can so deeply gratify the true artist, as the consciousness of having added one precious gem to the poet's crown. It is this aim which gives dignity to the profession of the player, and relieves its ephemeral character. If he renders the works of a poet as no passing reader can render them, if he unfolds underlying beauties to a capable audience, he is entitled to a share in the author's fame; his memory will be associated with the delights of poetry, as his ardent endeavour has thrown light upon the poet's thought. Where there is a national theatre, such as the Français, the representations of an intellectual player are not transitory; and so long as the artists of the Comédie Française keep their high aims, contenting themselves with the singular privileges of their position, and not making the acquisition of money their object, they will retain the respect of all lovers of Art as the best exponents of some of the best authors in the world. On the other hand, should the fatal disease of our time, which is the ambition for wealth, attack this company, the malady would spread, as all evil is swift to grow, till we had no temple of perfect Art left to us in Europe. The players who have been chosen as the special representatives of dramatic art since the time of Molière, must strive to keep that art pure and worthy of homage. They must devote themselves to it, and remain the faithful members of their own distinct community. There are two sources of ill capable of destroying their higher existence: the one is the pernicious habit of provincial starrng, which a decree recently passed by the administra-

tion of the Français is intended to check, a considerable penalty being imposed upon any member of the company who departs to play elsewhere. The other most evident danger is the acceptance of bad pieces, sheltered by well-known names. That of M. Augier has protected a corrupt taste neither worthy of himself as the author of the admirable comedies of "La Ciguë," and "Le Gendre de M. Poirier," nor in harmony with the position of the Français. His "Paul Forrestier" produced some years ago, and happily played but seldom now, was distinguished by deplorable defects as a work of art, setting aside all consideration of its moral tendencies. Monotonous in passion, untrue in its aspects of life, it depended for its effect upon startling situations, and great efforts on the part of the author to force these upon the audience. It contained some well written lines, but such a play could not obtain a lasting fame, and could only lead to the deterioration of the artists employed upon it, and of the public who applauded their performance. Faults even more lamentable, with less merit to atone for them, are to be found in this author's last piece of "Jean de Thommeray," recently produced at the Français.

The offences of an author will tell ultimately upon the players, who will repeat habitually the tricks of the degraded art by which they win a temporary success.

A painter who continually reproduced the bodies of the Morgue would soon become incapable of representing a living man.

It is grievous to see talent employed upon contortion, whether the artist be Delacroix, M. Augier, or Dumas fils. The works of this dramatist, acted principally at the Gymnase, and supported by the singular charm of Mademoiselle Desclée as the chief victim of the piece, are written ostensibly with a particular moral purpose, to which every detail of the play is made to conduce. Revolting scenes are exhibited under a light which for a time deceives the sense so as to make the result endurable, and by means of the actress, even attractive; but at the end a terrible catastrophe is contrived to convince the spectators that they ought not to have been attracted at all.

There will be a certain market in all great capitals, whether it be in Paris, New York, or London, for exhibitions of corrupt taste. Music and painting are as capable of degradation as the drama, but neither can produce an effect so widely spread and so immediate. Therefore, it is most important that those who desire to see a people elevated rather than debased by its recreations should encourage the theatre in its best aims. The drama is worthy of an Academy, no less than painting and music. The professors of each art in their different ways illustrate and inspire the poet, and all combine to enrich our life on earth with one of its highest attributes—imaginative beauty.

JULIET POLLOCK.



ON CAUSALITY IN WILL AND MOTION.

OF the evil spirits Milton says :—

“ Others apart sat on a hill retired,
In thoughts more elevate, and reason'd high
Of Providence, foreknowledge, *will*, and *fate*,”

—but I will not quote the melancholy conclusion.

Free-will has been said to be the most important philosophical question of the day, that around which the hottest battle of the Schools will henceforth have to be waged. For my own part, I set out with confessing that I have never seen any sufficient answer to that old book of Jonathan Edwards' on the Will (though I do not fully agree with it now). The only freedom, says Edwards, of which man is capable, and which the vulgar impute to him, is the power anyone has of doing as he pleases or wills. A free man means a free agent. Yet those who maintain Free-will, maintain that a volition does not depend on any cause out of itself, nor on anything prior to its own acts, which would render it necessary as bound up with its cause. The question is, Does not a particular act of choice or volition begin to be? If it does, then I do not see how we can except this from the dominion of that universal law of causality which intuition assures us of. All that begins to be has a cause, has a reason in that which existed before for becoming the precise mode of existence it actually

becomes. The appeal made is generally to common-sense somewhat in this form : We feel free ; we can refrain from willing or determine to will a certain action, as we please. Now, who can deny this ? And this is exactly *why* we feel free. It is our "pleasing" that determines our will. It is we ourselves in one state who determine ourselves in the next state. But then, also, if we inquire more curiously, we must ask, what made us please so to will as we do ? For this process of choosing is a complex one, involving intelligent perception, imagination, pleasure, and pain ; in some cases a peculiar sense of the *morality* of an action. All these spiritual elements certainly vary in each person, as they do in different races, and in different stages of development, individual and national. In some the power of realizing consequences, even though well known, at the moment of temptation does not seem to be organized as in others. Some have not quick sympathies ; or have a sluggish imagination, disabling them from putting themselves in the place of others,—have a feeble moral sense, or a perverted one. Some have taken positive delight in inflicting pain. Most men have consciences sensitive in some directions, and not so in others. A Sardanapalus may be averse to cruelty, and not to sensuality or idleness. A pure ascetic may not be averse to domineering cruelty. Some races have no word for guilt. Sir J. Lubbock mentions a race whose sense of guilt is peculiar, one of whose chiefs expressed his moral repugnance to the white man's custom of monogamy, saying that it was disgusting, and for all the world "like a Wanderoo monkey." These faculties and feelings seem to vary with vital organic development ; no one can study the works of Spencer, Darwin, Huxley, Carpenter, and others without feeling certain of that. But if they vary with it, certainly they are to a great extent (not wholly, however) determined by it. Herbert Spencer has maintained, and I think proved, that Life may be conceived as the "definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external co-existences and sequences," and that the highest creatures have reached those highly integrated, very definite, and heterogeneous organizations they possess through modifications upon modifications accumulated during an immeasurable past, together with those involved forms of consciousness which are the correlatives of these complex structures. Our perceptions and conceptions and feelings, then, are evidently determined for us largely by inheritance.

Here those who differ from me will probably demur. They will maintain that we have the power of using the capacities bestowed on us as we please, well or ill. As we please, granted ; well or ill, no ; we please to use them as our nature, together with our circumstances, oblige us to please. Certainly a person does give himself a con-

scious deliberate education, but *what kind* of conscious education he gives himself does not depend on himself. It is urged that freedom of the will consists in a man's power to *deliberate*—not to yield to the impulse of the moment—to weigh his action in the balance of reason, so that conscience may conquer inclination, if need be. Now, this power to deliberate, men possess in different degrees. An overmastering impulse may be inherited. Some from the first are what we call creatures of impulse; some have much stronger passions than others—in proportion to their sense of right and wrong, to their faculty for reasoning upon consequences. The impulse to deliberate is certainly not the same in different men; nor can the result of their deliberation be the same; this will be according to their characters. No doubt these same characters are largely formed by prior acts, prior desires, and deliberations. But it is evident that if this power to deliberate (wherein certainly the only enviable or conceivable human freedom does consist), and if the volitional result of it, depend on prior desires and resolves, we cannot push the process back for ever. A power to deliberate will hardly be claimed for that first mysterious act of volition wherein the conscious creature first distinguishes self from not-self; nor even to any appreciable extent for subsequent impulsive volitions of the child. But the first conscious deliberation worthy to be so called must be moulded by these, as well as by the teaching a child has received, and its individual capacity for being taught. Intelligence and will are *gradually* developed, along with body and brain. Well, but is there nothing more than inheritance in this? Is there nothing peculiar and individual? Assuredly there is. However continuous a person is with his ancestors, however similar in body, in mind, in tendencies, there is something special to him; that is, his vital and spiritual organism is new, is added to the sum of existence, if not quantitatively, at any rate qualitatively added; it has its own peculiar mode of becoming. If it were not so, infinite differentiations would not gradually have been accumulated as they have been, to be transmitted in the manner they are; though the new modes of existence, whether psychical or physical, have always had their representatives before, yet they are not absolutely the same; there is a difference, together with a sameness, which constitutes them what they are, and renders them knowable or distinguishable. What is the inference, then? That so far as a person is individual and peculiar, an altogether new manifestation of the personal principle, spiritual and vital, the causes we have alluded to are insufficient to account for him. Here we come to something very like that self-determination which the advocates of Free-will appear to contend for. Is it, after all, quite true that every act of choice is a mere resultant of the past? External circumstances vary; the

nervous structures are being constantly disintegrated and as constantly renewed, like the rest of the organism ; this is true also of the perceptions, feelings, thoughts, volitions. These, however similar to the past, are, like the external agencies that co-operate with them, in some degree absolutely new—else there were no internal change ; neither assuredly is the spiritual part of us merely passive to external change, but co-operative with it. Here, then, we have a constant present exertion of fresh vital and spiritual force co-operating with physical ; otherwise, I cannot conceive of the *progressive* personal identity, which is only identity on condition of being different and constantly varying : which is not a stagnant blank self-identity of $A=A$, but a mysterious progressive unity of diverse elements—and though the differentiations of a growing organism be inherited, yet it is a fresh process gone through all over again in the case of each child, and demands fresh power. But the gradual development of species in past ages is implied in the fresh growth of each human person. [Hence, to place the highest Intelligence *before* all the rest inverts the known order.] What Edwards would not admit is, after all, true, then—there is an activity in the soul, something of a self-moving power ; the manner of its exercise is, indeed, absolutely determined by the infinitude of interdependent past phenomena, but there is a constant renewal of its own peculiar power needed to co-operate with actual results of the past, and with progressive powers of the universe now and always acting. But does this admission really *help* the advocates of Free-will much ? does it further the *object* they have in view ? The Ego, a conscious Self, is truly present in the act of choice. I choose freely, because no external force compels me, except so far as either I am unconscious of it, or it enters into and becomes an element in my own intelligent self, desiring, deliberating, choosing. Still I can only understand, deliberate, and choose as I actually do, and the powers compelling me may be viewed objectively, as well as felt subjectively. But what is absolutely new and fresh in the conscious state which is to follow my present conscious state, I cannot directly determine. The desire of a future action is to some extent the same as that action,—it is that action *nascent*. But that which is quite new in a volition is caused rather by the unconscious self, or Principle of Personality, which underlies the conscious. It is true that we consciously will and desire what is not, and has not precisely been—for instance, in imagination and invention. But there is always much more in a designed effect than the designer ever put there ; and if there were not, design and its effect were impossible ; it *proceeds upon and implies a pre-existing order*. Self-determination is implied even in mere change of place. Motion is the free-will of Nature, as Free-will is the conscious tendency of spirit to motion. It

seems to me a great mistake to speak, as Mr. Spencer and others do, of *the one being transformed into the other*, though their correlation is certain. Each kind of being implies, on the contrary, a perpetual Divine Creation for every change (of relative proportionate existence) that takes place in it; and more than this, implies a perpetual generation from its own kind of existence in past time, and a perpetual generation of its own future existence. Thought and will must generate thought and will; motion, motion; life, life; pain, pain; pleasure, pleasure, &c.: yet *indirectly* these imply and constitute and generate their opposites, and more directly their analogues in the correlative sphere of existence; hence motion produces the idea of motion; light, mental illumination; heat, spiritual emotion; but not without help from correspondences in spirit. The retrograde metamorphosis of a living cell liberates formative vital force, which rebuilds another from the nutriment—modified by the former—but also new, life entering into new combinations. Here we have personal thought and will born of the battle between Death (ganglionic decomposition) and Life, which is true also of the highest spiritual Virtue. Schopenhauer is right; to extinguish pain, you must extinguish consciousness. But is that possible? The correlative formative process itself, and such statical equilibrium as the nervous centres maintain, would seem to be unattended with personal consciousness; perhaps only with that of the monad, or cell. Think, however, what vital and spiritual forces must be liberated by the death of the whole body! how much is required in the growth of a child! Surely that is a proof of the continuity of our lives with lives before birth, with lives after death, the transmigration being partly in accordance with character formed in the life preceding, and partly with unknown conditions of the new birth. But if Motion cannot directly generate Will, neither do I see how Free-will can generate Motion, though theologians maintain the contrary. Even though will can direct and modify Motion, in experience this is not until Motion has directed and modified will. Of a motion that should not precede and reflect itself in thought from without, before being willed, we have no type in experience. So that the dogma of Divine will originating motion absolutely cannot be construed in thought. Will is the *latest* and highest form of Power, but mechanical, chemical, and vital forms of power are *implied in it, and necessary to its development*. In human minds there is a phantasmagoria of ideas presented to the spirit through life from without; we can but desire and reject, and press onward to a goal out of sight, all being infinite, but we, with a sense of our infinity, hearing vague reverberations from our infinite past, and dimly divining our infinite future. How, then, does this

kind of universal self-determination help us? It may be termed *Freedom*, because it coalesces with the Absolute Self-determination of the Divine All—but in that sphere Necessity and Freedom are one. The Freedom supposed to be required for Responsibility is, on the contrary, a *conscious* self-determination of the person. If responsibility depends on the Metaphysical Freedom of the Will, very surely there is none. But virtue and vice are predicable of actual conscious states, not of their causes: a virtuous man is one who has a strong and controlling moral sense; a vicious man is one who has very little, and is not influenced by it. Virtuous people regard the latter with a moral indignation derived from their own moral sense of what is fitting or morally beautiful in character, and they desire to punish him because we naturally wish to hurt creatures we dislike. They have also good reasons,—the safety of society, preventing others from being like him, perhaps reforming him; but his repellent nature is at the root of their desire to kick him, though they may do that calmly and judiciously, through ministers of justice. Why, then, does a man feel remorse and indignation at his own conduct? Because he views his own behaviour otherwise than before, with a more controlling moral sense. He blames and despises himself for being so wicked or so weak as to have his higher reason overborne by lower impulses. But it is of that very state the Bible speaks when it says that we are *in bondage* to sin, and we all feel that is a just expression. Even if a lapse has been gradual, could the man in each indulgence have done otherwise? The highest form of human freedom is when the hierarchy of Reason, Conscience, and Desire

* What are even Reason, and Imagination, and Dreams, but *perceptions* of objects (more or less generalized) that present themselves really in the organism? I have argued elsewhere (CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, June 1872) that colours, &c., are in the object, as the vulgar suppose. And the elements of objects seem ready to form *new real* objects in the organism. Light, and the forces which things are, having made the senses and the nervous organism, are surely present there, and (conditioned by extra-organic perception) are ready to make new objects and new thoughts—the raw material of thought, spirit, being also present, to know and imagine. The *Variations* in perception, which is supposed to prove that objects as we perceive them are not external, are simply due to the fact that we perceive *different* objects, fancying that they are the same. A quality is not like a knowing, truly; but that hinders not a quality from being known. When it is said that colour is a sensation, and we don't want it twice, the point in dispute is assumed. Colour is *not* a sensation, but a quality known through sense. External objects create their counterparts in the organism, and when under certain conditions these are revived and perceived, that is remembrance; the external object is recognized, but with some manifest difference. I hope to argue this more at large elsewhere. Spencer's doctrine of perception contradicts common sense no less than Berkeley's and Hamilton's. It seems probable, however, that the organism always contributes its share of object perceived, even in normal extra-organic perception. For, as Spencer observes, disturbance in the periphery of an afferent nerve is multiplied in traversing all the nerves and ganglia concerned in perception. Now consciousness must bear some proportion to the whole of this disturbance.

holds its own in the spirit. The strongest desire may be in conflict with Reason and Conscience, which, being highest, are more *the Man*; they are co-ordinating and judicial faculties; so that the Man may will an act which yet he disapproves; there is needed a transforming power to bring his nature into harmony with itself. But even granted this perfection of character, it must be obvious that perfect Freedom and Moral necessity here coalesce. A true hero is bound by his Duty, by his love for the race; he cannot do other than right and noble actions. But in the end he does not owe this character to himself. Calvinists say he owes it to the grace of God. And is it certain that a much better phrase can be found to express the fact than this? Yet those who see too forcibly that the extremest form of "reprobation" cannot logically be evaded by Calvinists,—that the personal God must, according to their doctrines, be the cause of evil wills as well as good, may prefer to take refuge in the belief that God, as the only ground and substance of all actions, is incomprehensible and impersonal, is *Natura Naturans*, while good and bad wills belong to *Natura Naturata*. The Essential Antagonism we may not fathom, but veil our faces and pass on. After all, a very bad man is also very free; for his nature, too, is in harmony with itself; evil is his good; hell his heaven. Spinoza justly observes that an idiot, a madman, a drunkard, a dreamer, may seem free to themselves; but, as a bad man is in bondage from a good man's point of view, these seem so, too, from a normal man's. No man is more *metaphysically* free than these. This view may reasonably modify our manner of regarding even the most repugnant to us,—chasten it into something of mystic awe and large pity. But with an *accidental* choice it were surely ridiculous to be angry, even if that were murder.

The conception, indeed, of a creative Free-will imparting all their existence to innumerable created Free-wills—which yet are equally arbitrary and sovereign—is certainly not one easy to entertain. In fact, it seems a contradiction in terms. One more objection requires an answer—that beforehand we feel we may take either of two courses, and are not bound to follow one of them, and that if we were, it would be no use our trying to do right rather than wrong. The answer is, that we cannot tell beforehand what motives are destined to prevail, and our desires, aspirations, efforts, are factors in the determination of our volitions. On this head I will quote a passage from Herbert Spencer:—"The seeming indeterminateness in the mental succession is consequent on the extreme complication of the forces in action. The composition of causes is so intricate, and from moment to moment so varied, that the effects are not calculable. The irregularity and apparent freedom are inevitable results of the complexity,

and equally arise in the inorganic world under parallel conditions. A body in space subject to the attraction of a single other body moves in a direction that can be accurately predicted. But if it is surrounded by bodies of all sizes, at all distances, its motion will be apparently uninfluenced by any of them ; it will move in some indefinable varying line that appears to be self-determined ; it will seem to be *free*." As the Duke of Argyle well observes, you can predict pretty surely that a young rat will walk into a trap, but not so certainly that an old rat will ; his motives are more complicated ; but both have free-will.

But, need it be added, that, turning the tables on the Libertarians, we may argue how threats and punishments can only be useful as deterrent and reforming if motives have a calculable influence on the will ; while if the will be sovereign and arbitrary, can irrationally elect or veto its motives, threats and punishments would be of no use whatsoever—nor would it be of any avail to give children a good and right education ? But as for the general scheme of things, men suffer from ignorant failure to foresee consequences, just as they suffer from deliberate neglect of them—though not in their consciences. And the worst men do not suffer in their consciences. In the long run, the good will be happy, for circumstances in other lives may be more favourable. The evil, too, will suffer in other lives ; for there is a moral order ; but there is a disorder, too ; our idea of either is very relative—part of a greater idea too-high for us. And though there be Heavens and Hells, and innumerable states favourable to various ideals of life, impracticable now, though ardently longed for by some, the good must love good for itself ; that is Heroism ; self-sacrifice, absorption in God, who is All. *Degradation* is the true punishment of the selfish. A bad man who fulfils natural conditions of happiness *deserves* it, but never attains *moral* happiness. But if Free-will does not mean what I have said, it virtually makes human and Divine Wills the very centre of chaos and chance. Volition must be supposed to spring out of the Void with absolute indeterminateness by a constant succession of totally independent leaps. It may, therefore, be good or evil—this or that—and no one can ever calculate upon it. It is subject to no law, no intelligible order, it is pure caprice ; this might explain the miraculous, no doubt, but it would scarcely explain what is perhaps more certain and obvious, the facts of every-day experience. If Will be subject to law and order in its successive developments, that is, if it be manifested in a uniform and more or less ascertainable manner (as statistics prove it to be), then this manner of its manifestation must have a fixed self-existent cause producing it, rather than some other, for we cannot go back along an infinite series of tortoise and elephant. *Ex nihilo nihil fit*.

If a volition can start up by chance, so can the rest of the universe, and we are landed in blank atheism. And when it is said, I may look to the right or the left with sovereign freedom, the insignificance of the motives in such a case serves to conceal them. The accidental position, or involuntary movement of the eyes, may attract me more to one side than the other in the absence of preference.

Volition, in its beginning, can best be understood as Mr. Bain represents it. When pain co-exists with an accidental alleviating movement, that is the movement that will be chosen and continued. The shock of an alteration of state on the pleasurable side is a direct and immediate stimulus to the active forces of the system. The whole is founded on spontaneous movement in the organism, or, at least, movement determined by nutrition and stimulus. Under like circumstances, this becomes more and more easy and natural—because the nervous discharge, like other forces, follows the line of least resistance—and a particular organised association of sensations, ideas, and movements is established. Obviously this explanation applies also later in life; but, then, one sensation suggests more numerous ideas, a part of which represent consequences as they have occurred in experience, and there are various feelings suggested which were dormant before. So come hesitation and balancing. But I think it probable that this original discrimination of sensations as pleasant and painful constitutes the first dawn of consciousness—makes it possible. At the same moment, probably, of reaction against the pain, there dawns a faint sense of oneself opposing a hostile power. Here we see pain at the root of all higher life. Here, too, we have the rise of *will—opposing* forces that give pain, or would remove the cause of pleasure. Then follows the consciousness of our locomotive energy being resisted; but it seems that the consciousness of self must already be present for the knowledge of resistance to be possible. The sensation of a movement (a muscular sensation) soon becomes more complex—becomes a perception of a limb moving, a very different thing—and the self-consciousness becomes proportionately definite, but the same law of will and action holds. Will is not, as theologians maintain, our only type of power; for we have no *primitive* consciousness of will, except as *our own power opposed to an opposite and external power*. And if later, we fancy that the external object has a will, that is an error the infant and the savage learn in time to correct. For though our feeling of power is clothed with sensation, at first we perceive the object as giving us sensation; while later we can abstract from and purify our conception.

Nor should Will be regarded as a separate faculty at all. To desire one movement in preference to another is to will it. After-

wards we recollect, we judge, we reason, we invent. Our own activity in those different operations, which more or less involve one another,—that is our Will. Will seems to be present in germ, at least, wherever there is consciousness, for even the most dreamy train of ideas involves some attention. Sensori-motor and ideo-motor actions involve Will only so far as they involve attention, and, with reflex action, show for how much Will counts in Motion. The more completely consolidated are nervous changes,—that is, the more automatic and reflex in their character,—the more unaccompanied are they by consciousness. Herbert Spencer says, “When the adjustments of the organism to its environment begin to take in involved and infrequent groups of outer relations, when consequently the answering groups of inner relations include many elements of which some are not often repeated in *experience*, when as a necessary result there come to be hesitating automatic actions, then Memory, Reason, Feeling, Will, simultaneously become nascent.” Thus the visceral functions we are scarcely conscious of, and thus a child consciously wills the formation of every letter or syllable in learning to read, but afterwards is scarcely conscious of the process; it has become secondarily automatic. Progress by error and effort is the law of conscious life. Once a given stage of comparative ease attained by means of automatic organic adjustment, this becomes the platform on which to build further efforts, and by new errors and new sufferings to wrest from the Infinite Environment as yet undreamed adaptations in the sphere of Life, Intelligence, and Will.

Will is in complete dependence on the organism. Thought wearies the body; and when fatigued, it is difficult to think or resolve. The following is a striking account in Spencer’s “Psychology” why indigestion produces ill-temper from a physical point of view:—“Nervous action depends on an equable degree of nutrition furnished by the capillary blood-vessels. Now if the supply of blood fails in quality or quantity, what happens? The nervous plexuses which co-ordinate the defensive and destructive activities, and in which are seated the accompanying feelings of antagonism and anger, are inherited from all antecedent races of creatures, and are well organized. But those which, by correcting and co-ordinating a variety of inferior plexuses, adapt their behaviour to a variety of external requirements, have been but recently evolved; so that besides being extensive and intricate, they are formed of much less permeable channels. Hence, when the nervous system is not fully charged, these latest and highest structures are the first to fail. Instead of being instant to act, their actions, if appreciable at all, come too late to check the action of the subordinate structures.

And if a chronic vascular derangement causes an abnormal nutrition of all the central plexuses, we get insanity." Now take the case of a good man, who has acquired the habit of Virtue. Here is the body breaking in upon the soul, and at one fell swoop laying the laboriously built, yet fragile spiritual structure in ruins! For alas! the brain too, was concerned in that structure of Virtue. The madman often hates his best beloved! Here, then, we have discontinuity in our conscious states, and a want of harmony with persons and things around. But it is at the point furthest from rational Will. *Here* is the lawlessness which Libertarians claim as a privilege! *here* there is no apparent motive.

As regards the carrying-out of a train of thought, molecular motion of the nervous and muscular system is implied. But this is not a conscious process. *The will itself is directed on the consciousness desired.* Yet indirectly the vital motion is influenced, determined by the mental effort. But the condition of this resolve was equally a definite vital motion, dependent on organic nutrition. This indirectly determined the will. We are considering two opposite faces of the same thing. A *man* is not body alone, nor soul alone, but both soul and body in one—the Christian doctrine of *Resurrection*, therefore, in essence, commends itself to Reason. *I feel the pain in my finger.* But the element of *motion*, so far as its origination goes, is evidently generated by the previous organic state, together with the grand affiliated motions outside the individual organism. Thought and will are the subjective developments that correlate with given objective vital movements; these subjectively are clustered and serial sensations or ideas, which latter involve perception or knowledge of qualities external, to ourselves. It is the human objective vital movements (themselves a focus of external forces passing into corporeal organic unity) to which the condition of subjective personal conscious movements belongs. But the latter are not even necessarily conscious of the organic states as objective, as nervous and muscular. These produce each other unconsciously, and furnish the condition or basis of the conscious production of conscious states. But we must also take into account the mysterious unity and identity of Person into which the differences of Thought, Will, and Sensation fall, and where they interpenetrate. It is not a mere *series*, as Spencer and some modern psychologists maintain; that unity, however, is, as we might expect, to be found elsewhere; in the *body* notably as objective—in chemical unions—even in all material things as isolated in space and time. It is true, however, that the subjective unity is *higher, more one*, than even the correlative vital organic unity; you are altogether in a more elevated region of being. Nevertheless, there *is* the vital unity of the different functions and organs at the

base of this higher unity. Thus we have a complex nervous system united in centres of compound, and doubly compound co-ordination, with the vascular and sympathetic systems in strict union with the former. The more special nervous centres play upon the higher and more general, these again playing upon them. The conscious co-ordinations of Will would be impossible without, are founded upon, these unconscious co-ordinations of nature. The unity of function, and even appearance, is maintained in the body, whose *change* is essential to its identity. *Power*, again, is revealed to us in perception as both within us and without us, as spiritual and material, as entering into the essence of every change (phenomena *are* power passing from cause to effect); hence we cannot conceive of change without it, and hence the apodictic causal judgment when generalised and matured. I am aware, of course, that the Hume-Mill dominant philosophy teaches how *succession* of antecedent and consequent is all we know; and though it speaks of these being forces, it says a force is not a power, is not a cause. I fear I cannot discuss this view, for it is a profundity of metaphysique that I have for many years in vain striven to understand. Again, in the will to move a limb, we will it certainly as an external fact, because we have the type of a similar one from experience; but the motion, as objective and external, is generated by previous organic motions, stimulated by the environment and by nervous equivalents of idea and desire; the Will only directs, and has a part in determining it; just as previous and present motions have in determining this particular volition; which view meets, I think, Hume's famous objection on this head, adopted by Hamilton. Our power consists in desiring or willing a certain consciousness, *i.e.*, in retaining or increasing it, for if desired, it is already there; we *feel* our power passing into effect or maturity; but we know well that there are other powers co-operating in the effect; and the root of all is out of consciousness. We cannot move a paralysed limb, however we may will it. There is some sort of inchoate, to us inconceivable consciousness and will, perhaps, present wherever there is a complex resultant of motions and forces—everywhere. Spencer in his "Psychology," has subtly suggested the genesis of it through the nerveless undifferentiated protoplasm of the lowest zoophytes upwards. From this point of view I could conceive of the external world gradually gathering itself together, as it were, in motion, chemical composition, reflex action, instinct, reason, will, to know itself, and consciously design itself into new forms of beauty and utility, as before unconsciously. The categories of Being that we find in Spirit we may find also in Matter of the lowest kind—unity, diversity, motion, limit, quality, perceptions corresponding to each

quality, and innumerable poetic analogies founded in the nature of things—which shows they are not radically diverse, but that at the extreme limits of Personality and Object, we have only those essential differences, which constitute all real unity, raised to their highest power. Is not a flower in some sense a subjective self-developed unity, as well as an object? while a person may be regarded as object, though he is characteristically a subject with full self-realisation. Evolution, indeed, as hitherto expounded, is insufficient. The parentage of the higher is inadequately found in the lower. And the ever higher developments of life and spirit here must, I believe, be affiliated upon similar higher developments elsewhere. The degradation of higher natures may furnish the condition of increment in the lower. Thus, manhood, sinking toward the brute, might furnish needed assistance for the animal's development upward, and so there would be compensation; but degradation for the most part would be only to a lower level of humanity, and so toward the confines of higher non-human creatures; and sometimes might be rather in the direction of intellectually powerful demons, which would be a moral elevation for their race. It seems highly improbable that human immortality is uniform. There may be ascents toward higher humanities; and our holiest may rest in some star-paradise where the Holy Saviour reigns. The quantity of souls, bodies, and things is probably constant. Each is a monad entering into the constitution of a higher organic whole or monad, and each more or less confusedly reflects the Infinite in itself—living echoes all of One mysterious Voice, ever variously reverberating throughout eternity.

It has been argued (*e.g.*, in the *Spectator*, June 14, 1873) that freedom of the Will consists in our power to increase or diminish the influence of our own motives over us. Now, if motives be taken in their literal sense, this view would be self-contradictory. For motives can only mean all that moves or determines the choice or will. A motive, however, is generally understood to imply a conscious preference for one course of action over another. And in *these alone* all the freedom that we are sensible of may really be found. Motives do not influence the choice *ab extra*—they are ourselves in the exercise of intelligent choice—hence I cannot admit that Necessarians make men an automaton—a machine answering to a pull from without. It is the conscious personal identity present in successive states that constitutes the sense and fact of freedom: and those who treat man as a *mere series* of conscious states may be puzzled to account for this feeling, but I am not. Let us, however, consider whether we have this alleged power or not.

This theory avers that your love or your sense of duty is not enough to make you forbear from injuring a person. Now, is not the ordinary meaning of the term "Will" wrested when it is used for anything else than the ultimate choice of the person to act in such a manner? Motives are simply Will in process of forming. But the contents of experience as accounting for the facts seem to be exhausted by the motives and consequent act. Either you influence your motives consciously or unconsciously. Now do you consciously *give generosity and duty a value and strength that they are not felt to have in themselves* when you resolve to do a generous act? *Surely not.* Do you determine to be influenced by them rather than by selfish feelings? But if so, can *that* determination be without sufficient conscious motive? *It must be formed, if it is a conscious choice or determination, on some grounds or reasons.* This resolves itself only into the allegation that other motives reinforce virtue and generosity; but this cannot be what is intended. It appears to me indeed that this middle-ground between denying all influence to motives, and granting it all to them, cannot be held for a moment. How can you will to have your will influenced by this rather than that? To be influenced is to be passive to influence. And to will or choose to be thus passive to influence is simply to be so with preference. If I consciously diminish the influence of selfish desire, I do so because I prefer generosity and duty—I, as generous and virtuous, prevail over myself as a creature of appetite. *I do not arbitrarily and for no reason repress my desire, but as generous I do so.* The confusion is in fancying that *our motives are not as much ours as will is.* When Cyrus resolved not to see his beautiful captive, that was *because* his love of Virtue gained the victory over desire, and *because* he knew his own weakness. If choice were arbitrary, and from no intrinsically more influencing reason, how could it be good or bad? praise- or blameworthy?

Out of what fund would a man increase the influence of motives felt to be intrinsically weaker? Yet this arbitrary Will, separate from all our faculties and motives, is supposed to be particularly *us*—the Man—the *self*! But if it be so, then if our motives have no influence over *this*—they have no influence over *us*! which is absurd. It is said, indeed, we feel we might have done otherwise than we did. That is because we impute our present state to ourselves in the past. We cannot calculate, and do not know, all the causes that influenced us; we know we acted freely, that is, from *our own* desire; and we fancy we might have desired otherwise; so we might *if* we had thought of all the circumstances as we do now, and desired as we do now, but why did we not? Surely there was some determining reason for that; yet putting ourselves as we were before the act, we

remember we did not know for certain then *how* we should determine to act—therefore we felt free—but the motives were *then engaged in determining us*. In a case of intense over-mastering desire—that, makes up in present intensity what it lacks in reasonableness and virtue. A man knows well enough in this case what determined his Will: he had no need to increase or diminish strength of motive; he would have liked to do so if he had been able, but he knows he was not. Yet if he had, that would have been from his preference for virtue at the time—however much he may prefer virtue generally and esteem it more highly, the man who does wrong prefers a wrong act at the moment. If he had succeeded in resisting temptation, it would have been by diverting his thoughts, or putting himself out of the way of the tempter, from love to virtue. But in no case could he have acted from arbitrary sovereign will, without reason. Certainly, a man's will may be opposed to his desire, but not to all his desires—not to his strongest desire at the moment.

If something in the Will itself determines it *apart from reason and desire*, then the Will is, however, not more free than before; for something in itself obliges it toward one motive rather than toward the other; only it is nothing reasonable or desirable. Whether *that* does not make a man more of an *automaton* than my view, I leave the reader to decide. Conscious freedom is in mine; but this influence is out of our own control, in the act of control itself, which it determines; but it is not our own conscious reasonable desire, which alone can be named our own.

Now the real question is, what causes a *particular* volition? It is answered "the Will." But *is this general abstract entity adequate to account for a particular act of will?* What determines this volition rather than that? Surely mere general will is no answer. Let will be an active Power; but it issues in special concrete determinations. How and why? You now bring motives—it has special conscious motives before it, and you say it can elect between them. But still you say, they have no intrinsic influence to oblige it. Well, then, I ask again, *how do you account for its electing these rather than those?* The difficulty is absolutely unremoved. If it determines itself by a preceding act of choice, the position is given up. If it determines itself independently of this, then there must be an unconscious influence making it lean this way rather than that; and then it is not more free than before. No Exercise of Power is at all conceivable except as modified by other acts of power—other kinds of power which determine its own range of influence, opposing, helping it—its own preceding and contemporaneous acts of Power, different yet similar, coalescing with it, directing its present influence.

When it is said that will alone is not subject to the law of

antecedent and consequent, I do not know what is meant. *In no sphere* does antecedent *exclusively* determine consequent; but in every state it *partially* and *inevitably* determines what the consequent shall be, though *the consequent itself* helps *by its own noumenal power* to *produce its own phenomenal manifestation*, whatever that may be. Since recent researches, it is surely impossible any longer to speak of *matter as inert*: the molecular motion of inorganic colloids is enough to discredit the idea. Take, again, the spontaneous movement of the sporules of confervæ. But what are cohesion, gravitation, &c., if not expressions of material self-movement? Matter is a congeries of *forces*. These are modes of Noumenal Power, just as Will is; they are undeveloped will; chemical combination according to affinities, magnetism, electricity, the multiplication of cells by fission or gemmation—vital growth and reproduction—all tell the same tale. Love and Hate are at work here in a lower sphere. Rest is but counterbalanced Motion. Molecules, carrying their own rhythmical motions into the compound molecules they help to form, produce compound rhythmical motions. The sum of these in the lowest plant or animal probably determines the visible movement. Equilibrium or motion in a mass is indeed influenced *from without*; but that is just what I maintain about Volition also. Noumenal implicit Absolute Will, the *Principle* of phenomenal concrete wills, is the cause of them; that is what draws them on into personal wills, as they are in time; for in the Absolute Will the Principle of these very concrete material forces is also involved, just as they themselves are involved in particular human wills. But conscious personal Will comes *last*, and *cannot come first*, as natural theology supposes. For it involves a material world as *object* of knowledge, without which SELF-consciousness is impossible; it involves a nervous system and senses, wherein the material forces may focalize themselves, in order to knowledge—or some corresponding material organ of thought. So alone is *design* conceivable, which is *but a modified memory of an experience*, which is again expected to repeat itself outside, which we imagine and desire to modify. Such modification, however, is only possible within limits imposed by nature, and by means of an organism itself moulded by Nature. Such design, moreover, is essentially inspired—given from without. Conscious design never creates its own elements—only recombines them. Hence Paley's watchmaker cannot be at all like the Creator of the Universe. Strange that it should be thought reverent to think so, and irreverent to deny it! But thought and the world being essentially one, and the moulding of thought upon the world being conscious Reason, Reason must be found implicit in the world; unconscious purpose and design must be there, to sug-

gest our own tentative conscious designs: it is pardonable enough that we incline to make the Creator in our image when we discover our capacity to form a telescope on the principle of the natural eye; but we flatter ourselves a little too much, perhaps! The Deity, after all, may have wiser modes of procedure than Messrs. Carpenter and Westley. Does not the ordinary conception of Deity gratuitously invert our human intelligence, and leave it standing on its head?

Self-determination, if it implies that nothing antecedent determines a volition, merely takes it out of our own power to determine it, which is the reverse of what is intended. What every one means by "*our* power" is our power as desiring, as reasoning, as moral. And the more under control of Reason and Conscience, the less *able* to act against them, the more truly free and virtuous a man is. We say, such a one *could not* be capable of so mean and selfish or cruel an act. But if his will, as distinct from his reason, can start up arbitrarily and put a veto on the law of reason, such an element is simply disturbing and *lawless*—and this lawlessness is supposed to be a privilege! Why, it would be simply a monstrous and fatal misfortune; it ought not even to flatter our arrogance; for it would only take us out of the universal Harmony to our own cost, and *irrevocably*; for not even God could conquer or discipline so unintelligent and fatuous a principle as this. But, again, if this queer little human godlet be hedged in by all sorts of admitted limitations, it is after all a meek constitutional sovereign only, with nothing but the trappings of an autocrat about it—a sovereignty, methinks, hardly worth contending for? "Take away the bauble!" At the same time, if Free-will be defined *Will in accordance with Reason*, the case is given up. For then all depends on the amount of Reason present, which again varies with all the circumstances concerned. If the chart be mutilated, the captain cannot consult it to advantage. But this is the case with all of us; so none of us are free. And if the fund of supplementary power be said to consist in Reason, the amount of Reason present in proportion to other elements of character must rigidly condition and make necessary the manner in which this power of will is exercised: for the practical question is not about abstract "*man*," but about each concrete man. To change the phrase here, and say Reason is not a motive, whereas desire is a motive, is only to change the phrase, and not to alter the compulsion involved. If I desire a thing for itself, or for certain moral ends, I am in either case impelled by my desire, and ultimately by my strongest desire.

How should the will be *us free to elect* a motive that is not present in consciousness, or can only be made present in a very small degree, as another which is largely and habitually present? It has

been urged that Necessarians argue, "the *strongest*—i.e., the *prevailing*, motive prevails," which amounts to nothing. But not at all. The real question is, whether choice is not found to vary according to the proportion in which various character-elements are present to consciousness before action? Is the will as free to give its casting vote for generosity and righteousness in a Troppmann, or a Nero, or a savage, as in a civilized St. Francis, or a Washington? *But why not*, if the will rules the motives, and not motives the will? It is suspiciously like Napoleon's Providence, always on the side of the strongest battalions. And how account for the influence of *habit* in building up a character? Surely habits modify the course of volition pretty rigidly—though, no doubt, there are opposing elements of character, which, under exceptional circumstances, occasionally prevail, and which in some wonderful cases of Conversion are strengthened so as to reverse the whole manner of life. Most decidedly if you ask the subjects of these Divine influences, they will tell you their own "free will" had very little to do with this! It will be urged that in habit the will has bound itself by a series of acts. But, then, why were these successive acts more uniformly in one direction than in another, so as to lead to this formation of a habit? That could not be without determining efficient cause in each case.

In our greatest metaphysician's (Dr. Stirling's) recent work on "The Philosophy of Law"—a work in which he has made as plain to the English as it can be made the momentous "secret of Hegel"—there are some striking remarks on Free Will. The true light on the matter, he says, is just a reversal of what is usually believed in England. To act by motive is to act freely; to act without motive is to act under necessity. Moral necessity is freedom.

But I cannot agree with Hegel or Dr. Stirling when they proceed to argue that the law of Causality, after all, does not apply to will. For they say that will, in order to be completely free, must will its own self, and proceed to explain that will has realized *Reason* in the code of morals; in the body of laws called *the state*; so that will and Reason are truly one: *thinking* will is free will. The beast is driven ever by an *individual* motive,—but man will be controlled ultimately only by the universal. Yet, on the other hand, Dr. Stirling argues that in the law of causality, as physical, the cause but repeats itself in the effect: the motion in the ball is the same motion that was in the bat; the water on the street the same water that was in the rain-cloud; but we see no such identity between the motive and the act of will. The motive does not repeat itself in the act. Here we see a wholly new power in act, a power that meets actively what comes to it as motive, that changes its direction, that modifies it, and

can even *negate* it. Now, how does this agree with what was said above of motive making the will free? To this last view all the objections I have here stated to the Libertarian view seem to apply with full force. If Will and Reason be one, and if the motive be Reason, must not the motive repeat itself in the act, in order to realize Reason in a man's own life and in the State? How can there be a wholly new power in act here, changing the direction of motive, and even negating it? The motive, I think, does repeat itself in the act as much as the motion of the bat repeats itself in that of the ball. I will to move. Now Motion came from outside—was made into idea and desire inside—and I restore it to nature when I move. But I shall argue that identity is not an adequate explanation of the Law of Causality, even in the physical world—that when a bat moves a ball, there is recreation of fresh power quite as much as there is when motives determine volition. The ball responds, is noumenally self-moved, though determined by the bat's motion. Its new determination, in accordance with that, is a re-arrangement of its own self-identical persistent constituent active forces with respect to surrounding things. The ball is an agent, is not merely passive, is a subject of qualities.

Strictly speaking, it is the Eternal whole out of time that determines each effect; and the antedecents determine only as involved therein; but all are necessarily determined by the Eternal Cause in the order wherein they actually appear. Hence each effect is absolutely determined by the sum of the antecedents; yet we must not say by them in time; for else there is infinite regress, and no true Causality. This answers Clarke's objection as to Spinoza's doctrine of Motion. The purpose, the end, the Reason, are therefore, *in principle*, efficient cause. Dr. Stirling observes that Hume, denying our knowledge of any causal nexus between antecedent and consequent (mental or physical), points to the difference between bat and ball; but he answers with reason that this difference has nothing to do with the question. The relation, the motion, is identical—first in one, then in the other. For so much motion lost by the ball, so much gained by the bat. Some of the bat's *molar* motion, however, is converted by the *resistance* of the ball into *molecular*. The ball then reacts, and there is gravitation: the movement, in short, is resultant of *all* the forces concerned, which, indeed, are infinite. But every exertion of Force, every change in it, is in essence Noumenal—transcendent, eternal—nor entirely depends on preceding exertions of it. The resultant phenomenon includes *all the present* exertions of Force. There is an important difference, besides the bat and ball one. The bat moves from A to B; the ball from B to C. Can the same cause take a body on

from B to C, which brought it from A to B? Thus (to make the problem simpler), we will regard the same body—and I contend that the same cause which brings it into space-relation A is not competent to carry it into space-relation B. Grant the velocity and direction of motion to be the same, and that the ball now holds the same relation to point C, which before it held to point A—still the cause which brought it from A to B would rather leave it there than carry it out of B again. Is it the *same* cause which both puts a thing into a given state and takes it out of that same state? Strictly speaking, no. It is a similar cause, but not the same: it is so similar that the successive changes of relation to surrounding objects can be classified together as motion, even as the same motion: indeed it is these successive changes of relation of one thing to others that constitute this motion; the relations assumed are similar; but one relation to point A is relinquished, and another relation to it assumed; a similar relation to B is assumed, but immediately relinquished again. Hence I maintain that the motion from A to B does not adequately account for the motion from B to C. The cause that accounts for a body being in A does not account for its *not* being in A, which is what its leaving A and getting to B implies. (If unchecked motion always continues, that is only a statement of a law, and nothing to the point as to what causes it.) The identity in antecedent and consequent motion is not absolute; and hence this identity can hardly be said to constitute the whole causal nexus even here. The Future is also in the causal nexus, but in its *principle* only. Dr. Stirling, in his remarkable pamphlet on Protoplasm, discusses this question fully, and speaks of motion being an identity passing between fixed different—the arm, the bat, the ball, &c. This is evidently to hypostatize the abstract relation Motion in Hegelian fashion, and make it a living Idea or Spirit incarnating itself in special instances of motion successively. But this idea is, in fact, gathered by us from actual phenomenal motions; and though assuredly it must correspond to an identical relation in concrete things; yet this relation can never exist apart from all these; and hence it can never so far transcend them as to give us the Noumenal Principle or true cause of each concrete phenomenon. It cannot bring them into time-existence, because it is itself constituted together with them and by them, and cannot all of it as a complete relation exist before these very special instances: it is in time, but the causes must be out of time.

To hypostatize abstract ideas is gratuitously to double them. They and general relations, on the contrary, require Principles or Causes quite as much as concrete things do. And the principle or cause of them is and is not identical with them. It is the Ultimate

Incomprehensible. But thought and its externalities cannot be made into the Absolute; for *Change can never be thought as self-existent*; and the very essence of thought (as of things) is change. Hegelianism does not account for the concrete; for special persons, special things; it seems to ignore them, and keep aloof as though for safety, in the region of the abstract. It endeavours, indeed, to make the phenomenal Time-process itself eternal and absolute by generalizing the special instances of it; but this surely is only to empty the special instances, and leave them with less existence than before. Even that Trinity in thought and things, which Hegel and Stirling insist on, itself requires an inconceivable Principle of Development in time.

To say that a preceding stage of change adequately accounts for the consequent by identity seems, moreover, to rest the present stage always on one preceding, which rests again on one preceding—a process that never reaches a veritable Cause. Professor Ferrier, in his lecture on Heracleitus, indeed argues that the true idea of motion involves the conception of a moving thing being both in and out of a given position at the same instant—that a thing is not first in A, then in B, then in C, but both in A and out of A; in B and out of B; in C and out of C at the same moment. I have also heard it maintained that a thing moving is neither in nor out of these positions, but in some intermediate state. Now, if a thing is in no position—neither in one nor in another—it is nowhere; and if nowhere, *it is nothing*; and most assuredly it is not moving from one place to another, *which is what motion means*. Take then the other alternative. To my mind, for a body to be both in and out of a given position at the same moment, equally contradicts the very idea of motion. If a body is in A and out of it at the same moment, it is in B and A at the same moment, and equally in C, and equally, at the end of a series of stages, in Z—that is, a train moving from Edinburgh is there and at Carlisle and in London at the same moment. Now (*pace* Bradshaw), I don't believe it. This is a description, not of Motion, but of its opposite, rest—the rest of a body whose parts occupy many positions at the same time. But Motion means occupation of such positions successively, and *not* at the same time. These theories explain Motion by eliminating it.

Nor does Professor Ferrier's argument in support of his thesis seem to be good reasoning. It is obvious, he says, that a thing must either change *per continuum*, that is, with no intervals between the changes, or *per saltum*, that is with intervals between the changes. If it changes *per continuum*, we obtain a series of vanishing states, each of which is not at the very moment when it is; "in being it

ceases to be." But there is no true opposition between these alternatives. If *per continuum* means with no intervals between the changes, that is exactly how I believe bodies move, and all things change. (*All change is motion, spiritual or physical.*) If *per saltum* means with intervals between, I think they do not change so. Yet I believe that they move *per continuum*, and *per saltum*. What I contend is, that if a thing in being ceases to be; if each of its changes is not at the very moment that it is, then it is in no state at all, and it cannot therefore change from one to the other, because it never is in one (and therefore does not exist); but change means being first in one state, then in another. Mr. Ferrier gives an instance—that of freezing. Suppose water has reached the degree of solidity A—and suppose this lasts for a definite period. Then the disappearance of this state A must also last for a definite time before the appearance of the next degree of solidity B. Now, I ask in the name of common sense, why? He proceeds to give the reason. Because our supposition is (that is, on the assumed necessary alternative to the Heracleitan view, which he is defending) that appearance or being and disappearance or not-being are separate conceptions, and therefore we must not suppose that the disappearance of A is the appearance of B. Now see the fallacy here. The being and not-being (we say) of A must not be so absolutely identified as to confound A's being with A's own negation or non-being; therefore, virtually argues Professor Ferrier, the negation or non-being of A is not synonymous or even contemporaneous with the being or affirmation of B! Surely it does not at all follow that if one thing's existence is to be kept apart in time from its own non-existence, its own non-existence must be kept apart in time from the existence of some other thing that comes to take its place. On the contrary, I maintain that the not-being of A is the being of B. The disappearance of A is the appearance of B—constitutes it, involves it, necessitates it. Thus there is no interval at all between the changes—hence they are *per continuum*—but they are true changes—hence they are *per saltum*. Then, it will be replied, why do we not perceive them as abrupt sharp changes? Why do they seem to melt into one another? I suppose for several reasons. One is that the changes are generally very similar. Like produces like; changes always issue from among their own congeners; they are identical *as well as* different—hence in consciousness they form a continuous stream as they do outside; the next change varies *hardly at all* from the preceding; the variation becomes marked in a cumulative manner little by little; and the preceding impressions coalesce and mingle with the present. This is well seen in the instance of a Catherine-wheel firework. But besides all this I think we must regard each

change as in itself less than the human *minimum percibile*, which would give a confused vagueness in the impression of motion received.

I may remark that to assume a personal First Cause of Motion at the end of a long series of motions, as is commonly done, is not more satisfactory than to assume antecedent motion as the adequate cause of consequent. For if there be absolutely new effects at every moment now, a Power working a long time ago cannot be their adequate cause. The "watch" theory of the universe is one founded on a very superficial analogy. I wind up a watch, and it goes by virtue of natural properties that I have nothing to do with. But these are just what involve constant exertion of power. If one cannot conceive of power being *delegated* to created wills, still less can one understand its being *delegated* to a set of "natural properties." But since all matter is force, I do not quite see how theologians escape Pantheism after all, if they maintain with Mr. Martineau, Mr. Hutton, and the Duke of Argyle, that *Force is Will, with the element of Thought left out by us, but really present*. For are not Will and Action more oneself than any other part of self? Matter or Force then must be God. If this Force be delegated, to what? The dead Substratum is untenable now. And how delegate one's Force to a dead Substratum? Yet Mr. Martineau and Mr. Hutton admit that matter *resists*. Now if this force be will, what is the difference between a stone and a person, unless the resisting force be God's? A stone has *no will of its own*. How did God extrude this active substrate from His own ideas—or from nothing? How give His own will to something other than Himself? If, as Mr. Martineau maintains, He had matter co-eternal with Him, that would provide for my objection that a conscious Self implies a Notself to distinguish Self from. But then this matter must have resisting force already to be matter, and so not a delegated one, and not will, because opposite to the only will existing. Mr. Martineau gives it primary qualities, and, as I have argued before, these imply secondary qualities of some sort; and if some, why not all? But so a creation becomes superfluous. And how reconcile Mr. Martineau's view that Force is Divine Will with his view that God has matter (Force) over against Himself eternally? If these objections can be answered, it would be interesting to hear the answer. What is solidity but resistance? Yet that resistance cannot be merely general, must be of one sort or another; and that specific character would be a secondary quality, without which specific intelligent Will is inconceivable; yet mere general Will is but a metaphysical Nonens. Quantity implies quality, and vice versa. Extension implies a definite extended figured thing. Moreover, if causation be truly in antecedent and

consequent at all, we cannot even conceive of a causation totally different—of phenomenal will and motion, which shall not issue forth from among these, and have no phenomenal will and motion before them. What should determine a sudden series of phenomenal effects in time, which never had their representatives before? "From an eternity of idleness I, God, awoke," is not a reverent conception, nor a credible. And how should the non-material *originate* (as well as modify) the material? Successive ideas in the plan can alone account for successive phenomena, if plan is to account for them at all. But then, whence the successive ideas? We should want another series before them, and so on, and should never reach a cause at all. No—God is Power and Substance, and lives in the everlasting series of phenomena. We are the beatings of His heart, the breathings of His breath. Well then may we feel free! Since we are the self-determining Agent Himself in a Personal phase of His own activity. But God is the *whole* cause and effect, which we cannot grasp.

I now proceed to give what I hold to be true about the metaphysique of Motion. The mass or parts moving must be conceived to move just into their own adjoining magnitude all at once—into the place of the part that has just moved out of that same relation; and the cause that causes this is the true creative cause. This view alone seems to resolve satisfactorily the old Zenonian paradoxes about Motion. For thus conceived, one part of this moving ultimate is not in the space adjoining before another; but the whole moving ultimate is instantaneously withdrawn from existence thus, and recreated thus. A thing need not pass through any intervening infinite magnitude in order to get from one place to another. All I require to assume is that the magnitude next filled by the part moving shall be imperceptible by itself. Since the moving thing has a definite magnitude, in its next position it has the same; but what has shifted place is just its own infinitely divisible magnitude. It does not take an infinitely divisible time to go from A to B, nor *pass through* any space at all. It vanished from A, and its vanishing from A was its restoration in B. No time is involved in the annihilation and restoration; only in the succession of A and B. How long they abide can, as I said, only be measured in the mass of changes, and by a reference to some arbitrary fixed standard of changes. *A involves B, but must clearly not be confounded with it.* B is no doubt $B + A + C$, but B is accented, as A was at first, as C is afterwards. Motion without differences were not motion certainly; but the question here as everywhere is, *what brings the identity on into its differences?* The only answer possible is, the timeless and spaceless Essence; the unmoved

Mover; the Principle of intelligence and things that holds in eternal solution the differences which it precipitates in time.

Certainly the strongest argument in favour of Free Will is that of Kant. The moral law, he says, is a categorical imperative, universal and binding on every rational will: and the moral law says "Thou canst, for thou shouldst," and thus assures us of our own freedom. But in the first place, the moral law surely does not say, "Thou canst, and thou canst refrain;" it would only assure us of ability to fulfil the law; but that is quite consistent with moral necessity to fulfil it. Secondly, a man who is the "slave" of evil habits may groan for deliverance, and long to do right, feel that he ought, to the very full, yet know perfectly well, that he is not free at all, that he cannot—hence holy men point us to supernatural assistance, to conversion, to prayer, as our only hope. Does the moral law say to such a man, "Thou canst, for thou shouldst"? If so it is little better than what Byron calls it, a "juggling fiend," methinks! The solution of what is a real difficulty seems to me to lie hereabouts. As rational, or rather as moral, the man can do right—and the law is truly binding on him as a rational moral being. But he is less than this, he is animal, appetitive, self-seeking, and quite naturally so—as such *this* law of Reason is not binding on him, but quite another law. He, having a glimpse of the higher, more universalizing, harmonizing law, will strive to fulfil it—*ought* to strive—and in fact *must* strive, just in proportion to the predominance or incarnation of the higher Law in him. "Thou, *as moral*, canst, for thou shouldst." It is for and from itself the moral law speaks, and as such it is highest, most ideal, fitting, universal, beneficial for the race, and for the person as *integral element thereof*; the Race seeks consciously in him its own law of self-conservation. But he has instincts of self-conservation independent of the Race—to seek his own gratification without regard to the rest. These also have their law binding upon them. The other law must seem the higher to him who regards both. But it may not be the stronger influence in him. And he *cannot* obey the higher law so far as the lower predominates in him. Moreover to say *he ought* is to regard him *as moral*, as rational; to regard him from that point of view; yet do we not admit—even theologians—that he also fulfils the purpose, or (as they say) the secret, unrevealed will of God—that God "hath made one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?" In *one sense, then, he ought not* to do right—because he did not—and could not. He has his place, a lower one. Without him the good could not be. The race itself, as integral member of some vaster organism, benefits by him, the rebel—supposing he even helps to dissolve it as a race. It is the Principle of Reason that rules both voluntary and involuntary contributions to

the supreme development of reason in persons and animal instincts, and things—but we are not competent judges of what that is; unreason is involved.

An animal also may vary to the detriment of its species as well as in a beneficial manner. And if we have superseded animals, a superior race may ultimately be destined to supersede us. Nature surely may try again—she is very young; for she is everlasting. The crowning race will always think itself a marvel of perfection; but some spirits may regard even our great men as we regard the anthropomorphous apes. All, even the lowest foci of forces, have their law of self-conservation, and this is necessary to the persistence and conservation of higher organisms: hence the lower self-seeking life is admirable, and contributes to form the higher. But in man this may be a conscious contribution under favourable circumstances; and when the lower life asserts itself against the higher, the higher may consciously negate it: but we ought to see that even if the lower prevails, it is in the individual only; or in the family; or in the nation; or at worst in the species; and that even then the highest life of these lapsing units as integral members of a more complex organism or race cannot be sacrificed—such destruction is the very condition of higher life—and this in the deepest sense must be the good and destiny of the lapsing members, since their membership is the ultimate truth of them. The individual must conserve itself indeed; yet only in subordination to the interest of the monad of which it forms a part, which may demand its sacrifice: the brain-cell must conserve itself, but not when thought demands its decomposition. But the individual that destroys itself is infinite; the whole is in it; the individual therefore in some sense goes through all cycles of existence; if “thou canst” be not true in this life, it will be true in another; there is justice and compensation for all; none can be cut off from Divine fellowship, and if the good help progress directly, the bad help it indirectly. If from life to life *conscious* personal identity be not retained, that is no difficulty beyond what lies under our eyes. For surely if immortality be true, pre-existence must be, and the infant is identical with the man; but no experience can possibly bring back the infant consciousness. Yet unconscious continuity with, and influence upon, adult personality, this vanished infancy certainly has. I do not at all see what you gain by relegating your unconscious states which you forget, as Dr. Maudsley, *e.g.*, does, to *the brain*. The brain furnishes a part only of the conditions of their reproduction in memory. For (1st) nervous discharges *are not* the conscious states, though even Mr. Spencer seems often to speak as if they were; and (2nd), if they were, the particular discharges which will accompany conscious-

ness are *not* in the brain till their conscious correlates are (whether others like them be there or not); they are potential only; the nervous discharge will be new as well as old, and the meeting of all sorts of new forces is needed first—transformed food, respiration, other nervous discharges, &c. Then you want also the raw material of thought, of spirit; modified elements of mind—as modified nerve-cells are latent nerve-action, these are latent mind-action. But the *actual future* thoughts and vital phenomena are only in their substance—waiting their turn there. Thus in dreamless sleep, our consciousness withdraws into God—perhaps in death this might in some circumstances be possible—yet only for awhile could the endless transmigrations be suspended.

The greater part of our past selves is not consciously present with us at a given moment—no part of our future selves—and yet these are integral constituents in the self. An unconscious influence they have; in harmonious solidarity with them, in essential unity, the Absolute from moment to moment, and everywhere becomes Personal—now supreme incarnate Love, as in our Lord and Master, now incarnate Hate, as in many an anti-Christ. But Evil must be regarded less as the equal than as the servant and everlasting subordinate of Good.

RODEN NOEL.



EGYPT.

AT a quarter to one o'clock on the 16th of October, the *Péluse* slipped from her moorings in the harbour of Marseilles, and passing slowly between the far-seen pilgrimage Church of Notre Dame de la Garde and the Quarantine Station, took her course to the eastward.

Then followed a chequered week, of which the least agreeable incidents were a gale of some eight-and-twenty hours, and a night which we spent tossing about in a ground-swell off the harbour of Alexandria; while the most agreeable incidents were a lovely morning amongst the Lipari Isles, which looked more charming than I ever saw them look before, our first view of Crete, and the society of M. Mariette, one of the greatest of living Egyptologists.

Do you ask who were our other fellow-travellers? Well, they were numerous—somewhat too numerous for comfort, and you will have an excellent idea of what they were like, if you will only read the description given of his travelling companions by M. About in "Le Fellah," for that amusing writer made the same voyage in the same ship a few years ago. Only to complete the picture, in our case a few touches from Wilhelm Meister should be thrown in, for we had on board the whole of the *personnel* of the Opéra Comique, which is, I dare say, at this very moment amusing the Alexandrians.

We ran early in the morning into the harbour which Alexander,

Cæsar, Antony, and so many others of the greatest actors on the world's stage have made famous, and were for some time in suspense as to our fate with reference to quarantine, that scourge of Mediterranean travel having been called into exceptional activity this year by the presence of the cholera in various parts of Europe. Very soon, however, a boat came off bringing a letter which informed us that kind friends had made every arrangement for our comfort, and that we should perform our quarantine in a charming yacht fitted up on purpose.

Hither we soon betook ourselves, a guardian from the Lazaretto accompanying us, and our yacht hoisting the yellow flag as a warning to all persons to avoid touching it, to say nothing of us—its terror-striking inhabitants.

There was nothing, however, to prevent our receiving visits, provided our visitors did not actually touch the vessel, and we did receive a good many, conversing with our friends over the side.

After some seventy-two hours of close but delightful imprisonment, the quarantine authorities came to tell us that we were free. Sir John Lubbock and I immediately used our freedom by going on shore to call on Dr. Gaillardot, a French physician and man of science, who has given special attention to the Pre-historic Antiquities and to the botany of Egypt.

Somewhat later in the day we all set out for a long drive to see the sights, and receive the first impressions of Alexandria.

The sights proper are only two—Cleopatra's Needle and Pompey's Pillar. Cleopatra's Needle is an obelisk of red granite, which is connected by the hieroglyphics still legible upon it with Rameses II., of whom we shall hear more. It was brought from Heliopolis, some say by Cleopatra, whence the name which it usually bears. Others say it was brought in the reign of Tiberius.

Pompey's Pillar is a tall column, also of granite, which has nothing to do with Pompey, but was erected in honour of Diocletian, and which, according to M. Mariette and others, stood in the centre of the Serapeum, a gigantic edifice, erected for religious, literary, and other purposes, and dedicated to Serapis.

The above are the sights proper—the sights obligatory. But not less interesting than they are the lighthouse, marking the place where stood the famous Pharos, whose name has become the word for lighthouse in many languages; the island of Pharos itself, long since united with the mainland, and the two great harbours—one of which the Eunostus, or port of Good Return, bids fair to become under the hands of English engineers one of first-rate importance, worthy to be the gate of the Egypt of the future.

With the Alexandria of to-day, which everyone abuses, we were

on the whole agreeably surprised. It would doubtless be a horrid place of residence, but the newness and strangeness of everything is pleasant to the eyes of the European traveller. We thought it in everything, except situation, far superior to Smyrna, the place with which it seemed natural to compare it.

Very charming to the eye was the variegated crowd in the streets—a crowd of all lands, all dresses, all colours, and all features. Very charming were the date-palms laden with fruit, the unfamiliar forms of the *Acacia lebbek*, of the true Sycomore, of the lilac-tasselled *Limodorum persicum*, of a tall Tamarisk, of the Bamboo, and many other trees, which were either not known to us at all, or known only in stunted specimens.

Very charming was it to taste the fresh sugar-cane for the first time, to see the brown tents of the Bedouin Arabs, and those more civilized, but hardly less strange, Dahabeeahs, which convey so many of our countrymen up the Nile.

We slept in Alexandria, and, starting betimes in the morning, passed in little more than four hours over the 131 miles which separated us from Cairo.

They were four memorable hours. First came Lake Mareotis, looking unhappily as unlike as possible to what Shelley had in his mind when he wrote the lines—

“ But her choice sport was, in the hours of sleep,
To glide adown old Nilus, when he threads
Egypt and Ethiopia, from the steep
Of utmost Axumé, until he spreads,
Like a calm flock of silver-fleeced sheep,
His waters on the plain ; and crested heads
Of cities and proud temples gleam amid,
And many a vapour-belted pyramid.

“ By Moeris and the Mareotid lakes,
Strewn with faint blooms like bridal chamber floors ;
Where naked boys bridling tame water-snakes,
Or charioteering ghastly alligators,
Had left on the sweet waters mighty wakes
Of those huge forms :—within the brazen doors
Of the great labyrinth slept both boy and beast,
Tired with the pomp of their Osirian feast.”

Looking, I say, as unlike that as possible, but still a great and historical expanse of water with new birds and new water-plants dear to the eye of a botanist.

Next came the surprise, which should not have been a surprise, of finding Egypt so intensely green in the month of October, when all other Mediterranean lands are parched and burnt up.

Then about sixty-five miles from our point of departure, we crossed

the Rosetta branch of the Nile, a stream, now that the river had been falling in for a fortnight, nearly as broad as the Rhine at Cologne.

At last, after a good many more miles had been traversed, came the Damietta branch—not quite so large,—and ere long one of our party called out, “I see them.”

Yes, there far away to the south-west, like ghosts of themselves, as known to us from pictures, were the Pyramids of Gizeh, with the Libyan Desert rising behind them. That was one of the great moments of life, like that in which one first caught sight of the Dome of St. Peter’s, or the Acropolis of Athens, or the Mosque of St. Sophia.

Very soon after this we arrived at the station of Cairo. I will not attempt a general description of Masr the Victorious, for that is what El Kahira is said to mean, since I am sure I should fail to convey to you in my own words an adequate image of its kaleidoscopic life. The best sketch I have seen is in a lecture delivered by M. Brugsch, somewhere in Germany, but not very accessible. The thing usually said about the old part of Cairo is, that it is exactly like the “Arabian Nights,” and the thing usually said happens, in this case, to be very true and apt.

The following passage, taken from an extremely trashy American book, seems to me, nevertheless, to reflect, with great faithfulness, the feeling of the place:—

“To our new eyes everything was picture. Vainly the hard road was crowded with Moslem artisans home-returning from their work. To the mere Moslem observer, they were carpenters, masons, labourers, and tradesmen of all kinds. We passed many a meditating Cairene, to whom there was nothing but the monotony of an old story in that evening and in that road. But we saw all the pageantry of Oriental romance quietly donkeying into Cairo.

“I saw Fadladeen with a gorgeous turban and a long sash. His chibouque, bound with coloured silk and gold threads, was borne behind him by a black slave. Fat and fuming was Fadladeen as of old; and though Fermouz was not by, it was clear to see in the languid droop of his eye that choice Arabian verses were sung by the twilight in his mind.

“Abou Hassan sat by the city gate, and I saw Haroun Alrashid quietly come up in that disguise of a Mosul merchant. I could not but wink at Abou, for I knew him so long ago in the ‘Arabian Nights.’ But he rather stared than saluted, as friends may in a masquerade. There was Sinbad the Porter, too, hurrying to Sinbad the Sailor. I turned and watched his form fade in the twilight, yet I doubt if he reached Bagdad in time for the Eighth History.

“Then came Sakkas, men with hogskins slung over their backs, full of water. I remembered the land and the time of putting wine into old bottles, and was shoyed back beyond glass. Pedlars—swarthy fatalists, in lovely lengths of robe and turban—cried their wares. To our Frank ears it was nothing but Babel jargon. Yet had erudite Mr. Lane accompanied

us—Mr. Lane, the Eastern Englishman, who has given us so many glimpses into the silence and mystery of Oriental life, like a good genius revealing to ardent lovers the very hallowed heart of the hareem—we should have understood those cries.

“We should have heard ‘Sycamore figs—O grapes!’ meaning that said figs were offered, and the sweetness of sound that ‘grapes’ hath was only bait for the attention; or ‘Odours of Paradise—O flowers of the henna!’ causing Moslem maidens to tingle to their very nails’ ends; or, indeed, these pedlar poets, vending water-melons, sang, ‘Consoler of the embarrassed, O pips!’ Were they not poets there, these pedlars, and full of Oriental extravagance? For the sweet association of poetic names shed silvery sheen over the actual article offered. The unwary philosopher might fancy that he was buying comfort in a green water-melon, and the pietist dream of mementos in heaven in the mere earthy vanity of henna. But the philanthropic merchant of sour limes cries, ‘God made them light—limes!’ Meaning not the fruit, nor the stomach of the purchaser, but his purse. Will they never have done with hieroglyphics and sphinxes, these Egyptians? Here a man rose-embowered chants, ‘The rose is a thorn, from the sweat of the Prophet it bloomed!’ Meaning, simply, fresh roses.

“These are masquerade manners, but they are pleasant. The maiden buys not henna only, but a thought of heaven; the poet not water-melons only, but a dream of consolation which truly will he need.”

Our first excursion was to Heliopolis, the On of the Old Testament. You will recollect that Joseph married Asenath, the daughter of the high-priest of that city, and the Armenians still consider as canonical an apocryphal book known as the “History of Joseph and Asenath.” Heliopolis was never, it would seem, very large, but it was a place of great importance—the Oxford or St. Andrew’s of Egypt. Nothing is more probable than that Moses and Plato both studied there. If Moses did study here, then the great obelisk of Osirtasen, which is now the first object the traveller seeks out, must have been quite familiar to him, for it was already older, in his day, than any building in Scotland is now.

It stood, when we visited it, in the midst of a great field of sugar cane, which I here saw growing for the first time, and which murmured round it in the breeze as charmingly as ever murmured the pines of Theocritus upon the hills of Sicily.

Dean Stanley, whose short sketches of Egyptian scenery at the beginning of “Sinai and Palestine,” are, like so much else of the same kind that he has written, the purest of pure gold, reminds us that this obelisk had once many companions in the City of the Sun, and that it was hence that those obelisks were taken to which so many memories are attached, which touch us more nearly than anything in Egypt—the obelisks of the Vatican, the Lateran, and of the Porta del Popolo.

Hard by Heliopolis, at the village of Matareeah, is the tree which

the traditions of Eastern Christianity connect with the Flight into Egypt. It is a Sycomore or Egyptian fig, of considerable though not of venerable age; but, of course, it may be the descendant, as is believed by the Copts, of an older tree which grew on the same spot. However that may be, it now shelters from the fierce Egyptian sun the most lovely jasmine, some of which we gathered "*in memoriam*."

Our drive to Heliopolis introduced me to various Egyptian plants, for which, I need hardly say, I kept a sharp look-out, although the season of the year was the reverse of propitious. One of the first I lit upon was the *Erigeron Canadense*—a pushing American tourist whom I have traced over half Europe, and who has actually had the assurance to establish himself at Heliopolis. Not less interesting in a different way was the *Cleome pentaphyllus*, which we afterwards saw in every field, a pretty climbing *Cynanchum*, the *Althæa cannabina*, a very handsome mallow, much used as a defence for the fields of cotton (*Gossypium vitifolium*), which was covered with its showy yellow flowers.

Here, too, I saw for the first time one of the commonest of Egyptian birds, a lovely white heron, *Ardetta rustica*, which travellers newly landed generally mistake for the Ibis.

Of course we went to the Pyramids, and a very delightful expedition it was; but do not be afraid, I am not going to describe the Pyramids, and that for two reasons. First, because you have all read descriptions of them; and secondly, because one of the uses of a sketchy lecture like this is to direct your attention to the best books on the subjects of which it treats. I would advise you, then, to read the very clear and vivid description of her excursion to the Pyramids, which is given by Miss Martineau in her "*Eastern Life*," and will only notice one or two particulars in which our visit differed from hers. In the first place, then, we were some months earlier in the season than she, so that we looked from the top of the Great Pyramid, with our back to the yellow desert, over an immense extent of flooded country, from the midst of which the villages rose like so many little red islands.

In the next place, two of us, Sir John Lubbock and myself, penetrated into the Second Pyramid, that of Cephrenes, which is comparatively rarely visited, although it is in no way more difficult to penetrate than the other.

In the third place, there are now absolutely no difficulties which need be taken into account by any man or woman of average health and strength, in going up, coming down, or entering the Great Pyramid. You drive to it from Cairo in an hour and a half, and the so-called Pyramid Arabs understand the business of helping you up

and down extremely well. I will not, I say, waste time in description, but you will expect me to say a word as to the purpose and history of the Pyramids, because much light has been thrown on these matters of late years.

There is then now no doubt whatever, amongst people entitled to express an opinion, that the Pyramids were simply tombs.

There was found some years ago in Phœnicia a sarcophagus, which is now in the Louvre. The beginning of an inscription on it has been translated as follows :—

“In the month of Bul, the fourteenth year of my reign, I, King Ashmanezzer, king of the Sidonians, son of King Tabnith, king of the Sidonians, spake King Ashmanezzer, king of the Sidonians, saying, ‘I have been stolen away before my time—a son of the flood of days. The whileom Great is dumb; the son of Gods is dead. And I rest in this grave, even in this tomb, in the place which I have built. My adjuration to all the Ruling Powers and all men: Let no one open this resting-place, nor search for treasure, for there is no treasure with Us; and let him not bear away the couch of My rest, and not trouble Us in this resting-place by disturbing the couch of My slumbers. . . . For all men who should open the tomb of My rest, or any man who should *carry away* the couch of my rest, or any one who trouble me on this couch: Unto them there shall be no rest with the departed; they shall not be buried in a grave, and there shall be to them neither son nor seed. . . . There shall be to them neither root below nor fruit above, nor honour among the living under the sun. . . .”

Well! the Great Pyramid was nothing more nor less than the place where Choofoo, or Cheops as the Greeks called him, meant to “lie in glory”—mightiest amongst the dead as he had been mightiest amongst the living. He did not trust, like the Phœnician king, to words marked on his sarcophagus to scare intruders. He trusted to the skill of the architect to prevent the secret of his resting-place ever being penetrated. Nor can it be denied that to a great extent he succeeded. True his tomb has now been rifled, but according to some authorities it remained inviolate for full five thousand years.

Cheops was a king of the fourth dynasty, about whom many fables were told to the Father of History. That is not surprising, when we recollect that the Father of History lived about 456 B.C., in the days of the 27th dynasty—very possibly 3,500 years and more after the death of Cheops.

No one can look, however, on this tremendous mass, which is about as high as Strassburg Cathedral, covers as much ground as Lincoln’s Inn Fields, and is estimated to contain eighty-five millions cubic feet of stone—all this, observe, after its whole outer casing has been taken away, which has much diminished its size, without feeling that he who raised for himself such a sepulchre must have been a Prince obeyed by enormous numbers of people.

Time, says an old writer—

“Sadly overcometh all things, and now sitteth on a Sphinx and gazeth on the ruins of Memphis and Old Thebes, gloriously triumphing and turning old glories into dreams. The traveller, as he passeth through these deserts, asketh—Who builded the Pyramids? and he murmurs something in reply, but what it is he heareth not.”

And truly the riddle is only half read when we say that Cheops raised the Great, Cephrenes the Second, and Mycerinus the Third and much smaller pyramid. Who, we ask, as yet quite vainly, were the engineers? Who were the labourers? Were they captives from afar, or were they native Egyptians? Time, as yet, has murmured nothing in reply even to the most attentive ears. Our children may learn something more about this mystery, for the science of Egyptology is still in its infancy.

If anything could add to the glory of these stately tombs, it would be the still older and still more mysterious monument which stands close to them. I allude of course to the Sphinx, the type of the countless Sphinxes that have been carved in so many places in ancient and modern days, but as much superior to anything of the same kind as Kinglake's immortal description of it is to all other descriptions.

“Laugh and mock if you will at the worship of stone idols, but mark ye this, ye breakers of images, that in one regard the stone idol bears awful semblance of Deity—unchangefulness in the midst of change—the same seeming will, and intent for ever and ever inexorable! Upon ancient dynasties of Ethiopian and Egyptian kings, upon Greek and Roman, upon Arab and Ottoman conquerors, upon Napoleon dreaming of an Eastern Empire, upon battle and pestilence, upon keen-eyed travellers—Herodotus yesterday, and Warburton to-day,—upon all and more this unworldly Sphinx has watched, and watched like a Providence, with the same earnest eyes and the same sad, tranquil mien. And we, we shall die, and Islam will wither away, and the Englishman, straining far over to hold his loved India, will plant a firm foot on the banks of the Nile and sit in the seats of the Faithful, and still that sleepless rock will lie watching and watching the works of the new busy race, with those same sad earnest eyes, and the same tranquil mien everlasting. You dare not mock at the Sphinx.”

Travellers and others have formed many various estimates of the character meant to be portrayed by the Sphinx. The Arabs called it the Father of Fear.

To me it seemed to be, now at least, a good and gracious creature, fit representative of that old Egyptian life of the fourth dynasty, long, long anterior to the life represented in the tombs of Thebes with its complicated and tremendous theology.

What then was the Sphinx, and when was it cut out of the mighty rock on the edge of the desert? Alas! we know not. Probably it

was an object of worship, or the symbol of an object of worship—for the stern, stately, unadorned temple, known as that of Cephrenes close by, would appear to have been dedicated to it. Its Egyptian name was Hou, but the meaning of that word is still a mystery. As to the date of its creation we are no better informed, but we do know that Cheops repaired it, so that it is older than the Great Pyramid.

The voyage up the Nile is usually made in one of two ways—by steamers which start at fixed times, and remain a fixed time at each interesting place, or by sailing barges with huge latteen sails, which travellers hire for themselves. The inconvenience of the first method is the restraint and the being thrown with persons whom you have not yourself selected. The inconvenience of the second method is the loss of time, and the constant repetition of small worries, of which the works of travellers who have described the great river are full to weariness.

Happily for us we were dependent on neither the one nor the other method, of which the second would have been hopelessly out of the question for busy men. Thanks to the kindness of the Viceroy and of Nubar Pacha, we made the journey in a steamer belonging to His Highness, in the character of his guests, and accompanied by a member of his suite. I need not say that under these circumstances, we saw everything to the best advantage, stopping where we liked, when we liked, and as long as we liked, nor that all the troubles of a Nile voyage being removed, we were able to give ourselves entirely up to the study of what we went to see.

We embarked on the afternoon of November 1st, and were well on our way when the sun broke through the mists on the morning of All Souls.

Our start was, in one respect, an unfortunate one, for we had hardly left Cairo when Mr. Greg was attacked by an illness which, although it did not deprive us of the charms of his conversation, deprived him, I am afraid, of much of the pleasure of the journey.

We ran this first day some 70 miles, through a country which offered little to interest in the immediate neighbourhood of the river. Far away to the West rose the Pyramids of Sakkarah, Abouseir, and Dashour, and the strange structure known to the natives as the False Pyramid. Sometimes the desert came down close to the Eastern bank, sometimes it receded, leaving a considerable expanse, while in other places again there was only a haugh, like those along the Deveron or the Spey.*

Here and there we passed mud villages, or met huge boats so

* This paper was written for and read to audiences living near these two rivers.

deeply laden that their sides had to be built up of clay, like "feal dykes," or rafts piled with earthenware pitchers, slowly floating down-stream, or strange-looking craft with mighty piles of chopped straw, as picturesque in their way as the hay-barges of the Thames. Once a man was perceived swimming the mighty flood by the help of a bundle of reeds as a float. Once we ran aground, an operation which soon becomes a familiar one as we go up the Nile. Often we saw shadoofs, the inartistic contrivance by which the people ladle the water out of the river into the runnels which irrigate their fields. Many were the groves of palms, many the water-birds, but for the most part the hours went by in quiet reading and conversation, till the sun robing himself in gold went down below the Libyan hills, leaving the loamy Western bank intensely black, and the orange lines along the limestone cliffs on the East white and ghostly.

And now, as we run up the Nile, let us, seeing that there is not very much to observe in these first days, have a little talk about the ancient history of Egypt.

But first let me premise that much that I shall tell you in the next quarter of an hour is uncertain. You may rely upon what I am going to say being pretty well in accordance with the views of those best entitled to express an opinion on such matters, but they would be the first to admit the imperfection of their own knowledge, and to say that any day a papyrus may be discovered which may at once revolutionize the whole science of Egyptology.

Till, however, such a papyrus is discovered, you may accept these as probable opinions.

The oldest historical King of Egypt was Menes, and its ancient history extends from his reign to the decree of the Emperor Theodosius, which 381 years after our era abolished the ancient religion of the land and introduced Christianity.

You ask me, perhaps, when Menes lived. I reply that I do not know, but you may judge that it was pretty long ago, when I tell you that Menes was the first King of the first dynasty, and that Joseph was Prime Minister to the last King of the seventeenth dynasty.

From Menes to Theodosius thirty-four dynasties ruled in the valley of the Nile.

The first ten of these are known as the dynasties of the Old Empire.

The next seven are known as the dynasties of the Middle Empire.

The next fourteen are known as the dynasties of the New Empire.

The last three are known as those of the Lower Empire or Lower

periods—these last extending from Alexander the Great 332 years before Christ, to Theodosius, whose date I have already given you, 381 years after Christ.

The first three dynasties have left but few monuments so far as we at present know, but of course new excavations may require this statement to be altered. They reigned, according to Manetho, who has been much rehabilitated by modern research, for 769 years, but whether they did, or did not, it is at present impossible to say.

The fourth dynasty built the Pyramids of Gizeh, and in its time Egypt was unquestionably a very civilized, and, in many respects, a happy country, and that at a period when not only our part of Europe, but even Greece, the mother of our antiquity, was absolutely barbarous.

We have very little information about the fifth dynasty, but we know that under the sixth Egypt warred successfully in Nubia, and carried on mining operations in the Peninsula of Sinai.

After the sixth dynasty, a dark veil falls over the history of the Nile valley to the end of the eleventh dynasty, with which the Old Empire, or first period of Egyptian history, came to an end. It is believed that during this interval the prosperity of the country received a check, but whether in consequence of foreign invasion, or some other calamity, is, as yet, quite uncertain.

The day dawns for us again with the eleventh dynasty, whose seat was at Thebes, and not in any of the old royal cities of Egypt—Memphis, or Thinis, or far southern Elephantine. That dynasty has left us some remains, whose comparative rudeness lends confirmation to the idea that the end of the Old Empire had been gloomy and disastrous. Egypt under the eleventh dynasty seems to have been no further advanced than under the third. We have seen similar phenomena in Scotland,—thanks to the long English Wars.

With the twelfth dynasty we reach another period of great splendour and high civilization. Egypt is once more in possession not only of the whole country from the First Cataract to the Sea, but holds the Peninsula of Sinai, and fights successfully with its neighbours the Cushites, in the very regions which Sir Samuel Baker has lately traversed, and which are just going to be placed under the rule of Colonel Gordon, the distinguished leader of the famous force which was known to the Chinese as the Ever-Victorious Army.

Under this dynasty was raised the obelisk of Heliopolis, about which I have already spoken, and, according to some, the great reservoir of Lake Moeris was dug out, but M. Mariette is now inclined to consider it much older.

Of the thirteenth dynasty and its doings we have few details, but there is no doubt that under it Egypt was prosperous, and it is

believed that the same may be said of the fourteenth, but after it came a new and terrible change.

Pushed forward by some force, the nature of which is unknown to us, a race of people coming from the North-East invaded Egypt. Who were these people? Kalmucks, I think, says one of the greatest living authorities. Semites, I am pretty sure, says another. So much is certain, that they were a pastoral race, and that their Kings were the so-called Shepherds. The invaders settled in Lower Egypt in the region near the Suez Canal, and remained in the land a considerable time. How long? Well! one great living authority tells us 511 years, and another great living authority tells us—not nearly so long—less probably than 100 years.

Be this as it may, it seems pretty well agreed that Joseph was Prime Minister of one of these Kings or Pharaohs, most likely of Apophis, who was the last of the seventeenth dynasty, which reigned in the Delta, while a contemporary native-born Egyptian dynasty reigned at Thebes.

At length, however, the old native-born Egyptians grew strong enough under their Theban Kings or Pharaohs, to drive out these intrusive Pharaohs, which they of course proceeded to, a fact which is alluded to in the Bible, where we are told that a new King arose who knew not Joseph. So far from knowing Joseph, he hated Joseph and everything connected with him, and oppressed in every possible way Joseph's countrymen. This oppression reached its height during the long reign of Rameses II., or the Great, who reigned sixty-six years, and under whom the two cities of Pithom and Rameses, mentioned in Exodus, were built, largely by Hebrew labour, as appears quite clearly from Egyptian records, as well as from those which are so familiar to us.

Rameses was a very powerful prince, and succeeded in keeping down the foreign population in Lower Egypt, partly by his own strength, partly by virtue of a treaty concluded with the King of the Hittites; but his successor Menepthah was not so powerful, and under him took place that Exodus, which has exercised such an immense influence both on religion and history.

I do not think that it is at all generally known, that there is still on the borders of Lake Menzaleh, close to the Suez Canal, a population which there is every reason to suppose, is descended from the invaders, whose kings were the so-called Shepherds, and with whom the Hebrews were connected in some way that has not yet been traced out. These people, if not now, at least very recently, refused to pay certain taxes on the ground that they were not Egyptians.

But to return to the sequence of my narrative. With the last of the seventeenth dynasty, the Pharaoh to whom Joseph was Prime

Minister—a Pharaoh probably not of Egyptian, but of Semitic birth, the Middle Empire came to an end.

The eighteenth dynasty was far the most brilliant in the whole of Egyptian annals. Its first king was Amosis, who, driving out the Shepherd invaders, inaugurated a period of splendour.

Strange to say, a number of jewels which he had made to adorn the mummy of his mother,—jewels which were old long before Moses was born, are still preserved, and would do credit to Castellani, if they had been made by him yesterday.

I shall have something to say of the other kings of this dynasty when I come to speak of Thebes, but all I would ask you to remember for the moment, is that several of them carried their arms not only far to the South, but also far into Asia, and that it was out of some confused recollections of these victories and those of Rameses II. under the nineteenth dynasty, that the Greeks made up the idea of Sesostris, the great—but quite fabulous—Egyptian conqueror.

The nineteenth dynasty is made famous by the victories of Rameses I. in Asia, but already under his successor Sethi I., Egypt appears to have begun to lose some of her outlying possessions acquired by the eighteenth dynasty. His successor Rameses II. was a great conqueror, as I have already mentioned, but it may be doubted whether some of his conquests were not over rebels, and he was obliged to conclude a treaty with the Hittites, instead of forcing them to do his bidding by arms.

The twentieth dynasty had one great monarch, Rameses III., but on the whole it was not prosperous, and before it ended Egypt had not only lost all its foreign possessions, but saw the supreme power transferred from the Kings to the High-priests.

These High-priests continued to reign at Thebes while the twenty-first legitimate dynasty held sway at Tanis, or San, in the Delta, the Zoan of the Bible.

The first Sovereign of the twenty-second dynasty, was the Shishak of the Old Testament, who took Jerusalem in the days of Rehoboam, and his date, 970 B.C., is the first in Egyptian history which is absolutely certain. Others we know only approximately.

About this dynasty we have little other information, but there seems no doubt that they were not natives but foreigners.

The period of the twenty-third dynasty was one of disaster and confusion. The short-lived twenty-fourth was not more fortunate, and the twenty-fifth, an Ethiopian one, was hardly more glorious, at least for Egypt.

It fared better with the twenty-sixth, of Libyan origin. Its kings built those porticoes at Sais which Herodotus so much admired, but of which no trace remains, and Necho, one of them, was the

first to send an expedition from the Red Sea round the Cape of Good Hope.

The twenty-sixth dynasty closed in calamity, for it was now the turn of the Persians, who had been subjugated by Egypt in the days of the eighteenth dynasty, to take their revenge, and this they did under the leadership of Cambyses, as Herodotus has told us in great detail; and for 121 years, that is during all the period of the twenty-seventh dynasty, Egypt was a Persian province. Then it revolted, and for sixty-seven years under the twenty-eighth, twenty-ninth, and thirtieth dynasties it combated the Persians with considerable success, till at length the fortune of war declared for them again.

Nectanebo II., the last of the thirtieth dynasty, and of the Pharaohs, was driven away beyond the First Cataract, and Egypt becoming part of the Empire of Darius, soon passed into the hands of the conqueror of Darius,—Alexander the Great, with whose advent the New Empire came to a close.

Egypt now became a Greek Kingdom, falling as it did to Ptolemy, one of Alexander's Generals, when his great Empire went to pieces, and the dynasty of the Ptolemies lasted for 275 years, till one of them left his kingdom in B.C. 30 to the Romans, and from that time till it was subdued by the Arabs, A.D. 640, Egypt remained a province owing allegiance first to Rome and then to Constantinople.

It was about half-way through this period, A.D. 381, that the Edict of the Emperor Theodosius, put an end to the old Egyptian religion, of which both the Ptolemies and the Romans up to that date, had been more than tolerant, and established Christianity.

But we must now return to the river. The chief interest of our second day consisted in a sunrise and sunset of almost equal beauty, and in the contemplation of a long line of cliffs falling sheer into the water on the Eastern bank, which is known as the Gebel et Tayr, or the Mountain of the Bird, and which reminded me at a distance of Dover cliffs, as they did when closer of the outside of Leucadia, near the rock known as Sappho's Leap.

On the top of these cliffs is a Coptic Monastery, the monks of which—equally skilled in swimming and begging—plunge into the river, and come out to collect alms from passing vessels, accoutred in a garb even more simple than that coat of sky-blue paint which satisfied our ancestors. The rapid progress of our steamer saved us from being boarded by these degenerate children of the great Athanasius.

Our third day was made memorable by a visit to the Caves of Beni Hassan, which are decorated with wall-paintings of the twelfth dynasty, the second that is, you will remember, of those of the Middle Empire, and the same which raised the obelisk still standing at

Heliopolis. These caves have yielded to Egyptologists a very rich harvest, for they are full of representations of the daily life of the people at that remote period,—say, speaking roughly, 2800 years before Christ.

It seems to me, and I know that others share my impression—M. Renan, for example—that that life must have been curiously like the life of China. I was again and again reminded, when in Egypt, of the following very striking passage, which I quote from a book on China, called the “The Ever-Victorious Army:”—

“The (miscalled) Celestial is a narrow-minded, but exceedingly practical sort of being. He wants an ordered world, but one ordered only in a certain kind of way. Before his rapt Celestial vision lie the fruitful plains of the Great Flowery Land, lively and bright with the normal life of China, guarded on the north by snowy deserts which are happily far away from him, and on the south by stormy seas with great winds and waves which he does not tempt. His ideal is a happy family life, with age benignant, youth reverential, three or four generations living contentedly under the same roof; the fish-pond in front well stocked; grain abundant; tea fragrant; the village harmonized; the school well taught; the young Confucius of the family preparing for competitive examinations; the ancestral tablets going far back and recording honoured names, the ancestral hall well gilded, and a fit meeting-place for the wise elders; the spirits of deceased ancestors comforted with offerings and loving remembrances, not left to wander friendless in the air; the holidays cheerful, with bright silks and abundance of savoury dishes; the emperor benevolent; the people obedient; foreign devils far away or reverential; evil appearing only in the form of impossible demons, and hideous wicked emperors, painted on the walls of his house as a warning to foolish youth; no change in old customs to perplex the mind; the sacred books reverentially read and remembered; the present definitely arranged; the fruitage of the past stored; behind, sages and emperors; around, happy families; beyond, a darkness with which he little concerns himself, but into which his spirit may occasionally float a short way on some Buddhist or Taoist idea.”

But to return to the Beni Hassan pictures. It is in them one finds the first mention of those tribes from the North East, who at a considerably later period swarmed over the Egyptian border, and subjugated many fair provinces to their sway.

In these caves, too, the traveller sees to his surprise the Doric column, which was afterwards to be the glory of the most beautiful of buildings, the crowning marvel of the age of Pericles—the Parthenon of Athens—make its first appearance in the world.

Exquisite was the view from them over the narrow ribbon of green which makes the whole land of Egypt divided into two very unequal parts by its noble river, and with the yellow Libyan wall abruptly ending it, to the West.

After we had contemplated it for some time, Sir John Lubbock and I climbed the rocks above the caves, and stood on the edge of

the Eastern Desert, which stretches from the Nile to the Red Sea, as the one beyond the Libyan range does to the Atlantic. It was a scene of absolute desolation. Not a blade of grass, not a moss, not a lichen. The whole surface was made up of numbers numberless of a species of fossil known as the Nummulite, from its resemblance to a piece of money—the same which Strabo, finding at the Pyramids, took to be the petrifications of beans, which had been served out as rations to their builders.

Here, then, was a witness to an antiquity, which, although not great geologically speaking, was enormously greater, not only than the hoar antiquity of Egypt, but even than that pre-historic antiquity of which we had climbed the hill to look for some stray indications in flint flakes or the like.

The next few days had all their special interests, and some of them their small misfortunes, especially when we lay for twenty hours under a bank, because the engine had got out of order. Swimming in the Nile, in defiance of the crocodile, which is in this part of the river—though it was south of the line which marks on the map the northern limit of that agreeable reptile,—an excessively rare animal. A visit to an Egyptian village, which was really a hardly more artificial construction than the dam of the beaver; a little walk in the morning to look out for plants in the great fields of Sorghum, a noble cereal which grows some ten feet high, and another at night to see the minarets of Girgeh standing up against the afterglow, helped to wile away this enforced delay.

Other days had other interests—a visit to the key of the irrigation works of Egypt, where the people were working in parties, led generally by a girl who chanted a ditty, all the rest joining. The words were Arabic, but in other respects the scene might have been laid in the days of the Pharaohs. Then came the first Dôm palm, a branching species far less elegant than the date, but welcome as a wholly new vegetable form. Great flocks of pelicans, like a parliament of crows, the first indigo crop, all day long the soft movements of the shadoof, and right and left the Eastern and Western range, the old limits of the bed of the Nile, which has made in countless ages all this wonderful Egypt, were some of the principal impressions which I carried away.

But we must hurry on, for we are now at Kench, close to one of the most famous spots on the Nile.

The Temple of Denderah should not have been, but was, the first Egyptian temple which we saw—should not have been, I say, because it is comparatively quite modern—was being built, in fact, during the life of Christ, and was not quite finished till the days of Nero. It stands, therefore, in somewhat the same relation to the old temples

of the land, that one of Scott's churches does to a church which was built before the Reformation.

Imagine a huge brick wall standing up under a reach of the Libyan range, which is here much broken, and with little of its usual rimlike character. Surrounded by this brick wall, which entirely hid all within it from the view of the outer world, was the Sacred enclosure, and within the Sacred enclosure the Temple itself.

That temple was no edifice for public worship like our cathedrals. Huge though it was, it was simply the oratory dedicated by a king, in this case by one of the Ptolemies, to a particular divinity—in this case to Athor, considered as the Goddess of Beauty, Goodness, and Truth.

It was divided into four parts, the first a mighty portico, with columns three deep and about sixty feet high; the second, the temple proper, where the priests carried on all the arrangements preliminary to their worship; the third, the Holy of Holies, with its adjuncts; and the fourth, a chapel upstairs, opening on a terrace, where certain deities were specially adored.

Almost every square inch of its vast wall space was carved with figures, and written over with inscriptions in the sacred, or hieroglyphic characters, setting forth to the eye of the priests, and recording for all time, the theology of those who raised it.

No foot except that of the king and the priests ever trod its floors. It is doubtful even whether a few initiated persons were allowed to watch from the sacred enclosure the long processions, of which the worship largely consisted, as they wound about upon the terrace to which I have alluded.

Such was the Temple of Denderah in the days of its glory. Now, however, the great brick wall of the sacred enclosure has utterly disappeared, and the feet of the profane may tread and search out every corner of the vast edifice. Nor is this all, for over every accessible part of it, the carvings and the inscriptions have been systematically destroyed by superstitious savages, who defiled the names of Christianity or Islam.

Nevertheless, the patient research of Egyptologists has made all clear. We entered, and, thanks to M. Mariette, whose *Itinéraire* we had with us, knew that the gigantic columns which rose on our right were covered with representations of the king, being acknowledged as King of Lower, while those on the left represented him as being acknowledged as King of Upper Egypt, introduced, too, in this character to the Goddess of Beauty, Goodness, and Truth.

We entered the temple proper, and, thanks to the same guidance, knew at once where the sacred vestments were kept, and where the four sacred boats reposed, where the perfumes and oils were com-

pounded, and where the treasures were piled up. Nay, after going the round of the side chapels, and knowing so well for what each was intended, that we could, if so minded, have said the appropriate prayer in each, we reached the very Holy of Holies, and saw the niche in which the sacred secret of the whole building reposed. Now what was that sacred secret? It was a golden sistrum or timbrel, and its meaning, according to M. Mariette, was that all things were and should ever be in motion and agitation, should never rest, but continually energize. What is this but a reading 2,000 years old of the maxims of one of our latest teachers:—

“The service of philosophy and of culture to the human spirit, is to startle it into a sharp and eager observation. Every moment some form grows perfect in hand or face; some tone on the hills or sea is choicer than the rest; some mood of passion, or insight, or intellectual excitement is irresistibly real and attractive for us—for that moment only. Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself is the end. A counted number of pulses only is given to us of a variegated, dramatic life. How may we see in them all that is to be seen in them by the finest senses? How can we pass most swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the focus where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their purest energy?

“To burn always with this hard, gem-like flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life. Failure is to form habits; for habit is relative to a stereotyped world; meantime it is only the roughness of the eye that makes any two persons, things, situations, seem alike. While all melts under our feet, we may well catch at any exquisite passion, or any contribution to knowledge that seems, by a lifted horizon, to set the spirit free for a moment, or any stirring of the senses, strange dyes, strange flowers, and curious odours, or work of the artist's hands, or the face of one's friend. Not to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those about us, and in the brilliance of their gifts some tragic dividing of forces on their ways is, on this short day of frost and sun, to sleep before evening.”*

But we must return to the Temple. We penetrated then, as I have said, into all its recesses, and did not neglect to climb the staircase, and picture to ourselves the procession of priests moving along the terrace, and stopping to pray at the Shrine of Osiris, the representative of incarnate goodness, and of Isis, the representative, perhaps, in the late and much altered form of Egyptian belief, of the everlasting search of the creature after incarnate goodness.

Nor did we fail to have some kindly thoughts about those old Egyptians as we rode slowly back to the river, with the fresh breeze, from the still submerged fields, blowing on our faces.

Denderah seen, we steamed on, and before the sun had gone down we were running up to the quay of Luxor, the eastern side of Thebes,

* *Studies in the History of the Renaissance*, by W. H. Fater.

for that city sat crowned on either side of the Nile like London, and Petersburg, and so many of our modern capitals.

I soon landed, glanced at the much-ruined temple, built by Rameses II., but not otherwise very notable; and, later in the evening, after the moon was up, we made an expedition to Karnak.

Imagine forty acres of ruin, huge columns from forty to seventy feet high standing one hundred and thirty or so together, enormous masses of walls like the wall of Edinburgh Castle, avenues of half-destroyed sphinxes, tall obelisks standing, tall obelisks thrown down, great piles of masonry so undermined that you would tremble to pass them, if you did not know that they have stood as they are from time immemorial—a revel and prodigality of ruin such as you see nowhere else on the earth's surface, not even in Rome, and you will have some faint idea of Karnak, the fallen glory of the Theban kings of the eighteenth and nineteenth dynasties.

Moonlight is not a friend to minute examination, and I put off a further survey of Karnak to daylight, but when daylight came, it so happened that I was far too unwell to return thither, and for some days was unable to do anything except just to drag myself, as we steamed up the river, to the only partially uncovered temple of Esneh, whose pretty capitals show the influence of Greek art, and redeem much poor work.

At length we left the limestone behind, exchanging it for low hills of sandstone, which sandstone itself presently was left for granite. A bold island stood up in the midst of the river, and there were high rocks in its bed; while on the left a quay, planted with tall date palms, looked across to them over the water, and, lo! we were at Assouan, "the opening," the ancient Syene, the furthest extremity of Egypt.

Our first excursion was to Elephantine, the large island which lies opposite to Assouan, an interesting place, partly for its Nilometer, and partly because one here, for the first time, comes on a very large Nubian element in the population.

Another was to Assouan itself, which is curious to a northern eye, crowded as it is with people from the Upper Nile, brought hither by the trade in ivory, ostrich feathers, and other Central African produce. Of all these, the Bisharis are the strangest in their appearance, and might, as far as appearance goes, pass for pure savages.

I carry away from this frontier city of Egypt and Ethiopia three other well-defined recollections.

1st. The melancholy music of the Sakias, or water-wheels, worked by oxen, which, from a point some way below this, and all through Nubia, almost supersede the Shadoof.

2ndly. The thick grove of lebbek trees, close to which our vessel

lay, and under which congregated the chief business men of the place in robes of many hues.

3rdly. The high shrill voices of the Muezzins answering each other at eventide from Assouan to Elephantine, from Elephantine to Assouan.

Another excursion was to Philæ, the Iona of the later Egyptian religion—of the later, I say, for its importance only dates from the last indigenous Pharaoh, Nectanebo II., who lost, as I told you, his throne to the Darius, who lost his in turn to Alexander. The Ptolemies expended large sums in adorning this sanctuary, and it is still covered with their ruined constructions. Philæ is a beautiful spot, whether one catches sight of it amidst the currents which break the surface of the river to the north, or sees it from the reach to the southward, or gazes across it to the narrow strips of green only a few yards wide, which form here, and indeed in many parts of the country the whole of cultivable Nubia, or yet again looks along its colonnades at the island weird and waste, as one fancies the moon, covered all over with masses of granite, one would call boulders in the North, and which, representing as it does the *ne plus ultra* of desolation, was very properly named by the Greeks Abaton, or the untrodden.

Philæ is beautiful now, but I foresee that it will one day be much more beautiful. I feel confident that it is destined to be the Isola Bella of Egypt, for a very moderate expenditure in hydraulic machinery and in superintendence, would turn it into the most delicious of botanical gardens, on which you might have a specimen of every interesting plant that grows, from the Mediterranean seaboard to the source of the Nile.

This idea of turning Philæ into a Botanical Garden, leads me to say one word about the botany of Egypt.

The Flora of that country consists of about one thousand phanerogamous plants and ferns, including the chief non-indigenous plants of ancient cultivation. Our own British Flora consists, according to one of the most authoritative computations, of one thousand four hundred and twenty-five phanerogamous plants and ferns.

The thousand Egyptian plants are divided into three groups. Of these something more than a third belong to the Mediterranean region, a third to the Nile valley, and something less than a third to the desert.

The best months for botanizing are January and February—especially the latter, but there was something to be done, though very little, even in November, and by carefully utilising every walk and every excursion to look out for plants, I contrived to find a good many, amongst the most interesting of which were :—

Acacia Nilotica, the Sont, or Gum-arabic tree ; *Lawsonia inermis*, which gives the henna, much used by the Egyptian women to dye their nails ; *Cassia senna*, the Alexandrian senna of commerce ; *Cucumis colocynthus*, the colocynth of medicine ; *Zizyphus spina Christi*, which tradition connects with the Crown of Thorns ; *Indigofera argentea*, which produces the well-known dye ; *Sesamum Orientale*, which recalls the history of the Forty Thieves ; *Asclepias procera*, said to be used higher up the Nile for poisoning arrows ; *Parkinsonia digitata*, believed to have been brought from India by the troops of Alexandria the Great ; *Ricinus communis*, the castor-oil plant ; *Hibiscus esculentus*, an excellent vegetable, with a beautiful yellow flower, much grown in the fields ; *Panicetum typhoides*, a tropical cereal, which I found for the first and last time, just on the Nubian frontier ; *Cordia myxa*, which, under the name of Persea, figures in a novel, deciphered by M. Brugsch from a papyrus, almost, or altogether, the oldest composition of its kind known in the world.

It is a curious fact that some of the plants most closely connected with Egypt in the popular mind, have almost or altogether disappeared. The *Papyrus* has, it is believed, utterly vanished, the last known specimen, which is in the possession of an excellent German botanist at Cairo, Dr. Pfund, having been gathered by Sieber in 1813. The sacred *Lotus*, the large white scentless water-lily,—which is often carried in the hands of the gods, has become extremely rare—I could hear of only one station for it. The *Nymphaea lotus*, white, with the least shade of rose, and considered by Dr. Pfund exactly the same as the *Nymphaea thermalis*, which grows in the warm springs of Mehadia, in South-Eastern Hungary, and which in the time of Herodotus was much used for food, is not quite so rare, but still very far from common. The water-lily, which one sees everywhere in the Delta, is the *Nymphaea cœrulea*.

A fourth excursion was to the wild and remote island of Sehayl, to look from its summit over the tortuous rapids which are known as the First Cataract, and to think of old Herodotus, who with his devouring love of truth, so strangely mingled with weakness and credulity, came hither to see whether the Nile really did issue from an abyss near Syene between the hills of Krophî and Mophî, as he was told in Sais.

Our rowers, fine, powerful, merry fellows—Nubians to a man—made their labour lighter by a hideous chant : the camel that carried the Prophet—the camel the Prophet rode on—the camel that carried the Prophet, and so on over and over, again and again, but hushed their Babel to allow one of our party, as we floated down in the after-glow, to add the waters of the First Cataract to the long list of lakes and

lay, and under which congress
place in robes of many hue.

3rdly. The high shrill
other at eventide from A
Assouan.

Another excursion
religion—of the late
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Assouan, and steaming rapidly
look at the ruins of Kom Ombos,
bank, which recalled to my mind
and is, as has been remarked, one of
the Nile which gains anything from its
and on a mound the temple is placed, a
the flat alluvial valley of the Nile, as a hoopoe
one of the commonest Egyptian birds,—is in
the narrow gorge of the Nile, near
the vast quarries of sandstone at Silsileh, out of which the Egyptians
passed some of the grottoes in the narrow gorge of the Nile, near
their best building material. It is curious to see how completely
the sandstone in these buildings has outlasted both the limestone
and the granite. The former has been used up for lime, and the
granite, which was brought from Assouan, and was employed so largely
far off in Lower Egypt under the impression that it was indestruc-
tible, has decomposed under the influence of moisture, and of the
salts in the soil.

We did not linger long at Silsileh, but ran on to a point near
Edfou, on the Western bank, where we made our vessel snug for the
night, taking, before it was dark, a rather instructive walk in the
fields, where we came upon several peasant families preparing their
evening meal. These people, who, be it observed, are not labourers,
but small landowners, have no houses, but tiny shelters a few yards
round—in one part of which you find a little pen with five or six
sheep—in another an oven, in another a few cooking utensils, while
they sleep on the open ground, or protected at the utmost by a few
stalks of the Sorghum, the large cane-like grain of which I lately
spoke.

Their food consists of lentils, and certain other vegetables, along
with brown bread of the most admirable quality, and their drink is
the water of the Nile; to which by the necessity of the case they
are always near, for remember that in Egypt, where the Nile or the
canals supplied by it are not, life instantly ceases and you are in the
presence of the desert, and of Death.

Next morning we visited the noble temple of Edfou, another work
of the Ptolemies, whom one learns to respect when one sees how
much these Greeks did in the land of their adoption.

Edfou is a grander and better preserved Denderah, which has only

cleared out by M. Mariette, and displayed in all its noble

as.

the great Deity was Horus, the son of Isis and Osiris, who venerated under the semblance of a hawk, the Holy of Holies—eng an enormous monolith of granite of many tons weight, which would appear to have been his dwelling-place, surely the strangest birdcage which it ever entered into the mind of man to invent.

I daresay you have often read notices of the old Egyptian religion—some of them written by people who thought they knew all about it. Distrust them. It appears to me that up to this time the wisest Egyptologists have got to know very little about the old Egyptian religion even at any one period, and it is clear that that religion altered a great deal even in historic times.

My impression is that the basis of the religion was Pantheism, but if you go on to ask me what was the relation of the different Gods to the sum of things or Supreme God, or what were the ideas which were entertained either by the educated or uneducated at any one period about a future state—though in some kind of future state they clearly believed—I shall be obliged to confess to the most complete bewilderment.

Evidently Egypt exercised the greatest possible influence on minds of a religious cast in the old world. One sees this, for example, in any page in which Herodotus alludes to it—a fact of which a modern poet has made good use. Few truer things have been said about one side of the character of the great Halicarnassian than are contained in the following lines:—

He was a mild old man, and cherished much
The weight dark Egypt on his spirit laid ;
And with a sinuous eloquence would touch
For ever at that haven of the dead.
Single romantic words by him were thrown,
As types, on men and places, with a power
Like that of shifting sunlight after shower
Kindling the cones of hills, and journeying on.
He feared the gods and heroes, and spake low,
That echo might not hear in her light room.

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streams and seas in three quarters of the globe, which she had connected in the memory of her companions with the Lorelei of Heinrich Heine.

At length we left behind pretty Assouan, and steaming rapidly down stream stopped for an hour to look at the ruins of Kom Ombos, a Ptolemaic Temple on the Eastern bank, which recalled to my mind one of the Satires of Juvenal, and is, as has been remarked, one of the very few ruins on the Nile which gains anything from its situation.

Kom means a mound, and on a mound the temple is placed, a thing about as rare in the flat alluvial valley of the Nile, as a hoopoe—which, by the way, is one of the commonest Egyptian birds,—is in England.

From Ombos we proceeded to the northward, examining as we passed some of the grottoes in the narrow gorge of the Nile, near the vast quarries of sandstone at Silsileh, out of which the Egyptians got their best building material. It is curious to see how completely the sandstone in these buildings has outlasted both the limestone and the granite. The former has been used up for lime, and the granite, which was brought from Assouan, and was employed so largely far off in Lower Egypt under the impression that it was indestructible, has decomposed under the influence of moisture, and of the salts in the soil.

We did not linger long at Silsileh, but ran on to a point near Edfou, on the Western bank, where we made our vessel snug for the night, taking, before it was dark, a rather instructive walk in the fields, where we came upon several peasant families preparing their evening meal. These people, who, be it observed, are not labourers, but small landowners, have no houses, but tiny shelters a few yards round—in one part of which you find a little pen with five or six sheep—in another an oven, in another a few cooking utensils, while they sleep on the open ground, or protected at the utmost by a few stalks of the Sorghum, the large cane-like grain of which I lately spoke.

Their food consists of lentils, and certain other vegetables, along with brown bread of the most admirable quality, and their drink is the water of the Nile; to which by the necessity of the case they are always near, for remember that in Egypt, where the Nile or the canals supplied by it are not, life instantly ceases and you are in the presence of the desert, and of Death.

Next morning we visited the noble temple of Edfou, another work of the Ptolemies, whom one learns to respect when one sees how much these Greeks did in the land of their adoption.

Edfou is a grander and better preserved Denderah, which has only

lately been cleared out by M. Mariette, and displayed in all its noble proportions.

Here the great Deity was Horus, the son of Isis and Osiris, who was venerated under the semblance of a hawk, the Holy of Holies being an enormous monolith of granite of many tons weight, which would appear to have been his dwelling-place, surely the strangest birdcage which it ever entered into the mind of man to invent.

I daresay you have often read notices of the old Egyptian religion—some of them written by people who thought they knew all about it. Distrust them. It appears to me that up to this time the wisest Egyptologists have got to know very little about the old Egyptian religion even at any one period, and it is clear that that religion altered a great deal even in historic times.

My impression is that the basis of the religion was Pantheism, but if you go on to ask me what was the relation of the different Gods to the sum of things or Supreme God, or what were the ideas which were entertained either by the educated or uneducated at any one period about a future state—though in some kind of future state they clearly believed—I shall be obliged to confess to the most complete bewilderment.

Evidently Egypt exercised the greatest possible influence on minds of a religious cast in the old world. One sees this, for example, in any page in which Herodotus alludes to it—a fact of which a modern poet has made good use. Few truer things have been said about one side of the character of the great Halicarnassian than are contained in the following lines :—

He was a mild old man, and cherished much
The weight dark Egypt on his spirit laid ;
And with a sinuous eloquence would touch
For ever at that haven of the dead.
Single romantic words by him were thrown,
As types, on men and places, with a power
Like that of shifting sunlight after shower
Kindling the cones of hills, and journeying on.
He feared the gods and heroes, and spake low,
That echo might not hear in her light room.

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one of the most valuable documents in Egyptian history. I saw the obelisk of the great Queen, or rather Regent, Hatasou, who is among the most striking figures in the story of the valley of the Nile, and a building attributed to Thothmes III. whom I incline to think the greatest of its rulers. I re-saw all the mighty columns and mightier portals which I had seen before, but, when all was done, I cannot say that I carried away a very agreeable impression of Karnak. Even in its glory there must have been something vulgar about it, too many walls, too many pillars, too much of everything. The mere love of bigness surely killed out the sense of beauty in those who devised the parts of it which were last built. And now the desolation is too complete. It is ruin gone mad. In our own climate, or in Italy, all this austerity of desolation would have been softened down by ivy or other plants, which would have turned it into a Paradise of green leaves and flowers, but in this almost rainless region vegetation has not the slightest chance, and Karnak is as bare as a stonecutter's yard; whereas till the antiquaries swooped down upon it a year or two ago, the Colosseum was the home of some four hundred and fifty plants, enough to have a separate Flora written for them by a countryman of our own.

The next two days were given entirely to the western side of Thebes—the Libyan suburb as it used to be called.

It is covered with objects of the greatest interest, most of which we visited, but I will only refer to the most important.

These are the Colossi, the statue of Rameses II., and the tombs of the Kings.

The Colossi are too great statues, as high as a tall house, which sit alone in the midst of the great amphitheatre of yellow hills which walls in Thebes, and which when we saw them were still surrounded by the waters of the inundation. They represent Amenophis III. a king of the 18th dynasty, whose territories extended from Mesopotamia to Abyssinia, and are certainly amongst the stateliest of the works of man. The northernmost of the two became famous many hundred years after it was raised, as the vocal Memnon—the Greeks having taken it into their heads that it represented that mythical personage, who was, if you recollect, the son of Aurora. Nothing was more natural than that they should further imagine that the statue of the son emitted a musical sound when his mother the dawn appeared. They did so, and for centuries people came from all the ends of the earth to listen to Memnon.

It was strange as we stood hearing the bell-like sound which part of the statue gives out when struck, to remember that Strabo and Hadrian had done pretty much the same.

The broken statue of Rameses II., Rameses the Great, lies in the

building which he reared to commemorate his name, and to be for him a sort of mortuary chapel.

Dean Stanley says—

"By some extraordinary catastrophe, the statue has been thrown down, and the Arabs have scooped their millstones out of his face, but you can still see what he was—the largest statue in the world. Far and wide that enormous head must have been seen—eyes, mouth, and ears. Far and wide you must have seen his vast hands resting on his elephantine knees. You sit on his breast and look at the Osiride statues which support the portico of the temple, and which anywhere else would put to shame even the Statues of the Cherubs in St. Peter's—and they seem pigmies before him. His arm is thicker than their whole bodies. The only part of the temple or palace at all in proportion to him must have been the gateway, which rose in pyramidal towers, now broken down, and rolling in a wild ruin down to the plain.

"Nothing which now exists in the world can give any notion of what the effect must have been when he was erect. Nero towering above the Colosseum may have been something like it; but he was of bronze, and Rameses was of solid granite. Nero was standing without any object; Rameses was resting in awful majesty after the conquest of the whole of the then known world. No one who entered that building, whether it were temple or palace, could have thought of anything else but that stupendous being, who thus had raised himself up above the whole world of gods and men."

I cannot say that I was as much impressed as I expected to be with this statue. When it was standing erect, or even when it was merely overthrown, I have no doubt it was very striking, but too little of the human form is left to produce much effect, and besides, I confess to thinking that Rameses the Great was a bit of an impostor, who by assiduously putting his own name on every building up and down the land, and by having his victories, which were no doubt very great, continually celebrated, both by pen and pencil, during his long reign of sixty-six years, has rather usurped some of the fame which belonged to others, to Thothmes III. for example. In the time of Rameses the Great, Egypt was certainly on the decline. In that of Thothmes it reached its highest point.

I wish I had time to read to you the translation of a prayer, supposed to have been uttered by Rameses the Great while surrounded by foes in Syria, taken from a contemporary poem, called the Pentaour, in honour of his exploits—but time presses and I must hurry on.

The place where this great statue lies used to be called the Hall of Osymandias, and it was some confused report of it which reaching Shelley led him to write the noble lines which are amongst the few great gifts which modern poetry has made to Egypt.

I met a traveller from an antique land,
 Who said : Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
 Stand in the desert. Near them, on the sand,
 Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, whose frown,
 And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command,
 Tell that its sculptor well those passions read
 Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things,
 The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed :
 And on the pedestal these words appear :
 " My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings :
 Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair !"
 Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
 Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare,
 The lone and level sands stretch far away.

The tombs of the Kings are approached through a long ravine, wild as the wildest which you find in the upper parts of the valleys of the Alps. Now and then, once in a decade or so, tremendous rains fall on these parched hills of the Thebaid, and a furious torrent sweeps down this gorge ; but in the interval, year after year, it is absolutely dry, and absolutely silent—its bare stones and ochre-coloured rocks—glaring under a sun which is fierce even on the 20th of November, and which in summer must make it like the mouth of a furnace.

Up and up, higher and higher, round one turn after another, you wind, till you think that the end of your journey is receding as you advance. At length, after three weary but most memorable miles, you reach the last home of Egyptian royalty.

As soon as a Pharaoh came to the throne, he set to work to hollow out and decorate his tomb. It was always one of the greatest occupations of his life. I should not, I think, exaggerate if I were to say that on the tomb of the second King of the nineteenth dynasty, Sethi I.—who made, by the way, the oldest canal from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean,—as much human labour has been expended as would have built a Gothic cathedral.

I should despair of conveying to your minds any idea of the extraordinary elaboration of the details, and in many places you see, fresh as if they had been made yesterday, the corrections in the drawings of his subordinates suggested by the artist in charge. The whole forms an immense repertory of knowledge about the customs and the religio-philosophical ideas of the Egyptians, under the nineteenth dynasty. These, it would appear, were very different, and as to the ideas, far less simple and joyous than those which I have described to you in connection with Beni Hassan. Nay, these wondrous walls are so full of representations of the tremendous trials through which the human soul was supposed to have to go after death, and of the terrors of the unseen land, that one of the mon-

strous diversions of the reign of Nero was furnished by a party of Egyptians and Nubians, who came to Rome to represent to the eyes of the populace some of the scenes portrayed in this very tomb.

But are these tombs beautiful, you ask me—beautiful like a Greek Temple—beautiful like a church of the Middle Ages? Certainly not, I reply; infinitely curious—so curious as to send the mind wandering in mazes as labyrinthine as are their chambers, which run far—no one knows how far—into the mountains, but beautiful by no means.

The first place at which we stopped, for any considerable time, after leaving Thebes, was Belianeh, where we landed, and rode some eight miles over a plain green with young wheat, beans, and clover, to the rocky framework of the land—the so-called Hager, the same word, by the way, which you know so well in the Biblical phrase, “Now this Hager is Mount Sinai in Arabia.” The rise of the Nile this year has been some feet below the normal one, and a good deal of land in Upper Egypt will remain for twelve months uncultivated; but the country which we traversed to-day lay rather low, and had been thoroughly watered.

Arrived at the Hager, we found, right under the beetling Libyan range, the object of our search—the beautiful Temple of Abydos as the Greeks called it, or of Abouthis, that is, the City of This, as it was called by their predecessors. This was the seat of Menes, the oldest historical king of Egypt, as you recollect, and the temple, although built ages and ages after his time, in the days of the nineteenth dynasty, is nevertheless vastly older than those I have described to you at Denderah and Edfou.

It was built by Sethi I., the same whose tomb we visited at Thebes, and the artistic skill displayed in its adornment is of a higher order than is usual in Egyptian works. Many, indeed, of the figures on the walls have a great deal of beauty, whereas most Egyptian figures are decidedly more strange than beautiful.

We looked here with great interest at the famous tablet of Abydos, which was put up by Sethi I., and which contains the names of seventy-five of his predecessors, beginning with Menes, and ends with his own. I looked with interest on this tablet, because it has been found of much use in determining certain disputed matters of great importance in Egyptian history, as also has a somewhat similar tablet taken from a much more ruined temple hard by, and now preserved in the British Museum.

Great hopes are built upon excavations, which are to be made by M. Mariette in this neighbourhood; for here was the tomb of Osiris, and hither it was customary for Egyptians, when they could, to be carried after their death, just as the Persians are now constantly

carried to the city of Kerbela, that their bodies may rest in its hallowed soil. It was sad to wander about the necropolis, and see fragments of mummies lying about in all directions—here a head, there two legs, there a trunk. Decidedly, the old Egyptian method of disposing of their dead was one of the least desirable that ever was hit upon. The Greek, with its “two handfuls of white dust,” was far better.

We did not land again till we reached Syout, the chief town of Upper Egypt, to which we paid a short visit. It is a thriving place, surrounded by date and gum-arabic trees, with some twenty-five thousand inhabitants, and carries on a considerable trade in fine earthenware.

After seeing the Bazaar, which is better supplied than any of the others which we visited south of Cairo, Sir John Lubbock and I climbed the Libyan range, which rises directly behind the town, to see some of the tombs with which it is honeycombed, and to look—unsuccessfully as it turned out—for flint implements. The view from these heights is believed to be perhaps the finest in Egypt, except that from the citadel of Cairo, and can be at no season more charming than when we saw it on the 24th of November, when nearly the whole valley is a sheet of the most tender green, divided by the Nile, which, very sinuous in this part of its course, meanders through it like an azure ribbon. Azure, I say, for azure even its dark brown waters look at a distance under such a sky.

In old times the wolf was specially venerated at Syout, which indeed took its Greek name of Lycopolis from that animal, and a great many wolf mummies have been found in its hills; but it is chiefly famous in history from its tombs having been a favourite residence of Christian hermits, one of whom, John of Lycopolis, obtained such a reputation for sanctity, that the Emperor Theodosius sent a special envoy to consult him, as if his words had been oracles.

As we proceeded down the river the weather got decidedly colder, and the north wind, blowing with great violence, raised the Nile into something very like waves. By the help, however, of its very strong current and a full head of steam, we went down at a great rate—about fifteen miles an hour.

Pleasant it was to rush along, letting sights now become familiar flit past the eye—the shadoofs and the pigeon towers, the gum-arabic trees with their round yellow blossoms, the great green sorghum-fields, the brown villages crumbling into the stream, or safe, a little inland. Pleasant was it to behold, night and morning, the long protecting arms of the twin ranges which keep all external enemies far, far from Egypt, and the caves in them which served first as tombs, then

as hermitages for the wild monks of the desert—enthusiasts like Philammon in Hypatia.

Pleasant was it to watch the white and black kingfishers as they almost came on board.

Pleasant was it to see the great patient buffaloes and the quick-paced donkeys coming home from their day's work. One gets to respect the donkey in Egypt, I can tell you, almost as much as his fellow-labourer—the grave and stately, but not too amiable, camel.

Pleasant were the white Sheikhs' tombs beneath the rocks, and the bird-like boats which ran past us under full sail—pleasant all the sights and sounds characteristic of a well-defined portion of life which was rapidly passing away.

Our last halt before reaching Cairo was at Bedrechyn, where we went ashore and rode across the place where once stood Memphis to Sakkarah, the cemetery of that great city.

Of Memphis nothing remains but mounds of bricks. It was too near the new capital, Cairo, and has been used up as building material. Even, however, as late as the twelfth century, when Abdel-Ateef travelled, its ruins were stupendous.

The chief objects of interest at Sakkarah, are—First, a pyramid which may possibly be of the time of the first dynasty, and is, if so, the oldest-known relic of the past of Egypt.

Secondly, the great underground galleries where the successive Bulls, which were worshipped as the god Apis, were buried; and thirdly, the Tomb of Tih.

The Pyramid has not much to detain the traveller beyond its supposed antiquity, but the tombs of the Bulls are amongst the most curious things to be seen anywhere. They are gigantic sarcophagi of the most splendid granite, and weighing each of them many tons—so large indeed that half a dozen people could easily sit or stand round a table in the inside of each of them—and disposed along a gallery cut in the rock, perhaps three hundred yards in length. Indeed this is only part of the cemetery of the Bulls, for the roofs of two others are not in a safe state, and people are not allowed to enter. The worship of Apis is connected with the story of the death of Cambyzes, one of the most strange and tragic which Herodotus relates, but too long for me to do more than allude to it here.

The Tomb of Tih is the tomb of a priest who lived in the days of the fifth dynasty, and is important from the immense numbers of figures in relief and paintings with which its walls are covered, and which illustrate the life of Egypt at that remote period. The same remarks which I have already made with reference to the kind of general resemblance between that life and the life of China, when speaking

of the tombs of Beni Hassan, and their mural paintings, apply to the life depicted here. It would seem, as I have already said, to have been a simple, well-to-do, and happy sort of life.

This excursion was perhaps the only one in which we felt that we suffered by being the earliest travellers of the season, for the inundation had only just subsided, so that we rode through fields of brown mud, instead of seeing the palms (as Dean Stanley and other visitors to Sakkarah who came later in the year did) springing out of a carpet of the most exquisite green.

From Sakkarah we rode back to Bedrechyn, whence a very short run brought us to the port of Cairo, and our journey in Upper Egypt was a thing of the past.


It was not without many regrets that we stepped on shore, for one cannot live on the great river of Egypt for the better part of a month without getting to feel fond of it, as if it were a living creature—a feeling which the artist who sculptured the Nile in the Vatican must have experienced, for he has succeeded in inspiring the same feeling into all who are worthy to look on that noble statue.

Once more in Cairo, we had much to do in seeing and cross-examining many persons, who kindly submitted to that ordeal, with a view, especially, of piecing together the information we had obtained, and the ideas at which we had arrived, about the present state of things in Egypt; and from Cairo we made an excursion to Suez—so interesting to me as the western gate of India—and to the great canal which is working such a change in the intercourse between Europe and the East.

To enter, however, upon these subjects would inordinately prolong a lecture which has already extended to a frightful length, and would require, so to speak, an alteration of the mental focus which would be the reverse of agreeable.

Here then I will stop, thanking you for the kind reception which you have given me—one more added to the many kindnesses which I have received from you in the last sixteen years.

M. E. GRANT DUFF.



THE "PALL MALL GAZETTE" ON DOGMATIC EXTREMES.

THE late Professor Maurice once wrote : "A Dogmatist and a Rationalist in their worse sense, I know that I am liable to be; a Dogmatist and a Rationalist in their best sense, I desire to be." * Words which are so complex in their meaning that they may be used either in a good or a bad sense are very troublesome words. In the reformation of theology which must soon inevitably be made, the first and most necessary step will be either the entire abandonment of some of the present theological language, or the most rigid definition of the senses in which words are used. And the first experiment must be made with the word dogma. What does it mean? One class of writers take it in a good sense, and identify dogmas with the essence of Christianity. Another class take it in a bad sense, and denounce dogmas as entirely opposed to the spirit of the Christian religion. We are far from saying that the whole of the antagonism is merely verbal, but until the terms used are properly defined, even the real nature of the antagonism will not be understood.

In the last number of this Review there was an article by Dr. Tulloch, on "Dogmatic Extremes." The word dogma and its cognates was not, indeed, in every case, used in the same sense. The writer had to do battle with such weapons as were at hand. Yet the whole

* What is Revelation ? p. 201.

construction of the article was so clear, and the object aimed at so manifest, that to all who agreed with the writer there could not be a moment's doubt about his meaning. It appears, however, as if it were impossible for him to be understood by those who do not agree with him. A writer in the *Pall Mall Gazette* * criticised the article in a spirit so savage that he seemed to think men with such views as Dr. Tulloch's had no right to live. It is not our business to defend Dr. Tulloch. He is quite able to defend himself; but his position, and that of all who maintain it, is described as "bordering on dishonesty." This is a serious charge, and falls with more or less weight on the liberal men of every Church. It is quite true that of some clergymen it may be said, that they are altogether at sea as to what they believe, and to whom the advice given by the writer in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, not to define their theological position but to keep to practical work, is necessary and wholesome. The liberal party, however, though differing in many questions of detail, have a definite position which they are fully prepared both to define and to defend.

It is not evident whether Dr. Tulloch's reviewer writes from the side of dogmatic Christianity or from that of unbelief. But this is indifferent, as the answer in either case would be the same. The simplest form of that answer would be an appeal to facts. The short and easy method of refuting liberal Christians, adopted both by the dogmatists and the unbelievers, is this: Christianity teaches something; that something is a dogma; and therefore Christianity is dogmatic. Another form of the argument is: the Apostles' Creed consists of definite statements; these statements are of the essence of Christianity; if you reject dogmas you reject Christianity. A dogma is defined as a definite doctrine, and, therefore, to oppose dogmas is to oppose all definite teaching. This is the kind of reasoning by which the writer in the *Pall Mall Gazette* has "routed Bellarmine and confounded Baronius."

It seems necessary to state, with all brevity and simplicity, that a dogma in its primary meaning is a decree, an ordinance, or a commandment. The application of the word to doctrine or definite teaching is only secondary. Before a doctrine is properly a dogma it must be invested with authority. Some person or persons who either have or profess to have authority must declare it true. In this sense the only form of Christianity which is properly dogmatic is the Roman Catholic. It professes to have a living authority to make or declare dogmas, and to impose them on the belief of mankind on pain of everlasting punishment. The Roman Catholic may be wrong, but he is perfectly logical and consistent, when he believes all that his Church decrees. He really has dogmas, strictly and properly

* January 8, 1874.

so called. When men reject this living authority their sense of dogma becomes weaker, and the meaning of dogma begins to change. Those in the Church of England who call themselves "Catholics" believe that the Church of the first centuries had that authority to declare dogmas which the Church of Rome still professes to have, and so they regard as authoritative dogmas the old creeds and the decrees of the first Councils. Their position cannot be described as logical, but they are, nevertheless, essentially dogmatic Christians. To the true Protestant, dogma in this sense does not exist. He has, indeed, creeds, articles of faith, and definite statements concerning doctrine, but these have no authority. They are confessedly the work of fallible men, and are regarded as binding only so far as they can be shown to agree with Scripture. The Bible may be infallible, but the Creeds, that is properly the dogmas, are fallible. A dogma manifestly has not the same meaning in Protestant Theology which it has in Catholic Theology.

The liberal Christian accepts without hesitation the Protestant position. He acknowledges as a primary fact that Christianity, as given by God, is not given in a dogmatic form. The original documents of the Christian religion are a collection of histories and letters. They contain in a fragmentary form the teaching of Christ and His Apostles. The letters, especially those of St. Paul, contain many things hard to be understood, and many things which, so far as we can judge, were merely the private opinions of the writers. They contain, however, some clear and definite doctrines, partly moral and partly speculative, which commend themselves to the reason and the conscience of men, and which must be regarded as part of that absolute religion which by no kind of progress the human race will ever surpass. The facts recorded in the Gospel histories are beyond the reach of verification, and many of the doctrines, from the very nature of their subjects, are but adumbrations of the eternal and the true. That in Christianity which possesses men, that which has preserved it in the world, and that which is to us its most tangible essence, is its spirit. We may wish that the Bible had been more definite in its statements on many questions. But we must accept the fact as it is. To change it is beyond our power.

This view of the original documents of Christianity is no invention of modern times. It is not the result of any discovery made by liberal theologians. It is substantially the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church, and of all who maintain the necessity of a Church with authority to decree dogmas. Indeed the great argument for this authority is the indefinite and undogmatic character of the Sacred Writings.

That there may be no mistake about the meaning of the word

authority, we may say that in this place we mean by it such a power as defines and decrees a doctrine, or professes to do so, without any intervention of the fallible understanding of man. It may be said that the Scriptures do this. We answer that we are not denying authority to the Scriptures, but we deny that they profess to have that kind of authority which is claimed by the Church of Rome, or which some suppose resided in the Primitive Church—an authority which demands simple obedience irrespective of the reason or conscience of those from whom obedience is demanded. The authority of Scripture, to use Dr. Tulloch's words, is merely "persuasive and moral."

Liberal Christians reject dogmatic Christianity—that is, the Christianity decreed by the Churches—because they do not acknowledge any ecclesiastical authority competent to enforce dogmas. But it may be said that by dogmas Dr. Tulloch sometimes means definite statements of doctrines. This is true; and these definite statements may be called dogmas in the Protestant sense—that is, dogmas or opinions without authority. If, as we have already said, they are merely our inferences concerning what the Scriptures teach, they may not only be merely partial expressions of the truth, but they may be even perfectly false and mistaken inferences. The truth may be faintly mirrored before the understanding, and even in its opaque and twilight form may retain more lustre than in the definite statements of those who think they have apprehended it, and have not.

The question at issue is really the main question between Catholics and Protestants. We use these terms purely in their conventional sense. Of all the theories of revelation that of the Church of Rome is the most like what we should beforehand regard as the truth. It is both likely that the Divine Being would give a revelation, and that He would give it so as to secure men from all manner of doubt. And the best way to do this would be to establish a Church which was in the world the divine and infallible teacher of men for all times. This would give us the kind of certainty which we crave, and would secure the truth coming to us without the channel of man's fallible reason. Nothing but the clearest evidence that the Church of Rome is not what it professes to be, can justify any of us in refusing to submit to its decrees and to believe its dogmas. But there is nothing which Protestants of all kinds reject with more decision than this authority, and mainly on the ground that its dogmas violate the reason and the conscience. The claims of those who in the Church of England call themselves "Catholics," are not to be noticed seriously in any argument. It is perfectly incredible that the Divine Being should establish a Church which was to be kept infallible for

a few centuries, and then abandoned to schisms and divisions, so that it could no longer decree the dogmas for the decreeing of which it was established. If Catholicism, as it is called, be untenable, we must turn to Protestantism. We may take the simplest and most moderate form of it, that of the Church of England, and here we have sufficient ground for the rejection of dogma, as such. The Church of England, indeed, accepts the creeds of the Primitive Church, but it does so solely for the reason assigned, that they "may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture." It has XXXIX. Articles of Religion, defining and determining, we may say dogmatizing, the doctrines of Christianity. Yet one of those Articles expressly sets aside all authority except that of the Scriptures, and these, as we have already shown, are not dogmatic. It follows from this that, simply as members of the Church of England, we receive Christianity without dogmas.

It was pleading worthy of a lawyer paid for his brief to cite, as did the writer in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, the articles of the Apostles' Creed as expressing the substance of Christianity, to call them dogmas, and then ask for a decisive answer if they are true or not. The plain answer is that if we believe them at all we do not believe them as dogmas. The ground of our belief is not their being decreed. Protestants do not profess to believe them on any other ground but because they find them in Scripture or derive them from the light of reason. It may be said that the question was of dogma in the sense of definite statements, and that in this sense Dr. Tulloch did speak of dogmas. This may be granted, but he surely did not say that all doctrines were incapable of expression, and that there was no part of Christianity so clear as to be undisputed. What he plainly meant, if he did not say it, was that many articles of creeds are "mere accretions" around the truth. He did not deny that other articles might be the truth. It was a sharp stroke to cite matters of history as dogmas, and to set forth all dogmas or statements of doctrine as equally liable to the objection of being but partial statements of the truth. It is difficult for a writer always to say what he exactly means when the words he has to use are nearly worn out with use, and it is unworthy a reviewer who wishes to be fair, to spend his ingenuity in trying to entangle a man in his talk.

When Dr. Tulloch spoke of partial error being of the essence of Christian dogma, he could not have meant by dogma the statement of such universal and undisputed truths as the first clause in the Nicene Creed. He was manifestly speaking of such subjects as admit of dispute or variety in the modes of explaining them. There might, for instance, be no partial error in the statement that "Jesus died and rose again the third day," and yet concerning the resur-

rection of Jesus there might be many dogmas which expressed the truth but in part, or error with the truth. The article as it stands in the Creed is a simple statement which may be true or false, and yet it impinges on a subject which is transcendent, and that subject a very important one in its theological bearing; we mean the mode of Christ's resurrection. When we begin to make dogmas out of the fact of the resurrection, that is, when we give it a place in systematic theology, we are compelled to speculate or have an opinion about the mode of the resurrection. Did Christ rise with His material body or with a spiritual body? The dogmatic Christian, that is, the Christian who believes that his own speculations about truth are the truth, will say at once that it was no resurrection if the material body did not rise again. This was probably the belief of the Apostles. It was, doubtless, the belief of many of the Fathers, and it was plainly an important doctrine in the estimation of the Reformers of the Church of England. So great was the zeal of our Reformers against the old superstition of the real presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist, that they declared His "natural body and blood" to be in heaven. The same statement occurs in an equally gross form in the third of the Articles. This is an instance of what is meant by a dogma containing partial truth and partial error. What is true of the resurrection of Jesus is true of the resurrection of all bodies. Some of the Latin Fathers, as St. Jerome, and many of our greatest English divines, as, for instance, Bishop Pearson, have maintained the literal resurrection of the flesh. But the requirements of faith would be equally satisfied if we adopted the theory of Swedenborg, which makes the resurrection spiritual, and altogether denies, in the popular sense, the resurrection of the body. The dogma, as understood by St. Jerome and Bishop Pearson, it is impossible to believe. Moreover, by their definitions or dogmas, they have obscured the truth even as taught in the New Testament, where St. Paul tells us that flesh and blood shall not inherit the kingdom of heaven, and that we sow not the body that shall be, but God gives to the seed a body, and by a long argument this is proved to be a spiritual body.

To illustrate our meaning by another doctrine, we may take that of the Trinity. On the mode of the Trinity Scripture is silent. The word itself does not even once occur in the New Testament, and yet the doctrine is so plainly there that those who do not believe it can only get quit of it by such violent interpretations of Scripture as were made by the older Unitarians. But whoever wishes to know the danger and the mischief of dogma, both in the sense of an authorized article of faith and as a speculative opinion, has only to study the history of the dogma of the Trinity. The original doctrine

was not the absurdity which it has become in popular theology. We sometimes hear on a Christmas Day even in our Protestant churches the Child Jesus described as possessing the attributes of Deity—His arms described as the arms of the Infinite, and His undeveloped brain as gifted with Omniscience. This is the dogma, or inference, which is made without authority from some misunderstood passage of Scripture. Over against this is the plainest statement concerning the Child Jesus, that He grew in wisdom as well as in stature. The mode of the Divine existence is never explained by any of the sacred writers, probably because we have not capacities to understand it. But the dogmatists have explained it. There is nothing too deep for them. Creeds, old and new, have expressed the truth in language far beyond the comprehension of the human understanding, some of them even declaring that whoever wishes to be saved must thus think of the Trinity. The explanations in the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, so far as we understand them, are certainly very creditable explanations. The writers had a deep insight into the philosophy of Being. This exercise of their reason was perfectly legitimate, but they mistook their reasonings for the truth, and in this way a commendable Rationalism passed into a pernicious Dogmatism.

One other doctrine will illustrate our meaning even more than those already mentioned: this is, the doctrine of the Atonement. In the Gospels it only occurs in the simplest form. God forgives, Christ saves men. In saving them He loses His own life. These, and such expressions as these, are all that we find concerning the Atonement in the teaching of Christ, and surely it is enough for men to know that there is forgiveness, whatever may be the ground of that forgiveness. In the Epistles we have some Jewish illustrations, which may or may not be taken literally. Clear-headed, patient, and truth-loving men like Bishop Butler and John Locke maintained that there was no theory concerning the Atonement to be found in the New Testament. The mode of it was unrevealed. But let any man trace the history of this doctrine as a dogma and see how unlike

"the complex ways of man
Heaven's easy, artless, unencumbered plan."

It was a question on which the old Fathers were divided, whether the price of redemption was a price paid to God or to the devil. Christ's death was said to appease the Divine wrath, to satisfy Divine vengeance, and to reconcile God to men. Another theory made the death of Christ absolutely necessary, as Divine justice must fall somewhere, and as sin was against an Infinite Being, the victim, it was argued, must be Infinite. The essential truth was doubtless underlying all these theories, which at first were innocent speculations of the reason, but at last became mere "accretions of religious tradition."

The temporary character of many of the dogmas which have been regarded as doctrines that constitute the essence of Christianity may be seen in the way that they have gone out of fashion, and Christianity remained as good without them as with them. The objectionable expressions of reconciling God to man, and assuaging the Divine wrath by the death of Christ, are very frequent in our old divines, from Cranmer downwards. They are now scarcely ever heard in a modern sermon. Three hundred years ago, the doctrines of Calvin on predestination and reprobation were all but universal in the Churches of the Reformation. They existed in the Scottish Churches even to our day. They were retained by the old Independents, and revived in the Church of England in the last century. But they are now scarcely heard, even in Scotland, except in a very modified form. There is scarcely a clergyman of any reputation in the Church of England who professes to be a Calvinist, and Mr. Dale said lately that among the Dissenting preachers under forty years of age the proportion is very small. Mr. Spurgeon is the only eminent Dissenter who now preaches election and reprobation, or what was once dignified with the supereminent title of the doctrines of grace.

The charge of dishonesty which is made against the liberal clergy is a very unfair one. There may, as we have already intimated, be individual clergymen who are bewildered in their theology, and who cannot afford to resign their livings. But the charge as directed against the body of liberal Churchmen is one which may be repelled with indignation. Dr. Tulloch, speaking for the Church of Scotland, says that the idea is too absurd to suppose that pecuniary considerations have anything to do with it. In the Church of England, with some very exceptional cases, the sure way for a man to try to raise a barrier in the way of his preferment is to adopt "liberal theology." Many of the ablest of the English clergy who belong to what is called the Broad Church Party have to live by literature or school-keeping, and some of them have missed the highest preferments in the Church by their inflexible devotion to what they believed to be truth. Hampden and Milman, with their great learning, had to depend on the liberality of a Russell, and Dr. Temple only reached a bishopric through the judicial wisdom of Mr. Gladstone.

The only foundation for the charge of dishonesty is that the liberal clergy have subscribed Creeds and Articles containing the theories, traditional opinions, or dogmas from which they now wish Christianity to be freed. There is no doubt that this is a difficult and delicate subject; but liberal Churchmen did not choose their position, they inherited it. In some cases it may have been long after these Articles were subscribed that their imperfections were discovered. In other cases they may have been subscribed with the qualifications allowed by the

State. The liberal party have never been guilty of putting a non-natural sense on the Articles. They have always said that they are but partial expressions of the truth, and that a re-statement of the chief doctrines of Christianity was much to be desired. The alternative of leaving the Church was open to them, but if this were to be always followed there would be an everlasting secession, and no thinking man would long remain connected with any Church. It is no doubt a serious matter to have to subscribe the scholastic and Calvinistic theology of the Articles of Religion. It is still more serious for such men as Dr. Tulloch to be bound by the Westminster Confession, but the fault is with the Churches which adopt these formularies as their standards. They are not only the work of fallible men, but were created by the exigencies of the times in which they originated, and if retained at all ought to have been subjected to a periodical revision. There are scarcely any men in any of the churches which have creeds that can really say in their conscience that they give their assent and consent to all and everything which they contain. If they do they will be found guilty of some immoral reasoning to vindicate their sincerity. We have an instance of this at the present hour in the Free Church of Scotland, where some rather than admit the fallibility of the Westminster Confession, are denying that it contains any principles which directly sanction persecution for differences in religion.

A dogmatist in a good sense Professor Maurice said he wished to be. It is not to be denied that many whose dogmatism we condemn are to be commended for their zeal. It is not the earnest advocacy of one's own convictions which is condemned by Dr. Tulloch or by any Broad Churchman, but the want of tolerance and forbearance with others. It is that spirit of dogmatism which excluded Mr. Martineau from a professorship in London University, or that spirit which dictated the sharp and superficial criticism of Dr. Tulloch in the *Pall Mall Gazette*. It supposes that all truth is so definitely given, that there can be no possibility of anyone being right who differs from itself. Liberal Christians are willing that unbelievers, as well as dogmatic Christians, should be allowed to say all that they have to say. They are anxious that the patient spirit of Christ should be the spirit of all men. They regard themselves and mankind in general as still learning and ever drawing nearer and nearer to the perfection of truth. They are willing to learn patiently the lessons which God is teaching them. In Christianity they see an analogy with the daily course of nature, and difficulties of the same kind. However much some men may boast of the light of revelation, they know that the treasure is in earthen vessels, and in whatever way we look at it, by the time it is expressed in a definite form it

has contracted the taste of the vessels. This is the way that God has adopted ; what else can we do but accept it ? Christ made men His companions, and prepared their minds for a gradual and greater reception of what He had to tell them. Perhaps we know as much as our capacities can receive. The minds of men will go on defining. It is a natural and proper occupation ; but we must not confound our efforts to express the absolute truth with that truth itself. This would be to deceive ourselves and others, and to take the words and the thoughts of men as if they were the words and thoughts of God.

JOHN HUNT.



LETTERS FROM ELIZABETH BARRETT BROWNING

TO THE AUTHOR OF "ORION" ON LITERARY AND
GENERAL TOPICS.

III.

TO English philologists, in general, but more especially all those who can take an interest in the early studies of lyrical poets, it would be both curious and interesting to discover the methods adopted by different poets towards attaining excellence in the verbal mastery of their Art:—how they obtained their skill in diction—in fact, a command of words. But they are all silent. In the first chirrups and snatches of song, they all begin alike,—*i.e.*, without thinking as to how they do it—very much after the manner of song-birds. "They lisped in numbers, for the numbers came," and of course the words came first. And this bird-like practice may continue during some years, and with admirable success, being the fresh breath of the morning, the thought of any special studies only occurring with the advance towards some maturity of purpose. The two greatest song-writers the world has ever known—Burns and Béranger—probably continued in the first youthful way longer than most other poets; yet Burns eventually took to study, after some fashion, which is not, I believe, very well known, except that he fancied a little Latin would materially help him, and, finding it did not, he exclaims with amusing indignation;—

"What's a' your jargon o' your schools—
 Your Latin names for horns and stools,—
 If honest Nature made ye fools,
 What sairs yer grammars?
 Ye'd better ta'en up spades and shoals,
 Or knappin'-hammers!"

In another poem he says, with a sort of humorous self-irony, not without sarcasm at scholastic exactions, "Ye ken nae Greek." The biographers of Béranger are anxious to show that he had studied the finest classical poets; and yet, at the age of thirty-seven—judging by the date of his birth and that of the poem—he wrote:—

"C'est alors que Philomèle
 M'enseignant ses plus doux sons,
 J'irais de la pastourelle
 Accompagner les chansons.
 Puis j'irais charmer l'ermite,
 Qui, sans vendre l'eau bénite,
 Donne aux pauvres son manteau.
 Je volerais vite, vite, vite,
 Si j'étais petit oiseau!"

That Béranger must have made special studies of various kinds, before he could have attained to that perfection of finished simplicity manifested in most of his songs and other poems, there can be no doubt; but what they were has never, I believe, been recorded. Wordsworth, in an elaborate Preface, unfolds his views of the high and sacred office of the Poet, and on more than one occasion boasts of the pains and labour he has bestowed upon the Art, as Milton had done, yet no hint of *how* they went to work is vouchsafed to us. Shelley wrote an Essay, entitled "A Defence of Poetry" (a most inadequate title), which I should like to get printed in letters of gold; but Shelley, like all the rest, down to Gerald Massey and Algernon Swinburne, is mute as to all the means he took for his marvellous command of words. Miss E. B. Barrett, while alluding to her arduous studies, leaves us in many respects quite in the dark as to the collection of materials, *modus operandi*, and speculative excursions. Nor could her Letters, which I am about to give (on English Rhymes and Versification), have been in all probability ever written but for a certain friendly provocation that will be narrated. The present paper may, therefore, be regarded as a first glimpse of such secret work as we have alluded to—*notes pour servir à l'histoire*, &c.,—or how young poets (neglecting their future nests) feather their wings and arrows.

Miss Barrett had sent me the MS. of her beautiful poem entitled "The Dead Pan," asking my opinion about it, where it would be best to send it, or if it should be reserved for a special volume. Of course I admired its poetry and its versification, but concerning her view of perfect and imperfect, or *allowable* rhymes, in that poem, and several of her other productions, I wished, once for all, to object, and give full reasons for it. Still, as I had only published certain tragedies, and never any volume of lyrical, or so-called minor poems (nor have I done so up to this time), it seemed proper towards one who had long been secretly at work in that way, that I should give some rough sketch of my own studies of that kind, the substance of which may be condensed within a few pages, as it was in the first instance, in one or two notes. I am not aware of this sort of revelation having ever been hitherto made by any one.

It is related somewhere of Sir Walter Scott—and if the story is not true, it does not in the least signify—that at a Christmas merry-making, the genial border-minstrel proposed, among other round-games and puzzles, a prize to be given to whoever made a couplet, of any sort, with a *rhyme* to the first line which should end with the word "*silver*." There were to be no half-rhymes, or allowable rhymes, but a perfect rhyme. After young folks and old had thought, and frowned with comical mental struggles during some minutes, to no purpose, Sir Walter "put them out of their misery" by informing them, with a humorous smile, that there was *no* rhyme to "*silver*" in the English language! Hearing this "remarkable fact," when a boy—though I subsequently came to find it ridiculous enough—it made a considerable impression upon me, as a very strange thing in any copious language; but having commenced my first efforts in poetry by a sort of uncouth imitation of Milton's blank verse, and then abruptly ceasing (finding, no doubt, that I had got out of my depth) during six or eight years, the whole matter passed out of my thoughts. But not out of mind, because nothing seems ever to pass out of some minds—perhaps not quite out of any mind—and when it again occurred, I was commencing to write short lyrical poems, in the usual way—i.e., upon poetical emotions without very well-defined subjects, or subjects worth defining. I naturally "fought shy" of ending a line with "*silver*," but having to forage my brain for rhymes to other words of two syllables, such as *shadow—planet—filbert—squirrel—beetle—statue—trellis—anchor—April—August—temple—virtue—forest—angel—poet—proper—budget—stranger—open—almond—bayonet—blossom—something—nothing*, &c.,—I found there was not a single perfect rhyme to any one of them! The above list is by no means exhaustive. It is to be understood that this is only a rough sketch of an Essay, and of one not likely ever to be

written by me. This discovery, however, naturally led to further search, and I then made a list of the words of one syllable, and also of three syllables, to which there were no perfect rhymes in our language ; also, a list of all those words to which there was only one rhyme, such as *people* and *steeple*—*anguish* and *languish*—*winter* and *printer*—*hornet* and *cornet*—*hatchet* and *latchet*—*mountain* and *fountain*—*darkness* and *starkness*—*votive* and *motive*—*blackness* and *slackness*, &c.,—and a list of the triplicates, or words that have only two rhymes to them, such as *billow*, *pillow*, *willow*—*iron*, *scion*, *lion*,—and those which are quadruple, these two latter lists being meagre enough. Seeing the conditions of lyrical composition in English to be subject to these limits, it became obvious that for any freedom in writing, a large admission must be made for what the practice of the greatest of our poets has established as imperfect but *allowable* rhymes. And we now come to the vexatious fact that, while the true and only real test of a rhyme is its sound to the ear, many persons, deficient in that organ, take refuge in the plausible pretext that words must be rhymes to the *eye*—i.e., the letters must be in accord. How shortsighted and inconsiderate this is, can be shown in a moment. A learned member of the Spanish Academy once undertook to show us that we had twenty different sounds to the very first letter of our alphabet. Evading that elaborate examination, we will content ourselves with directing attention to the fact of the positive exchange of sounds which some of our vowels undergo in different words. Thus, *have* and *cave*, where the first sound is *h'av'* and the second is *ayve* ; *watch* and *match*, the first sound being *wot'ch*, and the second *atch* ;—the same with *wand* and *hand*—*was* and *has* ;—*wonder* and *thunder*, the first word having the *o* sounded as *u* ;—*head* and *mead*, the first sounding *ed*, and the second *eed* ;—*caught* and *draught*, the first having the terminal sound of *ort*, and the second *aft* ;—*do* and *go*, the first sounding *oo*, and the second *o* ;—*plough* and *tough*, the first sounding *ow*, and the second *uff* ;—*wounds* and *sounds*, the first having the vowel sound of *oo*, and the second of *ow'n*, &c. The non-recognition of these numerous changes of sound in the same vowels in different words (causing so many words which are perfect rhymes to the eye, to be in reality far more imperfect to the ear than many words which are of quite a different spelling) has been the cause of frequent critical censures when the defect was rather in the critic than the poet, and sometimes entirely in the critic. Thus, the very same critic who has unhesitatingly accepted the words *scarce* and *farce*, *hood* and *flood*, or *charm* and *warm*, as perfect rhymes, when they are most palpably of different vowel-sounds, would actually object to *dawn* and *morn*, because *morn* was not spelt *mawn* ; and, indeed, I have heard men of similar bad or

cavilling ear endeavour to prove such objection by adopting a provincial accent, or screwing their mouths in order to make "dawn" and "dawning" partially take the sound of *dar'n* and *darn'ing*, so that they should not rhyme with "morn" and "morning;"—and, in like manner, to give "morn" a provincial twang of "mour'n," in order to prove that it did not rhyme with *darn'* or *daw'n*. The Scotch have their peculiarities, so have the Irish, so have Yorkshire and Somersetshire—Londoners no less—and they should all "mind what they are about."

While some readers will be much interested in this question of English pronunciation, others will regard it, I fear, as supererogatory, so that at this stage of our introductory comments the wish arises that it were possible to ask if we were fatiguing our audience; but as this cannot be done, it will now be the safest plan to bring this matter "home" as briefly as possible.

From what has been already shown and suggested, it will follow that for the due freedom of lyrical poetry due allowance should be made for the perverse and exceptional peculiarities of the genius of the English language. Rhymes to the *ear* are to be regarded as the true criterion, and never to be sacrificed to rhymes however perfect to the eye. Finding there are so many words of one, two, and three syllables (i.e. the vast majority of our words) which have no rhymes at all to them, a reasonable number of allowable rhymes should be recognized,—that is to say, rhymes of consonants, where the actual vowels differ, or have different sounds, and other words which do not assume to be rhymes, but which rank with the Spanish *rima asonante* and have a pleasing effect when judiciously and sparsely mingled with perfect rhymes. I even consider that lyrical verse of the heroic measure would have a richer effect if some imperfect rhymes were purposely introduced, and this on the principle of *harmonious discords* in music which render the effect so much more grand,—in fact, while the genius of music depends upon original melody, the science is based upon harmony, which disallows all monotonies unless for isolated special effects.

Having gone to such "lengths" in my liberalities and allowances for our lyrical poetry, I am still ready to admit that some line of demarcation should be drawn. And this line, I think, has been passed more boldly, defiantly, and persistently by Miss E. B. Barrett than by any other English poet. Strange to say, while various unfortunate men have received the severest censure for trifling and trumpery licences (often quite fair and really allowable), my admired correspondent has but seldom been called to account for her numerous violations of all received principles of English rhyme. But what a compliment to her genius, the brightness and fertility of her intel-

lect, and to the energy and euphony of her verse, that critics were carried away by the stream, and rarely had time to take heed of the sticks and straws they were passing. This fact also implies a compliment to the critics.

The poem of "The Dead Pan," opens with this verse,—

"Gods of Hellas, gods of Hellas,
Can ye listen in your silence?
Can your mystic voices tell us
Where ye hide? In floating islands
With a wind that evermore
Keeps you out of sight of shore?
Pan, Pan is dead."

I am requested to make my comments on the MS. of this then unpublished poem;—and I fear it will be thought that I did not do my "spiriting" as gently as the poetess expected.

"June 17, 1842.

"Certainly :—mark as much as you please. They will all be marks of kindness, coming from you, whether depreciative or otherwise.

* * * * *

"What if certain passages in 'Dead Pan' should be in suspense, critically; voices crying to me 'alter this'—'alter *that*!'—whereas I may not have made up my mind, and my rhymes, as to alterations anywhere? For the rest, there will be some fifteen or sixteen pages of print. But it is in stanzas. You shall have it in MS., and also in proof, and then I shall be sure to do my best—or worst for you."

I commenced with a due appreciation of the poetry—its subject, treatment, and the euphonious flow of the versification; but took objection to many of the rhymes. I did not like "tell us" as a rhyme for Hellas; and still less, *islands* as a rhyme for *silence*. The only excuse for them, was the difficulty with regard to the first, and the impossibility of the second, as there was no perfect rhyme for *either* of them in the English language. I suggested that perhaps they were not intended as absolute rhymes at all, but euphonious quantities of the *rima asonante* class?—or was it considered that the rhymes being on the first syllables (*Hell* and *tell*, *si* and *I*) instead of the last, they were to be regarded as fair exchanges? In verse IV., I accepted "rolls on" and "the sun," and "altars" and "welters" on the principle of *allowable* rhymes, as they were quite as good as "corsets" and "forces" where the letters were all right, and recognized as true rhymes—which they really are *not*. In verse VI., I objected to "flowing" and "slow in," (the rhyme being only on the first syllable), and in verse XII. to "golden" and "enfolding," for the same reason. In verse XIII. "iron" was very badly rhymed by "inspiring,"

being only a rhyme on *ir*. "Panther" and "saunter" in the next verse were bad. In verse XVI., "driven" and "heaving" were not admissible. In verse XIX. "turret" and "chariot," could only be excusable on the equivocal grounds that there was *no* rhyme to *either* of them in the language, and it might seem generous to wed them for that reason, if not quite justifiable. The words "o'er her" and "horror,"—"angels" and "candles,"—"nothing" and "truth in," could only be excused on the same grounds, as there were *no* rhymes in the language to "nothing," "angels," or "horror." There were several more of these anomalies in the same poem, but I felt I had said quite enough. I was very curious to know how all this would be received. The following will show to what purpose I had preached and prayed:—

(No date, but apparently written in London.)

"Oh—you are a gnasher of teeth in criticism, I see!—you are a lion and a tiger in one, and in a most carnivorous mood, over and above. My dear Mr. Horne,—do you know, I could not help, in the midst of my horror and Pan-ic terror, smiling outright at the naïveté of your doubt as to whether my rhymes were really meant for rhymes at all? That is the naïveté of a right savage nature—of an Indian playing with a tomahawk, and speculating as to whether the white faces had any feeling in their skulls, '*quand même!*' Know then, that my rhymes *are* really meant for rhymes—and that I take them to be actual rhymes—as good rhymes as any used by rhymers—and that in no spirit of carelessness or easy writing, or desire to escape difficulties, have I run into them,—but chosen them, selected them, on principle, and with the determinate purpose of doing my best, in and out of this poem, to have them received! What you say of a 'poet's duty,' no one in the world can feel more deeply in the verity of it, than myself. If I fail ultimately before the public—that is, before the people—for an ephemeral popularity does not appear to me worth trying for—it will not be because I have shrunk from any amount of labour—where labour could do anything. I have *worked* at poetry—it has not been with me reverie, but Art. As the physician and lawyer work at their several professions, so have I, and so do I, apply to mine. And this I say, only to put by any charge of carelessness which may rise up to the verge of your lips or thoughts.

"With reference to the double rhyming, it has appeared to me employed with far less variety in our *serious* poetry than our language would admit of genially,—and that the various employment of it would add another string to the lyre of our Terpander.* It has appeared to me that the single rhymes as usually employed, are scarcely as various as they might be—" [Perfectly true, and also what follows.]—"but that of the double rhymes,

* The masterly use of double, treble, and all sorts of rhymes in *comic* verse—such as in "*Hudibras*," "*Don Juan*," "*Tom Hood's Poems*," and others, is some proof of this argument.

the observation is still truer. A great deal of attention—far more than it would take to rhyme with conventional accuracy—have I given to the subject of rhymes, and have determined in cold blood, to hazard some experiments. At the same time, I should tell you, that scarcely one of the Pan rhymes might not separately be justified *by the analogy of received rhymes*, although they have not themselves been received. Perhaps (also) there is not so irregular a rhyme throughout the poem of Pan as the ‘fellow’ and ‘prunella’ of Pope the infallible.” [Bad as this may be—and every poet of any vigour, has abundance of bad, as well as half rhymes—there is a marked difference between that sort of badness and what was pointed out in the ‘Dead Pan.’] “I maintain that my ‘islands’ and ‘silence’ is a regular rhyme in comparison. Tennyson’s ‘tendons’ and ‘attendance’ is more objectionable to my mind than either. You, who are a reader of Spanish poetry, must be aware how soon the ear may be satisfied, even by a recurring vowel. I mean to try it. At any rate, there are so few regular double rhymes in the English language, that we must either admit some such trial, or eschew the double rhymes generally; and I, for one, am very fond of them, and believe them to have a power not yet drawn out to its length and capable development, in our lyrical poetry especially.

“And now—upon all this—to prove to you that I do not set out on this question with a minority of one—I take the courage and vanity to send to you a note which a poet whom we both admire, wrote to a friend of mine who lent him the MS. of this very ‘Pan.’ Mark!—no opinion was asked about the rhymes,—the satisfaction was altogether impulsive—from within. Send me the note back, and never tell anybody that I showed it to you—it would appear too vain. Also, I have no right to show it. It was sent to me as likely to please me,—and pleased me so much, and naturally on various accounts, and not least from the beauty of the figure used to illustrate my *rhymatology*, that I begged to be allowed to keep it. So, send it back, after reading it confidentially, and pardon me as much as you can of the self-will fostered by it.”

Perhaps, under all present circumstances, I might now have considered myself exonerated as to the secret of this praise, in the spirit of which I should have most heartily joined (while objecting to some of the *letters*), but of course I took no copy of the note, and returned it as requested. I even forget who the poet was that wrote it, but fancy it must have been Landor. An allusion is next made to some critic in the *Quarterly Review*, always so fond of “doing a mischief” where poets and poetry are concerned, who carped and cavilled at several paltry and insignificant matters, such as the use of the word “very,” and sounding the *ed* at the close of certain words.

“Why shouldn’t I (also) say ‘very pale,’ if I please, for all Mr. Lockhart? It is very ludicrous, if I may not! I say no more ‘verys’ than other people—and defy all the critics in the world to prove it. Let them count and see. As to Tennyson, his admirer I am, and his imitator I am *not*, a

certainly. Nearly everything in the 'Seraphim' was written before I ever read one of his then published volumes : and even the 'instructing the reader to say ed,' was done on the pattern of Campbell's 'Theodoric,' and not from a later example. In these last volumes of mine I have eschewed all signs whatever of a diæresis pronounced or unpronounced,—so as to give no offence either to myself or other people. But it would be sheer weakness to throw out a word from your vocabulary because somebody is pleased to hang his own foolscap on it. Let it hang there ! It is not mine,—and I need not fear the disgrace of it.

"About the 'Pans'" [the too frequent repetitions] "you are right, and I shall thin them as much as I can. For all your kindness about the poem I am also grateful—'very' grateful, if you will let me be so insolent to Mr. Lockhart.

"You are a bloody critic, nevertheless. I am glad to hear of B——, and agree with you on the point of Patmore.

"Ever and truly yours,

"E. B. B."

The bravely humorous use of the epithet that has made the reader start with incredulous and comical dismay (having a back reference to the lady's graphic allusion to lions and tigers) in defiance of all its ordinary objectionableness, and outrage on "ears polite," I could not make up my mind to omit, but "after a struggle" have left it to the generous and right appreciation of those readers who are not unlikely to be excessively amused, even if not quite approving of it. The letter concludes with some genial criticism on the poetry of the Hon. Mrs. Norton, Rogers, Patmore, and some others, which must be reserved for a future opportunity.

Greatly admiring and respecting the breadth of intention and principle, as well as the moral courage of Miss Barrett, it will readily be supposed that I did not think it right to persevere with any further comments on this question. Besides, it is best, even with far inferior persons, to avoid a sore subject. The next time, however, that I went down on my usual visit to Miss Mitford, at Three Mile Cross, during "the strawberry season," as she called it, I determined to have the matter fully out with her in her garden summer-house, in face of all the geraniums. As she was a lady of the "old school," I was prepared for resistance when I unfolded my views as to the large number of allowable rhymes it seemed important, and indeed necessary, to admit in English lyrical verse. She broke in upon me at the outset, with—"Oh, pray do not teach or promulgate anything to make the Art of Poetry easier and more open to all-comers. Do everything you can to throw all sorts of difficulties in the way. The world is over-stocked already with minor and minnikin poets, and the crop multiplies every year. One of the very best things I have

ever done in my life is to have nipped in the bud half-a-dozen young poetesses. Elegant girls have come to me, declaring they had been visited by poetical impulses, and begging me to read what they had written. A very little was enough, and I assured them that such things had all been done over and over again." Admitting the good service thus rendered, not only to the young ladies themselves, but to their future husbands and children, I still requested to be heard, and told her of the recent correspondence with Miss Barrett. Then she listened very attentively. Repeating the broad views I entertained as to allowable rhymes, both single and double, I also spoke of the freedom as well as the harmonious variety to be attained by adopting, occasionally, the Spanish *asonante* verse, of which our language was highly capable, though it had so very seldom been used. Thus the *Magico Prodigioso* of Calderon opens with this sort of verse :—

"En la amena soledad
De aquesta apacible estancia
Bellísimo laberinto
De árboles, flores y plantas,
Podeis dejarme, dejando
Conmigo, que ellos me bastan
Por compañía, los libros
Que os mandé sacar de casa.
* * * * *
Idos los dos à Antioquia,
Gozad de sus fiestas varias,
Y volved por mi á este sitio,
Quando et sol cayendo vaya
À sepultarse en las ondas,
Que entre obscuras nubes pardas
Al gran cadáver de oro
Son monumentos de plata.
Aqui me hallareis."

The foregoing lines have been so admirably translated by Mr. Denis Florence MacCarthy, that although they were only recently published, I feel sure the anachronism of transcribing them here will be readily forgiven :—

"In the pleasant solitude
Of this tranquil spot, this thicket
Formed of interlacing boughs,
Buds, and flowers, and shrubs commingled,
You may leave me, leaving also
As my best companions, with me,
(For I need none else) those books
Which I bade you to bring hither.
* * * * *

Go to Antioch and mingle
 In its various sports, returning
 When the sun descending sinketh
 To be buried in the waves,
 Which beneath the dark clouds' fringes
 Round the royal corse of gold,
 Shine like sepulchres of silver.
 Here you'll find me." *

Could these English lines have been read to Miss Mitford, it is probable that she would have admitted their euphonious flow, and that one might soon come not to feel the loss of the rhymes. But in the absence of such an example, Miss Mitford simply agreed that it was "all very well for the Spanish, but thought it would not do in English verse." I then told her of the battle over the "Dead Pan" manuscript, adding my objections to certain rhymes in another of our friend's poems—such as "children," and "bewildering," and "stilled in;"—"resounding" and "round him,"—"Heaven" and "unbelieving;"—the fact being, whether the poetess intended it or not, that she was for introducing a system of placing rhymes on the first half of the word, and leaving the closing syllable to a question of euphonious quantity. Now, I frankly admitted that she had effected this so well that it did not hurt my ear, and I had mainly protested against it as contrary to all received usage, and to save her from critical onslaught, especially of those who could not appreciate her genius and her excellence in other respects. In like manner, "Bion" and "undying,"—"Bacchantes" and "grant us,"—"deep in" and "leaping," were all rhymes on the first or second syllable. I had, moreover, discovered that it had so happened, when there was *no* rhyme to a word, the lady was inspired, probably without being clearly aware of the fact, to unite another word in the same condition of single life; thus, among other instances,—

"But natural Beauty shuts her bosom
 To what the natural feelings tell!
 Albeit I sigh'd, the trees would blossom—
 Albeit I smiled, the blossoms fell."

Who can say such a euphonious verse hurts the ear?—and who can fail to admire it as poetry? One felt ashamed of having foraged out the fact that there was no rhyme in the English language either to "bosom" or to "blossom." There seemed, indeed, an *et tu Brute* look through the air on the whole of these objections—particularly

* Southey and Shelley were very harmonious in the use of the short lines of an irregular blank verse; but their rhythmic quantities were as usual, and not like the above. Mr. Robert Buchanan, in his '*Book of Orm*,' has adopted this *asonante* verse very successfully.

as many of the foregoing examples are taken, not from the "Dead Pan," but from a poem in a foot-note of which she makes such handsome allusion to myself. If I felt this at that period, I feel it the more now she is gone. And, after all, she may be right, to a considerable extent, in her struggle to enlarge the boundaries of lyrical poetry.

Miss Mitford smiled like a summer morning, but shook her head. Early training and fixed associations made her unable to look at the question in any new light. But it was the same with Leigh Hunt, and others. The delightful authoress of "Our Village," at the time we are writing about, was a bright silvery sixty, and her face always shone as brightly as her hair. I never saw a blooming girl of sixteen with a more fruity hopefulness in her countenance. Yet she clung to the past, not because she would not go on with the stream of things, but because from early training and habits of mind she *could* not. These new theories of rhymes outraged her notions of propriety, and, much as she loved and admired the poetess, she refused to entertain them, and more than hinted reproof to me for my large allowances in such matters. The special examples I had given she met with the following anecdote of another person, which, had it been narrated with any humorous or graphic art of the ordinary sort, would have had a rather ludicrous effect. As it is, I have some "compunctious visitings" in giving it. But Miss Mitford's humour was of a peculiar kind. She never adorned or "embellished," or used any mimetic art—if she really possessed any—but just placed the facts in a simple and prominent position, and slowly and drily delivered them with all the gravity of a chronicle. Strongly objecting to the rhyming licences adopted by the poetess, she thus proceeded to account for, and in part excuse them. "Our dear friend, you are aware, never sees anybody but the members of her own family, and one or two others. She has a high opinion of the skill in *reading*, as well as the fine taste of Mr. —, and she gets him to read her new poems aloud to her, and so tries them upon him (as well as herself), something after the manner of Voltaire with regard to a far less elegant authority. So Mr. — stands upon the hearth-rug, and uplifts the MS., and his voice, while our dear friend lies folded up in Indian shawls upon her sofa, with her long black tresses streaming over her bent-down head, all attention. Now, dear Mr. — has lost a front tooth—not quite a front one, but a side-front one—and this, you see, causes a defective utterance. It does not induce a lisp, or a hissing kind of whistle, as with low people similarly circumstanced, but an amiable indistinctness, a vague softening of syllables into each other,—so that *silance* and *ilance*, would really sound very like one another,—and so would *childrin* and *bewildrin*—*bacchantes* and *grant-es*, don't you see?"

On the other hand, while really perfect rhymes to "*daisy*"—" *tongue*"—and "*busy*" are found in "*crazy*,"—" *young*," and "*dizzy* ;"—there are no English rhymes, to the *eye*, for any of the first three. It will be obvious that all the foregoing examples are outside and far beyond the little commonplace objections to words, which a better knowledge of the condition of the language, and an examination of the practice of all standard poets (who are full of licences) would put clean out of court. Yet so strong is the force of habit, that Leigh Hunt—a poet of a life-long experience—upon coming to a couplet where the words *arch* and *porch* were given as allowable rhymes—as they are, and *must* be, with all of similar family,—wrote in the margin that they were "most impossible," and proposed to substitute the following,—

"A Serjeant of the Law, wary and wise,
Whose robes had often brushed Paul's Paradise," &c.

Passing over the glaring paraphrase, as there is not one word of the second line in Chaucer (neither do I consider the meaning at all the right one, and I may frankly admit not feeling quite sure that my own version is accurate), the ear that would not admit *arch* and *porch*, can yet give *paradise* and *wise*, not perceiving that the *s* in the latter word is pronounced as *z*—not *wice*, but *wize*—and takes rank with the allowable rhymes, like all of that, as well as the "*arch*" and "*porch*," class. The late Lord Lytton also, not very long ago, made an objection of a similar kind to a passage in something I had sent him; and then courteously added some words of the usual kind about spots in the sun, and that he supposed his "training had led him to regard certain rules as necessary," &c. It seems clear that those who emancipate themselves from the old system, in special respects, and examine our language for justification, will gradually become latitudinarians. Thus, while objecting to some of Miss Barrett's rhymes as inadmissible, I yet consider there is some truth and foundation in her defence of her theory. Many of her half-rhymes—either as consonant rhymes with different vowels (like *march*, *turch*, *torch*, &c., which are all allowable) or having the rhymes on the first syllable, and leaving only a euphonious ending, do not really hurt the ear, the positive proof of which is, that the great majority of her readers and admirers have probably never noticed them. And be it *ever borne in mind* that here, and elsewhere, in all critical strictures, whenever there is a doubt or difficulty with regard to the propriety of a rhyme, and its effect upon the ear, it is a most unjust and erroneous proceeding in estimating the *poetry*, to detach the rhymes from the context. I only do so on this occasion from necessity, since the discussion is not of poetry,

but of first principles as matter of language and pronunciation. As a marked instance of effects on the ear, the delight which children take in the old Nursery Songs is on account of their rhythmic harmonies; yet, in the very great majority of them, the music is of the kind of the old-fashioned child-song of—

Goosey, goosey, Gander !
Where shall I wander ?
Upstairs ?
Downstairs ?—
In my Lady's chamber ?

In chanting the foregoing, nobody—child, mother, or teacher—has ever been troubled with the *dawning* and *mawning* nonsense, and instructed the child to say *Gander* and *wann-der*, but has accepted the sound of *o* for a good rhyme to the *a* (in *gander*, as it is, and must be), and also the euphonious *asonante* of “chamber” as a third sort of rhyme. (In the verb *to wonder*, the *o* becomes *u* in pronunciation.) This early illustration of our ear's education is given to show that such things do not really hurt the ear then, or afterwards, and it is only when they are closely examined (as we have now been obliged to do) that the objection arises. In like manner, we may refer to the favourite old sea-song, by Dibdin, of “Here, a sheer hulk, lies poor Tom Bowlin !” It is quite too late for anybody to pretend that he has ever been troubled by the “bowlin” and “howling,” or “the crew” and “him to !” No doubt all this looks very like coming over to the lady's side,—and so let it look, for to that side who knows but future poets may possibly be drawn, with more or less variation of experiment and practice ?

The only systematic rhyming authority in the language is *Walker's Rhyming Dictionary*, and very laboriously, and very well, it is done. As examples of the licences of standard poets he gives the following,—

- “Draw next the patron of that *tree* ;
Draw Bacchus and soft Cupid *by*.”—OLDHAM.
- “Our thoughtless sex is caught by outward *form*
And empty noise, and loves itself in *man*.”—DRYDEN.
- “My parents are propitious to my *wish*,
And she herself consenting to the *bliss*.”—DRYDEN.
- “One sees her thighs transformed ; another *views*
Her arms shoot out, and branching into *boughs*.”—ADDISON.

This last I thoroughly justify, and do not object to the next :—

- “Wit, kindled by the sulph'rous breath of *vice*,
Like the blue lightning, while it shines *destroys*.”—POPE.

While considering the last example rather bold, it is nevertheless admissible. In short, the list of *allowable* rhymes given by Walker is of an extent to surprise all those who have not gone much into this question; and there is no doubt but the liberality becomes extended with one's experience. Yet, as before said, some kind of line should be drawn, however oscillating;—and however wide my notion of licence may have been thought, I am unable to go quite to the same lengths as the lexicographer. He quotes the following bit of Scriptural doggerel, referring to one of the Plagues of Egypt, frankly intimating that it does not offend his ear,—

“And how did he commit their fruits
Unto the *caterpillar*,—
And eke the labour of their hands
He gave to the *grasshopper*.”

Anybody who can stand that, can stand anything. Walker's words are,—“I have purposely omitted many licences I might have produced, as judging them in reality too licentious. Among these, however, I do *not* reckon this of Sternhold and Hopkins, of Gothic memory.” He then gives the verse just quoted. Our old Nursery Rhymes, with all their (unobserved) licences, never go to such a length. It is simply ludicrous, and the more so from its biblical gravity.

We now come to the very intricate, many-sided, opalescent question of *Versification*—metres, quantities, rhythm—and we shall be obliged to go back to Chaucer, the first great master in our heroic couplets. As all that has been done, in that way, since his time (A.D. 1400) by the Elizabethan poets and dramatists,—then by Milton, the first great master of our blank verse,—then by Pope, and his very different school,—then by Coleridge, Shelley, and Leigh Hunt (Cowper, Wordsworth, Moore, and others keeping in the regular metrical, and almost metallic, grooves), down to the present day of Tennyson, and his peers,—the mere opening of the subject could not possibly be rendered lucid and acceptable without extending this paper to a greater length than I think it would be right to intrude upon the courtesy of the Editor and Readers of the *Contemporary Review*. I therefore reserve a remarkable Letter from Miss Barrett, and another from Leigh Hunt, together with such connecting observations as may seem necessary, for the next instalment of the present series.

R. H. HORNE.



CHARITY : ITS AIMS AND MEANS.*

ADDRESSING a body of strangers, I may be permitted to begin with a word or two of personal explanation. First, my views about Charity are not theoretical; I have worked them out in a large East London parish. Second, the views which I shall advocate are by no means naturally congenial to me. I have never been able to wash my own heart in that solution of dilute sulphuric acid which I am wont to recommend to young beginners. To this day my heart aches as I hear a case of misery unrelieved. To this day my reason assents to, but my heart dissents from, the refusal. I have often wished that, as in the case of Henry VIII., familiarity with stern work had made it easy. But, ladies and gentlemen, it is because I feel this, that I have some confidence that the views I advocate are truths. They have at least not been adopted without much cost to myself, if they seem to be carried out at the cost of others.

In speaking to you on the Aims and Means of Charity, it will be well to say, in the first instance, that Charity is designed to help others, not ourselves. That may seem a very trite remark, but I doubt whether the full force of it strikes all engaged in the work. Charity is the gratification of a sentiment, as well as a

* A lecture delivered privately to a body of volunteer visitors in Marylebone, who had found a difficulty in reconciling the teaching of Christ with the conclusions of charity reformers.

part of Christian duty. It is a part of Christian duty—a part to which men have been stirred up by preaching, because they are so liable to neglect it—it is also a sentiment which the most thoughtless and irreligious frequently gratify. From the fact that it has been preached as a religious duty, people have sometimes looked upon it rather as a training-ground for their own benefit, than in its effect on others. Many people look on the poorer classes as allowed, by a wise discretion of Providence, to exist in order that the rich may have a means of saving their own souls. Poverty is not looked upon as an evil remediable by the better organization of social relations, and by the reformation of individual character, but as a necessary evil, designed as aforesaid to benefit the leisurely by giving them cases by which they may perfect themselves in spiritual medicine. It is as if a schoolmaster should consider ignorance as specially designed with the final cause of the creation and perfection of schoolmasters; as if a medical man should look on sickness as a divine institution for the education of surgeons and physicians. In other cases we meet with an evil, and we say, How are we to remedy it? Here we quote the words of the Bible—"The poor shall never cease out of the land,"—and omit to look at the verse lying hard by—"Save when there shall be no poor among you. Only if thou carefully hearken unto the voice of the Lord thy God, to observe and do all the commandments which I command thee this day." It is in the attempt to practise on the poor, to try and do ourselves good by being kind to them, that so much mischief has arisen. It is this which has made some kindness so distasteful to the poor, that one woman said, when she heard that her visitor was ill—"Poor lady, I am sorry for her; but there's one comfort—she's a lady; she won't have to be read to and prayed over."

But charity is also a sentiment—the gratification of a natural impulse. We all know the old story of the king who called his courtier's attention to the misery of a beggar, and having elicited an expression of sympathy, took the courtier's cloak to clothe the beggar. If there be a touch of exaggeration in the king's conduct, the story serves, like most caricatures, to bring out the tendency of certain actions which, as depicted in the prose of every-day life, do not strike us. The king who finds it pleasant to give away another's cloak would see no joke in giving his own away. The courtier thought he had a real sentiment of pity for the man, but is surprised at nothing so much as that his own cloak should be taken to relieve him. He would have given money, with far more consideration as to the amount necessary than he would have bestowed on the purchase of a new cloak,—but money he would have given because the sight of nakedness is unpleasant. Much of our desire to do away with misery rests on

the same wish to get rid of an offence to our æstheticism, which makes us paper our rooms with pretty paper and cover the brown garden ground with bright flowers. And the gratification of the sense of compassion is not to be mistaken for charity, else we shall some day fall into the error of the titled lady who was so much struck by the Bishop of Oxford's sermon that she borrowed a £5 note for the collection which she forgot to repay. Charity, then, does not mean doing good to our own souls by the development of a virtue at the expense of others' sufferings;—their misery is not to be used to force our spiritual growth;—nor is it a sentiment to be gratified at a little cost to ourselves. Charity—*caritas*—never exists till its object is dear to us, till we have learned to establish a relation of love between us and it.

With the acceptance of these truths, so self-evident that I am almost ashamed to dwell on them, the work of Charity is at once cleared of many of the evils which have disfigured it. It has been the unholy union of Charity with weakness and selfishness which has made her, lovely in herself, the parent of that hideous progeny, imposture, improvidence, and pauperism.

Our first principle being to do as much good as we can to the sufferer, without reference to our own feelings, we shall go to the case with much the same feeling as a doctor goes to a case, determined indeed to do his best to relieve it, but determined also never to sacrifice the future well-being of the patient to any whim which in the weakness of suffering he implores him to gratify, to any course of treatment which would produce speedy relief at the cost of weakness and pain afterwards. Each case must form a separate study, though the general principles of practice will soon be acquired. Thus when we go to a case the first question will be not what are we to do to relieve present misery? but here is a case of distress, how am I to put these persons in a condition in which such distress will never recur? And in the consideration of such cases we shall find great assistance:—1st, in the recognition of the principle that it is God's will that evil should not be put out at once; or, to state the truth in another way, that good should be slowly developed. Try and conceive yourself standing, with your present knowledge of God's designs, on the earth as the temple of creation slowly grew from its formless foundations. Often and often as you saw the whole surface of the earth producing only the lowest kind of organisms, you would have wondered why, if the purpose of God was to fit the world for the habitation of man, so much time was wasted. You would have stood whilst the lower series of rocks were in formation, and marvelled that creative energy should be wasted on the organisms that swayed in the rippling water, and vegetated in the liquid mud,

organisms whose beauties needed a microscope to exhibit them. You might later have stood in awe at the giant forests which encumbered the earth, at the glades songless for want of birds, and voiceless as regards man. And as age on age rolled on, and the trees rotted on the lifeless earth, again and again would have risen to your lips the question, To what purpose is this waste? Or you would have later looked with interest on the strange development of mammal life, at a time when the animals lived but to war on each other, when no human intelligence had interposed to help the survival of the fittest, to turn the strength of some to use, and to put down the violence of others. All this you would have marvelled at if you had been made a participator of the ultimate designs of the great Architect of Creation. Even now you can only catch a glimpse here and there of His meaning. You can now see that the waste of which you complained in the great vegetable period was no waste; that without the heat stored up in the coal measures, the magnificent activity of the 19th century could never have been developed. The seeming waste was but the waste of one who throws seed into the earth that it may multiply instead of using it in the unproductive condition.

Or if you take the converse of the truth, that evil is slowly destroyed, the history of mankind reads you the same lesson as that of the earth on which they live. It took centuries for the Israelitish race to exterminate idolatry, and to erect the great principle of Monotheism. Hundreds of years elapsed ere the Romans gave to the world, in place of the wasted energies of individuals, and individual tribes, the grand conception of an organized empire. If it took long for the Romans to develop law, it has taken no less a time for our country to present to mankind the principles of constitutional liberty. The world which waited so many thousand years for Christ must not be impatient. And you find further that there is no waste of time in the slow development of such truths, and the gradual extermination of the corresponding evils. It has occurred again and again that some man has arisen before his time and advanced that as truth, which has been generally accepted as such only after many centuries. He has succeeded in impressing some few with his notions, but the evil he tried to suppress has arisen again and again in new forms, till by slow degrees the evil has been for ever put out, and the truth seated on impregnable foundations. You must often have had to take refuge in some such thoughts as these when, impatient for some political or religious reform, for the redress of some grievance, or the introduction of some beneficial measure, you have been tempted to cry out: "The earth is given into the hand of the wicked: He covereth the faces

of the judges thereof; if not, where and who is He?" It is then that you have taken comfort in the thought, that if He did not exterminate the evil at once, He was waiting only to do it more effectually. He must allow the tares to grow with the wheat to fruit before He can separate them. He must let the tumour obtain a certain development before He can operate for its removal.

This consideration of the gradual process of God's works will be most valuable to you. It will make all schemes of wholesale demolition and reconstruction of houses, all schemes of clothing and blanketing whole districts, of magic processes of the sudden reformation of classes, by temperance movements, or revivals, seem to you as unpractical as they are impossible. And day by day as you go back from your work disheartened by failure, and desponding at the slight impression made on the evils of the world, you will say to yourselves, "God's mills grind slowly." I must wait, and be patient, He has been patient with me. Ink-pen Court is, after all, no blacker than my own heart, its progress towards a very low standard of perfection not one whit slower.

And the second great principle you will realize is the mercy of withholding present relief. You will have learnt in your study of God's development of mankind, by the processes which history reveals, that seeming evil is only good in disguise. Shall we take a case from the terrible famine we are apprehending in our dependency of India? Such an awful catastrophe as that which subjects some twelve to twenty millions of men to the horrors of impending starvation, such a calamity which crushes out hope for the future, and leaves men a prey to the despondency of a hopeless fatalism; what good can there be in that? Well, you have to look at history and see how the fate of the world depended on the famine of Egypt. The nation which was for so many centuries to be the depository of God's revelation, which was to hand on, like the torch-bearers of the Ceramicon, from century to century and nation to nation, the torch kindled at the lamp of truth, must be educated to perform its mission. Men whose whole life is spent in the solitude of vast pasture lands, men whose knowledge of organization does not extend beyond the requirements of a petty tribe, men the area of whose knowledge is confined to a little experience in cattle-breeding and farming, were not fitted to rule the destinies of the world. The men who have wrought religious revolutions have sometimes come from the deserts, but the men who have had to develop the political systems which are as the lamp to the light, must be practised in the knowledge of men. Therefore Israel went down to Egypt, and learned in all the wisdom and knowledge, the arts, and sciences, the history, and the mystery of Egypt, developed afterwards that political constitution,

produced those lawgivers and prophets, whose influence has been so great in the world, that men have ever since been copying or parodying them, and have been either stirred by their productions to the warmest enthusiasm, or by the parody of them to the most earnest opposition. The famine which determined the fate of Israel by driving them from their own land has had its counterparts through history, the latest of which, the great Irish famine of 1847, will form no unimportant landmark in the development of our Colonial Empire. And still there are hundreds of thousands of acres only waiting for the people to colonize them, millions of acres which could not be colonized by white men, or at least not without much assistance from men born in a warmer clime. If then we had unlimited resources at our command, should we be doing the wisest thing in feeding these Indians at their own hearth side? should we not do better working with the famine, to help them to colonize those vast regions of South America and the West Indies, where there is a chance for each man to develop into a landed proprietor? Famines are cruel only with the cruelty of the eagle who stirreth up her nest; they are the loud-spoken command—"Wherefore liest thou on thy face before me? Speak unto the people that they go forward." Or shall we take an example of the value of withholding, not from the history of the world at large, but of that home life of which we are all, whether we would be or not, witnesses if not students? The history of the education of each one of us is the development of character by the refusal of certain things which seem to us in our childhood indispensable. A Utopian would have made the world very differently; nothing is so absurd as the waste of time and the want of economy in the production of a human being. That he should absolutely come into the world without the power of balance, which would enable him to walk, and the power of articulation, which would enable him to talk, seems truly absurd. He is denied these requisites, and in the rough and ready school of tumbles he learns to balance himself, as in the school of necessity he learns ultimately to express his wants in words instead of squalls. But in so far as in after-life this principle is recognized, that the wants of a child are not to be gratified at once, but that in climbing the hill Difficulty he is to develop those powers which he will afterwards exercise in a more pleasurable way, does the child become a useful man. The mother who spoils her child prepares for herself a misery which will by no means atone for the injury which she inflicts on him, and her conduct is paralleled by the weak-minded philanthropist who starts with the notion that if misery exists, the best thing is to relieve it immediately. I am not going to attempt to present to you any solution of the problem of evil. But this you must allow, that if

we had thought that the best way of treating evil was always to get rid of it in the shortest way, half the secrets of science would have remained undiscovered. We are not to be more compassionate—to fancy ourselves more merciful than God. We shall never fathom the mystery why He has made the world so beautiful, and yet allowed many men to be born with eyes which cannot see this. We shall never understand why the animals are, as a rule, so perfectly formed, and yet there are so many human cripples. And yet we believe that the same hand conditioned the lots of both, though the only gleam of mercy which we can clearly trace is, that the animal with no power to remedy the evil by mechanical means is generally formed perfect, whilst deformity more frequently exists among men who have the power of alleviating the disease;—save that we know further, that there are other things equally beautiful with pretty flowers, and healthful animals, and that the virtues of kindness, sympathy, and tenderness, the most precious gifts bestowed on man, are directly developed by the presence of these helpless mortals.

And here I cannot but point out how Christ our great exemplar witnessed in the exercise of His power to the self-repression which I am trying to enforce on you. The Gospellers had no hesitation in recording miracles, they are troubled with no such doubts as sometimes destroy our comfort. And yet they represent Him as healing only one out of the great crowd of blind, lame, halt, and withered, who lay by the pool of Bethesda; they record only three cases of raising of the dead. Now take whatever view of miracles you will, this is a strange fact. Believe them, if you will, to rest on the testimony of honest witnesses, who fancied they saw only what they wished to see, or exaggerated reports of events referable to natural causes, Christianity, so far as I understand it, would not lose all if it lost something, supposing the miracles could be disproved. Taking this view, you would find it a marvellous thing, that instead of the host of miracles which crowd round the histories of later saints, you should find comparatively few collected round the life of Him, who is above them all, and those few worked after careful investigation of the moral condition of each patient. Take the other view, to me incomparably the higher as well as the most natural, that He, as the Lord of humanity coming to restore man's moral nature, was able by his intimate communion with God to see into the methods by which the working of nature, which is the working of God, could be set right, where by some breach of God's Law it had gone wrong, and thereby witnessing to men that God cared for the bodies as well as the souls of men (for the whole man, and not only for that religious part to which pietists have directed their whole attention)—then you have the most convincing testimony to the truth which I am trying to put

before you, that true mercy is far different from weak sympathy, that profuse liberality is a gross parody on Divine beneficence. The hesitation, the delay, reported before the working of many of the miracles, acquire in this view a new significance.

But such views as those I have advocated can only be held with safety in connection with a deep recognition of a third truth; viz. that the evils of the world are intended to work out their good results only through the co-operation of man. Held in its naked simplicity, this truth would leave us heartless and hopeless fatalists. The recognition of the fact, that evil may produce good, must not be interpreted into the statement that it must necessarily do so—at any rate the good which comes out of the evil will be produced the more speedily for the interference of man. For God has appointed man as a fellow-worker together with Him; and man's efforts must certainly be to do away with as much evil as he can. If I recognize it as a law of nature that matter left to itself remains at rest, and further, that the attraction of gravitation and cohesion may be very beneficial, I am not considered at any rate now-a-days to be flying in the face of nature, if I endeavour to overcome the inertia of matter, and to annihilate the force of cohesion, by mechanical or chemical forces; I am not, as they fancied of old, flying in the face of nature, I am only bringing new laws of nature into play. There was a time, you know, when men thought that they ought to bow to the will of God in disease,—when to seek to the physicians, and not to the Lord, was considered impiety; * now-a-days, when the "Peculiar People" seek to the Lord, and not to the physicians, we consider them equally impious. We are to look then on moral evils, as we look on physical evils, as only invitations to fresh exertion. We are workers together with God when we try to overcome them, but the work must be in the same direction as God's work. The wild birds of the country are useful—they eat the grubs and vermin—therefore, do not interfere with them. If you don't, you will find they eat seed and poultry as well as worms and weasels. The wild birds are harmful, they are destroying all our seeds, all our poultry; let us exterminate them. If you do, the vermin will multiply upon you, and you will need a Birds' Preservation Act. So it is not in morals only that you have to keep the exact middle, to recognize that either of two opposing courses of conduct, if carried to extremes, will be productive of harm.

I can quite fancy, for I have felt it, the difficulty which will arise in the minds of some. Am I to usurp the place of God, and to pronounce sentence against my fellow man; to say that he is to be left unrelieved on account of his past transgressions? Am I, who believe that God is as merciful to others as He has been to me, to act as if I, His

* 2 Chron. xvi. 12.

representative in this work, had no mercy? How can I make my way with them, how can I hope to lead them up to higher things, if they learn from me this is all that wise mercy has to say to them? Surely men are not to be won so. I have hinted half the answer: in many relations of life, in your relations with your children, you must act so; as a magistrate, as an employer of labour, you must in many cases act so. Only the tone in which the judgment is delivered, only the face which looks into their face, tells the real story. There is another half to the answer. Did there exist no poor law in this country, your position would be a very difficult one; but as there is, as there is public charity for all who will avail themselves of it, you will say to them, "I must leave you to other agencies; I shall still visit you; if you go into the house, I shall hope to see you when you come out. Public charity is no more degrading to receive than private bounty, though it be much less pleasant. Some day you will see that I have been acting the kindest part to you." Only in some such way as this can you really make charity bear equally on all. It is not so much a case of refusing mercy to the undeserving poor, as recognizing the rights of the deserving poor. This is somewhat of a digression forced upon me by the uprising of a question, which I know you have all put to yourselves. I return to my theme—your co-operation in the removal of evil.

If what I have said has gone home to your reason, then you will see with me that what you and I have to do, is to try and meet the disease with which we have to fight, not so much in its symptoms as in its causes. When the cholera had visited this country several times, and the doctors were quite abroad as to what remedies should be used, it occurred to Dr. Snow, that though it was difficult to cure, it might be possible to prevent it. The Rev. Henry Whitehead and Dr. Snow traced back to impure water the origin of a certain outbreak of cholera. Straightway we began to put our water supply in order. And we produced this remarkable result: that, in the places where cholera was most virulent in the former epidemic, no cholera to speak of exhibited itself in 1866; its ravages in that year were almost confined to one part of London. Subsequent investigation proved that it was due there to impure water; the courts in Whitechapel supplied with the New River Company's water escaped the scourge, the streets and courts supplied with East London water suffered terribly. Leakage of an impure river into one of the reservoirs was proved, and now when we expect an attack, we do not look so much to the question as to which of the many remedies will *cure* it, as to the question whether the water supply is in such a condition as to *prevent* it. Just in the same way, this evil of pauperism has been progressing, and remedies have been tried and

tried in vain. We came to such a crisis about 1832, that a new poor law was necessary, and that was passed in 1834. The remedy worked well for a time, but in 1866 the condition of the London poor was such, that new remedies had to be devised. We have by means of further supervision, of special treatment for vagrants, of strict maintenance of the restriction of out-door relief, produced such an effect, that a large workhouse built for the able-bodied poor in Whitechapel is untenanted, and that the pauperism of the Metropolis has enormously decreased. But the pauperism of the country, which is still out of all proportion to its just limits, which is a disgrace on a country accumulating capital by the £100,000,000 a year, will never be put an end to by the operation of the poor law. The very existence of a poor law, the very fact that there does exist a provision for all who cannot provide for themselves, is a direct incentive to pauperism, and to the neglect of social ties. Because there is a poor-house to go to, men run the chance of the resort to it, luck failing—the very fact that their relatives have a refuge there makes the less scrupulous decline the burden of their old relations. And it must be so. For the poor law has very slight preventive action; it is in the main a curative process. Do not think that I wish to say hard things against it. I say that for the time being it is the best, the only, method of dealing with a great evil. I would use it as I would use a carriage when I could not find a railway, but I would try might and main to get a railway made. I may be sanguine, but I look forward to a time when we shall return to the original principle of the poor law, and consider poverty a crime. I have no doubt that the severe laws against beggars in the Tudor period were a part of the rough and ready legislation of those days, which sought rather to put an end to an evil than to consider whether the remedy was strictly just. But the time to which I look forward cannot come whilst I live. It will take centuries perhaps to raise the class with whom we have to deal out of their present condition. But when we have learnt how to do so, then we shall have solved the question of pauperism. Now we are dealing with the poisoned river; we must cut off the poisonous supplies. And any measure taken to raise the whole tone of the class in which pauperism exists, is, if a wise one, more efficacious than twenty measures to remedy the evils of pauperism in its development.

It is that which has brought us here to-day. Some years ago, when this problem of pauperism was weighing for the first time very heavily on me, I read of Miss Octavia Hill's work, and saw in it that for which I had been looking—a method of attacking pauperism in its sources. Of the nature of that work I need not speak to you, who are, many of you, engaged in it. It proceeds on the principle that if men and

women are to be raised out of pauperism, you must improve the conditions of their existence, and that to improve the conditions of their existence you must engage them in co-operation with you. You must improve the conditions of their existence: I very much doubt whether, if you or I were compelled to live in such rooms as they live in for a month, we should be much better than they in the end. I remember laughing at a curate in the East End, who said that he always put on his gloves when he got beyond the Mansion House, but I have felt something of the demoralizing effects of living for six years in a place where there was no æstheticism. The constant presence of ugliness, of dirt, and discomfort does lower the tone and diminish self-respect. You may have felt this also in another way. When you have been walking in Switzerland, or living on that short allowance of linen necessary when at sea, you will have found a general carelessness or listlessness come over you—a general selfishness out of which you had to arouse yourself. Well, consider the condition of those who live in such places always, who have no comfort at home, and no prospect for the future. That despondency must come over them of which we read in the history of prisoners in the olden times. Few had the courage to bear up against the hopelessness of their lifelong doom; they lost self-respect, they became careless of their personal appearance. And so these prisoners in our London courts have a low moral tone, corresponding to their outer appearance. What is the use of trying to keep tidy in such places? What is the use of trying to lay by under such conditions? Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die. Well, your first endeavour is to make these people take a pride in their surroundings, in clean floors, tidy walls, and bright windows. I hope you don't forget those great educators of men—flowers. And I hope, in encouraging them to grow flowers, you discourage them from the delicate hot-house plants, and the roses which will not bear smoke, and press on them musks, creeping jennys, ornamental grass, fuchsias, and that beautiful window-green, the nettle-geranium. And then you try and make them see that life is not so hopeless, if only they will try and save. You tell them that so long as they spend all their earnings in drink, and lay by nothing for the future, you cannot help them. But if they will only try, they will always find a friend ready to help. As you go on at your work, you begin to feel a respect for them, which makes you shrink from offering them money, as you would shrink from offering it to one in your own class of life, and your relations are yet such that in case of great need, you can go to them as to a friend, and say, Don't be ashamed to borrow of me. And as you see them struggle, you learn the difficulties of their case, learn how harshly you judged

them when you set them down as all belonging to one degraded class. You find instances of kindness which make your heart leap, of tenderness which make your eyeballs sore, of heroism which make you wish that you could in your own sphere go and do likewise. You are going the right way to work. You are developing the whole man. You have got rid of the notion you once had, that it would be a grand thing to rebuild the whole of London, because you know that if you did, it would be no better in the course of a year or two. Some of us know that dogs and cats, if removed from the kennel and the stable, do not at once develop corresponding habits of cleanliness. It is whispered that when the Shah of Persia and his suite left Buckingham Palace, it was not left in a condition suitable to English royalty. You feel that you must make men work with you. This reconciles you to the slowness of the movements of boards and vestries. Underneath all their wrong-headed conservatism there does lie this germ of truth, that the places are quite as good as the people know how to make use of. There is still plenty of work for individuals. No rich man can find better employment for his money than in buying up courts where some such work as yours has been pursued, and promoting those who have graduated in your school to a better class of residence. But that is a very different thing from rebuilding by Act of Parliament. May London never be Haussmanized, till we have men to live in the houses. At present, as some of us know, the man has only the human form.

As you study their condition, you learn how much wider a question lies before you than at first appeared. If you have to elevate the whole man, you find that tracts and tickets are a poor prescription for pauperism. You need, indeed, the influence of religion and the help of money, but you need them most when the patient is convalescent. Port wine and mutton are excellent things, but they would kill a cholera patient. You must get rid of the cholera first. I say it with the deepest conviction, that there are physical conditions in which religion is absolutely impossible for the mass. I say it, not unmindful of many exceptions, which are just as much exceptions as that of the hard drinker who is more healthy than his abstemious neighbour, and of the spendthrift who lights on his legs at last. We must not legislate, nor act as if the world were made up of Samsons and Hercules; we must try and create a condition in which common men can bear the burdens of necessity laid on them. I am convinced that without more recreation, more joy in life, moral reformation must be much retarded. I have spoken to you of the depressing effect of living in the presence of the unloveliness of East London streets and surroundings, which, as Edward Denison said, made it quite an event to walk down Piccadilly and see nicely-dressed people. We must try and do something to make life a little less joyless. Whilst there are no decent

theatres, do you wonder that people love the light and the colour of the public-house, the penny gaff, and the low music hall? They need these things just as much as we need concerts, and conversaziones, and parties. Whilst there are no recreation-grounds within easy reach, whilst the parks, the present substitute for them, are at a distance of a mile or two, involving for a woman who would take her children there a 'bus, or at least a perambulator, involving also a half-holiday, do you wonder that women and men seek excitement in drink, and children herd in the streets to talk filth and learn vice? It is, I believe, an essential part of your movement that there shall be evening entertainments. I believe that good Saturday-night readings, with some little music, and occasional acting, would do much to fit the poor by-and-by for the Sunday sermon. We are apt to think slightly of what is given at such places, but even if we sometimes have to descend to poor comic songs, think of what they replace. It is not a question of choice between the highest influences and the lowest. These people, if not there, would be in the public-house, or in worse places. We must feed them as they are able to bear it, never letting ourselves down to their level, but still condescending to their weakness, and trying gradually to raise them to the appreciation of something better. I am delighted to hear of a movement in this parish for bringing the two widely separated classes of society together by means of tea-parties and social entertainments. Something of the sort was tried some years ago at the Society of Arts, but it lacked that system which can be developed in a parish. To gather together all without respect of circumstance or creed must be a good thing, and the refining influences of good music and cultivated reading cannot be over-estimated. They form a part of that education to which we must look as the leaven of the working classes, which will gradually raise them to what they ought to be. Instruction is only a part of education, religion is only its complement. It were well if religious people considered what idea of higher things many of the poor can have. At the best their heaven will be a Mahomedan paradise, an inglorious rest, not the rest that remaineth for the (working) people of God, not the joy of His presence. You remember the navy who described Miss Marsh's room. "Such a big dining-table, and such a lot of books, just like heaven." That was a grand conception in comparison with the heaven of many.

And now I have donè, not because my subject is exhausted, but because in so large a subject one can only hope with any effect to touch on certain salient points. I have no time to touch on many points on which I should have liked to insist—such questions as the work to be done on Boards of Guardians, and Rating, and Sanitary Boards, by those who have not the gifts required for personal contact with the poor—work here is work directly for the poor, as important

as that work of which I have principally spoken. So, too, must I leave untouched my own pet subject of education, and the method by which men and women with means may promote the welfare of the poor by interesting themselves in the conduct of primary education as members of School Boards, as managers of schools, as founders of scholarships—setting up a very Jacob's ladder, which, planted on the bare stones of the London courts, shall reach upwards to the Heaven of respectability and prosperity; and I must omit all mention of the various agencies, such as Parochial Mission women, sick nurses,—most valuable agencies not only in alleviating the present necessities, but in raising the condition of the poor—agencies which starve for want of a better pecuniary support; and, lastly, I cannot touch on emigration, or the care of the children of the depraved in industrial and other schools. All these tempting subjects I leave untouched. The moral of the whole is that to face this problem we must go as men to meet our fellow-men; believe that they are influenced by the same motives, actuated by the same principles as ourselves. But for this we need an enthusiasm of humanity, without which we cannot undertake that work. No patronizing, no advice as from superior to inferior, no wish to press people into our system, to cut them like so many ornamental bushes into our pattern, will do. We must have the love of men, the desire for their elevation so strongly at heart, that we will be content with any means, use any tools, forward any plan which will carry out that design.

The founder of Christianity has taught us that if we would influence men, we must make ourselves one with them, shrink from no unpleasant contamination, despise no feeling, look down on no habit, which is truly human. In Miss Octavia Hill's presence I cannot say how much I feel that the success of her work depends on her recognition, from the first, of this principle. But she will forgive me if I tell an anecdote which brought this home to me. I took Miss Octavia Hill one day down to see a court called Jacob's Court, in Whitechapel. It was not in my parish, but I had become acquainted with it in consequence of certain difficulties which we members of the Whitechapel Board had with the owner of that court. It was not in my parish, and I may say I was exceedingly thankful that it was not in my parish, for I considered it one of the most hopeless bits of building I had ever seen, one in which I could hardly expect people, living under conditions more bestial than human, to develop the qualities of the true man. Well, I took Miss Octavia Hill there, and when I had shown her something of the place, her only remark was, How I should like to have this court under my charge! Ladies and gentlemen, she had the enthusiasm of humanity, and I had none. Those who have that enthusiasm do not wish to have the unpleasant blotted out of their sight. They burn to reform it. They look on

it as mathematicians look on a difficult problem : as a doctor on a critical case. They have faith in the power of their remedies to overcome the evil, and therefore they desire to attack it.

In reward for your patience in listening to me to-day, I wish you some of what I trust you already possess—this enthusiasm of humanity, this burning desire to meet wrong and evil, and overcome it with the crusader's spirit, and the Christian's weapons. We shall never see our country what it ought to be till we have fought this fight. I have spoken, every occasion on which I had the opportunity, of the Elberfeld system of relief. Any one of you who does not know it, should purchase for four shillings the first report of the Local Government Board from a bookseller, and study it. I don't think it will be the last report you will buy. That is the development of a plan of personal co-operation which perhaps best suits a country governed on a bureaucratic system. It may be that we cannot in England adopt a precisely similar plan, but till we have decided to take each his part in the great work, the work will never be done. We can never do it by the medium of other agents, by subscribing to societies never so excellent, by the establishment of institutions never so good. If I have suggested any remedies they will all be as useless as medicine without a doctor, without personal co-operation. Remedies become mere quack medicines unless they are administered by persons educated by constant observation of the nature and causes of evil. I am asking no light thing of you—it is hard work. I am asking no small sacrifice of you—it is the sacrifice of yourselves. As I think of the great chasm which yawns between the rich and the poor, on the very edge of which our glorious institutions are built, of that chasm which widens every day, and seems to threaten to engulf us all, I am reminded of the old story of the fissure which opened at Rome. All ordinary means of filling it up failed, and the oracles were consulted, and they gave sentence that it could be closed only when the most valuable thing in Rome was cast in. Again, new efforts, and all unsuccessful, till one Curtius, bravest of all Roman soldiers, leapt all armed into the ditch, and it closed for ever. This great chasm of pauperism—into which we have cast cartloads of wealth, truckloads of Bibles, tons of sympathy, still gapes as large as ever. Is there no oracle at hand to tell us how to fill it up? Yes! the oracle has spoken. "A new commandment I give unto you, That ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another." When we have risen to the meaning of the command, when we have cast into that gulf all that is most precious,—prepossessions, prejudices, position—when we have made the sacrifice of Christ, that is, the sacrifice of ourselves, then the gulf will close, and close for ever!

BROOKE LAMBERT.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE STANDARD.

SIR,—Before men professing to be Christians co themselves to the principles of the Cremation Society may be well for them to inquire how it came to pass though the practice of burning prevailed extensively among heathen Greeks and Romans, it speedily and universally appeared on the prevalence of Christianity.

I need but refer to the Valley of Hinnom, outside Holy City, and to its typical import, as universally named by Jews and Christians, by both of whom, most destruction by fire has always been regarded as the type of Divine vengeance. Christians of old (to whose things visible were but symbols of unseen realities) inevitably shrank from a continuance of the heathen practice to them it was simply impossible; and Tertullian (A.D. 200) only expresses the universal Christian conviction when he speaks of a Christian man as one to whom it was unlawful, because to him Christ had remitted the penalty of fire. ("Christianus . . . cui cremare non est licitum."—*De Corona*, cap. x.)

H. GOU

Brixton, Easter Monday, 1874

BURIAL OR CREMATION?

SIR HENRY THOMPSON'S paper* in condemnation of burial, and in favour of cremation, is justly considered a very able production; but able as it is, I should not think it worth a reply if it had proceeded from an unknown writer, or from one less entitled to respectful attention. The theory on which its main conclusion is based is entirely without reasonable foundation; at all events I submit that I have a fair claim to a hearing, that I may try to show that much of my work during the last twenty years has not been misdirected; and that I, and those with whom and for whom I have acted, have neither induced nor encouraged an enormous waste of public money in establishing new and large cemeteries. We are convinced that the practice of burial may henceforth be continued without danger either to the present or to any future generation; that there is no need to abandon the use of those cemeteries it has cost so much to procure, and which are regarded by those for whom they are provided with just pride and satisfaction, as among the most evident sanitary and social improvements of our time;—nay more, which are regarded as of especial and peculiar sanctity by those whose dear ones sleep in them, to which they feel bound by the most tender associations of affectionate

* "The Treatment of the Body after Death," CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, Jan. 1874.

regret, and in which the last sad services can be most appropriately paid to the dead without any risk of injury or annoyance to the living.

Sir Henry, of course, allows what no one doubts, that there is no real difference, except as to the time occupied and the slowness of the changes undergone, between rapid decomposition by fire and slow decay in the grave; that the ultimate result is the same in both cases; and that the resolution of our bodies into their constituent elements cannot be avoided, and need not be retarded. He is not, however, quite accurate in describing that result to be the formation of water, of ammonia, and of carbonic acid, as the chief products; for if the decomposition either with or without fire be complete, no ammonia will be formed in the soil, or, if formed, it will be converted before it need escape either into the air or be carried off by water, in the form either of uncombined nitrogen, or changed into some compound of that element with oxygen, such as nitric or nitrous acid, to appear in the form of nitrates or nitrites, probably of lime, in the effluent water. Any of these products are perfectly harmless, and, in the quantities found, only to be objected to when they afford evidence of past putrescence, and may therefore possibly be accompanied by matter not yet so completely changed in form as to be perfectly innocent.

Sir Henry, however, not content with warning us against the real and serious danger arising from animal matter while in process of putrefaction, tries to excite apprehension of injury from that which may be, and in all reasonable probability must be, as completely decomposed as if it had passed through fire. In the following passage, the italics in which are mine, he states, not merely that burial may be, but *inevitably must be*, sooner or later, injurious either to us, or to our *children's children*; from which injury there is, he thinks, no possible escape except by the entire discontinuance of the practice:—

“At present we who dwell in towns are able to escape much evil by selecting a portion of ground distant—in this year of grace—some *five or ten miles* * from any very populous neighbourhood, and by sending our dead to be buried there:—laying by *poison* nevertheless, it is *certain*, for our *children's children*, who will find our remains polluting their water sources, when that now distant plot is covered, as it will be, more or less closely by human dwellings. For it can be a question of time only *when every now waste spot will be utilized for food-production or for shelter*, and when some other mode of disposing of the dead must be adopted. If, therefore, burial in the soil be certainly

* In ordinary instances a tenth of this distance would be sufficient, if it be in a direction towards which the town is not likely soon to extend.

injurious either now or in the future, has not the time already come to discuss the possibility of replacing it by a better process."

There is great virtue in an if; and IF the present mode of disposing of the dead be *certainly* injurious, the time has already come, not *merely* for discussing, but for adopting, and even for compelling the adoption of a better plan, just as the time had arrived some twenty years ago for compelling the abandonment of burying the dead in crowded churchyards, amidst the dwellings of the living;—a practice now almost everywhere abolished, or confined within such prudent limits as to be no longer a cause for reasonable apprehension, with such exceptions, indeed, as from time to time come to light, to be in their turn amended. A very heavy expense has been incurred, and very wisely incurred, in providing amply large and well-situated cemeteries, to render it possible for burial to be continued without danger, that is, without, not the possibility, but the probability of injury. These cemeteries, generally very large in proportion to the number of dead to be buried in them, have been established for London and for nearly every large town, and for very many villages, under the belief, which experience has proved to be a rational belief, that all cause for reasonable apprehension is thereby removed. That such places of burial, well situated as they generally are, may be mismanaged so as to become unsafe, is quite true, for so long as men are men, mistakes, and worse than mistakes, will occasionally occur; but in order that faults of management may not be seriously dangerous, as well as for other evident reasons, it is right and prudent that cemeteries should not be too near dwellings. However small a danger may be, it is foolish to incur it, and wrong to expose others to it needlessly. But the real danger from a well-situated and well-managed cemetery, large in proportion to the number of its burials, is not greater than from a well-managed railway; and it would be hard to find in either any but the very rarest instances of injury sustained, except from palpable mismanagement. To give up burial, therefore, because of the very slight amount of its *inevitable* danger would be as wise, or rather as foolish, as to give up the safest known mode of travelling, because one railway passenger in some eight or ten millions gets killed. The simple fact is, that it is not so much the burial, as the unburial of the dead that is dangerous, including of course in that term the disturbance of soil impregnated with putrefying, but not yet putrefied, animal matter. In cemeteries of ample size there is, however, little temptation and no excuse for incurring this risk, or that of placing in the soil a larger quantity of putrescible matter than it, and the plants on it, will completely absorb, or than the air carried down by rain and dew will thoroughly decompose. In proportion as we secure these

conditions is our safety, for then we shall have as perfect a combustion of putrescent matter as if it were burnt with fire; the ashes left in the soil will be as inoffensive as are those of the funeral pyre, while it will be far more easy to ensure the process being completed without offence, than it could be if done by fire. Besides, the latter process would necessarily require the active superintendence of a class of men, whose services for such an office it would be scarcely possible always to obtain; while it is evident that imperfectly conducted burning of the dead would be inexpressibly shocking, and apt not rarely to occur.

Sir Henry appears to allow, what anyone would be bold indeed to deny, that burial need not be injurious now; what he fears is, that by it we are laying by poison for our children's children. But is it so? If no more dead be buried in the soil than the free oxygen contained in rain and dew carried through it will decompose, and if such soil be left undisturbed until the process of decay is completed, and if, as is almost certain to be the case, the use of such ground for burial be discontinued, at the latest, when it becomes full of the remains that do not decay, and probably long before, such places will be neither harmful while they are used for burial, nor anything but beneficial when such use of them is discontinued, as then they will become large decorative gardens or small parks,—reservoirs of fresh air; and, when forgotten as burial grounds, will be used as places for exercise, at once ornamental and useful. But says Sir Henry, "it is only a question of time when every waste spot will be utilized for food-production, or for shelter." Perhaps every *waste* spot may be so utilized, but I deny that open ornamental places near towns are waste spots; they are on the contrary eminently useful, and there is not any greater probability of the cemeteries being utilized, as imagined, than that the parks and squares of London will be so. What do we see in our own time? Is every old burial-place eagerly sold for gain? Yes, when individual profit can be made by its sale, and when such sale is unrestrained by law; but when a few years ago it was proposed to sell the unused churchyards, as well as the churches not needed in the city of London, the idea was at once abandoned: when the sale of the Bunhill Fields burial-ground was threatened it seemed likely to excite a little rebellion; and no part of the cemeteries newly established under the Burial Act can ever be sold without the consent of the Secretary of State, nor with his consent can any portions of them that have been consecrated or used for burial be sold or be "utilized either for food-production or shelter." Parliament only can sanction that, and the probability of obtaining leave to "utilize for food or shelter" cemeteries that would

be far more useful as open places, is small indeed. What right have we to suppose that our successors will be less delicate in feeling than we are, or act more foolishly than we do ourselves?

Sir Henry fears injury from buried remains through the water sources being polluted; and doubtless the risk of drinking the soakage from cemeteries should be, *and is*, carefully guarded against. Where are the cemeteries the drainage from which is allowed to mix with water used for drinking, except, indeed, after passing through such a quantity of soil as renders it certain that it cannot do so without any organic matter it may contain being completely decomposed? That shallow wells near burial-grounds are often unfit sources for drinking-water is quite true, but those near cesspools or sewers are far more dangerous, and it is rarely possible when the larger danger is avoided, for the smaller one to be incurred. In short, shallow wells are rarely safe, and deep ones rarely dangerous; but even granting that wells near burial-grounds should, if not from prudence, at least from delicacy, be abandoned, such abandonment is a trifling inconvenience compared with the total abandonment of burial at a reasonable, but not too small a distance; and in very many cases it would be no inconvenience whatever, water supply being obtained, or obtainable, from distant sources, whence no such danger need be feared. This is, however, a danger to be avoided by careful selection of sites both for burial-grounds and for wells, more especially for wells, the neighbourhood of cesspools being their chief and most frequent cause of mischief. It is, indeed, straining at a gnat while swallowing a camel, to object to a burial-ground half-a-mile from a well, while tolerating a cesspool within a few yards; but I have often known it done. I have known also a churchyard suspected as the cause of polluting wells, when those nearest to it were not polluted, while others more distant were, the latter being nearer to the drain from which the pollution really proceeded, as the presence of excess of chlorides in the water clearly showed. Nay, I have not unfrequently detected attempts to attribute mischief to a burial-ground which really arose from another cause—attempts made, too, by those whose duty it was to remove that cause of mischief, which duty they were thus seeking to evade. Once an endeavour was made, by the Officer of Health of a very large town, to convince me that to bury dead bodies four feet under ground, fifty yards from a house, was dangerous (as in that case I think it was), but that a ton of night-soil in an open midden, close under the windows, would be perfectly safe, if covered with a sprinkling of dry soil or ashes: and a very strange contention I considered it.

Sir Henry appears to have persuaded himself that cremation of

our dead would be less painful than burial to the feelings of surviving friends, and to our own feelings in anticipation. Certainly it would prevent the possibility of being buried alive; but the English custom of postponing burial for some days (often too many!) is an effectual safeguard against that sad mistake; and cremation is just as likely to be improperly postponed as burial, or, if not, the chance, however remote, of being burned alive would be as unpleasant to think of as of being buried alive; though in neither case might there be any actual suffering, for life in a buried coffin would probably cease before consciousness was recovered. The supposed cases of those buried having struggled in their coffins on reviving from a trance, are far more likely to have been accidental disturbance of the body by the carelessness of those who carried the coffins; excepting, perhaps, in some very rare and rather doubtful instances of revival after burial following very soon—too soon—upon apparent death.

Sir Henry further tries to show that, because the process of gradual decomposition would, if witnessed, be very shocking, what he represents as the much less shocking process of burning should, therefore, be substituted for it. But what occurs in the depth of the grave is not seen, and is therefore not much thought of, and we "bury our dead out of our sight" that it may not be seen. "What the eye seeth not the heart regardeth not," and it is well it is so. Every day processes go on within our bodies, hidden from sight, little thought of, and the less thought of the better done; which if seen would be inexpressibly unpleasant,—for example, the processes of digestion, secretion, &c. If, however, we give up the bodies of our friends to be burned, we could not avoid thinking of what would be exceedingly painful to contemplate, however carefully the painful ceremony might be conducted—a ceremony which would, we are told, last three or four hours. First, there would be something analogous to baking, to drive off the constituent water which forms so large a part of our bodies, so that the remainder, reduced to dryness, might be inoffensively burnt to ashes. No doubt if sufficient care be taken, no actual nuisance need be caused; but neither need any annoyance accompany or follow burial, if proper care be taken, and much less elaborate care is needed to avoid it. What, then, is the use of substituting an artificial for a natural process, identical in the changes produced and in ultimate result, more especially as the one is far more liable to mishaps of a shocking nature than the other?

The last of Sir Henry's arguments against burial which I shall notice, is one he can hardly have expected us to accept seriously. He seems to regret that fertilising matters should, by being buried deep in the soil, be placed where it will lie dormant for many years, instead of being

quickly utilized—it is to be supposed, for food-production, for in, a note he mentions the large importation of bones and other phosphates (to the annual value of, it is said, £700,000) needed to maintain and increase the fertility of this little island. If this is not meant to be a suggestion that we should use our fathers' ashes as turnip-dressing, which would be worse than to "botanise on a mother's grave," it is hard to see what is intended; and if that be what is meant, why stop there? Why not, as we easily might, dry and reduce to powder the flesh as well as the bones of our relatives and friends, to be used as a substitute for guano—thereby saving the whole amount of £700,000 a year, which, divided amongst the thirty million inhabitants of the British Isles, would amount to the magnificent sum of sixpence a head every year, obtained at the trifling cost of outraging family affection, and desecrating what most of us regard with tender reverence? Such a proposal is about as likely to be adopted as would be that of resorting to cannibalism to reduce the cost of butcher's meat. This would do the dead no harm, and do no mischief to the living, except by converting us into a nation of savage barbarians—or rather, we should have to become such before we could even consider the possibility of adopting any of these economies. Sir Henry must be poking fun at us, he cannot be serious; but the joke is rather grim.

Another suggested mode of disposing of the dead, that of sinking them in the depths of the ocean, has far more to recommend it—at least less to condemn it—than that of burning them; for it need be attended with nothing revolting to our feelings. It would, however, be substituting a very troublesome plan for our present much easier one, which need not be attended with any danger either to ourselves or our successors, if we be careful to observe a few simple and inexpensive precautions in the use of our burial grounds, selecting them in proper situations, and obtaining others as soon as those now used become, for any reason, unfit for further use. Nor need we begrudge the very moderate amount of land needed for this purpose, even if it be never again used for production at any time, however distant. Assuming, what is absurdly improbable, that all England should ever become as populous as London now is, in proportion to its area, it would be in the highest degree desirable, if not indispensably necessary, that large open spaces should be preserved for health and exercise; and to this most useful purpose old burial grounds when disused as places of sepulture could, as many have been, be converted. It is a glaring abuse of language to speak of such employment of land as wasted, for it would be in the highest degree useful: and the more dense the population becomes, the more evident and important will that utility become also. There is, therefore, no

present need, or future probability, for even considering the discontinuance of the most ancient and most generally adopted mode of disposing of our dead, far less for adopting a plan involving a change in the form of our sublime and tender Burial Service. If we have to commit the body of "our dearly beloved brother," not to the earth, but to the flames, of course an alteration would be needed, but I submit that the new form would sometimes be so unpleasantly suggestive as to be alone sufficient to insure the prompt rejection of the entire proposal.

Throughout this paper I have necessarily drawn upon my long experience in this matter, as Medical Inspector of Burials in England and Wales, yet it must be distinctly understood that I write in my private, not my official capacity, and that I alone am responsible for the opinions given.

P. H. HOLLAND.



HOW SHALL WE DEAL WITH THE RUBRICS?

"The Book of Common Prayer expresses the ideal of the Anglican system, . . . rather than anything which has ever been generally realized ; while a conscientious clergyman will strive after the realizing of this ideal, he is not bound to put everything in practice at once, if there be difficulties in the way from the circumstances of the time, from prevailing notions and tempers, but is at liberty to go to work gradually and cautiously ; and those who are over us have [or ought to have] an authority sufficient to warrant us in any such variations as do not contradict the spirit of the Prayer-Book."

THESE observations, quoted, with one or two trifling variations, from the Preface to Canon Robertson's well-known work, "How shall we Conform to the Liturgy ?" contain the substance of what the present paper proposes to amplify and defend. The questions which they involve will probably be discussed in the course of the present year, if not in the present month, and it may therefore be worth while briefly to consider them.

1. The allegation of Canon Robertson, sustained with an amount of learning which would make his work worth reading if it were the dullest book in the world, and with an amount of wit which would make it worth reading if it were the most ignorant book in the world, is that the Rubrics of the Prayer-Book, although good as general rules, never have been, and never could have been, exactly followed out ; that, in fact, they are, in many instances, self-contradictory, and in many other instances have been uniformly set at

nought in practice. The same position is maintained in three elaborate articles in the *Quarterly Review*, on the comparison of Rubrics and Usage, in the 72nd, the 89th, and the 102nd volumes, of which the following extracts may suffice to give the results of an argument ably followed through many pages:—

“The supreme authority on all subjects connected with ritual is the Rubric. But the Rubric, unless its inconsistencies be explained and its blanks filled up by usage, is a most insufficient guide for the celebration of divine service, and in some instances it has been so far modified by usage, that a return to its letter appears in the light of an innovation. Unlike the common law of the State, the common law of the Church is not consolidated by a series of judicial decisions. It is the silent growth of good sense, the love of order, and the moderation of the clergy and their rulers; and when it is called in question there are few written records wherein it is declared, and no legal sanction whereby it may be enforced. . . .

“The incompleteness of the Rubric is a natural consequence of the course of the Reformation. The change of the religion and ecclesiastical polity of the country was not the work of a day, nor the result of an uniform and steady impulsion. In its progress it represented the struggles of men who only by degrees acquired strength to carry out their convictions to their logical consequences. In its ultimate results it was the aggregate agreement of a multitude of independent thinkers who differed on many non-essential points. . . .

“Neither now nor at any previous time has the Rubric of the Church given the precise rule of her practice. . . .

“It is not prescribed what antiquity or wealth of foundation, what degree of architectural grandeur, what affluence of clergy and choristers, or what length of custom or prescription is to justify the more ornate performance of the service. Then as now the matter is left to the discretion of the minister and churchwardens, checked by the authority of the Ordinary. . . .

“It is doubtless a disappointment to some that the law is not found to speak more plainly: not a few of the disputants on both sides would desire to supply the deficiency by more stringent regulations in favour of their own views, while among the moderate and indifferent many would be glad of any settlement that would silence the din of disputation. But an authoritative decision would probably only raise up candidates for martyrdom, the cheap martyrdom of modern days; and the cause of truth can only be injured by calling into play that heterogeneous mass of motive which an angry disputant calls his conscience. If our predecessors, who had ample power of coercion in their hands, saw the folly of attempting to confine the inflammable vapour of polemical controversy with hoops of

iron, now-a-days it were not less vain than unwise to seek to bind them with bands of straw." *

In short, the rubrical directions of the Prayer-Book, perhaps not in theory, but certainly in the practice of former times, resemble the Directory of the Westminster Assembly. They are the framework of the English worship—they can be appealed to as authoritative expositions of the law—they can be enforced in courts of law—but they never have been (and it is presumed by these learned writers that they never were intended to be) followed out in every particular. The maxim of Archbishop Tillotson has been again and again acted upon, "Charity is above Rubrics;" and we may add, not only "Charity," but "Common sense, is above Rubrics." Unless the Rubrics were inspired with a preternatural instinct of foreseeing every incident that would occur—unless, we may add, religious worship were reduced to a mere mechanical process, to be performed not by living human creatures, but by automatons,—this is self-evident.

2. Then arises the question—If this be so, why should any alteration of the Rubrics be needed? Why should not the actual regulations of the Prayer-Book assimilate themselves, without any express legal enactment, by the mere action of "Charity and common sense," to the constantly varying state of things? There are two reasons which prevent our acquiescing in a conclusion otherwise so reasonable and so well supported. One of these has, in great measure, disappeared—the other still continues in force.

The first is, or rather was, that the old subscriptions imposed by the Act of Uniformity, were in direct variance with the practice of the Church. The requirement from every beneficed clergyman that he should declare his "unfeigned assent and consent to all and everything contained and prescribed in the Book of Common-Prayer," seemed to make each minute particular in the Book as binding as the most important.

This rigid view of Subscription was sometimes enforced practically, both in the last century and in this. Archdeacon Sharp, in his work upon the Rubric and Canons, writes :—"We have by repeated engagements [which he enumerates] tied ourselves down to a regular, constant, conscientious performance of all and everything prescribed in and by the Book of Common-Prayer; and since this is said to be undertaken *ex animo*, how frivolous is it for any of us to say that the connivance or the presumed consent of our Ordinary, or the private convenience of ourselves or families, or the obliging any of our parishioners, or the apparent inexpediency of adhering to the letter in some few cases, will dissolve this our obligation." Thus also the late eminent Bishop Blomfield, in his Charge to the

* Quarterly Review, vol. cii., pp. 88, 89, 91, 92.

clergy of London in 1842, repeated words which he had formerly addressed to the clergy of Chester. "Conformity to the Liturgy implies, of course, an exact observance of the Rubric. We are no more at liberty to vary the mode of performing any part of public worship than we are to preach doctrines at variance with the Articles of Religion. Far from questioning the *right* of the clergy to observe the Rubric in every particular, I know it to be their duty; and the only doubt is how far are *we* [the bishops] justified in not enforcing such observance in every instance."

But within the last seven years these special grounds for such a minute enforcement of the Rubric have been swept away. All these stringent subscriptions to each particular statement in the Prayer-Book and in the Articles were abolished by the Clerical Subscription Act, and in their place was substituted a general requirement of assent and conformity to the doctrine of the two documents taken as a whole, purposely omitting all specification of details.*

It is true that from time to time such rigid language as I have before quoted has been revived, but this arises from an astonishing ignorance or forgetfulness of the recent legislation to which we have just referred. When, for example, in a sharp skirmish which ensued during the last Convocation between two well-known Prelates, one of these Prelates insisted on the necessity of all clergymen adhering to every word of the Thirty-nine Articles, such an assertion was in direct defiance of the words of the Act, and of the express declaration of the Royal Commissioners who framed the Subscription. Such revivals of an obsolete bondage, no doubt, must be guarded against. But this is a matter which the clergy have in their own hands, and by constantly claiming as regards the Liturgy the freedom which the law has given to them, they need not on this ground be under any apprehension of those deviations from the letter of the Rubric to which we have referred.

But, secondly, although the particular forms which required a preliminary approbation of the law have been altered, the law itself continues unchanged; and in regard to this a new difficulty has arisen in the way of continuing the easy common-sense system of the earlier periods of the English Church. On the one hand the increased revival of party zeal, and the re-enforcement of these Rubrical enactments, which began with the Oxford Tracts, has created a state of feeling on behalf of rigid observance which did not exist sixty years ago. Those who remember the early "Tracts for the Times" will know that the endeavour to revive the Rubrics was one of their chief objects, and the eager attempts to enforce them have been one of the

* For the proof of this in detail, I venture to refer to my "Essays on Church and State," pp. 212—222."

most lasting and, we may add, lamentable effects of that movement. Alongside with this, there has also been, upon the part of many of the clergy, a more scrupulous endeavour to conform themselves to what they knew to be the law of the land ; and this scruple has increased, and not unreasonably, in consideration of the increasing disregard of legal bonds, which makes it desirable for the loyal ministers alike of the State and the Church to discourage so far as they can, by their own example, this growing tendency towards ecclesiastical anarchy.

3. Therefore, when the Royal Commission on the Ritual and Rubrics of the Church was issued a few years ago, it was to be expected that the Commissioners should endeavour to produce some harmony between the latitude which existed in practice and the theory of the law. They also were animated in some instances at least by a wish to take that opportunity of extending the usefulness and influence of the Church by making such changes in the Rubrics as would manifestly, upon the face of them, bring the Church more nearly to the level of the higher Christian ideal which the nineteenth century possesses over the seventeenth.

On the particular recommendations of the Royal Commission, we do not here offer any remark. It is enough to indicate that there was nothing in itself unreasonable or inexpedient in their wish to bring about these improvements, and it must be added that, according to the almost invariable usage during the periods when the Reformed Church of England was gradually established on its present basis, there would have been no insuperable difficulty in carrying them out. The revisions of the sixteenth century, namely, those in the First Book of Edward the Sixth, those in the Second, and those in the reign of Elizabeth, were carried through the Legislature in substantially the same manner as all other Ecclesiastical changes down to our own time ; that is to say, on the recommendation either of Commissions appointed by the Crown or of the Bishops in concert with the Ministers of State, measures were suggested to Parliament, and when approved passed at once into law. The only exception is the last revision of the Liturgy in 1662. At that time, no doubt partly from a natural desire, after the convulsions of the great Civil War, to observe every formality both in Church and State with the most punctilious accuracy—partly under the pressure of the then dominant party of Laud, represented in the matter of Convocation by his venerable chaplain, Peter Heylin—the assent of the two Convocations of Canterbury and York was for the first and only time fully and expressly recognised in the Act which gave legal force to the changes. Even then the consent of the Convocation of York was only procured under the pain of incurring the penalties of *Præmunire*, if it dissented from the consent given by its delegates. In

the judgment of any who calmly consider the violent temper of the time, and the disastrous results which followed from the Act, it is not a precedent which can safely be invoked. In those earlier revisions, as just cited, of Edward VI. and Elizabeth, no such consent of Convocation is recorded in any of the Acts; and that of Elizabeth formally excludes the assent of the Bishops. What was true of the three first Acts of Uniformity is true of all the other Ecclesiastical changes passed in those reigns. Not in the Act of the Sacrament of the Altar (1 Edw. VI. c. 1), nor on Chantryes (1 Edw. VI. c. 14), nor on Abstinence in Lent (2 & 3 Edw. VI. c. 19), nor on the Marriage of Priests (2 & 3 Edw. VI. c. 21, 5 & 6 Edw. VI. c. 12), nor on the Abolishing of Images (3 & 4 Edw. VI. c. 10), nor on Holydays and Fasting Days (5 & 6 Edw. VI. c. 3), nor on the Royal Supremacy (1 Eliz. c. 1, 5 Eliz. c. 1*), nor on the Translation of the Bible into Welsh (5 Eliz. c. 28), nor on the Consecration of the Bishops (8 Eliz. c. 1), nor on Subscription* (13 Eliz. c. 12), is the assent of Convocation named. The assent of the southern or of the northern provinces may or may not have been given, but with the exception of 13 & 14 Charles II. c. 4, s. 1, their claim to a voice in determining the course of legislation has never received a constitutional recognition. And when we come down to later times†, the same abstinence from any reference to Convocation was maintained. Acts so materially affecting the condition of the Church as the Toleration Act, the Act for removing the Disabilities of the Roman Catholics, the Test Act, the Clerical Subscription Act, the Act for abolishing the Political Services which Convocation itself had framed, the Irish Church Act, were all passed without the slightest regard to Convocation. In one instance only—that of the abolition of the ancient Clerical Subscriptions—Convocation assented to what was already incorporated in the Act of Parliament, and in that Act its assent was neither required nor noticed. It is only within the last five years that the novel practice has been introduced of inviting in a formal manner the assent of the four bodies of the Upper and Lower House of the Convocation of Canterbury and the Upper and Lower House

* In these two Acts, not for the main purpose of the Act, but incidentally, Convocation is mentioned.

† It is sometimes said that what was reasonable in former times has become unreasonable now, because (as is alleged) Parliament has since those times been opened to Dissenters. This allegation is itself an historical error of the most palpable kind. There never was a time when Protestant Dissenters were excluded from either House. In the Long Parliament, in the reign of Charles I., there were many more Dissenters in the House of Commons than there are now. And even Roman Catholics sat in the House of Lords till 1672. And even were the presence of Nonconformists in Parliament an innovation, it is exceedingly important for the interests of a National Church that Nonconformists as well as Conformists should have at least an indirect interest in its concerns.

of the Convocation of York. Without disparaging any of these bodies, and without saying here anything which I have not already frequently said in that portion of Convocation to which I myself have the honour to belong, it is obvious that such a complicated process must of itself exceedingly impede the possibility of change, and when to this we add the fact that the Lower House of the Convocation of Canterbury (we do not presume to speak of the Upper House of either Province, or of the Lower House of the Northern Province), is so peculiarly constituted as to represent chiefly one current of clerical opinion, often adverse, not merely to the opinion of the educated laity, but also of the clergy themselves, the entanglement becomes still more complex. It is certain that on a recent question affecting the change* of one of the Rubrics, whereas of those who signed petitions on one side or the other, at least half the clergy had expressed themselves strongly in favour of such change, yet in the Lower House of the Convocation of Canterbury, only twelve were found to advocate it out of a body of nearly 200, and of those twelve far the larger number were *ex officio* members. Such a wide divergence between the actual feeling of the clergy at large and this body proves that the changes which the general opinion of the Church and the clergy deem necessary, can hardly be expected to pass through an assembly which so very inadequately corresponds to the general sentiment of those whose representatives it is supposed to contain.

There is one other difficulty in the way of Legislative change, especially when requiring the assent of the ecclesiastical assemblies, which cannot be overlooked. The decisions to which they may arrive on any particular Rubric represent the floating opinion—we may say, the floating fashion, or fancy—of the moment in which they happen to be made. The more they descend to detail the more does this temporary character of their decisions become manifest. Nothing is more evident than that these shifting fancies are liable to the most entire reversal within a very small number of years. Take, for instance, the question of the dresses of the clergy. Not twenty years ago, the use of the surplice in the pulpit was regarded as the badge of a particular party, and was endeavoured to be carried against unwilling congregations almost at the point of the sword. Yet now, the very party which so much insisted upon it, regards it as very little better than a Protestant rag hardly worth wearing at all. I have often quoted the story of an old woman who was present at a crisis in the church of St. George's-in-the-East, and waited to see what vestment the clergyman would wear when he came out of the vestry, and on seeing that he came

* The permission to disuse the Athanasian Creed.

out in a gown and not in a surplice, burst into tears and said, "Thank God, it is black"—and in quoting this story I have had occasion to remark that had she lived to our time she might have been led to exclaim—"Thank God, it is white."

Again, it was the custom some twenty or thirty years ago to press every one to communicate upon every possible occasion. It now seems the fixed object of the same school to provide for as large a number of persons as possible to attend without communicating. Of all the petitions which were presented to the Lower House of the Convocation of Canterbury during the last two years, next to those which related to the Athanasian Creed, the largest number have been to evoke and encourage the attendance of non-communicants.

4. Such are the difficulties of legislation in detail. Such also are the reasons which make the actual observance of the Rubrics impossible, and which, therefore, might seem to make some legislation almost necessary. The remedy in substance which we would venture to propose is, that which perhaps exists sufficiently if the clergy with the bishops were determined to avail themselves to the utmost of its use, or which perhaps may need some further extension to make it fully available. But whether the facility exists or need to be sought, the general remarks which we shall make will equally apply. What we would suggest is that the variations from the Rubrics which either actually prevail, or which may be deemed necessary for the greater efficiency of the Church, should be considered to have legal sanction, subject to such checks as may be devised for the maintenance of the general law and usage of the Church, in all cases where they are approved by the Ordinary. This principle, it is obvious, involves the two propositions laid down in the sentence quoted above from Canon Robertson's work on the Liturgy. On the one hand, the general framework of the Prayer-Book might be left intact, which in itself bears with it a considerable advantage. For, although there are cases in which the Rubrics or the forms of the Prayer-Book as revised in the seventeenth century may be so contrary to the increased knowledge which two centuries have happily conferred upon the Church, as to be manifestly untenable—although there is an advantage in showing from actual changes on the face of the Prayer-Book, that the Church is not dead, but living—that its old trunk can still put forth, as in the case of the new Calendar of Lessons, green shoots which imply a rising sap within the stem; yet there is a genuine historical interest in keeping as far as possible unchanged a document like the Prayer-Book, which is one of the very few works of any kind that, on the whole, command the

affection and the reverence of the whole country. And the inconvenience to which we just adverted of endeavouring to stereotype afresh upon future generations the particular feeling of our own time, certainly militates against incorporating into the Prayer-Book any detailed regulation which may for after years sow the same harvest of dragons'-teeth as was sown by our forefathers of the seventeenth century in the ambiguous Rubric on Ornaments. What we want is not what may commend itself to the passing sentiment of the majority of this generation, still less what may commend itself to the passing sentiment of a slender majority of a single party in one branch of the two Convocations; but a power of in some degree adapting the Rubrics to the exigencies of cases that may arise, and at the same time to do this without interfering with the general structure or substantial unity of the Church. In behalf of the principle that such relaxation should be allowed to depend upon the Ordinary, several important precedents may be quoted which show that it is entirely in accordance with the general spirit of the constitution of the Church. First, it is in strict conformity with the tenor of that Rubric at the beginning of the Prayer-book, which provides that if any doubts arise, they shall be solved by reference to the Bishop of the Diocese or the Archbishop of the Province. Such a provision (although, owing to the hardening and stiffening process which inevitably goes on with regard to legal enactments, it has been found almost useless for practical purposes) was evidently intended to cover a much wider ground than that which is now found possible under its shelter. Secondly, it is in strict conformity with the regulation with regard to the Ornaments of the Church, which was introduced into the Act of Uniformity under Queen Elizabeth—an Act which is conceived in a very different spirit from the harsh and rigorous Act of Charles the Second, and which, instead of laying down one paramount rule upon this matter, allows the question to be decided by constant reference to living authority.* Thirdly, the principle has been recognized, not only in these instances of ancient legislation, but also within our own time. In the New Lectionary Act there is special provision made for the Ordinary on occasions approved by him, to relax the provisions laid down in that Act. And, again, in the Act for the Shortening of Services, commonly called the Act of Uniformity Amendment Act, there is a clause enabling the Ordinary upon special occasions to substitute any service for that literally prescribed by law, provided that it consist of words from the Prayer-Book and from Scripture, and hymns.

In speaking to Englishmen, it is needless to go beyond those pre-

* The authority of the Queen's Majesty, with the advice of the Commissioners appointed and authorized under the Great Seal of England for Causes Ecclesiastical, or the Metropolitan of the realm.

cedents drawn from the history of our own Church. But if we wish to take a wider ecclesiastical view, it is not irrelevant to point to the fact that in the early Church the Liturgy of each Diocese depended entirely upon the will of its bishop. To that state of things we have no wish to recommend a return. A national Church must of necessity have a greater coherence and unity of structure than marked the undeveloped and, if we may use the expression, semi-barbarous churches which existed in the fourth and fifth centuries. But to those who profess to be guided by Catholic antiquity, the ancient precedent may not be without its use.

5. We will now proceed to state, by way of answer to obvious objections, the reason why such a liberty is not likely to degenerate into license, or the checks by which it can be prevented from doing so. In the first place, if the Rubrics were left as they are, unaltered, but with the understanding, expressed or implied, that they were liable to be thus relaxed, it would still be possible to enforce them by law in all such cases as had not received the sanction of the Ordinary. Secondly, the Ordinary, if necessary, might be controlled either as under the provisions of the Act of Elizabeth, by requiring the consent of the Privy Council, or of the Archbishop of the Province, who, as occupying so high and responsible a situation, might surely be entrusted both with the desire to maintain the general unity of the Church, and also as not giving his sanction to any extravagant vagaries. Thirdly, we may be encouraged by the reflection that, on the whole, the inertness or indisposition to change, and the tendency to move in prescribed grooves, constitute a power almost sufficient to counterbalance any violent rush in an opposite direction. Take, for example, the instances of relaxation which we have already cited. How often, or rather, it may be said, how seldom, have the clergy, since the adoption of the New Lectionary, invoked, as they legally might, the sanction of their Ordinary for substituting other lessons than those which the Act of Parliament lays down. Again, take the case of the Authorized Version. The reading of the Authorized Version in the Lessons of the Church rests entirely upon custom, and in no instance upon any prescribed law. The use of the Authorized Version in Church never received the sanction, as far as the Lessons are concerned, either of Parliament, or of the Sovereign, or even of Convocation; yet how very rarely does any clergyman take upon himself, except in a few well-known instances in the Historical Books of the Old Testament, the liberty of deviating from its expressions. Or again, take the case of other Churches than our own. The Presbyterian Church of Scotland, as is well known, has no liturgy prescribed by law—even the Directory is not actually binding as a rule of legislation; yet, so entirely has custom regulated the usage of the Church of Scotland, that it is only in very rare exceptions that we

find any variation in the usual order of hymns and prayers. So much so is this the case, that, as is well known, when two eminent prelates of our Church officiated some three years ago in a Presbyterian Church, and wished to conduct the form according to Presbyterian usage, the minister of the parish was enabled to lay before them a precise schedule of the manner in which in his church, as well as in all other parishes in the Highlands, the service ought to be conducted. If a danger of excessive variations were to be apprehended we should have already seen it under our existing system. Fourthly, amongst the checks which may be named are such as may be easily suggested by those who are anxious for the establishment of parochial councils in particular parishes. This, of course, would not cover the whole ground, inasmuch as college chapels, collegiate churches, and cathedrals, could have no corresponding body in relation to them. But it is worth mentioning as amongst the conceivable restraints on a too unlimited deviation. The practical question, therefore, is in what way such a liberty should be recognized. It may be, as we have already said, that the large relaxation already afforded by the *Lectinary Act* and by the *Act of Uniformity Amendment Act* combined, is sufficient for the purpose. In that case all that need be urged is that this relaxation should be openly avowed—that the clergy should not throw stones at each other for taking advantage of a relaxation which the law has thus afforded to them. But if these Acts should be insufficient, it might then be suggested whether it will not be advisable, under existing difficulties, to procure an enactment legalizing the sanction of the Ordinary to such deviations as from time to time, and from place to place, may be thought necessary for the greater efficiency of the Church. And here we would finally notice the objections which may be urged against entrusting so great a power to any single individuals, however eminent in the Church. We first reply that they have it perhaps already in a sufficient degree to meet all the requirements of the case, and yet there have not arisen instances of any evil results following therefrom. We would urge, besides, that there appears to be something absurd in an Episcopal Church refusing to its Bishops that confidence which, in all Presbyterian Churches, is granted without scruple to the Presbyter or to the Presbyteries of each particular congregation. We would further urge that there is a far greater chance of the wisdom and discretion of true charity and of insight into truth in individual clergy (much more in individual* Bishops or Ordinaries) than there is any ecclesiastical

* For an exceedingly just and able estimate of the superior value of the judgments of individual bishops over the judgments either of the whole bench collectively, or of any synodical decision, see the *Quarterly Review*, vol. lxxii., pp. 241, 242.

synod or assembly. Take the greatest ecclesiastical assembly which has been held in our time—the Council of the Vatican. On that occasion, it is certain that almost any individual prelate who was present was more likely to have arrived at the truth than the nine hundred Bishops collectively, who, as it turned out, voted or accepted a statement, which, individually, the majority of the most distinguished members of the Council had declared to be an absolute falsity.* Another apprehension which in some minds might arise from the exercise of this liberty would be, that it would open the door to those wide deviations in the direction of the Church of Rome which cause so much discomfort and alarm among some of our best laymen and clergy. We would reply first that these deviations already exist under the present state of things, and that according to the acknowledged principles of the school under whose auspices they are carried on, obedience or disobedience to the Bishop or the Ordinary, is in such matters of no importance whatsoever. And secondly, we would make a remark which is of a more general scope: that the best mode, as in other respects so in this, of counteracting the excesses of any English clergy in a Romeward or Papal direction, is not so much by restraining the particular excesses of a few individuals here and there, whilst we are obliged to leave unrestrained the chief movers and chief fountains of the tendency, but to strengthen in the Church the Protestant elements by giving to them the legal liberty of such deviations as the opposite party have taken for themselves, and of carrying out whatever measures are in themselves thought necessary for the highest interests of the Church, without fear or favour of those whose extravagances in a mediæval direction have caused alarm and disturbance.

In conclusion, these suggestions are made simply with the object of asking those who are chiefly concerned to bring their minds to bear upon the practical question of how the worship of the Church of England is to be carried on for the future, with the least chances of further disunion, and with the best chances of preserving the integrity of the Church, and obedience to the Law, together with that accommodation to the emergencies of the time, and the higher views of Christian truth and charity, which cannot be safely disregarded or set aside.

A. P. STANLEY.

* It would of course be easy, and perhaps advisable, to add to the Bishop or Ordinary assessors, lay or clerical, or both. Such a body—if well constituted—might serve the purpose both of encouragement and restraint. But this may be left to the judgment of the Bishops themselves.



CÆSARISM AND ULTRAMONTANISM.

ARCHBISHOP MANNING'S pamphlet on Cæsarism and Ultramontanism, gives the whole theory of one of the busiest and most conspicuous religious and political parties of the day in clear and emphatic language. I propose in the present Paper to examine that part of it which relates to the Church, leaving for a future occasion the consideration of that part which relates to the State. In order to do this, I will begin by stating the substance of the argument, which takes the form of a history with comments. The history describes first: Cæsarism as understood in ancient Rome, which the Archbishop calls Pagan Cæsarism; then the theory of the relation between Church and State held by Ultramontane Roman Catholics, which he calls Christian Cæsarism; and lastly, the legislation of the Tudors in this country, and that of the Emperor of Germany and the King of Italy in the present day, which he describes as "the Cæsarism of the last age of civil power lapsing or lapsed from Christianity."

The first picture is that of Pagan Cæsarism. Its most striking lines are as follows:—

"The sovereignty of Cæsarism is absolute and dependent on no conditions. It is also exclusive, because it does not tolerate any jurisdiction above and within its own. It does not recognize any laws except of its own making. Now this supreme power need not be held in the hand of one man. It may be a People or a Senate, or a King or an Emperor. Its essence is the claim to absolute and exclusive Sovereignty. It by necessity

excludes God, His sovereignty, and His laws. The sole fountain of law is the human will, individual or collective. * * * Law, morals, politics, and religion all come from him (Cæsar), and all depend upon him."

To crown all, a divine character was conferred upon Cæsar. He was addressed as *Æternitas Tua*, and qualified as *divus*.

The first great check placed upon Cæsarism was imposed by Christianity.

"The political consequences of the Incarnation constitute the essence of the moral, social, domestic, and civil life of men and of nations. * * * There can be no Cæsarism where Christ reigns. Christianity, in consecrating the civil authority of the world, has laid on it the limits of the divine law. Christianity has confirmed the civic power within its own sphere a delegation from God Himself, but by the same act Christianity has limited the sphere of its jurisdiction. It has withdrawn from its cognizance and control the whole inner life of man. The civil power cannot command his intellect, it cannot control his conscience, it cannot coerce his will. Christianity has indeed subjected the outward actions of man to civil government, but it has withdrawn from civil rulers the whole domain of religion. The State may imprison the body or even take its life, but it has no jurisdiction over the soul. All its acts are free; they have no lawgiver or sovereign, but God alone."

This great change was effected by very simple and definite means:—

"The presence of the Catholic Church among the civil powers of the world has changed the whole political order of mankind. It has established upon earth a legislature, a tribunal, and an executive independent of all human authority. It has withdrawn from the reach of human laws the whole domain of faith and conscience. These depend on God alone, and are subjected by Him to His own authority vested in His Church, which is guided by Himself. * * * Obedience to the Church is liberty, and it is liberty because the Church cannot err, or mislead either men or nations. If the Church were not infallible, obedience to it might be the worst of bondage. This is Ultramontaniam, or the liberty of the soul divinely guaranteed by an infallible Church; the proper check and restraint of Cæsarism, as Cæsarism is the proper antagonist of the sovereignty of God."

This statement of principles is followed by a variety of authorities, Gelasius, Constantine, St. Bernard, Thomas Aquinas, are all quoted with due complimentary epithets, and the result of their statements is drawn out in a series of contrasts between the view taken of government by Pagan Cæsarism and Christian Cæsarism respectively. The passage concludes as follows:—"The essence of 'Ultramontaniam' is, that the Church, being a divine institution, and by divine assistance, infallible, is within its own sphere, independent of all civil powers, and as the guardian and interpreter of the Divine Law, is the proper judge of men and of nations in all things touching that law in faith and morals."

A long argument follows to show that Ultramontaniam is "identical with perfect Christianity." The foundation of the argument is that "Christianity has introduced two principles of Divine Authority into human society: the one the absolute separation of the two powers spiritual and civil; and the other, the supremacy of the spiritual over the civil, in all matters within its competency or divine jurisdiction." The extent of this jurisdiction may be matter of doubt, but "except Erastians," no one can deny its existence "without renouncing his Christian name, or the coherence of his principles." The Christian theory is that Civil Sovereignty is from God, but that the Spiritual Power is independent, of which latter doctrine "the existence of the Church and the primacy of its head in these eighteen hundred years are proof enough." Moreover, "no Christian of sound mind will deny that these distinct and separate powers have distinct and separate spheres." He observes that in purely civil and purely ecclesiastical matters, there is no difficulty in seeing this. The difficulty appears only in "mixed" cases, and even as to these there need be no difficulty. The decision as to the limits of the two powers, must be vested in "a judge who can define the limits of the two elements respectively, and therefore of the respective jurisdictions." Now, "who can define what is, or is not, within the jurisdiction of faith and morals except a judge who knows what the sphere of faith and morals contains, and how far it extends?" The spiritual power "knows this with divine certainty," and is "thereby, in matters of religion and conscience, supreme." Archbishop Manning puts this in the most emphatic language. He gives us the essence of Ultramontaniam in the following passage:—

"The Church is separate and supreme. Any power which is independent and can alone fix the limits of its own jurisdiction, and can thereby fix the limits of all other jurisdictions, is *ipso facto* supreme; but the Church of Jesus Christ, within the sphere of revelation, of faith and morals, is all this, or is nothing, or worse than nothing, an imposture, and an usurpation—that is, it is Christ or Antichrist."

He adds:—

"If it be Antichrist every Caesar from Nero to this day is justified. If it be Christ it is the supreme power among men; that is to say:—(1.) It holds its commission and authority from God. (2.) It holds in custody the faith and law of Jesus Christ. (3.) It is the sole interpreter of that faith and the sole expositor of that law; it has within the sphere of that commission a power to legislate, with authority to bind the consciences of all men born again in the baptism of Jesus Christ; it alone can fix the limits of the faith and law entrusted to it, and therefore the sphere of its own jurisdiction; it alone can decide in questions where its power is in contact with the civil power—that is, in mixed questions; for it alone can determine how far its own divine office or its own divine trust enter into and are implicated in such questions;

and it is precisely that element in any mixed question of disputed jurisdiction which belongs to a higher order and a higher tribunal."

As an illustration, Archbishop Manning gives the case of a Professor in a Catholic University, who denounces the syllabus, and is excommunicated by his Bishop for so doing. The State supports and pays him. This, says the Archbishop, is utterly wrong.

"Here is a mixed question of stipend and orthodoxy: surely orthodoxy is a higher element than stipend; faith is of a higher order than thalers, and to judge of orthodoxy and faith belongs not to the Civil, but to the Spiritual tribunal, which is in that sphere superior, absolute, and final."

After this it may appear strange to say that the claims advanced by Archbishop Manning for the Church in this paper are modest in comparison with those which in a different publication he has made for the bishops of the Church and for himself as one of them. If it is not technically correct to say that Archbishop Manning regards himself and others as God incarnate, he does at least distinctly assert that he and they are in some special manner, which is for all practical purposes very like incarnation, connected with the Holy Ghost.

In a book called "*The Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost*"* (on the first page, characteristically enough, is the mark of a crown, under which is printed in quaint letters the word *Humilitas*), occur the following passages:—

"The present dispensation, under which we are, is the dispensation of the Spirit, or of the Third Person of the Holy Trinity. To him in the Divine Economy has been committed the office of applying the redemption of the Son to the souls of men by the vocation, justification, and salvation of the elect. We are therefore under the personal guidance of the Third Person as truly as the Apostles were under the guidance of the Second. The presence of the Eternal Son by incarnation was the centre of their unity; the presence of the Eternal Spirit, by the incorporation of the mystical body, is the centre of unity to us." (pp. 48, 49.)

After much discourse about "passive spiration," and other matters which I do not profess to understand, we come to the following, which is plain enough:—

"The pastoral authority, or the Episcopate, together with the Priesthood and the other orders, constitute an organized body, divinely ordained to guard the deposit of the Faith. The voice of that body, not as so many individuals, but as a body is the voice of the Holy Ghost, that pastoral ministry as a body cannot err, because the Holy Spirit, who is indissolubly united to the mystical body, is eminently and above all united to the hierarchy and body of its pastors."

Such is Archbishop Manning's conception of the Church and its general position and attributes. In a few words, it comes to this—

* Published in 1865 by Messrs. Longman.

the Roman Catholic Church is a divine institution, the leading officers of which are in some way or other directly and personally united with God Almighty. They are the supreme guardians of faith and morals, and are as such supreme over all governments whatever, within a sphere to be defined by themselves. In that sphere they have all power, executive, judicial, and legislative, and they can make, interpret, and execute their own laws, which are sanctioned, I presume, by purgatory or eternal damnation, as the case may be.

The first remark which suggests itself on this theory, is that, to me at least, it appears impossible to deny its coherency. If any man, or any body of men, really is entrusted by God with the custody of a revelation on all the leading points of religion and morals, I do not see how they can fail to occupy the position which Archbishop Manning claims for them. Religion and morals lie at the root of life ; and all the more important forms of human energy must depend upon them, and their operation must be affected and coloured by them. Let us suppose, for instance, that any body of men was in a position to say to mankind, with truth, and in such a manner as to be believed—

“God, an infinitely powerful and benevolent being, resembling you in the matter of consciousness and individual will, made the world and all its contents, human nature and society included. It is a place of trial and preparation for a wider sphere, and we who speak are entrusted by the Author of this Universe, who has in some mysterious way united himself with us, with an explanation, absolutely true as far as it goes, and sufficiently full and clear for every practical purpose, of the position which men occupy in the universe, and of the duties which they have to discharge in the present life. Now in regard to politics our message to men is this. In all matters relating to the preservation of the peace, the distribution of property, and the management of the common affairs of life, they must obey the civil rulers, who are to be found in all parts of the world ; but they must take from us the general theory of the Universe, and their conceptions of right and wrong. The duty of recognizing our supremacy in these points, and of governing themselves accordingly, is binding just as much on rulers as on subjects.”

Whoever could say this with truth, no doubt both would and ought to be the King of the world ; the most powerful temporal ruler would be to such a person or body no more than a sheriff to a judge. Such a ruler would and ought to be able to say, “I give you, the civil power, and lay society in general, to understand that this or that is the truth on the great moral problems which disturb society. This, and nothing else, is the true way of looking at the distribution of property, the relation between the sexes, vice, crime, pauperism, war.

These and no others are the principles on which you should found your legislation and your other proceedings upon this subject—this and no other is the theory of human life.” Moreover, when this was said experience ought to confirm it. The theory ought to recommend itself to men’s minds, and ought upon experiment to succeed. If such were the case, I certainly do not see how we could stop short of Archbishop Manning’s conclusions as to the relation between the Church and the State. Such a Church would leave the State no room for any other functions than those which he assigns to it. The State might no doubt make laws, let us say, to forbid crimes like murder or robbery; but if the ruler of the State did his duty, he would always go to the Church to know whether his definitions of these offences were in harmony with moral theology, and would always be ready to receive as a divine command any intimation on the subject. Thus, for instance, if parliament were debating the subject of the abolition of capital punishment, the debate might at any moment be closed by a papal declaration that capital punishment was immoral and barbarous; or that the objections made to it were sentimental nonsense, and that the hanging of murderers was a moral duty.

It thus becomes a question of urgent practical importance whether the claims made by Archbishop Manning for the Church are true or false. If they are true, of course they ought to be allowed. The Pope and his Bishops ought to be acknowledged as the Spiritual Sovereigns of the world, as the ultimate court of appeal on all questions which can permanently interest rational men, and as the rulers whose decrees must indirectly, at all events, dispose, not only of the thoughts of our hearts, but of the whole colour and tone of our lives, and the disposition of our property. If they are false, they are monstrous. It is difficult to imagine a lower depth of degradation than to surrender absolute control over one’s very soul to a man who, whether a conscious impostor or not, falsely pretends to possess the powers which Archbishop Manning claims.

Are we, then, to say that the claims in question are true or false? Or, rather, what are the reasons why the ordinary run of English people regard them as being about as well founded as the claims of the cardinal who was called Henry IX. to be King of England, though by no means so harmless? Those reasons appear to me to be broad, plain, and of overwhelming force. I will shortly state them, though in a variety of forms they have been stated and re-stated a thousand times. The issue, then, is whether these claims are true or false, and this issue is raised, not between students in theological schools, but between the Roman Catholic clergy and their adherents on the one hand, and the great mass of the educated part of the laity, including in particular the leading statesmen of Germany, England, France,

and Italy, on the other. It is the controversy, in short, between the clergy, or rather that part of the clergy to which Archbishop Manning belongs, and ordinary men of the world. The question, then, for us men of the world, people engaged in the common pursuits, and recognizing, and as a rule acting upon the common worldly maxims of honour and morals, is simply this: Shall we recognize the Roman Catholic clergy as our moral and spiritual sovereigns and guides? I think that the proper answer to this is—Never, unless and until they have proved beyond all reasonable doubt that they are really entitled to that position.

Of course there is a dark and perplexed side of life. We have all great want of light and knowledge, especially about the nature of the world in which we live, and what is to follow it. We are all impelled to dwell upon the questions—What? Whence? Whither? and to catch at any coherent explanation of them which may be offered to us. If any man could and did prove to me that he did really hold the clue of the great labyrinth, that he could really show me how we ought all to live and to die, and why it should be thus and not otherwise, I should regard him as a benefactor and obey his directions faithfully. I should not require from such a person a mathematical demonstration of the truth of his claims. I should require evidence strong enough to exclude all reasonable doubt—the sort of evidence which rational men require in the decision of all weighty practical affairs, that his claims were well founded, and when I was satisfied on that point, though I should always reserve a discretion as to believing what he told me, I should not be at all surprised or offended at his saying, I tell you that this, that, or the other statement, unintelligible to you, does express a truth, and I expect you to believe me.

I do not see how any one can be expected to say more than this; I should decline to argue further with any one who did not admit that a man who surrendered to another man control over his thoughts and actions upon weaker grounds than these hardly deserved to be called a man at all.

The next question is whether Archbishop Manning, as our local English representative of the Roman Catholic clergy, has made out, or can make out, as against educated men of the world, such a claim to spiritual dominion as I have described. In order to make out such a case they must prove, beyond all reasonable doubt, every part of the following proposition:—God became incarnate in Jesus Christ, who conferred the authority which I claim on Peter and the other apostles whom I represent.

This may be resolved into the following propositions:—

1. There is a God.

2. The historical statements of the Apostles' Creed are all true in fact, and amount to an account of the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ.

3. Jesus Christ established a Church with the constitution and powers which I claim for my Church.

4. My Church is the Church so established.

If there is room for reasonable doubt as to the substantial truth of any one of these four propositions, Archbishop Manning's case fails, and it would be the height or depth of weakness in any statesman or body politic to recognize in the Roman Catholic Church the rights and powers which he claims for it.

The first proposition is, that there is a God. It appears to me, that the existence of God is probable enough to supply to men a real motive to lead a virtuous life, but not established on such grounds that the proposition "there is a God," can serve as a foundation for inferences about any particular event or institution. It is one thing to say the general constitution and aspect of the world and of human nature, suggests the inference that this world is a place of moral trial, and that "be virtuous" is the implied command of a conscious and powerful ruler; and as I must have some theory to live by, I will adopt that, not because I am entirely convinced of its truth, but because upon the whole I think it most advisable upon several obvious grounds. It is quite another thing to say that the existence of God is a first truth which rests upon higher grounds than common truths, and can be used to interpret their meaning and to establish *a priori* probabilities in favour of an alleged revelation. In other words, it is one thing to infer the existence of God from the existence of the world, and quite another to use a doctrine about God supposed to be a first truth as the key by which the world is to be explained. This is what Archbishop Manning must do, and he is obviously not entitled to do it unless he is entitled to affirm the existence of God in so absolute and preremptory a manner, that the proposition "there is a God," considered as the basis of argument, will bear the same sort of weight as the proposition "two straight lines cannot inclose a space," or the proposition "the force of gravity varies inversely as the square of the distance." I deny his right to do this.

The controversy which relates to the being and attributes of God has been so much and so long debated from every possible point of view, that some general observations upon it may be made without much fear of error. Bishop Butler briefly refers to the argument on the subject in the following words, which form his justification for "taking for proved that there is an intelligent Author of Nature and Natural Governor of the world." He says,—

"As there is no presumption against this prior to proof of it, so it has been often proved with accumulated evidence, from the argument of analogy and final causes, from abstract reasoning, from the most ancient traditions and testimony, and from the general consent of mankind."

This condensed sentence, I think, mentions the principal arguments used upon this great subject. They fall under three heads. 1. Analogy and final causes, or, as it is more commonly called, the argument from design; 2. Tradition, testimony, and the present condition of mankind; and 3. Abstract reasonings. Upon this the following observations occur:—

The arguments which fall under the first and second heads, prove only a probability of the existence of God, greater or less according to the existing state of knowledge and opinion as to the general constitution of the world, physical and moral, and the history of its opinions and institutions. It would be presumptuous in me to suppose that my opinion upon the weight of this evidence was of any intrinsic value, but in order to avoid false inferences from the fact that I am obliged by the course of my argument to show that Archbishop Manning, and other persons of his way of thinking, have no right to impose their opinions upon others, I may observe that, rightly or wrongly, I believe that the importance of these arguments and the value of the probability which they raise, has been of late years unjustly depreciated. I am not in the smallest degree satisfied with what are popularly called the scientific refutations of them. For instance, the whole of the argument in Strauss's "*Alte und Neue Glaube*," about the inferences to be drawn from Mr. Darwin's theories, appears to me, upon many grounds, altogether unsatisfactory. Whatever ignorance may be involved in the admission, I must admit that I have never been able to understand the fallacy which many people impute to the old-fashioned argument from design, though I recognize its limitations. It is impossible to me to believe either that St. Paul's Cathedral always existed, or that it suddenly came into existence, or that the bricks and mortar accidentally built it by degrees or otherwise. On the other hand, I do not see the improbability of the common opinion about Sir Christopher Wren. When, however, this process of reasoning is applied, not to a work exactly like millions of others which are to be seen growing under our eyes every day and in all directions, but to the plan of the universe, and when I reflect on the vastness of the universe, on the almost infinite extent of human ignorance and the narrowness of human knowledge, it appears to me that the highest result to which such reasonings can properly lead, is a hypothesis suggested by facts, but which cannot be said to be conclusively proved, as our knowledge on the subject is limited to a small part of the facts.

That such arguments are not demonstrative has, I think, hardly been doubted by any one, and it requires little proof to show that the arguments drawn from the general opinions and traditions of men are of the same kind, though of less weight. Modern research and experience have shown that however ancient the belief in God may be, and however widely it may be spread, other theories of the universe are at least as ancient, as common, and as widely diffused. If the writers of the eighteenth century had been as well informed as we are about Buddhism and Confucianism, and the beliefs of savage tribes, they would hardly have written on the subject as they did.

Passing then from the arguments from tradition and design, I will say a word on the "abstract reasonings" which Butler mentions. The first observation which arises upon them is that their value is essentially a question for experts, and that experts of the first eminence have denied their validity. The "demonstration" of the existence of a God contained in Locke's *Essay* (Bk. iv. ch. x.), and the work written by Dr. Samuel Clarke on the same subject, are well known, and, by way of showing how persistently such arguments are used, I may observe that in a volume of *Essays on religion and literature* just published under Archbishop Manning's auspices, I find Locke's argument put forward very nearly in Locke's own words by the Rev. William Humphrey (see p. 361).

One of the faults of this argument is, I think, that it assumes the possession by the human mind of a power, which it does not really possess, of drawing universal inferences from an experience which is in fact exceedingly limited; but this is only my opinion, which is a small matter. Look at the opinion of Bishop Butler on the same subject. Twenty-four years* after the publication of Locke's *Essay*, and after a careful study of Clarke's work, Bishop Butler wrote as follows to Dr. Clarke:—

"I have made it, Sir, my business ever since I thought myself capable of such sort of reasoning, to prove to myself the being and attributes of God. And being sensible that it is a matter of the last consequence, I endeavoured after a demonstrative proof, not only more fully to satisfy my own mind, but also to defend the great truths of natural religion, and those of the Christian revelation, which follow them, against all opposers; but must own, with concern, that hitherto I have been unsuccessful; and though I have got very probable arguments, yet I can go but a very little way with demonstration in the proof of those things."

He then refers to Clarke's work, and proposes certain objections, to which Clarke replies. The correspondence removed one of Butler's objections, and apparently weakened the rest, but his last letter

* In 1713; Locke's *Essay* was published in 1689.

leaves upon me, at least, the impression that he was not convinced. After making certain objections, he says—

"Notwithstanding what I have now said, I cannot say that I believe your argument not conclusive; for I must own my ignorance, that I am really at a loss about the nature of space and duration. But did it plainly appear that they were properties of a substance we should have an easy way with the atheists, &c."

I do not think that in his later works Butler anywhere says, or even implies, that he thought that the existence of God admitted of demonstration. The whole argument of the *Analogy* rather implies the reverse. The well-known passage quoted above from the Introduction to the *Analogy* to my mind suggests this, though it is certainly not conclusive. I could, if necessary, refer to other passages in his writings which confirm this impression.*

I suppose it will hardly be alleged that any such demonstration has been discovered since Butler's time, or that he was not well acquainted with the subject.

It is often alleged that the belief in the existence of God is not dependent upon argument at all, but results, or may result, from a direct operation or energy of the mind itself, superseding all argument, and forming a higher and more certain method of procedure. I need not say how vehemently or on what apparently strong grounds the possibility, or at all events the existence, of such mental operations has been denied. As everyone knows, the question whether they exist or not is the subject of the great standing battle which each generation of metaphysicians transmits to its successors, and which appears to rage with undiminished eagerness in every successive generation. I do not think it necessary to express my opinion on a subject which has been argued out so often. For all practical purposes, two remarks will suffice. If a man needs no proof of a doctrine he needs no proof of it, but his certainty can be no warrant to anyone else, much less to the world at large. To tell me that my mind does affirm what I tell you it does not affirm, is to try to convince me by giving me the lie. To tell me that your mind affirms what my mind does not affirm, and that I ought to believe the affirmation of your mind rather than the silence of my own, is to assert your superiority over me, which is the thing to be proved. If, therefore, some minds do spontaneously make the affirmation in question, that in itself is no reason why nations in their corporate capacity should acknowledge its truth.

* *e. g.* "There is no need of abstruse reasonings and distinctions to convince an unprejudiced understanding that there is a God, &c., though they may be necessary to answer abstruse difficulties, &c. To an unprejudiced mind, ten thousand thousand instances of design cannot but prove a designer."—Conclusion to *Analogy*, near the beginning.

In the second place it is to be observed that even if some people's minds do spontaneously affirm the existence of God apart from all external proof of it whatever, nothing is more likely than that men should be mistaken in supposing themselves to form such a judgment. It is almost impossible to distinguish such an affirmation from a rooted prejudice, and such prejudices are very common. Numbers of people believe this and other doctrines with the most passionate energy, either because they hope or fear that they are true, or because they consider it a point of honour or duty to believe them. Belief may be produced in every sort of way, but the connection between belief and the truth of the matter believed in, is quite another thing. The writings of several men of the highest eminence convince me that they would have been atheists if they had had the moral courage, but that, fearing to embrace that opinion, they forced themselves to believe in God, taking a strange pleasure in trampling on their own reason, and in avowing, perhaps even in exaggerating, the difficulties of their belief.

Two excellent illustrations of this are to be found in Pascal and Dr. Newman. No one can doubt that Pascal believed, or that Dr. Newman believes, in God passionately and enthusiastically; and no one, I think, can read either Pascal's *Pensées*, or Dr. Newman's sermons without owning that their belief was the result, not of a process of reasoning open to all men, but of a desperate struggle to believe in spite of weighty objections.

As regards Pascal, a general reference to his *Pensées* will be sufficient, but I cannot resist the temptation of quoting once more a passage which seems to me to paint with the greatest liveliness the state of his own mind, and that of many others, on this subject.

"Parlons maintenant selon les lumières naturelles. S'il y a un Dieu il est infiniment incompréhensible, puisque n'ayant ni parties, ni bornes, il n'a nul rapport à nous : nous sommes donc incapable de connaître ni ce qu'il est, ni s'il est. Cela étant, qui osera entreprendre de résoudre cette question ? Ce n'est pas nous, qui n'avons aucun rapport à lui.

"Qui blamera donc les Chrétiens de ne pouvoir rendre raison de leur créance, eux qui professent une religion dont ils ne peuvent rendre raison. Ils déclarent en l'exposant au monde, qui c'est une sottise, *stultitiam*, et puis vous vous plaignez de ce qu'ils ne la prouvent pas. S'ils la prouvaient, ils ne tiendraient pas parole ; c'est en manquant de preuve qu'ils ne manquent pas de sens.

"Oui mais encore que cela excuse ceux qui l'offrent telle et que cela les ôte du blâme de la produire sans raison, cela n'excuse pas ceux qui la reçoivent. Examinons donc ce point et disons Dieu est, ou il n'est pas. Mais de quel côté pencherons-nous ? La raison n'y peut rien déterminer. Il y a un chaos infini qui nous sépare. Il se joue un jeu à l'extrémité de cette distance infini on il arrivera croix on pile. Que gagerez-vous ? Par raison vous ne pouvez faire ni l'un ni l'autre ; par raison vous ne pouvez défendre nul des deux. Ne blâmez donc pas de fausseté ceux qui ont pris un choix

car vous n'en savez rien. Non : mais je les blâmerai d'avoir fait non ce choix mais un choix ; car encore qui celui qui prend croix et l'autre soient en pareille faute ils sont tous deux en faute : le juste est de ne point parier.

"Où, mais il faut parier ; cela n'est pas volontaire vous êtes embarqué. Lequel prendrez-vous donc ?"

And he proceeds to argue in a well-known passage that if it is a mistake to bet on the existence of God, it is a mistake on the safe side. This passage, one of the most memorable ever written by its author, appears to me to sum up in plain prose, and apart from rapture and enthusiasm, the result of a great deal of matter about "nous connaissons la vérité non-seulement par la raison, mais encore par le cœur," &c.

As regards Dr. Newman, I must content myself with a general reference to his *Apologia*, and to the 13th, 14th, and 15th of his *Discourses to Mixed Congregations*. In these works he argues elaborately to reduce men to an alternative between Atheism and Popery. His argument in a very few words is this :—God's existence is certain because the voice of conscience testifies of it, but the doctrine is open to very strong objections, both intellectual and moral. If you can acquiesce in them, you can acquiesce in anything, and, therefore, in the claims of the Roman Catholic Church.* I cannot say that I think much more of Dr. Newman's difficulties than I think of his positive evidence : both appear to me shadowy and fanciful ; but whatever they may be worth, they tend to show, not that we must believe in mysteries, but that the existence of God is a doctrine supported by some considerations, and open to some objections ; in other words, that it is a matter of probability as to which we must decide as best we may by taking into account conflicting arguments and evidence. Dr. Newman's passionate belief on the subject appears to me simply a common instance of that moral weakness which transmutes wishes into beliefs. It does not admit of being brought to so distinct and positive a test as Lady Tichborne's belief in the identity of the Claimant with her son Roger, but to my mind it is not in itself a bit more convincing.

The practical importance of the distinction between thinking the existence of God an inference from the world, sufficiently probable to exercise a real influence over our conduct, and regarding it as a first truth immoveably established and capable of serving as a foundation for deductions by which particular facts may be proved, will appear from a consideration of the second of the

* I developed this at length in a review of Dr. Newman's "*Apologia*," published in *Fraser's Magazine*, September, 1864. I know that it was brought under Dr. Newman's notice, but I never heard that any answer to it was made or attempted.

four points which, as I have said, Archbishop Manning has to prove before he can establish his claim to be the spiritual Viceroy of this country under the Pope. This is the historical truth of the matters of fact stated in the Apostles' Creed.

As to this, I say, there are grounds for reasonable doubt as to the truth of what he asserts. How far that doubt extends, whether it ought to lead rational men absolutely to disbelieve the whole history, or whether it is probable enough to justify persons who find in it the highest lessons of virtue, in believing its truth in a private way, and with a view to the voluntary regulation of their own conduct, I do not say. It is not necessary to my argument to do so. What is necessary for me to say is, that the truth of the history of Jesus Christ is not proved beyond all reasonable doubt as against ordinary men of the world on whom the clergy are trying to force their yoke on the strength of it. The question, Is it wise to act on the assumption of the truth of this history so far as to conform to an established order of worship which appears in other respects to be useful? is quite different from the question—Is it wise to act on the assumption of the truth of this history to the extent of giving the Pope and Archbishop Manning a moral right indirectly to control our legislation about marriage and education? Much might be said on the first question, but I shall pass it over. To the second question I answer without the slightest hesitation—No.

In order to justify this answer, let us consider what, in general terms, the evidence of the truth of the history of Jesus Christ as given in the Apostles' Creed really is.

The question has been debated so long and so keenly that it is not difficult to do so in a very moderate compass.

Arguments upon this subject usually begin (and much too often end) with discussions as to the possibility of proving miracles; and the possibility of their occurrence; and this, again, is usually complicated by a definition of a miracle as a departure from a law of Nature, and a discussion as to what is meant by laws of Nature. The mere mention of these topics gives me, and I have no doubt must give many others, a sense of weariness, by raising recollections of endless and apparently interminable hair-splitting and verbal debates. It appears to me that by avoiding the use of the word "miracle," which, after all, means only a wonderful or marvellous event, and the phrase "law of Nature," which I regard merely as a rhetorical name for formulæ, enabling us, so far as our experience extends, to a certain extent to predict and understand the course of Nature, it is possible to reduce the whole controversy to a very few very plain questions which almost answer themselves.

The first question is :—Suppose that the known universe is the work

of a Being having consciousness, will, and power, do you think that such a Being would or would not be able to raise a dead man to life and carry him away bodily from mortal view, and to enable him to raise the dead, multiply loaves, restore sight to the blind, and so on. The answer to this question to my mind is obviously, Yes. I can set no limit in imagination to the powers of a Being capable of creating a world.

The second question is :—Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Jesus Christ did actually live, die, rise from the dead and ascend into heaven in the manner stated, and suppose that he stated on various occasions that God had enabled him to work miracles in order to warrant his announcement that there was a future life and a future state of rewards and punishments for virtue and vice respectively, would it be rational to believe him? To this also the answer appears to me to be, Yes, on this plain ground, that, in the case supposed, it would be obvious that Jesus Christ was endowed with powers of some kind or other peculiar to himself, and this would make it probable that he knew more about God and a future state than other people. The general beneficence and virtue of his life would make it probable that he told the truth, though this, of course, would be subject to the remark that when you have to do with a being not wholly of this world you know less of his principles of action than if he were a mere man.

The third question is :—Can any evidence be imagined which would prove beyond all reasonable doubt that such a series of events happened? To this also I should answer, Yes. Theoretically, I can set no limits at all to the probative force of evidence. I can imagine cases in which events in every respect as extraordinary as the resurrection might, if they really occurred, be proved beyond all possibility of doubt. Suppose, for instance, that a prophecy were to be published to-day announcing, in the most direct and unmistakeable language, events which were to take place a year hence. The publication of the prophecy might be proved not only to us but to our posterity in a manner which no one could doubt. If it were published in the different London newspapers, say in March 1874, the fact that it was actually made at or before that time would admit of no doubt at all. The subsequent happening of the events predicted might be proved with equal facility and in an equally conclusive manner. Indeed, you have only to take any miracle to pieces and it will be obvious that if it really occurred the difficulty of proving it might be small. What can be easier than to prove (if the fact be so) that a man was actually put to death and buried; that afterwards his coffin was found empty, and that after that he was seen and talked to

by numbers of people. Each of these events is in itself ordinary and common-place, and capable of being put quite beyond the reach of reasonable doubt. The combination of them makes the wonder, and if each is distinctly proved by independent testimony, a wonder, miracle, departure from the laws of Nature, or whatever else you please to call it, is shown to have occurred.

As to the difficulty of showing that a law of Nature has been departed from, a single illustration will, I think, show that this is possible. One of the strongest confirmations which the formula called the law of gravitation ever received was afforded by the discovery of the planet Neptune. Irregularities were observed in the orbit of Uranus which would be accounted for if Neptune were in a certain place at a certain time, and there he was accordingly. Suppose he had not been there, and that the irregularities in the orbit of Uranus could be accounted for in no other way consistently with the law of gravitation, the law of gravitation would be shown to be incomplete. The assertion that nothing can be proved which involves a departure from a law of Nature is true only if it be added that no formula can be regarded as a law of Nature which is really inconsistent with any one proved fact. The laws of Nature are not coercive, but only metaphorical laws. They describe but do not alter facts.

There are, however, some observations on the other side which, after making these remarks, ought not to be neglected. Admitting that evidence can be imagined which would prove beyond reasonable doubt events in themselves improbable in the highest degree, it seems to me childish to deny either that there is such a thing as intrinsic probability and improbability, or that the strength of the evidence ought to be proportioned to the improbability of the event to be proved. To deny either of these things is virtually to close all discussions upon evidence. Such discussion, whether carried on by historians, lawyers, or others, invariably assumes experience in a generalized form by which we measure and compare the intrinsic probability of the event and the intrinsic probability of the truth of the evidence. To deny this is to deny the validity of the argument, "he said it, therefore it is true," for this depends entirely on the probability of the truth of a given statement made under given circumstances, and if this is denied, not only the Christian but all other histories must be discredited together.

We are thus brought round to the turning point of all modern controversies. People may dispute for ever about miracles, laws of Nature, the probability that God would do this or do that, the analogy between Christian doctrine and the course of Nature,

and so forth, but the vital part of the whole discussion is simply this: Is the history of Jesus Christ as related in the Apostles' Creed shown beyond all reasonable doubt to be substantially true? Now, what is the evidence upon this point? It may, I think, be stated as follows:—

1. It is proved in many ways, and was proved once for all by Paley, that the history of Jesus Christ substantially as we have it, was widely and earnestly believed by considerable numbers of persons within a reasonable time after the occurrence of the events recorded in it. Roman Catholics would call this the testimony of the Church, and if this is the meaning of that phrase, and its full meaning, I see no objection to it.

2. The unquestioned Epistles of Paul refer to the subject.

3. There are the narratives in the Four Gospels.

This fact and these documents constitute the whole of the evidence now accessible on the subject. I will consider their value in their order.

The fact that the history of Jesus Christ was widely and earnestly believed not long after the time when he lived is stated by Paley at the head of each of the chapters forming the first part of his treatise in the following words: "*There is satisfactory evidence that many professing to be originally witnesses of the Christian miracles, passed their lives in labours, dangers, and sufferings voluntarily undergone in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their belief of those accounts; and that they also submitted from the same motives to new rules of conduct.*"

The parts of this proposition which I have italicised appear to me to be unproved. The great weakness of the writings of Paley (whom I admire and respect), is, that he entirely overlooks the force of the tender, enthusiastic, more or less visionary side of human nature. The most true and earnest believers in Christianity in all ages and countries, have been and are those who are, so to speak, born Christians,—people whom the character of Jesus Christ inspires with passionate, rapturous love, who would count all the common objects of life as so much dross, as dirt under their feet, in comparison with the rapture, the deep-seated, unfailing hidden joy of preaching the doctrines of Christ, living the life prescribed by Christ, suffering, and if necessary, dying in his cause. We see such feelings still in full operation in many different Christian communions. There have been in our own times martyrs in Madagascar, in China, and in the other parts of the world. There is probably not a parish in England in which there are not devout persons who do habitually "pass their lives in labours, dangers, and

sufferings voluntarily undergone" in what they regard as the cause of Christ. It would be antecedently probable, even if there were no historical evidence of it, that such would be the case in the earliest times of Christianity, and no doubt it was the case, but it is quite a different thing to say that these sufferings were undergone by actual witnesses of the miracles, specifically in attestation of miracles and solely in consequence of a belief in miracles. It would be about as rational to say that Henry Martyn (for instance) went to India, and exposed himself to the hardships of, which he ultimately died, solely in order to bear witness to the weight of the arguments for Christianity collected by Paley.

Now, whatever we may think of the merits and virtues of persons of this kind, most of them were not original witnesses at all. It is doubtful whether the testimony of any one such witness remains. But apart from this, they are just the sort of witnesses to whose evidence on specific matters of fact I should be inclined to attach least weight, and that because they are what a lawyer would call willing witnesses. Numbers of persons appear in the early ages of the Church to have submitted to be tortured to death rather than disown Christ, and the name which they earned was that of witnesses by way of eminence (*μαρτυρες*). To a dispassionate mind the value of their evidence is destroyed by the fact that they knew nothing whatever about the matter to which they are supposed to have testified except by remote hearsay. What their deaths did really prove was the moral attraction of Christianity for minds of a particular temper, not the historical facts upon which Christianity rests. I have known people who would, I am sure, have been proud to be allowed to suffer death in honour of the Virgin Mary. Yet they neither knew, nor could by any possibility know anything whatever about her. Heat the mind to a certain temperature, and fact, tradition, and doctrine are all fused into one homogeneous mass, which is believed whole on account of the inherent attractions of one of its constituent elements. "If Christ is not risen, then is our preaching vain and your faith is also vain." No argument can be so persuasive to those whom it affects at all, but it is not the way to prove matters of fact to the world at large.

Upon the whole, the general and early diffusion of the belief in the history of Jesus Christ appears to me to prove little more as to the truth of the history than is proved by the eagerness with which it is accepted and the warmth with which it is believed in the present day. Both the one and the other prove superabundantly how strong a hold Christian doctrine has on a certain class of minds, and how much they are attracted by the history and character of Christ himself, but they prove no more.

The next piece of evidence is to be found in the statements made by Paul (Gal. i. 11, and 1 Cor. xv. 1—10). The genuineness of these Epistles is undoubted, and though the passages referred to do not say so in so many words, they clearly imply that Paul was told of the resurrection of Christ by Peter and James. This is the nearest approach we now have to a direct statement by an eye-witness. It is coupled with one remarkable circumstance. After enumerating these appearances to Peter, the twelve, and the 500 brethren at once, of whom the greater part "remain unto this present," Paul proceeds, obviously alluding to the vision on the road to Damascus—"And last of all he was seen of me also, as by one born out of due time." Now, this vision certainly would not prove anything approaching to what is commonly understood by the Resurrection. It is more like an apparition, and is not easily distinguishable from the delusions of sunstroke, but Paul puts it on a level with the other appearances. However, it still remains true that Paul says that Peter and James told him that Christ rose from the dead, and that Paul refers those whom he addresses to other persons who, he says, were living witnesses of one appearance of Christ.

Lastly come the four Gospels. I need not do more than allude to the existence of the well-known controversies as to their authenticity. I should think no one would say that it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt, or that it is really possible to get beyond conjecture on the matter. On two points, indeed, we have more than conjecture. It is hardly possible to doubt that the Synoptic Gospels are either different versions of each other, or of one common original, and it is clear that they record in one language conversations and other transactions which were carried on in another. It would, I suppose, be difficult to say more of the Gospels than that they contain, to use the words of Luke, "those things which were most surely believed" amongst the Christians of a period considerably subsequent to Christ, though no one can say how far subsequent. The state of things is, as if in the year 3800, the principal authorities as to the life of Napoleon Bonaparte were four popular biographies written in English somewhere about the present time, and quoting no authorities.

I need not dwell upon the various detailed criticisms which have been made upon the gospels. The matter has been argued backwards and forwards till everything that can be said or imagined has been said and imagined, and libraries have been written on a matter which really lies in a very small compass. I may, however, make a few observations by way of specimen of thousands which have been made, and might be repeated *ad nauseam*. In the first place it is alleged on the one side, that there are many inconsistencies between the narratives of the different Gospels. It is alleged on the other

hand that the inconsistencies are only apparent, and not real, and that superficial variation covering substantial agreement is a sign of truth. Endless ingenuity has been displayed in the elaboration in detail of these conflicting views, and both sides, as it appears to me, have indulged in a great amount of conjecture as to matters on which nothing certain can now be known.

I do not happen to have met with the observation which presents itself to my mind on the subject, as the result of long professional experience in the investigation of disputed matters of fact, though I can hardly doubt that it must have been made, because it seems so obvious. It is that the effect of variations or inconsistencies between the accounts of different witnesses is to raise doubts which must remain till they are explained. They may upon explanation confirm the credit of the witnesses. They may totally destroy it, but this depends on the nature of the explanation. If one man lays the scene of an event in London and another in Bristol, it may often be rash to conclude at once, and without going further into the matter, that one of them is speaking untruly, or that the event never happened at all. But it is obvious that some mistake or misapprehension exists which ought to be cleared up. The case is one for cross-examination, and the result of the cross-examination may be either to reconcile the apparent contradiction, or to show that on the one side or the other there is ignorance or fraud. Till the matter has been probed to the bottom the question who is right and who is wrong must remain doubtful. The first step which a lawyer takes, whether in advising his own side or testing his adversary's case, is to look into the various doubtful points which it presents, and to get them cleared up, either by the production of additional evidence or by cross-examination. The care and skill with which this is done makes one principal difference between a man who does and a man who does not understand this part of his business. Novelists, and the authors of anecdotes have invested the whole topic with associations which jar with religious and devotional feeling, but cross-examination is a real and serious test of truth, and one of which the omission must of necessity produce doubts, which, after a certain time, become absolutely incapable of being solved.

Every one of the leading passages in the Gospels fills me with a wish to question the author, whoever he may have been. The impossibility of asking such questions, and of receiving any answer at all to them, must, and does, in every case, produce doubt. I will give instances enough to show what I mean. The Gospel according to St. Matthew (why "according to"? why not "by," or "of"? we do not say the history "according to" Thucydides, or philosophy "according to" Plato,) does not expressly mention the ascension, but it

which would seem to imply that it took place on a Mark mentions the fact very shortly, and says Luke says that it occurred at Bethany. The account in the Acts implies that it I do not say that these accounts are in- tions might clear up the whole matter. Now that the authors of the Gospels access to two entirely different her. How this was we can main, doubtful. Look again ew xxviii. 16, "Then the eleven , into a mountain where Jesus had they saw him, they worshipped him: but ted? On what grounds? What made the oublets? These questions can never be answered.

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be known on the subject is, that the author of the ung to St. Matthew recorded that some of the original of what we are told was an appearance of Christ after his rection "doubted"—which can only mean that they doubted, for whatever reason, whether the person whom they saw was really Jesus. Many other instances of the same sort might be given.

Another class of cases occurs in which it is to me at least impossible not to feel that it would be but common justice to hear the other side. I once listened to a sermon from a dignitary of the Church of England, in which he said that he would argue the probabilities of the resurrection in "a cold, dry, legal spirit," and he proceeded to compare the probabilities of what he called the apostles' account ("the angel of the Lord descended from Heaven and came and rolled back the stone," &c.), and the chief priests' account ("his disciples came by night and stole him away while we slept," &c). The preacher urged with much warmth that it was a moral impossibility that Roman soldiers should sleep on guard, and that the disciples, awed as they were by what had happened, could commit an audacious and useless imposture. He totally forgot that what he called the chief priests' account is not what the chief priests said, but what the author of St. Matthew's Gospel says that they said, which is quite a different matter. Nothing could be more curious or important than to hear the chief priests' account of the matter, and to be able to confront the centurion and his soldiers who are said to have been on guard that night with the author of St. Matthew's Gospel or his informant. It is indeed only remote and uncertified hearsay which assures us that there ever was any guard at all. Unless Judæa was utterly and generically unlike both England and India, there is every reason to suppose that if we could

hand that the inconsistencies are only apparent, and not real, and that superficial variation covering substantial agreement is a sign of truth. Endless ingenuity has been displayed in the elaboration in detail of these conflicting views, and both sides, as it appears to me, have indulged in a great amount of conjecture as to matters on which nothing certain can now be known.

I do not happen to have met with the observation which presents itself to my mind on the subject, as the result of long professional experience in the investigation of disputed matters of fact, though I can hardly doubt that it must have been made, because it seems so obvious. It is that the effect of variations or inconsistencies between the accounts of different witnesses is to raise doubts which must remain till they are explained. They may upon explanation confirm the credit of the witnesses. They may totally destroy it, but this depends on the nature of the explanation. If one man lays the scene of an event in London and another in Bristol, it may often be rash to conclude at once, and without going further into the matter, that one of them is speaking untruly, or that the event never happened at all. But it is obvious that some mistake or misapprehension exists which ought to be cleared up. The case is one for cross-examination, and the result of the cross-examination may be either to reconcile the apparent contradiction, or to show that on the one side or the other there is ignorance or fraud. Till the matter has been probed to the bottom the question who is right and who is wrong must remain doubtful. The first step which a lawyer takes, whether in advising his own side or testing his adversary's case, is to look into the various doubtful points which it presents, and to get them cleared up, either by the production of additional evidence or by cross-examination. The care and skill with which this is done makes one principal difference between a man who does and a man who does not understand this part of his business. Novelists, and the authors of anecdotes have invested the whole topic with associations which jar with religious and devotional feeling, but cross-examination is a real and serious test of truth, and one of which the omission must of necessity produce doubts, which, after a certain time, become absolutely incapable of being solved.

Every one of the leading passages in the Gospels fills me with a wish to question the author, whoever he may have been. The impossibility of asking such questions, and of receiving any answer at all to them, must, and does, in every case, produce doubt. I will give instances enough to show what I mean. The Gospel according to St. Matthew (why "according to"? why not "by," or "of"? we do not say the history "according to" Thucydides, or philosophy "according to" Plato,) does not expressly mention the ascension, but it

contains a passage which would seem to imply that it took place on a mountain in Galilee. Mark mentions the fact very shortly, and says nothing as to the place. Luke says that it occurred at Bethany. John says nothing about it. The account in the Acts implies that it occurred at Mount Olivet. I do not say that these accounts are inconsistent. A few obvious questions might clear up the whole matter. On the other hand they might show that the authors of the Gospels of Matthew and Luke had had access to two entirely different traditions really contradicting each other. How this was we can never know. It is, and must for ever remain, doubtful. Look again at the verse in the narrative in Matthew xxviii. 16, "Then the eleven disciples went away into Galilee, into a mountain where Jesus had appointed them. And when they saw him, they worshipped him: *but some doubted.*" Who doubted? On what grounds? What made the writer mention their doubts? These questions can never be answered. All that ever can be known on the subject is, that the author of the Gospel according to St. Matthew recorded that some of the original witnesses of what we are told was an appearance of Christ after his resurrection "*doubted*"—which can only mean that they doubted, for whatever reason, whether the person whom they saw was really Jesus. Many other instances of the same sort might be given.

Another class of cases occurs in which it is to me at least impossible not to feel that it would be but common justice to hear the other side. I once listened to a sermon from a dignitary of the Church of England, in which he said that he would argue the probabilities of the resurrection in "a cold, dry, legal spirit," and he proceeded to compare the probabilities of what he called the apostles' account ("the angel of the Lord descended from Heaven and came and rolled back the stone," &c.), and the chief priests' account ("his disciples came by night and stole him away while we slept," &c). The preacher urged with much warmth that it was a moral impossibility that Roman soldiers should sleep on guard, and that the disciples, awed as they were by what had happened, could commit an audacious and useless imposture. He totally forgot that what he called the chief priests' account is not what the chief priests said, but what the author of St. Matthew's Gospel says that they said, which is quite a different matter. Nothing could be more curious or important than to hear the chief priests' account of the matter, and to be able to confront the centurion and his soldiers who are said to have been on guard that night with the author of St. Matthew's Gospel or his informant. It is indeed only remote and uncertified hearsay which assures us that there ever was any guard at all. Unless Judæa was utterly and generically unlike both England and India, there is every reason to suppose that if we could

get to the bottom of the matter we should have to decide between witnesses contradicting each other flatly. It is surely contrary to the first principles of justice and common sense to give absolute confidence to the statements of unknown persons who are obviously writing on hearsay, and who accuse people who can no longer be heard in their own defence of fraud and falsehood. Pilate and the chief priests never have been, and never can be heard in the matter, and the result is that justice can never be done, and that the doubts which hang over the history can never be removed.

Another point which has often impressed me, is that the whole of the history of Jesus Christ is put forward as of equal certainty. It is, indeed, embodied in one mass in the Apostles' Creed, from the miraculous birth to the ascension. The evidence on these points is, however, of very unequal degrees of force. The miraculous birth, for instance, must, from the nature of the case, be proved by the uncorroborated assertion of Mary. Whether she ever made any such assertion, to whom, and under what circumstances she made it, is nowhere stated. The history is rather indicated, than expressly told, by Matthew. Mark does not mention it. Luke, who avowedly wrote upon hearsay, gives it at full length, interspersing it with two separate poems, or counting Simeon's prayer, three; and John does not mention it, though the Gospel which bears his name professes to be written by the disciple who "from that hour took her to his own home," and would, therefore, know more of the subject than anyone else. Add to this the fact that similar stories have been told of the birth of many remarkable persons in that and other ages of the world,* and say whether it is possible to be sure beyond all reasonable doubt that any such event happened. Yet it forms an article in the Apostles' Creed. It is part of the general history on the strength of the literal truth of which Archbishop Manning claims a divine right to demand for the Irish Roman Catholic bishops the control of Irish University education.

Putting all this together, I conclude that one main part of the evidence on which Archbishop Manning claims spiritual sovereignty over us all is evidence which no court of justice in the world would accept or listen to, for the purpose of inflicting the most trifling punishment or conferring the most trifling right. If Archbishop Manning wished to recover an alleged debt upon the sort of evidence on which he claims for his Church the moral and spiritual sovereignty over the human race, the court would say to him, If this

* The story of the miraculous birth of Buddha has a curious generic similarity to the history in question. It is overlaid, indeed, with a mass of details which probably appeared natural and honourable to his biographers. To a European they are simply disgusting.

debt is really due to you, you ought to have taken proper means of proving it at the time when such means existed. As it is, we can do nothing for you, and if you have lost anything to which you were entitled, it is your own fault for not taking proper steps at the proper time. How can we act upon a general rumour that the defendant owed you money, a remark by one of your friends that another friend told him the same thing, and a pamphlet by an unknown author, written years afterwards, which asserts it?

It must be carefully borne in mind that these remarks apply to a man who is himself making a claim, and one which, if not well founded, is the most audacious claim ever advanced in this world to universal spiritual sovereignty. Such a claim forces those on whom it is urged to give it a plain and strong reply, and this I have tried to do. I have nothing at all to say to a person who speaks in a different tone and assumes a different position. I can understand a man who says I admit that I can force no one to believe the history of Jesus Christ. I ground upon it no demand for spiritual authority over my neighbours. It appears to me possible. If true, it would account for the facts. It is beautiful, and I cannot bring myself to think that the great benefits which a belief in it has conferred on mankind are due to mere mistake. At all events, it has come to be inextricably mixed up with all sorts of tender and sacred associations, and with the practice of virtues which it is much easier to destroy than to replace. I shall therefore go on going to church. To such a person I should reply, So long as you are quiet and modest, and do not interfere with the common course of affairs, I have nothing at all to say to you. I fully recognize the weight of the practical considerations to which you appeal. I have not now to discuss the value of your theory. All that it is necessary for me to say, and all that I do say, is—that evidence which may be strong enough to explain or even to justify the use of a particular form of public worship in a quiet way is not strong enough to support an enormous fabric of spiritual and temporal power. Different sorts of foundations are required for different kinds of superstructures.

I pass now to the third and fourth items of Archbishop Manning's case, which may be conveniently considered together. They are as follows:—

3. Jesus Christ established a church with the constitution and powers which I claim for my church.

4. My church is the church so established, and as such possesses the powers in question.

The first remark which suggests itself upon this is that *a priori* there is no presumption in favour of the notion that Jesus Christ founded

any institution at all. If we grant the historical truth of the history told in the Apostles' Creed, it simply confounds all our notions of probability and improbability. The question, how God incarnate would secure the permanence of a revelation to man, is a question on which no mortal man is entitled to form even a conjecture. We can only look at what he either did or said. Now all the sayings and doings of Christ which even profess to be recorded at all are recorded in the New Testament, and thus the propositions stated depend upon the interpretation of half a dozen vague texts. Strike out from the New Testament "Thou art Peter," "Go ye therefore and teach all nations," "the pillar and ground of the truth," and a few other texts, and the whole of the Roman Catholic case against Protestants is destroyed. I cannot understand how upon any hypothesis as to Christ and as to the Gospels they can be regarded as more than vague and obscure metaphors. I have no wish to recur to a worn-out controversy, but if anyone wishes to see in detail the difficulties of the Roman Catholic interpretation of "Thou art Peter" and "Feed my sheep," I would recommend him to read Jeremy Taylor's *Liberty of Prophecy*, and Chillingworth, and to compare them with Bossuet and Bellarmine.

There is, however, a previous question which I should have thought must suggest itself to everyone. What reasonable grounds have we for believing that any one of the texts in question represents a real occurrence? Take, for instance, the words, "Go ye therefore and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost: teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and, lo! I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world. Amen." There are either four* different versions of them or else as many different statements were made, much to the same effect and on the same occasion. The different versions vary widely, and in points of the utmost importance. Each of them, as we have it, is recorded in Greek, whereas Jesus Christ spoke Syriac. We know not whether when his words were spoken they were taken down in writing, or by whom; we know not who is responsible for the translation nor whether it is correct; we know not how many years elapsed between the utterance of the words and the composition of the documents in which they now appear; and yet we are told that they are amongst the main foundation stones or title deeds of a universal and everlasting spiritual monarchy. I do not wish to offend anyone by connecting common associations with matters which appeal to their deepest feelings, but I would ask whether in these days anyone would venture to rest important

* Matt. xxviii. 19, 20; Mark xvi. 14-18; Luke xxiv. 46-48; Acts i. 5-8.

interests on the authenticity of mere anecdotes as to the sayings of eminent persons? We have all heard of abundance of stories of which the sinking of the *Vengeur* is the type. Many of them have been distinctly disproved in our own days by a process of critical inquiry utterly alien to the habits of the first Christians; yet they were universally believed. They have found a place in authentic histories (like the first edition of Carlyle's "French Revolution"), and if a few obscure original papers had been destroyed or a few old men had died before curious inquirers questioned them on the subject, they would have passed beyond the reach of refutation, and would have been an accredited and accepted part of history. Archbishop Manning claims a right to dictate to Parliament about education, marriage, and church endowments, on the strength of the interpretation which he puts upon a few ambiguous and fragmentary expressions, which as likely as not were never uttered at all. It is as if a man should claim to be king of England on the strength of a doubtful interpretation of an obscure metaphor, different forms of which were attributed to James II., late in the eighteenth century, by various French memoir-writers who derived their information from unknown and unspecified sources.

To say that the New Testament contains a complete scheme of Church government, or the materials from which such a scheme might be constructed, is like saying that it contains the differential calculus, and this proves that, as against Roman Catholics, the case of the ordinary orthodox Protestants is unanswerable. The controversy cannot move a step unless the truth of the matters of fact stated in the Apostles' Creed, and the supernatural authority, in one sense or other, of the New Testament, are admitted or proved. Take this foundation away, and Catholic and Protestant are silenced alike. Admit it, and the fact of the silence of the New Testament about Church government, and as to far the greater part of theology, proves the conclusions of such writers as Chillingworth and Jeremy Taylor—namely, that error upon such points is unimportant, and that Christianity is simply (to use the language of a later generation) a republication of natural religion supernaturally authenticated. The only apparent advantages which Roman Catholics have ever gained in controversy over Protestants have arisen either from the hankering of Protestants after elaborate systems of doctrine and Church government—that is to say, from a desertion of their true principles—or else from the adoption by Roman Catholics of arguments which upset the foundation common to both. The Protestant always gets the best of the Catholic if he really fights him up to the point at which the Catholic, in despair, throws a match into the powder magazine.

There is, indeed, one line of argument by which Roman Catholics may appear to avoid this conclusion, but it is impossible to make it out in fact. They may say the Church proves itself. Its history shows that it is divine. You can give no reasonable account of its growth and present position, except that which is implied by the truth of the claims which it makes. The existing Church, the wonderful virtue and wisdom of Pius IX., Archbishop Manning, Cardinal Cullen, and a variety of other personages of the same sort, taken in connection with the history of their predecessors, is the foundation upon which faith in the Bible and in Jesus Christ is the superstructure.

This appears to me to be the only way of putting the Roman Catholic case which does not involve an argument in a circle or a *petitio principii* (the Church proves the Bible, and the Bible proves the Church, or the Bible is true and proves the Church). The Roman Catholic Church and its history are, no doubt, facts from which we may draw inferences. Is it possible, however, to draw from them the inference which this argument suggests? Is it possible to read the ordinary histories of the world without seeing that the history of the Christian Church is like the rest of human history? Clouds and darkness hang over the origin of the religion. It grew as other great creeds have grown; it has had its victories and its defeats, its good times and its bad times. It has assumed all manner of forms and broken up into a thousand contending parties; but no one sect of it can claim exclusive goodness and truth, or can even allege with much appearance of justice that it represents the real original unadulterated religion. To pick out for such a position the Roman Catholic Church and the Roman Catholic creed as we know them appears to me to be a distortion of all historical truth. The Romish Church has a history which for 1500 years or more is as distinct and clear as the history of the English or French nations for 1000 or 1200 years. It has its merits and defects, its achievements and its atrocities, like any other history; and it is to me as difficult to believe that it is divine as to believe that Archbishop Manning is generically different from other men. It has performed great services to mankind. It has inflicted on them great injuries. It has preached much truth and much nonsense, according to time, place, and circumstance; nor can it be said that the one is less or more characteristic of it than the other. I will give a slight illustration of this from the works of one of the greatest writers of the Roman Catholic Church, Bellarmine. I would ask any one to read his treatise on Purgatory,* and to say whether it is not a fair specimen of the sort of matter of

* "Bellarmini Disputatium de Controversiis Christianæ Fidei," ii. 483—566.

which all his works consist, and whether it is possible to discuss it seriously. I will give two samples of it. After much twisting of texts to prove "*purgatorium esse*," * we arrive at the second book "*de Circumstantiis Purgatorii*." Chap. vi. relates to the place of purgatory. On this, says Bellarmine, the Church has defined nothing, but there are many opinions. Some think "*loca animarum non esse corporalia*." This was Augustine's view, "*sed retractavit*." Others, that conscience is "*infernum et purgatorium animæ*," but "*hæc*" (opinio) "*refellitur nam si ista opinio esset vera, non minus essemus nunc in inferno vel purgatorio quam post mortem*." Others think that purgatory, "and therefore hell" (*sunt enim loca vicina*), are in the Valley of Jehosaphat, which appears to be an unobjectionable view if any one likes it. Another opinion is, that it is not on the earth at all, but that the place of punishment is "*aërem istum caliginosum ubi Dæmones versantur*." The opinion which Bellarmine adopts is as follows :—

"The other opinion is the common one of the Scholastics that purgatory is in the bowels of the earth, near hell, for the Scholastics by common consent establish (*constituunt*) inside the earth four hollows (*sinus*), or one divided into four parts, one for the damned, a second for the souls to be purged, a third for infants dying unbaptized, a fourth for the just who died before the passion of Christ, which is now empty. These correspond to the kinds of punishment, for they are all places of punishment. Now all punishment is either of loss or of sense, and either eternal or temporal : for eternal punishment of loss only there is the *limbus puerorum* ; for temporal punishment of loss only, the *limbus patrum* ; for eternal punishment of loss and sense, hell ; for temporal punishment of loss and sense, purgatory."

Notwithstanding the neatness of this cross division, Calvin said, "*hæc omnia fabulas esse*." Bellarmine refutes him at length by various arguments, one of which, directed to the point, "*quod intra viscera terræ sit locus aliquis animarum*," is as follows :—

"Ad argumenta quæ tunc" (in another work) "*attulimus accedunt varæ eruptiones ignis quæ in terris apparent, quas non temere B. Gregorius putat esse indicia quædam inferni intra viscera terræ existentis . . . Laurentius Surius in historia anni 1537 scribit circa montem Heelam Insulæ Islandiæ, unde erumpunt flammæ, et audiuntur quædam tonitrua horribilia, sæpe apparere animas, quæ dicunt se mitti ad illum montem*."

Bellarmino is very particular about the condition of souls. He discusses, amongst other things, the question whether they can ever get

* On one of these texts, "He shall be saved, but so as by fire," Bellarmine says it is "*unum ex difficilissimis et utilissimis totius scripturæ*." It proves two doctrines purgatory and venial sin. It involves a metaphor which is carefully stated and interpreted. The interpretation involves "*quinque difficultates*," on one of which there are "*sex sententiæ*." Upon the first sententia arises a solution and a reply, and so of the rest, like the seven wives coming from St. Ives.

out "*ex receptaculis suis*," and is inclined to think not. However, John Damascenus was of a different opinion, for he says that one Falconilla was let out of hell on the prayers of S. Thecla, and that Trajan was let out of hell on the prayers of S. Gregory. Bellarmine examines Trajan's case with the utmost care. First he says, that if it did really happen, we must believe "that Trajan was not absolutely condemned to hell, but only punished in hell according to his present demerit, and that judgment was arrested (*sententiam suspensam*), because S. Gregory's prayers were foreseen." Moreover, he could not have gone straight from hell to heaven, he must first have been re-united to his body and baptized and repented or done penance (*pœnitentiam in hac vitâ egisse*). Now the accounts of his case say nothing of any such occurrence, and this throws a doubt over the whole story, which, indeed, Bellarmine does not credit for several reasons.

One of these reasons is, that Gregory would have committed mortal sin in praying for Trajan, and it hardly seems likely that if the prayer was a mortal sin, it would have been granted. Ciaconus indeed says, that Gregory prayed "*ex peculiari instinctu divino*." "At contra," objects Bellarmine, the history expressly declares that Gregory was punished "with a perpetual pain in his stomach and his feet" (*perpetuo dolore stomachi et pedum*). True, it is urged that this pain was to keep him humble ("*ne elatio illi subreperet*"). "At contra," Petrus diaconus expressly declares, "*Gregorio ab angelo dictum fuisse, quod quia præsumpserat hoc petere laboraret usque ad mortem dolere, &c., ergo in pœnam peccati, nam præsumptio peccatum est*." Ciaconus, however, was not to be beaten so easily, and he produces various other witnesses, one of whom (Mechtildis), said that he had asked the Lord what he had done with the souls of Samson, Solomon, Origen, and Trajan, "*et responsum esse Deum velle esse omnibus incognitum quid sua liberalitas cum illis egerit*," which Ciaconus puts forward as a circumstance tending to show that Trajan was not in hell. Bellarmine triumphantly argues, first, that it clearly shows that no one could possibly know that Trajan was in heaven, and next, that it is inconsistent with another part of the evidence of Joannes Diaconus, who declares that Origen was actually seen in hell with Arius and Nestorius.

To me there is something inexpressibly grotesque in this mixture of acuteness and absurdity. It is like a mad judge summing up to an imaginary jury out of the Arabian Nights. "At this point, gentlemen, a black man, whose name is not given, and whose object is not very apparent, came out of the wall and said to the fish, 'Fish, fish, are you in your duty?' The fish made a reply, to which I shall refer immediately. Some circumstances in this story appear to me suspicious.

Of course the black man might speak to the fishes, but I know of no direct authority for the proposition that fishes can speak to black men. I am aware that the whale said to Moses in the bulrushes, 'Almost thou persuadest me to be a Christian;' but whales are mammals, not fishes properly so called, and Moses, if not entirely white, was probably very far from being black, so that the case does not apply. However, gentlemen, it is entirely a question for you whether you will or will not believe the evidence as to the black man. I cannot affect to direct you upon it as matter of law. With regard to the alleged reply of the fishes, it is different. I admitted proof of what was said by the black man (not without some hesitation), on the ground that it was a statement accompanying, and probably explaining, the act of coming out of the wall; but I had no hesitation in excluding the reply of the fish. It can be nothing but hearsay, and by the first principles of the law of evidence it must be withdrawn from your consideration."

I can hardly argue with a person who does not put Bellarmine's speculations on a level with such an effusion as this; but it is impossible to draw any intelligible line between this part of Bellarmine and many others. It is impossible to believe in purgatory without either believing this nonsense, or cutting the doctrine down upon principles which would apply equally to transubstantiation, and many other doctrines. Let common sense once get in its little finger, and you cannot keep out the whole arm. Absolutely exclude it, and you must be content to debate with Bellarmine the causes of Gregory's gout, and the credibility of witnesses who say they saw Origen in hell, and souls coming out of the crater of Hecla. It would be curious to know what Archbishop Manning really thinks of the *limbus patrum*, and the fate of the unbaptized infants suffering to all eternity the *pœna damni*, because they died before baptism.*

Upon the whole it appears to me that ordinary men of the world both may and ought to say to Archbishop Manning, as I do, "You have entirely failed to make out any sort of claim to be my spiritual master, which I should be justified in entertaining for one moment. The fundamental principle upon which your whole system

* Bellarmine's account of the fate of the unbaptized infants is bad enough. A being who keeps a number of poor little babies crawling about in a huge black hole to all eternity on a point of form deserves to be called intolerably stupid and cruel, even though it be true, according to what Bellarmine calls "*communis opinio scholasticorum*," "*limbum puerorum in loco inferni altiore esse quam sit purgatorium, ita ut ad eum ignis non perveniat*." This, however, it must be admitted, is humane in comparison with what I can only call the devilish wickedness of some of the Protestant opinions on the subject. Cotton Mather's poem about the last judgment describes the whole matter:

"Then to the bar all they drew near who died in infancy,
And never had or good or bad effected personally."

They are told by the presiding Moloch, that if Adam had not sinned they would have

depends is based upon arguments which the limitation of human knowledge considerably weakens. The history which you next appeal to rests upon hearsay evidence which can no longer be tested, though innumerable points in it show the necessity of further inquiry or of continued doubt. The institution which you represent can make out no clear title to the powers you claim for it, even upon your own statement of the case; and, admitting many of your premisses, your Protestant adversaries show that your conclusions are untenable. The history of your Church is just like other human histories. You are just like other men, not much worse or better than your neighbours, and assuredly not much wiser.

The Church, Archbishop Manning says, is "either Christ or Antichrist." It appears to me that it is neither one nor the other, but simply a collective name for a number of not very wise laymen superintended by clergymen who differ from the ordinary Anglican clergy principally in the colour of their spiritual veneering. With no intention to be wanting in personal respect to Archbishop Manning, I cannot see that he has more right than any other man to be believed when he says that in some sense or other he is a kind of organ of the Holy Ghost, and that if not, then he must be a limb of Antichrist.

These are the reasons which lead me to think that Archbishop Manning's claims on behalf of the Church of Rome cannot be supported. I have said nothing which has not in various forms been repeated over and over again, and I may add that I think I am entitled to appeal to the general conduct of the lay world as a plain proof that mine are the views usually entertained by laymen, though I do not say that every layman has distinctly realized them in his own mind. Look at the position of the Church in every part of the claimed the benefit, and that as he did they must stand to the loss. They are accordingly taken away with much lamentation to the place of torment:

"God's vengeance feeds the flame,
With piles of wood and brimstone flood
That none can quench the same."

These illustrations show how monstrous it is for men to throw their own gloomy and cruel thoughts into the form of definite statements about matters of which they know absolutely nothing at all, and about which their very conjectures become absurd as soon as they cease to be vague.

Any one who doubts whether intelligent Catholics in the present day have got much beyond Bellarmine upon this matter would do well to read a passage in the life of Bishop Grant (pp. 208—214) about the "Holy Souls." It contains *inter alia* a story as to the temporal blessings to be secured by praying to them. "A firm of Catholic lawyers," taking a hint from a statement of the Bishops on this point, "promised a certain number of masses to the Holy Souls if a complicated and unpromising suit in which they were engaged were successfully terminated. They gained it, and so much more happily than they could have anticipated, that the promised offering to the Holy Souls was proportionately increased." What would the judges say to such a proceeding? It has a most unpleasant resemblance to bribery.

world. Has not the civil power here, there, and everywhere quietly, and more or less courteously, but firmly, refused to recognize in the priests the powers which Archbishop Manning claims for them, and to which, on his view of the case, they are no doubt entitled? That this is so is the burden of every pastoral which issues from the Vatican, and the belief that it is so is the explanation of the syllabus. Nay, Archbishop Manning himself has expressly admitted that in these ages politics and science have fallen away from the faith. How badly I am used, says a convict, twenty witnesses swore against me, and the jury with one voice found me guilty. Probably, one would reply, you really were guilty. If Archbishop Manning's claims are well founded, why do politics, science, and all the governments of Europe, repudiate them? If they are false, there is no difficulty in the matter.

Look again at the tenor of most, or at least of many, of the sermons which are continually being preached up and down the country. "You worldly moralists," says the preacher, "would you live as you do if you believed in your heart all that I am continually telling you? If you really and earnestly believed all that is written in the Bible, would you love the world so dearly and enjoy the pleasures of life so eagerly?"* If the hearers answered quite honestly, they would say very much what I have said in this paper. They would reply, "Well, if you must know, we do not believe what you tell us, except to a small extent, and in part. We think in general that religion is a good thing, and is rooted in human nature, but your particular version of it appears to us very much too doubtful to be acted on to any unpleasant extent." If we look at what men do instead of what they say (which is surely the true way to discover their real opinions), we can hardly escape from the conclusion that this is what the great mass of quiet, respectable, orderly people really do in their hearts believe about religion, and if this is their real opinion, why are we to suppose that it is false? Why not let opinion upon this as well as upon other subjects rest at its natural level? Why not take the world as you find it? The only possible answer to this question is Because the world is wrong, and to this the reply is, Then prove it to be wrong by producing arguments to show that the subject of religion is not doubtful, that the different propositions which you maintain can be properly and fully made out, and that they should be made the foundation of our conduct. I think this will be found to be no easy task.

JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN.

* This vein of rhetoric was worked with vivacity and ingenuity not long since in a novelette entitled "Modern Christianity & Civilized Heathenism."



THE EVOLUTION HYPOTHESIS, AND THE ORIGIN OF LIFE.

PART I.

YEAR by year the word "Evolution" becomes diffused more widely through our literature, and the central idea which it implies grows familiar to an ever-increasing multitude of readers. We have witnessed within the last few years a marvellous awakening of interest in the minds of the public generally to questions of science, and it so happens that a discussion of the Doctrine of Evolution has been more or less directly involved in those departments of Science and Philosophy, which have during this period received the largest share of popular attention.

Perhaps the greatest impetus was given to the spread of the doctrine about fourteen years ago, by the publication of Mr. Darwin's now celebrated "Origin of Species." This volume has been followed by quite a library of works and memoirs on the same subject—partly scientific and partly popular. From about the same date also, Mr. Herbert Spencer has been engaged in systematically elaborating the principles of an all-comprehensive Evolution Philosophy, and the results of his genius and labour are now undoubtedly influencing the thoughts of a rapidly widening circle of readers. Both in this country and abroad, the doctrine of Evolution is gradually but surely gaining ground amongst the most reflective; and although many other

writers have been more or less influential in determining this result, it has been in the main brought about by the two above mentioned.

Evolution implies continuity and uniformity. It teaches us to look upon events of all kinds as the products of continuously operating causes—it recognises no sudden breaks or causeless stoppages in the sequence of natural phenomena. It equally implies that natural events do not vary spontaneously. It is a philosophy which deals with natural phenomena in their widest sense: it embraces both the present and the far distant past. It seeks to assure us that the properties and tendencies now manifest in our surrounding world of things, are in all respects similar to those which have existed in the past. Without a basis of this kind, the Evolution hypothesis would be a mere idle dream. Uniformity is for it an all-pervading necessity. Starting from facts of daily observation and from scientific experiments, the properties and tendencies of things are noted and grouped; whilst philosophers, using the knowledge thus gained, seek to trace back the progress of events and show how this complex world has gradually been derived from a world of more and more simple composition. We are taken back in imagination even much further. We are referred to a primal haze or nebula—as the gigantic germ of a future Universe. This was the conception of Laplace.

But whether we follow the philosopher in his bold speculations concerning the past, or listen to the biologist making his predictions concerning the future stages which the germ of a given animal will pass through in the progress of its evolution—in each case the “uniformity of nature” is tacitly assumed. This assumption underlies almost all our thoughts and actions, even in every-day life. And without such a belief in the Uniformity of Nature, science would be impossible—the very idea of it, in fact, could never have arisen. In its absence we could neither fathom the past nor illumine the future. As Mr. Mill said,*—“Were we to suppose (what it is perfectly possible to imagine) that the present order of the universe were brought to an end, and that a chaos succeeded in which there was no fixed succession of events, and the past gave no assurance of the future, if a human being were miraculously kept alive to witness this change, he surely would soon cease to believe in any uniformity, the uniformity itself no longer existing.”

It is true that in earlier times no absolute belief in the uniformity of Nature existed, even amongst the select few. The Greek philosophers, including Aristotle, recognized “chance” and “spontaneity” as finding a definite place in Nature, and to this extent they were not sure that the future would resemble the past. But as we have

* *Syst. of Logic*, 6th edit. vol. ii., p. 98.

become more familiar with a wider range of natural phenomena, and with their mutual relations or order of appearance, so has the conception of chance or spontaneity disappeared from the scientific horizon—driven out of the field by the steady advance of Law and Order. Those who embrace the Evolution Philosophy are foremost in this opinion—they believe that no effects of whatsoever kind can occur without adequate causes, and, the conditions being similar, that the same results will always follow the action of any given cause. Their whole creed is, in fact, pre-eminently based upon an assumed Uniformity of Nature.

The present is essentially a time of transition in matters of opinion. Men who have been educated in one system of beliefs are gradually being converted to another, because the new system is thought to be more harmonious with the observed order of natural phenomena. This has been the case even with the chief exponents of Evolution. They have themselves had to unlearn much which they had previously learned. The doctrine of Evolution has thus been developed only by the sacrifice of many previous early beliefs and modes of thought. But it often happens that an old belief will—unknown perhaps to the person himself—leave decided traces of its previous influence, and thus prevent for a time the full realization of all the logical consequences of new views. This vestige of the old state of opinion or habit of thought, is more especially apt to remain in directions where unexplained facts, or strong prepossessions and prejudices, bar the way. Some modes of this inconsistency may become obvious to one worker or thinker, and some to another, according to the particular direction which his investigations or thoughts may have taken; and such inconsistencies should be pointed out as they present themselves. So that, with the view of strengthening an hypothesis which I, in common with so many other workers in science, believe to be true, I now venture to allude to certain apparent anomalies in the declared opinions of the most prominent upholders of the doctrine of Evolution in this country. It seems all the more desirable that this should be done, since the inconsistencies may be easily shown to be wholly uncalled for, and to involve sundry unscientific conceptions. Yet the modifications of opinion which appear to be demanded on the ground of fact, as well as on the ground of reason, will necessitate very considerable and almost revolutionary changes in the accepted code of biological doctrines.

An examination of the facts of science generally and of various everyday phenomena, teaches us, according to the Evolutionist, that matter of different kinds, situated as it is and has been, gradually tends within certain limits to become more and more complex in its internal and external constitution. Coupling this conclusion with

various astronomical data, with geological data, and with facts derived from the study of the past forms of Life upon our globe, the Evolutionist essays to penetrate through the long vista of bygone ages, till he may rest his speculative gaze upon a vast rotating nebular mass of gaseous matter, of comparatively simple though unknown constitution, from which he supposes our Universe to have been slowly evolved. Without futile questionings as to the explanation or cause of the existence of the nebula, without speculation as to what simpler or more complex matter may have immediately preceded it, it is obvious that we may for our own convenience take up its imaginary existence at any stage. Though we must be free to admit that, in concentrating our attention upon this nebular stage, or upon any other, we arbitrarily break into a mysterious cycle of existence whose Cause is to us unfathomable. It is needless for my purpose, however, to attempt to concentrate the reader's attention upon a period so remote in the history of our Universe. The primordial nebula, as it cooled and condensed, acquired a more rapid axial rotation: masses were gradually thrown off from its circumference, and these in their turn condensed into rotating spheroids, which continued to circulate round the parent mass in elliptical orbits. Assuming, then, with the Evolutionist, that our own planet had a past history of this kind, we must also assume that it gradually changed from a gaseous to a fluid state before beginning to solidify by the formation of a superficial crust—a crust which gradually thickened as the fervent heat of it and of the fluid nucleus abated by heat radiations into space. Until this stage of the Earth's history had been far advanced, no Living Things could have existed upon its surface. "Hence," as Sir William Thomson said,* "when the Earth was first fit for life there were no living things on it. There were rocks, solid and disintegrated, water, air all round, warmed and illuminated by a brilliant sun, ready to become a garden." Living things must, however, have appeared upon its surface at some very remote epoch, since their remains are to be found far down in the rocks which at present constitute its crust. But how, it must be asked, is the first appearance of living matter upon the earth to be accounted for?

We should not needlessly invoke an abnormal act of Creative Power, we must not even resort to a "moss-grown fragment from the ruins of another world," unless it is really necessary to invent some such hypothesis. Now, the Evolutionist repudiates the notion of Creation in its ordinary sense; he believes that the operation of natural causes, working in their accustomed manner, were alone quite adequate to bring into existence a kind of matter presenting a new order of complexity, and displaying the phenomena which we

* Inaugural Address at Meeting of British Association, *Nature*, Aug. 3, 1871, p. 269.

have generalized under the word "Life." Living matter is thus supposed to have come into being by the further operation under new conditions of the same agencies as had previously led to the formation of the various inorganic constituents of the earth's crust—such mineral and saline substances as we see around us at the present day. What we call "Life," then, is regarded as one of the natural results of the growing complexity of our primal nebula. So that, in accordance with this view, we have no more reason to postulate a miraculous interference or exercise of Creative Power to account for the evolution of living matter in any suitable portion of the Universe (whether it be on this earth or elsewhere), than to explain the appearance of any other kind of matter—the magnetic oxide of iron, for instance. So far, all thorough Evolutionists are quite agreed. This is the view of Spencer, Lewes, Huxley, and others—possibly of Darwin. I say possibly of Darwin, because on this subject it so happens that the language of this most distinguished exponent of Evolution is more than usually tinged with a previous point of view. Speaking of the probable commencement of Life upon our globe, Mr. Darwin says * :—"I believe that animals have descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number. Analogy would lead me one step further, namely, to the belief that all animals and plants have descended from some one prototype. . . . There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms, or into one; and that whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms, most beautiful and most wonderful, have been and are being evolved." Taking into account the phraseology made use of in the above quotation, we have little difficulty in recognizing the views of an Evolutionist, dwarfed and modified though they are by an ultimate appeal to a Creative act only a little less miraculous and singular than the mythical origin of our reputed ancestors—Adam and Eve. Some existing naturalists may perhaps contend that Mr. Darwin ought to have kept more closely to the Mosaic record—replacing his one primordial form by a dual birth of male and female, without whose mutual influence no "biological individuals" can in their opinion come into existence. Such a supposition, it is true, would be as antiquated and unnecessary from the Evolutionist's point of view as is the whole notion of life having been originally "breathed" into one or more organic forms. Mr. Spencer's language is happily free from both these defects: he neither uses the phraseology of the Creative hypothesis, nor does he adopt a definition of biological

* *Origin of Species*, 6th edit. 1872, pp. 424 and 429.

"individuality" at variance with the Evolution philosophy. He distinctly teaches that living matter must have been at first formless, and that multiplication would have taken place, as amongst the lowest forms of the present day, exclusively by agamic methods—nay, more, he teaches that living matter must have been the gradual product or outcome of antecedent material combinations. "Construed in terms of evolution," he says,* "every kind of being is conceived as a product of modifications wrought by insensible gradations on a pre-existing kind of being, and this holds fully of the supposed 'commencements of organic life,' as of all subsequent developments of organic life." But on the question whether the process of Archebiosis (life-evolution) is likely to have occurred once only, as Mr. Darwin seems to hint, or in multitudinous centres scattered over the earth's surface, Mr. Spencer makes no definite statement. The latter belief would, however, be entirely in accordance with his general doctrine; and we seem all the more entitled to infer that Mr. Spencer inclines to the notion of a multiple occurrence of Archebiosis, both in space and in time, since he does not reject the possibility of its occurrence in our own day. Granting "that the formation of organic matter and the evolution of life in its lowest forms may go on under existing cosmical conditions," he believes it "more likely that the formation of such matter and of such forms took place at a time when the heat of the earth's surface was falling through those ranges of temperature at which the higher organic compounds are unstable." But conclusions which we are only able to infer from the writings of Mr. Spencer have been distinctly enunciated by Mr. G. H. Lewes. In a criticism of the "Darwinian Hypothesis," he very forcibly pointed out that it is quite compatible with the hypothesis of evolution to admit a variety of starting points for the formation of living matter, and he consequently laid down in principle a very important extension of the Darwinian doctrine, in its application to higher organisms. He says†: "Although observation reveals that the bond of kinship does really unite many divergent forms, and the principle of Descent with Natural Selection will account for many of the resemblances and differences, there is at present no warrant for assuming that all resemblances and differences are due to this one cause, but, on the contrary, we are justified in assuming a deeper principle which may be thus formulated: All the complex organisms are evolved from organisms less complex, as these were evolved from simpler forms: the link which unites all organisms is not always the common bond of heritage, but the *uniformity of organic laws acting under uniform conditions*. . . . It is therefore consistent with the

* Principles of Biology, vol. ii. Appendix, p. 482.

† *Fortnightly Review*, 1868.

hypothesis of Evolution to admit a variety of origins or starting points." In this paper Mr. Lewes distinctly postulates the probability of a repetition of the process of Archebiosis, wherever the conditions were favourable, and though he says nothing against the continuance of such a process in the present day, neither does he dwell upon it as a probability.

Professor Huxley's* opinions on the subject of Archebiosis are very similar to those of Mr. Spencer, with the exception that he seems more strongly opposed to the notion of its occurrence at the present day, and it is to this aspect of the question that I would now direct the reader's attention. Why should men of such acknowledged eminence in matters of Philosophy and Science as Mr. Herbert Spencer and Professor Huxley promulgate a notion which seems to involve an arbitrary infringement of the uniformity of nature?

They would both have us believe that living matter came into being by the operation of natural causes—that is, by the unhindered play of natural affinities operating in and upon matter which had already acquired a certain degree of molecular complexity. They believe that the simpler kinds of mineral and crystalline matter continue to come into being now as they have ever done; nay more, they believe that the higher kind of matter, originally initiated by the operation of natural causes, continues to grow both in animal and in vegetal forms, solely under similar influences, and yet they consider themselves justified in supposing that natural causes are now no longer able independently to initiate this higher kind of matter (protoplasm). We find Professor Tyndall† also affirming, in the most unhesitating language, the ultimate similarity between crystalline and living matter: affirming that all the various structures by which the two kinds of matter may be represented are equally the "results of the free play of the forces of the atoms and molecules" entering into their composition. And he, too, would have us believe that whilst differences in degree of molecular complexity alone separate living from not-living matter, the physical agencies which promote the growth of living matter are now incapable of causing its origination.

Why, we may fairly ask, should a supposed difference be erected by Evolutionists between Origination and Growth in the case of living matter, whilst no one dreams of making any such distinction in reference to crystalline matter? Is it true that the process of growth differs from the process of origination, and if so in what respects? Philosophically speaking there is little difference. Take the case of

* Inaugural Address at Meeting of British Association, *Nature*, Sep. 15, 1870, p. 404.

† *Fragments of Science*, 4th edit. (1872) pp. 85—87, and 113—119.

the formation of the "silver tree" cited by Professor Tyndall. A weak galvanic current is passed through a solution of nitrate of silver, and simultaneously in a first increment of time a number of molecules of oxygen and of silver begin to aggregate independently into crystals of oxide of silver; in a second increment of time the operation of the same causes produces similar results, only now part of the new crystalline matter forms in connection with the pre-existing germs of crystals, though part of it may still aggregate independently. During a third, a fourth, and in all succeeding increments of time, in which the same causes operate amidst similar conditions, similar results must ensue. But, taking the process of origination which occurs in the first increment of time, would Professor Tyndall have us believe that it is in any way different from that of growth which takes place in a second, third, or fourth increment of time? Does not the very fact that origination and growth so often occur simultaneously in the case of crystalline matter, and under the influence of the same causes, show us that the two processes are intrinsically similar, and that conditions favourable for growth are also likely to be favourable for origination? And if this be true for crystalline matter, may we not infer that it would also be true for living matter? These are questions neither asked nor answered in any definite manner by those whose opinions I have already cited. They are, however, questions by no means unworthy of an attentive consideration.

Although, as a general rule, conditions favourable for the growth of any particular kind of crystalline matter are likely to be favourable for its origination, still it must be acknowledged that the presence of a crystal will occasionally lead to its growth in a medium in which similar crystalline matter had previously shown no tendency to form independently—even in cases where the introduction of a non-crystalline nucleus would not be able to determine a similar formation of crystalline matter. In spite of the general law, therefore, that conditions favourable for the growth are also favourable for the origination of crystalline matter, we are compelled to admit that growth may be determined under certain conditions where origination does not occur, and that the presence of pre-existing crystalline matter favours the process. Now a distinction of the same kind undoubtedly obtains in the case of living matter. We know quite positively that although Bacteria will not originate in a previously-boiled ammoniac tartrate solution, or "Pasteur's solution," that the addition of a few of these organisms (all other conditions remaining the same) will soon occasion a very considerable growth of the living matter of which they are composed.* We are

* The Beginnings of Life, vol. i. p. 325.

thus reduced to ask, whether the influence of the pre-existing nucleus is relatively more potent in the case of living matter than it is in the case of crystalline matter? This is a question which unfortunately we are unable definitely to answer. But so long as we have no positive knowledge on this subject, we surely have little right to infer that processes both of origination and of growth continue in the case of crystalline matter, whilst the process of growth alone survives in the case of living matter. There are no facts easily discoverable upon which such an assumption can be legitimately based.

The probabilities would seem altogether in favour of the continuance of a natural process like Archebiosis after it had been once initiated, more especially when this natural process is so closely allied to another which manifests itself with the utmost readiness on all parts of the earth's surface. So that unless very cogent reasons could be adduced against the occurrence of Archebiosis at the present day, looked at from an *à priori* point of view, there seems scarcely room for doubt upon the subject. The properties and chemical tendencies of material bodies seem to be quite constant through both time and space. Speaking upon this subject in a recent discourse on "Molecules," Professor Clerk Maxwell says,* "We can procure specimens of oxygen from very different sources, from the air, from water, from rocks of every geological epoch. The history of these specimens has been very different, and if, during thousands of years, difference of circumstances could produce difference of properties, these specimens of oxygen would show it. . . . In like manner, we may procure hydrogen from water, from coal, or, as Graham did, from meteoric iron. Take two litres of any specimen of hydrogen, it will combine with exactly one litre of any specimen of oxygen, and will form exactly two litres of the vapour of water. . . . Now, if during the whole previous history of either specimen, whether imprisoned in the rocks, flowing in the sea, or careering through unknown regions with the meteorites, any modification of the molecules had taken place, these relations would no longer be preserved.

. . . . But we have another, and an entirely different method of comparing the properties of molecules. The molecule, though indestructible, is not a hard rigid body, but is capable of internal movements, and when these are excited it emits rays, the wave-length of which is a measure of the time of vibration of the molecule.

. . . . By means of the spectroscope the wave-lengths of different kinds of light may be compared to within one ten-thousandth part. In this way it has been ascertained, not only that molecules taken from every specimen of hydrogen in our laboratories, have the same set of periods of vibration, but that light having the same set of periods of vibration, is emitted from the sun and from the fixed stars.

* *Nature*, Sep. 25, 1873, p. 440.

. . . We are thus assured that molecules of the same nature as those of our hydrogen exist in those distant regions, or at least did exist when the light by which we see them was emitted." With evidence such as this before us, which could be multiplied to an enormous extent, we should hesitate before needlessly postulating any infringement of the uniformity of natural phenomena.

What, then, are the reasons assigned for the non-occurrence at the present day of the process of Archebiosis? All that Mr. Spencer says upon the subject is, that such a process seems to him more likely to have occurred at "a time when the heat of the earth's surface was falling through those ranges of temperature at which the higher organic compounds are unstable," than at the present day. Why such conditions would be more favourable than those now existing Mr. Spencer does not say; and that such an alteration should suffice to put a stop to Archebiosis, although we see living matter still growing freely all over the earth under the most diverse conditions as regards temperature, seems very difficult to believe. Yet no other suggestion is offered in explanation of an assumption which seems essentially unscientific. For the assumption that Archebiosis took place only in the remote past, puts this process on a *quasi* miraculous level, and tends to assimilate it to an act of special creation, the very notion of which Mr. Spencer, in other cases, resolutely rejects.

Again, what reason does Professor Huxley give, in explanation of his supposition as to the present non-occurrence of Archebiosis? He says,* if it were given to him "to look beyond the abyss of geologically recorded time" to a still more remote period of the earth's history, he would expect "to be a witness to the evolution of living protoplasm from not-living matter." And the only reason distinctly implied why a similar process should not occur at the present day, is because the physical and chemical conditions of the earth's surface were different in the past from what they are now. And yet, concerning the exact nature of these differences, and the degree in which the different sets of conditions would respectively favour the occurrence or arrest of an evolution of living matter, Professor Huxley cannot possess even the vaguest knowledge. He chooses to assume that the unknown conditions existing in the past were more favourable to Archebiosis than those now in operation. This, however, is a mere assumption which may be entirely opposed to the facts. It is useless of course to argue upon such a subject, but still it might fairly be said, in opposition to his assumption of the impotency of present telluric conditions, that the abundance of *dead organic matter* now existing in a state of solution would seem to afford a much more easy starting-point for life-evolution than

* *Nature*, Sep. 15, 1870, p. 404.

could have existed in that remote past, when no living matter had previously been formed, and consequently when no dead organic matter thence derived could have been diffused over the earth's surface.*

Professor Huxley is, however, very inconsistent, since, in spite of his declared expectation of witnessing the evolution of living from lifeless matter, if it were given him "to look beyond the abyss of geologically recorded time," he had said scarcely five minutes before, in reference to experimental evidence bearing upon the present occurrence of a similar process, that "if, in the present state of Science, the alternative is offered us, either germs can stand a greater heat than has been supposed, or the molecules of dead matter, for no valid or intelligible reason that is assigned, are able to re-arrange themselves into living bodies, exactly such as can be demonstrated to be frequently produced in another way, I cannot understand how choice can be, even for a moment, doubtful." Having thus expressed himself, it was a little strange that Professor Huxley forgot to inform his audience five minutes afterwards what "valid or intelligible reason" he was able to assign for the occurrence of that evolution of not-living matter into living protoplasm, in the remote past, to which he alluded. A supernatural interposition of Creative Power would explain the presence of living things upon our earth, just as easily as a supernatural preservation of living matter from the destructive effects of heat would account for the presence of living organisms within certain experimental flasks. But Professor Huxley most inconsistently says that, even in the face of scientific evidence concerning the destructive powers of heat upon living matter, he would rather explain the presence of organisms in certain flasks on the hypothesis of a (supernatural) preservation of germs, than believe in the otherwise proved occurrence of a present life-evolution, similar to that which he assumes to have taken place in the past. He is willing to accept the supernatural in the present, though he declines to interpret the past by its aid. He assumes this attitude because no "valid or intelligible reason" is assigned in explanation of life-evolution, a belief in which would render unnecessary any appeal to the supernatural in the present; though he himself postulates the occurrence of the same unexplained process in the past, solely in order to avoid recourse to the supernatural. Professor Huxley's position in reference to this question is very puzzling, and one cannot help wondering through what monochromatic glass he had been taking his observations (from his watch-tower) in order to come to the conclusion that "the present

* This is a consideration of great importance; since those who believe that Archebiosis occurs in organic solutions at the present day, have not yet professed to show that it can occur in saline solutions free from all traces of organic matter.

state of science" gives any sanction to such vacillations, or entitles him to appeal to a supernatural preservation of germs instead of trusting to the known uniformity of natural phenomena.

Sir William Thomson was certainly much more consistent. He too seemed inclined to explain the experiments of our own day by resorting to the hypothesis of a supernatural preservation of germs, and similarly he seems not unwilling to explain the original advent of Life upon this globe, by another assumed process of "contagion." He has resort neither to a Creative hypothesis, nor to the hypothesis of a natural becoming of living matter, but, shelving the question of "origin" altogether, he suggests that our Earth may have become peopled with organic forms owing to the advent upon it, in the remote past, of a "moss-grown fragment from the ruins of another world." Sir William Thomson's hypothesis seems strangely improbable in itself, though it has, in comparison with the views of others, the somewhat rare merit of being not inconsistent with his notions concerning the experiments of to-day. He does not reject the supernatural in the past, whilst resorting to it for the present—he resorts to it in the present and in the past alike, and curiously evades the problem of origin altogether.

Since so little—or rather nothing—is said by Professor Huxley in support of his supposition that living matter does not originate in the present day, even though the process of origination is so closely akin to that of growth, and though the process of growth is taking place at every moment of our lives, in every region of the globe, and under the most varied conditions—amidst tropical heat and icy coldness, on mountain-tops and deep down in almost unfathomable ocean-beds,—it seems only reasonable to suppose that he must have been influenced by some prepossessions. And so far as one can gather from his Presidential Address before the British Association, from which I have already quoted, he does appear to have been powerfully biassed by theoretical considerations. One of these we shall now consider.

Much stress is laid by certain writers upon the fact that "the doctrine of spontaneous or equivocal generation has been chased successively to lower and lower stations in the world of organized beings as our means of investigation have improved."* So that, as another very eminent writer says, "if some apparent exceptions still exist they are of the lowest and simplest forms."† And it is usually inferred from this fact that further knowledge and improved means of observation will prove these apparent exceptions to be no exceptions

* Prof. Lister, Introductory Lecture, (University of Edinburgh), 1869, p. 12.

† Mr. Justice Grove (Presidential Address), Rep. of Brit. Assoc. for the Advancement of Science, 1866, p. lxxi.

to the supposed general rule—*omne vivum ex vivo*. A consideration of this kind seems to have powerfully influenced Professor Huxley. But much confusion exists in reference to the point, which needs to be removed. In the first place, it must be freely admitted that many ancient notions, dating from the time of Aristotle, on the subject of "Equivocal or Spontaneous Generation," were altogether crude and absurd. Secondly, it is necessary to distinguish (and Professor Huxley did so) between two meanings of the phrase which have often been confounded with one another—viz., between Heterogenesis, or the mere allotropic modification of already existing living matter, and Archebiosis, or the independent origination of living matter. Thirdly, it should be distinctly understood that those who strictly adhere to the Evolution hypothesis could never believe in the origination of any but the "lowest and simplest" organic forms by a process of Archebiosis. So that, as Professor Huxley professes himself an Evolutionist, the objection above indicated should have been quite pointless for him. Molecular combinations giving rise to units of protoplasm far below the *minimum visibile* stage of our most powerful microscope would represent those initial collocations by which alone living matter could come into being—though the "germs" thus initiated may afterwards appear as minutest visible specks growing into Bacteria, Vibriones, or Torulæ. We may, therefore, be permitted to remark that even if it were given to Professor Huxley to "look beyond the abyss of geologically recorded time," he would be extremely unlikely to witness an "evolution of living protoplasm from not-living matter." At the most, he might see (that is, if equipped with a powerful microscope) only what he may equally well see now—viz., a gradual emergence into the sphere of the visible of minute specks of living protoplasm. But though he might, when looking back to this remote age, be inclined to consider such appearances as testifying to the evolution of living protoplasm from not-living matter, he would perchance find it just as difficult to convince others of the absence of invisible salamandrine germs (derived perhaps from the "moss-grown fragment of another world") as he is himself difficult to be convinced by similar appearances at the present day. Professor Huxley seems, for the time, to have lost sight of a consideration justly deemed by Professor Tyndall to be of great importance in the interpretation of evolutionary phenomena—viz., the enormous difference in point of size between the first constituent molecules of protoplasm and the minutest visible organisms. As Professor Tyndall* puts it, compared with their constituent elements, "the smallest vibrios and bacteria of the microscopic field are as behemoth and leviathan"—even though the latter are often less than $\frac{1}{300000}$ of an inch in diameter.

* Fragments of Science, 4th edit. (1872) p. 151.

Thus it would appear that a consistent belief in the Evolution Hypothesis necessarily carries with it a belief in the continuance of the process of Archebiosis from the remote epoch when living matter first appeared upon this earth down to the present time. The Evolutionist teaches us that living matter is not in its essence different from other kinds of matter, and that it originally came into being, like the various forms of mineral and crystalline matter, by the operation of mere natural causes. As Professor Huxley says* :—"Carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen are all lifeless bodies. Of these carbon and oxygen unite in certain proportions and under certain conditions to give rise to carbonic acid; hydrogen and oxygen produce water; nitrogen and hydrogen give rise to ammonia. These new compounds, like the elementary bodies of which they are composed, are lifeless. But when they are brought together under certain conditions, they give rise to the still more complex body, protoplasm; and this protoplasm exhibits the phenomena of life." So that if living matter has once arisen naturally and independently, the laws of uniformity alone, upon which all Science is based, should lead us to expect that it would continue to have a similar "origin" so long as such matter continued to "grow" under the most varied conditions upon and beneath the Earth's surface. And these conditions being fulfilled, we have a good *à priori* warrant for the belief that living matter is continually coming into being by virtue of the operation of the same "laws" or molecular properties as suffice to regulate its growth.

Let the Evolutionist attempt to deny it, and see what other difficulties he plunges into, in addition to that lack of consistency which I have already pointed out.

If an evolution of living matter occurred only far back beyond the depths of geologically recorded time, and if, as Mr. Darwin † would have us believe, "all the living forms of life are the lineal descendants of those which lived long before the Cambrian epoch," how is the Evolutionist to explain the existence of the multitudinous myriads of lowest and almost structureless organisms which exist at the present day? He starts in his argument in favour of Evolution from the fact that the condition of homogeneity is one of necessarily unstable equilibrium. All homogeneous matter inevitably tends to become heterogeneous, and, of the different kinds of matter, none unites within itself the various qualities tending to favour this passage from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous in the same degree as living matter. These tendencies are daily exemplified to us by the phases of embryonic development passed through by the more or less homogeneous germs of multitudinous complex organisms

* *Fortnightly Review*, Feb. 1869.

† *Origin of Species*, 6th edit. p. 428.

from which they proceed. The embryonic development of one of the higher animals—of man himself, for instance—is a kind of highly condensed epitome of animal evolution in general. And the varied forms of life of higher organization, both animal and vegetal, which have existed, and still exist, upon the surface of our earth, are all supposed by the Evolutionist to have arisen by dint of insensible modifications wrought through the long lapse of ages upon successive generations of organic forms. But if living matter contains within itself the potentiality of undergoing such mighty changes and of ever growing in complexity—if from originally structureless protoplasm (that is, structureless to our senses) all the varied forms of life have been derived, how is it that some of this very same matter should have remained through the long lapse of ages almost in its primitive structureless condition? * Why should one portion of the living matter which came into being in pre-Cambrian epochs have passed through such marvellous changes, whilst another portion has continued to grow through all the inconceivably numerous generations which must have occurred between that time and the present, without undergoing change?

In other words, what is the meaning of the existence of Bacteria, Torulæ, Amœbæ, and such simplest organisms at the present day? † Mr. Spencer saw this difficulty; but apparently did not fully realize its force. He attempts, as it appears to me, very inconsistently to evade it by supposing that living matter may escape increasing organization so long as it can escape the influence of gross changes in external conditions; and, just as inconsistently, he assumes that living matter could escape these changes in external conditions through that long lapse of ages, which the lowest estimate regards as a period of no less than 100,000,000 of years. Speaking of what he presumes to be ancient, though almost structureless, organisms, and endeavouring to account for their stationary condition as regards structure by supposing that they have succeeded through long ages in “dodging” all changes in their environment, Mr. Spencer says:—“New influences are escaped by the survival of species in the unchanged parts of their habitats, or by their spread into neighbouring habitats, which the change has rendered like their original habitats, or by both.” Now, in opposition to these views of Mr. Spencer, many very cogent objections may be alleged. In the first place, in supposing that the organization of living matter would not

* The multiplication of the lowest forms of life takes place so simply that, as Prof. Huxley has pointed out, it is nothing more than a process of “discontinuous growth.”

† Especially when Mr. Darwin says:—“Judging from the past, we may safely infer that not one living species will transmit its unaltered likeness to a distant futurity.”—*Origin of Species*, (1872) 6th edit. p. 428.

increase even through ages of time unless it were subject to marked variations in external conditions, Mr. Spencer makes a supposition which seems notably at variance with his own doctrines of Evolution. Does he not for a time ignore those internal causes of change which must ever be in operation within living matter as within all other kinds of matter—and which, even in combination with approximately fixed external conditions, should suffice to produce a continually increasing differentiation (organization) in living matter? Mr. Spencer himself says* :—"All finite forms of the homogeneous—all forms of it which we can know or conceive—must inevitably lapse into heterogeneity. In three several ways does the persistence of force necessitate this. Setting external agencies aside, each unit of a homogeneous whole must be differently affected from any of the rest by the aggregate action of the rest upon it. The resultant forces exercised by the aggregate on each unit, being in no case alike both in amount and direction, cannot produce like effects on the units. And the various positions of the parts in relation to any incident force preventing them from receiving it in uniform amounts and directions, a further difference in the effect wrought on them is inevitably produced." Even this is not all: Mr. Spencer also points out that "every differentiated part is not simply a seat of further differentiations, but also a parent of further differentiations; since in growing unlike other parts, it becomes a centre of unlike reactions on incident forces, and by so adding to the diversity of forces at work adds to the diversity of effects produced. This multiplication of effects is proved to be similarly traceable throughout Nature." Now, if causes like these are inevitably at work upon and within the simplest forms of life, no change in external conditions would be needed in order to ensure an increasing complexity of structure, through months or years, to say nothing about long ages of time. But as a matter of fact, granting that the liability of organisms to increase in complexity of structure "arises from the actions and reactions between organisms and their fluctuating environments," and seeing that these changes in the environment are enumerated by Mr. Spencer as being due to "astronomic, geologic, meteorologic, and organic agencies," organisms never could by any possibility shelter themselves through long ages of time even from the influence of these external inciters of change. Mr. Spencer's explanation of the cause of the existence of multitudinous almost structureless organisms at the present day, therefore, entirely falls to the ground. The lowest organisms can neither escape the incidence of new external conditions (such as we know from actual observation do powerfully modify them), neither, if they could, should the progress of organization thereby cease—since the internal causes

* First Principles, 2nd edit. pp. 429 and 548.

of change would still remain active and still continue to give rise to a "multiplication of effects," as Mr. Spencer has himself explained.

Thus the existence of such lowest and simplest organisms as the microscope everywhere reveals at the present day, is quite irreconcilable with the position that life-evolution has not occurred since an epoch inconceivably remote in Time. Admit the present occurrence of Archebiosis and Heterogenesis, and both the existence and protean variability of the lowest organisms are at once readily explained. We may suppose them continually seething into existence afresh, endowed with enormous plasticity; so that new recruits are constantly appearing, ever ready to fill up the gaps which would otherwise be occasioned by promotion and death. The opposite doctrine concerning such organisms as the structureless *Amœba* and the insignificant *Mucor*, now daily appearing on decaying substances, seems opposed to all reason from the point of view of the Evolution Philosophy. As I have elsewhere asked * :—"Would the Evolutionist really have us believe that such forms are direct continuations of an equally structureless matter which has existed for millions and millions of years without having undergone any differentiation? Would he have us believe that the simplest and most structureless *Amœba* of the present day can boast of a line of ancestors stretching back to such far remote periods that in comparison with them the primæval men were but as things of yesterday? The notion surely is preposterously absurd; or, if true, the fact would be sufficient to overthrow the very first principles of their own Evolution philosophy."

H. CHARLTON BASTIAN.

* *The Beginnings of Life*, 1872, vol. i. p. xii.



WHY AM I A CHRISTIAN ?

IT is becoming every day more important that this question should have a clear and decided answer ; one that does not take refuge in generalities, that does not shut its eyes to opposing arguments and evidence, that least of all allows itself to impute moral blame to those who will not accept it. It should be able also to satisfy or silence two classes of men, and should be given with both of these in view—namely, those who profess to be Christians, and those who oppose Christianity. If we think of the first alone, we are apt to make too little allowance for the prejudice in favour of our religion, and thus rest content with weak arguments ; if we think of the latter, we tend to stand too much on the defensive, and provoke the remark that modern advocacy of the faith aims only at showing that the *falsehood* of Christianity has not been proved. And in giving our answer we must not be content to rely on old arguments, as though the matter had been settled for ever long ago. I do not say that the arguments are worthless, or insufficient, and should be thrown aside as weapons which were efficient once but are now superseded ; but I am sure they need examining, so that we should not take their goodness for granted, but should see if they retain point to meet objections, whether new or old ones revived.

This duty is one we all must undertake, more or less, but specially the clergy, who are the appointed preachers, and therefore defenders

of the faith. If they cannot give a reasonable answer, they must be content to see their religion lose ground with thinking men. And whatever may be said of other people, whatever reasons there may be, and there are good ones, against others making themselves acquainted in detail with all that has been urged against the Christian religion, the clergy, one would think, should not be afraid nor unwilling to be at the pains to learn the current tone of thought in these matters. It will never do for them when difficulties are brought directly or indirectly before them to say that "it is better to have nothing to do with such things, they should be put aside as wicked, we for our part were long ago convinced of the soundness of the current arguments in favour of our holy religion, and we decline to re-open the question." They must answer, and they must answer not from a mere one-sided investigation, having read the refutation only of the views they are opposed to, but from real knowledge of the character and scope of the objections they wish to meet. That there is danger for them in this course, and that many of them strongly object to it, I do not doubt; but I am quite certain there is much greater danger in the course the majority seem content to take. Every time they refuse to answer a doubter with anything more than vague generalities, or indulge in censure of the essential wickedness of all doubt of whatever kind, they give a wound to their cause more serious than any their own faith would be likely to receive in investigating attacks on Christianity. No one expects elaborate defences from men who have not ability or learning to undertake such things, or are fully occupied with the practical duties of their profession; such can well be left to those who have special gifts and opportunities, and there is no lack of them; but it is expected that all the teachers of the nation in religious matters should take the pains to make themselves acquainted with the general run of what has been and is said both for and against the doctrines they teach. They must read both sides to some extent, if they wish to understand both sides, if they would avoid the attributing to men opinions which they have never professed.

The answer I propose to give to the question "Why am I a Christian?" is one which involves this investigation of at all events the main objections to Christianity as at present received, and is also applicable both to the believers and unbelievers in our religion. It would evidently be quite impossible for me to travel over the whole range of Christian evidences, and to give even an imperfect view of their several importance; and the mere enumeration of the various arguments would be wearisome, and also would encourage the habit I have objected to, of taking the evidences for granted. I shall, therefore, take but one line of thought, and without setting it up as

supplying the only arguments of strength or value, bring it forward as the one which to my mind indicates the direction at least in which we should look for the strongest supports of the faith.

I shall leave out of sight what are called the external evidences. Miracles and prophecy are great subsidiary aids to those who have accepted the truth of Christianity, and who are unshaken in the faith, but there is no doubt that they are obstacles in the way of unbelievers, and also are often the subjects out of which doubters gather their first difficulties. Then the internal evidence, or what is called "the witness of the Spirit," though extremely valuable, and probably to some the ultimate reason of their acceptance of the faith, is, from its very nature, one that cannot approach a demonstration, and must be dependent for its effect on each man's disposition. We have to find a way in which we may dispel the doubts or silence the opposition of others, and for that purpose an argument which can at once be met with the reply "I don't feel it," "Such and such truths do not of necessity commend themselves to my conscience," is not a strong argument. Nor is the argument from Church authority of any weight until we have proved its claims, and therefore previously proved Christianity to be true. Leaving all these on one side, the class of argument I would use is that which starts from the admission of certain facts in the history of the world, and which asserts that looking at those facts as admitted on all sides, and trying to explain their origin and meaning, it is easier to believe than to disbelieve Christianity. The objection which naturally arises, and which would come first from the supporters of the faith, is that this is taking very low ground, that we should not be content with this, but should put forward more cogent and demonstrative arguments. Granted: if we could get them. But it will be found that it is very strong, if not the strongest that could be found. For as it presents itself to us, Christianity is a matter of history: Did or did not certain events take place? and history cannot be proved by demonstration. Such an event as the Battle of Marathon cannot be proved in the same way as we can prove that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal to one another; the highest we can attain is probability; and I do not see that the Christian facts are essentially different. I therefore maintain that this line of argument is not to be decried as wanting in dignity, but that it is the most effective one we can adduce. And it has this great advantage, that it is undoubtedly scientific. We hear constantly the taunt that the defenders of Christianity, and especially the clergy, know nothing about reasoning conducted on scientific principles, that the arguments of theology are full of all the mistakes and fallacies that have ever been fallen into by mankind—begging the question, reasoning in a circle, explaining

away, everything that can provoke a man accustomed to take nothing for granted. And I must confess that such taunts are not always ill-founded. How very important then that we should cast about for a style of arguing which should meet our detractors on their own ground, and show them, by using the very processes to which they are accustomed, that our position is strong. And what can be more scientific than to take the facts of the case, to examine all the theories which have been framed to account for these facts, and to choose that one which has the highest probability? This is the line of modern science; let us take it to establish, so far as human reasonings can, Christianity.

I will try to indicate how this principle should be applied. Take, first, the facts of the earliest Christian history as recorded in the New Testament. There is no doubt, I suppose, that there was such a person as Jesus Christ, and that the main events in connection with His life and death (excepting those which are miraculous) did happen. Granting this, which is the best theory to account for the existence of such documents as the Gospels? I maintain that the theory which holds that the Gospels contain a literal account by eye-witnesses, or by those who had their information from eye-witnesses, of events wonderful or otherwise, is the most reasonable, the easiest to believe of all which have been advanced. Look at the others. There is the theory of the Rationalists. Paulus, and I believe Schleiermacher, held that all the miraculous events in the Gospels were to be accounted for by purely natural causes. When the disciples were in imminent danger of shipwreck, and thought they had been saved by the command of the Lord to the waves to be still, the fact was that their boat had got round a point into smoother water; when our Lord healed fevers with a word, it was merely that a crisis had happened at that particular time, or that imagination had produced a powerful effect, as we know it does even now. Can this theory stand as a reasonable explanation? Then there is the mythical theory of Strauss. He maintains that round the original kernel of truth there has grown the shell of legend; and that all the wonderful stories of which we read have been produced by much the same causes as produced the legends of Hercules or Romulus. I think it will be found that however ingenious his explanations may be, and however much he may have hit upon some decided difficulties, yet that a scientific investigation of his theory will show it to fail in the question of *time*. Give him unlimited time, and his theory would perhaps be not easy of refutation; but it is one of the facts we have to account for, that the Gospels were produced within comparatively a few years of the events they profess to relate (he himself puts the date of the first three Gospels at the beginning of

the second century), were circulated among men and women who had conversed with those who professed to have witnessed those events, and yet that they were universally accepted as true. There is not sufficient time for the legend to form. Then there is the form into which Rénan has cast the Gospel-history. In many points he accepts Strauss as his guide, but he has constructed a more complete biography of Christ than the other. His idea is that of our Lord being a man with all the natural dispositions and tendencies of his age and nation; and his explanation of the miraculous seems to be that the Jews would not believe in a prophet unless he were a thaumaturgist; therefore a thaumaturgist Jesus became, partly unconsciously, but I think he implies partly knowingly. At least, he allowed people to think he could work miracles. We ask again, is this theory a more *natural* one, more likely than the Christian? Lastly, there is one I should not like to pass by in silence, the New Gospel of Mr. Matthew Arnold. He, while looking on the miraculous as legendary, and after summarising the accounts of the Resurrection, commenting on them to this effect—"Do we not here see a legend growing under our very eyes?" differs from Rénan in placing our Lord on a height almost immeasurably above his followers. He thinks that thus we can account for the wondrous beauty of many of Christ's sayings, and at the same time explain the supernatural in the history of his doings. But he is obliged, to make things fit in, to attribute something like deceit to our Lord. He speaks of his claim to be the Messiah, and of his thus fulfilling prophecy; but he seems to imply that He ordered his life so far as He could, in order that He might fulfil prophecy. And thus, while raising him with one hand, he depresses him with the other. But as long as there runs through Mr. Arnold's book the ground idea that a Personal God is not revealed in either Old or New Testament, so long we cannot, however much we may admire his beauty of style, and his evident appreciation of the value of religion, look upon him as one who has given such a natural explanation of facts as Christians do.

These are the main theories which are now trying to gain acceptance in the world; it is our duty to examine them as far as we are able, and if we find that their explanations of the admitted facts of the existence of the Gospels are not so natural, so reasonable, as the Christian theory, we have then a very strong argument, which is available, both for ourselves and for those who find difficulties. We may then say, "There are difficulties in ours, but where can you find a better? It is at all events easier to accept ours than any other you can produce." It is plain that the Supernatural is after all the point on which everything turns. We do not indeed by this

line of argument bring in miracles as *evidences* of Christianity, rather on the other hand miracles are the *difficulty* we have to explain. We say that after careful examination of the history which contains them, and of the various theories which have been formed to account for it, the Christian, which is the literal, is the simplest and most natural. Rénan says somewhere that he does not doubt the *possibility* of the miraculous, but he denies that the miraculous has ever been proved; are we not a long way towards that proof when a literal interpretation of the history containing miraculous accounts is the only reasonable one?

Leaving the past, look at the present. We find a large number of men who more or less are endeavouring to lead that special kind of life which is called Christian, and which is allowed to be highly moral, and therefore praiseworthy, by all, however much some may dislike the special doctrines of the faith. Now why do all these people lead moral lives? I do not intend to go over well-worn ground, and so I will not do anything more than simply refer to the great difference between our *ordinary* morality and the *highest efforts* of the most moral men of Greece and Rome, and of India and China, as compared with Europe; the fact of the superiority of Christian morality, as exemplified in the lives of its followers, is admitted: the question, as before, is to account for it. We are told that it is simply the reception of truths relating to conduct which were unknown or partially known before: that Christ was a great moral teacher, and that his followers have recognized this. But is this explanation at all sufficient to account for the facts? Is there any other instance of nations being subjugated thus by the intellect, and persuaded into following a reasonable course in opposition to their natural wishes and supposed self-interest? As a matter of fact, further, if you question those who thus practise a high morality, and ask them why they individually do it, do they allow that it is simply because they consider Christ to be a teacher of morality? Do they not all allege, as their motive power, the belief in a Divine Person, whom they are constrained to love, and so to obey? And, in fact, is not this so evident, that some of those who do not themselves believe in Christ's Divinity are unwilling to take any steps towards making others disbelieve, simply because they have no other inducement to morality to offer? What can explain these facts better than the truth of the existence of the Divine Person, the belief in whom has been such a wonderful motive power? Is not the idea of a Teacher manifestly insufficient? But we may be told that the motive of fear, roused by inventions of an offended God and future punishment, is sufficient. For some: but not for all; for fear would touch but the inferior natures, leaving all the noblest men and women unaffected. Then,

are we moral because it is the custom? True enough; but how did the custom begin? All these reasons fail; but listen to the Christian theory, and the facts are such as must naturally have arisen.

There is another argument of the same kind, in the fact of the acceptance of Christianity by all the more civilized nations of the world. This is a fact; how is it to be accounted for? An objection has been made to this, drawn from the consideration that our civilization, as it has not always been the highest, may in future give way to a higher, and we do not know that that civilization will be Christian. But this is putting a hypothesis against a fact. There is more in the further objection that the hypothesis is becoming a fact; that the civilized nations are giving up Christianity. I think, however, we may answer that they are no more giving it up now than they might have been said to be giving it up in former times—in the last century, for instance—and yet that the heart of Christianity remained faithful then, and may be presumed to be faithful now. At all events, we can say that now, looking at things as they are, and not as we think they may be, or appear to be going to be, Christianity rules the highest nations of the world. Is not this an argument that is calculated to meet the wants of the highest development of humanity which has as yet been seen, and thus is probably of divine origin?

There are other arguments of the same class which might be brought forward, drawn either from the past or present existence of certain facts in the world's history, but these I have mentioned will be sufficient to show distinctly enough the line I am inclined to take. In answer to the question, "Why am I a Christian?" I reply, "Because the Christian theory explains past and present history reasonably and naturally, and no other theory can." I hope my answer will be considered satisfactory. But it will not be, unless I end with a few words of explanation. First, I have not so much given arguments as indicated where arguments are to be found. I suspect that if this paper were read by a sceptic he would find no reason, when he got to the end, to acknowledge himself convinced; but if he were to follow out the line to which I point, I think he might be relieved of some of his difficulties. I do not attempt to be more than a guidepost, pointing *towards* the place we wish to go to. And, secondly, I should like to say that the arguments thus pointed at are neither exclusive nor final. They are not exclusive, for they are not the only ones of weight; Christianity does not rest on them alone. Nor are they final, in the sense of being the strongest which can possibly be obtained, and with which I should expect always to be content. They are not those which satisfied me when I first began

to read the Christian evidences; I do not assert that if I live twenty years longer, I shall then think them equally conclusive, or be disposed to place the chief weight on them. But they are, or rather the style of argument of which they are part, is, that which commends itself most to my mind *now*; and I think they are such as the world generally will now most willingly accept. As the world changes, it requires changing proofs of that which is itself unchangeable; and since just now the tendency is to scientific investigation, those proofs which are most scientific will obtain the most ready acceptance. And however much some people may dislike the tendency, and may wish to call back the spirit of the ages of faith, we must learn to see things as they really are, and adapt ourselves to the conditions under which we find ourselves. It is really of no use whatever to inveigh against the spirit of infidelity abroad, and to think that a simple declaration on our part of its wickedness is enough; we must take the facts of the day, its tendencies, its modes of thought, and we must do our share in the defence of Christianity, not by throwing ourselves on what has been done before, but by inventing or adopting fresh weapons to meet fresh attacks. I think in the method I have indicated, which of course I do not put forward as being at all original, we can find a strong position, both for our own satisfaction, and for the defence of the faith against those without.

GILDART JACKSON.



CREMATION :

A REPLY TO CRITICS AND AN EXPOSITION OF THE PROCESS.

I CONFESS that it is not without some surprise that I find my proposal to substitute Cremation for Burial as a sanitary reform, formally opposed in the last number of the CONTEMPORARY by a member of the Medical profession. From the general public, on account of its natural and tender sympathy with ancient customs, especially when hallowed by religious rite, I had expected adverse criticism. From those who are interested, or believe themselves to be so, in the celebration of funereal pomps and ceremonials of all kinds, a protest was also not unlikely to be heard.

In all this, however, I have been mistaken. So far from encountering opposition, I have received encouragement and support from all classes to an extent which would have been to me almost incredible had I not witnessed it.

Clergymen are anxious to demonstrate how few are the words requiring change in our Burial Service to render it wholly applicable to Cremation. The public Press has all but unanimously spoken favourably of the scheme, demanding only to be assured on certain grounds of possible objection, with which presently I shall have to deal. Persons in all ranks and stations of life write me to say there is nothing they would more gladly obtain than the assurance that their wish to be burned after death could be realized without difficulty.

And lastly, I am bound to say that the much—perhaps too much—abused undertaker, with a knowledge of the world and a breadth of view for which some might not have given him credit, has said to me:—"I only desire to supply the public want: as long as the public demands funeral cars, magnificent horses, display of feathers, and a host of attendants, in black, I must furnish them; but I am equally ready to perform Cremation to-morrow if the public demand it, and if you will tell me how to do it properly." And I find him an ally at once and not an enemy.

Surprised, then, as I am, equally at the number of my friends, and at the quarter from whence my one opponent arises, it is with no little satisfaction, since I am to have an opponent, that I find him to be one so well qualified for the task; the writer of the article in question being no less an authority than the Medical Inspector of Burials for England and Wales to the Home Department. I feel sure, then, that all which can be said in defence of Burial and in opposition to Cremation, will be urged by so experienced and redoubtable an antagonist: one who, according to his own showing, has had a large share in controlling and directing the public money for the establishment of Cemeteries during the last twenty years. And after all, I cannot wonder, seeing how extensive is his acquaintance with the present state of these matters, and how closely he himself is identified with them, that he should intimate at the outset that in itself my paper "is not worth a reply," "the theory on which its main conclusion is based being so entirely without reasonable foundation."

He nevertheless consents to discuss the subject, although he fails to specify the theory thus stigmatized. As I intend to examine the article carefully, the omission will probably not be important. The following may be accepted as a fair summary of the views expressed in it. Mr. Holland admits the great evils of burial when it is adopted within the limits of the town; but believes that "amply large and well situated Cemeteries" having been established, for which "a heavy expense has been incurred;" if, furthermore, they are not too much crowded at first, and are not too soon disturbed afterwards, it is "possible for burial to be continued without danger, that is, without, not the possibility, but the probability of injury." All these advantages granted, even then Cemeteries "may be mismanaged so as to become unsafe," "for so long as men are men, mistakes, and worse than mistakes, will occasionally occur;" and he states that "the real danger from a well situated and well managed Cemetery, large in proportion to the number of its burials, is not larger than that of a well managed railway."

We learn, then, from her Majesty's Inspector that Burial is by no means a certainly innocuous procedure: although, provided all the

conditions named above are present, which, by the way, is by no means always the case in our very popular suburban Cemeteries, much mischief may not occur.

In addition to this he combats at some length views which he quite erroneously attributes to me ; and also imputes inaccuracy in a statement of mine relative to chemical changes, which imputation I shall prove to be wholly without foundation.

It is on these grounds that Mr. Holland advocates Burial, and he is bold enough to assert its superiority to Cremation, although, it appears, he has had no experience whatever of the latter process ! I doubt whether he ever witnessed an experiment, much less has performed one himself, indeed I am compelled to infer from his remarks that he knows nothing of it beyond the account which, in my last paper, I gave of the experiments by Brunetti of Padua, the results of which, although excellent, are, as I intimated more than once, very inferior to those which might easily be attained. He feels bound to admit that, "no doubt, if sufficient care be taken, no actual nuisance need be caused" by Cremation, but qualifies the admission by suggesting that the process "is far more liable to mishaps" than burial, such mishaps as must be occasionally expected, causing far more disgusting nuisance, far more difficult of concealment.

To all this I shall reply : first, that the evils of Burial are far too lightly estimated by Mr. Holland, respecting which I will adduce overwhelming testimony of a kind that he will not question or deny.

Secondly, that the plan of Cremation I have myself adopted and will now advise, is wholly free from objections of the kind Mr. Holland has imagined to exist ; that it is complete in its results, and is absolutely causeless of danger or offence to others.

The evils inflicted [on the living by the burial of the dead, I find myself compelled to demonstrate. In my original article I assumed these to be well known and universally admitted, and had no idea that evidence on this subject could be required. This, however, was an error. Thus I have several times been asked quite gravely by young men, well educated and intelligent, if it were an ascertained fact that decaying dead bodies within a grave could really induce disease in the living : true, they might give rise to horrible effluvia, and be very disagreeable, but were they positively harmful ? And one respectable journal suggests, as worthy of consideration, whether solicitude on these matters does not betray an undue care for the preservation of life, and regards an attempt to control this fertile source of disease, as dictated by "a constant and morbid fear of death" ! For all this remarkable ignorance of the subject, I can only account by the fact, that a generation has risen up since there

was made that notable revelation of horrors in the London church-yards which the older men of our time can never forget, but which the younger men never knew.

Some five-and-twenty years have now elapsed since a systematic examination of the churches and grave-yards of the Metropolis was made by the most eminent and trustworthy men of the day, when details were brought to light which, at that time, smote the public with horror.

The result was that Acts of Parliament were passed prohibiting intramural interment. The poisonous abominations were removed, vaults were hermetically sealed, and the dead were carried miles away; nevertheless the same detestable process of putrefaction goes on, although it is, at present, beyond the reach of our senses, and only now and then obtrudes itself on our notice.

My task, however, becomes yet more necessary, since we have before us to-day a Medical Inspector of Burials, who, while admitting with manifest reluctance, that some danger still attaches to the process of interment, comes forward to advise the public with all the weight of his experience, to continue that practice instead of inquiring, which he has not done, whether a mode of disposing of the body may not exist which is absolutely harmless and devoid of all the evils named above.

It is clear then that, for the sake of the general reader, it is necessary to refer, although briefly, to the indubitable evidence which exists relative to this subject.

For his information let me state that the "General Board of Health" made, in 1849, a special investigation, commissioning for the purpose Southwood Smith, Chadwick, Milroy, Sutherland, Waller Lewis and others, to conduct a searching enquiry into the state of the burial-grounds of London and large provincial towns; and to devise a scheme for extramural sepulture. From their report,* which abounds in information, I shall make two or three extracts.

Happily, any minute description of the state of the graveyards and

* "Report on a General Scheme for Extramural Sepulture." (Clowes and Sons, 1850.)

(Signed)

CARLISLE.
ASHLEY.
EDWIN CHADWICK.
T. SOUTHWOOD SMITH.

The subject had been examined before by official authority; and at an early period by Walker, whose work on "Graveyards" is well known, and contains much information. (Longmans, London, 1839.)

"A Special Enquiry into the Practice of Interment in Towns;" by Edwin Chadwick (London, 1843), is replete with evidence, and should be read by those who desire to pursue the enquiry further.

their contents which resulted from "the present practice of interment in towns" need not be given. It will suffice for our purpose to observe that the reporters say :—

"We shall be under the necessity of making statements of a very painful nature, and sometimes of representing scenes which we feel most reluctant publicly to exhibit; but we should ill discharge the duty entrusted to us if we were to shrink from the full disclosure of the truth; more especially as a thorough knowledge of the evil is indispensable to an appreciation of the only effectual remedy."*

Passing over these details I quote again as follows :—

"We," say the reporters, "may safely rest the sanitary part of the case on the single fact, that the placing of the dead body in a grave and covering it with a few feet of earth does not prevent the gases generated by decomposition, together with putrescent matters which they hold in suspension, from permeating the surrounding soil, and escaping into the air above and the water beneath."

After supporting this statement by illustrations of the enormous force exercised by gases of decomposition, in bursting open leaden coffins whence they issue without restraint, the reporters quote the evidence of Dr. Lyon Playfair (now H.M. Postmaster-General) to the following effect :—

"I have examined," he says, "various churchyards and burial-grounds for the purpose of ascertaining whether the layer of earth above the bodies is sufficient to absorb the putrid gases evolved. The slightest inspection shows that they are not thoroughly absorbed by the soil lying over the bodies. I know several churchyards from which most foetid smells are evolved; and gases with similar odour are emitted from the sides of sewers passing in the vicinity of churchyards, although they may be more than thirty feet from them."

. . . . He goes on to estimate the amount of gases which issue from the graveyard, and estimates that for the 52,000 annual interments of the Metropolis† no less a quantity than 2,572,580 cubic feet of gases are emitted, "the whole of which, beyond what is absorbed by the soil, must pass into the water below or the atmosphere above."

The foregoing is but one small item from the long list of illustrative cases proving the fact that no dead body is ever buried within the earth without polluting the soil, the water, and the air around

* "Report on a General Scheme," &c., p. 5.

† A number which has already reached 80,000, in 1873, so rapid is the increase of population. The above was written in 1849.

It has been stated by some that the mere contact of the corpse with fresh earth suffices for safe disinfection! Such a monstrous delusion is disposed of by this evidence.

and above it: the extent of the offence produced corresponding with the amount of decaying animal matter subjected to the process.

But "offence" only is proved; is the result not only disagreeable but injurious to the living?

The Report referred to gives notable examples of the fatal influence of such effluvia when encountered in a concentrated form; one being that of two gravediggers who in 1841, perished in descending into a grave in St. Botolph's churchyard, Aldgate. Such are, however, extremely exceptional instances; but our reporter goes on to say that there is abundant evidence of the injurious action of these gases in a more diluted state, and cites the well demonstrated fact that "cholera was unusually prevalent in the immediate neighbourhood of London graveyards." I cannot cite, on account of its length, a paragraph by Dr. Sutherland attesting this fact: while the many pages detailing Dr. Milroy's inspection of numerous graveyards, are filled with evidence which is quite conclusive, and describes scenes which must be read by those who desire further acquaintance with the subject.*

Dr. Waller Lewis reports the mischievous results of breathing the pestiferous air of vaults and the kind of illness produced by it.† His long and elaborate report of the condition of these excavations beneath the churches of the metropolis, presents a marvellous view of the phenomena, which, ordinarily hidden in the grave, could be examined here illustrating the many stages of decay; a condition which he describes as a "disgrace to any civilization." But it may be said all this is changed now; intramural interment no longer exists; why produce these shocking records of the past?

Precisely because they enable us to know what it is which we have only banished to our suburban cemeteries; that we may be reminded that the process has not changed, that all this horrible decomposition removed from our doors—although this will not long be the case, either at Kensal Green or Norwood, to say nothing of some other cemeteries—goes on as ever, and will one day be found in dangerous vicinity to our homes. And here I must make an explanation which I think can be necessary to very few who read my former article, although Mr. Holland misunderstands me and bases the greater part of his paper upon the utter misrepresentation of my meaning he is pleased to make. Because I said that in burying the corpses of to-day in distant graves we were "laying by poison for our children's children," he takes special pains to inform me that

* See independent examples on each of pages 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 21, 26, 28, 43-46, and many others in the "Report" above quoted, p. 29.

† See also Chadwick's "Special Enquiry," for numerous illustrations.

probably these particular corpses must at that future time be as innocuous as if they had been burned. No doubt they will be so, but as years pass on, the close neighbourhood and ultimate contact of the putrefying dead with our living descendants must arrive.

It is only a question of time. And it was expressly for the purpose of guarding against the misapprehension I complain of, and which has furnished my opponent with such large opportunity of needless remark, that I added the following passage which it is only charitable to suppose he must have overlooked (although it forms the immediate sequel to that which he quoted) :—

“It may be granted, to anticipate objection, that it is quite possible that the bodies now buried may have lost most, if not all, their power of doing mischief by the time that the particular soil they inhabit is turned up again to the sun's rays, although this is by no means certain ; but it is beyond dispute that the margin of safety as to time grows narrower and narrower year by year, and that pollution of wells and streams which supply the living must ere long arise wherever we bury our dead in this country.”

Now there is no doubt that the passage which has been thus unfairly separated from its context and so made to appear the exponent of views I do not hold, and have, indeed, expressly disclaimed, is that in which he professes to find ground for his assertion that the “theory on which my main conclusion is based, is entirely without reasonable foundation.” What then becomes of this sweeping assertion !

At this point let me call another witness on this important subject. Perhaps it would be difficult to name a higher authority in this country on any question of public health, than that of Dr. Edmund Parkes, Professor of Military Hygiene of the Army Medical School at Netley. With the particular part of his writings which I am about to quote, I was unacquainted until the last few days, perhaps because they appear in a work “prepared especially for use in the medical service of the army.” That at all events must be my excuse for not having them within reach before.* In a short, but suggestive, chapter “On the disposal of the dead,” he proposes the following question :—

“What, then, is the best plan of disposing of the dead so that the living may not suffer ? At present the question is not an urgent one ; but if peace continue, and if the population of Europe increase, it will become so in another century or two. Already in this country we have seen, in our own time, a great change ; the objectionable practice of interment, under and around churches in towns has been given up, and the population is buried at a distance from their habitations. For the present, that measure will pro-

* A Manual of Practical Hygiene. (London, Churchill, 1864.)

bably suffice, but in a few years the question will again inevitably present itself.

"Burying in the ground appears certainly the most insanitary plan of the three methods.* The air over cemeteries is constantly contaminated (see p. 76), and water (which may be used for drinking) is often highly impure. Hence, in the vicinity of graveyards two dangers to the population arise, and in addition, from time to time, the disturbance of an old graveyard has given rise to disease. It is a matter of notoriety that the vicinity of graveyards is unhealthy."

To return to our reporters; we have seen the condition of graveyards in towns, but it will not be undesirable to glance at the evidence relating to the condition of provincial churchyards, where in the midst of a sparse population, the pure country air circulates with natural freedom—numbers of such spots are mentioned—let one single example be "Cadoxtqn Churchyard, near Neath." Respecting this, the Reporter writes:—"I do not know how otherwise to describe the state of this churchyard than by saying that it is truly and thoroughly abominable. The smell from it is revolting. I could distinctly perceive it in every one of the neighbouring houses which I visited, and in every one of these houses there have been cases of cholera or severe diarrhœa." This is not a selected specimen, some are even worse; for further examples see below.†

I next complain that there is insufficient recognition in Mr. Holland's paper, of the unhealthy character of the emanations which result from the process of putrefaction when affecting the human body. He lays great stress on the fact that at the *end* of those long stages of decay which burial renders necessary, the result is as harmless as at the end of the process of Cremation, passing over as not worth notice the fact that for long years the corpse is replete with influences which are mischievous to anything which may come within their range; absolute isolation being the only condition of safety. Conversely stated, this is precisely my own argument, and demonstrates triumphantly the superiority of Cremation. I affirm that by burning, we arrive in one hour, without offence or danger, at the very stage of harmless result which burying requires years to produce. True, indeed, it is, "that the ultimate result is the same," but an infinity of mischief may happen by his process, and none can happen by mine. And, after all, he can only on his own showing claim a perfect result by burial "*if* no more dead be buried than the free oxygen contained in rain and dew carried through it, will decompose; and *if* such soil be left undisturbed, &c., and *if* the use

* "Burial in the Land, or at Sea, and Burning," p. 458.

† Op. cit., p. 48. Report of Mr. Bowie, describing graveyards at Merthyr-Tydvil; Hawick, Roxburghshire; Greenock, and other places.

of such ground for burial be discontinued," &c., &c. Again there is another instance of Mr. Holland's insufficient recognition of the unhealthy character of cadaveric emanations which I must particularly call attention to. I had stated that in the resolution of an animal body, the gaseous products were carbonic acid, water, and ammonia. He impeaches my correctness, saying that I am

"Not, however, quite accurate in describing that result to be the formation of water, of ammonia, and of carbonic acid, as the chief products; for if the decomposition either with or without fire be complete, no ammonia will be formed in the soil; or if formed, it will be converted before it need escape either into the air, or be carried off by water, in the form either of uncombined nitrogen, or changed into some compound of that element with oxygen, such as nitric or nitrous acid, &c."

I never said the ultimate result of the resolution in question was ammonia, but I repeat that ammonia is an intermediate formation in large quantity, by which nitrogen passes off before it comes to be "the nitric or nitrous acid" he speaks of, the latter being by the way no more an ultimate step in the process than is ammonia. At what point shall we stop if we are to trace to their last stages the volatile component elements of the body? Why certainly not at ammonia, nor at nitric acid, but at carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, and oxygen. I chose to rest at ammonia, because the evolution of ammonia is an important fact, and I re-assert that it is largely produced. So much for the *a priori* statement. Now what is the evidence from observation in this matter? Was I right or was I wrong, as Mr. Holland says I am, in stating that the body is resolved among other things into ammonia? Any intelligent witness will do for me, but we have Dr. Parkes still in the box; let us interrogate him. That same short chapter almost commences with the following passage:—

"After death, the buried body returns to its elements, and gradually, and often by the means of other forms of life which prey on it, a large amount of it forms carbonic acid, ammonia, sulphuretted and carburetted hydrogen, nitrous and nitric acid, and various more complex gaseous products, many of which are very foetid, but which, however, are eventually all oxidized into the simpler combinations."*

In another part of the volume, in speaking of the air of churchyards, he writes:—

"The decomposition of bodies gives rise to a very large amount of carbonic acid Ammonia and an offensive putrid vapour are also given off."†

"In vaults, the air contains much carbonic acid, carbonate or sulphide of ammonium, nitrogen, hydrosulphuric acid, and organic matter."

* Parkes, p. 457.

† Op. cit. p. 76.

My readers will agree with me, I think, that this matter is disposed of.

I now arrive at the second part of my subject, in which I have to show that the plan of Cremation I have myself adopted, and will now advise, is wholly free from objections of the kind Mr. Holland has imagined to exist; that it is complete in its results, and is absolutely causeless of danger or of offence to any.

Many persons have expressed to me the opinion that I ought in my first paper to have described what I believed to be the best mode of performing Cremation. May I say that this was also desired by the Editor of this Journal. I felt, however, although I was prepared to give the information in question, that it was impossible to judge beforehand what might be the reception by the public of my project, and that I might perhaps go too far, and weight it too heavily, if I actually sketched the process by which each reader could realize for himself its nature and mode of operation. I think the reticence was prudent, although it might possibly have been unnecessary.

I think it is fair to myself to say that, before that first article was published, a scheme for burning two thousand bodies a week for London (the average present requirement being about sixteen hundred) was quite completed, and that I had satisfied myself that to accomplish this would not be a difficult task, and that it would occasion no nuisance whatever.

Without entering on those details, I will give an example of what I have done in the matter of resolving the body into its ultimate elements by heat.

And first of all I must request the reader to dismiss from his mind all the allegations against the practice of Cremation which Mr. Holland has made, grounded on what he imagines that process to be. He states that it "would necessarily require the active superintendence of a class of men whose services for such an office it would be scarcely possible always to obtain; while it is evident that imperfectly conducted burning of the dead would be inexpressibly shocking, and apt not rarely to occur." The point first named is a matter barely worth contesting; but the last five words are absolutely without foundation, and I challenge him to show a tittle of evidence to support the very grave allegation they contain.

A powerful reverberating furnace will reduce a body of more than average size and weight, leaving only a few white and fragile portions of earthy material, in less than one hour. I have myself personally superintended the burning of two entire bodies, one small and emaciated of 47 lbs. weight, and one of 140 lbs. weight, not emaciated, and possess the products—in the former case, weighing $1\frac{3}{4}$ lb.; in the latter, weighing about 4 lbs. The former was completed, in twenty-

five minutes, the latter in fifty. No trace of odour was perceived—indeed, such a thing is impossible,—and not the slightest difficulty presented itself. The remains already described were not withdrawn till the process was complete, and nothing can be more pure, tested by sight or smell, than they are, and nothing less suggestive of decay or decomposition. It is a refined sublimate, and not a portion of refuse, which I have before me. The experiments took place in the presence of several persons. Among the witnesses of the second experiment was Dr. Geo. Buchanan, the well-known medical officer of the Local Government Board, who can testify to the completeness of the process.

I challenge my opponent to produce so fair a result from all the costly and carefully-managed cemeteries in the kingdom, and I offer him twenty years in which to elaborate the process.

In the proceeding above described, the gases which leave the furnace chimney during the first three or four minutes of combustion are noxious: after that time they cease to be so, and no smoke would be seen. But those noxious gases are not to be permitted to escape by any chimney, and will pass through a flue into a second furnace, where they are entirely consumed; and the chimney of the latter is smokeless—no organic products whatever can issue by it. A complete combustion is thus attained. Not even a tall chimney is necessary, which might be pointed at as that which marked the site where Cremation is performed. A small jet of steam quickening the draught of a low chimney is all that is requisite. If the process is required on a large scale, the second furnace could be utilized for Cremation also, and its products passed through another, and so on without limit.

Subsequent experiments, however, have resulted in a still greater success. By means of one of the furnaces, invented by Dr. Wm. Siemens, I have obtained even a more rapid and more complete combustion than before. The body employed was a severe test of its powers, for it weighed no less than 227 lbs., and was not emaciated. It was placed in a cylindrical vessel about seven feet long by five or six in diameter, the interior of which was already heated to about 2000 Fahr. The inner surface of the cylinder is smooth, almost polished, and no solid matter but that of the body is introduced into it. The product, therefore, can be nothing more than the ashes of the body. No foreign dust can be introduced, no coal or other solid combustible being near it: nothing but heated hydrocarbon in a gaseous form and heated air. Nothing is visible in the cylinder before using it but a pure almost white interior, the lining having acquired a temperature of white heat. In this case, the gases given off from the body so abundantly at first, pass through a highly

heated chamber among thousands of interstices made by intersecting fire-bricks, laid throughout the entire chamber, lattice-fashion, in order to minutely divide and delay the current, and expose it to an immense area of heated surface. By this means they were rapidly oxidised, and not a particle of smoke issued by the chimney: no second furnace, therefore, is necessary by this method to consume any noxious matters, since none escape. The process was completed in fifty-five minutes, and the ashes, which weighed about five pounds, were removed with ease. The foregoing is a very meagre sketch of Dr. Siemens' furnace, the principle of which is well known to engineers, and to scientific men generally, and need not be described in detail here.

I will now add,—not that it affects the process in the slightest degree as to results,—that all my experiments hitherto have been made with the lower animals.

As a rough and unfinished sketch of a system to be followed, when Cremation is generally adopted, I would suggest the following:—

When death occurs and the necessary certificate has been given (relative to which an important suggestion will be made hereafter), the body is placed in a light wood shell, then in a suitable outside receptacle preparatory to removal for religious rites or otherwise. After a proper time has elapsed, it is conveyed to the spot where Cremation is to be performed. There, nothing need be seen by the last attendant or attendants than the placing of the shell within a small compartment, and the closing of the door upon it. It slides down into the heated chamber, and is left there an hour, till the necessary changes have taken place. The ashes are then placed at the disposal of the attendants.

I now come to a very serious matter, treated of by Mr. Holland in a manner of which I am compelled to complain. He is pleased to make merry himself, and to suggest that I am joking—or, to use his own phraseology, "poking fun"—when calling attention to my remarks relative to the "economical" view of Cremation.

In speaking of this, I stated that "it is an economic subject, *whether we will it or not.*" Now I wish him and all my readers to understand, that I was never more serious, never more earnest in my life than I was then and am at this moment, and in consideration of this question of "economy." Anything like "fun" or a "joke," wherever else it may be tolerated, is wholly out of place here. Seeing that the Great Power which has ordained the marvellous and ceaseless action which transmutes every animal body as quickly as possible into vegetable matter, and *vice versa*, and has arranged that this harmonious cycle should be the absolute and necessary law for all existence, I have space for no other sentiments than those of

submission, wonder, and admiration. If any say that it is in bad taste, or does violence to some right feeling, to speak of the fate that inevitably awaits everyone of us, in that, on some future day, the elements of our bodies must enter into that other life of the vegetable world, whence once they came, let the complaint thereof be carried to the Highest Court of the Universe, and let the question be asked there, Whether "the Judge of all the earth doth right?"

Meantime it suffices us to know that the very existence of these cavillers is solely due to that Divine fecundity which pervades all nature, and is regulated by economical principles, the beneficent operation of which we may feebly postpone, doing some notable harm thereby, but happily can never resist in the end.

My charge against Mr. Holland, however, is not this, but something much more serious. Alluding to the small modicum of remains in the form of ashes after Cremation, and which I was content should be preserved in an urn, stating only that the fields were their "righteous" destination,—as they are,—he speaks of the latter suggestion as a "desecration" and as "outraging family affection;" and actually associates it in some fashion with savagery and cannibalism. Yet, can we believe it, he, so tender of sentiment on this subject of deceased remains, himself actually advocates and practises the utilizing of by far the greater part of those remains for the production of grass and other vegetables, for the express purpose of keeping his cemeteries sweet and wholesome! The gaseous elements of these buried bodies, which, as I particularly insisted upon when dealing with that question of economy, are by far the greater part, being incalculable in amount in relation to the ashes, which are by comparison a mere trifle, and which alone he is pleased to mention. That greater part, I say, he not only uses himself, but he knows that this very utilization of it is the only way he has of preserving a cemetery in a tolerable condition. He knows perfectly well that the presence of abundant plant-growth is essential in the cemetery, to assimilate the noxious gases arising from the buried bodies before alluded to, and that those plants owe their life and structure to the very elements of our "friends and relatives," about whom he professes to be so utterly shocked that I should conceive it possible to utilize them for any economical purpose! I charge my opponent, then, his professions notwithstanding, as in part the manager of the cemeteries of this country during twenty years, with having presided over perhaps the largest institution that ever existed for transmuting the human body into vegetable growth of various kinds. My one objection to his system is, that it does it so slowly, so offensively, and so dangerously!

Now, lest perchance someone not himself acquainted with the facts

alluded to may desire, for such a statement, other authority than my own, let us listen once more, and for the last time, to Dr. Parkes. In order to oxidize the foetid organic exhalations of the burying-ground, he says: "The only means which present themselves, as applicable in all cases, are the deep burial and the use of plants, closely placed in the cemetery. There is no plan which is more efficacious for the absorption of the organic substances, and perhaps of the carbonic acid, than plants; but it would seem a mistake to use only the dark, slow-growing evergreens; the object should be to get the most rapidly growing trees and shrubs," &c.*

But even this is not my opponent's crowning inconsistency. So determined is he not to accept Cremation, that he suggests another mode, "that of sinking the dead in the depths of the ocean," as having "far more to recommend it." No doubt there is much to be said in its favour; much more certainly than for burial. Yet shocked as he is at the notion that his father's ashes should ever fertilize the field, he would consign the body to a place whence, almost instantly, it would be devoured by fish and crustaceans, whose numbers would be multiplied correspondingly by their benefactor's enormous contribution of food, as the public markets soon would testify. No animal multiplies more rapidly than fish, and the "economic" question would be determined in a manner more complete, and more direct, and with a more remunerative result than any which I had ever dared, or still should dare, to suggest!

This remarkable proposal appears actually on the same page as that in which he affects to be outraged by my suggestion that burning the body would necessarily contribute to the "food production" of the earth.

And here I shall take leave of Mr. Holland, to seek some less formidable antagonist. Possibly in this light may be regarded the writer of an article in the *Spectator* newspaper,† whose objection, supposing it to be seriously urged, is almost the only one besides those already noticed which has appeared within the range of our periodical literature.

By stretch of charity one might almost imagine it to be a joke, seeing it is the writer's only way of retreat from a wholly untenable position. He urges that as the present generation is doing its best to exhaust "the rivers, the rainfall, the mines, and the natural fertility of the earth," we ought to leave our dead remains "in bank for our descendants;" or, in other words—for the generous sentiment is repeated—"it is well that such a deposit as the dead of generations should be left to our posterity!" Waiving altogether the greatest

* P. 458. Dr. Sutherland also strongly insists on the same practice.

† *Spectator*, January 3, 1874.

objection to this testamentary provision for our grandchildren—viz., the amount of disease and death which is unquestionably produced by burial in the soil—the writer ought to have known that the “bank” in question, to use his own simile, pays no interest; and that it is perfectly certain that such capital rendered productive at once, according to nature’s design, must yield a far greater profit, even for posterity, than his own notable one of burying this one talent in a napkin as an offset against what he is pleased to consider our present exhaustion of “the rivers and rainfall,” which he declares is taking place at “railway speed”! As if consumption of water in any form, were it a million-fold what it is, could exhaust or diminish the common stock a single drop! No modern schoolboy could make such a blunder as this; nevertheless, it is only a specimen of others existing within the short limits of that article, and equally easy to expose if need be. I cannot pass over, however, one statement that this writer has dared to make: He speaks of my figures relative to the number buried in London in 1873, and estimating the amount of bone-earth and ashes belonging thereto, as “very debateable,” and, further, that they “are open to question.” After saying this, he declines “to fight so eminent a physicist on so small a point of detail.” Is the point so small? I declare those figures to be below, and not above, the truth, and am amply prepared to prove it. My veracity is at stake, for I know no higher crime than to issue misleading or exaggerated numerical statements in order to prove a case, unless, indeed, it be to utter insinuations, without affording a tittle of proof to support them, that an accurate numerical statement is untrue.

I now desire to afford explanations which have been asked relative to the following very important subject. It has been said, and most naturally, what guarantee is there against poisoning if the remains are burned, and it is no longer possible, as after burial, to reproduce the body for the purpose of examination? It is to my mind a sufficient reply that, regarding only “the greatest good for the greatest number,” the amount of evil in the shape of disease and death which results from the present system of burial in earth, is infinitely larger than the evil caused by secret poisoning is or could be, even if the practice of the crime were very considerably to increase. Further, the appointment of officers to examine and certify in all cases of death would be an additional and very efficient safeguard. But,—and here I touch on a very important subject,—Is there reason to believe that our present precautions in the matter of death-certificate against the danger of poisoning are what they ought to be? I think that it must be confessed that they are defective, for not only is our system inadequate to the end proposed, but it is less efficient by com-

parison than that adopted by foreign governments. Our existing arrangements for ascertaining and registering the cause of death are very lax, and give rise, as we shall see, to serious errors. In order to attain an approach to certitude in this important matter, I contend that it would be most desirable to nominate in every district a properly qualified inspector to certify in all cases to the fact that death has taken place, to satisfy himself as far as possible that no foul play has existed, and to give the certificate accordingly. This would relieve the medical attendant of the deceased from any disagreeable duty, relative to inquiry concerning suspicious circumstances, if any have been observed. Such officers exist throughout the large cities of France and Germany, and the system is more or less pursued throughout the provinces. In Paris, no burial can take place without the written permission of the "*Médecin-Vérificateur*;" and whether we adopt Cremation or not, such an officer might, with advantage, be appointed here.*

For perhaps it is not generally known, even, as it would seem, by those who have emphasized so notably the objection in question to Cremation, that many bodies are buried in this country without any medical certificate at all; and that among these, any

* The practice referred to is thus regulated:—

The following is the text of the French law. Code Napoléon, Article 77. "*Aucune inhumation ne sera faite sans une autorisation, sur papier libre et sans frais, de l'officier de l'état civil, qui ne pourra la délivrer qu'après s'être transporté auprès de la personne décédée pour s'assurer du décès, et que 24 heures après le décès, hors les cas prévus par les règlements de police.*"

Thus the verification of the decease must always be made by a civil officer in person; viz., by the Mayor of the town, or by someone he shall appoint. The law, however, is executed differently in Paris and in the provinces. In Paris, the verification is made exclusively by medical men appointed for this purpose in each "*quartier*." Their functions are defined by an Act of the 31st of December, 1821. As soon as a death is reported, the civil officer communicates with the medical man of the "*quartier*" in which the deceased resided, and awaits the report to decide (in concert with the deceased's friends) at what hour burial should take place. The medical man attends at the residence indicated, acquaints himself with all the circumstances of the illness, and reports in writing relative to the following particulars:—1. The christian and surname of the deceased; 2. The sex; 3. If married or not; 4. The age; 5. The profession; 6. The exact date and hour of the decease; 7. The "*quartier*," the street, the number and story of the house in which it occurred; 8. The nature of the illness, and if there be any reason for making an autopsy; 9. The duration of the illness; 10. The name of the persons who provided the medicines; 11. The names of the doctors and others who attended the case. Besides this verification made by the doctors belonging to each "*quartier*" of Paris, by an order of the Prefect of the [Seine, April, 1839, a committee was formed to watch over the service. The medical men who attest the facts connected with death at Paris are called the "*Médecins-Vérificateurs des décès*."

In Vienna, a similar document is always prepared, and perhaps with still greater care and minuteness. The same may be said of Munich, Frankfort, Geneva, and other Continental cities.

number of deaths by poison may have taken place for anything that anybody knows. Is it in the provinces chiefly that this lax practice exists? No doubt, and more particularly in the principality of Wales. But it occurs also in the heart of London. A good many certificates of death are signed every year in London by some non-medical persons. In one metropolitan parish, not long ago, which I can name but do not, above forty deaths were registered in a year on the mere statement of neighbours of the deceased. No medical certificate was procurable, and no inquest was held; the bodies were buried without inquiry. This practice is not illegal; and, in my opinion, it goes far to make a case for the appointment of a "Médecin-Vérificateur." During the existence of pestilence especially, such a safeguard is necessary. Before I quit this subject, let me make a brief extract from evidence given by Mr. Simon before the Royal Sanitary Commission in 1869, from which it appears that medical certification of death is not the rule, but the exception, in some districts of Wales. He says:—

"The returns of death made to the Registrar-General are necessarily imperfect. . . . We had to make inquiry on one occasion as to the supposed very large prevalence of phthisis in some of the South Wales counties. . . . It turned out that this great appearance of phthisis in the death registers depended upon the fact that the causes of death were only exceptionally certified by medical men. I remember that in one case only 15 per cent. of the deaths had been medically certified. The non-medical certifiers of death thought that 'consumption' was a good word to cover death generally, so that any one who died somewhat slowly was put down as dying of 'consumption,' and this appeared in the Registrar-General's returns as phthisis."

Dr. Sutherland long ago called attention to this matter. I quote his remarks from the work above named. Referring to Paris, Munich, and other cities, he says:—

"Where there are regularly appointed verifiers . . . who are generally medical men in practice . . . the districts of the city are divided between them. . . . The instructions under which these officers act are of a very stringent character, and the procedure is intended to obviate premature interment, and to detect crime. The French and the German method of verification is intended to be *preventive*. A number of instances were mentioned to me in which crimes which would otherwise have escaped notice were detected by the keen and practised eye of the Verifier, and the general opinion certainly was that much crime was prevented."*

This is but an episode in treating of Cremation: a very important one nevertheless. I have therefore thought it right to take this opportunity of advocating a more stringent provision than now exists for an official inspection and certificate in all cases of death.

* Op. cit.

Lastly, it would be possible, at much less cost than is at present incurred for burial, to preserve, in every case of death, the stomach and a portion of one of the viscera, say for fifteen or twenty years or thereabouts, so that in the event of any suspicion subsequently occurring, greater facility for examination would exist than by the present method of exhumation. Nothing could be more certain to check the designs of the poisoner than the knowledge that the proofs of his crime, instead of being buried in the earth (from whence, as a fact, not one in a hundred thousand is ever disinterred for examination) are safely preserved in a public office, and that they can be produced against him at any moment. The universal application of this plan, although easily practicable, is however obviously unnecessary. It is quite certain that no pretext for such conservation can exist in more than one instance in every five hundred deaths. In the remainder, the fatal result would be attributed without mistake to some natural cause—as decay, fever, consumption, or other malady, the signs of which are clear even to a tyro in the medical art. But in any case in which the slightest doubt arises in the mind of the medical attendant, or in which the precaution is desired or suggested by a relative, or whenever the subject himself may have desired it, nothing would be easier than to make the requisite conservation. As before stated, the existence of an official verifcator would relieve the ordinary medical attendant of the case from active interference in the matter. If then the public is earnest in its endeavour to render exceedingly difficult or impossible the crime of secret poisoning,—and it ought to be so if the objection to Cremation on this ground is a valid one, the sooner some measures are taken to this end the better, whether burial in earth or Cremation be the future method of treating our dead.

I must add one word in reply to a critic who rather hastily objected that the estimate in my original paper of the mean cost of burials in London as about £10 per head is too high. I have re-examined my calculation and find it, if in error at all, too low. Curiously enough, in going through Dr. Edwin Chadwick's work, already referred to, for other purposes, I find that he also made a similar calculation thirty years ago, and that his estimate is rather higher than mine. He puts it at more than £600,000 for the metropolis, when the population was a little more than one-half what it is now; I reckoned £800,000 for the year 1873. And he considers the cost of funerals for England and Wales to be, at that time, nearly five millions sterling. He includes cost of transit, which I omit, as being necessary equally with Cremation and burial, so that the difference between us is not considerable.

To sum up:—

For the purposes of Cremation nothing is required but an

apparatus of a suitable kind, the construction of which is well understood and easy to accomplish. With such apparatus the process is rapid and inoffensive, and the result is perfect. The space necessary for the purpose is small, and but little skilled labour is wanted.


Not only is its employment compatible with religious rites, but it enables them to be conducted with greater ease and with far greater safety to the attendants than at a cemetery. For example, burial takes place in the open air, and necessitates exposure to all weathers, while Cremation is necessarily conducted within a building, which may be constructed to meet the requirements of mourners and attendants in relation to comfort and taste.

Cremation destroys instantly all infectious quality in the body submitted to the process, and effectually prevents the possibility of other injury to the living from the remains at any future time. All care to prevent such evil is obviously unnecessary, and ceases from the moment the process commences. The aim of Cremation is to prevent the process of putrefaction.

On the other hand, Burial cannot be conducted without serious risks to the living, and great care is required to render them inconsiderable with our present population. Costly cemeteries also are necessary with ample space for all possible demands upon it, and complete isolation from the vicinity of the living, to ensure, as far as possible, the absence of danger to them.

It is a process designed essentially to prolong decay and putrefaction with all its attendant mischief; and the best that can be affirmed of it is, that in the course of many years it arrives, by a process which is antagonistic to the health of survivors, at results similar to, but less complete, than Cremation produces in an hour without injury to any.

HENRY THOMPSON.



ON THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF MUSICAL EXPRESSION.

TO define the precise functions of Music, and to fix its place in a scheme of Fine Arts, has proved one of the most intricate problems in that intricate science called, since Baumgarten, *Æsthetica*. And this difficulty may easily be seen to spring from the unique character of the art. While the other arts of Painting, Sculpture, and Poetry are distinctly concerned with representing some facts or aspects of nature, material objects or events in human life, Music appears at first sight to have no such representative aim. Indeed one finds that some writers—for example, Zimmermann—have contended that the whole province of this art is to construct, in perfect freedom from ulterior claims, the most beautiful arrangements of tones and harmonies. A curious illustration of the perplexities to which the subject of the exact function of music has given rise may be found in the classification of the arts proposed by Schopenhauer. Setting out from his two fundamental conceptions, Will, the thing in itself or noumenon, and Idea, the immediate objectivity of Will in a particular stage, he ranks all the other arts according to the gradation of Idea which they severally represent. But as he could not well fit music into this scheme of objectified wills, he resolved to accord to this form of art the dignity of imaging not Idea, but Will itself.

At the same time a deeper reflexion has suggested that music, while superficially opposed to the imitative arts, has at bottom certain subtle affinities with them. So distant a thinker as Plato, though he discarded the idea of a musical art independent of poetry and dance, saw that it might be made an instrument of moral culture, because of the affinities existing between rhythmic and harmonic (melodious) movement and the motions of the soul. Aristotle, whose estimate of Art was so much higher than Plato's, sought to bring music under a conception of artistic imitation (*μίμησις*) by attributing to it, apart from words, the power of representing human actions, dispositions (*ἥθη*), and feelings. Similarly, among many other modern writers on æsthetic subjects, Kant and Hegel have distinctly recognised that music has to embody and portray the subjective and emotional life of the mind.

Yet even now there is but little definite agreement with respect to the precise scope of musical representation. Not to dwell here on the question revived by the school of Wagner, whether music is capable of representing anything worthy and satisfying if divorced from words, I may point to the doctrine proclaimed by Weisse, that the art of tone is not concerned with imaging any definite activity, whether of material nature or of mind, but aims at symbolising the universal relations of all activity; and to the courageous assertion of Hanslick, that while the art is wholly unable to represent feeling, since every emotion rests on definite ideas and judgments, it can represent, by the analogy of audible figure, made up of the height, strength, rapidity, and rhythm of sequent tones, the visible movements of external nature.

In view of this general uncertainty as to the precise significance of musical sounds, if indeed there be any such significance, it might well appear a little rash to attempt a new solution of the problem. Yet a reason for doing so may, perhaps, be found in the fact that a more promising direction has recently been given to the inquiry by the attempts of Mr. Spencer and Mr. Darwin to connect musical effects with a long series of ancestral experiences, human, and, probably, pre-human, the results of which are now transmitted to the new-born individual as deeply organised associations. What the exact amount of truth may be in the particular mode of derivation resorted to by each of these distinguished biologists, need not now concern us.* It is sufficient to say that in the conception of musical effect as a psychological product, in the growth of which vocal

* Mr. Darwin attributes the deep emotional effects of music to associations which have grown up with vocal expression during the interchanges of sexual feeling, whereas Mr. Spencer would connect them with the vocal utterance of emotion in general.

phenomena play the most conspicuous part, a new and sure road seems opened up by which one may reach a scientific basis for this interesting æsthetic problem.

Music, as I have elsewhere sought to show,* affords three distinct orders of gratification. First of all, in its discrete tones, and in its melodious and harmonious combinations, it satisfies seemingly simple sensibilities of the ear. Further, in its arrangements of these tonic elements under certain forms of time, accented rhythm, key, and modulation of key, it presents numerous beauties of symmetry and unity which gratefully employ the intellectual faculties. Finally, as most are agreed, it exercises a mysterious spell on the soul, stirring deep currents of emotion, and awakening vague ideas of the Infinite, the Tragic, and the Serene. It is this last ingredient of musical effect, confessedly the most subtle and the most fitted to elude scientific detection, which will now occupy us.

On first reflexion, one may easily fail to find anything suggestive in a long-sustained musical tone or chord; and certainly these sounds are sufficiently unlike the common every-day voices of nature. It was said, indeed, by Lucretius that music distinctly imitates birds; and one can readily imagine a child's mind impressed by the few faint analogies music and unartistic vocal sound so obviously offer. Yet the slightness of this resemblance between musical tones and natural sounds is not pure loss to the art. By leaving the perceptive activities, which employ themselves on objective facts, unoccupied, it secures more scope for the play of the subjective and emotional nature. This may be illustrated by contrasting tones and colours. It has been supposed, by Kant among others, that a colour-art (*Farbenkunst*), analogous to tone-art, is a possible invention, and, indeed, a certain abbé did attempt, in the beginning of the last century, to construct an instrument, after the manner of the piano, for giving a rythmical and harmonious sequence of colour. Without denying the possibility of such an art, one may call attention to the fact that artistic colours, being for the most part perfect copies of natural tints, would necessarily convey to the mind ideas of objects, and would consequently make too large a demand on the percipient, and leave too little room for the sentient activities of the mind, to supply an æsthetic impression perfectly analogous to musical effect.

In music, then, the intellectual activities are not called away to objective realities underlying the impressions, and have to find their satisfaction in observing the formal aspects of the impressions themselves. Hence the full delight of Sensation which the art is said to minister. This effect is, moreover, not so simple as it might at first

* "Fortnightly Review," April, 1872.

appear. Every strong and full sensation not only involves an intense element of feeling in itself, but, acting as a stimulus to the cerebral activities, produces indirect emotional effects. Thus a powerful and sudden flash of light affords, together with a strong visual sensation, a wide emotional agitation, betrayed by numerous movements of the trunk and limbs. In addition to the intense but limited consciousness implied in the sensation, there is the diffused consciousness implied in the general excitement following. In the case of music this double effect is easily recognizable. A powerful and sustained tone, a full chord, and a rapid series of such chords, illustrate a rising scale both of sensational and of general emotional intensity. And it is not simply quantity of sound which determines the range and duration of this secondary effect. The peculiar timbre of some instruments, as, for example, the violin, appears to aid this result. There are certain throbbing tones of this potent instrument which, without awakening any distinguishable variety of emotion in my mind, always seem to "go through me," as the common expression well describes it.*

This, then, is the first and fundamental fact in the explanation of the unique influences of music. Without it there does not seem any mode of accounting for the deep range and mysterious vagueness of its effects. But this is only one step towards the needed solution. A second question arises as to the particular direction in the emotional and ideal mind which these secondary waves of tonic effect are likely to take. Are there, it may be asked, any facts in the peculiar construction of the human mind which would point to definite channels for this diffused stream of mental activity? In order to solve this point, it is simply needful to recall the general physiologico-psychological truth, that streams of nervous influence, wherever set up, tend to rush with greatest force into channels lying in the closest organic connection with the initial channels, and that mental agitation, however stimulated, tends to transform itself into definite feelings most intimately associated with the original feeling.

The reader will have anticipated that this line of inquiry brings us to the vocal phenomena rendered so prominent in Mr. Spencer's theory of music. That musical tones present the closest analogies to the human voice as affected by emotion and serving as its expression, and that in this manner the art is able to stir so many recognizable shades of emotion in the listener's mind, has been recognised more or less clearly by nearly all writers on the subject, whether speculative or critical. Indeed the common modes of describing the effects of music, using as they do analogies drawn from

* Hence Mr. Spencer hardly seems quite exact in affirming without qualification that the human voice is necessarily the most effective of instruments.

the outpouring of joy and grief in vocal sounds, appear to point very distinctly to this interpretation of musical symbols.

The conclusion to which a subjective analysis of musical effect appears to lead us is confirmed, moreover, by the history of the genesis and development of music. Its earliest forms seem to have been simply slight intensifications of that natural cadence and rhythm which a flow of emotion impresses on vocal utterance. Not even distinct or discrete tones of uniform pitch were at first employed, the melodies of this primitive song sliding continuously without appreciable break of pitch, just as one finds occurring to-day in Oriental music, and in many of the popular airs of Southern Europe as sung by the native peasants. This naïve form of art was, moreover, uniformly accompanied by dance or rhythmic movements, the whole play of voice and moving limb serving to express a deep internal sentiment. The long processes by which the art has grown from this crude shape to the elaborate forms familiar to ourselves, in which range of pitch, time, melody, harmony, and co-ordination of simultaneous movements have been carried to so great a complexity, at the same time outgrowing the capacities of the human voice, may be regarded as a slow tentative progress towards the realization of the fullest and most various beauty of tonic form. But has this progress involved a *pari passu* decline in expressive power? As the germ of musical art has become gradually loosened and separated from its natural stem, has it lost the most essential characters of its parentage? And, if not, by what means has the representative function been preserved, and, it may be, enlarged?

Recalling what has been said respecting the wide stimulative effects of musical sensation, one may easily see that while modern music is in external form very far removed from pre-artistic and spontaneous vocal utterance, it may still by force of multitudinous faint analogies be fitted to revive vast regions of emotional consciousness. Even if less definitely like vocal expression, and more subordinated to laws of form and beauty, it may still be capable of very deep and wide effects as an indirect exponent of human feeling and thought.

A careful consideration of the structure of music, as we now know it, will indeed convince us that underneath so much that is purely artificial, or rather artistic, there lie deeper traits which still link the art with the simple instinctive activities of the human voice. A brief account of these will constitute, then, our next step towards a comprehension of the highest significance of complex modern music.

The analogies between music and vocal sounds may be found both in the elements of the art and in its combinations or arrangements. The former again may be sub-divided into direct and indirect resemblances. Among elements of direct resemblance I should reckon

pitch, intensity, timbre, change of pitch or interval, as great or small, and duration and rapidity of tone. Each of these attributes may be discovered more or less distinctly in natural vocalization. With respect to pitch, it has been remarked that spontaneous emotional utterance commonly produces a gradual sliding of continuous tone rather than a series of tones of distinct pitch. Yet, as Mr. Spencer has shown, even in every-day vocal expression, especially of the more excited energetic kind, one may notice wide leaps of the voice through long intervals; and with attention we can easily detect in voices familiar to us some characteristic prevailing height of tone. The variations of timbre in the human voice accompanying changes in the prompting feeling are very curious, and every reflective amateur must have remarked the differences of expressive character which peculiarities of timbre give to the several musical instruments. Intensity and rapidity are too obviously common to vocal and musical tones to necessitate a special illustration of the fact.

In the elements of music having indirect affinity with vocal sounds something is due to analogies, not between different impressions of sound, but between these sensations and other orders of feeling. Thus, for example, melodious sequence, though no doubt suggested in its simplest forms by vocal sounds—for apart from any involuntary following of the ear, the simplest intervals of octave and fifth are probably, after transitions to adjacent tones, the easiest for vocal execution—owes a considerable part of its expressive character to its peculiar effect on the mind. When a melodious interval is sweet and natural, or strange and harsh, the slight amount of direct resemblance between it and vocal sounds easily leads the listener to interpret the whole character as vocal and expressive. Similarly with the harmony and discord of simultaneous tones. The co-ordination of two or more tones of different pitch, intensity, &c., was probably first suggested by the common phenomenon of sympathetic vocal expression by different persons. And similarities and contrasts in the pitch, intensity, direction of interval and rapidity of two or more series of tones, clearly have their prototypes in varying relations among the simultaneous utterances of several voices. Thus the convergence of two series from a wide interval to perfect unison, or from greatly unequal to equal intensities or rapidities, directly resembles familiar vocal changes during the interchanges of emotion which make up a considerable part of simple social life. And so it happens that the new and artistic ingredient of harmony, with its painful correlate, comes, in the same manner as the element of melody, to simulate an analogy with vocal expression. A pleasing harmony becomes the equivalent for emotional agreement among two voices, while a discord appears to pourtray their emotional disagreement. A third musical quality which becomes in

a similar manner transformed into a seemingly vocal one, is tonality, or the ruling of a fundamental key-note. This element, too, was probably first suggested by the medium pitch which the spontaneous voice adopts. As a point of quiet repose after wide elevations and depressions, this primitive fact seems to furnish the prototype of the restful satisfactory tonic. This being so, it is easy to understand how we attribute a vocal significance to the elaborate relations of key, regarding each note of the scale as the equivalent of a certain vocal transition from the medium and normal pitch of quiet customary expression.

It need hardly be said that the complete simulation of these attributes of the natural voice by the artistic inventions of melody, harmony, and key, has been rendered possible by the long predominance of song, as the earliest and most popular variety of music. Such artistic experiences add new affinities and associations to those of pre-artistic and natural experiences, confirming the tendency of the listener to interpret every aspect of musical tone, by whatever instrument produced, as a vocal utterance.

Passing now from the elements employed by music to the combination and co-ordination of these in artistic composition, one may find still further points of affinity with instinctive vocal action. Although a finished song, say one of Schubert's or Mendelssohn's, not to speak of complex instrumental compositions, may at first hearing seem to be very unlike a chain of vocal utterances prompted by changing feeling, there are nevertheless distinct analogies in the ordering of musical parts to the sequences of the natural voice. Thus in both one may find not only great variations in the force, pitch, and rapidity of the sounds making up the series, but, further, a certain duration of the whole, a prevailing force or intensity and rapidity of sound, together with a large regulating movement of rise and cadence, and a general tendency to revert to the point of rest supplied by the tonic of the fundamental key. Although no simply spontaneous vocal utterance falls into the regular order prescribed by the laws of musical time, yet faint adumbrations of equal rhythm are certainly furnished by vocal expression. Each variety of this expression has a roughly assignable length, rapidity, complexity of change, and so on, and hence one naturally comes to read in all forms of musical structure the symbols—elaborated and idealized, it is true—of that play of vocal activity, with the alternating impulses of daily life, which long preceded all art, and still presents itself as one of our most familiar experiences.

Now, however vague some of these resemblances between musical form and spontaneous vocal expression may be, the whole sum of such affinities is quite sufficient to produce a very marked mental

effect. There being, as we have seen, little or nothing in the impressions of music to call forth the perceptive energies to objective realities beyond, and there being, on the other hand, a large available stream of emotional influence in the stimulative side of tones, it is to be expected that even vaguely marked channels of suggestion will be instantly filled by the pressure of the current. And what one might thus infer *à priori*, one may observe in actual fact. The well-recognized effects of music on wide regions of consciousness may be seen to illustrate this deep-lying relation between the art of tone and the natural undirected actions of the inarticulate voice.

The links of association now considered appear to invest music with three kinds of representative character. First of all, by the simplest action of association, musical tones seem to typify vocal action itself, looked on as a conscious play of muscular energy. Secondly, by a further process they revive and render more or less distinctly recognizable to consciousness, varieties of emotional agitation, such as usually vent themselves in like vocal sounds. Finally, by a still longer process of thought, these re-awakened feelings are projected in fancy behind the musical tones, so that these seem to be the utterances of another soul stirred to emotional movement. Each of these orders of character deserves special description and illustration.

The first class of expressive characters may be called the *dynamic* attributes of music. This term is sometimes applied to accent, or the emphatic strength of tones, but it seems better fitted to denote all suggestions of force or energy. As Mr. Spencer has shown, the equivalents of vocal energy in music are emphasis, rapidity, distance of pitch from a certain average level, and width of interval. Strong tones, and rapid sequences of tones clearly imply by suggestion large amounts of vocal energy. With respect to pitch it seems probable not only that very high and very deep notes, as remote from the plane of easiest vocal execution, represent large amounts of force, but that height has an additional dynamic value. Rising intervals in melody usually increase in emphasis while falling intervals decrease. A descent to the key-note is more restful than an ascent to the same note, and so the former is commonly written *diminuendo*, while the latter is written *crescendo*. It seems possible that as the human voice produces its loud and distinct sounds at a high pitch, whereas its very low notes are necessarily feeble and unpenetrating, special associations may have arisen between height and intensity of tone. By these means, then, music calls up nascent feelings of muscular energy, and so assumes a dynamic aspect. In the easy and the energetic, in the painfully strained and the profoundly mighty characters of music, we may see the various effects producible by skilful modification and arrangement of these elements of association.

Nor are these suggestions of form confined to purely vocal memories. The exercise of the voice has been connected by abundant experiences with other and motor activities of body and limb. More particularly in those states of pleasurable spontaneous action which characterize a healthy and robust youth, shoutings and bafflings of voice have gone hand in hand with runnings, leapings, and quiet rhythmic swayings. From these experiences springs the natural association of music and dance, which Plato said could not be dissolved, since the simultaneous impulse to vocal sound and bodily motion is common to all young animals.* Hence, too, that common tendency to sway body and limb under the influence of the more simple musical rhythms, as dance melodies. And these suggestions clearly involve faint ideal revivals of the elating joys of exuberant motion, the pleasure of mere expenditure of force and of muscular exertion, together with the exhilarating feelings of movement itself. In this manner music acquires much of its cheering powers; its deeply stimulative capabilities, which of themselves would tend to excite the motor activities, being aided by definite associations of muscular action. And this side of music is in direct contrast to the passive and more purely emotional side. A style of music which stirs a large measure of this active consciousness may excite comparatively little of feeling proper, of the joy and sadness that alternate and mingle in our emotional life.

The order of musical composition that appears to appeal most distinctly to the active, as contrasted with the passive, consciousness of a listener, is that which is marked by a simple regularity of rhythm, time and accent being distributed according to an easy and obvious principle. For it is in the form of a simple grateful rhythm, either that of two alternating movements, or at most a triple time, that the simultaneous outpouring of spontaneous energy in voice and motion tends to shape itself. Hence these effects are most easily seen in the earlier stages of musical composition, as in dance measures, marches, &c., where a sharply dividing accent recurs with every simple division of time or bar.

In more complex musical structures the suggestions of conscious energy and of grateful movement scarcely attain to the rank of distinct feelings. Yet even here one may observe their influence. For what is the well-known interpretation of music as the play of Nature's forces but the projection of ideas of vocal and other actions behind the tones which are thus transformed into displays of an objective might? Musical tones can in dim outline imitate some few of nature's sounds,

* *Leges* ii., 653 D. E.

as the voices of wind and water, crash and roar, and other aspects of volume or quantity in sound. Far more powerfully, however, it awakens memories of our own conscious energies. Hence a grand orchestral volume of tone, by stirring myriads of such vague feelings, and at the same time supplying dim ideal shapes for these impulses, may easily seem transmuted into the splendid simultaneous rush of Nature's energies, whether in chaotic separation or harmonious order. And thus it becomes possible to speak fancifully of a more definite dynamic character in a piece of music, as when Beethoven says of the grand torrent of sound in the first movement of his C Minor Symphony: "Fate is knocking at the gate" (*Das Schicksal klopft an die Pforte*).

Yet music, while conveying these vague ideas of motor energy, conveys still more copiously ideal shadows of the emotional life which is more or less associated with all muscular activities when not voluntarily put forth, and which holds such an intimate relation to vocal action as the great instrument of expression. How finely and truly music expounds the emotional experiences of life appears to be a familiar truth. Yet it is not quite so easy to perceive what are the precise shades of feeling it expresses, and, as we have seen, there is still much discussion as to the limits of this expression. A more adequate understanding of this point may be rendered possible by carefully examining the mental process by means of which music is able to awaken faint pulsations of a past emotion.

When a plaintive melody, as, for example, that of Mendelssohn's "Suleika" in E minor, or of Schumann's "Ich grolle nicht," moves the listener's mind to an exquisite sadness, it effects this, according to the theory of vocal association, by its numerous resemblances,—in softness and slowness of tone, in gradual transition, and strange half-painful intervals of melody,—to those vocal sounds into which a feeling of pensive sadness has, through long experiences, spontaneously uttered itself. Hence the emotional forms which the several styles of music are fitted to awaken must be those which have a distinctive and characteristic expression. Now it is easy to see that many varieties of human feeling fall into indistinguishable vocal utterances. Not only does a thwarted love adopt an emotional language very like that of a thwarted ambition, but the murmurings of a still content are often closely similar to those of an incipient grief, and as Mr. Darwin confesses—to the apparent injury of his theory of Emotional Expression,—the sharp cries of pain come, at times, very near those of an ecstatic pleasure. Hence it has been said, by Helmholtz and others, that music produces not definite emotions but rather moods or emotional frames of mind (*Gemüthsstimmungen*). Let us just glance at a few of these.

Music clearly can represent various degrees of emotional strength. An intense passion, whether joyous or painful, is indirectly shadowed forth by the energetic elements of tone, emphasis, rapidity, range of interval and duration. Thus we have faintly simulated the several gradations of emotional excitement, from the gentle flow of feeling typified by the *adagio* up to the intense rush of passion typified by the *presto con fuoco*. So, too, musical form can roughly distinguish between simple, clear, and comparatively uniform feelings, and full, complex, and stormy or fitful passions. Simple orderly rhythms, as one finds in abundance in the allegros of Haydn and Mozart, appear to interpret for us the clear joyous phases of our emotional life, while more involved, abruptly changing, and inextricable plexus of tones, such as frequently occur in one of the later symphonies of Beethoven, or in an overture of Wagner, seem rather the outbursts of deeply complex and half-confused emotions involving many contributing currents of feeling along with their exciting ideas. By a still larger measure of complexity,—in changes of accent and time, in variations of pitch and of interval, as well as in modifications of melody, harmony, and key,—music acquires the power of portraying vast tracts of our emotional life, not only the curious alternations of feeling, such as intense outburst and subsidence, doubt and assurance, which make up the whole history of a single passion, but also transitions of mood, either those effected by the many fine gradations which connect related emotions, such as gladness and pity, or those caused by sudden and abrupt alternations of passion, as, for example, from stormy rage to tender regret.

The qualitative differences of emotion, again, as pleasurable or painful, may be dimly expressed through the indirect associations of melody and harmony. Pieces in which the melodious sequences are sweet and clear—eminently those compositions written in the major key which move for the most part through simple intervals of time—appear bright and joyous beside those which perplex and momentarily pain by the number of strange minor sequences. And similarly, the preponderance of simple harmonies intimately connected in melodious sequence, or of less perfect and discordant combinations distantly related to one another, stamps a composition with the character of serene happiness or of painful emotional conflict. Moreover, by subtle combinations of these musical qualities, an indefinite number of intermediate shades of emotion,—outbursts of wild joy with painful recollections not wholly extinguished, or dark turbid rivers of sorrow in which glimmerings of hope may still be seen—may be dimly represented. As an illustration of these mixed emotional effects I may point to spirited movements in the minor key, such as Schubert's first Impromptu in the *Moments Musicaux*. And

it is clearly possible, too, by skilful co-ordinations of several simultaneous movements, to indicate to some extent the side-currents of feeling which so frequently shadow and obscure a dominant emotional mood. Yet it is easy to see that all such suggestions are necessarily vague and limited, and suffice to embody only a few of the larger and more conspicuous aspects of emotion.*

It is said that music represents not only feelings but ideas. No doubt the transition of vocal sound from pure emotional expression to articulate declaration is a very gradual one, and in our ordinary life-intercourse feeling vents itself by affecting intelligible speech. Hence it seems natural that musical composition, built up as it is out of large numbers of distinct tones rapidly succeeding one another and accompanying one another in simultaneous combinations, should, in vaguely depicting emotion, seem also to describe the many trains of image and thought which accompany, sustain, and determine our emotional states. Not that there is anything in musical elements directly imitative of thought; but that they become transformed, by the reacting influence of the feeling which they awaken, into a clear, articulate language which seeks to define, explain, and justify the emotion. In the case of several simultaneous movements, again, each separate thread of rhythmic melody seems to be a distinct train of ideas having its own shade of feeling, and thus one appears to find in a complex orchestral theme a faint analogue of whole passages of inner consciousness, with their diverging trains of thought and their various streams of emotion.

Once more, music seems to take from our inner subjective life and body forth in outer symbols, not only feelings and ideas, but also impulses of will. Whereas the art is primarily lyric, uttering a pure, unconstrained impulse of feeling, it becomes later on dramatic, or rhetorical, declaring earnest resolution, firm purpose, eager questioning, and so on. There are obviously certain arrangements of tone which best represent these mental attitudes. Thus, increase of accent and heightening of pitch, followed by abruptness of termination, are rhetorical and volitional rather than emotional.† As Mr. Mill has well said, "Grief, taking the form of prayer or of a

* A slight yet suggestive analysis of the emotional side of music is given by Mr. Haws in his *Music and Morals*.

† It is easy, for instance, to note the correspondence of the two intervals



to question and answer. Accent, length and pitch of the notes, and the melodious relation they sustain, give to the first abrupt energy and the incompleteness of expectation ; to the second, a subsidence to content and rest.

complaint, becomes oratorical; no longer low, even, and subdued, it assumes a more emphatic rhythm, a more rapidly returning accent." Emotion if left to itself gradually subsides, and its vocal accompaniment falls to a restful conclusion. Hence strong and abrupt climaxes of tone rather suggest the presence of a volitional element, of a purpose of declaring feeling in order to impress other minds. Illustrations of such rhetorical effects may be found in the recitatives of oratorios and operas, out of which one may select the masterly achievements of Wagner.

It remains to be seen how these subjective effects of music become transformed by intellectual processes into apparently objective realities. The simplest and crudest example of this tendency to objectify a subjective feeling awakened by melody, is to be found in the vulgar delusion, that the pain and joy, the yearning, longing, and the assured content, are in the very tones themselves. This curious error may serve to illustrate how very intimate is the association between the two spheres of sound and inner consciousness. A higher form of this quasi-reasoning process is seen in the universal attribution of the tones as vocal utterances to some unknown conscious subject. In listening to the rippling melodies of a piano or to the keen throbbing tones of a violin, one involuntarily pictures to himself, in dim Shelleyan outline, some subtle spirit whose glad delight or exquisite woe is welling forth the mysterious sounds; or, if the utterance be more designed, "heard," and not "overheard," as Mr. Mill has so aptly said, one conceives himself as confronted and addressed by some unknown being. Co-ordinations of different rhythmic movements, again, become interpreted either as distinct processes of thought and feeling in one and the same mind, or as passages from the inner lives of different minds. How analogous is the play of two currents of thought and sentiment in one mind to the interchanges of thought between two minds may be seen in Mr. Tennyson's subtle poem, *The Two Voices*. Yet it may perhaps be said that when one series of tones is rendered very prominent as the dominant melody, while the others are of the nature of harmonious accompaniments, the hearer is apt to interpret the composition as the outflow of a single emotional nature. On the other hand, if two or more parts are equally prominent, and the whole movement is more strictly polyphonic in character, the common interpretation is that of different natures in emotional intercourse. Thus, the reader who has again and again known the mystic power of Mendelssohn's duetto, in the *Lieder ohne Worte*, will probably be able to recal a tendency to think of the two shades of sentiment depicted—half dissonant, but finally blending in perfect unison, and passing into the most delicious repose—as the reciprocal appeal and response of two distinct personalities converging towards complete sympathy.

It is this impulse to project a living, throbbing soul behind musical tones which helps to lend so much of the mysterious to the art. In listening to a progressive movement, especially if it be new, and of an unfamiliar form, one conceives himself as brought within hearing of some unknown nature, or natures, whose deepest experiences and aspirations are about to be unfolded to him. And just as there is a charm of mystery which chains one's attention to a new mind approached in the course of life's intercourse, so, in yielding the ear to some new musical message, one is apt to experience something of a delightful sense of awe, as though about to peer into the unveiled depths of a human spirit. How this effect of awful expectation may be brought about by skilful combinations of strange unfamiliar harmonies and melodious successions at the opening of a piece will be known to everyone conversant with the best opera overtures. A well-known illustration of this effect may be found in the unwonted yet deeply suggestive cadences which open Beethoven's 18th Sonata :



Similar effects are to be met with in the opening bars of accompaniments to the songs of Mendelssohn.

As a final stage of this mental disposition to refer musical tones to an objective source, I may allude to the recognised habit of regarding music as the audible form of visible movement, as the ear's symbols for reading the great processes of material nature. Musical tones, as we have recognised, distantly imitate nature's sounds. Moreover, through the suggestions of our own active energies and their resulting movements, and the well-established parallelism between rhythmic sound and rhythmic motion, it may indirectly call up faint images of nature's visible activities, as the blithe flow of brook or the angry rush of cataract. But this is not the whole of the process. The deepest and most constant power of music acts on our emotional nature, stirring vague impulses of oft-experienced sorrow and joy, terror and relief. And under the sway of these emotional states, ideas tend to transform themselves into appropriate images. Now the most constant intellectual accompaniment of a deep emotion is the thought of its exciting cause, or objective source. Hence, under the influence of an impressive piece of music, the mind is strongly predisposed to look for recognisable causes of its strange agitations, and by this means suggestions of external events, which otherwise would scarcely rise into consciousness as distinct ideas, become intense and luminous

images. And thus a composer may to some extent conjoin with the easier task of stirring a certain variety of emotional mood the more difficult task of bodying forth to the consciousness of the listener those great and impressive events of nature—dire storm and hurricane, smiling calm, attack from furious beasts or human foe, or deliverance from peril—which through long ages have been the causes of some of the deepest emotional experiences of human nature. And it is this truth which justifies what is good in such attempts as that of Beethoven in his grand, deeply-moving *Sinfonie Pastorale*, to sweep out in vague tonic outline imposing phases of nature.

Our examination of the sources of musical expression seems to bring us to the conclusion, that though there are vast numbers of analogies entwining about music and human life and nature, and binding them in mental union, no one order of these is of sufficient distinctness and strength to render music clearly imitative. The emotional embodiments of music, dependent on links of vocal association, are by far the most conspicuous, and yet these, as we have seen, are never sharply defined. The vagueness of such emotional effect is conclusively shown by the fact that whenever a number of people seek to define the feeling of a composition, they pretty certainly select different species of emotion. What appears to one hearer to image a lover's plaint may seem to another to exhibit the pensive feelings awakened by a still evening landscape. The requirements of æsthetic form, which have been the chief law of musical development, have long since lifted music far above the vain office of expressing, as in articulate language, one distinct variety of feeling. One condition of the first genesis of music was the surrender of definite expression in exchange for indefinite—a pure melodious sequence, and even a pure single tone being, strictly speaking, a departure from natural imitation. And the whole progress of music has been in the same direction.

And yet this very limitation of musical expression, when looked at from another side, may be seen to have been an addition to its power. What is lost in definite transmission of individual emotion is more than made up in vague transmission of vast groups and strata of feeling. A delicate and subtle melody taken from some musical classic does not, it is true, profess to be a very exact paraphrase of one distinct flow of feeling, but by its numerous half-hidden affinities with vast series of vocal expressions, it is able to stir deep and complex fountains of emotion, slowly distilled out of wide tracts of experience. It is this depth and quantity of emotion evoked by music, together with the mind's inability to define it as any familiar variety, that constitute the infinity of the art, and account for its mighty subjective influence. The myriads of individual experiences

that underlie the mysterious emotional effect of a quiet plaintive *adagio*, of a wild *prestissimo*, or of a frolicsome *scherzo*, consisting of all one's own past feelings vented in similar forms of vocal tone and of all sympathetic feelings awakened by hearing like sounds in others, may well account for the profundity of the effect. And if we add to this the plausible hypothesis, that mingling with this residuum of individual experience are countless currents of emotion transmitted by long series of ancestors, the explanation of the effect appears to be complete.

In its gradual developments, then, music seems to have been striving to gain range and depth of emotional expression, clothing this expression in the most beautiful and artistic forms. In contrast to the first crude tentatives in song, aiming at nothing higher than a slightly intensified embodiment of a definite emotion with its attendant ideas, complex modern music appears to be a grand translation of the common vocal utterance of feeble men and women into a noble and sublime language, such as might be spoken by natures of a finer mould than ours, whose emotions and thoughts take grander proportions, and move in more orderly sequence; or, it may be said, more correctly perhaps, that the fine structures of tone which modern music has raised transcribe into abstract symbols the most general aspects and relations of all emotional life, and thus image in vast dim outline the whole world of human feelings, not in detached fragments, but in the most perfect order of rise, complex development, and final subsidence in a deep satisfying rest.

Such a conception of the scope of music may perhaps enable us to fix approximately the æsthetic significance and value of the several kinds of composition, and to see something almost childish in the fierce war of words on the rival claims of lyric, dramatic, and purely instrumental music.

In the progress of vocal music the development of this ideal tendency is distinctly discernible. If we compare an elaborate artistic song of Schubert with a popular song (*Volkslied*), or the simple choral devices of a Greek theatre with the highly wrought workmanship, vocal and instrumental, of a modern opera, we find a clear advance towards ideality. No doubt individual passions, thoughts, and aims are still portrayed, only they are portrayed in more complex and more noble forms. When, for example, Wagner makes Lohengrin pour forth his big throbbing love, or the pilgrim Tannhäuser utter his boundless remorse, one feels that it is the expression of an emotion, human indeed in its quality, but yet superhuman in its depth, range, and mighty force. The musical medium, by its grand artistic forms, and still more by its countless associations with various shades of human emotion, raises a historical or legendary passion to an intensity, volume,


and splendour of form that make it seem god-like. Yet this ideality is necessarily restricted here, because it is a real individual experience that has to be represented. The retention of words, which convey definite successive nuances of an emotion and distinct groups of ideas accompanying it, necessarily impedes the free action of creative musical impulse. However skilfully changes of melody and harmony may be co-ordinated with changes of the passion to be depicted, it must sometimes happen either that the ideal beauty and grandeur of the form is sacrificed, or that some of the subtle developments of the passion want their musical expression. And thus the ideal transformation by a lofty musical medium of a definite and concrete passion is always a compromise. In enjoying a song of Schubert, one must not care to know all its verbal details. The music is said to perform its function if it transmits the most impressive phases and the ruling sentiment of the poem. The opera still illustrates, as it has repeatedly illustrated before, a contest for supremacy between fine ideal musical form and clearness and fulness of expression. One troubles little enough about the words in listening to an *aria* from *Don Giovanni*; for beauty of form and high melodious quality gladden the mind. On the other hand, in hearkening to one of Wagner's long quasi-recitative rhapsodies, it is the uttered emotion, colouring and swaying as it does in so masterly a way all changes of tone, that engages the attention and absorbs the whole mind. Each effect is fine and worthy, only they can never be perfectly reconciled and made to contribute to one and the same final end. Were it otherwise, the apostles of the *Zukunftsmusik* would be right, and the age of free instrumental music might be looked on as past.

But according to the conception here adopted respecting the resources of music and the direction of its past development, instrumental music, so far from being superseded, would seem to be the most ideal attainment of the art. For it is here, and here only, that the instinct for worthy and beautiful form has unfettered play, while it is only here, too, that the deepest effect of emotional expression can be realised. Just as the addition of musical tone to vocal expression is the first step towards the ideal formative function of the art, so the perfect severance of tone from the definite expression of individual passion is another progress on the same road. Melodious vocal tone disguises many of the actual phases of a passion, and transforms those it seeks to embody into new and grander shapes. Instrumental accompaniment does this in a still higher degree. The growth of independent instrumental music simply completes the suppression of the individual and peculiar in our emotional life, and the artistic embodiment in its stead of the vast forces of emotion which lie deep down in the human soul. Would it then be very forced reasoning if one were

to conclude that instrumental music is the highest and most perfect development of the art? Certainly there is more ground, both in the nature and laws of musical effect, and in the direction of musical evolution, for according this first rank to pure instrumental music than for claiming it, as Herr Wagner does, with such redundancy of poetic language, and such a painful absence of solid argument, for the new opera.

The question appears to stand thus: Music has always advanced by the play of two sets of forces—the instinct for intense emotional expression, and the artistic quest for tonic beauty and power. And any form of music would seem to be justified which displays a large achievement in either of these directions. Even within the bounds of instrumental music itself, one may study the separate strivings of the two æsthetic impulses. While Mozart in his symphonies arrived at the most perfect beauty of form, Beethoven studied rather to show forth the emotional capabilities of tone. The aim embodied in Schumann's charming descriptive music, for example the *Waldscenen*, and in the *Programmmusik* of Liszt, namely, that of eliciting to the full the emotional energies latent in pure tones, though liable to lead away from a perception of the highest melodious beauty, is clearly a justifiable side of musical activity. Yet it might be urged that these two aims are only to a certain extent separable; the most passionate flood of tones needing some degree of melodious control, and the sweetest orderings of tone and harmony being certain to whisper some tender mysterious story of sorrow and joy. From this it might be reasoned that the highest attainment of music is the simultaneous realization of lofty beauty of form and of deep emotional expression, so far as they are susceptible of attainment in grateful unison. And certainly, if one must decide on an absolute best in music, this would appear to be it. But, if so, there seems every reason for supposing that this highest attainable fusion of the two tendencies is to be found, not in the opera or any form of word-bound music, but in that free development of pure tone which has certainly reached a beauty and a splendour of power unattainable by song, and which nevertheless retains, in the folds of its own intimate structure, abundance of force for stimulating and satisfying the deepest emotional cravings of the human heart.

JAMES SULLY.



THE BEER QUESTION IN ENGLAND.

THE Temperance Question, we may hope, has at length got out of the intolerant and unpractical form which the misdirected efforts of certain Societies had given it, and has fallen rather into the hands of the police and magistrates, who are wisely taking the more humble but more useful line of watching the action and effects of the new Licensing Act; so that any suggestions for farther reform are likely now to obtain a fair hearing.

Of course it is not to be wondered at that one excess should, by that law of reaction which holds good in the moral as well as the mechanical world, produce another; and it was no doubt the gigantic evils which intemperance produced, threatening to sap both the moral and material strength of the nation, that blinded the eyes of a knot of good men so completely as to make them attempt to reverse a verdict which could claim a better title to whatever authority can be derived from "*Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus,*" than can be claimed for most Catholic doctrines.

Poets have sung the praises of wine from the beginning, and moralists have generally acknowledged its virtues while lamenting and reprobating its excesses; and although beer is an article which excites a less fervid admiration, yet the nations that have been best acquainted with its virtues, ourselves and the Germans especially, have been loud in its praises. We believe the general verdict to be

the true one, and have no sympathy with that small but noisy section of temperance reformers who, starting from what we conceive to be false premises, advocate compulsory measures for enforcing universal abstinence. The total failure of this well-intentioned but misguided party to influence others both in and out of Parliament must have convinced them that their crusade, at least in England, is utterly hopeless; and that the cure for the great curse of intemperance must be sought for from some other source than that of Permissive compulsion.

The Licensing Act, the result of a rather hurried consideration of the temperance question by an overtasked Parliament, has now been long enough in operation to give some little data as to its effects, and there is at the least evidence enough to prove that the law has been far from a complete success; and that it will probably require farther legislation. The evidence on the whole seems to amount to this, that generally, according to the testimony of the clergy, magistrates, and county police, there has been some, but not a very definite decrease, of drunkenness in the country districts in consequence of the houses being closed at an earlier hour; and *per contra*, that in London, Liverpool, and other large towns there has been, since the Act came into operation, a decided and considerable increase in drunkenness; though it is quite open to argument whether this increase has proceeded from the operation of the Act, or from other and independent causes, especially from the increase of wages and consequent facility of obtaining a larger supply of intoxicating liquor. As favourable to the Act, we may quote, among other testimonies, the opinion of the clergy of sixteen rural deaneries in the diocese of Carlisle, as reported by the Bishop at the Diocesan Conference last year (*Guardian*, September 3), and the opinion expressed by the Chairman of the South Holland magistrates, in Lincolnshire (*Lincoln Chronicle*, September 5). On the other hand, there is the startling Report of Colonel Henderson, the Chief of the Metropolitan Police, who tells us the sad and disappointing news that there were 29,109 drunk and disorderly cases that came under his cognizance in the year 1872, the year following the Act, as compared with 24,213 in the year preceding; * and other large towns seem to afford similar,

* Year.	Drunk and disorderly conduct.		Drunkenness.		Total.
1868	.	10,463	.	9,169	19,632
1869	.	10,853	.	9,538	20,391
1870	.	11,549	.	10,076	21,625
1871	.	13,016	.	11,197	24,213
1872	.	16,420	.	12,689	29,109

Showing a regular progressing increase, though the police suggest that the figures represent an increase of rigour in carrying out the law rather than an increase of drunkenness.

though not always such decisive, testimony.* That an immense increase has taken place in the consumption of all intoxicating liquors is indisputable from the revenue returns; the increase on the duty on spirits alone during the past year being one million and a quarter, and the general result being expressed with rough accuracy by the oft-repeated statement that the nation has drunk itself out of the Alabama claims—that is, to the amount of upwards of three millions.

But although this result must be all utter blackness to the total abstainers, and even to the United Kingdom Alliance, yet perhaps it is not so sad to deeper thinkers and more unprejudiced minds. The increase represents and is the result of national prosperity; or, to say the least, an increase in wages—for there are many besides the Alliance who will not be willing to admit that an increase of wages, if spent mainly in intoxicating liquors, is national prosperity. Now, here a question arises, which it is not so easy to answer. How far has this increase of drinking gone in a right and how far in a wrong direction—for from our point of view there is a right as well as a wrong direction? Has it gone in excess to the stomach of the drunkard, or in increased but moderate supplies to the homes of the industrious poor, contributing to the health and strength of working men and women who stood in need of it? Has it been that

“Those drink now who never drank before,”

or rather,

“Those who always drank now drink the more?”

It will be admitted by all except the very intemperate temperance people that much depends on the answer that can be given to this question; that our efforts should be directed to the former result, and that any legislative action that can conduce to this result will be highly beneficial; and this brings us to the point we desire especially to urge.

We start then in the belief that good cheap ale, beer, wine, and spirits, are in themselves a benefit, and only prejudicial, like other good temporal gifts, in that they are liable to become a curse by being abused, and especially we hold that good wholesome beer at a

* In Lincolnshire, the chief of the constabulary for the county has just reported to Quarter Sessions that the convictions for drunkenness exceed those of last year by 129, while last year's exceeded the previous year's by 103; and he adds, “as there is no substantial increase of population, and the police action has not changed, drunkenness is clearly more frequent.” The chief constable for the City of Lincoln reports the convictions to have doubled this year, 261 against 130 last year, and yet adds, “This does not arise from any general increase of drunkenness in the city”!!!

cheap price and in proper quantities is a boon to the ordinary working man, *and would conduce to sobriety.*

If this seems a startling doctrine, it is not a new one. Adam Smith says ("Wealth of Nations," bk. 4, chap. iii.): "The cheapness of *wine* seems to be a great cause, not of drunkenness, but of sobriety. The inhabitants of the wine countries are in general the soberest people of Europe; witness the Spaniards, the Italians, and the inhabitants of the southern provinces of France." If this be true, and it seems to be borne out by all who know the countries, it is a fact worth any amount of argument and declamation from the intemperate temperance apostles who insist that all alcohol is poison, and damage a good cause by their excesses in repeating oft-refuted assertions.

But if this be true of wine as to more southern climates, why should it not be equally so as to beer in the northern? As wine cannot be produced here, it can never become cheap enough to be the ordinary beverage of the country. Besides, it is not altogether suitable to our colder climate. The cheap light wines of the Continent are cooling, and adapted to warmer countries, while beer possesses the more tonic and nourishing properties required in our colder and damper atmosphere. Nature is always the best director in dietetics, as physicians well know; and yet in the regulation of our drinking we have tried—but, of course, tried in vain—to eject her with a legislative fork, repressing and discouraging where we ought to have guided and encouraged. Of course it is vain to expect that any number of Acts of Parliament will make men sober. We must look to other causes, and to more than one, to bring about this. Two generations since it was very common, and thought no disgrace, for gentlemen at a dinner party to get drunk. The custom has happily ceased, but no Act of Parliament did away with it; and something more powerful than legislation will, if ever the happy consummation arrives, make the world sober. Acts of Parliament will no more make men sober than they will make the land grow ten quarters per acre. But we are bound to see in both cases that the law does not retard or hinder a gradual improvement. We often talk about amending this or that by Act of Parliament, while all the time over-legislation is preventing us from improving ourselves; and this, we believe, has been the case with respect to intoxicating drinks. We should treat drunkenness as a wise physician treats disease. Try to be beforehand with it, on the principle that prevention is better than cure: and where we see a malady we must trust very much to nature to shake it off, aiding her as far as we can by our efforts, but not by going directly against her. And where there is an evident want manifested, we must endeavour to satisfy it by some wholesome

antidote, instead of ignoring it, or opposing it by some weak barrier of man's dictum which strong human nature is sure to throw down with a rush.

The fact is, with respect to wholesome drink, the supply has scarcely kept pace with the demand. It is difficult to procure pure water in our towns, almost impossible in many parts of the country, though there is hope that sanitary laws will improve this in time. Wells are no longer to be relied on, as they were in the days of the patriarchs. Pollution has taken possession of rivers which ran for our forefathers in their pristine pureness; while with respect to all other drinks, we have too long tried all sorts of restrictions and repressions instead of relying on freedom. Free trade is, of course, generally accepted now as right in a fiscal point of view: but even here there is a marked anomaly with respect to drink. There has been lately a cry raised of "a free breakfast table," but why not a free dinner table and a free supper table as well? The truth is, we scarcely yet know what real free trade is. What we have is a crooked lopsided thing that the exigencies of party politics has introduced under a false name. There is no duty on the raw material of our manufactures, no duty on the main articles of food; but the most oppressive and vexatious duties and prohibitions on the common drink of the nation. What is the consequence? That, good water having become difficult to procure, any other wholesome drink, suitable to our climate and constitutions, is dearer and more difficult to obtain in England than in almost any other country. It is this difficulty in many instances that drives men to other expedients and makes them drunkards in the end.

If it is an indisputable fact that the most temperate countries in the world are those where there is the most abundant and cheapest supply of pure and wholesome light alcoholic drink,—that is, the cheap wine countries, where there neither is, nor can be, much 'restriction,—does it not teach us that unfettered nature is wiser than artificial restraint? But it will be said that there is no such beverage in England. Our climate does not produce it. No, but our climate will produce one better suited to our wants, and especially to the poor man's wants, if we will let it.

We ought to make our beer as cheap and wholesome as their wine; but to do this we must first repeal the duties on the raw material. It cannot, perhaps, be done all at once for fiscal reasons; but it ought to be kept in view and demanded in the interests of temperance quite as much as in the name of that boasted, but at present lopsided principle, miscalled Free-trade. If it is impossible to spare the whole of the Malt-Tax at once, yet, as a mere matter of even-handed justice to all classes, the reduction of the wine duties ought to have

been followed by a similar reduction on the excessive taxes levied in various ways on beer.

We know very well that the reduction of a tax in a short time lowers the price of an article to a greater extent than the actual difference made in the duty. It has been so with wine. A stimulus has been given to the trade, and induced the growers to open out new resources ; and it is not too much to say that good, cheap, drinkable wine may now be had for not much more than half its former price. Beer, on the contrary, at least the poor man's beer, has increased in price, and cannot generally be procured retail for less than fivepence a quart. But there would soon be an immense reduction if both the raw material and the trade could be set free ; and then it would be a more universal drink, finding its way to the homes of the poor ; and the quality of the article sold would improve also ; for much of the temptation to adulterate would be removed.

But the greatest difficulty, we shall be told, remains. The grand question is, how to counteract the evil influences of the public-house. How are we to regulate the places where it is sold, and where it is drunk ? It will be admitted that we shall have done something, and something real and of value, if we can improve the article, and convert what now is often a poison into a wholesome beverage. As to the houses, they are of two kinds, the places where liquor is drunk, and the places where it is only sold. We must consider them separately. The greatest difficulty is with the former, and the Licensing Act is dealing with them, and is on its trial, and has scarcely had time yet to obtain an impartial verdict. There is, at least, hope that it is doing good in some places. What seems still to be wanted is not so much any limitation in their number, (for we must remember that if we materially diminish the number of houses, we proportionately increase the number of drinkers congregated at one place, which is often the greater evil of the two,) but rather the legal power of keeping a convicted drunkard altogether out of such houses at least for a period. In America, we believe, when a man has been convicted twice of drunkenness, notice is given to the publicans within a certain radius not to supply him with liquor for six months ; and if a man leaves a public-house drunk the publican is bound to see him home or to send some one home with him. But perhaps something might be contrived more stringent and efficacious than this exercise of control by the publicans themselves, which must always be irksome to them, and which they would be afraid of carrying out strictly for fear of losing their custom. Might not the penalty for drunkenness, which certainly ought to be much heavier than it is, always include a prohibition to enter a public-house for a certain time, any infringement of this regulation being of course visited by a much heavier penalty ? and the fines and penalties for all open

exhibitions of drunkenness in the street ought, in the interest of the drinkers as well as of the sober, to be far heavier and more uniform than they are. This would in the end be mercy to the drunkard ; for the diminution in the number of the convictions would soon make up for any increase in the severity of the fine or sentence ; and outward decency and absence of evil example, things not to be despised in the suppression of crime, would be maintained. Few things are more demoralizing to the lower-minded classes than the sight of a tipsy man. But it is with the beershops for the sale of liquors not to be drunk on the premises that we act now in the most mistaken manner. Here the old heresy of the Manichæans as manifested in the various Societies for the suppression of intemperance, seems to have influenced our legislation. We assume the liquor-trade to be an evil, and wish to contract it. But what inconsistency !—if it is an evil, we ought to seek to destroy it, as indeed some societies do. But on our assumption that it is good, we wish to extend it.

The first thing is to get free-trade in the manufacture of beer ; and the next thing is to get free-trade in the sale. Instead of seeking to lessen the number of places, we should seek to increase them. The sale of beer, at all events, should be as free as the sale of bread, or meat, or groceries. Let it be sold across the counter at any respectable shop. Indeed the only stipulation we would make would be that the seller kept a shop of some sort and sold something else besides beer ; and thus we would do away with beer-shops proper, or rather beer-shops improper. Now they are often vile places, but there is no reason why they should be. Now a respectable artizan often does not like to send his girl, or a tradesman his maid-servant, to buy a pint of beer. In order to procure it she must go into a bar and run the risk of meeting a drunken man, or of hearing some obscene words ; but if she could run into the street and buy it across the counter as she buys a pound of sugar, half the evil would be done away with. Encourage beer-shops then, but insist that they are shops, not holes in the wall. If we got good, cheap, wholesome beer, and every facility for obtaining it—and unrestricted free-trade is the best producing power—we might hope for a return to a healthier tone, for then more of the drink would be consumed at home, and some proportion of it would go to the family. The home ought to beat the gin-palace, which is a species of establishment of comparatively recent standing, dating back only about thirty or forty years, and which, with all its outward decoration of plate-glass and gilding, is yet comfortless withal, and not irresistible in its attractions. The cosy, chatty parlour in the village or small town, where there is a little politics and business and a good deal of gossip and scandal, is perhaps more attractive ; and the Licensing Act has done good in sending home its company an hour earlier than before.

Many of our licensed victuallers and publicans admit this; and we should, in legislation, beware of wounding their feelings or imperilling their interests as a body: for nothing is to be gained by it; but should rather strive to enlist them on our side. They cannot always help the disgrace brought upon their houses. It often arises from some two or three known characters whom the publican would be thankful to be rid of; and the law should give him this power in some such way as we have indicated. It might do something to break up disreputable little bands of drinkers.

We are not sanguine enough to suppose that by such means drunkenness would be altogether suppressed, and, we are aware that legislation is frequently apt only to drive evils into some new channel, and to make them reappear, different in form but the same in fact; as in Scotland, where the general closing of public-houses on Sundays is said not to have made men sober, but to have made them hypocrites. Still, we believe that such antidotes are far more hopeful than the usual nostrums of the Temperance societies. Total abstinence is inapplicable to the social habits of the country; we mean to the social habits which are in themselves innocent; and, however praiseworthy some of the supporters of the cause may be, and however successful in isolated cases, it does not touch the mass. Still less do we believe in the tawdry parade of the Good Templars. Some time since, we were travelling by an excursion train into which a party entered whom we at first sight mistook for the mayor and corporation of the ancient little borough at hand; but the sight is now familiar to us, and we cannot imagine how any good cause can be promoted by the gorgeous display of orders, stars, collars of various colours, ribbons, and other decorations, with which men, women, and children vainly bedizen themselves, and then exhibit in procession to their wondering fellow-creatures. We cannot conceive that sobriety is enhanced by such paltry means, or that any good can come of such "demonstrations," as it is the fashion to call them; demonstrations surely of folly and weakness, and too often accompanied with uncharitableness and disparagement of the efforts of others. We lately met such a procession of persons in a cathedral town, who concluded their day's outing with listening to speeches abusing the parsons for their views of the temperance question at a recent Church Conference.

In this, as in other social matters, the clergy have not shown indifference or apathy; but they, in common with legislators, magistrates, and most of the thinking classes, have kept aloof, often reluctantly, from what is called the temperance movement, because, with much sympathy for the cause, they have felt that its promoters were aiming at a false issue, and that they themselves could not countenance the practices resorted to. Indeed it seems rather to be

the province of the clergy to repress the exaggeration and tyranny of some of the temperance advocates, to preach temperance in *all* things and to take care that abstinence does not usurp the place of religion, or pride that of moderation.

The medical declaration signed in December, 1871, by the Presidents of the Royal Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons, and by all the leaders of the profession, breathes this temperate view of the question, deprecating the inconsiderate prescription of alcohol, but declining to abandon its use in the treatment of disease; and desiring wise legislation which would restrict its use and gradually introduce habits of temperance. But this is very different from the language of the ordinary total abstinence lecturer who so often repels by his exaggeration.

We must confess we have more faith in regulating the old public-houses than in establishing new ones without the drink, as has been proposed. It may be comparatively easy to establish them in some villages where the soil is owned by one or two persons; and model parishes without a public-house are not impossible under such conditions. But we doubt if they have much effect beyond driving the quiet drinkers to their own homes, and the convivial ones to the nearest parish where there are plenty of small freeholders to assert independence. Such expedients, too, savour of class legislation; for we are not aware that any one has yet suggested a club at the west-end without port-wine and champagne; and we suppose every one will admit that we ought to wish our poorer brethren to have, as far as their circumstances admit, all the pleasures which we ourselves enjoy.

We are not surprised that the gigantic evils of intemperance have sometimes blinded men's minds to the inconsistencies of the remedies proposed, and we ought not, perhaps, to wonder at the excesses of ardent and well-meaning reformers; but at the same time we ought to feel sure that we shall lose nothing in the end by adhering to true principles, relying on the Apostolic exhortation to be "moderate in all things," undeterred by the imputation of lukewarmness. We must beware of alienating any class by imputations often undeserved, especially when that class is one so powerful and so necessary to the cause as the licensed victuallers, who think themselves aggrieved by unmerited abuse. We must not irritate the working man or give him any pretext for thinking that he is debarred from the liberty that is within the reach of the rich.

To deal successfully with such a question we cannot forego the assistance of any class; but must look for a solution of its many difficulties, not to the empirics of a party, but, under God, to the hearty co-operation of all who are willing to assist.

ARTHUR GARFIT.



CONTEMPORARY EVOLUTION.

PART III.

THERE are thus, as we have seen, now struggling for Supremacy **THREE DISTINCT IDEALS**, three distinct Socio-political systems, and two are mixed up and blended in the great movement which has been described as reviving Paganism.

That great modern movement has been and is so powerful because it is invigorated by the temporary union of these two essentially divergent and conflicting tendencies or ideals.

(1) The first of these is the mainly unconscious and partly conscious real Pagan revival and revolt against God,—**PAGANISM**.

(2) The other is the spirit of freedom, the assertion of natural right, and revolt against the domination of Man (*merely as Man*) over his fellow,—**CIVICISM**.

Besides these there is also that with which the Pagan revival has conflicted and conflicts, namely :—

(3) The tendency to preserve, or more or less bring back, the Mediæval Christian Theocracy,—**MEDIÆVALISM**.

These three tendencies are actually mixed up in the most complex manner in modern, social, and political struggles, as we shall shortly see.

The efforts of those who strive for the third ideal need not here occupy us, since our subject is the action upon Christianity of the modern movement—on the supposition that it continues.

The first tendency—that towards true conscious Paganism—may indeed, as was said in the first part of this essay, present us with some startling developments in the future.

Nevertheless, when once completely dissociated from the spirit of Civicism, its force must greatly diminish, and if the reappearance of a Spanish Grand Inquisitor in the flesh is about as likely as that of a *Plesiosaurus*, a general enduring return to the old Paganism must be still more unlikely.

There is then reason to believe that the second tendency and ideal, that of freedom, reposing both upon expediency and absolute God-given right, is the consummation towards which society is, on the whole and in general, tending, widely divergent as may be really or apparently its direction here and there.

In England, its colonies, and in the United States, this tendency is now triumphant. Our example is telling powerfully upon other nations, but happily the rapidity with which the English-speaking races are multiplying will tell yet more, since in a few centuries "English" will be *the* language of the world.

Nevertheless the action of the first (Pagan or Monistic) tendency is to be feared as a powerful agent hostile to freedom, existing concealed amongst those who are now active in the destruction of the last relics of the Mediæval Theocracy in the name of liberty. Such agents are seeking to destroy them, not in the interest of natural freedom, but for the establishment of a revived Paganism and dominant and intolerant "Naturalism" to which they are passionately attached. They therefore seek to bind in fetters the opponents of their Unchristian *Antitheocracy*, the establishment and endowment of which they desire to effect. Hence those justifications and laudations of active Persecution to which the *Pall Mall Gazette*, Professor Huxley, and others,* have given utterance.

Our Empire, by a happy combination of circumstances, and by the merits of the races which inhabit it, has long been the conspicuous assertor of freedom. The sentiment in favour of wide liberty to the individual citizen—in speech, in writing—in locomotion and association, has not only taken deep hold of our own people, but also of the population of that magnificent transatlantic Republic, the greatest glory of which is the perfect freedom of its citizens.

By a series of happily devised measures perseveringly perfected through more than a century, this civic liberty has been defined and ever more efficiently guarded, the tyrannical measures of Stuart as of Tudor being repudiated in principle no less than practically.

It is to be hoped that the force of this traditional current in

* E.g., "In the judgment of history the tyrannies of free thought may be justified."
—*Westminster Review*, October, 1873, p. 413.

favour of individual liberty is in England too strong to be reversed or turned aside. Nevertheless there is a certain danger that the "No Popery" prejudice may to such an extent favour the efforts of the Anti-Christian fanatics as to prejudice the conservation of our civic freedom.

At the least it has influenced public opinion with regard to Continental politics, so far that the leaders of that opinion condone or even applaud measures which are directly opposed to all our traditional liberal legislation.

This no doubt is partly owing to the complexity of the struggle going on between Church and State in Germany, and a failure to distinguish between two very different sets of actions which are respectively the expression of the two different tendencies which have been above distinguished as Civicism and Paganism.

One of these, Civicism, is the continuance of the general movement hostile to Christian Theocracy, the tendency of which movement is to break off religion from connexion with the State, and to withdraw from those citizens who choose to devote themselves to religion, all exceptional privileges, and all power or control over the civil acts of those who do not voluntarily seek their ministry. With this movement the traditional Liberals of England may well enough sympathize.

The other—the Pagan, or Monistic—tendency, is to convey to the numerical majority of the nation an absolute power over all the external manifestations of internal belief, an absolute power over their persons and their property; in a word, to erect a more thorough and degrading despotism than Europe has seen since the downfall of the Pagan Cæsars.

No doubt many honest men favour the Prussian Church Laws because they see that they favour the first tendency, and because they do not perceive how they are really inspired by the second or Pagan spirit.

This confusion is favoured by those who (however justly they may assert their legal or their treaty rights) oppose the laws by protests in favour of the "Liberty of the Church," "Christian Marriage," the "Rights of the Bishops," &c. An opposition, necessarily futile, (unless the whole modern movement can be reversed or arrested) because "Civicism" knows nothing of "the Church," or "Christianity," or "Bishops," as such (only recognizing individual citizens and their rights against reciprocal encroachment) while "Paganism" hates all three.

On the other hand, many of those who advocate the new laws out of a spirit of opposition to Mediævalism, forget, or do not understand, that they are trampling on the most fundamental rights of their

fellow-citizens, and erecting a tyranny which has much less to say in its defence, and is indefinitely more Autocratic in its principles than the old system they, in the spirit of their age, oppose.

According to the spirit of modern freedom, individuals are perfectly free—with the limitations before mentioned—to form themselves into associations in which their mutual relations are regulated by mutual consent, and free to exclude from their voluntary society individuals who do not conform to the rules they have freely chosen for their own regulation;—no one citizen having the right to intrude himself upon the society of others who do not approve of him.

But the new laws, in fact, deny to citizens the right to group and associate themselves in voluntary associations, to select freely from their fellow-citizens those to whom they will confide the education of their children, or to obey the dictates of their conscience by acts which are innocent of encroaching on the similar rights of other citizens.

To deny the right of an episcopally nominated Roman Catholic Priest to officiate in a parish, the Roman Catholic parishioners of which desire him, is to infringe the rights of election of those citizens who by the fact that they call themselves Roman Catholics show that they have delegated that power to their bishop, and that they elect as their Minister that citizen who is selected by such bishop. To exile or imprison such Roman Catholic Bishop is to outrage the rights of a yet greater number—the Roman Catholics of the diocese, who show by their calling themselves *Roman Catholics* that they, in fact, voluntarily elect as the citizen to whom they will stand in a certain voluntary relation—that one who is indicated to them by, and who is in communion with, the Roman Pontiff.

To attempt to impede excommunication, is to deny to citizens the right to exclude from a voluntary society members who do not conform to freely chosen rules.

To violate the freedom of person and property of citizens without trial, without even one distinct definite accusation—even though such citizens call themselves Jesuits—is a glaring injustice; but greater, though less glaring, is the tyranny thereby inflicted on thousands of citizens whose rights of choice and election are violated by such acts, and whose most earnest desires and wishes as to themselves, and their children and friends, are thereby trampled on.

The citizens calling themselves Jesuits have gross wrong done them; their parents, brothers, sisters, and personal friends suffer hardships hardly less patent; but unnoticed and apparently unthought of are the wrongs of the thousands who have been deprived of their greatest comfort—thousands of the most innocent and most helpless citizens of the State. Who can tell the hundreds of fond mothers, faithful wives, and tender sisters who have bitterly wept the forced

departure of the guardians and supporters in virtue of wayward sons, errant husbands, and erring brothers! These and cognate considerations will reveal a mass of silent suffering, perhaps greater than that produced by many a bloody battlefield.

The effect of bias so strongly put forward by Mr. Herbert Spencer in this Review last year, could hardly find a better exemplification than the dispositions felt by so many Englishmen to these acts. This may be made clear if we suppose similar acts under other circumstances. Let us suppose that a law was passed that no one might assume, or change, an office in any Freemasons' Lodge without the expressed assent of the Government; also that no member of the Freemasons' body, whatever secrets he might have violated or rules transgressed, might be officially blamed in or be excluded from Masonic society without the permission of the Government being first asked and obtained. It is hardly likely but that even non-Masonic Englishmen would deem such legislation a daring infringement of the liberties of the subject.

But if another law were passed summarily expelling from England all Freemasons and confiscating Masonic property, what would be the outcry? This, however, is by no means all. We must further suppose, that a law was passed giving the police authorities power at their discretion, to declare, without proof, any man or woman whatever, belonging to any voluntary association, to be, in spite of their denials, affiliated Masons, and to expel them accordingly. The iniquity of the measure is so monstrous as to impair the force of the supposition by its very monstrosity, and the impossibility of really conceiving it to be done in England.

Yet this is literally what has taken place in Prussia with the applause, *mirabile dictu*, of "LIBERALS." It is of the A, B, C of our system, that no man should be punished without a trial. Yet in Germany, because citizens happen voluntarily to belong to a private society which has not a fragment of power over its members beyond what such members voluntarily concede—nay, even because police authorities choose, without evidence produced, to say that any citizens are affiliated to such a society—they have not only been held up to public ignominy by official utterances, but have actually been torn away from friends and relations and their locomotion restricted within narrow limits, or they have been expelled the country, and their very persons, in some instances, treated with cruel violence.

These citizens are meantime accused of no definite crime; in spite of demands they are brought to no trial, and have no opportunity given them of self-justification.

As we said just now, the effect of bias could hardly go further than

to make Englishmen, who blame the expulsion of the Moors and Jews from Spain, applaud such acts.

And what is the authority that dares thus to outrage and trample on the primary rights of citizens? The German Government is a modern one, it is based on the modern basis—popular will; not on an asserted and externally recognized God-given power like that of the thrice-crowned Kaisers of Mediæval times.

It is true that the Emperor in his not very wise and not very truthful* letter to the Pope, talks about his "responsibility to God" for his sovereign acts, and it is generally supposed he asserts for himself a divine right. But for this assertion he has nothing to show, no external witness, as before said, or objective testimony. If Kaiser Wilhelm can raise the dead, he may resuscitate in his Berlin subjects a belief in his own supernatural authority. But the acts of his Government run more and more in the anti-Theocratic direction, and its true basis will thus be more and more plainly avowed to be the will and consent of the majority of his subjects. It comes then to this, that the actual or apparent majority of Germans claim the power to dispose absolutely and without appeal of the minority; to dictate to them their mutual voluntary relations, determine the amount of their locomotion, or even their very residence within the land—to fix for them the dogmas of their creed and their mode of worship, and to enforce the education of their children in a belief directly contradicting that of their parents.

Yet the *Times* has gone the length of asserting that Prussia has the right to do this now, because of what we did three hundred years ago in England, as if no progress had taken place within that period, even were the circumstances the same, which they manifestly are not.

Yet the *Times* would hardly venture to approve of the passing of a "bill of attainder" against a political opponent of the English Sovereign of to-day, or the summary decapitation of any illustrious Lady whose existence might be personally inconvenient to some future chief ruler.

* "Not very wise," because his reply as to what Protestants believe concerning "One Mediator," has nothing whatever to do with the Pope's remark respecting the necessary consequences of Baptism. "Not very truthful," for two reasons—first, because he therein implies an accusation of treason against citizens who in vain ask for an opportunity of showing their innocence by a public trial, the laws of Prussia not enabling the Bishops to BRING AN ACTION FOR LIBEL AGAINST THE MINISTER by whom the letter is countersigned; secondly, because he replies to what everyone knows was not the Pope's meaning. The Pope, of course, knew well enough that according to constitutional fictions, the Emperor must officially approve of all his Ministers' acts, but La Marmora's book has shown us how in the past he was led by his Minister in opposition to his real private wishes. The Pope, of course, hoped and thought that in the recent Church laws he was also being led in opposition to his private wishes, and some who know the Berlin Court well still believe that in so thinking the Pope was right.

But the circumstances are manifestly not the same. They are not so because the Bishops and the Clergy generally may, in the absence of conspicuous protests to the contrary, be fairly taken as the representatives of the religious opinions of those to whom they minister. Now in England the great majority of the clergy submitted to the change which Henry VIII. introduced. The Act of his Legislature which abolished State recognition of Papal supremacy in England did not violate the rights of citizens in anything like the degree in which the recently made Church laws of Germany violate them. Again, the English Church of the sixteenth century was that of the entire people; but in Prussia the persecuted Church is that of but a portion, and its legal rights and the claims of its members on the State are different in different regions, according to the date and the terms of the acquisition of such regions by the Prussian Kings. There is yet another contrast in our favour. What we did we did openly and above-board, but the German Government has added the meanness of mendacity to brutal outrage; since it asserts that the Roman Catholic religion is not persecuted, and while Papal supremacy is not in express terms abolished, it is virtually and effectively set aside and practically annulled. A new State religion is, in fact, set up and sought to be forced upon citizens by the May laws. To ask Roman Catholic citizens to acquiesce in such laws is to ask them to lie—to apostatize from their religion, and at the same time to pretend to adhere to it. In *principle* there is no difference whatever between asking a Roman Catholic of to-day to perform some outward act of assent to the recent Church legislation of Germany and asking a primitive Christian to burn incense to the Genius of the Emperor.

A demand on Roman Catholics to admit that Dr. Reinkens is a Catholic Bishop is a grotesque insult to their reason as well as an outrage to their conscience.* It amounts to a demand that they should recognize the majority of their fellow-citizens as having the power to determine for them what they shall deem to be essential characters of their own spiritual chiefs. On this principle the Emperor's government might require that the title of "Catholic

* The complete abandonment of the Christian stand-point by those who advocate new State religions even when such advocates are disguised as ecclesiastics, is curiously illustrated by the declaration of Dr. Reinkens (when taking his oath to the State). He then declared that if the State should hereafter require of him acts inconsistent with his duty as a Christian Bishop, *he would resign his office* rather than oppose it. Now the universally received ideal of a Christian Bishop is that of a Shepherd who feeds his flock with sound doctrine and protects it from the attacks of mundane wolves. What Dr. Reinkens asserts as incumbent upon him he, of course by implication, asserts to be also the duty of other bishops. Thus, according to him, the duty of bishops in the presence of a Government which has become hostile to Christianity is to *desert their charges* and to leave their starving flocks to the mercy of the wolves, as this eminent pastor professes beforehand his readiness to do.

Bishop" should be given to Baron Rothschild, and hardly less absurd would be the requisition that Bismarck should be everywhere in Germany received and treated as a "*Princess*."

It is a matter of deep regret that religious antipathy should cause many in England to sympathize with acts so entirely opposed to English social principles, but the outcome will probably bring about a juster view.

In such action as is now going on in Prussia and Switzerland, an effect is being produced exactly contrary to that which the actors desire.

That such an effect should be produced is quite in accordance with Mr. Herbert Spencer's whole teaching, and as he has lately* reminded us, "Feelings called into play will strengthen, while those which have diminished demands on them will dwindle."

Under the sway of a benevolent government there is a certain natural tendency amongst Christians to feeble volitions in support of their religion, from the small opportunities offered for the energetic exercise of such volitions. On the other hand, a persecution such as is now going on tends, as the recent elections prove (more even by the increase in the number of opposition voters than by the number of Christian members returned), to elicit acts which by their very exercise strengthen the feelings and stimulate the volitions which gave them birth. Moreover, as the persecution increases in intensity, the reaction in favour of civic freedom (already evinced by no inconsiderable support) will also increase, and these effects must continue till the cause is removed. More and more respect and sympathy for the Roman Catholic clergy will be felt and manifested by an increasing number of Protestants who see that the former are fighting their battle also, and who admire their courage and constancy. Thus a great strengthening of the Roman Catholic Church in Prussia cannot but be the final result of these hostile efforts, since the times do not admit, as yet, of a bloody war of extermination.

Nevertheless, the anti-Theocratic tendency will probably remain too powerful to allow of a simple reversal of the recent legislation, and thus a *tertium quid* will be arrived at by the consent of the Roman Catholics, and of those who, being in favour of civic freedom, do not (like the Reinkenists and fanatical Pagans) desire the State establishment of a rival system.

This *tertium quid* must be the severance of Church and State—another important step in that great process of six centuries' growth which it has been here endeavoured to depict.

To return from this digression: it seems that social evolution, if

* CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, September, 1873, p. 523.

it continues to advance along the same path as hitherto, must mean the entire destruction of the mediæval Christian Theocracy.

If this destruction should be accompanied by the universal enforcement of a rival Pagan system, an *anti*-Theocratic establishment, the effect would no doubt be most disastrous for Christianity. It may, however, be confidently affirmed that, whatever be the extravagances of the Paganism to come, no attempt to erect a Universal Pagan *anti*-Theocratic Despotism could resist the hostile coalition of Christians with all those who desire the natural liberty of the individual citizen. The monstrous claim of men, *as mere men*, to control and direct the consciences of their fellows, could never succeed in justifying itself to the human reason.

With a *regime* of true Freedom, that is, where there is liberty and order, experience shows us that Christianity can grow and thrive.

If, instead of Paganism, Civicism gains the day (the second of the three systems now struggling for sway), it is difficult to see how the latter can have any positive religious effect whatever. The merely negative action of depriving all religions of any State support is but the forming of "a fair field and no favour," where success must depend on quite other than political causes.

Such, at least, is the conclusion which seems forced on us at a first glance, but a satisfactory conclusion cannot be arrived at without some further examination.

There are some who apprehend, however, that instead of our soon seeing an orderly system of civic freedom, European society is simply tending to disintegration and anarchy. Now, of course, a lapse into utter barbarism would necessarily carry with it a destruction of Christianity, since Christianity supposes the existence of a certain degree of natural social evolution, such, *e.g.*, as that of "the Family"—an institution at which the hostile efforts of the most "advanced" reformers are directly aimed.

It is certainly conceivable that at least such anarchy as has arisen in parts of Spain and as prevailed for a short time in Paris might extend itself over a much wider area. Not many of those who enjoyed the most refined salons of the French capital under Louis XV. would have believed it possible that all France before the century ended could have presented the spectacle that it did during the worst moments of the "Terror." Men may have similar blindness to-day.

We have seen how that support of our European social organization, which consisted in a widely diffused belief in its Divine ordination, has been gradually withdrawn, and naturally and necessarily the support derived from a simple acceptance of Christian morality is concomitantly weakened—that morality being replaced by

other systems and ultimately by the teaching which now issues from our nationally supreme sources of culture. (1) That right is but another name for pleasure ; (2) that temporal good is the only good to be sought after or desired ; and (3) that no man has control over or is responsible for his actions.

It is difficult to think that the wide reception of these doctrines amongst the lowest classes will not be attended with very considerable transformations, and those are certainly not altogether devoid of rational grounds of apprehension, who fear that as the Græco-Roman civilization was ruined through the invasion of barbarians from without, so existing civilization may be destroyed through an eruption of barbarians from below.

And when we consider the intimate relations existing between that civilization and Christianity, there can be little cause for wonder either that Christianity itself should for a time share in such unpopularity as our social system may have acquired, or that that system itself should vanish simultaneously with a wide-spread, avowed, and open renunciation of the religion which gave birth to, and was so intimately blended with it.

Can Christian monarchy rationally survive for many centuries the dethronement of the power that consecrated it ? Nobles, the descendants of those who robbed the Church—that is, the whole of their poorer fellow-citizens—for their own selfish aggrandizement, should hardly be surprised if fresh injustice again plunders them. A Plutocracy of merchants, manufacturers, and wealthy professional men offers little to impress the masses with a sense of its inviolable sanctity.

The highest triumphs of Art, magnificent decorations, the richest products of the loom, profusion of gold and jewels,—these things as used by the Church were at least for the enjoyment of the multitude. There will be little cause for surprise if that multitude ultimately objects to the withdrawal of these things into the palaces of kings and of princes, whether feudal or mercantile ; or to the exclusive appropriation of some of them for the private use of rich women, however virtuous, or of beauties however vile.

Wrong has been destroyed to give way to other wrong, injustice has been displaced by fresh injustice, till much honest indignation reinforces that spirit of revolt against our existing social system which so widely pervades the masses in the great European cities, producing an accumulated aversion from a civilization which has cast off almost all the grace, much of the material, and still more of the moral alleviations, which attended the earlier Christian Theocracy.

It would be unjust to our species to deny the mitigating circumstances attending the surging of democratic passions to-day. Careworn toilers may view with complacency the glittering splendour of

barons whose rank they view as God-ordained and yet evanescent, they being essentially and for eternity but the equals of themselves, whose humble path is no less God-appointed, and on that account no less really worthy of esteem—both being actors for a little time upon the same stage, and to be judged not by their accidental trappings, but by their due fulfilment of their respective parts!

But this belief has been and is being sedulously destroyed. Can we wonder that with its disappearance the same phenomena come to be viewed in a very different aspect?

Nevertheless there are grounds for thinking that the violence of social antagonisms are on the whole likely to diminish, however noisily or brutally they may upon occasions here and there assert themselves. Even if Europe should become the scene of disorder which some fear, it is impossible that the whole world can simultaneously be the theatre of the most extreme and bloody red-revolutionary tyranny.

Those imbued with the doctrine of Evolution can hardly accept a belief that the process of social development has culminated in Europe, considering how distant from attainable perfection is the stage already reached, and the assertion that it has done so in the whole world would probably be considered by them a manifest absurdity.

Going then to the extreme of what can be deemed possible, however wildly improbable, let us imagine that private freehold property in land has been universally abolished, that complicated regulations are in force tending everywhere to depress the capitalist at the expense of the artisan, that throughout Europe a persecution has raged which has resulted in the slaughter of every bishop and the majority of the clergy, as well as the abolition of every religious order, and the destruction of every single church. Let us suppose, also, that purely secular instruction is everywhere compulsorily given, and that relations between the sexes of the extremest degree of laxity become recognized by law. What would be the effect of so profound and extensive a revolution on the Christian Church? In the first place the universality of that Church would manifestly enable its supreme head ever to find a shelter, and in the supposed condition of Europe that refuge might well be found in the great Republic of the West. Similarly, institutions for the carrying on of the traditional culture of the clergy would for a time become extra-European.

The Church has no absolute necessity for property in land, as past persecutions have abundantly demonstrated.

The slaughter of bishops would but lead to the consecration of others desirous of shedding their blood for the faith, while the

monarchical constitution of the Church, made still more marked since the Vatican council, would enable the government of the European Missionary Church to be carried on, if needful, without bishops, under the direct episcopal jurisdiction of the Pope. The Church of Japan has survived through the rage of persecution without the aid even of a single priest, native or foreign.

The elevation of the artizan class, when once effected, would put an end to their hostility to the Church, since that hostility has mainly arisen from a belief that the action of the Church was prejudicial to their elevation. No inevitable antagonism divides the clergy as such from the humblest classes, and the illustrious head of the English Church has publicly shown in his own person how warm are his sympathies for the depressed agricultural labourer.

Unless, again, we find hereafter scientific and philosophical evolution fatal to the Church, the action of compulsory secular instruction *must* also ultimately result in disappointment to its promoters. It must result in such disappointment, since Christians would be forced once more, as of old, to give at home that intelligent and emotional training in doctrine and practice, the effect of which no public teaching can rival, and by which the influence of Pagan schools was successfully combated in former times.

With the revolutionary changes here supposed once introduced, all the causes of the present popular antipathy to Christianity would be removed, except those resulting from fear of the attractive influences of its morality, and from the possible prevalence of an anti-Christian philosophy, the action of which will be considered in the next Part.

The disorders springing from a general relaxation of sexual morality can hardly fail to give rise to a reaction in favour of Christian ethics on the part of an increasing portion of the population, if only through the extinction by natural selection of the families of the most sexually vicious.

The abolition of religious orders must cease when once individual liberty for citizens begins to assert itself, since citizens cannot be free if they are not permitted by their fellow-citizens to live peaceably together in voluntary associations, eating, dressing, and reading according to their pleasure, as long as they limit not the similar rights of others.

But even before the introduction of such common individual freedom, it is almost impossible for the most tyrannical State to interfere with the practice of the evangelical counsels—voluntary poverty, chastity, and humility. Each successive great epoch of the Church has been fruitful of fresh modes of their manifestation, and some new embodiment of the ascetic spirit has appeared for a time on

the crest of the advancing wave of Christian aggression on the world. After the Martyrs came the Fathers of the Desert, then the Benedictines, to be succeeded by the white-robed Cistercians, themselves to give way to the Friars, whose influence was afterwards overshadowed by the valiant soldiers of Loyola. Arguing simply from analogy, it is not likely but that the same cause may produce again effects similarly appropriate to time and place. The old religious orders did not adopt picturesque or fantastic costumes, but slight modifications of fashions then in vogue amongst the poorest class, so that each at its origin appeared far less peculiar than at present.

Hard work and charity under one form or another were universally obligatory, and to this day the Trappist works like a day-labourer. It may well be then that manual toil in other forms, and a fresh modification of fraternal charity, will cause religious congregations to be as heartily welcomed and beloved by a socially-democratic republican community as ever they were in the ninth, thirteenth, or sixteenth centuries.

Even under a communistic *régime*, presided over by some "Albert ouvrier," a body of workmen who were only distinguished from their fellows by a larger spirit of fraternity, and a disposition to take a greater share of work than others, while at the same time they appropriated a less portion of its fruit, would speedily be popular; and a love for God might soon come to be pardoned, when it was seen to be accompanied by an earnest and self-sacrificing love for man.

Sisters of Charity have met with respect even from the roughest of French "Reds," and all hostility whatever to them would disappear when they ceased to be ideally connected with the maintenance of a political system which kept democracy in check, or sought so to keep it.

It seems, then, that no necessarily fatal result to Christianity may be expected from the wildest political changes; but rather that an extreme advance of the modern spirit may give rise to fresh Christian developments. But such disorders as are here spoken of, such rapid and sudden destruction of the existing European social fabric, are really in the highest degree unlikely. It seems far more probable that a system of freedom on the English and American models, more and more approximating to what has been called Civicism—that is, the ideal of Mr. Herbert Spencer—will be gradually, and in the majority of cases peacefully, attained, although with much vexatious, though not violent, persecution from devotees of Paganism.

Should such be the real future, experience already shows us how disappointed will be those who expect the destruction of Christianity from political changes favourable to Democracy.

In America we see before us undeniable evidence that the Church

can not only exist, but augment and thrive, in the freest political atmosphere—shown more by the multiplication and spread of religious orders and the upgrowth of a native-born clergy, than by the augmentation of the Episcopate. There (in New York) has arisen a new religious congregation—the Paulists—the founder and head of which, Father Hecker, is a typical example of the Church of the United States; not less conspicuous for love of his country and admiration of its politico-social system than for unhesitating and unquestioning obedience and loyalty to the head of his Church.

The United States have also supplied us with a crucial test of the power of the Church to resist the strongest secular influences hostile to its integrity.

During the late memorable war almost every Uncatholic form of Christianity became split and divided into a Northern and a Southern, an anti-slavery and a pro-slavery body. The Church alone maintained its unity perfectly unbroken, and was thus enabled more efficiently to aid in healing the moral disunion and allaying the heartburnings which remained after the victory, by which unbroken unity many earnest minds in the Great Republic have been deeply impressed.

In Belgium, again, we see how the Church can not only prosper under free institutions, but have so energetic and vigorous a life as to provoke a violent, though groundless, dread of the re-establishment of Mediævalism. How it lives in England and in Ireland we see.

Again, the fact that complete civic freedom favours the Church's growth may be gathered from those who clamour for a retention of the last remnants of the old Theocratic system as barriers to "Ultramontaniam." It is on this very ground that the separation between Church and State in Bavaria and South Germany is opposed by "liberal Catholics," and that such a union is sought by Dr. Reinkens, while M. Loyson has just proclaimed it an *honour* to Christianity to obtain State recognition and support. Even in England the disestablishment of the Anglican Church is opposed by those who dread the growth of definite "dogma" and "ecclesiastical tyranny," and clamour for spiritual freedom, as understood by Dean Stanley and his school.

It seems, then, that the completion of the great modern anti-Theocratic movement (if developed in the direction, not of a State-supported Paganism, but in that of Civicism—that system of mutual respect and individual freedom, which expedience and natural morality agree to justify), by no means necessarily implies a weakening, still less a destruction of the Church; whilst facts are not wanting which seem to indicate a thence resulting increase in its vigour and efficiency. It is not sluggish majorities, but active, concentrated, and aggressive minorities which influence the world's course most effectually.

But a process of internal integration has been spoken of as possibly accompanying the external disintegration of that great complex organism, the Church. To make this manifest would require little less than a history of the development of Church doctrine and discipline from the thirteenth century to the present day. It will, however, hardly be contested that the whole course of such development has tended to give more and more precision and distinctness to the Church's dogmas, and efficiency to the action of its governing power. If the number of regular clergy has relatively diminished, the whole mass of the secular clergy (as it is often reproachfully said) has become more and more approximated to a great body of regulars. The perfection of the Church's organization, the definiteness and clearness of doctrine it has attained, could not well have been made more manifest than by the acquiescence throughout the whole Episcopate, without one solitary dissentient voice, in the recent Vatican decrees. Thus it cannot be denied that, *pari passu* with the disintegration arising from the increasing disability or disinclination of kings (or other and subordinate social authorities) to enforce the decisions and behests of the Church, the Church herself has simultaneously developed, by a process of integration, a vastly increased power of herself promulgating, applying, and giving effect to them over all those who voluntarily accept her spiritual sway. The downfall of the Chief Pontiff's spiritual principedom, which marks the formal end of Christendom, was almost immediately preceded by the culmination of his spiritual power through the universal acceptance throughout the whole Church of his official Infallibility, than which no step could be more calculated to give vigour, precision, and unanimity to the action of the whole body.

Moreover, even material inventions and improvements have strikingly co-operated in the same direction. The facilities afforded to locomotion, and the transmission of intelligence by railways and the electric telegraph, set at defiance the old restrictions as to the publication of Bulls and the other machinery of Church government.

It is also undeniable that outside the Church's organization there has gone on a movement which from the Christian standpoint must be called upward, parallel with the later phases of the movement distinctive of the Christian Theocracy. In England, besides the great Tractarian and Ritualistic development of Anglicanism, a movement towards increased orthodoxy or towards ecclesiasticism, (e.g., as evidenced architecturally) has gone on even in Nonconformist bodies. In Germany, while on the one hand Rationalism is increasing, on the other an upward reaction is setting in amongst Evangelical Christians which the Bismarckian persecution cannot

but aid in developing. Even in Holland there has been, and is,* a powerful and extensive movement in an upward direction.

Moreover, one important effect of the great modern movement will be to let in upon the Christian Church the full action of "Natural Selection."

During the period in which the Church had full temporal support and sheltered within its fold whole nations, with hardly an avowed dissident, the following merely natural effects must have inclined to mar its efficiency:—

1. Want of the stimulus of opposition, tending to diminish the vigour of efforts for its support and extension.

2. A similarly diminished need for the diffusion of a keen, intelligent, and reasoned apprehension of its doctrines and teaching.

3. A lowered moral tone from the influence of the indifferent majority—resulting in diminished efforts after a life in accordance with Christian precepts and counsels. This is owing to a diffusion over the whole body of the spirit governing the majority, which spirit in almost every large community is otiose and indifferent. In the days of the Church's temporal prosperity the indifferent were included within the Church, instead of being visibly external to it, and so tended to lower the tone of the whole.

Thus an unenergetic, tepid, unintelligently apprehensive, and morally inconsistent spirit, may but too naturally tend to diffuse itself over a temporally-supported, honoured, and wealthy Church, which has no declared dissidents in the area in which it exists.

When such a theocratically organized Christian community becomes, by revolution, exposed to the free assaults of enemies the most varied, with disestablishment and disendowment as a result, the first effect must be the falling away from the Church of those who either morally or intellectually, or both, are out of harmony with her.

Freedom of inquiry, with all other freedom, as it becomes more and more a settled institution, will more and more incline to diminish the effects of mere traditional adherence to family creed, and the passage to and fro will become more and more easy. Thus those with proclivities towards the Church, but in childhood external to her, will more readily find their true level, while those brought up within her pale, but who in spirit have revolted from her sway, will, by becoming manifestly external to her, cease to disgrace her or to lower the moral tone of her community.

Freedom of marriage, amongst other freedoms, will tend to produce strong hereditary predispositions, both for and in opposition to Christianity, but there will also be a most important action tending to favour the increase in number of those Christianly predisposed.

* See CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, November, 1873, p. 955.

This action is the stringent religious obligation imposed on married Christians in no way to impede their natural multiplication, whilst the opposite practice is being widely urged outside the Church, and is likely to act as an increasing check on Pagan propagation.

Moreover, as the two tendencies which have been here distinguished as "Civicism" and "Paganism" become disentangled and distinguished, an immense twofold gain must accrue to Christianity, if the modern movement continues so successfully and irresistibly that the tendency to revive the mediæval system becomes extinct. On the one hand, that activity which is now directed to a revival of mediævalism will be set free and applied to the protection of freedom against Pagan despotism. On the other hand, nine-tenths of the present hostility to the Church will have ceased when it is clearly and generally seen that no desire or intention of reviving mediævalism exists in it. Then those who are anti-Theists, and fanatically opposed to Christianity in the interest of Paganism, will stand alone against the combined opposition of Christians and advocates of freedom—that is, against those who can heartily combine on a basis of God-given natural right, whether that right be or be not supplemented and further enforced by Divine Revelation.

Thus it seems that when perfect free play is allowed, the Church must come to be more and more composed of naturally-selected citizens whose intellect fully approves her doctrines, and whose modes of life more or less fully harmonize with her precepts and counsels. Moreover, such citizens will naturally have their emotions more and more strongly excited, and their volitions rendered more and more vigorous, by those very actions which the struggle for existence renders needful in support and extension of that system to which they adhere, and which the fact of their adhesion under varying circumstances tends more and more to elicit.

Such, then, seems to be the answer afforded by the facts to the calm judicial inquirer who seeks to ascertain what must be the effect, by the operation of natural laws, upon the Christian Church of the further continuance of the political portion of the great modern movement in the direction it has so long followed.

(1) *The effect on Christianity will be to give increased coherence and strength to its organization, and efficiency to its action.*

(2) *The result of the conflict will depend not on political changes, but on those matters which must occupy us hereafter—Science and Philosophy.*

He, however, who wishes to judge fully of the matter here treated should endeavour to place himself in imagination at the Churchman's standpoint, and consider how he might express himself as to the course of modern Political Evolution in relation to Christianity.

The Churchman might express his sentiments somewhat thus:

"The Church as a whole has never known retrogression or defeat since she first stepped forth from the upper chamber in Jerusalem, conquering and to conquer. The Church's progress is to be estimated not by the number of souls who externally profess belief in her, but by the number who obey her laws in a sufficient degree to obtain their salvation.

"When the Church, in mounting the throne with Constantine, obtained what in the eyes of the world was a startling triumph, she made no doubt a true and proper step in advance, but one attended with many concomitant disadvantages and dangers. In condescending to allow her sacred monogram to adorn Imperial standards, and in permitting kings to sanctify their diadems with the sign of the cross, gratitude was due from powers so favoured to the Church which granted them, not subservience from the mother and queen to the children she nourished and protected. In the words of the head of the Church in England, 'it is not the State which establishes the Church, it is the Church which establishes the State.'

"The barbaric tribes successively led under the Church's sway were providential agents in bringing about that glorious dawn of Christian supremacy, the Mediæval Theocracy. But unavoidable defects attended that development. Vast numbers of the indifferent, the gross, the merely credulous, and the worldly, were led within the Church's fold by circumstances, accepted its doctrines unhesitatingly but unprofitably, since in them 'works' did not accompany 'faith,' and belief without charity, as Dr. Newman has so well shown, leads directly to superstition.

"The Christian Mediæval system culminated in as near an approach to a universal Theocracy as was then possible, but the world was manifestly quite unripe for a more perfectly developed condition, with (as we now know) its far larger area unchristianized, more than half undiscovered, and with a vast mass of latent Paganism in the part externally Christianized.

"A great process of differentiation and division of labour had necessarily to be gone through. For the perfection of society, philosophy, politics, science, and art had to become the exclusive occupation of different minds, instead of remaining in the hands of the clergy, whose proper study is Theology. These fields of activity could not be adequately cultivated without the devotion of many minds entirely and exclusively to one or other of them. Had Christians, especially those highly placed, been thoroughly imbued with the spirit of their religion, no doubt the necessary transformations might have taken place peacefully and without religious disruption, but the essentially Papal character of the Church was not fully recognized, nor was it then experimentally known how by

separation from the centre of spiritual life the supply of vital force was necessarily cut off. The Pagan principle of State supremacy, once effectively introduced, ran its logical and inevitable course fatally to the Mediæval Theocracy and the social system therewith connected. Providentially accompanying this movement, has gone on a gradual perfecting of the Church's independent organism, and a greater and greater detachment of it from the State.

"The Church has willingly lent its support to the secular power, which, in return, has either sought perfidiously to bind it in golden chains, or has brutally spurned it as now in Germany. This fortunate perfidy will enable the Church to escape the popular enmity which the State is sure, sooner or later, to incur, while its perfect organization will enable it to survive and flourish the better for the pseudo-Christian State's downfall, and replacement by a system of Natural Freedom for each individual citizen.

"This process of reinvigoration is already becoming patent. Since the clearly logical and Christian declarations of Boniface VIII., no Pontiff has so uncompromisingly asserted the Church's claims as Pius IX.

"The completion of the anti-Mediæval movement will only bring out yet more clearly what is but in effect and in other terms the proclamation and assertion of the supreme rights of conscience. But while the extent of the Church's success in the thirteenth century should not be over-stated, so also there is no cause for discouragement in the apparent reverses it has since undergone. Whether under the anti-Papal revolts of the sixteenth century, or the anti-Christian revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the same unvarying process of steadily increasing conquest has been, is, and will be incessantly going on, and this in spite of superficial appearances to the contrary. As to the first of these events (the sixteenth century revolt), the spread of the faith in the new world compensated for its restriction in the old, while its very restriction was the occasion of the more complete development of the faith in the area which retained it, where it became more intensely and consciously held. As to the second event, its wonderfully invigorating action on those who remain Christians, in France, Italy, Switzerland, and Germany, is before our eyes to-day.

"The manifest religious changes of the sixteenth century will ultimately turn out to have been really to the Church's advantage. Before them the Church contained a mass of latent heresy and infidelity, while now the religious bodies external to the Church contain a mass of latent orthodoxy.

"This is especially the case amongst English-speaking Christians. The noble anti-Erastian passion of the sturdy Puritans, and their honest zeal against what they believed to be Idolatry, were

essentially most Catholic, as was also the heartfelt piety of the Evangelican protest against the cold formalism of the Established Clergy of that time. The marvellous growth of High Church views has resulted in a forest of new spires, in schools, convents, and pious institutions, far and wide in our land—proclaiming the deep and earnest nature of our religious progress. Even the very fanaticisms of ‘Sabbath observance’ and ‘Bibliolatry’ are replete with Catholic ascetic and devotional instincts, however misdirected.

“In the Protestant masses of to-day is contained an immense body of latent Catholicism, like some chemical substance in solution, which but requires a sudden change of temperature or the introduction of some foreign body to precipitate itself, or become manifest in a conspicuous crystallization. The number of those who have really understood the Church and rejected her, is infinitesimal, and article after article, and book after book, again and again, show how profoundly she is misapprehended, and how the mass of the hostility directed against her is really directed against that to which she also is no less opposed.

“Even the apparently anarchic spirit of the ‘Internationalists’ is in one respect really vivified by a profound Christian spirit—the spirit of Cosmopolitanism. They clearly see that a man who would sacrifice the welfare of the world generally to that of his own country is only one degree less selfish than the man who would sacrifice his country to aggrandize his family. What was the very first step in the destruction of the Christian Theocracy becomes thus condemned and reprobated by the logical descendants of such destroyers as Philip the Fair and Henry the Eighth.

“Of course that destructive action cannot be approved and can still less be aided by any sincere Christian. So to approve would be to repeat the error of De Lamennais. A separation of Church and State cannot be good save relatively through human perverseness. A union of Church and State is the natural and true ideal, and will spontaneously reappear (when once the world has been reconverted) through common consent. But Christianity is forbidden to propagate itself by the sword. The children of those who have thrown off her yoke and who are becoming more and more literally Pagans cannot, *upon Church principles*, be religiously coerced or called on to accept that which, on account of honest prejudice, their reason is really unable to embrace. The Church absolutely condemns* the use of force when a nation has either not received or has once lost the Faith.

“But although the crew of Bismarcks, Garibaldis, and Victor Emmanuels may be regarded as obscene creatures of rapine, never-

* “Ad oclum homines trahendos esse, non cogendos.”—*Breviary Office for St. Augustine of Canterbury.*

theless hyænas and vultures have, after all, a useful and salutary function to execute, without their having any good intention in the acts they perform, or being a bit less unclean vultures and hyænas on account of that function.

"A continuous action of six hundred years has not been permitted without good cause, and the changes effected, however iniquitously brought about, have been providentially allowed and overruled for the full development of the Church in all its glory through the manifestation of its action in a world of full civic freedom.

"The Pagan movement which made its way by asserting and proclaiming freedom, is ending in an attempt at the most extreme and debasing of despotisms.

"The Christian movement, which progressed through strong assertion of authority, is ending, as it logically should do from its principles, in being the great supporter of individual freedom reposing upon conscience—'rights' answering to 'duties.'

"The long process of Christian integration having, in the Vatican Council, culminated in the complete organization of supreme authority, the liberty of the individual regains full play—the restraint of conscientious fears as to possible ill effects of his utterances being removed by the recognition of a ready and infallible authority capable of rendering his well-meant but mistaken efforts harmless. Similarly, the whole hierarchical system of subordinate authority, down to the private confessor, being fully established, and the whole controlling agency necessary for the Church's stability having been completed, a freer play may be given to individual energies than for the centuries past during which that agency was developing and perfecting. If before, the energies and activities of Churchmen were unequal to those of their opponents, this relation will speedily be reversed, as Switzerland and Germany are beginning to show us. The missions of the Greeks and Latins with regard to the Church being mainly fulfilled, the vigorous Teutonic race has now to promote its peaceful triumph through individual energy in the arena of civic freedom.

"Judging then of the future by the past, changes to come will but bring out more and more the Church's true nature by gathering in the latent Catholicity of separated bodies, and by sloughing off such unworthy members as have, in the past, been retained in it by sloth, ignorance, or interest. It will thus necessarily become more and more conspicuous for the holiness of its members as compared with such of the population as is avowedly Pagan and unbelieving. As the process of Evolution has gone on from the inorganic world to the organic, from the vegetable to the animal, and from the simplest form of sentient life, through constantly increasing complexity, till the hour struck for the introduction of a rational animal

into the world, so the evolution of humanity has proceeded and is proceeding from direct and simple conscious apprehensions to more and more reflex, self-conscious, and complex comprehensions. And this applies fully to the acceptance of the Christian Church. As it has been, so it will be. Of time there is no stint. The next glacial epoch is sufficiently remote. By the continuance then of this evolutionary process there is to be plainly discerned in the distant future a triumph of the Church compared with which that of Mediæval Christendom was but a transient adumbration. A triumph brought about by moral means alone—by the slow process of exhortation, example, and individual conviction, after every error has been freely propagated, every denial freely made, and every rival system provided with a free field for its display. A triumph infinitely more glorious than any brought about by the sword, and fulfilling at last the old pre-Christian prophecies of the Kingdom of God upon earth."


Such, perhaps, might be the Churchman's reply as to the position and prospects of Christianity, to those who oppose to him the phenomena of the last six centuries' change. Here it has been endeavoured dispassionately to estimate what, at the very utmost, must be the destructive effects on Christianity of the greatest amount of anti-Theocratic change which can possibly be anticipated, and the answer has been that there is no reason to apprehend even its enfeeblement, still less its annihilation.

Nevertheless, we have yet but considered the Political aspect of the great modern anti-Mediæval movement. The Scientific and, most important of all, the Philosophic aspects of that movement remain to be considered. We may conclude that the political changes will be harmless to the Church, but it will manifestly be quite otherwise if either Science or Philosophy contradicts its dogmas.

Whatever the effect, however, one thing is certain—that Science will address itself with greater and greater power to a constantly increasing circle of auditors, and will command an increasing number of cultivators and experts, and it is to be hoped that the same may be said also of Philosophy.

If, then, either scientific and philosophic Evolution is hostile to Christianity, the progress of such Evolution must be fatal to it, and political Evolution, by giving them increased liberty, must hasten their fatal effect. To these aspects of Evolution then we must next address ourselves.

ST. GEORGE MIVART.



GERMANIC MYTHOLOGY.

NO special plea is surely required for occupying ourselves with the religious beliefs of our forefathers, when we remember—in the words of the Rev. Isaac Taylor—that “day by day, as the weeks run round, we have obtruded upon our notice the names of the deities” who were once worshipped by the heathen Saxons, Angles, Frisians, Scandinavians, and the Germanic race in general. Strange enough, however, our very familiarity with the names of those deities is such that the great mass of men use them without thinking of, or even knowing, their origin and meaning.

The words alluded to refer, of course, to the names given to the days of the week. In “Sunday” and “Monday” we get a glimpse of that worship of the Sun and the Moon which prevailed among our ancestors from the immemorial time when they yet dwelt on the pasture-grounds of Central Asia, as a simple tribe of herdsmen and hunters, down to the days when Cæsar met the fierce warriors of Ariovist between the Rhone and the Rhine. Star and Fire-worshippers our forefathers were, as Cæsar relates. Hence they could—even as the Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans did—give to those days the appellation of Sunday and Monday.

In the word “Tuesday,” we meet with the name and worship of Tyr, Tiu, or Ziu, the Germanic God of War. In “Wednesday,” we find Wodan, the supreme deity, or All-father. In “Thursday” is contained

the name of Thunar, or Thor, the God of Thunder. In "Friday," that of Freia, the Goddess of Love and Domestic Virtue. In "Saturday," which some think is the Germanized form of the Roman day of Saturnus, there is, in the opinion of Grimm, a god "Sætere" hidden—a malicious deity, whose name is but an *alias* for Loki, of whom it is recorded that once, at a great banquet, he so insulted all the heavenly rulers that they chained him down, Prometheus-like, to a rock, and made a serpent trickle down its venom upon his face. His faithful wife, Sigyn, held a cup over him to prevent the venom from reaching his face; but whenever she turned away to empty the cup, his convulsive pains were such that the earth shook and trembled. So it is stated in the Edda, the text-book of the Germanic pagans, in that famous song, "The Banquet of Oegir," which is a Titanic satire upon the dwellers in Asgard. I believe we can see in that fable some poetical attempt at explaining earthquakes by the action of subterranean fire—for Sætere-Loki is a Fire-god. But, no doubt, few people now-a-days, when pronouncing the simple word "Saturday," think or know of this weird and pathetic myth which must have exercised a similar spell upon the Teutonic race of old, as did a kindred legend upon the Hellenic mind.

Even as the days of the week are primed with the mythology of our forefathers, so it is the case also with the names of many towns, and villages, and hills, all over Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, England, and Scotland. When we travel to Athens, we easily think of the Greek goddess Athene; when we go to Rome, we are reminded of Romulus, its mythic founder. But when we go to Dewerstone, in Devonshire; to Dewsbury, in Yorkshire; to Tewesley, in Surrey; to Great Tew, in Oxfordshire; to Tewin, in Hertfordshire—have a great many even an inkling that these are places once sacred to Tiu, the Saxon Mars? When we go to Wednesbury; to Wanborough; to Woodnesborough; to Wembury; to Wanstrow; to Wansdike; to Woden Hill, we visit localities where the Great Spirit, Wodan, was once worshipped. So also we meet with the name of the God of Thunder in Thundersfield; Thundersleigh; Thursleigh; Thurscross; Thursby, and Thurso. The German Venus, Freia, is traceable in Fridaythorpe and Frathorpe; in Fraisthorpe, and Freasley. Her son was Baldur, also called Phol or Pol, the sweet god of peace and light. His name comes out in Balderby; Balderton; Polbrook; Polstead, and Polsden. Loki, or Sætere, is probably hidden in Satterleigh and Satterthwaithe. Ostara, or Eostre, the Easter Goddess of Spring, appears in two Essex parishes, Good Easter and High Easter; in Easterford; Easterlake, and Eastermear. Again, Hel, the gloomy mistress of the underworld, has given her name to Hellifield; Hella-thyrne; Helwith; Healeys, and Helagh—all places in Yorkshire,

where people seem to have had a particular fancy for that dark and grimy deity. Then, we have Asgardby and Aysgarth, places reminding us of Asgard, the celestial garden, or castle, of the Aesir—in other words, the Germanic Olympus.

The instances just given might be multiplied by the hundred: so full is England, to this day, of the vestiges of Germanic mythology. Far more important, however, is the fact that in this country, as in Germany, we still find a great deal of current folk-lore and fairy-tales, of either a charming or a ghastly character, as well as a mass of quaint customs and superstitious beliefs affecting the daily life and even the happiness of men, which, on closer investigation, can be shown to be the remnants of a "strange and savage faith of mightiest power," as Southey called it. To go even lower down: the very nursery tales, and children's games and rhymes, in Germany, England, and other countries where the people of Teutonic stock dwell, are imbued with the lingering spirit of that ancient creed. There are German children's games that are the poor remnants of religious ceremonies and rude dramatic representations once performed by Pagan priests. There are children's dances and lullabies in which may be recognized the last faint echoes of sacred dances and hymns, formerly danced and sung in the primæval forests of Northern Europe, or, earlier still, on the green hills between the Caspian Sea and the Punjaub. A rhyme apparently so bereft of sense, like

"Lady-bird, lady-bird, fly away home!
Thy house is on fire!
Thy children at home!"

can be proved to refer to a belief of our forefathers in the coming downfall of the Universe by a great conflagration. The Lady-bird has its name from having been sacred to Our Lady Freia, the Germanic Venus. The words addressed to the insect were once an incantation—an appeal to the goddess for the protection of the souls of the Unborn, over whom, in her heavenly abode, she was supposed to keep watch and ward, and whom she is asked to shield from the fire which consumes the world.

Everyone knows of *Grimm's Tales*. They were collected, from the lips of the people, by one of the greatest authorities on German language, literature, and mythology. Now, a writer who, besides his own deep researches, has worked successfully to render the labours of Continental authorities accessible to the English public, says, with the felicity of expression that is peculiar to him:—"It might seem strange, indeed, that so great a scholar as Grimm should have spent so much of his precious time in collecting his *Märchen*, or Tales, if

those tales had only been intended for the amusement of children. When we see a Lyell or Owen pick up pretty shells and stones, we may be sure that, however much little girls may admire these pretty things, this was not the object which those wise collectors had in view. Like the blue and green and rosy sands which children play with in the Isle of Wight, these tales of the people, which Grimm was the first to discover and collect, are the *detritus* of many an ancient stratum of thought and language, buried deep in the past. They have a scientific interest."

And they have a scientific interest in more than one respect! Surprising thoughts of generations long gone by may often be read in mythic tales. Fanciful and odd as their imagery appears, a grain of sense, even of science, can frequently be discovered in their fantastic shell. In olden times, even as now, there were men of science; and there were others who wanted to hide science under a bushel, or to keep it to themselves. Hence, mythological systems were generally erected over a substratum of philosophical thought; the priest keeping to himself the latter as a private knowledge, only to be talked of in the innermost recess of the sanctuary, where no profane gaze could penetrate, whilst the mass of the people were spoken to in highly coloured tales which they were asked to accept as a revelation. But the tale itself—formed, as it were, in the shape of a riddle—mostly contained some deeper meaning, which was only walled in by the flowery, or sometimes prickly, language of fiction, and requiring a key, or some opening pass-word, to unlock its secret.

I well remember how I was once laid hold of by a young German peasant, of considerable intelligence, who could read and write, as all German peasants do, but who startled me by one of the most extraordinary superstitions, which at that time I felt inclined to set down as a sheer meaningless fabrication. It was a queer, straggling tale about prophesying the future, and the shape of all coming things, from an egg—a piece of witchcraft which had to be performed on an Easter Sunday, by a man stepping out of church backwards, and, whilst looking through the egg, breaking out into a loud laughter! The highly-mysterious mien with which this wonderful information was given was in fit keeping with the terror of the speaker, lest, by making use of it, I should endanger my soul and go astray for ever. When, somewhat later, I came to investigate the subject, I obtained the proofs that what had seemed mere boorish nonsense could be traced back to the decayed religious system of our forefathers, and that it had a meaning; even as Greek fables about Jupiter descending in a golden rain, and similar myths, have their explanation, though the real sense is somewhat smothered under a kind of poetry run wild, which has escaped from critical control.

In the case of that young peasant I found that, unwittingly, he was the possessor of a very remarkable chip of Teutonic mythology which contained a presentiment, in a very crude and mystic form, but still a presentiment, or early conception, of that Germ Theory which traces all living things, and their fatally foreshadowed form, from an "egg"—a theory now held by a majority of scientific men. Even all the minor accessories of the peasant's tale explained themselves by-and-by. Easter Sunday had to be chosen for his piece of witchcraft because Easter was originally a Germanic festival in honour of the Goddess of Spring, who is to this day remembered by the people in Germany and other Continental countries, as well as by the peasantry of some of the northern and eastern counties in England, in the well-known custom of presenting coloured eggs to children. The "going out backwards from church" was, according to the orientalizing system of Christian edifices, practically an obeisance before the Goddess, who was supposed to dwell in the East, in the region of the rising sun, whose orb is the great agency for awakening life out of the sleeping germs. The "sign of disrespect" that had to be made before leaving church was meant as an abrenunciation to the Christian creed; the soothsayer returning for the nonce to the heathen belief—and thereby, it was thought, endangering his soul. Even the "laughter" which had to be indulged in found its explanation. At Pagan festivals, about Easter time, a laughing chorus once typified the smile of re-awakening Nature. Many centuries after the overthrow of Paganism, the priest, on Easter Sunday, had first to tell his congregation a merry tale, and then to break out into what was called an "Easter-laughter"!

Thus, in that young peasant's mind, a very important piece of Teutonic mythology had stuck fast, of which he could not get rid, in spite of the proficiency he had obtained in the mechanical repetition of his catechism. And the more one enters into those matters, the more one must become convinced that it is no use fighting against superstitions by simply calling them "rubbish" and "nonsense;" for somehow the untutored mind clings to them as if, in its vague yearning for something higher than the prosaic every-day life, it felt that there is a poetical treasure concealed in those myths, which only required a magic wand to come forth and charm the craving heart. Nor will these superstitions be entirely rooted out until a full scientific treatment of them has taken place—until they shall be universally known to be the last remnants of heathen creation-stories, of ancient attempts at a philosophical or physical explanation of this wondrous world, of religious systems built thereon, or of glorious hero-sagas which have arisen out of these systems, and then been transformed, broken up, or degenerated, into rustic tales.

It would be idle, no doubt, to look for great depth of meaning in all the shallows of mythological systems—and some of them are very shallow. But this much is clear, that if we will wean men from crude notions that haunt them, and yet promote the enjoyment of fancies which serve as embellishing garlands for the stern realities of life, we cannot do better than to spread a fuller scientific knowledge of that circle of ideas in which those moved who moulded our very speech. From an artistic point of view, the spread of such knowledge is also desirable. We feel delight in the conceptions of the Greek Olympus. We store in our museums the statues of Jupiter, Juno, Mars, and Venus. Painters and poets still go back to that old fountain of fancy. Why, then, should we not seek for similar delight in studying the figures of the Germanic Pantheon, and the rich folk-lore connected with them? Why should that powerful Bible of the Norse religion, which contains such a wealth of striking ideas and descriptions in language the most picturesque, not be as much perused as is the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, or the *Æneid*? Or is it too much to say that many even of those who know of the *Koran*, of the precepts of Kon-fu-tse, and of Buddha, of the *Zend-avesta*, and of the *Vedas*, have but the dimmest notion of that grand Germanic Scripture?

No doubt, Mannhardt is right when saying that the Teutonic divinities have not the perfect harmony and quiet plasticity of the Olympian ideals. Still, to resume a description before given: Can it be said that there is a lack of poetical conception in the figure of Wodan, or Odin, the hoary ruler of the winds and the clouds, who, clad in a flowing mantle, careers through the sky on a milk-white horse from whose nostrils fire issues, and who is followed at night by a retinue of heroic warriors whom he leads into the golden, shield-adorned Walhalla? Is there a want of artistic delineation in Freia, an Aphrodite and Juno combined, who changes darkness into light—wherever she appears—the goddess with the streaming golden locks and the siren voice, who hovers in her snow-white robe between heaven and earth, making flowers sprout along her path, and planting irresistible longings in the hearts of men? Do we not see in bold and well-marked outlines the figure of the red-bearded, steel-handed Thor who rolls along the sky in his goat-drawn car, and who smites the mountain giants with his magic hammer? Are these dwellers in the Germanic Olympus mere spectres, without distinct contour? And if their strength often verges upon wildness; if their charms are sometimes allied to cruel sorcery—are they not, even in their uncouth passions, the representatives of a primitive race, in which the pulse throbs with youthful freshness? Or need I allude to that fantastical throng of minor deities, of fairies, and wood-women, and elfin, and nixes, and cobolds, that have been evolved out of all the

forces of Nature by the Teutonic mind, and before whose bustling crowd even Hellenic imagination pales?

Then, what a dramatic power the mythology of our forefathers has! The gods of classic antiquity have been compared to so many statues ranged along a stately edifice; no idea of action, of tragic conflict, arising out of the whole. How different the Germanic view of the Universe! There, all is action, struggle, dramatic contest—with a deep, dark background of inevitable Fate that controls alike gods and men. The battle-spirit and the terrible earnestness of our ancestors reflects itself in this creed. The religion which a race produces is generally an image of its character. "In his deities," Schiller says, "man depicts himself." At the end of time—the Germanic tribes believed—Odin is to be devoured by the wolf Fenrir; Thor to be destroyed by the Serpent's poison; the heavens and the earth stand in a lurid blaze; the abodes of gods and heroes are doomed to destruction; and only after this terrible catastrophe shall have ended, will there be introduced a new and peaceful reign, with eternal bliss.

So, on the score of dramatic and pictorial interest, the creed of the Teutons has something to show. But it is a subject much neglected by both poets and artists. Whilst the eternal classic figures, Madonnas, and threadbare subjects from Italy and Spain never cease to be treated, the old Germanic deities, in spite of the poetical halo which surrounds them, are mostly left to wander about disembodied, waiting for the gifted hand that will mould them into form. The artist who has attempted or who will do this, is assuredly not placed in a worse position than his Hellenic predecessors who also had to make their selection from a number of floating mythological conceptions, which it was their merit to have wrought into a harmonious figure.

It is a characteristic of the mythology of all nations that changes are continually being at work within the most elaborate systems. Hence, any one dealing in a general way with the ancient Germanic creed will have to make a cross-cut, so to say, through the vast material before him. In this way, he may be able to show some of the chief strata of a bygone religion, as well as some incongruous layers which seem to lie confusedly between and athwart them, and which may have been forced across the original structure by heathen theological commotions that are beyond the ken of history. A mere glance at the sources of Germanic mythology is sufficient to give an idea of the many changes which must necessarily have occurred in its contents through the lapse of time, during which, whilst the main substance of sagas may remain the same, the ever-weaving hand of fiction continually seeks for new garnish, with which to edge, lace, and border out the familiar garment.

If we begin with Herodotus' account of the Thracian and Getic people who, according to modern research, are supposed to have been a Gothic, Germanic race; and if we follow our sources through Roman, Greek, German, and Norse literature, ending with the two Eddas which were written down when the Odin religion collapsed in her last northern stronghold, we have already gone over a period of not less than 1600 years. Besides this, there are supplementary sources in the still current popular tales, as well as in the records of the Witch Trials. Within the 1600 years mentioned, the sources at first flow very scantily. They are more or less pure; not seldom they cease altogether. At other times, they are contradictory; even each particular source sometimes contradictory in itself—as is the case in wellnigh all religious systems. The Brahminic creed is no longer to-day what it was of old: the hundred sects within it have points of contact, but also points of decided divergence. Under the official Greek religion, there continued, for a long time, an under-current of Orphic rites; and the divinities of Homer and Hesiod were not exactly those of Aeschylus and Sophokles. The Hebrew Church, some 1800 years ago, was divided into fiercely contending parties whose representatives, differing on cardinal points, yet sat side by side in the Temple. It is scarcely necessary to supply more recent examples. In the same way, it is not to be expected that the ancient Teutonic religion should present features of an immutable fixity. At different periods, or among different tribes, it had its gradual changes, like all other creeds. Most probably also it had its sects. A stiff and fixed uniformity is the less to be expected in it, because the Germanic tribes, unlike in this, as in other respects, to the Gauls, had no fully formed priestly caste. The Germanic creed may therefore have least presented “that angularity which drives sharp points into people's ribs”—to borrow an expression from Professor Blackie.

There are indications that, among the earliest forms of Teutonic worship, there was, besides the worship of Light and Fire, a *cultus* of water-deities. It is stated that, after a great struggle between the two contending divine circles, the Vana gods “received admission into Asgard,”—in other words, that the rival creeds were merged into each other, even as the Greeks worked the Tree and Serpent worship of subject races into their own religion; or as the Brahminic religion has, from a similar reason, been gradually overlaid with forms and figures originally foreign to it. Few are the passages from which we can get a glimpse, at this distance of time, of the Vana creed, which seems to have preceded, or been in opposition to, the Odin religion. But we know that Odin's own consort, the Germanic Queen of the Heavens, originally came, with her brother Freyr, the refulgent god of the sun, from this Vana circle. This combination

of the two different and opposing creeds in the two chief representatives of the victorious religion has perhaps its counterpart in the mediæval Madonna *cultus*, which has in a large measure arisen out of the Venus and Freia worship of preceding systems of belief.

In accounting for the origin of the world, the Teutonic doctrine knows—like Buddhism—of no personal creator. There are several striking resemblances between certain Buddhistic and Wodanic tenets; and some writers have endeavoured to trace that similarity between the very names of Woden, or Boden, and Buddha. Yet, as Mr. Fergusson has rightly remarked in his book on *Tree and Serpent Worship*:—"There are not perhaps in the whole world two religions so diametrically opposed to one another as Buddhism and Wodenism, nor two persons so different as the gentle Sakya Muni, who left a kingdom, family, and friends, to devote fifty years of his blameless life to the attempt to alleviate the sufferings of mankind, and Odin, 'the terrible and severe god, the Father of Slaughter; he who giveth victory and reviveth courage in the conflict; who nameth those that are to be slain.'"

In the beginning of things, there is, in the grand and impressive words of the Edda, only a deep and dreary chasm:

"Once was the age
when all was not;
nor sand, nor sea,
nor salty waves;
nor earth there was, nor sky above;—
only yawning abyss, and grass nowhere."

Ere the world comes into shapely existence, a chaos was assumed, in which an Abode of Darkness and of icy cold, and an Abode of Fire were marked off at opposite poles. But this Chaos had already the principle of Life in it; for out of the meeting of Fire and Ice came a giant form, Oergelmir, whose name signifies Fermenting Matter. We here see a combination of those Neptunic and Volcanic theories by which geologists have endeavoured to explain the formation of the surface of the earth.

After the appearance of Fermenting Matter, it was said, there rose in course of time—even as in Greek mythology—first a half-human, half-divine race of Giants, and then a race of Gods. The Gods had to wage war against the Giants, and finally vanquished them. Evidently, the Giants represent a torpid, barren state of things in nature; whilst the Gods signify the sap and fulness of life, which struggles into distinct and beautiful form. There was a custom, among the Germanic tribes, of celebrating this victory over the uncouth Titans by a festival, when a giant's doll was carried round in Guy Fawkes'

manner, and at last burnt. To this day there are traces of this heathen practice. In some parts of northern Europe, so-called "Judas-fires" are lighted about Easter time, which have their origin in the burning of the doll that represented the giants, or *jötun*. In some places, owing to another perversion of the original meaning of things and words, the people run about, on that *fête* day, shouting: "Burn the old Jew! burn the old Jew!" The *jötun* was, in fact, converted, when Christianity came in, first into a *Judas*, and then into a *Jew*; a transition to which the similarity of the sound of words easily lent itself: and so a Pagan superstition, or religious notion, which at any rate had some basis of meaning, serves even now, in a Christian age, for the maintenance of an unjust prejudice against an inoffensive class of fellow-citizens. Out of such errors of the ear, new mythological conceptions often arise; whilst old prejudices maintain or fortify themselves by slipping into the cast-off garments of a vanquished creed, and puzzling men by this strange travesty.

The origin of man, in Teutonic cosmogony, leads us back to kindred classic myths. Man and woman, in the Eddaic conception, were supposed to have grown out of the trees, though they were fashioned into form, and gifted with a soul, by a divine act. Among the Greeks there were similar legends of the rise of mankind both from stones and trees; that is, from all kinds of matter, inorganic and organic. Perhaps we have in both the Germanic and the Greek tale a pantheistic notion, or a notion of the affinity of all things and beings, which again comes near the results of modern science. It is supposed by Simrock and other authorities that even that well-known German children's rhyme, which mothers and nurses sing when dandling a child on the knee: "*Jetzt reiten wir nach Sachsen, wo die schönen Mädchen auf den Bäumen wachsen*" ("Now we ride into Saxony, where the pretty girls grow on a tree"), is by no means a senseless doggerel, but a last echo of an ancient cosmogonic view. The very word "*Sachsen*," being derived from a word signifying "stone," brings this ditty into close connection with the Greek tale. It is only of late, I may say in passing, that this apparently childish lore has been more fully investigated in a systematic form all over Germany; and the most curious vestiges of ancient Pagan notions, rites, and incantation songs, have already been discovered in them—the results, in some cases, being truly astounding, and of the highest interest to the archæologist. It is as if a costly vase had been shattered into a thousand fragments, showing no trace of their original connection, and one were able, by dint of persevering labour, to collect them once more, and reconstruct the noble contour of that antique vase.

The idea of the immortality of the soul was strong with the Teutonic races. Whilst in Buddhistic doctrine—unless Professor Max Müller's contrary reading be accepted—there is *nirwana*, or an entire extinction of the soul, so that in Buddhism we have the extraordinary spectacle of a religious system without a personal creator, without a future state, but with high moral precepts, the energetic individualism of the Teutons was loth to conceive the possibility of entire personal annihilation. They believed in a paradise of warriors, where the blessed heroes while away the time with fights, giving and receiving wounds; wounds that heal every night, when the warriors joyously sit down in the glittering banquet hall. With Wodan, in Walhalla, the departed leaders of men were supposed to dwell; with Thor, the common folk; others with Freyr, the God of Light; others, again, with his sister Freia. The notions about the future life were, however, not so clearly fixed as some writers appear to have imagined. At the side of the loftier conceptions of immortality, there was another line of thought, indicating a change of the dead into flowers. It seems to be an etherealized refinement of the idea of the origin of mankind from the world of vegetation. In the song of "Fair Margaret," in *Bishop Percy's Manuscript*, there is a last faint echo of this flowery creed. "Out of her breast there sprang a rose; and out of his a briar." So also, a vine and a rose-tree sprout forth on the grave of Tristan and Isolt; and a violet on the tomb of Ophelia.

In connection with the Germanic idea of a future state, there was a belief in a Fountain of Rejuvenescence, to which the aged return, to be gifted with new powers of life. There is some resemblance, here, to the Platonic idea of pre-existence, and of a never-ending regeneration. This notion re-appears in the character of Hel, who is half dark, or livid, and half of the hue of the human skin—a Goddess of Death, as well as a Mother of Life, working with hidden powers beneath the soil. The place where she resided, and which has furnished the word for the later "Hell," was only a shadowy place of concealment for those who had died otherwise than in battle—from age or from illness; ingloriously. *Hellen*, in German, means, in fact, "to conceal," and still has the same meaning in some English dialects. When, however, the origin of the name of this sheltering deity became lost, her appellation was used to torment mankind with the idea of unutterable horrors. This transmutation is the more surprising because the Germanic races had known of no hellish fire, nor of any Satanic Prince of this World. Though Loki was an evil-doing god, they did not conceive him as an arch-fiend; they did not assume a Principle of Evil; and long after they had been converted to Christianity, they felt a remarkable repugnance against the belief in a Satan. The Church introduced this belief with some degree of difficulty;

and when at last the notion of a demoniacal arch-fiend was accepted, popular fancy twisted him into all manner of shapes, monstrous and grotesque, in which we can sometimes detect a remnant of that wild humour which attaches to some of the doings of Loki, as well as of his gigantic counterpart, Utgard-Loki, to whom he stands about in the relation in which Hephaistos did to Pluton.

For the sake of correctness it must be added that in the Edda, which, like other sacred Scriptures, is not throughout of a homogeneous mould, some passages occur, mentioning a place of punishment, as well as a personal creator. These passages are apparently borrowed from a foreign religious system. One of them is almost Dantesque in its ghastly imagery. Of the Prophetess Vala it is said :—

“She saw a hall standing
far from the Sun,
on the Dead-land’s shore ;
its doors are northwards turned.
Venom drops fall
in through the holes ;
entwined is that hall
with serpents’ backs.

She there saw wading
the sluggish streams,
bloodthirsty men, and perjurers . . .
There the Serpent sucks
the corpse of the dead ;
the Wolf tears men.”

Very powerful, and very hideous withal ! Upon the whole, Germanic Mythology is not disfigured by many such conceptions, though the sombre sky and scenery of Northern climes has left a deep imprint upon it, and clothed not a few of its forms with an aspect of terror.

I now come to some facts which at first sight appear rather startling.

The Germanic races—like many others, from Assyria to Mexico—had the tradition of a great flood. They had the ceremony of baptism. They had the sign of the Cross. They had a Queen of the Heavens, whose Son, destined to suffer death, was called “the blood-covered God.” They believed in twelve divine personages amongst whom a thirteenth played the traitor. They had a God of Peace, who died through that traitor. They spoke of the Supreme Being as hanging in the flesh on a tree—wounded by a spear—suffering thirst—and “offering himself to himself.” They believed that the God who had been slain by treachery would come back at the end of time, when a Golden Age would follow.

Of Odin, who appears in various incarnations, several miracles are

recorded. It was said that he could raise men from death, and make the wind cease, and still the tempest of the sea, and prevent the waves from swamping the ship. In the ninth incantation of the "Runic Song," Odin says:—

"For the ninth I know :
if I stand in need
my bark on the water to save,
I can the wind
and the waves allay,
and still the sea."

In the same song, Odin says of himself:—

"I know that I hung
on a wind-beaten tree,
nine whole nights,
with a spear pierced,
and to Odin offered
myself to myself ;—
on the branch of that tree
of which none knows
from what root it springs.

Bread no one gave me
nor a horn of drink ;
downward I peered,
to runes applied myself ;
then fell down thence."

The End of the World is said, in the Norse Scripture, to be preceded by a time of horror:—

"An axe-age, a sword-age—
shields will be cloven ;
a wind-age, a wolf-age,
ere the world sinks.
Brothers shall fight,
and slay each other,
the bonds of kinship
be ruthlessly broken."

Even as in St. Mark it is said:—"The brother shall betray the brother to death, and the father the son, and children shall rise up against their parents, and shall cause them to be put to death."

Again, the "Song of the Prophetess," when describing how the very powers in Heaven shall be shaken and dissolved, says:—

"The sun darkens ;
Earth into Ocean sinks.
From Heaven fall
the bright stars—"

a passage that comes remarkably close to St. Mark:—"The sun

shall be darkened . . . and the stars of Heaven shall fall, and the powers that are in Heaven shall be shaken."

At last, after the world has been consumed, and the great struggle with the Wolf-Beast has been fought out, a Golden Age begins :—

"Unsown shall
the fields bring forth,
all evil be amended.
Baldur shall come :—
Hödur and Baldur, the heavenly gods,
Odin's glorious dwellings shall inhabit.

A hall is standing,
brighter than the Sun,
with gold bedecked,
in Heaven.
There shall the righteous
people dwell,
and for evermore
happiness enjoy.

Then comes the Mighty One
to the Great Judgment,
the Powerful from Above,
who rules over All.
He shall dooms pronounce,
and strifes allay,
holy peace establish,
which shall for ever last."

This, again, comes surprisingly near the last but one chapter in St. John's Revelation. I am compelled to point out these extraordinary similarities, in order to make it more clearly understood how the early Christian missionaries, on setting to work to supplant the Germanic creed, could sometimes make use of the contents of the latter. There is a letter, written by Pope Gregory in the sixth century, which refers to the conversion of the Anglo-Saxons, and which has served as a guide, in not a few instances, for the missionary labour among the heathens in Germany. In this letter it is laid down as a maxim that the sacred places of the Pagans should not be destroyed, but be sprinkled over with consecrated water, and then changed into Christian churches, so that the people should be gradually induced, in the places dear to them through old custom, to devote themselves to the service of the true God. The sacrificial meals in honour of the Pagan divinities, the Pope added, should be changed into repasts in honour of the holy martyrs ; and so-forth. It is easy to see that, under such a system, unless a missionary was of a peculiarly unbending character, every apparent point of contact between the two creeds was frequently rendered available for the purposes of conversion.

There is a theory—Mr. Gladstone, amongst others, has given utterance to it—which, instead of explaining these similarities and points of contact in a simple and natural way, declares that all the creeds before Christianity prophetically point to the coming of the Messiah. But with every due respect for the great English statesman who has shown but recently, by his letter on the Evolution Theory, that he is at any rate sensitive about the opinion of independent thinkers, I believe all scientific inquirers will agree that his is an impossible thesis. None can doubt, for instance, that the Cross has been used as a religious symbol for thousands of years before the Christian era. On Scandinavian runic-stones the Cross is found before the time when the Northmen were converted. The hammer of the Germanic God of Thunder had the shape of one of the numerous forms of the cross. The sign of Thor's hammer was made over the drinking-cups at sacrificial meals. Crosses are to be seen in the rock-hewn caves and temples of India and of Central America—nay, in the very wilds of Asia, among groups of cairns, dolmen, and cromlechs, where it is supposed they were erected by an aboriginal race which had been driven there by the first Aryan invasion—ages before Christ. The Egyptians, the Phœnicians, the Chinese, the Etruscans, the Keltic races, the Aztecs, had various forms of the cross. In the British Museum there are some statues from an island in the Pacific which have Crosses of the simplest form—in the shape of a T—engraven on their backs.

Now, shall we say that from the beginning of times the Cross cast its prophetic "Shadow of Death" over the world? Or is it not more reasonable to think that a religious symbol which is found at the earliest times easily came to be introduced into a later form of creed?

We live in an age in which the human mind endeavours to trace all things and ideas to some early germ, or root. It is done in language, in literature, in physiology, in religion. We take pleasure—though it is not unmixed with pain for the poetic temperament and for the profound but melancholy disposition—in showing how, out of some poor root, or cell of speech, a language arises which serves as a garb for the master-works and master-thoughts of a Sophokles and a Shakespeare; of a Bacon, Descartes, and Kant; of a Lessing, Göthe, and Schiller. We look for the connecting links between physical forms which, at first sight, strike us rather by their dissimilarity than by any resemblance; and at last, men like Lamarck, Geoffroy St. Hilaire, Darwin, and Haeckel, succeed in tracing out some original type from which the present structures have gradually branched out. We take up some great epic poem like our *Nibelungen-Lied*, which is the Iliad of Germany's heroic age. It dates from

the Christian era—from the twelfth century. To the general reader, the *Nibelungen-Song* may appear as the product of a single bard, who, out of the furnace of his own fiery soul, created, all by himself, those mighty figures of Brunhild and Kriemhild, of Siegfried, Hagen, and Dietrich. But any one who drank deeper at the well of ancient Germanic poetry, soon becomes aware that the *Nibelungen-Lied*—similar in this to the Homeric poems—has been gradually evolved out of a number of heroic ballads whose authors are lost in the night of ages, but which, in their main substance, can be traced back to that same Edda wherein the heathen theology of our forefathers is preserved. Were that collection of songs still extant which Karl the Great had ordered to be made, but which, until now, has not yet been recovered, we would probably possess the missing link between our mediæval epic and the ancient Wodanic religion. In the Edda itself, the careful student will find the vestiges of different authors as well as of different developments of creed. Beyond the Edda, we have at present but a few passages in early Roman and other writers to go back to. Still, in spite of that lack of further material, we may, even by the aid of those scanty data, establish a clear connection between the mythology of our Germanic ancestors and that of the Aryan stock in India, at the time when the Vedas were composed—that is, probably, thousands of years before Christ.


Again, to take quite a recent instance, some man, learned in cuneiform inscriptions, alights, by good chance, upon an old clay tablet, and by a second good chance picks up, on the spot where once the palaces of the Assyrian rulers stood, another bit of inscribed clay which fits in to the former. The result is, that the Biblical account of the Great Flood is shown to be derived from a tale older than the Mosaic one by, perhaps, thousands of years. The main substance of the legend is in both cases alike. There is the ark, and the raven, and the dove, and the mountain which appears when the waters subside; and the altar on which the sacrifice is offered after the deliverance from danger. The language also is in some passages nearly identical. The names, however, are different: the half-divine Sisit is changed into a human being, Noah; and altogether the description is worked out in a somewhat different manner. Now, could it be said, with any show of reason, that the Assyrian clay tablet prophetically points to the flood described in the First Book of Genesis? Or is it not rather clear that the Hebrew text has been evolved from some previous Assyrian or Chaldean poetry, in the same way as the Song of the Niblungs was evolved from the old Norse mythology?

On all sides, then, we get into some kind of Evolution, or gradual development. I would not assume, on philosophical grounds, that

we can, by pushing this theory to its farthest ends, penetrate at last the great domain of what has been called the "Unknowable." Resolve language indeed, as you will, into its roots or earliest sounds; trace back all living forms to some original cell; show how Mind, in its first feeble flickerings, darts forth from Matter: the Great Secret remains the same. Unless human thought changes its very conditions of existence, I cannot see how we shall ever comprehend Eternity and Infinity, which yet we are driven to assume; or how we shall bridge over the immense gulf that separates an incomprehensible state of absolute void from one filled with the essence of life. No; that deep darkness which surrounds the bright sphere of thousands and myriads of conceivable worlds, will not leave us—let the telescope sweep ever so far through the immensity of the star-lit heavens!

But one thing we can do through Science—and that is, light up the space which more immediately surrounds us, and destroy the terrors which are but the projections of the infant spirit, or the wilful fabrications of interested deceivers. Science—the Science of Religion—can show how out of a few germs of mythology, which were the product of early races, a forest of legends has grown up and spread through ages over all parts of the world. In this way we learn to understand how religions apparently the most diversified often exhibit such striking similarities. But if, after all these careful inquiries, there are still men, even men of genius, who will regard as realities, or as miraculous occurrences, those mythic fancies which have come down to us in a multitude of shapes, independent thinkers must surely ask to be excused from sharing their view. Science will go its way unmoved. It will know how to appreciate the wonderful play of the imagination which is so highly developed in the Indian, the Egyptian, the Hellenic, and the Germanic systems of creed. It will readily point to all that there is of philosophical speculation, of beauty, or of rugged grandeur in them. But neither will it shrink from proving how mythological notions which are still upheld as articles of faith to-day, have been developed from heathen tenets older by thousands of years; and thus Science, by pouring a flood of light on the gloomy world of superstition, will aid in removing some of the worst impediments of human progress.

KARL BLIND.



GAMBLING IN POLITICS.

A BALL has been sleeping for thirty years in the Conservative cannon, and now it has shot out with a force that has done no mean damage, and created no small consternation in the Liberal ranks. Mr. Gladstone, who has been chiefly struck by it, is doubtless the least dismayed by it of anyone. His whole policy—beyond that of any Premier England ever had—has been that of a political soldier, who regards the public service as “a battle and a march.” If there had been any accumulation of wadding and powder behind the Tory ball, his preference—judging from what the public know of his character—would be to have that thing out, clear the ground as Sir Garnet Wolseley does on the Gold Coast, and get at the enemy, who has been popping pellets from the bush for a tiresome time. Such account of the political situation as is here given, is by one who belongs (though doubtless a very indifferent student) to the school of “Felix Holt the Radical,” where, in political prosperity or vicissitude alike, are taught the wholesome maxims of self-trust and self-respect—where graces are scant, and honesty, with a dash of gratitude in it, is the chief thing striven after—where each seeks to go to the root of things somehow, if he can get at it. The writer’s observations are here rendered, because the Editor of this Review is pleased to consider, that where many persons have given their impressions of the fall of the Ministry, those of one of this

school, may, as a matter of variety and perhaps of impartiality, have a place, though things may be thus said from which the Editor may himself dissent.

As far as the working class and their leaders are concerned, it is desirable to understand what has given Conservatism its means of action—and who have, by apathy, or connivance, or policy, contributed to its grotesque advance. Mr. Disraeli has a picturesque imagination, and the troops under his command have been portrayed as dainty, gallant, high-spirited, with representative proclivities altogether “on the side of the angels.” The public have, therefore, been astonished to see them roll into battle-array on casks. Their old knightly banner, which bore the dignified device of “the Crown, the Church and the Constitution,” has been abandoned for one bearing the strange legend, “the Bible and the Barrel,” or as *Punch* better expresses it,—

“While Bung and Bunkum, still to Dizzy dear,
Scarce altered reappear,
In the euphonious pair—‘Our Bibles’ and ‘Our Beer.’”

With prompt ingratitude the victorious troops repudiate their mode of march and array. But the facts are too strong for them. The spectacle in every street and at every poll is ineffaceable. Their triumphant escort from the Tap is not to be denied. Their friends at the bar are not likely to allow themselves to be ignored; and if a Brewer can be elected for Speaker, we shall doubtless see the lobbies of the House of Commons lined with casks of pale ale, so that honourable Members may refresh their memory and their principles on going into division. Boniface is a proud man to-day. His expansive countenance is radiant, his porcine eyes glisten, and behind the tap there is a mobility of rotundity, as though one of his casks were alive. It is not a pleasant enough thing to dwell upon; but nothing can rob him of the historic distinction of being the “foremost fact” of the Conservative Reaction of 1874. Nevertheless he could not have succeeded as he has, had it not been for other causes of contemporaneous activity—the most conspicuous of which, and sufficient to account for what has taken place, are:—

1. The Ballot.
2. Mr. Gladstone’s force of sincerity.
3. The manners of some of his Ministers.
4. The Liberal insurrection of impatience.

As far as the Ballot is concerned, the present writer is not free from partizan responsibility, which, however, he is far from desiring to disown. His “Defence” of that measure was made “in consequence of Mr. Mill’s objection to it,” and was accorded a place of reference

by Mr. Bright and Mr. Berkeley, in terms which will long be a matter of pride to the author. The argument advanced was, that under a representative government a man for one minute in seven years is master of himself—afterwards he is at the mercy of the Member of Parliament he elects; who may tax him, compel the country into war, be a party to base treaties, may limit his liberty, may degrade him as an Englishman—but the voter is bound by his member's acts. From election to election the member is master. The elector must obey the laws members make—else they may proclaim martial law, put a sword to his throat, or fire upon him with the latest improved rifle they have made him pay for in the Estimates. For seven years the elector may howl, but he can alter nothing until he gets to the poll again, when he may take part in displacing the member who has betrayed him. If, however, he is compelled to vote openly, he is kept under the eyes of his masters; he merely carries a political Ticket-of-leave, and his vote is duly reported to the political police—his landlord, his employer, his customer, or his priest. The only emancipation is the Ballot, and it does not seem a very revolutionary craving to desire one minute of absolute freedom every seven years. It did not seem taxing a Constitutional Government over-much to ask this.

It was asked for, and had; and it is worth explaining how it has operated, since Mr. Gladstone is made personally responsible for manifestations at the poll which would have been witnessed elections ago had the same conditions existed. The writer of the argument stated was far from thinking himself that the immediate result of the Ballot would be the Millennium—but a Tory Government; and knowing that a prophet gains small credit by prophesying after the event, he wrote to the *Times*, the *Daily News* and *Echo*, to say so before the Bill passed. The record exists. His reason for urging the measure was, that it would render the political education of the people a necessity, and incline Liberals—who might be rejected peremptorily at the poll—to care for that education as they did thirty years and more ago. The Anti-Corn Law League stopped it. Passionate and wearied Chartists, disappointed at the neglect of their claims by the middle-class, broke up Anti-Corn Law meetings—and the poor, penniless, wandering, agitating speakers of the people, whose lives were a daily privation, and who had been mostly deprived of their situations through their advocacy of the claims of their class, were denounced as “hired orators”—subscriptions to their political unions (made mostly by middle-class sympathizers) fell off, and for twenty years in England there has not been a single political society of working men able to pay the rent of their meeting-rooms. Tories may find a majority at another

election yet, unless the political education of the people receives other attention than their scant means can command, or unless increased wages and co-operation enables—as it is to be hoped it will—the people to obtain it for themselves. The want of it was very evident this Election, not only among Electors, but among Candidates. The Liberals canvassed, not knowing that a more effective course was open to them. The Tories were ever their masters herein. There is a vigorous mendicancy in the good old Tory. Nobody begs like he. Fresh from the clubs, where a political working man is regarded as an “English Jacobin,” the Conservative candidate pours a wonderful stream of blandishments on the artizan elector. The Liberal solicits him in a shamefaced way, but your Conservative kisses his wife, and does not hesitate at the children. It is only Mr. Horsman who complains if he takes the measles. The Tory will take the small-pox at an election, and hold his tongue. In Norwich, at this election, “ladies of quality” and high rank were brought down and paraded round the city like show-women. They were not political women who concern themselves with the civil rights of their sex, and who have reason to interfere in elections of members who may treat them as Mr. Bouverie did; but ladies of whom no poor man or woman, caring for public affairs, ever heard of before. Mr. Huddleston won his seat by these arts; but for the first time working men commented upon and resented them. Only one candidate in all England—Mr. H. K. Spark, of Darlington—went to the poll without canvassing; and he lost the seat, because he provided no substitute for it. No sooner was the general election announced than every sottish and scheming hostelry, every court, alley, and purlieu of boroughs, poured forth all sorts of familiar, creeping, seedy things, in search of electoral opportunities. The battered, much-brushed hat; the smooth, enterprising face; plethoric, bar-parlour orators; hangers-on about the tap; men whom no public cause had ever known except when money or beer was flowing, now strode out with fervour of patriotism, to save the nation from Liberal worrying. Liberalism, with its scrupulous ways, industrious turn, and economic tactics, was nothing like as demonstrative. They who trust to principles are nowhere at an election compared with those who trust to prejudice—unless they have the sense to take care that the principle is represented by the explanations of persons, fervid and omnipresent. But the pressure of intimidation had been withdrawn from the poll, and no pressure of political knowledge and obligation was supplied in its place.

Mr. Mill and Mr. Grote came to perceive that open voting was the only organized instrument existing on both Liberal and Conservative sides: and in the absence of education it balanced the forces of

political opinion by local pressure in known proportions. Once impunity was ensured by a really secret poll, the timid, the ignorant, the venal, sharp-eyed interest and sharp-edged spite, obsequiousness and stupidity—having neither ridicule, nor scorn, nor resentment to fear,—could swamp all who ordinarily voted from knowledge of the conditions of political progress, and from regard to the traditions of their fathers, who had incurred obloquy and peril in the service of fruitful but then unfriended truth. These crowds were sure to be triumphant when they were joined to those who were really Conservative, honestly objecting to Liberal progress, and disliking those who promoted it; and, in addition, reinforced by those critical and censorious Radicals, who were ostentatiously instructed that it was their immediate interest to vote for the adversaries of their own principles. It were mere imputation, and not political judgment, to make Mr. Gladstone responsible for this unwonted combination. The Liberal watchwords are "Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform." Peace means public self-restraint; Retrenchment means a provident policy; Reform means self-helping, self-dependent habits among the people. No wonder the many deem a defensive policy tame compared with defiance, when gentlemen have hankerings after "a spirited foreign policy." The rich are not yet recognized as models of frugality and self-help, and self-reliance is ever troublesome. Liberalism, which means that a man shall hold his own, and increase his own by efforts of his own, and not at the expense of other people, will long seem mean and unsympathetic, compared with Tory graciousness, which—as we used to sing in Boroughmongering days—

"Robs you of a pound, and gives you twopence back."

Nine people out of ten would think a good deal of the "twopence" down, and very little at whose cost it came to be offered; and would merely say to the Minister who promised it, as Sheridan said to his father, when he threatened to bequeath him but a shilling, "Do you happen to have it about you?"

It seems paradoxical to say it, but had Mr. Gladstone been a less capable or less fertile Minister, prudent Conservatives would not have ventured upon Mr. Disraeli without a policy. They well know that if affairs go much wrong, Mr. Gladstone can supply the nation with a policy and a new surplus when this has disappeared. Without the Ballot they could, through other means, have destroyed Mr. Gladstone's majority; but not have displaced him but for its fortuitous aid. Conservative journals are not justified in ascribing all their success to a discernment of their political virtues, dexterously concealed by the nation until now.

2. The Conservative, a creature naturally given to repose, would

not—although the Ballot had given him hope—have sprung into ambitious activity, had not Mr. Gladstone spread disquietude around by the ascendancy he had won by commanding capacity and an earnestness in the interests of common people, unknown to the etiquette of ministerial life. Premiers before him were open to conviction on subjects on which they had made up their minds. Mr. Gladstone was open to conviction on subjects upon which he had not made up his mind, if any one could show him good reason for his assent; and what filled the people with hope and brought uncounted peril to himself, he would act upon his conviction when he had it. Mr. Disraeli was understood to be favourable to the repeal of the Taxes on Knowledge, but he spoke against it. Sir George Cornwall Lewis believed in their repeal, but took no step to concede it. When the Society seeking their repeal had less than £500 a year, and were powerless to accomplish their ends, the bulk of the Newspaper Press being against them, Mr. Gladstone repealed these taxes as soon as he saw the demand was just. And when he visited the Tyneside, 200,000 people went out to greet him because they were told that he was the first Chancellor of the Exchequer who was ever known to have a conscience. It was added that, doubtless, there had been other Chancellors with consciences, but having no occasion for the use of that commodity in public affairs, the nation had not discerned it. Mr. Gladstone had faults—he was not perfect, it is a long time since England had a Prime Minister that was: and it never had one who incurred so much reviling through civility to the common people. He even admitted that they were of the “same flesh and blood” as their “betters;” he strove to render more proportionate the taxation they were called upon bear; to open the door to merit in the army, navy, and civil services; to make land more accessible; its tenancy more equitable and secure. He was willing that education should be general; to permit co-operative means of industrial amelioration, and consigned the poor to a minister who distinguished where poverty was a disease of the social state and where it was a crime, and gave prevention a place as well as punishment. All this, which meant progress for the many, meant unrest for the privileged classes. What new security and gain, justice to the many, might bring to them, they did not heed and did not trust.

Mr. Gladstone, who occupied himself with considerations of public advantage, thinking peradventure that Radical discernment, if not gratitude, would vindicate to the people a policy which their forefathers had in vain prayed to see, little dreamt of the curious crowds of people who had grudges to avenge upon him. Even milkmen had their little grievances. They were worried when “Simpson” was put down. Hundreds of votes were given in the great towns

against the Liberal Government, because Tories were assumed to be opposed to harassing interests by vexatious Laws against adulteration. The shopkeepers were laying wait for their opportunity: Co-operation, that new power of industry which gives thrift new motives, poverty new hope, and teaches the dependent self-help, had generous advocates in Mr. Morrison and Mr. Hughes. Both have been put out of Parliament by the hostility of grocers and drapers, who have confidence that Conservatives will obstruct, if they cannot put down, the co-operative movement.

Mightier parties, however, than shopkeepers had other grievances. The abolition of purchase in the army, notwithstanding the people were served by it, was not a measure to render the Government popular among the classes most able to harm it. Rich families increase now as they never did before. To them it was no pleasant thing to be deprived of buying commands for their sons. To the sons it was no pleasant thing to have to think like artizans, and compete with the sons of their own shoemakers in qualification for command, or come to receive orders in the field from them, if they happen to excel their excellent employer in courage and capacity for war. How many sons of working people have been murdered through the incapacity of their officers for the duties of command? How often have foreigners observed that English soldiers were "lions led by asses?" The poor parents of soldiers have not had time to appreciate the Government which has delivered their children from this. In the meantime sharp resentment—as Mr. Cardwell could tell—has come upon the Government from officers who regard the change as an indignity put upon them by Ministers who do not understand the treatment due to gentlemen, and thousands of pounds received from the War Office in adjustment of their claims, have percolated through the Clubs to promote the "Conservative reaction."

What a series of electric shocks must have been sent by the Cabinet through thousands of wealthy families, when competitive examination was generally enforced in the Civil Service! It was further clear to all respectable people that we were not under a Government of gentlemen when this was done. No Conservative administration had shown such want of taste as to compel a young gentleman to sit down with the son of a tallow-chandler, to try for the same office which "Long Sixteens" (as he was contemptuously called) might win, and the dainty youth in one of Poole's best coats—not win. This, indeed, was democratic equality of an undoubted revolutionary kind. Well may tinted journals of society see no good in Mr. Gladstone, and declare that he has long lost the confidence of all classes—who mistake their own lost privileges for the greatness of the State.

These are not dark days ; they are merely capricious days. One cause not discreditable to Mr. Gladstone, which told against him at the poll, is that the country is getting rich, beyond all the dreams of commercial gain. The prosperity which Liberal legislation, and the security which wise and timely concession, have brought to so many successful families, and the vast unearned increment of wealth which other families have acquired, even as they slept, without thought, or care, or toil, or desert, of their own : naturally incline these fortunate people to say, " Things are very well as they are, why cannot Mr. Gladstone let well alone ? " They do not see that their security in their great advantages, depends upon those below them having their fair chance also. Mr. Gladstone is anxious for the security of the State, while those who would arrest equity and amelioration are anxious chiefly for their own. It is for these people to take care what the Tory Government does. Toryism never yet contented England, or kept it contented, and the comfortable people who think only of themselves may find out, as they have in other countries, that Liberal progress is safer than " Conservative reaction." It is bad to worry and harass fortunate classes, but it is worse to harass and worry a hard-working and not over-fortunate people. What a mass of suspicious discontent carried interested protests to the blind and silent poll of 1874 !—because they said they were worried. The poor are always being worried—worried by ignorance in which they have been kept—worried by unequal taxation—worried by laws which gave capital every chance and labour none—worried by neglect and delays through weary years. They have no hearing and no advocacy in the powerful organs which echo the dainty doctrine that it is the comfort of the comfortable alone that Cabinets should keep in view : as though poverty had not its overwhelming interest in the welfare and equitable government of the nation. It is the man without a steak for his dinner who may be said to have the largest stake in the country—and these are they who will hold accountable whoever, for private ends of their own, have displaced the great Minister who cared for them politically, and incurred obloquy, and undertook unceasing labour to serve them.

3. That some Ministers alienated many active supporters of the Government is true ; and this enabled Conservatives to affect a sympathy for those outraged, who would themselves have treated them in another way, with ten times the contumely, the most unhappy-mannered Minister displayed. It is, however, difficult to speak of persons, whether adversaries or friends, with justice.

Though words of praise require on the part of those who utter them more care than words of blame—because in pronouncing praise, a man gives to others who know and observe, the measure of

his own discernment : words of blame require most consideration as respects their effect upon those to whom they apply. To censure any one unjustly is to discourage honourable endeavour. Few men are so great in character and disinterested, as to persist in advancing the interests of those who disparage them wholly, and give them no credit, when they have earned it. Where a private or a public man finds that he gets no good word, whatever duty he strives to discharge, he soon comes to think he would be no worse off if he consulted his own interests, and did what is scandalously and gratuitously imputed to him. Therefore though Mr. Ayrton, so far as could be judged from his manners, was a person who liked to be disliked, and whose choice was to be disagreeable ; this should not blind the country to the fact that he introduced some reforms in departments where they were much wanted, and where only a "noble savage" would encounter the unpleasant consequences of doing it. In the control of expenses of the Houses of Parliament, and in various contracts for public works, previous Commissioners thought more of their own social repute "in society" than of the public purse ; and while the well-bred public applauded their blandness, the poor taxpayer had to pay annually a very large sum for it : and many who joined in the respectable abuse of Mr. Ayrton were under many obligations for services he had rendered. Mr. Ayrton carried a Bill to legalize meetings in the parks. We may never know what influential animosity that brought upon himself and the Government. When Mr. Vernon Harcourt made the treacherous proposal that the permission to hold the meetings should be in the hands of the police, Mr. Ayrton resisted it, and kept the authority in official hands. In matters affecting public liberty the worst Home Secretary we ever had is better to go to, than the best Commissioner of Police we shall ever see. Those who had to do with the Metropolitan Police in Sir Richard Mayne's days, found that the political working class was always treated as a criminal class. It is not the men, it is the system : and Mr. Ayrton kept us out of the system. Many other things Mr. Ayrton did well. Albeit it was a want of loyalty to the Liberal party that he should so often bring it into discredit, by want of courtesy ; but it is better for the people that public interests should be guarded by a rough repellant hand, than betrayed by a dainty one.

We have journals which have been for two years contending that 'Trades' Unions were powerful enough to hold the country at their mercy—now contending that the publicans, who are a thousand times more opulent and better organized, are not to be regarded as the influential factor of the Conservative reaction. A business which brings into the Exchequer some twenty millions, must be a vast one. It is the mightiest and wealthiest and most fortunate in the nation.

If it unites for political action, it can put up Ministries or put them down, until the nation gets enraged at the ignominy to which it is subjected, and puts the trade itself down. While other people live upon the necessities of others, it is the misfortune of the publican to live upon their vices. He grows rich as they grow poor. What a periodical is to a little printer, a single drunkard is to a little publican. He keeps him going. Once the devil of drink gets into a house, every penny of property finds its way to the tap-till. If Mr. Disraeli will protect this dreadful profit, or connive at its protection, and Mr. Gladstone will not, it is natural that the publican should turn to Mr. Disraeli. It is a miserable business all through, and may help to wreck other Cabinets than Mr. Gladstone's.

It very ill becomes Radicals to join in unqualified condemnation of Mr. Bruce because he missed his way through listening too much to men of merciful intentions, who would, however, make Temperance a social oppression. Instead of stopping the increase of public-houses; dissolving those which exist; buying up by equitable compensation needless ones; Lord Aberdare treated the inn as a criminal establishment. Instead of making the publican sharply responsible for selling drink to the drunk, the late-working artisan was put to annoyance every night, and on Sundays those who had to live in fireless rooms, could only get admission to an inn for refreshment in a clandestine way, as though they were thieves. He is a wise man who keeps political principle in mind once a month, but a personal ignominy sustained every day may obscure party obligations in the best disposed. But though it explains, it does not justify revenge in publican or customer. If every politician wronged by Parliament seeks redress by the destruction of his own party, the English democracy will soon come to know the vicissitudes of that of France.

Mr. Lowe was another member of the Cabinet who enabled the enemy to be mischievous. He received people on business as he would stupid pupils in class. It was said at last that Deputations sent to him were chosen of bullet-headed persons, so that in the event of a Blue Book impinging on their heads it might the better glance off. Some co-operative working men from the north, were afraid to come up to see him on a matter of moment to them, until one assured them that Mr. Lowe was always courteous to those who understood their own business, and was only impatient with pretending people, who did not really know what they were talking about: and they were quite charmed with Mr. Lowe's attention and consideration of their case. Of course it was a real benefit to the public that Mr. Lowe should reason with Deputations and show them where they were wrong. It was in reality far more civil to them to point out errors to them, if error they were under, than the old

official blandness, which never paid a bit of attention to what they said, but sent them away with smiles and sonorous phrases, which filled the mind with delight and satisfaction; and it was not until next day that it was discovered the Minister had said nothing—promised nothing—meant nothing. It had been better for ministerial repute had Mr. Lowe been less of the professor in his manners; but those who cared mainly for what he said, and looked, as the late Mr. Mill did, to the quality of his administrative acts, found reason to be grateful to him for many things.

Tories never fall into the error of suggesting that Deputations which come to them are fools. They do not discover it. They consider all who come to them on behalf of progressive schemes as turbulent, disaffected, revolutionary, or no better than they should be: so that they give no heed to what they want, or what they mean, and never find it out. Out of office they openly revile them—in office they bow them to the door without committing themselves by giving reasons. If Mr. Lowe had less conciliation he had more self-respect. It is hard to say whether he was one of Plato's square men in a round hole. Had he, however, been in Mr. Forster's place, the worst disaster the Liberal party sustained under Mr. Gladstone's rule, had been averted. Nevertheless, Mr. Lowe's services were far more than a set-off to his sayings. Mr. Robert Buchanan is a poet of many uncomfortable associations, but who thinks of them or cares for them, when reading "Meg Blane?"

Mr. Forster made a remark to the present writer, in the days when Radicals took great pains to get him into Parliament, which was published by a lady who now contributes to *The Spectator*. It is but justice to Mr. Forster to recur to it now. It has escaped that lady's excellent memory, else that journal had reproduced it in justification of its sole hero: in proof that he would at any time have done what is now regarded as a defalcation in principle in him. Mr. Forster gave offence, not by carrying the only form of the Education Bill he could carry, but by persisting that it was the only Bill he would carry. When the gallery of the House of Commons was filled with Dissenting Ministers, he addressed them as though they were infidels, and opposed to the teaching of the Bible. Whereas, all they sought was to have what they, more than Mr. Forster, regarded as a sacred Book, treated in a sacred way, and taught under circumstances of separateness and solemnity, which a mixed-minded school does not permit. In public affairs, as in private life, disappointment must constantly occur, through our judging men by what we assume of them, and we accuse them of deceiving us when we have deceived ourselves by want of exact knowledge. Nevertheless, Nonconformists were justified in expecting that Mr. Forster would show at least as much consideration

for them as he never failed to show when addressing the Opposition benches. Instead of this he stretched out his arm and told them he had "Puritan blood in his veins," which induced one who knew him to say, "It is a pity he does not put a drop into his Bill;" and the same person asked Professor Huxley if he would analyze a globule or two and discover what the degenerate admixture was. The satisfaction at seeing Mr. Winterbotham associated with the Government, arose from its being perceived that he did not forget that his grandfather had been imprisoned in Newgate for nonconformity. All the traditions of mutilation, ignominy, and suffering, endured by Nonconformists in long years gone by, related to their steadfast and perilous vindication of the principle that the State should propose no religion—oppose no religion—pay no religion: and Mr. Forster's Bill violated all the conditions. Nonconformists had been degenerate indeed had they not been a little angry when Mr. Forster bound their hands while their ancient enemy the Church, rifled their pockets in the interests of ecclesiastical ascendancy. It had been done without their well understanding what was the matter with them, and they only awakened to their situation by the shriek of triumph set up by the Conservative press, when they naturally called upon their trusted friend Mr. Forster to render them help and set them free: and they were very much surprised to hear him tell them that he meant it, and would resist any attempt to undo them. *The Spectator*, who understood from the beginning what was intended, openly called for Tory votes in Bradford to reward the Minister who had served them so well: and in London our walls were covered with great Tory placards on which Conservative candidates made as their chief profession of principle, that they would support Mr. Forster's Bill. The London press have mainly represented that it was petty jealousy or unworthy hostility to a Liberal Minister, which animated Sir Titus Salt and Mr. Illingworth in opposing Mr. Forster's return for Bradford. They had ceased to believe that he was a Liberal Minister, and for other reasons not relevant to cite here, the best Liberals in the country had long thought so. It is a bad thing to reject an able man who may serve your cause in many things, though he may have failed you in one; but it is a very different thing to reject him because you have reason to believe that he will fail you in anything where your enemy's applause and support is to be had. The Bradford electors and Nonconformist Liberals may be wrong in their judgment, and do serious injustice to Mr. Forster; but they ought to be judged by what they do believe, and not by what Mr. Forster's advocates and their adversaries assume them to believe.

Mr. Disraeli, with discernment and fairness, has lost no time in saying that the 25th Clause is a flag and symbol of Nonconformist

humiliation, and as such, he maintains it. This is the party purport of his language, and it is far less irritating to Nonconformists to hear, than the offensive representations that there is really nothing in that clause, and it is not worth while—indeed it is undignified scrupulousness in Nonconformists, to insist upon its abandonment. No one has taken much part in public controversy who is not aware that when one side who has an advantage—and knows it—tells the other side that it is too little a thing for them to quarrel about, the meaning always is that it is too great a thing for them who hold it to give up. A curious instance of this lately occurred at a School Board in the Eastern Counties, upon which a Canon of the English Church and a Catholic priest sat. It was determined that the Bible should be read in the Schools under the care of the Board, when the question was raised as to what Bible should be used—the authorized version or the Douay. The Rev. Canon said he greatly respected the conscientious feelings of his fellow member of the Board, the Catholic priest. As to the Douay version he had not a word to say against it. Practically there was no difference between that and the authorized version. All the essential facts of their holy religion were to be found in both—it therefore was not worth while interfering with the conveniences of established schools by introducing the change. God knew it was from no narrowness on his part, or want of kindly feeling to the Rev. Gentleman—but because of his desire that good feeling and fellowship should prevail, that he hoped he would not press so small a matter as that involved in the merely verbal differences of the two Bibles. So full of charity and tenderness was the Rev. Canon's speech, that the Board expected he would fall upon his Roman brother's neck, and weep that imaginary differences should produce alienation on the Board. Whereupon a shrewd member of the Board said, he agreed with the Rev. Canon as to the practical unimportance of the rival versions, and therefore, as it was generous and charitable and Christian in the majority to consult the consciences of the minority, he would propose that the Douay version should be used in the schools of the Board. This gentle speech fell like nitro-glycerine among the Board. Instantly, loud protests arose. The Canon leaped—the Canon shrieked, and tradition in the city sayeth that he took the place of the Chairman, to prevent the insulting motion being put. The little thing for the minority to accept, became a great thing for the majority to grant. These caprices of defence in Parliament and out, did as much mischief as Mr. Forster's pertinacity; and a body of men whose influence and ardour have always been an important element in Liberal contests, were rendered indifferent or hostile, and their dissatisfaction animated the adversaries of the government to put forth all their strength.

Were it the design of the writer to discuss here minor causes of

mark, which led—not to the “Conservative reaction”—but to the Liberal resentment, he would place in the front of them the incredible fact, that the first act of a Reformed Parliament, elected by an ostensibly universal suffrage, was to turn the working-class out of the lobby of the House of Commons. This proceeding led to indignity so frequent, and to indignation so deep, that the present writer made a representation to Mr. Speaker upon the subject. One who has accomplished more than any other publicist to increase the Liberal seats at this election, could never be induced to go near the House—where, if he did, he had to stand in an outer hall, perhaps for hours, while a policeman whistled his name to his venerable father through a gutta-percha tube. Now he is a member himself, his son can only have word with him by the same means. A Liberal member of Parliament has been converted into a sacred creature, whom no elector may approach safely, nearer the House than Charing Cross. Yet no Radical member, who named his own irritation at any disregard of himself “independence,” had ever a question to put in the House on this subject.

4. There is a broad dash of George Francis Train in Tory journalists. In spasms of egotism they claim, as popular signs of reaction in favour of their views, all the discontent which has arisen from the Liberal insurrection of impatience. Individuality of thought and purpose, which is the seed of future progress, is permitted no chance of growth, save in Liberal fields. It is the boast, the pride, the mission of the other party—so they say—to “stamp it out.” Those individualists, whether their ends are public or private, have thought it becoming policy of late to resist even those who tolerate it, if they do not at once adopt their proposals. The Temperance party began by protesting that they would vote against any candidate who would not confiscate the artizan’s pint of “half-and-half,” until he had obtained the permission of two-thirds of his neighbours to have it. These Numerical Reformers, thus badly instructed the Pewter-Pot party, who soon bettered the instruction, and rolled all their barrels over to the Conservative side. In Newcastle-on-Tyne alone, 800 publicans did this in one day—turned their parlours into Tory Committee-rooms, their barmen into canvassers, and lent their dog-carts to carry their customers to the poll. The Anti-vaccinators caught the contagion of revolt; and women who had a right to protest against Acts, which they considered to menace their possession of themselves, adopted the policy of rebellion. Thus there arose cries of “Permission to prohibit”—“Liberty for delirium tremens”—“Fair play for infection”—“Freedom of contagion” (as many regarded it). It were ill to tell how many other parties adopted the easy, the alluring, but fatal policy of vengeance. Even Trades Unionists would trade no more with Liberals—the Labour Representation League

resolved to represent only itself—the Peace Society made war on the only Government which ever showed it any respect—the Liberation Society promised to do what it could to fetter future progress—the Female Suffragists went over to the party which treats them with open contempt—the Sunday League was in one accord with the Society for Preventing the Sale of Puppies on Sunday Morning—the Open Church and the Open Spaces Societies resolved to shut out everybody not of their way of thinking—the National Education Union, and Education League were like-minded in voting for the declared enemy as against its hesitating friends. No party was too small to join the union of parties in favour of disunion. Even the Aborigines Protection Society declared against the protection of anybody, unless they were attended to. But all this would have been more matter of amusement than the scandal of policy, had not the Radical party—the Parliamentary advance-guard of the nation—been smitten with the same disease of retaliation. The Liberal, one daily to which the party look, seemed indifferent whether Liberals or Tories prevailed; and the only weekly Metropolitan organ of historical repute, which represented Radicalism, openly said it did not care which: if anything, it preferred the Tories. Then, why should the people, why should anyone, show zeal any longer for Liberalism or Radicalism, when this is the language of the Radical leaders? Why should Mr. Gladstone give his years and strength to conserve Liberal interests and advance Liberal progress, if this is the feeling of those who have hitherto been looked up to as the future leaders of the Liberal party? The people must be far wiser, more generous and just than their leaders, if they did not show indifference at the poll. There would not have been a Radical candidate returned anywhere, had not the people been, in many places, better counselled than they were in London; or more discerning of themselves. At least in the North, the pitmen and artizans remembered that “Mr. Gladstone once resigned office rather than sacrifice the votes of 700,000 workmen.”* Two hundred thousand workmen on Newcastle Moor recently passed grateful and honourable resolutions of regard for the Premier who had done this; and at this election Mr. Cowen carried the cry of “cordial and independent, not critical and censorious,” support to Mr. Gladstone, through all the county of Durham, and Tories were chased from the field where they were entrenched in gold; and Liberals put in all the thirteen seats. The captious Radicalism which paralysed us in London would have handed every seat in Durham over to the enemy. Durham is the chief county in England now, where a Radical workman, who has gratitude, can hold up his head. To disparage and displace Mr. Gladstone, when we

* Political Essays, by Bernard Cracroft.

have no one to look to when he is gone, who is the first Premier who introduced a representation of the Radical element into the Cabinet; because he who went faster than the nation, does not go far enough or fast enough; and put power into the hands of persons who will not go at all, and who defame and deride all who want to move forward,—would be called spite, if we were not told that it is the latest revelation of Radical policy. Fortunately for political progress, there are Radical leaders of different quality coming to the front, who, united to many already in the front, will restore the repute of the party for a broad, generous, English regard for noble, if incomplete service.

Reform in Parliament had more friends among the higher classes in 1792 than it had in 1832. Did we not turn Sir William Clay out of the Tower Hamlets because he had had the paltry measure for the abolition of Church Rates in his hands for twenty-four years and had not carried it? The present writer was a candidate there when Mr. Ayrton was first elected; and was the first working-class candidate to whose election expenses Mr. John Stuart Mill contributed. Regard for his intrepid generosity prevented any publicity of it. But his contribution was known to be his protest against the criminal tardiness with which Liberal measures were in those days advanced. How many weary years did the agitation consume which gave us the Ten Hours' Bill—which saved little children from daily misery and premature death in the mills? Did not Mr. Hume's stout heart cease to beat before the day of financial reform set in? Mr. Roebuck can tell us how hopeless was political improvement in the day when he rendered brave and unrequited service to the people. Mr. Horsman and Mr. Bernal Osborne can tell us of the gallant years they struggled to compass the abolition of the Irish Church. Do we not all know how relieved the country felt when Parliamentary stagnation descended into the grave with Lord Palmerston—the most genial evasionist who ever barred the way to improvement? When we look back on the miraculous five years of Mr. Gladstone's Government, it is impossible to estimate the obligations which Liberals and Radicals have chosen to disown and rebuke. There may be occasions when it is justifiable to revolt against doubtful friends, and put undoubted enemies in their places—but the laws of party warfare in these cases ought to be codified, and made very plain for the guidance of common people. Deserting to the enemy for the encouragement of your friends, is something like prudent departures from truth; and we ought, as Lord Bacon suggested, to make plain notes of all departures from an excellent habit. For men of high name—of ample fortune—of assured position—whom no changes of Ministries can obscure—whose comforts no delay will impair—it is all very well to drive a Minister of the people from

office with words of disparagement, under the impression that at some future day he will return invigorated by ingratitude; and acknowledge as his real friends those who attempted to put humiliation upon him;—but what, in the meanwhile, is to be said to worker in mill and mine, who have grown old under hope deferred, which maketh the heart sick—waiting for relief from Ministers who never risked a division to serve them?—are they still to strive—not for the relief which genius and sincerity meditated for them—but that the enemy put in possession on policy, may one day be ejected? In the meantime the displaced Minister may die; he next to him to whom Liberalism has been indebted for ascendancy, may no longer be able to take part. All this may be brilliant strategy, but it is not a brilliant out-look which has been brought about.

He, however, argues in vain on any question who does not take into account and bring into sight the force of the opposite case. The Radical objection was that the late Cabinet's measures were not what they should be. Nobody's are, as a rule. Ministerial measures are to be judged by their tendency; by the chances of carrying all that is wanted; by the dead weight of aristocratic dissent which has to be borne or diverted, by an adventurous Minister in England. Since no Minister of less genius and purpose, could or would have gone so far in the Radical direction as Mr. Gladstone has, and since no one likely to succeed him this generation will be likely to go as far, it were policy, if it were not gratitude, to accord him a sincere if qualified support. There are Liberals, it must be owned, who try Radical patience. One writes to the *Times* to ask "is he called to vote for such a man as Odger"? forgetful that the Odgers are expected "to vote for such a man" as this contemptuous querist. In numerous boroughs the working classes are called upon to vote for Liberals no human being, rightly constituted, would care for—lest they split up the Liberal interest: but in what borough have Liberals consented to accept a Radical, lest that interest be split up? Yet if this is to be resented by calling in the common enemy, no Radical Government, if formed, would exist a month before it was destroyed by the same arts. Do Radicals meet everybody's views? How long will Mr. Macdonald's votes outside Trades Union questions, satisfy Liberal workmen? Have we not educated Chartists in the House, who have destroyed the Liberal party as did Feargus O'Connor and Ernest Jones the old People's party? There is all the difference in the world between suggesting improvement and contending for improvement, and disparaging Ministers in terms which give aid and comfort to the enemy. Did not Professor Fawcett oppose compulsory education, and aid those who were against it being made secular? Did not Mr. Mundella betray his disposition to follow in Mr. Forster's

disastrous footsteps? If electors adopt the policy of voting against every one who fails them on some essential question, no Radical would be sure of a seat. Zeal, as noble as theirs, has ruined popular movements before. However, as Major Cartwright used to say, "the very errors of juries are to be respected;" so mistaken zeal in the interests of the people, is not to be treated like zeal against them: only let it be understood to what it amounts, and to what impotence it may lead the people. Those who have gambled in politics and played at the Ballot-box for their own hand only, and have put in the enemy as a speculation—are mute now. They cannot ask for what they know will be refused, who have aided to put Mr. Disraeli in power that it might be withheld. We have now to deal with a ruler who, as Madame de Staël said discerningly of the first Napoleon, is of unknown nature; to whom English destinies were never till now entrusted with absolute power. The Conservatives have put us under a race who were never our masters before. The Jew, it is relevant to recal, has an industrial daintiness which is an affront to a labouring nation. He stands by while the Gentile puts his hand to daily work. The Jew tills no ground; he follows no handicraft. He lives by wit and thrift. He is of every nation, but of no nationality—save his own. He takes no initiation; he leads no forlorn hope; he neither conspires for freedom, nor fights for it. He profits by it, and acquiesces in it, but will aid either despotism or liberty—as a matter of business. There are men of noble quality among them, but as a general rule, as Cobden said of Lord Palmerston, a Jew of ambition has no prejudices. Derision and persecution only inspire his strong spirit with retaliation, and absolve him from scrupulous methods of compassing it. Two things he pursues with an unappeasable passion—distinction, and authority among believers, before whom his race has been compelled to cringe. An ancient people, which has existed by subtlety and courage, and has the capacity of tradition (which Reformers of our time lack), looks forward to efface—not the indignity of days but of centuries, which gives them an implacableness of aim that never pauses at the most circuitous toil, nor turns aside from its purpose. How else came Mr. Disraeli by that fine instinct of speech, that patience to study sentences, until he has been able to climb on phrases to power? Weak people are subject to a disease of words, which breaks out over their meaning like an eruption. But with Mr. Disraeli language is a weapon of dainty device, lending distinction to the user, and extorting admiration at the skill with which he wields it. What protracted and untiring vigilance of adaptation he must have observed, to render himself endurable to the haughty nobles who have put him in authority over them!—advancing himself as the proscribed only can, by making himself necessary—distilling

Conservative dislike into epigrams, and volunteering a brilliant animosity against their opponents the Liberals! However, even among adversaries, he will find generous recognition of his daring and ability. That the bounds of freedom will be broadened under his rule we may not expect from one who is placed in authority by those who trust him to arrest the growth and self-action of the nation.

. All that remains for Radicals to do, who are not compromised by the fatal policy which has discredited for a season their sagacity, is to preserve respect for the great Minister who has fallen, mainly by faults of earnestness and fertility of service—faults which few Premiers have the honourable distinction of committing; and to seek and use occasions of regaining their useful and necessary place as the party of the future. In a right cause defeat which deters is deserved, and defeat which dismays, is disgraceful. The policy of all who seek public improvement, in a Constitutional country, is patience and persistence. Political error is a serpent, alive at both ends—if severed it may still sting; while it wriggles it lives; and those who mean to end it must—chop at it.

GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE.



UNIVERSITIES : ACTUAL AND IDEAL.

◀THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF THE LORD RECTOR OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF ABERDEEN : FEB. 27, 1874.)

ELECTED by the suffrages of your four Nations, Rector of the ancient University of which you are scholars, I take the earliest opportunity which has presented itself since my restoration to health, of delivering the Address which, by long custom, is expected of the holder of my office.

My first duty in opening that Address, is to offer you my most hearty thanks for the signal honour you have conferred upon me—an honour of which, as a man unconnected with you by personal or by national ties, devoid of political distinction, and a plebeian who stands by his order, I could not have dreamed. And it was the more surprising to me, as the five-and-twenty years which have passed over my head since I reached intellectual manhood, have been largely spent in no half-hearted advocacy of doctrines which have not yet found favour in the eyes of Academic respectability—so that when the proposal to nominate me for your Rector came, I was almost as much astonished as was Hal o' the Wynd, "who fought for his own hand," by the Black Douglas's proffer of knighthood. And I fear that my acceptance must be taken as evidence that, less wise than the Armourer of Perth, I have not yet done with soldiering.

In fact, if, for a moment, I imagined that your intention was simply, in the kindness of your hearts, to do me honour; and that the Rector of your University, like that of some other Universities, was one of

those happy beings who sit in glory for three years, with nothing to do for it save the making of a speech, a conversation with my distinguished predecessor soon dispelled the dream. I found that, by the constitution of the University of Aberdeen, the incumbent of the Rectorate is, if not a power, at any rate a potential energy; and that, whatever may be his chances of success or failure, it is his duty to convert that potential energy into a living force, directed towards such ends as may seem to him conducive to the welfare of the corporation of which he is the theoretical head.

I need not tell you that your late Lord Rector took this view of his position, and acted upon it with the comprehensive, far-seeing insight into the actual condition and tendencies, not merely of his own, but of other countries, which is his honourable characteristic among statesmen. I have already done my best, and as long as I hold my office, I shall continue to endeavour, to follow in the path which he trod; to do what in me lies, to bring this University nearer to the ideal—alas, that I should be obliged to say ideal—of all Universities; which, as I conceive, should be places in which thought is free from all fetters; and in which all sources of knowledge, and all aids to learning, should be accessible to all comers, without distinction of creed or country, riches or poverty.

Do not suppose, however, that I am sanguine enough to expect much to come of any poor efforts of mine. If your annals take any notice of my incumbency, I shall probably go down to posterity as the Rector who was always beaten. But if they add, as I think they will, that my defeats became victories in the hands of my successors, I shall be well content.

The scenes are shifting in the great theatre of the world. The act which commenced with the Protestant Reformation is nearly played out, and a wider and a deeper change than that effected three centuries ago—a reformation, or rather a revolution of thought, the extremes of which are represented by the intellectual heirs of John of Leyden and of Ignatius Loyola, rather than by those of Luther and of Leo—is waiting to come on, nay, visible behind the scenes to those who have good eyes. Men are beginning, once more, to awake to the fact that matters of belief and of speculation are of absolutely infinite practical importance; and are drawing off from that sunny country “where it is always afternoon”—the sleepy hollow of broad indifferentism—to range themselves under their natural banners. Change is in the air. It is whirling feather-heads into all sorts of eccentric orbits, and filling the steadiest with a sense of insecurity. It insists on reopening all questions and asking all institutions, however venerable, by what

right they exist, and whether they are, or are not, in harmony with the real or supposed wants of mankind. And it is remarkable that these searching inquiries are not so much forced on institutions from without, as developed from within. Consummate scholars question the value of learning; priests condemn dogma; and women turn their backs upon man's ideal of perfect womanhood, and seek satisfaction in apocalyptic visions of some, as yet unrealized, epicene reality.

If there be a type of stability in this world, one would be inclined to look for it in the old Universities of England. But it has been my business, of late, to hear a good deal about what is going on in these famous corporations; and I have been filled with astonishment by the evidences of internal fermentation which they exhibit. If Gibbon could revisit the ancient seat of learning of which he has written so cavalierly, assuredly he would no longer speak of "the monks of Oxford, sunk in prejudice and port." There, as elsewhere, port has gone out of fashion, and so has prejudice—at least that particular fine, old, crusted sort of prejudice to which the great historian alludes.

Indeed, things are moving so fast in Oxford and Cambridge, that, for my part, I rejoiced when the Royal Commission of which I am a member, had finished and presented the Report which related to these Universities; for we should have looked like mere plagiarists, if, in consequence of a little longer delay in issuing it, all the measures of reform we proposed had been anticipated by the spontaneous action of the Universities themselves.

A month ago, I should have gone on to say, that one might speedily expect changes of another kind in Oxford and Cambridge. A Commission has been inquiring into the revenues of the many wealthy societies, in more or less direct connection with the Universities, resident in those towns. It is said that the Commission has reported, and that, for the first time in recorded history, the nation, and perhaps the Colleges themselves, will know what they are worth. And it was announced that a statesman, who, whatever his other merits or defects, has aims above the level of mere party fighting, and a clear vision into the most complex practical problems, meant to deal with these revenues.

But, *Bos locutus est*. That mysterious independent variable of political calculation, Public Opinion—which some whisper is, in the present case, very much the same thing as publican's opinion—has willed otherwise. The Heads may return to their wonted slumbers—at any rate for a space.

Is the spirit of change, which is working thus vigorously in the South, likely to affect the Northern Universities, and if so, to what

extent? The violence of fermentation depends, not so much on the quantity of the yeast, as on the composition of the wort, and its richness in fermentible material; and, as a preliminary to the discussion of this question, I venture to call to your minds the essential and fundamental differences between the Scottish and the English type of University.

Do not charge me with anything worse than official egotism, if I say that these differences appear to be largely symbolized by my own existence. There is no Rector in an English University. Now the organization of the members of an University into Nations, with their elective Rector, is the last relic of the primitive constitution of Universities. The Rectorate was the most important of all offices in that University of Paris, upon the model of which the University of Aberdeen was fashioned; and which was certainly a great and flourishing institution in the twelfth century.

Enthusiasts for the antiquity of one of the two acknowledged parents of all Universities, indeed, do not hesitate to trace the origin of the "*Studium Parisiense*" up to that wonderful King of the Franks and Lombards, Karl, surnamed the Great, whom we all called Charlemagne, and believed to be a Frenchman, until a learned historian, by beneficent iteration, taught us better. Karl is said not to have been much of a scholar himself, but he had the wisdom of which knowledge is only the servitor. And that wisdom enabled him to see that ignorance is one of the roots of all evil.

In the Capitulary which enjoins the foundation of monasterial and cathedral schools, he says: "Right action is better than knowledge: but in order to do what is right we must know what is right."* An irrefragable truth, I fancy. Acting upon it, the king took pretty full compulsory powers, and carried into effect a really considerable and effectual scheme of elementary education through the length and breadth of his dominions.

No doubt, the idolators out by the Elbe, in what is now part of Prussia, objected to the Frankish king's measures; no doubt, the priests, who had never hesitated about sacrificing all unbelievers in their fantastic deities and futile conjurations, were the loudest in chanting the virtues of toleration; no doubt, they denounced as a cruel persecutor, the man who would not allow them, however sincere they might be, to go on spreading delusions which debased the intellect, as much as they deadened the moral sense and undermined the bonds of civil allegiance; no doubt, if they had lived in these

* "*Quamvis enim melius sit bene facere quam nosse, prius tamen est nosse quam facere.*"—"Karoli Magni Regis Constitutio de Scholis per singula Episcopias et Monasteria instituendis," addressed to the Abbot of Fulda. Baluzius, "*Capitularia Regum Francorum*," T. i., p. 202.

times, they would have been able to show, with ease, that the king's proceedings were totally contrary to the best Liberal principles. But it may be said, in justification of the Teutonic ruler, first, that he was born before those principles, and did not suspect that the best way of getting disorder into order was to let it alone;—and, secondly, that his rough and questionable proceedings did, more or less, bring about the end he had in view. For, in a couple of centuries, the schools he sowed broadcast produced their crop of men thirsting for knowledge and craving for culture. Such men gravitating towards Paris, as a light amidst the darkness of evil days, from Germany, from Spain, from Britain, and from Scandinavia, came together by natural affinity. By degrees, they banded themselves into a society, which, as its end was the knowledge of all things knowable, called itself a "*Studium Generale*;" and when it had grown into a recognized corporation, acquired the name of "*Universitas Studii Generalis*;" which, mark you, means not a "Useful Knowledge Society" but a "Knowledge-of-things-in-general Society."

And thus the first "University," at any rate on this side of the Alps, came into being. Originally it had but one Faculty, that of Arts. Its aim was to be a centre of knowledge and culture, not to be, in any sense, a technical school.

The scholars seem to have studied Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric; Arithmetic and Geometry; Astronomy; Theology; and Music. Thus, their work, however imperfect and faulty, judged by modern lights, it may have been, brought them face to face with all the leading aspects of the many-sided mind of man. For these studies did really contain, at any rate, in embryo—sometimes, it may be, in caricature—what we now call Philosophy, Mathematical and Physical Science, and Art. And I doubt if the curriculum of any modern University shows so clear and generous a comprehension of what is meant by culture, as this old Trivium and Quadrivium does.

The students who had passed through the University course and had proved themselves competent to teach, became masters and teachers of their younger brethren. Whence the distinction of Masters and Regents, on the one hand, and Scholars, on the other.

Rapid growth necessitated organization. The Masters and Scholars of various tongues and countries grouped themselves into four Nations; and the Nations, by their own votes at first, and subsequently by those of their Procurators, or representatives, elected their supreme head and governor, the Rector—at that time, the sole representative of the University, and a very real power, who could defy Provosts interfering from without; or could inflict even corporal punishment on disobedient members within the University.

Such was the primitive constitution of the University of Paris. It is in reference to this original state of things, that I have spoken of the Rectorate, and all that appertains to it, as the sole relic of that constitution.

But this original organization did not last long. Society was not then, any more than it is now, patient of culture, as such. It says to everything, "Be useful to me, or away with you." And to the learned, the unlearned man said then, as he does now, "What is the use of all your learning, unless you can tell me what I want to know? I am here blindly groping about and constantly damaging myself by collision with three mighty powers; the power of the invisible God, the power of my fellow Man, and the power of brute Nature. Let your learning be turned to the study of these powers, that I may know how I am to comport myself with regard to them." In answer to this demand, some of the Masters of the Faculty of Arts devoted themselves to the study of Theology, some to that of Law, and some to that of Medicine; and they became Doctors—men learned in those technical, or, as we now call them, professional, branches of knowledge. Like cleaving to like, the Doctors formed schools, or Faculties, of Theology, Law, and Medicine, which sometimes assumed airs of superiority over their parent, the Faculty of Arts, though the latter always asserted and maintained its fundamental supremacy.

The Faculties arose by process of natural differentiation out of the primitive University. Other constituents, foreign to its nature, were speedily grafted upon it. One of these extraneous elements was forced into it by the Roman Church, which in those days asserted with effect, that which it now asserts, happily without any effect in these realms, its right of censorship and control over all teaching. The local habitation of the University lay partly in the lands attached to the monastery of S. Geneviève, partly in the diocese of the Bishop of Paris; and he who would teach must have the licence of the Abbot, or of the Bishop, as the nearest representative of the Pope, so to do; which licence was granted by the Chancellors of these Ecclesiastics.

Thus, if I am what Archæologists call a "survival" of the primitive head and ruler of the University, your Chancellor stands in the same relation to the Papacy—and, with all respect for his Grace, I think I may say that we both look terribly shrunken when compared with our great originals.

Not so is it with a second foreign element, which silently dropped into the soil of Universities like the grain of mustard-seed in the parable; and, like that grain, grew into a tree in whose branches a whole aviary of fowls took shelter. That element is the element of Endow-

ment. It differed from the preceding, in its original design to serve as a prop to the young plant, not to be a parasite upon it. The charitable and the humane, blessed with wealth, were very early penetrated by the misery of the poor student. And the wise saw that intellectual ability is not so common, or so unimportant, a gift, that it should be allowed to run to waste upon mere handicrafts and chares. The man who was a blessing to his contemporaries, but who so often has been converted into a curse, by the blind adherence of his posterity to the letter, rather than to the spirit, of his wishes—I mean the “pious founder”—gave money and lands, that the student who was rich in brain and poor in all else, might be taken from the plough or from the stithy, and enabled to devote himself to the higher service of mankind; and built Colleges and Halls in which he might be not only housed and fed, but taught.

The Colleges were very generally placed in strict subordination to the University by their founders; but, in many cases, their endowment, consisting of land, has undergone an “unearned increment,” which has given these societies a continually increasing weight and importance as against the unendowed, or fixedly endowed, University. In Pharaoh’s dream, the seven lean kine eat up the seven fat ones. In the reality of historical fact, the fat Colleges have eaten up the lean Universities.

Even here in Aberdeen, though the causes at work may have been somewhat different, the effects have been similar; and you see how much more substantial an entity is the Very Reverend the Principal, analogue, if not homologue, of the Principals of King’s College, than the Rector, lineal representative of the ancient monarchs of the University, though now, little more than a “king of shreds and patches.”

Do not suppose that in thus briefly tracing the process of University metamorphosis, I have had any intention of quarrelling with its results. Practically, it seems to me that the broad changes effected in 1858 have given the Scottish Universities a very liberal constitution, with as much real approximation to the primitive state of things as is at all desirable. If your fat kine have eaten the lean, they have not lain down to chew the cud ever since. The Scottish Universities, like the English, have diverged widely enough from their primitive model; but I cannot help thinking that the northern form has remained more faithful to its original, not only in constitution, but what is more to the purpose, in view of the cry for change, in the practical application of the endowments connected with it.

In Aberdeen, these endowments are numerous, but so small that, taken altogether, they are not equal to the revenue of a single third-rate English college. They are scholarships, not fellowships; aids

to do work—not rewards for such work as it lies within the reach of an ordinary, or even an extraordinary, young man to do. You do not think that passing a respectable examination is a fair equivalent for an income, such as many a grey-headed veteran, or clergyman, would envy; and which is larger than the endowment of many Regius chairs. You do not care to make your University a school of manners for the rich; of sports for the athletic; or a hot-bed of high-fed, hypercritical refinement, more destructive to vigour and originality than are starvation and oppression. No; your little bursaries of ten and twenty (I believe even fifty) pounds a year, enable any boy who has shown ability—in the course of his education in those remarkable primary schools which have made Scotland the power she is—to obtain the highest culture the country can give him; and when he is armed and equipped, his Spartan Alma Mater tells him that, so far, he has had his wages for his work, and that he may go and earn the rest.

When I think of the host of pleasant, monied, well-bred young gentlemen, who do a little learning and much boating by Cam and Isis, the vision is a pleasant one; and, as a patriot, I rejoice that the youth of the upper and richer classes of the nation receive a wholesome and a manly training, however small may be the modicum of knowledge they gather, in the intervals of this, their serious business. I admit, to the full, the social and political value of that training. But, when I proceed to consider that these young men may be said to represent the great bulk of what the Colleges have to show for their enormous wealth, plus, at least, a hundred and fifty pounds a year apiece which each undergraduate costs his parents or guardians, I feel inclined to ask, whether the rate-in-aid of the education of the wealthy and professional classes, thus levied on the resources of the community, is not, after all, a little heavy? And, still further, I am tempted to inquire what has become of the indigent scholars, the sons of the masses of the people whose daily labour just suffices to meet their daily wants, for whose benefit these rich foundations were largely, if not mainly, instituted? It seems as if Pharaoh's dream had been rigorously carried out, and that even the fat scholar has eaten the lean one. And when I turn from this picture to the no less real vision of many a brave and frugal Scotch boy, spending his summer in hard manual labour, that he may have the privilege of wending his way in autumn to this University, with a bag of oatmeal, ten pounds in his pocket, and his own stout heart to depend upon through the northern winter; not bent on seeking

“The bubble reputation at the cannon's mouth,”

but determined to wring knowledge from the hard hands of penury;

when I see him win through all such outward obstacles to positions of wide usefulness and well-earned fame; I cannot but think that, in essence, Aberdeen has departed but little from the primitive intention of the founders of Universities, and that the spirit of reform has so much to do on the other side of the Border, that it may be long before he has leisure to look this way.

As compared with other actual Universities, then, Aberdeen may, perhaps, be well satisfied with itself. But do not think me an impracticable dreamer, if I ask you not to rest and be thankful in this state of satisfaction; if I ask you to consider awhile, how this actual good stands related to that ideal better, towards which both men and institutions must progress, if they would not retrograde.

In an ideal University, as I conceive it, a man should be able to obtain instruction in all forms of knowledge, and discipline in the use of all the methods by which knowledge is obtained. In such an University, the force of living example should fire the student with a noble ambition to emulate the learning of learned men, and to follow in the footsteps of the explorers of new fields of knowledge. And the very air he breathes should be charged with that enthusiasm for truth, that fanaticism of veracity, which is a greater possession than much learning; a nobler gift than the power of increasing knowledge; by so much greater and nobler than these, as the moral nature of man is greater than the intellectual;—for veracity is the heart of morality.

But the man who is all morality and intellect, although he may be good and even great, is, after all, only half a man. There is beauty in the moral world and in the intellectual world; but there is also a beauty which is neither moral nor intellectual—the beauty of the world of Art. There are men who are devoid of the power of seeing it, as there are men who are born deaf and blind, and the loss of those, as of these, is simply infinite. There are others in whom it is an overpowering passion; happy men, born with the productive, or at lowest, the appreciative, genius of the Artist. But, in the mass of mankind, the *Æsthetic* faculty, like the reasoning power and the moral sense, needs to be roused, directed, and cultivated; and I know not why the development of that side of his nature, through which man has access to a perennial spring of ennobling pleasure, should be omitted from any comprehensive scheme of University education.

All Universities recognise Literature in the sense of the old Rhetoric, which is Art incarnate in words. Some, to their credit, recognise Art in its narrower sense, to a certain extent, and confer degrees for proficiency in some of its branches. If there are Doctors of Music, why should there be no Masters of Painting, of Sculpture, of Architecture? I should like to see Professors of the

Fine Arts in every University; and instruction in some branch of their work made a part of the Arts curriculum.

I just now expressed the opinion that, in our ideal University, a man should be able to obtain instruction in all forms of knowledge. Now, by "forms of knowledge" I mean the great classes of things knowable; of which the first, in logical, though not in natural, order is knowledge relating to the scope and limits of the mental faculties of man; a form of knowledge which, in its positive aspect, answers pretty much to Logic and part of Psychology, while, on its negative and critical side, it corresponds with Metaphysics.

A second class comprehends all that knowledge which relates to man's welfare, so far as it is determined by his own acts, or what we call his conduct. It answers to Moral and Religious philosophy. Practically, it is the most directly valuable of all forms of knowledge, but, speculatively, it is limited and criticised by that which precedes and by that which follows it in my order of enumeration.

A third class embraces knowledge of the phenomena of the Universe, as that which lies about the individual man; and of the rules which those phenomena are observed to follow in the order of their occurrence, which we term the laws of Nature.

This is what ought to be called Natural Science, or Physiology, though those terms are hopelessly diverted from such a meaning; and it includes all exact knowledge of natural fact, whether Mathematical, Physical, Biological, or Social.

Kant has said that the ultimate object of all knowledge is to give replies to these three questions: What can I do? What ought I to do? What may I hope for? The forms of knowledge which I have enumerated, should furnish such replies as are within human reach, to the first and second of these questions. While to the third, perhaps, the wisest answer is, "Do what you can to do what you ought, and leave hoping and fearing alone."

If this be a just and an exhaustive classification of the forms of knowledge, no question as to their relative importance, or as to the superiority of one to the other, can be seriously raised.

On the face of the matter, it is absurd to ask whether it is more important to know the limits of one's powers; or the ends for which they ought to be exerted; or the conditions under which they must be exerted. One may as well inquire which of the terms of a Rule of Three sum one ought to know, in order to get a trustworthy result. Practical life is such a sum, in which your duty multiplied into your capacity, and divided by your circumstances, gives you the fourth term in the proportion, which is your deserts, with great accuracy. All agree, I take it, that men ought to have these three

kinds of knowledge. The so-called "conflict of studies" turns upon the question of how they may best be obtained.

The founders of Universities held the theory that the Scriptures and Aristotle taken together, the latter being limited by the former, contained all knowledge worth having, and that the business of philosophy was to interpret and co-ordinate these two. I imagine that in the twelfth century this was a very fair conclusion from known facts. Nowhere in the world, in those days, was there such an encyclopædia of knowledge of all three classes, as is to be found in those writings. The scholastic philosophy is a wonderful monument of the patience and ingenuity with which the human mind toiled to build up a logically consistent theory of the Universe, out of such materials. And that philosophy is by no means dead and buried, as many vainly suppose. On the contrary, numbers of men of no mean learning and accomplishment, and sometimes of rare power and subtlety of thought, hold by it as the best theory of things which has yet been stated. And, what is still more remarkable, men who speak the language of modern philosophy, nevertheless think the thoughts of the schoolmen. "The voice is the voice of Jacob, but the hands are the hands of Esau." Every day I hear "Cause," "Law," "Force," "Vitality," spoken of as entities, by people who can enjoy Swift's joke about the meat-roasting quality of the smoke-jack, and comfort themselves with the reflection that they are not even as those benighted schoolmen.

Well, this great system had its day, and then it was sapped and mined by two influences. The first, was the study of classical literature, which familiarized men with methods of philosophizing; with conceptions of the highest Good; with ideas of the order of Nature; with notions of Literary and Historical Criticism; and, above all, with visions of Art, of a kind which not only would not fit into the scholastic scheme, but showed them a pre-Christian, and indeed altogether un-Christian world, of such grandeur and beauty that they ceased to think of any other. They were as men who had kissed the Fairy Queen, and wandering with her in the dim loveliness of the underworld, cared not to return to the familiar ways of home and fatherland, though they lay, at arms length, overhead. Cardinals were more familiar with Virgil than with Isaiah; and Popes laboured, with great success, to re-paganise Rome.

The second influence was the slow, but sure, growth of the physical sciences. It was discovered that some results of speculative thought, of immense practical and theoretical importance, can be verified by observation; and are always true, however severely they may be tested. Here, at any rate, was knowledge, to the certainty of which no authority could add, or take away, one jot or tittle, and

to which the tradition of a thousand years was as insignificant as the hearsay of yesterday. To the scholastic system, the study of classical literature might be inconvenient and distracting, but it was possible to hope that it could be kept within bounds. Physical science, on the other hand, was an irreconcilable enemy, to be excluded at all hazards. The College of Cardinals has not distinguished itself in Physics or Physiology; and no Pope has, as yet, set up public laboratories in the Vatican.

People do not always formulate the beliefs on which they act. The instinct of fear and dislike is quicker than the reasoning process; and I suspect that, taken in conjunction with some other causes, such instinctive aversion is at the bottom of the long exclusion of any serious discipline in the physical sciences from the general curriculum of Universities; while, on the other hand, classical literature has been gradually made the backbone of the Arts course.

I am ashamed to repeat here what I have said elsewhere, in season and out of season, respecting the value of Science as knowledge and discipline. But the other day I met with some passages in the Address to another Scottish University, of a great thinker, recently lost to us, which express so fully, and yet so tersely, the truth in this matter, that I am fain to quote them:—

“To question all things;—never to turn away from any difficulty; to accept no doctrine either from ourselves or from other people without a rigid scrutiny by negative criticism; letting no fallacy, or incoherence, or confusion of thought step by unperceived; above all, to insist upon having the meaning of a word clearly understood before using it, and the meaning of a proposition before assenting to it;—these are the lessons we learn” from workers in Science. “With all this vigorous management of the negative element, they inspire no scepticism about the reality of truth or indifference to its pursuit. The noblest enthusiasm, both for the search after truth and for applying it to its highest uses, pervades those writers.” “In cultivating, therefore,” science as an essential ingredient in education, “we are all the while laying an admirable foundation for ethical and philosophical culture.” *

The passages I have quoted were uttered by John Stuart Mill; but you cannot hear inverted commas, and it is therefore right that I should add, without delay, that I have taken the liberty of substituting “workers in science” for “ancient dialecticians,” and “Science as an essential ingredient in education” for “the ancient languages as our best literary education.” Mill did, in fact, deliver a noble panegyric upon classical studies. I do not doubt its justice, nor presume to

* Inaugural address delivered to the University of St. Andrews, Feb. 1, 1867, by J. S. Mill, Rector of the University (pp. 32, 33).

question its wisdom. But I venture to maintain that no wise or just judge, who has a knowledge of the facts, will hesitate to say that it applies with equal force to scientific training.

But it is only fair to the Scottish Universities to point out that they have long understood the value of Science as a branch of general education. I observe, with the greatest satisfaction, that candidates for the degree of Master of Arts in this University are required to have a knowledge, not only of Mental and Moral Philosophy, and of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy, but of Natural History, in addition to the ordinary Latin and Greek course; and that a candidate may take honours in these subjects and in Chemistry.

I do not know what the requirements of your examiners may be, but I sincerely trust they are not satisfied with a mere book knowledge of these matters. For my own part, I would not raise a finger, if I could thereby introduce mere book work in science into every Arts curriculum in the country. Let those who want to study books devote themselves to Literature, in which we have the perfection of books, both as to substance and as to form. If I may paraphrase Hobbes's well-known aphorism, I would say that "books are the money of Literature, but only the counters of Science," Science (in the sense in which I now use the term) being the knowledge of fact, of which every verbal description is but an incomplete and symbolic expression. And be assured that no teaching of science is worth anything, as a mental discipline, which is not based upon direct perception of the facts, and practical exercise of the observing and logical faculties upon them. Even in such a simple matter as the mere comprehension of form, ask the most practised and widely informed anatomist what is the difference between his knowledge of a structure which he has read about, and his knowledge of the same structure when he has seen it for himself; and he will tell you that the two things are not comparable—the difference is infinite. Thus I am very strongly inclined to agree with some learned schoolmasters who say that, in their experience, the teaching of Science is all waste time. As they teach it, I have no doubt it is. But to teach it otherwise, requires an amount of personal labour and a development of means and appliances, which must strike horror and dismay into a man accustomed to mere book work; and who has been in the habit of teaching a class of fifty without much strain upon his energies. And this is one of the real difficulties in the way of the introduction of physical science into the ordinary University course, to which I have alluded. It is a difficulty which will not be overcome, until years of patient study have organized scientific teaching as well as, or I hope better than, classical teaching has been organized hitherto.

A little while ago, I ventured to hint a doubt as to the perfection

of some of the arrangements in the ancient Universities of England ; but, in their provision for giving instruction in Science as such, and without direct reference to any of its practical applications, they have set a brilliant example. Within the last twenty years, Oxford alone has sunk more than a hundred and twenty thousand pounds in building and furnishing Physical, Chemical, and Physiological Laboratories, and a magnificent Museum, arranged with an almost luxurious regard for the needs of the student. Cambridge, less rich, but aided by the munificence of her Chancellor, is taking the same course; and, in a few years, it will be for no lack of the means and appliances of sound teaching, if the mass of English University men remain in their present state of barbarous ignorance of even the rudiments of scientific culture.

Yet another step needs to be made before Science can be said to have taken its proper place in the Universities. That is its recognition as a Faculty, or branch of study demanding recognition and special organization, on account of its bearing on the wants of mankind. The Faculties of Theology, Law, and Medicine, are technical schools, intended to equip men who have received general culture, with the special knowledge which is needed for the proper performance of the duties of clergymen, lawyers, and medical practitioners.

When the material well-being of the country depended upon rude pasture and agriculture, and still ruder mining ; in the days when all the innumerable applications of the principles of physical science to practical purposes were non-existent even as dreams ; days which men living may have heard their fathers speak of ; what little physical science could be seen to bear directly upon human life, lay within the province of Medicine. Medicine was the foster-mother of Chemistry, because it has to do with the preparation of drugs and the detection of poisons ; of Botany, because it enabled the physician to recognize medicinal herbs ; of Comparative Anatomy and Physiology, because the man who studied Human Anatomy and Physiology for purely medical purposes was led to extend his studies to the rest of the animal world.

Within my recollection, the only way in which a student could obtain anything like a training in Physical Science, was by attending the lectures of the Professors of Physical and Natural Science attached to the Medical Schools. But, in the course of the last thirty years, both foster-mother and child have grown so big, that they threaten not only to crush one another, but to press the very life out of the unhappy student who enters the nursery ; to the great detriment of all three.

I speak in the presence of those who know practically what medical education is ; for I may assume that a large proportion of

my hearers are more or less advanced students of medicine. I appeal to the most industrious and conscientious among you, to those who are most deeply penetrated with a sense of the extremely serious responsibilities which attach to the calling of a medical practitioner, when I ask whether, out of the four years which you devote to your studies, you ought to spare even so much as an hour for any work which does not tend directly to fit you for your duties?

Consider what that work is. Its foundation is a sound and practical acquaintance with the structure of the human organism and with the modes and conditions of its action in health. I say a sound and practical acquaintance, to guard against the supposition that my intention is to suggest that you ought all to be minute anatomists and accomplished physiologists. The devotion of your whole four years to Anatomy and Physiology alone, would be totally insufficient to attain that end. What I mean is, the sort of practical, familiar, finger-end knowledge which a watchmaker has of a watch, and which you expect that craftsman, as an honest man, to have, when you entrust a watch, that goes badly, to him. It is a kind of knowledge which is to be acquired, not in the lecture-room, nor in the study, but in the dissecting-room and the laboratory. It is to be had, not by sharing your attention between these and sundry other subjects, but by concentrating your minds, week after week, and month after month, six or seven hours a day, upon all the complexities of organ and function, until each of the greater truths of anatomy and physiology has become an organic part of your minds—until you would know them if you were roused and questioned in the middle of the night, as a man knows the geography of his native place and the daily life of his home. That is the sort of knowledge which, once obtained, is a life-long possession. Other occupations may fill your minds—it may grow dim, and seem to be forgotten—but there it is, like the inscription on a battered and defaced coin, which comes out when you warm it.

If I had the power to remodel Medical Education, the first two years of the medical curriculum should be devoted to nothing but such thorough study of Anatomy and Physiology, with Physiological Chemistry and Physics; the student should then pass a real, practical examination in these subjects; and, having gone through that ordeal satisfactorily, he should be troubled no more with them. His whole mind should then be given, with equal intentness, to Therapeutics, in its broadest sense, to Practical Medicine and to Surgery, with instruction in Hygiene and in Medical Jurisprudence; and of these subjects only—surely there are enough of them—should he be required to show a knowledge in his final examination.

I cannot claim any special property in this theory of what the

medical curriculum should be, for I find that views, more or less closely approximating these, are held by all who have seriously considered the very grave and pressing question of Medical Reform; and have, indeed, been carried into practice, to some extent, by the most enlightened Examining Boards. I have heard but two kinds of objections to them. There is, first, the objection of vested interests, which I will not deal with here, because I want to make myself as pleasant as I can, and no discussions are so unpleasant as those which turn on such points. And there is, secondly, the much more respectable objection, which takes the general form of the reproach that, in thus limiting the curriculum, we are seeking to narrow it. We are told that the medical man ought to be a person of good education and general information, if his profession is to hold its own among other professions; that he ought to know Botany, or else, if he goes abroad, he won't be able to tell poisonous fruits from edible ones; that he ought to know drugs, as a druggist knows them, or he won't be able to tell sham bark and senna from the real articles; that he ought to know Zoology, because—well, I really have never been able to learn exactly why he is to be expected to know zoology. There is, indeed, a popular superstition, that doctors know all about things that are queer or nasty to the general mind, and may, therefore, be reasonably expected to know the “barbarous binomials” applicable to snakes, snails, and slugs; an amount of information with which the general mind is usually completely satisfied. And there is a scientific superstition that Physiology is largely aided by Comparative Anatomy—a superstition which, like most, once had a grain of truth at bottom; but the grain has become homœopathic, since Physiology took its modern experimental development, and became what it is now—the application of the principles of Physics and Chemistry to the elucidation of the phenomena of life.

I hold as strongly as any one can do, that the medical practitioner ought to be a person of education and good general culture; but I also hold by the old theory of a Faculty, that a man should have his general culture before he devotes himself to the special studies of that Faculty; and I venture to maintain, that, if the general culture obtained in the Faculty of Arts were what it ought to be, the student would have quite as much knowledge of the fundamental principles of Physics, of Chemistry, and of Biology, as he needs, before he commenced his special medical studies.

Moreover, I would urge, that a thorough study of Human Physiology is, in itself, an education broader and more comprehensive than much that passes under that name. There is no side of the intellect which it does not call into play, no region of human knowledge into which either its roots, or its branches, do not extend; like the Atlantic be-

tween the Old and the New Worlds, its waves wash the shores of the two worlds of matter and of mind; its tributary streams flow from both; through its waters, as yet unfurrowed by the keel of any Columbus, lies the road, if such there be, from the one to the other; far away from that North-west Passage of mere speculation, in which so many brave souls have been hopelessly frozen up.

But whether I am right or wrong about all this, the patent fact of the limitation of time remains. As the song runs:—

“ If a man could be sure
That his life would endure
For the space of a thousand long years—”

he might do a number of things not practicable under present conditions. Methuselah might, with much propriety, have taken half a century to get his doctor's degree; and might, very fairly, have been required to pass a practical examination upon the contents of the British Museum, before commencing practice as a promising young fellow of two hundred, or thereabouts. But you have four years to do your work in, and are turned loose, to save or slay, at two or three and twenty.

Now, I put it to you, whether you think that, when you come down to the realities of life—when you stand by the sick-bed, racking your brains for the principles which shall furnish you with the means of interpreting symptoms, and forming a rational theory of the condition of your patient, it will be satisfactory for you to find that those principles are not there—but that, to use the examination slang which is unfortunately too familiar to me, you can quite easily “give an account of the leading peculiarities of the *Marsupialia*,” or “enumerate the chief characters of the *Compositæ*,” or “state the class and order of the animal from which *Castoreum* is obtained.”

I really do not think that state of things will be satisfactory to you; I am very sure it will not be so to your patient. Indeed, I am so narrow-minded myself, that if I had to choose between two physicians—one who did not know whether a whale is a fish or not, and could not tell gentian from ginger, but did understand the applications of the institutes of medicine to his art; while the other, like Talleyrand's doctor, “knew everything, even a little physic”—with all my love for breadth of culture, I should assuredly consult the former.

It is not pleasant to incur the suspicion of an inclination to injure or depreciate particular branches of knowledge. But the fact that one of those which I should have no hesitation in excluding from the medical curriculum, is that to which my own life has been specially devoted, should, at any rate, defend me from the suspicion of being

urged to this course by any but the very gravest considerations of the public welfare.

And I should like, further, to call your attention to the important circumstance that, in thus proposing the exclusion of the study of such branches of knowledge as Zoology and Botany, from those compulsory upon the medical student, I am not, for a moment, suggesting their exclusion from the University. I think that sound and practical instruction in the elementary facts and broad principles of Biology should form part of the Arts Curriculum: and here, happily, my theory is in entire accordance with your practice. Moreover, as I have already said, I have no sort of doubt that, in view of the relation of Physical Science to the practical life of the present day, it has the same right as Theology, Law, and Medicine, to a Faculty of its own in which men shall be trained to be professional men of science. It may be doubted whether Universities are the places for technical schools of Engineering, or Applied Chemistry, or Agriculture. But there can surely be little question, that instruction in the branches of Science which lie at the foundation of these Arts, of a far more advanced and special character than could, with any propriety, be included in the ordinary Arts Curriculum, ought to be obtainable by means of a duly organized Faculty of Science in every University.

The establishment of such a Faculty would have the additional advantage of providing, in some measure, for one of the greatest wants of our time and country. I mean the proper support and encouragement of original research.

The other day, an emphatic friend of mine committed himself to the opinion that, in England, it is better for a man's worldly prospects to be a drunkard, than to be smitten with the divine dipsomania of the original investigator. I am inclined to think he was not far wrong. And, be it observed, that the question is not, whether such a man shall be able to make as much out of his abilities as his brother of like ability, who goes into Law, or Engineering, or Commerce; it is not a question of "maintaining a due number of saddle horses," as George Eliot somewhere puts it—it is a question of living or starving.

If a student of my own subject shows power and originality, I dare not advise him to adopt a scientific career; for, supposing he is able to maintain himself until he has attained distinction, I cannot give him the assurance that any amount of proficiency in the Biological Sciences will be convertible into, even the most modest, bread and cheese. And I believe that the case is as bad, or perhaps worse, with other branches of Science. In this respect Britain, whose immense wealth and prosperity hang upon the thread of Applied Science, is far behind France, and infinitely behind Germany.

And the worst of it is, that it is very difficult to see one's way to any immediate remedy for this state of affairs which shall be free from a tendency to become worse than the disease.

Great schemes for the Endowment of Research have been proposed. It has been suggested, that Laboratories for all branches of Physical Science, provided with every apparatus needed by the investigator, shall be established by the State; and shall be accessible, under due conditions and regulations, to all properly qualified persons. I see no objection to the principle of such a proposal. If it be legitimate to spend great sums of money on public Libraries and public collections of Painting and Sculpture, in aid of the man of letters, or the Artist, or for the mere sake of affording pleasure to the general public, I apprehend that it cannot be illegitimate to do as much for the promotion of scientific investigation. To take the lowest ground, as a mere investment of money, the latter is likely to be much more immediately profitable. To my mind, the difficulty in the way of such schemes is not theoretical, but practical. Given the laboratories, how are the investigators to be maintained? What career is open to those who have been thus encouraged to leave bread-winning pursuits? If they are to be provided for by endowment, we come back to the College Fellowship system, the results of which, for Literature, have not been so brilliant that one would wish to see it extended to Science; unless some much better securities, than at present exist, can be taken that it will foster real work. You know that among the Bees, it depends on the kind of cell in which the egg is deposited, and the quantity and quality of food which is supplied to the grub, whether it shall turn out a busy little worker or a big idle queen. And, in the human hive, the cells of the endowed larvæ are always tending to enlarge, and their food to improve, until we get queens, beautiful to behold, but which gather no honey and build no comb.

I do not say that these difficulties may not be overcome, but their gravity is not to be lightly estimated.

In the meanwhile, there is one step in the direction of the endowment of research which is free from such objections. It is possible to place the scientific inquirer in a position in which he shall have ample leisure and opportunity for original work, and yet shall give a fair and tangible equivalent for those privileges. The establishment of a Faculty of Science in every University, implies that of a corresponding number of Professorial chairs, the incumbents of which need not be so burdened with teaching as to deprive them of ample leisure for original work. I do not think that it is any impediment to an original investigator to have to devote a moderate portion of his time to lecturing, or superintending practical instruction. On

the contrary, I think it may be, and often is, a benefit to be obliged to take a comprehensive survey of your subject ; or to bring your results to a point, and give them, as it were, a tangible objective existence. The besetting sins of the investigator are two : the one is the desire to put aside a subject, the general bearings of which he has mastered himself, and pass on to something which has the attraction of novelty ; and the other, the desire for too much perfection, which leads him to

“ Add and alter many times,
Till all be ripe and rotten ; ”

to spend the energies which should be reserved for action, in whitening the decks and polishing the guns.

The necessity for producing results for the instruction of others, seems to me to be a more effectual check on these tendencies, than even the love of usefulness or the ambition for fame.

But supposing the Professorial forces of our University to be duly organized, there remains an important question, relating to the teaching power, to be considered. Is the Professorial system—the system, I mean, of teaching in the lecture-room alone, and leaving the student to find his own way when he is outside the lecture-room—adequate to the wants of learners ? In answering this question, I confine myself to my own province, and I venture to reply for Physical Science, assuredly and undoubtedly, No. As I have already intimated, practical work in the Laboratory is absolutely indispensable, and that practical work must be guided and superintended by a sufficient staff of Demonstrators, who are for Science, what Tutors are for other branches of study. And there must be a good supply of such Demonstrators. I doubt if the practical work of more than twenty students can be properly superintended by one Demonstrator. If we take the working day at six hours, that is twenty minutes a-piece—not a very large allowance of time for helping a dull man, for correcting an inaccurate one, or even for making an intelligent student clearly apprehend what he is about. And, no doubt, the supplying of a proper amount of this tutorial, practical teaching, is a difficulty in the way of giving proper instruction in Physical Science in such Universities as that of Aberdeen, which are devoid of endowments ; and, unlike the English Universities, have no moral claim on the funds of richly endowed bodies to supply their wants.

Examination—thorough, searching examination—is an indispensable accompaniment of teaching ; but I am almost inclined to commit myself to the very heterodox proposition that it is a necessary evil. I am a very old Examiner, having, for some twenty years past, been occupied with examinations on a considerable scale, of all sorts and

conditions of men, and women, too,—from the boys and girls of elementary schools to the candidates for Honours and Fellowships in the Universities. I will not say that, in this case as in so many others, the adage, that familiarity breeds contempt, holds good; but my admiration for the existing system of examination and its products, does not wax warmer as I see more of it. Examination, like fire, is a good servant, but a bad master; and there seems to me to be some danger of its becoming our master. I by no means stand alone in this opinion. Experienced friends of mine do not hesitate to say that students whose career they watch, appear to them to become deteriorated by the constant effort to pass this or that examination, just as we hear of men's brains becoming affected by the daily necessity of catching a train. They work to pass, not to know; and outraged Science takes her revenge. They do pass, and they don't know. I have passed sundry examinations in my time, not without credit, and I confess I am ashamed to think how very little real knowledge underlay the torrent of stuff which I was able to pour out on paper. In fact, that which examination, as ordinarily conducted, tests, is simply a man's power of work under stimulus, and his capacity for rapidly and clearly producing that which, for the time, he has got into his mind. Now, these faculties are by no means to be despised. They are of great value in practical life, and are the making of many an advocate, and of many a so-called statesman. But in the pursuit of truth, Scientific or other, they count for very little, unless they are supplemented by that long-continued, patient "intending of the mind," as Newton phrased it, which makes very little show in Examinations. I imagine that an Examiner who knows his students personally, must not unfrequently have found himself in the position of finding A's paper better than B's, though his own judgment tells him, quite clearly, that B is the man who has the larger share of genuine capacity.

Again, there is a fallacy about Examiners. It is commonly supposed that anyone who knows a subject is competent to teach it; and no one seems to doubt that anyone who knows a subject is competent to examine in it. I believe both these opinions to be serious mistakes: the latter, perhaps, the more serious of the two. In the first place, I do not believe that any one who is not, or has not been, a teacher is really qualified to examine advanced students. And in the second place, Examination is an Art, and a difficult one, which has to be learned like all other arts.

Beginners always set too difficult questions—partly because they are afraid of being suspected of ignorance if they set easy ones, and partly from not understanding their business. Suppose that you want to test the relative physical strength of a score of young men. You do not put a hundredweight down before them, and tell each to swing it

round. If you do, half of them won't be able to lift it at all, and only one or two will be able to perform the task. You must give them half a hundredweight, and see how they manœuvre that, if you want to form any estimate of the muscular strength of each. So, a practised Examiner will seek for information respecting the mental vigour and training of candidates from the way in which they deal with questions easy enough to let reason, memory, and method, have free play.

No doubt, a great deal is to be done by the careful selection of Examiners, and by the copious introduction of practical work, to remove the evils inseparable from examination; but, under the best of circumstances, I believe that examination will remain but an imperfect test of knowledge, and a still more imperfect test of capacity, while it tells next to nothing about a man's power as an investigator.

There is much to be said in favour of restricting the highest degrees in each Faculty, to those who have shown evidence of such original power, by prosecuting a research under the eye of the Professor in whose province it lies; or, at any rate, under conditions which shall afford satisfactory proof that the work is theirs. The notion may sound revolutionary, but it is really very old—for, I take it, that it lies at the bottom of that presentation of a thesis by the candidate for a doctorate, which has now, too often, become little better than a matter of form.

Thus far, I have endeavoured to lay before you, in a too brief and imperfect manner, my views respecting the teaching half—the Magistri and Regentes—of the University of the Future. Now let me turn to the learning half—the Scholares.

If the Universities are to be the sanctuaries of the highest culture of the country—those who would enter that sanctuary, must not come with unwashed hands. If the good seed is to yield its hundredfold harvest, it must not be scattered amidst the stones of ignorance, or the tares of undisciplined indolence and wantonness. On the contrary, the soil must have been carefully prepared, and the Professor should find that the operations of clod-crushing, draining, and weeding, and even a good deal of planting, have been done by the Schoolmaster.

That is exactly what the Professor does not find in any University in the three Kingdoms that I can hear of—the reason of which state of things lies in the extremely faulty organization of the majority of secondary Schools. Students come to the Universities ill-prepared in classics and mathematics, not at all prepared in anything else; and half their time is spent in learning that which they ought to have known when they came.

I sometimes hear it said that the Scottish Universities differ from the English, in being to a much greater extent places of comparatively elementary education for a younger class of students. But it would seem doubtful if any great difference of this kind really exists; for a high authority, himself Head of an English College, has solemnly affirmed that: "Elementary teaching of youths under twenty is now the only function performed by the University;" and that Colleges are "boarding schools in which the elements of the learned languages are taught to youths."*

This is not the first time that I have quoted those remarkable assertions. I should like to engrave them in public view, for they have not been refuted; and I am convinced that if their import is once clearly apprehended, they will play no mean part when the question of University reorganization, with a view to practical measures, comes on for discussion. You are not responsible for this anomalous state of affairs now; but, as you pass into active life and acquire the political influence to which your education and your position should entitle you, you will become responsible for it, unless each in his sphere does his best to alter it, by insisting on the improvement of secondary Schools.

Your present responsibility is of another, though not less serious, kind. Institutions do not make men, any more than organization makes life; and even the ideal University we have been dreaming about, will be but a superior piece of mechanism, unless each student strive after the ideal of the Scholar. And that ideal, it seems to me, has never been better embodied than by the great Poet, who, though lapped in luxury, the favourite of a Court, and the idol of his countrymen, remained through all the length of his honoured years a Scholar in Art, in Science, and in Life.

"Would'st shape a noble life? Then cast
No backward glances towards the past:
And though somewhat be lost and gone,
Yet do thou act as one new-born.
What each day needs, that shalt thou ask;
Each day will set its proper task.
Give other's work just share of praise;
Not of thine own the merits raise.
Beware no fellow man thou hate:
And so in God's hands leave thy fate."

T. H. HUXLEY.

* "Suggestions for Academical Organization, with Especial Reference to Oxford,"
By the Rector of Lincoln.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "CONTEMPORARY REVIEW."

SIR,—Will you allow me to add, by way of appendix to Mr. Hunt's article on Dogmatic Extremes in the last number of your REVIEW, a few remarks which had suggested themselves to me on reading the *Pall Mall* article to which he refers.

The drift of that article was to show that the position of Broad Churchmen is logically untenable, and scarcely honest morally. Now it appears to me that the existing views on the subject of religion may be broadly classified under the heads of Rationalism, Rational Religion, and Irrational Religion: the typical forms of each being, of the first, Positivism; of the second, Broad-Churchism; of the third, Ultramontaniam. The first admits of no supernatural element in religion, and is, in fact, exclusive of anything which deserves to be called religious faith or worship at all. The third looks upon the exercise of reason as godless, and demands absolute, unquestioning submission to authority, whether of the Bible or of the Church. The second holds that reason and faith are equally important elements of man's nature, and that no system can be true which repudiates the exercise of either. It claims to carry out the directions of St. Paul, to give every man a reason for its hope, to pray with the spirit and with the understanding also. It is thus evident that it has a harder task before it than either of the others. While they start each from a single principle, and shut their eyes to everything which does not agree with this, rational religion finds itself compelled to acknowledge two principles which are often in apparent conflict. Admitting, on the one hand, the divine authority of an external revelation, and yet holding, on the other, that man possesses an earlier revelation no less divine in his reason and conscience, it is often hard pressed to reconcile the one with the other. In its attempts to do this it finds it necessary to distinguish between the letter and the spirit, between the temporary form and the permanent truth embodied in it. This alone naturally exposes it to a charge of vagueness, but it is further itself conscious of vagueness as it gropes its way on into

regions unexplored by the systematizers of the past ; holding, as it does, that no limit is set to inquiry, that all light comes from God, and that it is the duty of man to follow unshrinkingly whatever light is given to him.

The former source of vagueness is, I presume, that to which Principal Tulloch alludes in the passages quoted. If such vagueness is held to be conclusive against the value of a religion, what is to be said of the Anglican, as compared with the Romish, view of the Church or the Sacraments or the state after death ? What is to be said of the Epistle to the Hebrews as compared with Leviticus ? Of the Gospel compared with the Law ? If that which is most tangible is truest, we must all subscribe Falstaff's catechism.


In saying this I am far from asserting that vagueness is always the measure of spirituality. The Christian idea of God is certainly less vague than that held by Mr. Matthew Arnold, which, again, I should suppose to be both less vague and more spiritual than the Straussian. Vagueness is a practical weakness ; still it is better than definite falsehood ; and, if accompanied by a real yearning after truth, it is only a temporary state ; the spiritual eye becomes stronger, the object long gazed at stands out in clearer light.

It is, however, more with the general result of the article than with any special argument that I am concerned. It appears to me to aim at the extinction of the middle party and the aggrandizement of one or other of the extremes. Which extreme would profit, in the first instance, by such a change it is not difficult to foresee. The religious instinct, call it, if you will, superstition (for such it becomes when estranged from reason), is one of the most powerful and universal of feelings ; while appeals to the pure reason, whether in the shape of science or philosophy, can never reach more than a very small minority. No doubt extremes generate each other by reaction, and it is possible that England may be doomed to witness a seesaw between Atheism and Superstition when once the mediating principle is removed. If it should be so, no prospect can be more gloomy, whether for religion, for morality, or even for civilization itself.

In thus defending Broad-Churchism, I would not be misunderstood to defend the practice of all Broad Churchmen. I think they have done much to provoke the attacks which are now made upon them from all quarters, by their amiable eagerness to welcome—I had almost said to *toady*—all that comes to them in the guise of advanced thought of any kind. Is the Liberal party driven to some new political dodge to get up a cry for an election, or does some physicist scare the world with a new and startling hypothesis, at once a Broad Churchman will be found to declare that here we have the latest word of revelation. Thus the Church is degraded into a mere waiter upon the Press, a position neither dignified nor advantageous to itself, and most unfair to the nation which looks to it to test and

correct, not simply to echo, its passing whims and crotchets. It is to be hoped that the bracing air of adversity may serve to thin the ranks of the Broad Church of mere popularity hunters; and at the same time put the stronger men on their mettle to do the great work which is laid especially upon them—the reconciliation of religion and science.

J. B. MAYOR.



ULTRAMONTANISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

I TOOK up Mr. Stephen's article on Cæsarism and Ultramontaniam with a full hope of finding all that could be said for the former, and against the latter, urged with the close reasoning of which I have always believed the author to be a master. I laid it down with a feeling of disappointment. The case argued is not mine. The whole issue had been changed. The title ought to have been "Faith and Doubt." This is the sum of the argument. "Ultramontaniam is untenable, because Christianity cannot be proved to be true;" or, again, "Ultramontaniam cannot be proved to be true, because we cannot be certain of the existence of God." The whole article is a profuse verification of a sentence in the essay under attack, in which I said: "No man can deny that the authority of the Church is separate from all Civil powers, and within its own spiritual sphere supreme, without renouncing his Christian name, or the coherence of his reason." In this the article before us is not incoherent, and Mr. Stephen admits that; granting Christianity to be a Divine Revelation, and the Church to be a Divine institution, he does not see how he could stop short of my conclusions (p. 510).

He then proceeds to say that, so far from Christianity being proved to be true, even the existence of God is not certain: that the arguments of Locke, Clarke, Butler, Pascal, and Dr. Newman fail to prove it. He says: "We have all great want of light and knowledge about the nature of the world in which we live, and what is to follow it. We are all impelled to dwell upon the questions—What? Whence?

Whither?" (p. 503). He says "that the existence of God is probable enough to supply to men a motive to a virtuous life, but is not so established as to serve as a foundation for inferences about any particular event or institution" (p. 504). He then proceeds thus: "What is necessary for me to say is, that the truth of the history of Jesus Christ is not proved beyond all reasonable doubt as against ordinary men of the world on whom the clergy are trying to force their yoke on the strength of it" (p. 510). Mr. Stephen then goes on to consider the evidence of the truth "of the history of Jesus Christ as given in the Apostles' Creed." He believes, "supposing the universe to be the work of a Being having consciousness, will, and power, that such a Being would be able to raise the dead;" also, "assuming that Jesus Christ did actually live, die, rise, and ascend into heaven after working miracles, it would be rational to believe him;" and that it would be "probable that he would know more about God and a future state than other people" (p. 511); that he can imagine "evidence which would put these things beyond reasonable doubt." But he adds that of the witnesses of these facts, "most were not original witnesses" (p. 514); that they had only "hearsay;" that the vision on the way to Damascus is not easily distinguishable from the delusions of sunstroke" (p. 515); that as to the four Gospels, "the state of things is as if in the year 3800, the principal authorities as to the life of Napoleon Bonaparte were four popular biographies written in English somewhere about the present time, and quoting no authorities" (p. 515). Much more of the same kind on the Articles of the Apostles' Creed I gladly pass over, and come to the conclusion. Mr. Stephen proceeds: "Upon the whole it appears to me that ordinary men of the world both may and ought to say to Archbishop Manning, as I do, 'You have entirely failed to make out any sort of claim to be my spiritual master. . . . The fundamental principle upon which your whole system depends is based upon arguments which the limitation of human knowledge considerably weakens. The history which you next appeal to rests upon hearsay evidence which can no longer be tested, though innumerable points in it show the necessity of further inquiry or of continued doubt'" (pp. 525, 526). I have here collected what may be called the serious argument of the article, for I cannot believe that Mr. Stephen's excursions to Bellarmine and the Arabian Nights, the Limbus Patrum and the imaginary jury, the black man and the fishes, winding up with the wit of undergraduates about Moses and the whale, were intended for argument. When a writer has declared that Christianity is not yet proved to be true, and that the existence of God is doubtful, I think I may postpone my answer as to what I believe of infants dying without baptism. My answer cannot appreciably affect the thesis before us. I have indeed very explicitly given my answer to this question, publicly and in print, but to repeat

it here and now would break the line of what I have to say. I fully acknowledge that I cannot render Ultramontanism credible to any mind that does not believe the Articles of the Apostles' Creed; nor can I hope to render Christianity credible to any mind that is not convinced of the existence of God. The article before us is of great value. It reveals the position of a small number of minds among us. They are convinced that what they think is the opinion of their age. The more confidently they believe it themselves the more confidently they believe others must think as they do.

This comes out somewhat amusingly in two sentences. "The Church is simply a collective name for a number of *not very wise laymen*, superintended by clergymen who differ from the ordinary Anglican clergy principally in the colour of their spiritual veneering" (p. 526). Ten lines lower we read, "I am entitled to appeal to the general conduct of the *lay world* as a plain proof that *mine* are the views usually entertained by *laymen*." The lay world is thus divided into "not very wise laymen," and "laymen who hold my views." They, if not very wise, at least are wise. *Sapiunt quia sentiunt mecum*. This does not seem to me powerful or consecutive as reasoning. And when I recall to mind the belief of Englishmen in the Christian Revelation, and in the existence of God, it does not seem to me to be a true estimate of the laymen of the Church of England, or of the Established Kirk or of the Free Kirk of Scotland, or of the Nonconformists in either country. I hope I have said nothing disrespectful to Mr. Stephen, for whom I entertain a true regard. It will not, I hope, give him pain if I add how well I am aware, that to him Ultramontanism must be foolishness if indeed I am right in affirming Ultramontanism to be Christianity.

Although I cannot think that I shall be expected to enter upon the question whether God exists or no, as a necessary condition to the discussion of Ultramontanism, I cannot refrain from making certain remarks on Mr. Stephen's argument.

First, I am glad to see that he justly and truly appreciates the nature of the evidence which is to be expected or required for proving the existence of God. He says, "I should not require a mathematical demonstration" (p. 503). It was probably therefore a slip of the pen when he wrote that I am not entitled to affirm the existence of God unless I affirm it as I would the proposition, "two straight lines cannot inclose a space" (p. 504).

Secondly, I am not sure that I understand Mr. Stephen's comment on Bishop Butler's letter to Clarke, in reference to the book on "The Demonstration of the Being of God." Does Mr. Stephen mean that Bishop Butler expressed himself to be in doubt as to the sufficiency of the proof for the existence of God? Butler says only that he cannot make up his mind to affirm that the proof is

demonstrative. That he held the proof to be *certain* is beyond all question. He doubted only whether it reached the character of demonstration. We in England have affixed to the word *demonstration* a technical and second intention. We confine it to such proofs as science, properly so called, can afford. Clarke used the word in its larger sense, as other languages of Latin origin are wont to do; intending to affirm that the moral certainty of the existence of God amounts to demonstration. It does indeed amount to a certainty beyond all doubt. But it cannot be stated in terms which involve the intrinsic impossibility of conceiving its contradictory, as in the proposition, that "two parallel lines can never meet," "the whole is greater than a part," and the like. It was of this only that I understand Bishop Butler to hesitate.

Thirdly, it seems to me that Mr. Stephen has failed to state correctly the method of proving the Divine origin of Christianity and the Divine foundation of the Church.

He has treated it as a question of evidence from Scripture. Surely it is a question of facts. The documents of the New Testament may be offered in proof at a certain stage of the argument; but assuredly not at the outset.

Again, Mr. Stephen writes as if the *onus* of proving Christianity to be true rests upon us who believe it. But surely at this time of day the *onus* of proving it to be false or to be doubtful rests upon those who refuse to believe it. Meanwhile, *Securus judicat orbis terrarum*. The Christian world is in possession. It is a fact which must be accounted for before Christianity can be rejected. It is a visible fact, as palpable as the British Empire. It is a fact in history which can be traced up to its foundation. As the British Empire has its succession of Sovereigns, its unwritten and written laws, its legislature, and its tribunals, its customs and traditions of public and private life, its documents and records: so has the Christian Church, more widely known more profuse in evidence, more open to every kind of test. Like the British Empire, the Church has a corporate identity and living consciousness which are traceable up to the time of its Founder. Its account of itself rests upon a history which cannot be rejected without shaking all evidence, except the personal eye-witness and ear-witness of each man for himself. If we were to believe nothing but what we have seen, heard, and touched, the human mind would dwell in a blank isolation. The Divine origin of the Christian Church rests upon a history which cannot be shaken without shaking the foundations of all moral certainty. It rests upon a legitimate authority of direct evidence, the most explicit and uninterrupted to be found in all history. It claims our belief on the maximum of historical certainty. If its history is not to be believed, all history would be shaken.

St. Augustine says :—"Si auferatur haec fides de rebus humanis, quis non attendat quanta rerum perturbatio, quam horrenda confusio subsequeretur."—*De Fide*, cap. 2, n. 4.

And Grotius :—"Pro rerum diversitate, diversa quoque sunt probandi genera. Alia in mathematicis, alia de affectionibus corporum, alia circa deliberationes, alia ubi facti est quaestio : in quo genere standum est nulla suspicione laborantibus testimoniis ; quod nisi admittitur non modo omnis historiae usus perit, medicinae quoque pars magna, sed et omnis quae inter parentes liberosque est pietas, ut quos haud aliter noscamus."—*De Verit. Relig. Christ.* lib. ii, c. 29.

I use authority here, not in its official or jurisdictional sense, but in its etymological sense, for the motive of our belief or source of evidence. No witnesses have authority but those who are competent and veracious. All incompetent and unveracious witnesses are excluded as illegitimate, because wanting in the properties necessary for evidence. But the common sense and common lot of mankind compel us to believe much upon authority.

The whole formation of the human mind, *ante usum rationis*, is by necessity on authority, which is legitimate both by parental duty and by competence of reason.

The scientific knowledge of almost all men is received on authority.

The whole practice of medicine and surgery exacts submission to authority.

The whole historical knowledge of men rests upon two authorities which do not corroborate each other : first, on the authority of historical monuments and documents, and next upon the authority of the historical critic.

This is no small tax on our submission, or credulity ; and if we were not free to disbelieve every word of it, and if the value of a halfpenny or the slightest civil privilege depended upon it, we should perhaps rise against it. And yet to reject the authority of human history would be an irrational act, unworthy of reasonable men.

But why ? Because its authority is measured by its evidence : because if the writers who give testimony to facts of the past be competent and veracious, they have a claim to be believed : above all, if they were eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses of the facts they relate. They have then the highest certainty of sense and reason for what they record.

To affect to doubt the credibility of human history is the work of reckless or senseless men ; it is to ruin the traditional basis of right, and law, and contracts, and moral obligations, and loyalty, and authority in the commonwealth and in human life.

For the truths of the natural order, which are the proper objects

of moral and metaphysical philosophy, we have the legitimate authority of the monuments and documents of the old world; which testify to us the belief of mankind in the existence and nature of God, of the human soul, and of the primary distinctions of morality. This *communis consensus* is an authority sufficient to demand my attention. It is also a criterion whereby to distinguish these uniform and universal truths from the local partial idiosyncratic opinions of men or of ages. And yet though this be a *rule*, it is not the *motive* of my belief. I believe these truths on their own intrinsic evidence, which manifests them to my reason, and my reason reflecting on itself verifies the conformity of its own acts with these truths, and thereby generates in my reason a certainty which excludes the hesitations of probability and the entrance of doubt.

Again, the visible fact of the Christian world proposes to my reason the maximum of evidence for the events upon which it rests. That evidence is the evidence of eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses. It is a part of their autobiography; their testimony was an adequate motive of credibility to those who heard them; the expansion of that testimony throughout the world, and its continuity through all ages, if it has not added to the *intrinsic* certainty of the facts, has in no way lessened it. But it has proportionally increased the *extrinsic* evidence by way of corroboration and accumulation, reaching up to the moment of the facts alleged. I affirm, therefore, that this authority is both competent and veracious, and therefore legitimate; and that its action upon the human reason is not by way of imperious command, but of the proposition of evidence. It comes and speaks to us, clothed with the evidence of its testimony.

Authority is, therefore, not an imperious act substituting command for reason, *Sic volo sic jubeo stet pro ratione voluntas*: but it is reason and evidence speaking by a legitimate voice. Authority and evidence are thereby identical and convertible.

Bishop Butler has pointed out that the proof of Christianity does not rest only upon the probative force of particular evidences, but also upon the *cumulus* of a multitude of proofs and probabilities which amounts to moral certainty. He says:—"Thus the evidence of Christianity will be a long series of things reaching as it seems from the beginning of the world to the present time, of great variety and compass, taking in both the direct and also the collateral proofs; and making up all of them together one argument; the conviction arising from which kind of proof may be compared to what they call *the effect* in architecture or other works of art; a result from a great number of things so and so disposed, and taken into one view."*

Again, he says:—"Admitting the fact that God has afforded to some no more than doubtful evidence of religion; the same account

* "Analogy," part ii. chap. vii.

may be given of it, as of difficulties and temptations with regard to practice. But as it is not impossible, surely, that this alleged doubtfulness may be men's own fault; it deserves their most serious consideration, whether it be not so. However it is certain that doubting implies a degree of evidence for that of which we doubt; and that this degree of evidence as really lays us under obligation, as demonstrative evidence."†

Now, though I have not called upon Mr. Stephen to admit my claim to be "his spiritual master," on the arguments offered in the Essay on Cæsarism and Ultramontaniam, I fully admit that I have bound myself to justify my assertions that the Church is separate from all civil powers, and within its own sphere supreme. This is my thesis, and this has been attacked. This I am in duty bound to defend, and with this only I have now to do. If the Lord Chief Justice had delayed judgment the other day until Counsel had argued the Mosaic Cosmogony, the lawful heir of the Tichborne estates would still be long kept out of his rights. I will not then be captured by the temptation to discuss even the existence of God, though I admit it to be fundamental not only to Ultramontaniam, but to the civilization of man; and that because in this present contention it is so remote as to be irrelevant.

I am addressing those who believe Christianity to be a Divine Revelation.

I will therefore dismiss from this contention the two first of Mr. Stephen's four theses, namely:—

1. There is a God.

2. The historical statements of the Apostles' Creed are all true, in fact; and amount to an account of the Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ.

And I accept as a duty the maintenance of the third and fourth.

3. Jesus Christ established a Church with the constitution and powers which I claim for my Church.

4. My Church is the Church so established.

For the present I will confine myself to the third thesis.

And in proof of this I will offer in this article only the evidence of non-Catholic witnesses.

The point we have in hand is this, that the Church is separate and supreme.

I. The Established Church of England affirms to this day, in its whole ecclesiastical law and by the teaching of its highest authorities, that the Church of Jesus Christ is a society separate in its spiritual constitution from all civil powers and within its own sphere of doctrine and discipline supreme. In making this assertion I shall not be misunderstood to mean that the Established Church has preserved its spiritual supremacy in doctrine and discipline. I may refer

† *Ibid.*, conclusion.

to the first essay in a volume lately published, in which I have expressly shown that the change effected by the 24 and 25 of Henry VIII. has reduced its spiritual powers to subjection. Nevertheless the spiritual supremacy in doctrine and discipline is in *theory* explicitly recognised in the very statutes by which in practice it has been suspended. The claim pretended by constitutional lawyers from Lord Coke downwards, that the Acts of Henry VIII. did not create any new jurisdiction in the Crown, but only restored its ancient supremacy, is enough alone to prove this point. No man of ordinary knowledge will pretend that the Catholic Church in England prior to Henry VIII., was not in perfect communion of doctrine and discipline with the Church throughout the world, and no man will venture to say, with St. Gregory VII. and St. Thomas of Canterbury before his eyes, that the Catholic Church did not claim and vindicate to itself its spiritual supremacy in faith and morals. If anybody has doubt as to the independence and spiritual supremacy within its own sphere of the Church of England from its first foundation, I may refer to the Essay already mentioned, and to such works as Spelman's Councils, Wilkins' Concilia, and the collections of Mr. Haddan and Mr. Stubbs. The doctrine cannot be better summed up than in the following passages. Of the Anglican Councils, after speaking of the provincial and diocesan synods, &c., Mr. Wilkins says:—

“Besides these councils in the time of the Anglo-Saxons, convened for the affairs of the Commonwealth, there met also synods of the clergy, in which the bishops as ecclesiastical judges presided, and promulgated rules and statutes in matters purely ecclesiastical. And if at any time during the session of the civic councils there were any urgent necessity to treat of ecclesiastical questions, the bishops used to withdraw from the convention of the state to an ecclesiastical synod, to decide on points affecting the welfare of the Church; and their decrees sometimes received the assent of Parliament, and in this manner acquired the authority of the laws of the kingdom, in addition to their force as the canons of the Church.

“To these Synodical assemblies of the Saxon times we must add other ecclesiastical councils, which so long as they had no civil character, were held at the summons of the archbishop, by the suffragan bishop and prelates. The kings with their nobles attended them *by invitation*; and such of their proceedings as they approved obtained the royal assent. If any ecclesiastical canons were made in synod in the king's absence, they were enjoined on the whole Anglican clergy by the decree of the custos and nobles of the kingdom, and the king's counsellors in the next convention. None of the determinations of the ecclesiastical councils were regarded as *public statutes* unless approved and confirmed by the supreme power of the sovereign.”

After the Conquest Wilkins says:—

“When ecclesiastical matters were to be treated, the legate of the Pope, or the archbishop, with the consent, sometimes by the order of the king, caused a mandate for the holding of a synod to be published, the meeting of which mostly coincided with the state assemblies or festivals, so that the king might be present to conduct the proceedings, and either restrain or

confirm them. In the king's absence abroad, the archbishop had from him authority to convene the bishops and prelates, even when the great councils were not held."—*Wilkins Dissertatio de veteri et moderna Synodi Anglicanæ constitutione*, viii., prefixed to the Concilia.

Johnson's account is as follows :—

"During the time of our Saxon and even Danish kings, the bishops were in full possession of the power of making as well as executing canons ; nor does it appear that they ever abused it to the hurt of civil government. Our kings were so far from apprehending any mischief from ecclesiastical synods, or from sending their prohibitions to them, that they often honoured these assemblies with the presence of themselves and their nobility without interposing in their debates or giving any stop or impediment to their definitions. The Norman princes never attempted to diminish or interrupt the archbishop's ancient right and practice of assembling synods, and making such canons and ecclesiastical provisions as were deemed necessary or seasonable. But after the Pope had set himself up for sovereign in *temporals* as well as *spirituals*, and in order to exercise this sovereignty had introduced his canon law into all nations that were in communion with him, and had a number of men in every country ready to execute his will and pleasure, in opposition to the *civil* government, and to its great detriment, our kings saw it necessary to check the arrogance of the Pope, and his creatures here in England, by sending prohibition to the bishops in their synods (that they might make no canons to the injury of the king's prerogative, and of the civil constitution) and in their courts, that they might put no such canon in execution. * * * But still the authority of enacting canons and constitutions in matters merely *spiritual*, and the cognizance of such causes remained untouched, entirely in the hands of the convocation as to the *enactive* part, and of the prelates as to the *executive*.

"Though the Saxon bishops had an unlimited power of making canons, yet we have many laws relating to matters merely spiritual enacted by kings in their great councils or civil gemotes. This may seem to some to have been an entrenchment on the authority of the bishops. To this it has been answered that the bishops, without whom no great council was held, retired into a place by themselves in order to draw up and enact laws relating to religion, as was the practice in some neighbouring countries. And I will not deny that this might sometimes be done. Yet when I see here and there an ecclesiastical law interspersed among a great number of such as are purely temporal, at other times almost an equal number of ecclesiastical and civil laws mutually succeeding each other in the same system, at other times two or three ecclesiastical laws dropped into a set of temporal, and *vice versâ*, temporal among ecclesiastical ; I am inclined to believe that both sorts of laws were made by an amicable conjunction of both powers. In truth the old Saxon laws and English statutes made in relation to the Church were in effect only civil sanctions of old canons or grants made to the Church of some civil privileges, which she enjoyed not before, or a reinforcement of such grant with penalties annexed, and there could be no reason why the bishops and clergy should not accept the assistance of kings and great men for these purposes. * * * I do not remember a single instance of a law (before the Conquest) but what any bishop upon the principles of that age might fairly consent to, and no law relating to the Church or religion, but what may justly be thought to have been promoted if not postulated by the prelates. And I take the Articles of Clarendon (A.D. 1164) to be the first instance in our history of making laws that bishops did not care to sign."—*Johnson's Ecclesiastical Laws*, part i., Preface xxiii., xxiv.

I have given these quotations in full, because they will afford the best prelude and exposition of the celebrated Act of 24 Henry VIII., by which religion in England has been made to depend upon the civil power. We have seen that the Church in England was from the first recognized as a spiritual society of Divine foundation, invested with Divine authority, both legislative and judicial, independent of all civil powers, and in matters of doctrine and spiritual discipline supreme. The frequent violations of this divine authority, and the royal customs which usurped upon this independence are simple violations and usurpations, which in no way extinguish or annul the divine rights and powers of the Church. The encroachments of the royal power were ever advancing from the Conquest to the reign of Henry VIII. In the reign of Henry II. they were checked and thrown back for awhile by the martyrdom of St. Thomas of Canterbury. Afterwards they revived again and gathered strength, and at last grew to a head in the reign of Henry VIII., under the form and title of the Royal Supremacy. Nevertheless it will be found, that in theory the divine foundation, authority, rights, powers, and office of the Church both in doctrine and discipline were still recognized in the fatal statute which rent England from the Catholic faith and unity. The preamble of the 24 of Henry VIII. runs as follows:—

“Where by divers sundry and authentick Histories and Chronicles, it is manifestly declared and expressed, that this Realm of England is an Empire, and so hath been accepted in the world, governed by one supreme Head and King, having Dignity and Royal Estate of the Imperial Crown of the same: Unto whom a Body politick, compact of all sorts and degrees of people, divided in terms and by names of Spirituality and Temporality, been bounden and owen to bear next to God a natural and humble obedience: He being also institute and furnished, by the goodness and sufferance of Almighty God, with plenary whole and entire Power, Pre-eminence, Authority, Prerogative, and Jurisdiction, to render and yield Justice and final determination to all manner of folk, resiants or subjects within this his Realm, in all Causes, Matters, Debates and Contentions happening to occur, insurge or begin within the limits thereof, without restraint or provocation to any foreign Princes or Potentates of the World: The Body Spiritual whereof having power, when any cause of the Law Divine happened to come in-question, or of Spiritual Learning that it was declared, interpreted and shewed by that part of the Body politick, called the Spirituality, now being usually called the English Church.”*

The preamble affirms the following points:—

1. That the realm of England has only one supreme head and king.
2. That the body politic, subject to that supreme head, is divided into spirituality and temporality.
3. That the body spiritual has power, when any cause of the law

* “On the Spiritual Jurisdiction of the Church of England,” 24 Henry VIII. cap. 12. For the Restraint of Appeals.—Gibson’s “Codex,” vol. ii. p. 924. Oxford, 1761.

divine or of spiritual learning should come in question, to declare and interpret, and that part of the body politic called the Spirituality was called usually the English Church.

The effect, therefore, of this statute was, as its title declares, to restrain appeals by excluding all authority of the Holy See. As regards, indeed, the universal Church, this statute violates both unity and faith; but as regards the constitution of the local Church in England it made no organic change. The two provinces of Canterbury and York with their spiritual jurisdiction, tribunals and judges, for doctrine and for discipline, remained as before. They were however paralysed and annulled by the erection of an appellate jurisdiction higher than the Court of the Metropolitan and vested in the Crown. Against this, it was, among other things, that St. Thomas of Canterbury contended to the death. One of the Constitutions of Clarendon runs as follows:—"Ab Archidiacono debebit procedi ad episcopum, ab episcopo, ad archiepiscopum, et si Archiepiscopus defuerit in iusticia exhibenda ad Dominum Regem perveniendum est postremo." The jurisdiction and tribunals of Archdeacons, Bishops, and Archbishops, in both cases were left intact, though they might be annulled in the last resort, but even in this case, as we shall see hereafter, it has been done not by denying the spiritual rights and powers of the Church, but under the plea of reviewing and correcting the forms of procedure. Throughout the whole of the Tudor legislation, notwithstanding the encroachments of the Crown and Parliament, and the actual violations of liberties and office of the Church, its divine constitution, rights, and powers, synods and tribunals, for doctrine and for discipline, were always explicitly recognized and professedly respected. I can hardly think it necessary to load this article with quotations in proof of this assertion. The members of the Anglican Church will certainly not require it, excepting those only who represent the small Erastian school, which has always existed in it. It may nevertheless be as well to show in what language the highest authorities of the Anglican Church have spoken in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, on the divine authority of the Church, its unbroken succession, the powers of the keys and of ordination, the deposit of the faith, and the teaching and judicial office of the Church.

Bishop Bilson says, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth:—

"The Apostles' charge to teach, baptize, and administer the Lord's Supper, to bind and loose sinners in heaven and in earth, to impose hands for the ordaining pastors and elders: these parts of the apostolic function and charge are not decayed and cannot be wanting in the Church of God. There must either be no Church, or else these must remain; for without these no Church can continue."*

* Bilson, "Perpetual Government of Christ's Church," chap. ix. p. 156. Oxford edition, 1842.

In the same manner Hooker says :—

“ In that they are Christ’s ambassadors, and His labourers, who should give them their commission, but He whose most inward affairs they manage? Is not God alone the Father of spirits? Are not souls the purchase of Jesus Christ? What angel in heaven could have said to man, as our Lord did unto Peter, Feed my sheep, preach, baptize, do this in remembrance of me, whose sins ye retain they are retained, and their offences in heaven pardoned whose faults you shall on earth forgive.†”

Jeremy Taylor says :—

“ If Antichrist shall exalt himself above all that is called God, and in Scripture none but Kings and Priests are such, *Dii, vocati, Dii facti*, I think we have great reason to be suspicious that he that divests both of their power does the work of Antichrist for him especially if the discipline or government, which Christ hath instituted is that kingdom by which He governs all Christendom when they throw Christ out of His kingdom.”‡

Bishop Beveridge, speaking of the succession of Bishops, says :—
“ By which means the same Spirit which was breathed by our Lord into His Apostles is together with their office transmitted to their lawful successors the pastors and governors of our Church at this time; and acts, moves, and assists at the administration of the several parts of the Apostolic office in our days as much as ever.”§

Almost any amount of quotations might be added from Andrewes, Hall, Laud, Bramhall, Hammond, Pearson, and a host of others. I will, however, add but one more witness, and that because his language is identical with that which is to be found in “Cæsarism and Ultramontanism.” In the midst of the controversy between Atterbury and Wake and Kennet, on the subject of the Royal Supremacy and the independence of the Church, Leslie, one of the best defenders of the Church of England, writes thus :—

“ I intend not to interpose in this dispute; only this use I have to make of it, that both parties do now happily agree in the original and inherent rights of the Church as a society *distinct* from and *independent* upon the State, even when the State is Christian. This Dr. Kennet does frankly declare to be the chief end that moved him to write his book, viz., ‘to assert the nature of the Christian Church as a society endowed with fundamental rights to preserve its own being; and among these a right for the governors to assemble and agree upon the common measures of faith and unity as at first independent on the heathen, so even now on the Christian magistrate, when the necessities of desertion or persecution so require.’ The Christian Church was endowed as a society with a divine right of preserving the faith and securing the discipline that should be necessary to hinder the gates of hell from prevailing against her. In order to this end the Church governors had authority to meet and consult upon all urgent affairs.”

† Hooker, “Ecclesiastical Polity,” Book v. section 77.

‡ “Taylor on Episcopacy,” introduction.

§ Beveridge, “Sermon on Christ’s Presence.”

Leslie says that Kennet quarrels with Atterbury, because

"He claims no divine right ; he quotes not one text for the divine right of councils he proposes no one reason for the necessity of such an inherent and original power in the Church ; he does not labour to prove that Christian magistrates cannot retract nor a national clergy recede from antecedent rights ; he waives the Christian, and acts only the Englishman. I am sorry the Church of England has come to that pass, that to assert her only rights is to waive the Christian. Have not our laws confirmed to her all the rights belonging to a Christian Church ? if not, sure they should be mended."

I may say that Leslie's whole work, from beginning to end, affirms as the doctrine of the Established Church of England, that the Christian Church, and the Church of England as a part of it, is a society separate from all civil powers, and in the exercise of its spiritual office in doctrine and discipline independent and supreme. I will, therefore, add only a few more passages :—

"If the independence of the Church not only on heathen but Christian magistrates be an original, inherent, and Divine right, with which Christ has invested her, it ought always to be maintained : good princes will be most willing to allow it, but if granted to them others will not part with it ; nor will they endure to have their encroachments on the rights of the Church called either persecution or desertion ; and they will always find time-servers and flatterers to support them in it."

He says it is the duty of bishops and priests—

"To tell them [civil rulers], and not to fear they will be displeased at it, that Christ is *above them* and His church too, and *independent* on them : that they themselves are part of her flock, and so *subject* to her discipline, and in that capacity as well as any other, though entirely and without reserve, subject to them in all temporals."

"Again, if bishops will not exercise that power, which Christ has given them, they are accountable to their Lord for it : but they cannot give it away neither from themselves nor from their successors, for it is theirs only to use, not to part with."

"This makes short work with the submission : let lawyers, therefore look to it, how they can reconcile it with this great and fundamental truth ; if not, then down it must come. The bishops are no ways concerned : let them try whether any judge in Westminster Hall will hold up an Act of Parliament against the Gospel ; or say, that they are more proper judges of the Gospel than the bishops. Let Erastus show his face without a vizard ; it is the only way to overthrow him effectually. You need not be afraid that any Christian will fall in love with him. But if the bishops will submit themselves to his yoke, who can speak in their defence ? Some would let them go, if religion did not go with them ; and that is the reason why others would have them gone. They find the keys of their discipline hung at the belt of Erastus ; and some would persuade them that it is best so, lest Pharaoh increase their burdens ; and that to think of a deliverance, is to put a sword in his hand to slay us !"*

There is nothing contained in the essay of "Cæsarism and Ultra-

* Lealie, "Preface to the Case of the Regale and Pontificale."—Works, vol. iii. Oxford, 1832.

montanism" more explicit than these passages. They assert the divine foundation, the divine authority, the divine office of the Church in doctrine and discipline, its judicial office by the power of the keys, its independence of the State, and its ultimate and supreme power in the sphere of spiritual things over all civil powers, as abundantly and as precisely as I have done. The relation of the Established Church to the Crown and civil power has always been justified in the following, or in similar terms. They have said :—

"1. It is an article of our Baptismal Faith, that the Church of Christ is a Divine Kingdom ; in this world, but not of it ; governed by its Divine Head through the Pastors whom He has lineally commissioned to feed His flock ; that to His Church He entrusted the custody of the Faith and Holy Sacraments ; or, as we say, of doctrine and discipline—with full spiritual power to administer and to rule in all things pertaining to the salvation of souls, by His authority and in His Name. For the perpetuity of the Church, and for the preservation of the Truth, He has pledged His own perpetual presence and the guidance of the Holy Spirit.

"From all which revealed promises and principles of His Divine Kingdom, it follows that the Church, in all things relating to the custody of doctrine and discipline, possesses a sole, supreme, and final power, under the guidance of its Divine Head, and responsible to Him only.

"2. And, further, we believe that the Church in England, as a member or province of this divine kingdom, possesses *in solidum*, by inherence and participation in the whole Church, the inheritance of the Divine Tradition of Faith, with a share in this full and supreme custody of doctrine, and power of discipline, partaking for support and perpetuity, in its measure and sphere, the same guidance as the whole Church at large, of which, by our Baptism, we have been made members.

"3. The Church in England, then, being thus an integral whole, possesses within itself the fountain of doctrine and discipline, and has no need to go beyond itself for succession, orders, mission, jurisdiction, and the office to declare to its own members, in matters of Faith, the intention of the Catholic Church. On this ground alone the present relation of the Church in England to the Church of the East and of the West can be justified. We trust that the spiritual organization of the Church, which, through Saxon, Norman, and English periods of our history, has united this great Christian people, surviving through all perils and mutilations, contains still within itself the whole doctrine and discipline, the Faith and Power descending from its Divine Head.

"So far from exalting the insular position of the Church in England into a normal state, we lament the unhappy suspension of communion which divides the visible Church of Christ. But we trust that

as, in the period of the great Western schism, the Churches of Spain, France, Germany, and many others were compelled to fall back within their own limits, and to rest upon the full and integral power which by succession they possessed for their own internal government; so the Church in England has continued to be a perfect member of this Divine Kingdom, endowed with all that is of necessity to the valid ministry of the Faith and Sacraments of Christ.

"On these grounds our chief writers and canonists have rested the defence of the English Church, and it is of vital necessity that the principles of this defence should not be violated.

"4. By this we see at once what is the office and relation of the Civil Power towards the Church at large, and in England in particular, namely, to protect, uphold, confirm, and further this, its sole, supreme, and final office, in all matters of doctrine and discipline. The joint but independent action of the spiritual and civil powers from our earliest history may be traced through the succession of our Councils and Parliaments—the king expressing and exercising the sum of the civil power, the Archbishop of the Spiritual,* of which joint action the celebrated preamble of the 24th of Henry VIII. cap. 12, is a recital and proof.

"5. The Royal Supremacy is, therefore, strictly and simply a civil or temporal power over all persons and causes in *temporal* things, and over ecclesiastical persons and causes in the *temporal* and *civil accidents* attaching to them. It is in itself, in no sense, spiritual or ecclesiastical—understanding the word ecclesiastical to mean anything beyond a *civil* power accidentally applied to ecclesiastical persons or causes.

"An Anglican would further add, that he knows of no supremacy in ecclesiastical matters inherent in the civil power or prince, but either (1) such power as all princes, Christian or heathen, alike possess; or (2) such as has been received by delegation from the Church itself.

"As to the first or original prerogative, Constantine, before his conversion, had as full a supremacy as after it; Julian, after his apostacy, had no less. St. Augustine says: "Qui Augusto imperium dedit ipse et Neroni . . . qui Constantino Christiano ipse Apostatæ Juliano."† The supremacy was simply a supreme dominion of power and coercion by the civil sword.

"As to the derived or delegated supremacy, it amounts to no more than a supreme power over all the forms and processes in which the *coercive* jurisdiction of the Church in Christian states has been clothed. It is neither legislative nor judicial by way of *discretion* or

* Stillingfleet, "Ecclesiastical Cases," vol. ii. p. 91.

† S. Aug. de Civit. Dei, lib. v. c. 21.

determination‡ in any matter relating to the faith or discipline of the Church."

If I were to object to such an Anglican argument, that the Convocations and tribunals of the Established Church have been again and again violently overborne by the Crown and Parliament, or by the Crown in Council, as, for instance, in the recent decisions in the case of Mr. Gorham and in the case of the *Essays and Reviews*, he would answer, that violence does not make law; and that though the Established Church suffers the intrusion of false doctrines, that does not alter its spiritual office; and, moreover, that the judges of the Privy Council recognize that spiritual office by expressly declaring that they are incompetent to judge as to the *truth* of any doctrine, and use their jurisdiction only to inquire what doctrines may *legally* be held and taught by the clergy of the Established Church. It is not my purpose now to point out the reach and bearing of this answer in relation to Catholic truth and unity. I adduce it only to show, that theoretically the law of England at this moment recognizes the spiritual office of the Church, and its exclusive competence in determining the truth of doctrine, and therein of judging whether and when its spiritual office and its doctrines are invaded. It was therefore strictly accurate to say, as I have said, that the Established Church of England affirms as broadly as I did, that the Christian Church is separate from all civil powers, and within its own spiritual sphere superior to them. It was, I believe, a profound consciousness of this truth which caused the conspicuous absence of the Anglican clergy from the late meetings at St. James's Hall and Exeter Hall. Self-respect made it impossible for them to take part in stirring up a No-Popery cry, and the consciousness, that the Falck laws are a tyrannous violation of the Divine constitution and office of the Church, as they themselves believe it, restrained them both in conscience and in justice from countenancing the outrages and persecution of the Prussian Government.

In thus drawing out the historical and legal theory of the Established Church in its relations to the civil power, I do not forget that a large latitudinarian and rationalistic section of its members would in practice refuse its spiritual office and authority. I must, however, affirm that the still larger numbers of its clergy and of its members who hold the theory and principles I have here drawn out are the truer representatives of its history and of its legal rights. Still less do I forget the habitual violations of these rights at all times, and in all reigns, for three hundred years. No one in these days can forget for a moment the Appeals to the Crown in Council, and the legalizing of false doctrine within the Established Church. These very facts

‡ Beveridge, "Synodicon Prolegomena," tom. i. p. 11. "*Leges Civiles non præcedere debent sed sequi ecclesiasticas.*"

have brought out into greater relief and fuller light the theory and claims of the Established Church as it exists on paper. It has, moreover, spread throughout a large part of its clergy and people a desire of separation from the Civil Power as the only way of obtaining independence. And lastly, it has called forth from many of the highest and best minds in the Establishment an outspoken declaration that they do not and will not recognize the sentences, or judgments, or condemnations of the Crown in Council either as affecting the Anglican Establishment, or as binding in any way upon their conscience. Such men, if consistent, may one day form a Free Kirk in England.

II. What has hitherto been proved from the documents of the Established Church in England may be even more easily proved from the documents of the Kirk of Scotland.

“Presbyter is but Priest writ large.”

In the first chapter of the *Second Book of Discipline*, under the title of *The Kirk's Jurisdiction is of God, and is groundit on the Word*, we read :—

“The Kirk . . . has a certain power granted by God according to the which it uses a proper jurisdiction and government exercised to the comfort of the whole kirk. This power ecclesiastical is an authority granted by God the Father through the Mediator Jesus Christ unto His kirk gathered, and having the ground in the Word of God to be put in execution by them, unto whom the Spiritual government of the kirk by lawful calling is committed.

“The policy of the kirk flowing from this power is an order or form of spiritual government which is exercised by the members appointed thereto by the Word of God, and therefore is given *immediately* to the office-bearers, by whom it is exercised to the weal of the whole body.”

Under the title *The Difference betwixt the spiritual and civil jurisdiction*, we read :—

“This power and policy ecclesiastical is different and distinct in the own nature from that power and policy ecclesiastical which is called the civil power, and appertains to the civil government of the Commonwealth, albeit they be both of God. . . .

“For this power ecclesiastical flows *immediately* from God and the Mediator, Jesus Christ, and is spiritual, *not having a temporal head on earth* but only Christ, the only spiritual king and governor of His kirk.

“It is a title falsely usurped by Antichrist to call himself Head of the Kirk, and ought not to be attributed to angel or man, of what estate that ever he be, saving to Christ, the only Head and Monarch of the Kirk.

“Therefore this power and policy of the Kirk should lean upon the Word *immediately* as the *only* ground thereof, and should be taken from the pure fountains of, the Scriptures, *the Kirk hearing the voice of Christ the only Spiritual king*, and being ruled by His laws.

“Notwithstanding as the ministers and others of the ecclesiastical estate are subject to the magistrate civil, so ought the person of the magistrate be subject to the Kirk spiritually and ecclesiastical government. And the exercise of both these jurisdictions cannot stand in one person ordinarily. The civil power is called the power of the sword, and the other the power of the keys.

"The civil power should command the spiritual to exercise and do their office according to the Word of God : the spiritual rulers should require the christian magistrate to administer justice and punish vice, and to maintain the liberty and quietness of the Kirk within their bounds.

"The magistrate handles external things only and actions done for men, but the spiritual ruler judges both inward affections and external actions in respect of conscience by the Word of God.

"The magistrate neither ought to preach, minister the sacraments, nor execute the censures of the Kirk, nor yet *prescribe any rule how it should be done.*

"Finally, as ministers are subject to the judgment and punishment of the magistrate in external things, if they offend, so ought the magistrates to submit themselves to the discipline of the Church if they transgress in matters of conscience and religion."

In the third chapter of the *Second Book of Discipline* is prescribed how persons are admitted to ecclesiastical office. Besides the inward calling of God, is required the outward calling of the Kirk ; and this has two parts—election and ordination. In the election must be the judgment of the eldership and the consent of the congregation. No intrusion contrary to these two conditions is valid.

In the tenth chapter, *Of the Office of a Christian Magistrate in the Kirk*, Christian Princes are said to be

"Holden to advance the Kingdom of Jesus Christ, to be nourishers of the Kirk, to maintain, foster, uphold, and defend it against all hurt. . . . Also to assist and maintain the discipline of the Kirk, and punish them civilly that will not obey the censure of the same *without confounding always the one jurisdiction with the other.* . . . To make laws and constitutions agreeable to God's Word, for advancement of the Kirk and policy thereof : without usurping anything that pertains not to the civil sword, but belongs to the offices that are merely ecclesiastical, as is the ministry of the Word and Sacraments, using of ecclesiastical discipline and the spiritual execution thereof, or any part of the power of the spiritual keys which our Master gave to the Apostles and their true successors."

We have here in the amplest terms the separate existence of the spiritual power, its independence, its direct authority derived from its own Head, its supremacy within its own sphere over the civil State and its rulers, its exclusive power to make spiritual laws, to pronounce spiritual judgments, to elect and ordain its own ministers, in absolute independence of all persons and powers of the civil State, and its right to invoke the secular arm to enforce by civil process the discipline and the judgments in which it admits neither of appeal nor review.

It would be waste of time to trace out the history of the Kirk, since these decrees were made. It gave pretty good evidence of its independence and supremacy in the seventeenth century, when it bound kings in chains and nobles in links of iron. It vindicated these great laws of liberty of conscience by noble histories of suffering unto bonds and death under the persecutions of Charles II.

III. Direct and explicit as the evidence of the Kirk of Scotland is in

proof of my assertion, the witness of the Free Kirk is still more decisive. Between the Established Kirk and the Free Kirk there is no particle of difference either in doctrine or discipline; the sole cause of the Disruption was the refusal of the Free Kirk to recognise the jurisdiction of any civil court in the call of ministers. They regarded the acquiescence of the Established Kirk in the claims of the civil courts to be at variance with their duty towards Christ, and fatal to the independence of His Church. On the 18th of May, 1843, four hundred and seventy-four ministers, headed by Dr. Chalmers, accompanied by a great body of elders and multitudes of people, separated themselves from the Established Kirk. By that act they revived in all their precision and intensity the principles of spiritual independence and supremacy declared by the *Second Book of Discipline*.

IV. Lastly, it can hardly be necessary to trace the history of what are called the Free Churches of England. They came into existence by a refusal of the Royal Supremacy in religious and ecclesiastical matters. This one principle of spiritual independence and liberty of conscience within the sphere of religion has created the Brownists, the Puritans, the Presbyterians, the Independents, the Baptists, and all Nonconformists of every name. For this one principle for two hundred and fifty years they suffered civil disfranchisement, penalties, imprisonment, capital punishment, exile, contempt, and every form of contumely and privation galling to upright and honourable men. In all these sufferings they had companions, who, though differing from them in the most sacred truths, nevertheless agreed with them in this, that the faith and the Church of Jesus Christ are "neither of men nor by men, but by the Holy Ghost," and that the authority of Revealed Truth is supreme over all civil powers. Nonconformists and Catholics lay bound in the same prisons and suffered on the same scaffold, and notwithstanding their wide divergence of faith, in this point at least they suffered for the same cause.

It would be easy to go on multiplying historical evidence of what I have affirmed, but I think that enough has been already offered to justify the main assertion, which has caused the criticism of Mr. Stephen. I had said: "All freedom of soul and conscience in men, in families, and in states, comes from the limitation of the civil power; but the limitation of the civil power can only come from superior authority. That superior authority is not in the order of material power, but of Divine right. The limitation which has changed Cæsarism into Christian Monarchy is Law; and that Law the Law of God, represented, expounded, applied upon earth by an authority of His own creation, and by judicial powers of His own delegation." These words read like a quotation from the *Second Book of Discipline*, or from the Anglican Leslie. There is not a syllable which does not fall within the limits of the Free Kirk of Scotland.

I further affirmed what follows: "Now what I have here asserted is Ultramontanism, but it is not Ultramontanism alone; it is Christianity as it has been held by all men in all ages, by Catholics and by Protestants alike, by Ultramontanes and Gallicans, by Anglicans and by Presbyterians, by the Free Churches of England, whose noble and pathetic history has just been written on the eve, as I fear, of their apostacy from the high and heroic spirit of their founders and fathers in patience and fidelity to the great law of Christian liberty in Jesus Christ."

I then added:—That Ultramontanism consists

1. In the separation of the two powers (spiritual and civil), and the vesting them in different persons;

2. In claiming for the Church the sole right to define doctrines of faith and morals; and


3. To fix the limits of its own jurisdiction in that sphere.

I affirm then once more, that these three principles are held by Anglicans, by Presbyterians, by Nonconformists of every name; and, further, that they are of the substance of Christianity: that no man can deny anyone of them without denying the office and even the existence of the Christian Church, or without affirming the preposterous and monstrous doctrine, that the revelation of Divine Truth is to be judged and disposed of by Royal mandates, legislative enactments, and civil tribunals, which is the lowest and basest form of Erastianism. *Cujus Regio ejus Religio*. Surely this is a denial of Revelation altogether. Why not say so at once?

I therefore affirm again that every Christian, who believes that Christianity is a Divine Revelation, must also believe that a Divine Revelation is independent of all civil authorities, and is dependent upon the authority of God alone, whether that Divine Authority make itself known by its own action in the isolated conscience of each individual man, or in the assembly of each Christian sect, or in the congregation of a Presbytery, or by the acts of an Episcopate, or by the voice of the Visible Head of the Universal Church. The forms, indeed, are different; the principle is one and the same. The Revelation of God is sustained and promulgated to the world by the authority of God Himself, in independence of all civil authorities, and in supremacy over them all.

This is the claim I have, therefore, made for the Catholic Church, abstracting from all forms of visible order and external polity; and I submit that Mr. Stephen's third thesis is maintained explicitly by the Anglican Establishment, the Established Kirk, the Free Kirk of Scotland, and by all Nonconformists in both countries: namely, that "Jesus Christ established a Church with the constitution (visible or invisible) and powers which I claim for my Church." The answer "We ought to obey God rather than men," carries the whole claim of Divine authority.

HENRY EDWARD,
Archbishop of Westminster.



THE EVOLUTION HYPOTHESIS, AND THE ORIGIN OF LIFE.

PART II.

HAVING endeavoured to show how very inconsistent is the view of certain leading Evolutionists, that Archebiosis was limited to the earliest stage or stages of the prodigious period during which living things have flourished upon the earth's surface ; and also how irreconcilable such a notion is with the fact of the existence of multitudes of almost structureless organisms at the present day, let us now turn to a brief consideration of the evidence which is considered by many to prove the present occurrence of Archebiosis. In other words, let us consider the nature of the evidence which may go to assure the Evolutionist that he need postulate no arbitrary infringement of the uniformity of nature, and that living matter, like other kinds of matter, comes into being by virtue of the same laws or molecular properties as suffice to regulate its growth.

When Professor Huxley delivered his celebrated Inaugural Address before the British Association in 1870, by disregarding the consideration of adverse facts, and bringing to the front a long chain of evidence on a subject which had only a very subordinate importance for the argument, he did his best to convince the public that there was no evidence justifying a belief in the present occurrence of Archebiosis—and that, on the contrary, the doctrine *omne vivum ex vivo* was still, not only in the ascendant, but “victorious along the whole line.” He showed, by what doubtless appeared to the

majority of his audience a brilliantly conclusive chain of evidence, that the sole cause of putrefaction in certain experimental fluids was, as maintained by Pasteur, their unperceived contamination with atmospheric germs. Professor Huxley, however, fell into the error which M. Pasteur had previously committed—he ascribed to the presence and influence of germs of Bacteria, phenomena which have now been shown to be producible, and actually produced in many instances, by the mere dead organic particles which the air contains in such abundance. Speaking of living Bacteria germs, Professor Huxley summed up by saying:—"Considering their lightness and the wide diffusion of the organisms which produce them, it is impossible to conceive that they should not be suspended in the atmosphere in myriads." Had Professor Huxley himself made some careful and discriminating experiments on this part of the subject, he might have found that the supposed impossibility of conception was entirely delusive. Again, it is well known that Professor Huxley did at the time discredit the now admitted fact that Bacteria will appear in sealed flasks (containing suitable fluids) whose air has been expelled by boiling.* He discredited this fact because he believed that Bacteria must have been destroyed by the process of boiling—and because he was unwilling to believe that they could be produced *de novo*. He went, as we have seen, so far as to say that he would rather discredit scientific evidence concerning the destructive influence of heat upon living matter, than believe in the present occurrence of a life-evolution similar to that which he postulates for the past—although unable to assign any valid reason for making such a distinction between the evolutionary potentialities of the present and those assumed to exist in an unknown past.

What then has been the subsequent progress of events? In the first place it has been shown by Professor Burdon Sanderson, myself, and others, that living Bacteria germs are not diffused through the air to any appreciable extent,† and this is now a very widely accepted doctrine, in spite of its being, as Professor Huxley imagined, an impossible conception. Secondly, the fact which he discredited of the appearance of Bacteria in closed flasks after the boiling of their contents, has been fully substantiated by Professor Sanderson, Professor Huizinga, and others. They have satisfied themselves as to the correctness of my statements, and have found that swarms of Bacteria will appear in the course of a few days within sealed experimental flasks, whose fluids have been previously boiled. Meanwhile it has been shown, and is believed by biologists generally, that the briefest exposure to the influence of boiling water (212° F.) is destructive to all living matter. Whilst those who have attempted accurately to define the precise degree of heat which suffices to kill

* *Nature*, Sep. 15, 1870, p. 403.†

† "Beginnings of Life," 1872, vol. ii. p. 6.

the lower infusorial organisms have invariably found that none of them could survive exposure to a temperature of 140° F. for five minutes.* Indeed all the simplest forms which can be individually watched are found to be killed when suddenly exposed to temperatures below 131° F., and Max Schultze† has found that many of them perish even at or below 122° F.

But if living protoplasm is certainly destroyed by sudden exposure to a temperature of 140° F. when in the moist state, irrespective of the nature of the fluid in which it may be immersed; and if living matter of the same kind will constantly make its appearance in many suitable fluids—safely protected from contamination—within a few days after the fluids have been exposed to the very much more destructive temperature of 212° F. (to say nothing of still higher grades of heat), what conclusion can be drawn by men of science but that Archebiosis still occurs—that living matter, like crystalline matter, is still capable of arising *de novo*, or independently of pre-existing germs? The Evolutionist's belief in the uniformity of nature becomes still further justified by evidence.

Stripped from all unnecessary and unessential complications, such is our present state of knowledge on this problem as to the present occurrence or non-occurrence of Archebiosis. It is easy, of course, for any person who does not investigate a subject for himself, and who continues to disregard the investigations of others as long as their results are opposed to views which he may chance to have adopted, to continue unshaken by the course of events. But it is none the less rash and disingenuous for him to renew (without comment or rectification) the proclamation that his particular view is still "victorious along the whole line," after the inexorable logic of facts has shown it to be otherwise.‡ Later in the day Professor Huxley may, perchance, learn more readily to distinguish the difference between "marking time" and marching. Again, many of those who do not fully believe in the Evolution Hypothesis, and who still cling to a "vitalistic" philosophy more or less fully, appear bewildered, if not terrified, by the conclusion which stubborn facts threaten to force upon them. They behave in the most inconsistent manner, and in dealing with these facts which imperil their old prepossessions, they find it convenient to forget for the time and occasion the ordinary rules of scientific research. Although the turning point of the whole question as to the present occurrence or non-occurrence of Archebiosis must obviously depend upon the precise temperature at which living matter ceases to live, none of those who are opposed to a belief in its present occurrence, and have taken part in the controversy, will fairly

* Proceedings of Royal Society, No. 145 (1873), pp. 325—331.

† *Das Protoplasma*, 1863, p. 63.

‡ See Professor Huxley's "Critiques and Addresses," 1873, with his remarks on this subject at the conclusion of the Preface.

face this all-important part of the question. They are alert enough to realize their danger. For those who have admitted the fact that Bacteria will appear in previously-boiled fluids would have no possible loop-hole for escape, if they also found the facts I have mentioned concerning the thermal death-point of Bacteria, and living matter generally, to be correct. Hence they studiously avoid investigating or ever writing anything definite upon this part of the subject. Taking advantage of the enormous weight of prejudice and prepossession against views which they are themselves unwilling to admit; taking advantage also of collateral complexities with which the subject is unavoidably beset, they succeed, either knowingly or unwittingly, in introducing confusion into their treatment of the question by dealing with side-issues as though they were essentials. They thus contrive to escape detection (like cuttle-fish behind the clouds produced by their own ink), so that the confusion and incoherence of their argument remains undiscovered by a large majority of their readers.

Well may Sir John Herschel have said,* when speaking of the use and abuse of hypotheses, that "a bigoted adherence to them, or, indeed, to peculiar views of any kind, in opposition to facts as they arise, is the bane of all philosophy." Well, indeed, will it be for Science generally, or the Cause of Truth, when her followers in all departments learn more fully to act in accordance with wise precepts such as these †:—"Experience once recognized as the fountain of all our knowledge of nature, it follows that in the study of nature and its laws, we ought at once to make up our minds to dismiss as idle prejudices, or at least suspend as premature, any preconceived notion of what might or what ought to be the order of nature in any proposed case, and content ourselves with observing, as a plain matter of fact, what *is*. To experience we refer as the only ground of all physical enquiry. But before experience itself can be used with advantage, there is one preliminary step to make, which depends wholly on ourselves: it is the absolute dismissal and clearing the mind of all prejudice, from whatever source arising, and the determination to stand or fall by the result of a direct appeal to facts in the first instance, and of strict logical deduction from them afterwards."

Having been compelled by experimental evidence and observation to believe in the present occurrence of Archebiosis and Heterogenesis—and having already attempted to show that this conclusion is more harmonious with the generally-accepted body of scientific doctrine than that which it supplants—I will now endeavour to lay before the reader some of the principal and most interesting consequences resulting from this recognition of natural uniformity. This I will attempt to do in as short a space as is compatible with my object of

* "Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy," p. 204.

† *Idem*, p. 79.

giving the intelligent reader some notion of the general scope and nature of the biological doctrines which recent experiments and observations seem to force upon us. A detailed statement of the facts and reasons upon which the following views are based, may be found by those who desire it elsewhere.*

Living matter is constantly being formed *de novo* in obedience to the same laws and tendencies as those which determine all the more simple chemical combinations. The qualities which we summarize under the word "life" are in all cases due to the combined molecular actions and properties of the aggregate which displays them, just as the properties which we include under the word "magnetism" are due to particular modes of collocation which have been assumed by the molecules of iron.

Living matter is especially characterized by the complexity of its molecules and their state of continual intestine movement. This peculiarity, as well as other related qualities, make the simplest aggregates of such matter especially prone to undergo those secondary structural re-arrangements which all plastic and homogeneous masses of matter are liable to exhibit. And although in the case of living matter these re-arrangements manifest themselves by producing what we call "organization," still the forms and structures which many of the lowest organisms tend to assume are entirely referrible to the polarity of their molecules—just as the forms of crystals are the results of similar, though simpler, polarities.

And, speaking generally, the complexity of organization attainable by the lower animal forms gradually tends to increase as the masses of matter from which new forms are to develop increase in size, owing apparently to the multiplication of effects that may be induced by the production of several series of molecular re-arrangements within the larger aggregates. The changes progress, however, in each case till a condition of moving equilibrium is established between the sum total of molecular actions taking place within the living aggregate and the forces of its environment.

The power of undergoing spontaneous division (fission or gemmation), which is manifested by living matter, and upon which all the phenomena of "reproduction" depend, is apparently one of its most fundamental properties, though it is in itself a result of that molecular mobility and complexity to which we have previously referred.

And it is this same molecular mobility which makes an aggregate of living matter, in the form of a simple organism, very prone to undergo changes in its intimate constitution—either "spontaneously," or under the incidence of a known change in external forces. Some new conditions may not visibly affect it, others may

* "The Beginnings of Life," 2 vols., 1872.

cause its "death," whilst others again may affect it only to such an extent as to bring about some modification of its molecular constitution, which, by reason of an altered polarity, entails a more or less marked transformation of form and structure (Heterogenesis).

Thus the marvellous convertibility of lower organisms, their ability to undergo self-multiplication, and their tendency to become (under favourable conditions) more complexly organized, are all necessary consequences of those physical doctrines concerning "life," the truth of which is deemed to have been established by previously-recorded experiments.

These myriads of lowest forms of life, multiplying only by processes of fission and gemmation, constitute an inextricably-tangled plexus of more or less convertible animal or vegetal forms (corresponding pretty closely with the Protista of Professor Haeckel) which, though often reappearing, are for the most part evanescent and transitory states, either of comparatively new-born living matter, or of portions of matter which have become individualized by heterogenetic processes occurring in the substance of the higher forms of life. But, howsoever derived, such forms constitute a vast assemblage of "Ephemeromorphs" amongst which Heterogenesis occurs almost as frequently as Homogenesis.*

Gradually, however, the first traces of those processes of "conjugation" and of internal gemmation begin to manifest themselves, which subsequently become perfected into "sexual" modes of reproduction.

And when animal and vegetal organisms manifesting that cyclical homogenesis known as "alternate generation," appear upon the scene, and with them those simpler allies (formed from large germs), which undergo a direct process of development, we first begin to obtain such regularly-recurring and definite assemblages of animal and vegetal forms as are usually grouped under the name of "species."

Until such assemblages of repeating individuals make their appearance—that is, until Homogenesis becomes the rule—the "laws of Heredity" can scarcely be said to come into operation. Hence, the complexly-interrelated individuals constituting this vast underlying plexus of Infusorial and Cryptogamic life must remain wholly uninfluenced, so far as their form and structure are concerned, by what Mr. Darwin has termed "Natural Selection." Such vegetal and animal organisms, however, gradually tend to become more and more complex. An ascending development takes place; and as this occurs, the causes which originally sufficed to determine their form and structure, and which for a time continue to induce comparatively rapid and marked deviations, become less and less capable of bringing about structural modifications during the life of

* The song of the Ephemeromorphs might be, in the words of Ovid,
"Corpora vertuntur; nec quod fuimusve, sumusve,
Cras erimus."

the individual. Changes which are now less rapidly accomplished have to be perfected in a succession of individuals. Thus is the operation initiated of those subtle and more slowly modifying agencies which have been so admirably illustrated by Mr. Darwin.

But amongst specific forms of slight complexity, the influence of Natural Selection as a modifying agent is probably much less important than it is amongst more active and complex animal forms; and in all cases its action in producing change may be assisted by "spontaneous" internal changes in the molecular activity of certain parts of the organism, or by other internal changes more obviously induced by modifications in the sum-total of "external conditions" acting upon the organism.

Each cause of specific modification, however, whether acting alone or in concert with one of the other producers of internal change, can only come into play in subordination to the ever-potent laws of "organic polarity," by which a multiplication of effects is apt to be induced.

In addition to these conclusions concerning the present order of events, we seem warranted in drawing the following speculative deductions concerning the past:—

An elemental origin of living matter similar to that which takes place at the present day, and, in addition, all the related heterogenetic phenomena, have probably been taking place on the surface of our globe since the far remote period when such matter was first engendered.

The countless myriads of living units which have been evolved in different ages of the world's history must, in each period, have given rise to innumerable multitudes of what have been called "trees of life," branching out into animal and vegetal forms of almost inconceivable variety. Myriads of these "trees," including all their branches and innumerable ramifications, may have wholly died out during the many vicissitudes of the earth's surface and the long lapses of ever-fruitful ages; though the descendants or ultimate ramifications of some of such trees—dating back to quite different and perhaps far-distant epochs—may still survive. How far, however, the roots of any of the "trees" from which the existing higher forms of life are derived, may have extended back into the depths of geologic time, we are utterly unable to estimate.

Throughout all this life-evolving period of the history of our globe, the progress of "organization" seems to have been essentially similar. And that this should be so, seems readily explicable by the consideration that living things, both as regards their origin and their subsequent differentiation or development, are the immediate products of ever-acting natural laws or material properties. They should act therefore now as they have ever done, and so produce almost similar effects.

The lower the forms of life—that is, the nearer they are to their

source—the greater seems to have been the similarity amongst those which have been produced in different ages—just as the lowest forms are now similar in all regions of the earth. On the other hand, the longer any particular “tree of life” has lived (of which there have been countless multitudes born in each age), the wider may be the divergence of form presented by the ultimate outgrowths of any two of them, or of outgrowths of similar rank produced from trees which have developed during different ages—especially when the assemblages of organisms constituting one of these ideal trees, have lived under the influence of any unusual set of telluric conditions.

The “vertebrate” grade of organization *may* have been many times attained by ultimate branches of different “trees of life.” But how long or when the particular “tree of life,” from one of the branches of which Man was developed, appeared upon the earth, it is quite impossible to say.

Taken as a whole, the positive portions of the above doctrines—those portions which are based upon observation and experiment in addition to having a strictly logical deductive warrant—whenever they are thoroughly accepted, must suffice to revolutionize the foundations of Zoological and Botanical science. We should, therefore, be prepared to scrutinize our position most carefully, before committing ourselves to any such fundamental change of doctrine. This may, perhaps, best be done by omitting for the moment all special consideration of the significance and value of the “crucial instance” which in my opinion suffices to settle the question. We may take many other wide-reaching facts, and confronting them with the old and with the new hypothesis, we may test the relative value of these simply as hypotheses—that is, by endeavouring to form an independent judgment upon the question, as to which of them gives the best explanation of the largest number of facts, and which best enables us to predict new facts.

Reduced to its simplest form, the fundamental fact whose interpretation is doubtful may be thus expressed:—*Certain of the most minute living things are known to appear in some fluids independently of pre-existing visible germs.* In explanation of this fact and of analogous instances of various kinds, two hypotheses are offered:—

(1.) The hypothesis of *Archebiosis* (carrying *Heterogenesis* with it as a necessary consequence), which supposes that these minutest living things have come into being and into the region of the visible by a process of chemical combination and growth, similar in kind to that by which crystalline germs originate in other fluids.

(2.) The hypothesis of *Panspermism* (discrediting both *Archebiosis* and *Heterogenesis*), which supposes that these minutest living things have merely developed in the fluids owing to the accidental

presence of invisible germs thrown off from pre-existing living organisms.

Thus we start with two possibilities which, in the eyes of the Evolutionist at least, have about an equal amount of probability. Each hypothesis is, moreover, supported by an analogical argument of considerable force.

The analogy tending to support the first hypothesis is drawn from the essential similarity existing between living matter and other forms of matter, and from the fact that Crystals originate independently in fluids, and make their appearance in suitable media just as these lowest living Organisms are observed to do. Although this analogy has not been dwelt upon by my opponents on this question, the relationship between crystals and organisms is generally admitted by Evolutionists. It is distinctly affirmed by Mr. Herbert Spencer, and also just as completely by Professor Tyndall—as I have already mentioned. Professor Huxley, moreover, speaks most distinctly on this subject. He says :*—"It is not probable that there is any real difference in the nature of the molecular forces which compel the carbonate of lime to assume and retain the crystalline form, and those which cause the albuminoid matter to move and grow, select and form, and maintain its particles in a state of incessant motion. The property of crystallizing is to crystallizable matter what the vital property is to albuminoid matter (protoplasm). The crystalline form corresponds to the organic form, and its internal structure to tissue structure. Crystalline force being a property of matter, vital force is but a property of matter."

The second hypothesis may be said to be based upon (rather than merely supported by) the analogy, derived from the observed universality of "reproduction" amongst living things. It is argued that if all living things, so far as the process is visible, are "reproduced" or derived from pre-existing parent living things, so it is probable that cases in which the process is invisible would come under the same otherwise universal law—expressed by the phrase *omne vivum ex vivo*.

So far, then, it would seem that at least as much is to be said in favour of the new as of the old hypothesis, even from a mere *primâ facie* consideration of their respective merits. But as I have already endeavoured to point out, a closer scrutiny of these general arguments tells much more in favour of the new hypothesis of Archebiosis ; in the first place, because no reason can be shown why the process of life-evolution should have been arrested ; and secondly, because if it does occur at the present time, it never could come under the direct observation of anybody, and consequently the general experience of mankind concerning the "reproduction" of living things, upon which

* Essay on "The Physical Basis of Life," *Fortnightly Review*, 1869.

the dictum *omne vivum ex vivo* has been founded, would in no way be questioned—the facts would lie altogether outside this experience.*

A belief in Archebiosis, whether past or present, seems to me necessarily to carry with it a belief in Heterogenesis. So that if Archebiosis be continually taking place, Heterogenesis should be an equally common phenomenon. But even for those who believe that Archebiosis took place in the past though it has now ceased, Heterogenesis must remain as a very possible process from an *à priori* point of view. Such a process is for living matter what Allotropism is for crystalline matter. And it so happens that the evidence in favour of the present occurrence of Heterogenesis is even stronger and much more varied than that in favour of the present occurrence of Archebiosis. Whilst the latter is a matter of warranted inference, the former is a matter of direct observation. So that concerning the present occurrence of Heterogenesis we may say, (1), that it follows as an almost necessary consequence from the physical doctrines of life; (2), that it is a process which admits of daily observation by skilled observers; and (3), that it would explain many series of phenomena of the most varied nature, which otherwise remain quite inexplicable.†

Our present position may perhaps be best illustrated by tabulating in parallel columns a statement of the principal reasons and facts which seem to support the hypothesis of the present occurrence of Archebiosis and Heterogenesis, but which are more or less inexplicable by the hypothesis of Panspermism and an exclusive Life-transmission doctrine. I am compelled to arrange the matter in this apparently one-sided form, because I know of no large classes of facts adverse to the hypothesis of the present continuance of Archebiosis and Heterogenesis.

* As I have elsewhere said :—"Living matter, like crystalline matter, is only *formable* by a synthesis of its elements. As crystals have not the power of self-multiplication, they have only one mode of origin. But because organisms have reproductive powers, the obviousness of these modes of increase has sufficed to cast doubts upon the reality of the independent origin of living units."—"Beginnings of Life," vol. ii. p. 77.

† It is worthy of note, moreover, that it is the recognition of the present occurrence of Heterogenesis which is the all-important necessity. A belief as to the process will carry with it all those changes in biological doctrine and in medical science which seem to me both necessary and inevitable. The further belief as to the present occurrence of Archebiosis is an extension of the "Spontaneous Generation" doctrine, which, though it may be logically demanded and warranted, is one of altogether secondary importance. This is all the more important, because a belief in Heterogenesis is open to biologists of all shades of opinion. Indeed those biologists who still believe in the existence of a special "vital principle," would only infer the occurrence of Heterogenesis from such experimental facts as would warrant, on the part of the Evolutionist, a belief in the present occurrence of Archebiosis. The Evolutionist is bound to recognise a difference between living organic matter and dead organic matter, which the Vitalist, holding himself aloof from positive scientific evidence, might not feel called upon to admit.—(See "The Beginnings of Life," vol. i. pp. 244—249.)

In support of the present occurrence of Life-Evolution.

1. Our belief in the Continuity of natural phenomena seems to require it.

2. The fact that crystalline matter still comes into being, or originates under the majority of those conditions in which its growth occurs.

3. The fact that the microscopical evidence in favour of origination is similar in the case of crystalline and living matter—both appear to arise *de novo*.

4. Living matter (in the form of the specks above-mentioned) does appear quickly and abundantly in situations where the uniformity of natural phenomena entitles us to believe that no living matter (whether visible or invisible) could have pre-existed.

*In support of the present occurrence of Heterogenesis.**

5. Actual observation with the microscope of many phenomena of this kind. (Vol. II., chaps. xvii., xix.—xxii.)

6. The analogy between the phenomena of Heterogenesis and

Against Panspermism and an exclusive Life-transmission doctrine.

1. The postulation of an infringement of the Continuity of natural phenomena without adequate cause.

2. The impossibility of explaining why living matter, which still grows under the most varied conditions, should have ceased to originate under many of them.

3. This apparent *de novo* origin of specks of living matter is only to be denied by the assumption of their derivation from invisible germs pre-existing in the fluid—and for this assumption there is no independent warrant.

4. The occurrence of Life-Evolution or Archebiosis in certain experimental flasks is only to be denied by making another assumption (as to the power of resisting heat displayed by living matter), which is not only without scientific warrant, but is in opposition to established facts.

Against Panspermism and an exclusive belief in Homogenesis.

5. The gratuitous assumption that many otherwise good observers should all be deceived—simply because their interpretations contradict the preconceived opinions of the majority of naturalists.

6. The absence of all reason why phenomena of Allotropism

* As most of these facts have not been referred to in this communication, I subjoin, after each pair of paragraphs, references to the chapters or pages in which the subject has been discussed or referred to in my work, "The Beginnings of Life."

those of Allotropism. (Vol. II., pp. 49—85.)

7. The fact that the presence of certain of the lowest organisms within higher organisms is more or less determinable at will. (Vol. II., pp. 317—345.)

8. Our power of determining the presence of animal or plant-like organisms at will, in vessels containing certain organic infusions. (Vol. II., pp. 209—219, 231—235.)

9. The Order observable in the succession of living things which appear in very many organic infusions: — 1. Bacteria; 2. Monads and Amœba, or Fungus Germs; 3. Ciliated Infusoria; 4. Rotifers.

10. The wide diffusion and general association of certain organisms (Rotifers, Sloths, and Nematoids) which multiply by very large and well known germs.

11. Our power of determining the presence of some of the higher Fungi (Mushrooms), and of Nematoids, at will, in certain organic mixtures.

12. The wide diffusion and numerical abundance of Desmids and Diatoms. (Vol. II., pp. 420, 435—455.)

13. The inconstancy of particular species of lower organisms in the same habitats from year to year; and the sudden appearance of other organisms in enormous numbers in situations where they had not previously existed.

should not show themselves with different kinds of living matter, as with simpler molecular compounds.

7. The impossibility of explaining this, except by the disproved assumption that living organisms are always permeated by innumerable invisible and generally latent germs of such lowest organisms.

8. Our power of watching all the stages by which these animal or plant-like forms are produced, from the "pellicle on hay infusions," and our inability otherwise to account for their first appearance as bodies of comparatively large dimensions.

9. No reasonable explanation in accordance with the hypothesis of Homogenesis, and with facts known concerning the distribution of the germs of such organisms. (Vol. II., pp. 297—306, 502—535.)

10. These facts, quite irreconcilable with the ascertained absence of such germs or organisms from the atmosphere, and an exclusive doctrine of Homogenesis. (Vol. II., pp. 535—538.)

11. These results seemingly inexplicable from the point of view of Panspermism and Homogenesis. (Vol. II., pp. 433, 537 *note*.)

12. Inexplicable by what we know concerning their absence from the atmosphere and their modes of multiplication.

13. Facts either incapable of being explained by or directly opposed to the hypothesis of Homogenesis and Panspermism. (Vol. II., pp. 454, 535.)

14. The uniform association of certain other organisms with their accustomed matrices, *e.g.*, of particular kinds of Mould with particular organic substances, and the invariable association of *Euglenæ* with Rotifers.

15. The observed relations between size of matrix and grade of organization attained by the allotropic product, where a vegetal matrix is transformed into an animal organism.

16. The interchangeability of those organic forms which are derivable from originally similar vegetal matrices.

17. The extreme variability of the simplest representatives of the Vegetal Kingdom. (Vol. II. pp. 150—165, and Appendix D.)

18. The present existence amongst such lower organisms of all the gradations by which a purely sexual process of generation is gradually evolved. (Vol. II., p. 552, and *Table*.)

19. The explanation of the mysterious phenomena of "Alternate Generation"—and especially of the anomalous exceptions in the case of *Medusæ* with large eggs.

20. The existence of multitudes of almost structureless organisms at the present day. (Vol. II., pp. 605—622.)

14. The uniformity of such associations quite incompatible with known facts concerning the prevalence of germs of Fungi, *Euglenæ* and Rotifers in the air. (Vol. II., pp. 302 *note*; 535, 508 *note*.)

15. The impossibility of explaining away all these observations, by assuming them to be the faulty inferences of hasty or unskilled observers. (Vol. II., chaps. xx.—xxii.)

16. Difficulties similar to those last-mentioned. (Vol. II., pp. 491—499.)

17. The impossibility of denying the united but independent testimony of so many observers, although such variability seems irreconcilable with the notion of these organisms being direct continuations of an extremely ancient similar matter which has resisted change for ages.

18. The impossibility of finding any explanation of this fact which shall be consistent with an exclusive doctrine of Life-transmission and Homogenesis.

19. The absence of all explanation, not only of the phenomena but of the exceptions thereto (Vol. II., pp. 560—571.)

20. The impossibility of believing that living matter could persist with so little change for 100,000,000 of years or upwards, whilst other portions of the same matter have progressively developed into all the varied forms of Life that have appeared upon this globe.

Taken as a whole, the amount of evidence, both deductive and inductive, seems, to say the least, very decidedly to preponderate in favour of the present occurrence of Archebiosis and Heterogenesis. Both fact and reason appear to be notably insufficient on the side of the counter hypothesis. So that a careful consideration of the respective merits of the two hypotheses—looked at merely as hypotheses—seems to show in a very unmistakeable manner which is most worthy of our acceptance. This is more especially the case if we look well into the foundations of the old belief. Its boasted universality will then be seen even to have no sufficient *a priori* warrant. It is, in fact, an induction which has been formed after a partial scrutiny of the facts—one also which has been arrived at, not in accordance with the modern methods of experimental inquiry, but by the ancient method of mere passive observation and enumeration, against which the founder of the Inductive Philosophy so strongly raised his voice.*

The formula, *omne vivum ex vivo*, which has now become a party watchword, bases its supposed universality and authority, partly (1) upon an erroneous assumption, and partly (2) upon a simple and incomplete observation of phenomena.

(1) The exposure of the untruth of certain old and crude doctrines concerning "spontaneous generation," many of which date from the earliest times, and the fact that the belief in this mode of generation has been successively driven, with increasing knowledge, from higher to lower forms of life, till at the last it is maintained as a mode of origin only for the very lowest and most minute of living things, has been regarded by many, as I have already pointed out, as one of the most weighty arguments against this mode of generation. But this objection, as I have shown, is robbed of all its seeming strength when it is said that the modern Evolutionist would only expect to obtain evidence concerning the *de novo* origin of the minutest specks of Living Matter—gradually emerging into the region of the visible and subsequently developing into the most elementary forms of Life.

(2) On the side of observation the formula *omne vivum ex vivo* is supposed to derive its authority from the fact that the experience of mankind generally—both skilled and unskilled—testify to its truth. Here again, however, the authority of the formula is invalidated, on account of a similar misapprehension as to the real nature of the problem. It is almost unnecessary to say that observation is of no avail in regions where it becomes impossible, and consequently that observation cannot tell us whether previously invisible specks of living matter have arisen from invisible living germs, or by an independent elemental mode of origin. Thus, living matter may have been continu-

* Named by him "Inductio per enumerationem simplicem, ubi non reperitur instantia contradictoria."

ly coming into being all over the surface of the earth ever since the time of man's first appearance upon it, and yet the fact that no member of the human race has ever seen (or is ever likely to see) each birth, throws even no shade of doubt upon the probability of its occurrence.

What then are we to say to the supposed validity of this much suspected phrase, *omne vivum ex vivo*? No more requires to be said than that it is an instance of one of those rude and loose inductions, common amongst the uneducated, and in early days even amongst scientific men. As the late Mr. Mill said* :—"The unprompted tendency of the mind is to generalize its experience provided this points all in one direction; providing no other experience of a conflicting character comes unsought. The notion of seeking it, of experimenting for it, of *interrogating* Nature (to use Bacon's expression) is of much later growth. The observation of nature by uncultivated intellects is purely passive; they accept the facts which present themselves, without taking the trouble of searching for more. . . . But though we have always a propensity to generalize from unvarying experience, we are not always warranted in doing so. Before we can be at liberty to conclude that something is universally true because we have never known an instance to the contrary, we must have reason to believe that if there were in nature any instances to the contrary, we should have known of them." Now it was only by an utter inattention to this latter all-important requirement that the past experience of mankind could ever have appeared to warrant the illegitimate induction *omne vivum ex vivo*.

As Mr. Mill pointed out,† the proposition, "all swans are white," must have appeared to Europeans, not many years ago, an "unequivocal instance of uniformity in the course of nature." Subsequent experience has shown that they were mistaken, although they and all their predecessors through many centuries had observed nothing to contradict this proposition. "The uniform experience therefore of the inhabitants of the known world, agreeing in a common result, without one known instance of deviation from that result, is not always sufficient to establish a general conclusion."

Thus, whilst the hypothesis of Panspermism is based upon an illegitimate belief, is at variance with many uniformities of nature, and is wholly incapable of embracing the required facts, that of Archebiosis and Heterogenesis is legitimate in its foundation, is not at all at variance with natural uniformity, and is capable already of explaining a very wide circle of facts pertaining to the past and present history of our globe.

But these are the very tests by which we are accustomed to probe a new hypothesis, with the view of ascertaining its probable truth or

* "System of Logic," 6th edit., vol. i., p. 349.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 348, 351.

falsity. What Mr. Justice Grove* said in 1866, when speaking of the Darwinian hypothesis, is now just as applicable concerning the hypothesis of the present occurrence of Archebiosis and Heterogenesis. He said:—"The fair question is, Does the newly proposed view remove more difficulties, require fewer assumptions, and present more consistency with observed facts than that which it seeks to supersede? If so, the philosopher will adopt it, and the world will follow the philosopher—after many days."

But if, even when looked at merely as hypotheses, that of Archebiosis with Heterogenesis seems so likely to drive the old doctrine out of the field—we instinctively look around us for one of those "crucial instances" which may serve, as has been so often the case in the history of science, finally to decide between the contending claims of old and new views.

Now a crucial instance of this kind (or opportunity of employing the all-decisive experimental "Method of Difference") does very fortunately lie within our reach, and has already been referred to. Its true value, however, may be now more clearly seized by the reader; so that for this reason, and because all past discussions on the question of the Origin of Life have shown that this is the part of the subject whose scientific basis is least understood or most persistently disregarded, I venture, even though with some slight reiteration, to make a few concluding remarks on this crucial test—whose decision the opponents of Archebiosis attempt to set aside by a mixture of, what appears to me to be, illogical arguments and groundless assumptions.

There are only two possible modes of accounting for the fact that "certain of the most minute living things are known to appear in some fluids independently of pre-existing visible germs." If therefore it can be shown that living though invisible germs did not pre-exist in certain fluids in which such minute living things subsequently make their appearance as usual, we thereby prove that in such instances they must have owed their appearance to the other process—viz., to Archebiosis. Nothing can be plainer than this; if a given event must be occasioned by one or other of two causes, and if in certain instances we can show that the event followed, notwithstanding the absence of one of these causes, then the event must have been occasioned by the other cause. An experiment of this nature is named a "crucial instance" or *experimentum crucis*.

Let us look then into the nature of the crucial instance which lies at our disposal in this emergency.

If we wish to ascertain whether living matter exists, or rather if we wish to make sure that living matter does not exist in any given fluid, the only course open to us is to submit the fluid to the influence of agencies which we have previously ascertained to be

* Presidential Address, in Report of British Association, 1866, p. lxxviii.

capable of "killing" such matter—that is to say, of putting an end to that combination of properties the existence of which formerly gave us the right to call it "living" matter. As scientific men, we distinguish one body or class of bodies from another by the fact of their possessing certain distinctive attributes or properties—and happily, in this respect, common usage does not differ from scientific usage. No one would think of calling any metal "gold" unless it possessed the combination of properties peculiar to gold; no physicist would call a body a "magnet" unless he could show that it possessed magnetic properties; no chemist would call a fluid "alcohol" unless he could show that such fluid possessed the known properties of alcohol, and similarly no biologist would call a body "living" unless it possessed those attributes or properties which we are accustomed to regard as fundamental or characteristic. Again, no man of science would dream of crediting living matter in an imaginary case with properties different from those which he has on all previous occasions found it display—if he had reason to believe that it existed in any given medium he would of course look for it on the basis of its known properties, just as a chemist would search for gold in any solution thought to contain it, by having regard only to its accustomed or known properties. The man of science necessarily starts from and assumes the truth of the uniformity of natural phenomena at every step—to do otherwise, in fact, would be a mockery of science. Assumed invisible germs, therefore, if postulated at all by the man of science, must be postulated to exist with properties similar to those of known germs, since they would all alike be composed of protoplasm, or simplest living matter. And, again, if he has satisfied himself that, in all known instances where trial has been made, the sudden exposure of living matter to a moist heat of 140° F. has proved destructive to it—that is, has destroyed the combination of attributes which previously entitled it to be called "living"—he can only conclude that this is a general truth which he may take for granted in the future.

Being, from the Evolutionist's point of view, altogether a question of physical or molecular property, the resistance of protoplasm or living matter to heat stands upon the same level as that of the degree of heat necessary to destroy or "kill" one of the simpler chemical compounds; or the degree of heat necessary to cause ebullition in a given fluid. These are all cases in which, as Mr. Mill said,* "we reckon with the most unfailing confidence upon uniformity," so that "when a chemist announces the existence of a newly-discovered substance, if we confide in his accuracy, we feel assured that the conclusions he has arrived at will hold universally, though the induction be founded but on a single instance." Now here, far from being based upon a single instance, the fact that many different

* "System of Logic," 6th edit., vol. i. p. 351.

kinds of living matter are killed by a temperature of 140° F., rests upon the repeatedly recorded observations of several independent investigators—upon the observations of Pouchet, Liebig, Cantoni, Hoppe-Seyler, Kühne, Max Schultze, myself, and others.

But as it is the fact that living matter is killed at 140° F., and as it is also true that certain fluids heated to much higher temperatures (to 212° F. and upwards) and subsequently exposed to certain conditions free from all possibility of contamination with living matter, will shortly swarm with the living things whose mode of origin we desired to learn, the man of science is compelled to conclude that such living Organisms must have originated independently of living germs, and, therefore, after the manner of Crystals. Here then is our "crucial instance."

Thus by this simple resort to the "Method of Difference," we are enabled to solve our problem, and finally decide between two rival hypotheses—between one which has already been shown to be badly based, contradictory, and wholly inadequate to explain the facts; and another which is well-grounded, harmonious with the great body of scientific doctrine, and far better capable not only of explaining known facts but of leading to the discovery of new truths. The occurrence of Archebiosis is, therefore, established as a natural phenomenon, and, like other natural phenomena, we are entitled to believe not only that it will recur whenever the conditions are similar or otherwise suitable, but that it has been in operation through the whole of that long vista of bygone ages during which the surface of our Earth has been occupied by living things. The consequences which naturally flow from the recognition of this truth are of enormous importance for different branches of science, but as I have already endeavoured to point out, they are consequences which will be found to be thoroughly consistent with the philosophy of Evolution.

H. CHARLTON BASTIAN.



A BROAD-CHURCH VICAR OF THE LAST CENTURY.

Memoirs of the late Rev. Theophilus Lindsey, M.A. By
THOMAS BELSHAM. London : Williams & Norgate,
1873. Centenary Volume.

A CERTAIN section of English Nonconformists have recently commemorated an incident of personal history of a somewhat remarkable character. In so doing, they have paid honour where honour was due. At the time of its occurrence, the incident referred to attracted no inconsiderable share of public attention ; and even after the lapse of a century, it is by no means unworthy to be still spoken of in terms of respect and sympathy. The example of fidelity to the sense of duty with which it is bound up, is one of a kind that is not too common, either in our days or in any other. It is one, therefore, of which society—churches and congregations in particular—would do but ill to lose sight ; for, in truth, it has more than one practical lesson of special interest and value for churches and congregations of every name.

It is now just one hundred years since this event occurred. Theophilus Lindsey at that time held the good living of Catterick, near Richmond, in the county of York. He was vicar of that parish, and in November, 1773, he had been so for a period of exactly ten years. He was then a little over fifty years of age, and, it is understood, entirely without private income of his own. Catterick was not his first living ; for, by virtue of his family connections and the influence of friends of rank and wealth, he had been successively presented to livings in Yorkshire and in Dorsetshire, previously to entering upon that of Catterick.

It was at an early period in his career as a clergyman, that

Lindsey first began to have serious doubts in reference to the established doctrine and worship of the Church. These appear to have originated in his intercourse with Archdeacon Blackburne, a well-known liberal and learned clergyman of the time, with whom Lindsey was connected by marriage. But, indeed, in his younger days some things in the Articles had caused him hesitation and uneasiness. It had occurred to him, while at the University, that it was strange and unnecessary to make young men declare and subscribe their assent to so large and heterogeneous a mass of doctrines as are contained in the accepted formularies of the Church. "But," Lindsey himself says, "I was not under any scruples, or great uneasiness on this account." He had, in fact, as he also tells us, never much thought of the subject, or examined into certain doctrines in particular, which proved at length to be his great stumbling-block. The mystery of the Trinity is what he thus more especially alludes to; and here, he says, he at that time supposed "that all was right." In the course of time, however, considerable doubt concerning this deep subject arose in his mind; and while he resided in Dorsetshire he applied himself to a more diligent study of the Bible. The result of this may be stated in his own words:—"The more I searched, the more I saw the little foundation there was for the doctrine commonly received and interwoven with all the public devotions of the Church, and I could not but be disturbed at a discovery so ill suiting my situation. For in the end I became fully persuaded, to use St. Paul's express words, (1 Cor. viii. 6) that 'there is but one God, the Father,' and He alone to be worshipped. This appeared to be the uniform, unvaried language and practice of the Bible throughout; and I found the sentiments and practice of Christians in the first and best ages, corresponding with it."* Thoughts such as these, whether justly entertained or not, placed Lindsey, according to his own judgment, in a very serious position. They led him, in fact, to think of relieving himself, as he expresses it, by giving up his preferment in the Church. He did not do this; and he tells us, in very simple and candid terms, what the motives were, which for a long time prevented him from taking such a course.

In the first place, he felt a natural reluctance to cast himself out of an honourable and useful profession, in which he was heartily interested, and for which he had been expressly educated. This feeling was heightened, he says, by his being alone at the time, and having no intimate friend to consult with; and his imagination was shocked by the singularity and strangeness of what he was about to do; for such subjects at that time were not so much canvassed or become so familiar as they have been since. The time referred to

* "Apology on Resigning the Vicarage of Catterick." Fourth Edition, 1782.

must have been about 1759. He gently adds, and doubtless with perfect truth, that his mind was influenced simply by the foregoing considerations, and not by worldly retrospects or motives. At that time, too, he had a prospect which would naturally have lessened the force of any such motives, had they existed. He was not likely to be left entirely destitute, if he had gone out of the Church. A second reason which weighed much with him, was the example set by others. Many worthy persons, he says, of his own acquaintance, thought much as he did, and could nevertheless remain quietly in the Church, and officiate in it. Why, then, should he alone be so singularly scrupulous? Why distress himself and disturb others by enthusiastic fancies, bred in gloomy solitude, which by time and free communication with others would probably be removed, and give way to better and wiser thoughts? At any rate, it was worth while to wait a little, and not rashly take a step which he might long repent. There was a third consideration which Lindsey deemed important, and which is not unfamiliar to many in our own time. He was not the author or imposer of the matters complained of. What he did was ministerial only, in submission to civil authority, and is not this within certain limits, the authority of God? If he expected a perfected state of things, in which there should be no flaw or hardship, he should not only leave his benefice, but go out of the world altogether. There was a general tendency in what was established to serve the interests of virtue and religion; and was not this enough?—enough at least to authorise him to rest satisfied, and wait patiently for a change in smaller matters, which though grievous to him, were not felt to be so by others? Meantime, he had the power to forward the desired work by preparing men's minds for it, whenever there should be a disposition in the State to rectify what was amiss. If, then, he could by any mode of interpretation, reconcile in his own mind the prescribed forms with the Scripture, and "make himself easy," he was not only justified, but to be commended.

To these reasons, which I have given very nearly in Lindsey's own words,* he might have added another, which has been urged in more recent times. It is, that, if men are to be members and ministers of one and the same Church, and to unite in a common worship, it is necessary for the individual, in some degree, to forget himself and his own private estimates of truth and error, in the great service in which all alike, though with varying capacities and tendencies, engage themselves. No liturgical forms which could be composed, can be expected to be perfectly free from difficulty to every mind that has to use them; and the same remark will apply to the written or doctrinal constitution of any Church establishment. Hence, again, it is not to be required that every individual member should literally receive and believe everything. It is enough if he finds himself able to give a

* Apology, pp. 220-224.

general consent in regard to great principles and the more essential doctrines. This view of their duty is no doubt now taken by many good conformists to things as they are ; and each man has clearly a right on such a subject to judge for himself. But yet it may be permitted to observe, that the reason just stated really amounts to a strong plea for setting aside the minute definitions of doctrine which are incidental to our established orthodoxies, and which have so frequently caused pain or disquiet to tender consciences. It is in fact a reason, not for enforcing an imperfect or insincere conformity, but for conceding to the individual judgment somewhat more of right and liberty than now exists to receive or reject, as may appear to be required by the interests of truth. On these points, however, a few remarks may be more appropriately introduced towards the end of this paper.

In the year 1763, Lindsey had the opportunity of exchanging his Dorsetshire living for that of Catterick, but it was necessary for him, in doing this, again to subscribe the Articles. Conscientious as he was, and proof, as there can be no doubt that he was also, against worldly motives and selfish interests, he did not feel himself prevented by his scruples from renewing his subscription. He regarded subscription, in fact, as a less solemn bond than the weekly repetition of Prayers and Creeds before the congregation ; and thus, if he could do the latter, there was no reason, he thought, why he might not sign. It is difficult to understand this frame of mind. For by subscription, a man signifies to the world, in a formal and solemn way, that he accepts and believes the Articles. If subscription has any meaning at all, surely it must mean this ; and without question it does mean this, to the great mass of mankind. The doctrine, again, about which Lindsey now felt the most serious difficulties, is the very corner-stone of the established theology, and is embodied in the Articles as plainly as words can express. Not only so, but it recurs in the Prayer Book again and again, not in Scriptural phrase alone, but in words of human composition, which mean that and nothing else, as in the Athanasian Creed, and at the commencement of the Litany. Yet here was Lindsey doubting or even rejecting this doctrine, but still again subscribing. It is only fair to give his own words on this subject :—"My great difficulty," he writes, "was the point of worship. In comparison with this, subscription to the Articles, however momentous in itself, gave me then but little concern. For, as the devotions of the Church are framed in strict agreement with the Articles and correspond with them, more especially in what relates to religious worship, I looked upon my continuing to officiate as a constant virtual repetition of my subscription ; and therefore I needed not, nor did, decline the actual repetition of subscription when occasion served, though I was not forward in seeking such occasions." For a time he was satisfied with this

apology. But he speaks differently in another place. He says, "It was a blameable duplicity on my part, that whilst I was praying to the One God the Father, the people that heard me were led by the language I used to address themselves to two other persons, or distinct intelligent agents. . . . And if," he adds, "anything be evil and odious in His sight, prevarication and falsehood is such ; and most of all an habitual course thereof in the most solemn act a creature can be engaged in, the worship of Him, the holy, all-seeing God."

This was written, it will be remembered, after he had retired from his position in the Church, when his eyes had become fully opened to the untenableness of that position. It took time, however, as we may well understand, for such thoughts to grow up and assume a definite form and force in his mind. Hence he spent no less than ten years in his new vicarage ; but all this time he was learning slowly and steadily to feel and appreciate his difficulties, and gathering courage for the final act.

At this period, like other clergymen who have been troubled with doubts, Lindsey applied himself assiduously to his parochial duties. His friend, Mrs. Cappe, speaks of the Sundays she spent with Mr. and Mrs. Lindsey as "the delight of her life," and gives us a lively picture of his care in catechising the village children in church on that day, at a time when Sunday-schools had not as yet come into existence.

It is observable again, that, although he took a long time in reaching his final determination, yet so far as is known, he never made any attempt to force down, or even make light of, his rising scruples. He rather did the contrary. For he read and studied, he tells us, the history of the two thousand ministers ejected under the Act of Uniformity, in 1662. It was constantly present to his thoughts that he himself might probably be obliged to follow their example. Moreover, one of his greatest impediments to speedier action was this, that in abandoning his position, he would be leaving at the same time the great field of useful exertion in which he was now so diligently employed. And to many a man, there can be no doubt, it is harder to throw up opportunities of useful daily work than it is to give up place and profit. It is certain that this was a predominant feeling in Lindsey's case ; nor can we wonder that this feeling, praiseworthy as it is, tended to delay the issue to which he was ultimately brought.

But there was another cause for that delay, equally powerful and equally reasonable and interesting in its character. Lindsey was not the only clergyman at this time who felt the burden imposed by subscription, and the great difficulty of standing up, week after week, to give utterance to doctrines which were not heartily believed. There were, in fact, many others in the same unquiet and uncomfortable state of mind—some of whom, at a later period, followed Lindsey's

example, as for instance did his two friends, Dr. Jebb and Dr. Disney. Thus it happened that in the year 1771, an association was formed of a number of such clergymen, together with some sympathising laymen, for the purpose of applying to Parliament for relief in the matter of subscription. What these petitioners wanted was, that a declaration of assent to the sufficiency of Holy Scripture might be substituted for subscription to the Articles and the Book of Common Prayer. It was a bold proposal, and it had really as little chance of success then, as such a proposal would have in our own day. With the great mass of those who subscribe to the established theology, now as then, the sufficiency of the Scriptures can hardly be said to be more than a name. For, legally speaking, it is not the Bible, but the Articles and Prayer Book which must be accepted as the exponents of Christian faith, and in agreement with which all public teaching of religion must be regulated. Thus, in effect, those formularies are placed in a position of supreme authority. They are virtually made the authoritative interpreters of Scripture, serving to give tone and colour and meaning and definiteness to its declarations—no minister of the Church being allowed to take his stand on the Bible alone, irrespective of the legally imposed documents. The *insufficiency* of Scripture, therefore, would seem to be the accepted principle with those who accept this system—loud as may be the professions sometimes made in words, as to the supremacy of the Bible.

And here it may not be out of place to ask, what the authority really is; which is thus set up and made to override even the Bible. Is it any other than the private judgment of certain great ministers and bishops of Queen Elizabeth, men of note and power, three hundred years ago? For these were the men who composed the Articles, and, of their own free will, appointed the use of the Prayer Book much as it now is. If, then, the ministers of the Church are virtually told that it is not enough to assent to the Bible as the expression and guide of religious faith; that there must, as regards essential doctrines, be other formularies to interpret the Bible by, and make all plain; is not this, in effect, to acknowledge as spiritual dictators the men by whose judgment the formularies referred to were either actually written or originally prescribed to the Church? Nay, is it not even to attribute to them, as some would seem avowedly to do, the very same kind of infallibility which the Church of Rome has of late begun to ascribe to the Pope? But to do this, again, is simply to make the men of our time distrust or forego the exercise of their own judgment, while bowing to that of others who had not the means of judging which now exist—who lived, in truth, in a past age of most imperfect knowledge, and were, from every point of view conspicuously unfit to legislate in matters of religion for future generations.

The great body of the clergy in Lindsey's time, as doubtless they

would do in ours, saw the matter in a different light. They stood aloof from the proposed petition—a small section of them only uniting in it; and it is needless to add that, after an animated and interesting debate, it was rejected in the House of Commons by a majority of about three to one (217 to 71). The possibility of some different result had led Lindsey to wait, and to defer his resignation, in the faint hope that some relief might come to him by the decision of Parliament. When this hope was finally taken away, he could no longer hesitate; but still it was not until the 12th of November, 1773, that he formally wrote to his Bishop announcing his intention of giving up his living at the end of the month. Dr. Markham, then Bishop of Chester, afterwards Archbishop of York, acknowledged Mr. Lindsey's letter in very kindly terms. He remonstrated with him, and sent him some textual arguments which he considered specially adapted to his case. Lindsey's reply shows us that these had no effect upon his judgment. His resolution, he said, had been no hasty step, but the result of many years of anxious deliberation and inquiry. His faith, he told the Bishop, was not built "on a system of philosophy, but on an impartial examination of the mind and will of God, as discovered in the Old and New Testament."

When this was written, Lindsey had been for more than twenty years a minister of the Church of England. From an early point in this long period he had been in difficulties as to the course which he should adopt. It was thus a slow and toilsome journey, by which he made his way to what he deemed the just result. We may wonder at the delay; but, at all events, the remembrance of it should lead us to charitable judgments in estimating the character of other cases of a similar kind, which may come under our observation. There is certainly no reason, in Lindsey's case, for thinking that any but the most upright motives guided his conduct. And yet he himself speaks humbly and sorrowfully of the commonplace arguments (as he afterwards thought them) which had served him as excuses for remaining so long where he was:—"Not that I justify myself herein," he says, "yea, I rather condemn myself. But as I have humble hope of the Divine forgiveness, let not men be too rigid in their censures. Let those only blame who know what it is to doubt, to be in perplexity about things of the highest importance, to be in fear of carelessly abandoning a station assigned by Providence, and being found idle and unprofitable when the great Master came, to call for the account of the talents received."

It is interesting to notice one of the more important theological arguments by which, for a time, he quieted his scruples, and enabled himself to remain where he was. It is an argument and a view of the subject which has probably been familiar to many persons in a similar state of mind. He says that he brought himself "to consider the Trinitarian forms in the Liturgy and the invocations at the beginning

of the Litany as a threefold representation of the One God the Father, governing all by Himself and by His Son and Spirit; and as a threefold way of addressing Him as Creator and benevolent cause of all things, as the Redeemer of mankind by His Son, and their Sanctifier by his Holy Spirit." This obviously amounts to simple Sabellianism—a very ancient heresy in the Church, according to which the Infinite is revealed to us under three relations or manifestations. It is much the same explanation of the mystery which, as propounded by Dr. Wallis at Oxford, received the warm approval of that University; while a different theory of the Divine Nature, that of Dr. Sherlock—a theory in truth of three distinct and infinite minds—was as strongly condemned. The former, plausible as it was, did not satisfy the straightforward and truthful mind of Lindsey. He says expressly of his later opinions, "I could not now satisfy myself with Dr. Wallis' and the like softenings and qualifications. . . . I wondered how I had been able to bring myself to imagine that I was worshipping the Father in spirit and in truth, whilst I was addressing two other persons . . . and imploring favours severally of *them* in terms that implied their personality and distinct agency and deity, as much as that of the Father. If invocations so particular, language so express and personal might be sifted and explained away into prayer to one God only; I might, by the like supposals and interpretation, bring myself to deify and pray to the Virgin Mary, taking her . . . to be now alive and beatified in heaven; and maintain that I was still only praying to the one God, who was thus invoked in his creature that was so nearly united to him." *

Thus, then, did Lindsey give up his living in the Church for conscience sake—a course in which, it is right to notice, he was warmly supported and encouraged by his wife; and, whether he were right or wrong in his theological conclusions, he has unquestionably set an example of faithfulness to his convictions and his sense of duty, which well deserves to be kept in honourable remembrance.

It is not necessary to follow him in any detail in his later career. He removed from Catterick to London immediately after his resignation. Here he became the founder of Essex Street Chapel, and exercised his ministry for many years, using the Church Liturgy reformed, much as had been proposed by another eminent churchman of the last century, Dr. Samuel Clarke. Many of Lindsey's old friends looked coldly upon him, or cast him off; but he found many new ones ready to sympathise with him and co-operate in his work.

The history of this faithful confessor speaks for itself; but two or three considerations of special interest are suggested by it, and claim a passing notice in their bearing upon ideas and discussions of the

* Apology, pp. 230–231.

present time. We may see by this case, and the circumstances incidental to it, that the natural tendency of a great ecclesiastical system like that of our Established Church, is to make people more or less indifferent to the exercise of individual judgment. It presents them with an elaborate scheme of orthodoxy ready drawn up for unchanging and unchangeable daily use, and this it imposes indiscriminately upon all who enter its ministry. This, too, with a true, if almost unconscious, instinct, it well understands how to uphold and render acceptable by various attractions of ecclesiastical privilege, title, and honour, with all the substantial advantages of one kind and another which accompany them. The tendency of all this is obviously to draw people away from private thought and criticism of their own, upon the more vital parts of what is thus so persuasively offered to their acceptance. It is to make them undervalue, or even repress, individual inquiry; to give them the feeling that it is best and safest to swim with the stream; and thus it exposes them, in many an instance, as in that of Lindsey, to the danger of being drawn on to the nominal profession of that which, in the secret depths of the heart, is not felt to be wholly true. Such is the natural *tendency* of our popular church systems—for the remark is applicable in degree not to the English establishment alone, but to the various Nonconformist organizations by which it is surrounded.

But, while this is admitted, in respect to the general tendency, it is unnecessary to impute to any one in particular either unfaithfulness to the Truth, or even carelessness in regard to what for him is consistent and honest. For it is but fair always to remember, that as minds and characters differ from each other, so, in these matters of inward conviction and outward profession, each person has a perfect right to judge for himself. Men are not called upon to decide for one another, much less to judge and condemn one another. If evidence which to one appears ample, to another does not appear so, then the only thing each has to do, is to acknowledge that to his own Master every one standeth or falleth; and that our several accounts are to be rendered not to man, but to One who is Lord and Judge of all alike. The history which has just been recounted may, at least, serve to teach us the wisdom and the happiness of being candid, truthful, and upright, both in our judgments and in our conduct resulting from them. And it should help to show us that the life which is ruled by such a spirit is the only sure way to that true peace which is better than human approval.

There is another consideration readily suggested by this history. It is whether a national system can be *right*, which virtually requires its ministers either to suppress their convictions on important matters of religious doctrine, where they are out of harmony with the standards, or else, by avowing them, to render themselves liable to the most serious sacrifice of means and position, such as that which

Lindsey and some others of his time voluntarily made, and which others in our own day have been compelled to make. This man, let it be remembered, was led, after long and careful inquiry and reflection, to see and believe that certain portions of the established creeds and other formularies of the Church to which he belonged were untrue, and not only that they were untrue, but that they were directly opposed, as he thought, to the teaching of those Scriptures which the Church itself affirmed to be the one source and witness of religious truth. Such was the deliberate and most serious conviction of his mind. But he was not at liberty to say this ; he must not openly say it without being liable to forfeit his living,—that is to say, incurring a penalty of the severest kind. In such a case, many a man would have been contented to repress his rising scruples. Many a man would feel himself tempted to close his eyes to what, in his heart, he thought to be the truth ; and some, yielding to the temptation, would be induced to go on, making a mere formal and outward profession. The national system, then, under which we are living, is plainly such as artificially, and it may be added, needlessly, creates this most serious moral danger, and exposes its ministers to this great temptation. And why should they not have liberty to speak what they think to be true on these subjects ? Why should they be bound over, by a kind of penalty, to take only one side of any great controverted question within the scope of their inquiries as teachers of religion ?

The answer to this question, according to many persons, will be that the side to which they are thus bound is the side of the truth ; and it is quite right that men should be bound over to believe the truth, and prevented from running into error. But, supposing this to be so, might not the truth be left to speak for itself ? Surely we are all anxious to find out the truth ; and, as a general rule, no one prefers error for its own sake. And even though, under a different system, individuals, here and there, might go astray in the use of their permitted liberty (as doubtless some would do), yet others would be able to supply the needed correction ; and, where a real liberty of thought and of discussion existed, it could not fail that truth would triumph in the end. Moreover, in such a case, a far greater weight must naturally attach to what might be spoken by the minister of religion than can be the case at present. It would be felt that the words were those of a man not pledged in any way to a foregone conclusion ; of one who was not merely repeating what he had bound himself under virtual penalties to say, but who might speak differently if his conscience told him to do so ; and it could not but be that greater respect and attention would on all sides be paid to what was said. It is, therefore, an unwise and impolitic arrangement, to say the least, under which honest and truthful men are virtually forbidden to speak out freely and openly what they think,

even on these deeper subjects of theological interest—unless, indeed, they shall speak in accordance with established doctrines.

And further, must it not be held that the prevailing system betrays and embodies a lamentable want of faith in the native power of Divine truth? It is thought to be necessary to tie up the very thoughts of its ministers and make them all speak only in one way; as though the truth committed to their keeping could not stand alone, but must be fenced round by these human safeguards. And for a moment compare, in this respect, the position of religious truth with that of truth of any other kind. Is not this left to speak for itself?—that is to say, would any one think of binding down the professor in a university, for example, to teach only such and such doctrines of Chemistry, or Geology, or any other science? This is not done, and no one has ever thought of doing it—since, perhaps, the days of Galileo. The truths of Science are able to take care of themselves. Their teachers and defenders are perfectly free to speak according to what they see and believe; and all the world knows that this is the only course by which the truth with which they have to do can be really maintained and error destroyed. Why, then, again, should we proceed differently in the case of Theology; or why should we not dare to trust the preacher with the same liberty of thought, of inquiry, of avowal, which is given to the man of science?

But, some persons will reply, the great doctrines of Christianity are Divine truths: they are not, therefore, to be left open to inquiry or discussion like other truths; but we are called upon, rather, to receive them and believe them with a blind unquestioning faith. In reply to this, let it be fairly remembered that the truths of Christianity, in their ordinary dogmatic form, are not, at all events, found stated in that form in the Scriptures, but come down to us, as we have them in the usual standards, from the time of the Reformation. They were gathered *out* of the Bible, as it was thought, by certain men who lived in the sixteenth century, and who, by the aid of preceding authorities, of their own or a former age, and under the guidance of their own judgment, framed the theological system now usually embodied in the Articles and Trust Deeds of our Churches and Chapels. The three Creeds may seem to form an exception to this statement. But it is perfectly applicable to them, too, if we refer them each to its own century. They are simply the compositions of certain men who lived in the third, the fourth, the seventh, or eighth centuries respectively. Let it be further remembered that these ancient men of a long past time, who have succeeded so well in impressing their theology upon our age, were only human beings like ourselves. They were not gods, or even angels. They had not, so far as is known, been admitted to any more intimate acquaintance with Divine things than the men of our own times. They were not inspired or infallible, and, therefore, they may have been wrong in

regard to some things which they thought true. Nay, some of them unquestionably *were* wrong, and in points which they deemed of the utmost importance: Calvin, for example, in his terrible doctrine of Election and Reprobation, which nobody, I suppose, holds in these days, at least nobody worth considering in these discussions. If, then, the great reformers and creed-makers could go wrong on one point, they might do so on others; and so it easily follows that our later time ought to be *free* to receive or reject their theology, according to its own judgment; that it should not be called upon to believe merely because they believed—or because any one may choose to attribute to them the character and authority of an infallible Church.

From these and similar considerations it also follows that the truths, or reputed truths, of all theologies, even the truths, or reputed truths, of Christianity itself, are amenable to investigation by every human mind. Full liberty to think, examine, and speak ought, therefore, to be possessed by a national clergy. It is only a thoughtless or a craven spirit of indifference to the natural rights of the individual soul that would bind them down to a blind acceptance of any unchangeable orthodoxy of man's devising. It is not to be forgotten that the Infinite Spirit is a *living* Spirit; that He may still, even now, speak to our minds; and that in every new fact of Science which, by the careful labours of thoughtful men, is made known to the world, we have truth Divine, revealing to us the will of the Creator, or the ways by which He may have chosen to exercise His power. If, then, at any given moment we should shut ourselves up, and say, in effect, Here we take our stand; now we have got a complete knowledge of Divine things; henceforward we can admit nothing that is inconsistent with our established theology: to do this would be much as if we would harden ourselves against the very Spirit of God, and refuse to hearken to His voice, and close our eyes to the light which He in His grace and mercy may be causing to rise and shine upon us. For, surely, to vary the form of expression, every truth of nature is as much God's truth as the deepest or most solemn teachings of religion; and thus it is plain that all are individually bound, as reasonable men, to keep an open ear, and a candid mind, and a quick, clear sight for the reception of every word and sign which may come to us from the Infinite, by whatever channel it may please Him to send them to us.

It is, indeed, easy to dismiss with contemptuous words the conclusions of a Darwin respecting the probable origin of man, or those of a Lyell and others respecting the antiquity of the world; as it is easy and sufficient, with some persons, to oppose the reasonings of a Colenso with an appeal to Church authority, which, after all, is only the judgment of fallible minds like our own. But when this is done the question will still remain, Are these things *true*? Are they most probably true? Are they worthy even of provisional acknowledg-

ment, with a view to further examination, in order to find out the more perfect truth? The question will still remain, Does the Lord of truth Himself speak to us, even in these discoveries, or suggestions, of scientific research, and is He calling upon us, and inviting us, in them, to abandon, or to alter and qualify, our ancient and long-descended ideas by these new revelations of His infinite activity in the ages of the past? Such questions as these still remain; and we are invited to face them like thoughtful reasonable inquirers, who are anxious only to know the Divine will. They are to be calmly and patiently entertained, and decided, if we *can* decide them, on the highest principles of right and reason which are known to us.

But to act thus and in this spirit men must be *free*, as Lindsey's history may well teach us. They must be free, not merely to "assent and consent," but to reject and deny; free to think and to speak, even to teach and preach. If they are not so, any high consistency or love for truth can scarcely exist, or exercise their rightful influence. At any rate, multitudes around will be slow to believe in their existence, and slower still to give themselves up to the guidance of those in whom they think them wanting. Thus, again, and as the sure conclusion of the whole matter, an ecclesiastical system which in its fundamental principle is out of harmony with this "glorious liberty of the children of God" is, and can be, only as a house built upon the sand. Some day, sooner or later, it must fall, and great will be the fall thereof; or, if it does not perish by a sudden overthrow, it will continue to stand only as the subject of a slow and lingering decay, a mere stately monument of the lost greatness of other times, ceasing by degrees to have living power in the world, and incapable of gaining the ear or the heart of any but unthoughtful or superstitious men,—a statement for which it would be easy to find an illustration in at least one ancient and venerable ecclesiastical body of our time.

G. VANCE SMITH.



RUSSIAN IDYLLS.

IN the cemetery of Voroneje, a pleasantly-situated town in the neighbourhood of the Don, rest side by side the remains of two Russian poets. They were both natives of Voroneje, both of them had nature richly gifted, to both was it fated to lead a hard life and to die young. The one, Koltsof*—who has been called the Russian Burns, though he resembled the Ayrshire poet in little except the fact of having been endowed to a very high degree with genuine poetic feeling and with the gift of lyrical expression—was the son of a small trader, who not unnaturally tried to force the youthful poet into the uncongenial groove of a mercantile life; the other, Nikitin,† kept a small bookseller's shop in the town. Of Koltsof I have spoken elsewhere;‡ of Nikitin it is unnecessary to say more than that the nature of his surroundings was such as to deepen what was in him, probably, a natural melancholy, due to the constantly weak state of his health, and to imbue his poetry with a sadness in which a more robust and more fortunate writer would have less frequently indulged. My present object is not so much to speak of the lives the two Voroneje poets led, as to attempt to give some idea of the poetry which they wrote—selecting, at the same time, those of their poems which contain sketches of Russian manners and customs, and which may therefore serve to create before the eyes of their readers some kind

* Born 1809, died 1842—pronounce Kaltsóf.

† Born 1826, died 1861—pronounce Nikítin.

‡ *Fortnightly Review*, Sept. 15, 1866.

of picture of Russian peasant life. With this peasant life, Koltsof, trader though he was and native of a town, was thoroughly well acquainted. His father dealt in cattle, and during the summer the young poet used to revel in the liberty which he enjoyed for weeks together, when he took charge of his father's herds on the steppes, and drank in rapture with the free air which he breathed—whether gazing by day across the great sea of summer grass, undulating beneath the breeze, while above blazed the sun in the unclouded sky ; or lying beside the camp-fire at night, and listening to dreamy sounds rising from the mysterious plain, on which from their ebon vault the clear stars looked down with steady gaze. There, afar from the petty vexations of the town, he entered into the full spirit of the life led by the herdsman and the farmer ; and therefore it is that he has been able to express their humble aspirations, their simple hopes and fears, with perfect fidelity, and at the same time with true poetic feeling. Nikitin, also, though less frequently let loose from business, had many opportunities of acquainting himself with what was going on in the peasant's hut as well as within the homes of the working classes of his native town ; and therefore his poetry, no less than Koltsof's, may be taken as the true though sublimated expression of such ideas as are common to the hard-working, weather-beaten peasantry of Russia. A pleasant transcript of some of these ideas, including a picture of one of those scenes with which they are so often associated, is afforded by the following poem by Koltsof. It is written in unrhymed verse, the peculiar charm of which is, of course, utterly lost in my prose translation, one that has no other merit than that of being exactly literal. It is called *Urojai*, or—

THE ABUNDANT HARVEST.

1.

With a rosy flame the dawn burns on high, but the fog still broods
over the face of the earth ;
Till the day has caught the fire of the sun, and rolled up the mists
higher than the tops of the hills,
And has pressed them into a black cloud. The black cloud has
begun to knit its brows—
Has begun to knit its brows, as if reflecting, as though musing upon
the place of its birth,
As though remembering how the wild winds will drive it before
them across the face of the wide world.
Then it arms itself with the hurricane and the thunderbolt, with the
lightning's flash and the bow of the cloud.
It has taken up arms, and flown abroad, and struck its stroke, and
poured itself forth
In a torrent of tears, in a flood of rain, over the copious bosom of the
earth.

2.

Now from heaven's heights the dear sun looks down. The earth a
 plenteous draught has drunk.
 On their corn-fields, and gardens, and meadows green, the rustic folk
 cannot gaze enough.
 For the grace of God these rustic folk have waited long with trembling
 and prayer.
 Together with the spring there have come to life the secret thoughts
 of their quiet minds.
 Thought the first. To pour into sacks the grain in the bins, and to
 set their carts in order.
 Thought the second. Forth from the village by night to drive their
 line of carts.
 Thought the third. . . . When of this they thought, to God the
 Lord arose their prayers.
 With early dawn have they gone a-field. There in handfuls heaped
 each scatters the grain, furrows the soil with the ploughshare's
 blade, or rips it across with the harrow's tooth.

3.

I will go and gaze with gladdened eye at what God has sent to men
 for their toil.
 Above my waist the large-grained rye rises, then dreamily bends well
 nigh to the ground.
 On every side the corn, guest sent by God, greets with a smile the
 joyful day.
 Over it the breeze floats lustroously, streaming this way and that, a
 wave of gold.
 Now in whole families the peasants commence their harvest, cutting
 close to the roots the stalks of the lofty rye.
 Into close-packed mows are the sheaves collected ; from the lines of
 carts sounds music all the night long.
 On every side do the stacks erect their heads in the barn-yards—
 taking up much room, like nobles of yore in their robes of
 state.

4.

The dear sun sees that the harvest is done ; so colder gleam his
 last autumnal rays.
 But with warm light glows the peasant's taper—burning before the
 pictured form of the Mother of God.

Here is another picture from the harvest-field, also by Koltsof,
 but painted in a different tone. It is called *Molodaya Zhnitsa*,
 or—

THE YOUNG REAPER.

High up in the sky stands the Sun, pouring fierce heat on Mother
 Earth. Stifling is the air to the maiden ; sadly does she stand
 in the corn-field, little pleasure does she find in cutting the full-
 cared rye.

All parched is she by the heat of the field ; like fire burns her face.
Droops her head forwards towards her breast, falls from her hand the severed stalk.

Not without a cause does the maiden work slackly, gazing aside, and forgetting her task. Ah ! in her breast her poor heart is aching ; into it has a new inmate entered.

Yesterday she went—it was a holiday—into the woods she went to look for raspberries. There a youth met her—not for the first time—met her as though by chance, and stood still and looked at her ever so pitifully. And he sighed, and he sang a sad song—

Far away in the woods resounded that song. Deep in the soul of the fair girl did it find response and shelter.

Stifling and hot is the air to the maiden ; sadly does she stand amid the corn, little pleasure hath she in reaping the full-eared rye.

Next let us take another of Koltsof's poems, in which the sorrows not of the fair maiden, but of the good youth, are described. It is called *Kosar*, the Scytheman, or—

THE MOWER.

Ah me ! in an unlucky day, in an unhappy hour, was I born into the world ! Broader shouldered am I than my grandfather, full chested am I, like my mother. On my cheek amid milky white my father's blood has kindled a rosy dawn. Well-ordered lie my jet black locks. All that I take in hand turns out well—

Yet in an unlucky day, in an unhappy hour, was I born into the world !

Long did I, last autumn, court Marya,* the Starosta's daughter. But he, the old hunk, stood out against me. Whom does he want to marry her to ? Does he suppose that I run after her because her father is said to be rich ?

Suppose his house is a flowing cup ! It is she that I want, 'tis for her I pine. Her fair face with its rosy flush, her rounded cheeks, her soft dark eyes, have driven wild the youth—

Ah ! yesterday how didst thou weep for me ! 'twas yesterday the old man utterly refused to give thee to me—Ah ! such pain as this no time can ever render bearable !

A new scythe will I buy—will whet it and sharpen it—and then bid farewell to my native village ! Weep not, my Marya ! with my keen scythe, will I not wound myself. Farewell, O my village ! Farewell, O Starosta !

Into far off parts will the youth go, down along the Don, by the river banks. There stand villages fair to see. There the plenteous Steppe stretches far away, robed all over with luscious grass—

Ah, Steppe of mine, free Steppe ! how widely, Steppe, thou spreadest out thy arms, extending onwards to the Black Sea waves !

* In the original Grunya or Grunyushka, dimin. of Agrafena. The Starosta is the chief man of the village community.

Not I alone as guest have come to thee. I and one more to thee have come, my scythe-blade keen. Long has my heart been set on pacing slowly with my scythe, lengthways and broadwise, through the grassy Steppe.

Eagerly press on, O shoulder! rapidly move, O hand! Breathe on my face, O wind from the South. Do thou quicken the wide Steppe, breaking it up into waves.

Whistle, O scythe, bright glancing around! Whish, O grass, falling mown. Bow down, O flowers, your heads to the ground. Ye will fade like the grass—as I fade, longing for Marya.

I will rake up the mows, I will heap up the ricks. A handful of coin will the Cossack's wife give unto me.

The coin will I keep, sewed up in my cloak. And so soon as I return to my village, straight to the Starosta will I go. My poverty may not have gained me his pity; but his goodwill will I buy with my store of gold.

Pathetic and often melancholy as the genuine folk-songs of Russia are, there is a manly force in the Russian peasant's character to which such poems as Koltsof's "Mower" give true expression. Equally true, however, to the gloomier moods of Slavonic thought and fancy are those of his lyrics which lament in wailing tones the deeper sorrows of life, or describe that peculiar weariness of existence which drives so many Russian sufferers into suicide. I cannot pretend to render justice, even approximately, to one of the best known (to Russians) of his songs, that styled "The Peasant's Musing," but it has been excellently translated, together with many more of Koltsof's poems, by Bodensedt. Here is, however, a literal version of its words:—

I will sit me down to the table and think—what it is to live in the world, when all alone.

No young wife has the youth: the youth has no trusty friend.

No golden store has he—no warm corner. Not a plough-horse, not a harrow, not a plough. . . .

Together with poverty, but one gift did my father bestow on me—vigorous strength. But even that, in a short time, has been all consumed, by bitter need, among strange folk.

I will sit me down to the table and think—what it is to live in the world, when all alone.

Equally impossible is it for me to give even the faintest idea of the melancholy music which fills the verses, of which the following lines are a prosaic rendering:—

Ripe-eared rye, do not whisper! Sing not, O Scytheman, over the sweeping Steppe!

I have no cause to get goods now; I have no cause to grow rich!

Not for my own delight, did I, the youth, intend—did I intend my goods—but for the maiden's delight. Sweet was it for me to gaze into her eyes—into her eyes, full of loving thoughts!

Now have those clear eyes grown dim—the maiden fair sleeps the
 sleep of the grave!
 Heavier than the hills, blacker than the midnight, one dark thought
 crushes down my heart.

Nikitin's feeble health, the hard nature of the life he led, and the small amount of sympathy which his writings evoked, all made him inclined to look upon the gloomy side of things, and to choose as themes for his verse sad rather than joyous ideas. But the melancholy with which his poetry is imbued, being always natural and rarely morbid, is not in any way distasteful. It speaks of sorrow and suffering; but its tone is generally that of a resignation that is neither without courage nor without solace. A fair specimen of his manner is afforded by the following sketch of—

"THE STUBBORN FATHER. *

"You can cry or not as you please. But mind you do
 What I've commanded. No! I will not listen.
 You're a mere child. It's much too soon for you
 To take to arguing. You say, forsooth—
 'My wooer is bad-tempered, and a spendthrift.
 He's killed one wife already.'—Speak out, girl!
 Say—'Father, I'm in love with Kuzma's son
 Up at the mill.'

Not if you promised me
 'Mountains of gold, should that old warlock's son
 Get hold of you! †

'He has laid by some money!'
 Well! let him boast of that. Now let him try
 To get an honest name. Why, I would rather
 Go begging round the world—or die of hunger—
 Than make myself a laughing-stock. I won't
 Become related to a conjuror—
 We don't like warlocks in our family.
 * * * * *

And so it's thus, you shameless girl, you mean
 To pay me back the money that you've cost me!
 Pretend to criticize your suitors! Girl!
 Do you know the power that a father has?
 Why—if I wished it—you would have to marry
 The cow-boy. Don't tell *me*. There! That's my will!"

Within his daughter's breast her breathing stopped—
 Her face turned ashy pale, and shuddering
 Like a leaf, she threw herself with sad lament
 At the old man's feet.

* Nikitin's verse, though good, does not stand on the same high level with that of Koltsouf. I have ventured, therefore, to render the two dramatic sketches of his which I have selected into rough blank verse, and sometimes slightly to abridge.

† Millers, in Russia, are often suspected of being warlocks—for they live apart from other men, and their streams are notoriously haunted by water sprites.

“Dear father, pity me!
 Oh, do not bury me alive in the grave!
 Are you so weary of me? Am I not
 A useful servant to you? You have said
 Full many a time you would not give your child
 To one who did not love her—Oh, my father!
 Do not destroy my youth! I'd sooner pass
 My days in toil, and live and die unmarried!—
 Do break this marriage off, my own dear father!”

“Excellent, really! I should like to know
 Where you learnt all that wisdom. Oh, I see
 What you are thinking of—‘My father's old.
 To the grave with him, and let the pretty one
 Enjoy her freedom.’ You don't wish to see
 Your father honour'd in the village, help'd
 By a rich son-in-law in time of need!
 So be it! Only leave my house at once,
 And never set your foot in it again!”

“Oh, father! do not drive me from your house!
 I do beseech you by my mother's tears
 To pity me—Remember, when she lay
 Upon her deathbed, how she begged and prayed,
 In the name of God, that you would treat me kindly.
 I'm your own flesh and blood. Don't turn me out!”

“Oh, yes! I know how all you women talk!
 So you must needs go crying for the dead!
 If your dead mother were to rise from the grave,
 I'd say to her—‘This shall be as I please.’
 Girl! if you don't obey me, I will curse you!”

A week has passed. . . . The question has been settled.
 The father celebrates his daughter's marriage.
 The voices of the wedding guests resound,
 The old man waxes merry in his cups,
 Dances for joy, and proudly brags about
 His daughter and her husband.

On one side
 The bridegroom sits apart, smoothing his beard,
 Dressed in a new caftan, and justly proud
 Of his red girdle, and his shoes, adorned
 With copper lacings.* By him sits his bride,
 Her head-gear gay with beads, her wedding dress
 Thick set with studs. Her face is white as snow.
 Full many a tear the maiden must have wept,
 In that sad week before the wedding-day!

At last the feast is over. From the house

* A piece of rustic foppery dear to the hearts of some of the villagers of the Voroneje government.

The father leads his child into the yard,
The bridegroom cocks his cap upon one ear,
And bids his horses gallop. High in the air
Rises the dust, as up the village street
The troika flies, while o'er the horses' heads
The bells ring merrily.

Then all grows still,
And when the midnight comes, it hears no sound,
Save where the Miller's son, who cannot sleep
For sorrow, sits without his father's house
And sings—Now wailing forth his heart's lament,
And now in bolder strains defying fate.

Time flies—the first snows fall—the villagers
Gladly greet Mother Winter. Some of the men
Drive off to the towns—the rest find work at home.
In all the barns the flails go merrily—
But Pakhom—he does nothing, only drinks
At the kabák all day with heavy heart.
“Well, neighbour!” will some other tippler say—
“No doubt your daughter gets on rarely now,
With such a husband.” Then old Pakhom knits
His grisly brows, and casting down his eyes,
Grumbles out—“Can't you mind your own affairs?
Look to your own wife—never mind your neighbour's!”
“My wife's all right!” his sneering neighbour cries—
“I wish you joy of your fine son-in-law!
He's lying out there in the mud, dead drunk!”

A year has passed away. A feast-day comes.
Roused by the sound of bells, the villagers
Flock churchwards joyously. Without—the Sun
Looks down upon the pious folk. Within—
Two candles gleam beside a pinewood coffin.
At the head old Pakhom stands—in threadbare clothes—
And sadly musing gazes steadfastly
On his dead daughter's face.

The service done,
The peasants bear the coffin to the grave,
And there the earth receives the obedient daughter.
Then to her father turns her husband, saying—
“I can't think why it was your daughter died—
She had all she wanted—but somehow or other
She was always ailing.”

But the old man stands
Silently by her grave. Upon his breast
His head hangs heavily—and when the earth
Falls on the coffin with a hollow rattle—
A shudder runs along his limbs, the tears
Stream from his aged eyes.

Full many a
He, lying sleepless in the dead of night,
Will listen, shudd'ring, to that hollow s

By way of a second specimen of Nikitin's work, we will take a poem styled *Burlak*. The name *burlaki*, it may be as we observe, was formerly applied to the men who, in painful fashion towed barges up the Volga. But this form of labour is, at present nearly extinct. Our own word "bargee" may perhaps be taken at least an illustration of, if not quite an equivalent for, the term

BURLAK.

Ah, friend! You too have had your sorrows. Else
A song would never make you weep. Well now,
Just hear what I have gone through—then you'll know
What sorrow really means.

My father died
When I was just nineteen, and I was left
An orphan, and at first alone—but soon
A neighbour's daughter won my heart; I pleased her,
And we were married—happily did we live
Together. I could fancy she had brought me
Happiness with her—(Heaven be hers, poor thing!)
You can't conceive how good a manager
She was—she wouldn't waste a single farthing.
In the long winter evenings, she would light
A fir-wood splinter,* and then spin away
For hours—not pausing till the cocks would crow.
Then would she lay her down—but with the dawn
She was up again—would run to give their food
To the sheep and cows—next light the fire—and then
Betake her to her spinning-wheel again,
Or find some other indoor work to do.
When summer came, she'd help to cut the rye
And carry it, nor ever weary. I would say,
"Isn't it time to rest?"

"Oh no!" she'd cry,
"I'm not a bit tired"—

Every now and then
Perhaps I'd buy her something as a present.
"You needn't have done that, my bonny bird,"
She'd say—"We love each other much too well
To care for presents—don't go wasting money
On me"—

My life with her was just as if
I'd been in Paradise.

But no one knows
How soon calamity may fall upon him!
My wife lay down to rest within the grave—
The world grows dark whenever I think of it.

My only consolation was my child—
I'd only one—a fair-skinned, dark-haired boy,

* Used in Russian cottages instead of a candle

As like his mother as one drop to another—
 He had begun to spell a bit already,
 And I to think "My boy will be a man."
 But that was not God's pleasure—in the spring
 He got some kind of sickness. We called in
 Wise women, soothsayers, had magic drinks
 For him to take. I promised I would give
 A rouble for a candle—to be burnt
 Before the holy image in the Church. . . .
 But God refused to listen to my prayer—
 I had to lay my darling in the coffin,
 And bear him to the graveyard. . . .

In those days,

Those dreary days, 'twas bitter for me, friend!
 My heavy arms hung listlessly—my neighbours
 Gathered their harvests. All the fields around
 Were blithe with song. . . . But there I pined away
 With weary sorrow. When the day was done,
 The heavy-laden carts would come from the field
 And in a line drive creaking thro' the village.
 But in my cottage I would sit alone,
 Trying to stem my tears.

The autumn passed.

I waited till the first snow fell.—Methought,
 I'll sell my rye, fit up a sledge, and go
 And earn a living with it somewhere.

Suddenly,

Woe upon woe! a murrain seized my cattle—
 Never until I die shall I forget
 That fatal year—

I managed to get through

The winter somehow. But I saw I'd lost
 My old position. In our village meetings,
 This one would flout me, saying:—"Good! it seems
 The barest beggar thinks he has a right
 To meddle in the business of the Commune!"
 That one would gird at me behind my back,
 And cry:—"The lazy fellow! Such a one as he
 Will never gain his bread. In my opinion,
 If one's a man, one never will give way,
 Whatever happens."

All this talk and laughter

Aroused me—God assisted me, I think.
 I felt a longing for a freer life.
 I got a passport, paid up all my taxes,
 And joined the bargemen.

Since that time my grief

Has yielded to the Volga's dark blue wave . . .
 Rest follows toil: upon the riverside
 Bright burns the evening fire—a comrade starts
 A song—the rest join in—your spirits rise—
 A thrill runs o'er your limbs—you sing yourself.
 And if at times a dreary season comes,

And half-forgotten sorrows vex your soul—
 There's solace still. You hear the river's roar,
 Singing of freedom to the sweeping plain.
 Fast beats your heart—you burn—though wintry cold
 The weather, yet you want no cloak to warm you.
 Aboard and take your seat! fall back on the oar!
 Pleasant it is to brave the rushing storm.
 The waves run mountain-high—in snowy flakes
 The foam flies past; strange voices groan and wail.
 The tempest roars and whistles—from your soul
 A cry arises: "Let God's will be done.
 If we're to live, we'll live. And if to die,—
 Well then, so be it!" And you feel as though
 Your heart had never known what sorrow meant.

Before concluding I will give—this time in a literal prose version
 —one more specimen of Nikitin's pictures of Russian peasant life.
 It is called

A WINTER NIGHT IN THE VILLAGE.

The frosty air tingles: the night is as clear as the day: the bright
 moon looks out from behind a cloud:
 The sleeping village seems deserted. The storm-wind has covered
 the houses deep with snow.
 There is dumb silence in the empty streets: the barking of the
 watch-dogs is no longer heard.
 Work does not seethe now in the great court-yards: the doors no
 longer creak. All sounds are still in the cottages.
 The villagers, having prayed to God, sleep quietly, forgetful of their
 cares and heavy toil.
 Only in one cottage burns a fire—one poor old woman has not yet
 gone to sleep.
 She thinks about her fatherless children. Who will be kind to them
 when she is dead?
 Can they hope that any one will give them a crust of bread, clothes
 and shoes, and a warm corner? . . .
 Then in silent grief, full of heavy thoughts, she stands trembling
 before the sacred picture,
 And falling on her knees, she sadly and humbly prays aloud, but
 with bated breath—
 "Holy Virgin! preserve these orphans from the wrath of man, from
 pain and care.
 Graciously aid them in their unbefriended lot, and guard them from
 the crimes which come of want.
 Give them strength and wisdom, and may their sins be forgiven at
 the Judgment Day."

The flame in the copper lamp feebly lights the faces of the Holy
 Images,
 And the care-worn forehead of the old woman, and the two sleeping
 orphans in the corner of the room.

Now have the cocks begun to crow near at hand—the dead season of
the night has come—

Hark! a troika, driven by a cheery singer, has suddenly rattled past.
Now in the frosty distance slowly dies his song away.

I have restricted my efforts, in the present article, to giving some idea of a few among the pieces written by two of Russia's poets. That Russia is by no means deficient in poetry may be judged from the fact that a book recently published (in Russian) at St. Petersburg, by N. V. Gerbel, entitled "Russian Poets in Biographies and Specimens," gives extracts from more than 120 writers—of whose existence, with perhaps half-a-dozen exceptions, it may be assumed that most English readers have never heard. But the best testimony to the richness of Russia's poetic vein is afforded by the numerous volumes of songs, collected from the mouths of the peasants, which are being published in that country. As a specimen of this vast mass of popular poetry, we may take the following lament, intended to be sung on the eve of her wedding-day by a motherless bride :—

I will go up into the belfry. I will strike the great bell. Surely,
from within the damp earth, my own mother dear will hear the
clang of the bell, will answer the wailing call of her own dear
child.

Then will I tell her, the loved one, of all my sorrow and sadness—
that my marriage-day is close at hand, that to-morrow I shall go
as a bride to the church, that the wedding guests will come—
strangers all, no friendly faces.

But thou, O my mother who didst nourish me! thou wilt not sit at
my wedding-feast! thy eyes no longer gaze upon the bright
world! Into the house of God, to that great and solemn rite, one
who is not my own mother will lead me.

O mother dear! neither gold nor silver do I beg of thee. But for thy
blessing do I pray, O mother who bore me. Dearer to me is it
than gold! Dearer to me is it than silver! Grant thy blessing,
O my mother, to thy poor orphan child!

W. R. S. RALSTON.



EVANGELICALISM.

IN the January No. of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW there appeared a criticism, by the Rev. F. R. Wynne, on a passage in my recent paper on "Purgatory, Heaven, and Hell." It is so seldom that theological controversy is conducted in the considerate, fair, and I may almost say friendly spirit, in which Mr. Wynne writes, that were it for this reason alone, his critique would call for a reply. I am glad also to have the opportunity of recurring to the general subject, not only to point out more clearly the defective character (as I conceive it) of Mr. Wynne's rejoinder, but in order to develop a little more fully certain truths which were but briefly stated in my original article.

How far Mr. Wynne is a characteristic representative of the Evangelical school of to-day I am unable to tell. If he is, they must be singularly changed for the better. He unquestionably disavows what he calls "the hard, cold theories by which Puritanic writers have tried to expound and enforce" the dogma of justification by faith only. These "Puritanic theories" he asserts to be as unlike the doctrine of the New Testament as "light is different from darkness." If this view is really shared by the majority of the Evangelical party in the Church, I, for one, do unfeignedly rejoice. If it is shared by their influential younger minds, the gain is very great, and the fact would prove that the criticisms and theological culture of other schools have at last penetrated into quarters where they have hitherto been abhorred and denounced. I cannot, however, but fear that

Mr. Wynne is scarcely to be regarded as a representative Evangelical. Certainly it is but a short time ago that one of the recognised chiefs of the party denounced Geology, at a clerical gathering, as an invention of the devil, designed to upset the authority of the Bible. He might, of course, as reasonably have denounced arithmetic as an invention of the devil, designed to torment little boys with the mysteries of Practice and the Rule of Three.

Mr. Wynne, if I may say so without offence, seems to be rather a representative of a large class, made up of the various schools in the Church, who have a horror of clear and intelligible statements on any great religious subject. The vehement terms in which he denounces "the old Puritanic theories" on justification, alone are sufficient to show that he is, at present, one of those who are in love with haziness of conception. Then, again, afterwards he says, "We ask for no special theory of atonement—Christ gave himself for us, and we are forgiven, that is all we want to know." He might as rationally allege that if we wish to observe the loveliness of natural beauty, we should choose a day when the sunlight is darkened and all nature hid in an impenetrable fog. And this fondness for mistiness is especially characteristic of the existing condition of theological thought. Science and philosophy have filled the intellectual atmosphere with doubts, and criticisms, and suspicions, which have a direct tendency to the unsettlement of religious men's beliefs. It is impossible to escape these terrible influences. They are everywhere. No man can escape hearing or reading of the current questionings of the old convictions as to the Bible and the old-fashioned theology. He must live out of all society; he must never read a newspaper or periodical; he must never go into a strange church; he must never take up a chance book in a friend's house or on a bookseller's counter. The very books and periodicals which he himself believes in contribute to spread the knowledge of the facts by their attempts to refute the opinions which they condemn.

Thus surprised, bewildered, and distressed, is it to be wondered at that many minds take refuge in this misty haze, and forget that a cloud, however gilded and coloured by their own personal fancies, is in reality nothing but a shifting multitude of cold and colourless drops of water? Mr. Wynne detests the "theory of justification" upheld by the old Puritans; but they had this enormous advantage over him, that they knew what they meant. They used words which expressed definite and intelligible ideas, whether or not those ideas corresponded to real, though invisible truths. Take the very words of Christ which Mr. Wynne quotes, "Come unto me, all ye that are weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest." "Him that cometh unto me I will in no wise cast out." How is it possible to attach any meaning to these words, supposing they bear upon the doctrine of justification by faith only, without adopting some theory as to the

atonement? I can quite understand what a sweet and soothing anodyne the repetition of these words may prove to a congregation which loves to find comfort in its theological teaching, but which very much dislikes the trouble of being made to think, and to ask itself what doctrines it does really hold. And I can also understand the agreeable sensation of preachers and writers who can utter the same words, without any resolute determination to make out what they mean. But, in reality, they had a meaning as uttered by Christ; and all application of them to the living men and women of to-day, which does not include some definite belief as to what they mean, is an illusion and a trick of intellectual fence. As it happens, when taken with the words that immediately follow, the invitation of Christ is directly destructive of the Evangelical view of justification. "Take my yoke upon you," he adds, "and learn of me, for I am meek and lowly in heart, and ye shall find rest unto your souls." "Rest" is to be found by adopting the "yoke" of Christ, by learning his meekness and lowliness of heart; and not by the adoption of any form of that dogma which Mr. Wynne admits to be the special characteristic of Evangelicalism.

This dislike of precision in religious belief arises partly from the dread which many persons feel as to the conclusions to which they may be forced if they attempt consistency. They love to wander piously (as they imagine) in a land peopled with the dim ghosts of doctrines that once were living, and to invest their faint and shadowy forms with all the energy and force of a vivid vitality. But it also arises from that confusion between the knowable and the unknowable, which we have inherited from the theories of past centuries, and the incurable propensity of the scholastic divines to imagine that when they had put words into grammatical shapes, they had defined accurate and real ideas. From them, too, we inherit the unhappy notion that uncertainty is to be expressed by haziness of description. This, indeed, is the very fallacy which lies at the root of all these declarations that "we want no theory," which are now so common. To be uncertain as to the truth of any doctrine is one thing; to shroud that doctrine in a cloud of indefinite statements, is altogether another. How, indeed, can we seriously argue whether or not any doctrine or opinion is true, until we have formed a definite conception as to what it is? Men may deceive themselves into the notion that it is impossible to know whether this or that doctrine is true, while in fact they are simply unable to enter into any real discussion of the matter, because they have not distinctly realized what it is they are going to argue about.

Equally pernicious and fatal to the reconstruction of religious belief, in these days of the shattering of old superstitions, is the want of perception of the line which separates the knowable from the unknowable. Almost every religious body has its creeds and articles

of faith, more or less inherited from the scholastic theology, which assume that it is possible for the human intellect to comprehend the nature of God in his essence, and to define that which cannot possibly be put into human language, because it cannot be comprehended by a created intelligence. To know God in his relations to ourselves and to the Universe which he has created, is the highest and noblest of all knowledge; but to know Him as He is, is impossible. It is impossible now, and it will be impossible for ever, for the simple reason that He is infinite and we are finite.

But this is precisely what the mediæval theologians unhappily forgot, and thus they drew up dogmatic schemes, or rather forms of words, which were destitute of all meaning, because they attempted to define the undefinable. Recognising, in a sort of vague way, this undeniable truth, it is the fashion with many men now to assume that the right remedy for the old folly is to wrap all beliefs concerning God and his relation to ourselves in one cloud of indefiniteness and uncertainty. Science and criticism have invaded with their daring denials the whole region of religious belief; and the world of "divines" is stricken with consternation, and their favourite resource is to introduce into their beliefs that flabbiness and yieldingness which presents no solid, hard front to the blows of the invader. So it was in the days of the old battering-ram, when the besieged hung a mass of soft and shapeless defence in front of their walls, against which the ram dashed itself in vain. But, on the other hand, while we reduce the outlines of our faith to this formless dimness, what becomes of our practical religion? As has been well said, man cannot live upon moonshine, however charming it may be to look upon! And in the meantime Rome stalks forward and makes her repeated converts. She, at least, knows what she means, and the weary Protestant, sickened with the popular teaching that religion is full of mysteries which are beyond the human intelligence, sinks into her extended arms, and quenches all independent thought in the sugared narcotic which she offers to his lips.

Again, in a very significant foot-note, Mr. Wynne at once shows us how entirely he has repudiated the opinion which was once absolutely universal among the Evangelicals, and illustrates the paralysing influences of this notion as to the value of vagueness of conception. "In the quotations from the New Testament writings," he says, "which I may have to make in the course of this argument, I do not require to have any 'theory of inspiration' granted. It is enough for my present purpose that they should be taken as genuine documents of the Apostolic age, containing the substance of the Apostolic teaching. It is enough that they should be considered as giving us, on the whole, a reliable account of what our Lord and his immediate followers said and did." And in this statement Mr. Wynne undoubtedly expresses the views of a large number of the clergy in

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the original propagation of Christianity was invented. Our perverted use of the New Testament followed the introduction of the Pagan conception of the Divine Nature into the early Church, and was only turned, as an after-thought, into a convenient instrument for perpetuating those conceptions in after ages for the benefit of an ever-encroaching priesthood in their supremacy over an ignorant and superstitious laity.

Let us, in the name of all we hold most sacred, look at the facts of the life which we all are living. God, who made us, is a hidden God. The many millions who believe, in some vague way, in His existence, believe in it because they are taught by their elders. Few of them, indeed, are capable of those profound inquiries which are necessary in the case of more cultured minds. But from all of us He is a hidden God, in the sense that we cannot speak to Him face to face ; that His attributes can only be learnt by laborious and acute study ; that wise and good men differ almost vitally as to the methods by which He is to be approached, and as to our present relation to Him. At the same time, the whole world is overspread with evil and misery. The lives of the majority of men and women are passed without any such knowledge of God as can create in them a noble and loveable character. Myriads die as infants, before the faculties with which they are born can even begin their growth and development. All humanity is divided into tribes and nations who live in a perpetual state of armed truce, when they are not engaged in slaughtering one another, and a vast portion of the production of human industry is wasted in preparation for mutual slaughter, and in this gigantic slaughter itself. The hatreds of men professing and often feeling a strong religious zeal are frequently as savage as those of men who openly disclaim religious motives ; and they crush, torture, and slay one another for the sake of what they call religious truth, with all the bloodthirstiness of a vulgar murderer. What an awful, incomprehensible, and terrible thing is, then, this life we are living ; and yet, when we die, no one comes back from the world into which he has entered to tell us what he has there found to enlighten him.

In the midst of this fearful mystery many able and accomplished minds rest satisfied with the conviction that all real knowledge of God and of the life after death is impossible, while the larger number of the whole human race are lost in gross superstition or utterly heedless of the existence of any invisible or future world. On the other hand, there are a certain number of capable thinkers to whom life is intolerable, if it is not lightened by some belief as to the existence of God, and of their relation towards Him, and of the eternity which awaits them beyond the grave. On their teaching depends the spiritual life of the religious world in general, which cannot think profoundly for itself. It is for them to employ to the very utmost those faculties which they possess in the attainment of as

much certainty as may be possible in the solution of the tremendous problem of human existence and of the Universe itself. If they are of the clerical order, it is even more emphatically their duty to try the traditional theories in which they have been brought up, before they presume to teach others, or to profess themselves trustworthy guides to their flocks, or to publish their opinions to the world.

I do not say, of course, that no man is justified in acting as a religious teacher or writer until he has attained an age when his faculties are completely matured, and the results of his thinking are of real value. But I do say this, that every clergyman who is intellectually capable of the study, is bound to institute these inquiries at as early an age as possible, to think out to their conclusions the traditions which he has been taught, and to ascertain on what real grounds he holds the theological creed of which he takes the responsibility of teaching to others. It may be long before he can satisfy himself, and after all he may discover that there has been some flaw in his early reasonings which vitiates the whole course of his subsequent conclusions, and that the very foundations of his belief have to be again reviewed, if he would do his duty to God, to himself, and to his fellow-men.

How far this serious method of inquiry after truth is encouraged by our existing methods of theological and university teaching, I cannot pretend to say. No one, I suppose, is thoroughly satisfied with our existing system; perhaps least of all the bishops themselves.

But if it is argued against me that the prosecution of studies of this nature would lessen the number of men who take orders in the Church of England, and would cause many seriously thinking men to pass years before they could make up their mind on matters of pressing urgency, I would reply, in the first place, that there are some men in orders in the Church of England, who ought never at any time to be admitted as clergymen at all. Whether they are few, or whether they are many, such persons are, from the ineradicable faults of their character, wholly unfit for the sacred office. To set up such men as teachers of their fellow-creatures and expounders of the religion of Jesus Christ, is a grave mistake, and worse than a mistake; and any increase in the seriousness with which candidates for ordination were compelled to study the grounds of their belief, which would banish such intruders altogether, would be a gain to the Christian ministry and not a loss.

For it is one of the lamentable practical errors of to-day to identify the values of quantity and quality in the clergy of our numerous population. The demand for newly ordained men is so urgent, or is supposed to be so urgent, that the bishops hesitate long before they reject any tolerable candidate, especially if he possesses a university

degree. The fact is notorious, not only in clerical circles, but in all classes of society who are at all behind the scenes in clerical affairs. "What am I to do?" a bishop asks. "I am pressed on all sides by applications; the number of churches is increasing everywhere; and the standard of intelligence and culture in the candidates for orders becomes lower rather than higher every year." To this ordinary defence I venture, however, to demur. In my opinion, this episcopal readiness to ordain men of a low standard of intelligence and culture is an error. The power of the Church ministry, as a whole, would gain immeasurably, were they reduced in numbers, in order to raise them in fitness for their duty. How do we measure the powers of an army in the field? By its roll-call? or by its intelligence and discipline? We wish to make the clergy of the Church a real power in the land, and we imagine that this is to be done by giving the commission to every respectable youth who can pass a tolerable examination in a few books, and write a barely grammatical theological essay, and sending him out to preach in an age when all things are shaken to their foundations; while these youths are no more fitted to enter into the theological arena than they are to command the Channel fleet, or to draw up a codification of the whole body of English law.

At the same time, the waste of labour among the existing English clergy is enormous. I am aware that what I am going to say will sound shocking in the eyes of very many excellent persons, both lay and clerical, but I must say it nevertheless. I repeat that the waste of labour among the zealous and hard-working clergy is immense, and the number of the zealous and hard-working is now very great. We have, first of all, too many churches in our large towns, especially in London. The churches are too many, because those which we have are not nearly filled. They have been built, but they are half empty. Very many of them might be closed for at least half the number of times that they are open, and the spiritual condition of the neighbourhoods in which they stand would be none the worse for it. Again, the number of services is now often out of all proportion to the real needs of the human soul. Consider the total throwing away of a clergyman's time which results from this modern fashion of reading the morning or evening service, or both of them, every day in the week. For a clergyman to profess that he does this solely because of some injunction in the rubric, is a heavy tax upon one's credulity. The rubric is a convenient excuse for doing what we, for other reasons, wish to do; but nobody, of any school, allows the rubric to stand in his way for a moment when it obstructs him in carrying out his desires. Is there, then, any benefit, I would ask, resulting to the souls of a whole parish, which at all makes up for the loss of time to the clergy who read these week-day prayers? On the contrary, they are deprived of that leisure which would give

them more time for reading, or for ministering to larger bodies of people than they now have under their care.

It is the same with the third service which is now common in many churches. Of what possible use is it, in comparison with the additional calls upon a clergyman's time and working capacity which it involves? To measure the result of this custom, one must not go into the churches where the clergy, *rari nantes in gurgite vasto*, happen to possess the quality of attracting crowds of listeners; but to those where the average commonplace minister, carried away with his zeal for doing good, undertakes a number of services and administrations of the Communion, at which his church is perhaps not one-half nor one-third filled. Surely all that is actually desirable for the healthy progress of the population of London, and the same of other great cities, might be effected by two-thirds of the clerical labour that is now expended in most churches. In other words, two-thirds of our present clergy could do all that is really needed, and consequently, the number of the clergy might be reduced by one-third, by shutting out from their order the large number of the incapables who now encumber its ranks; or a large increase of leisure might be ensured to those who now enter on their duties unprepared by those serious studies which their sacred offices imperatively demand.

In truth, the English Church has become seriously infected with a superstition which is essentially Roman in its origin, and which tends to lower the intellectual qualifications of her clergy. The supposed value of a daily attendance at a morning or evening service is derived from the supposed sacramental value of "assisting" at the celebration of a daily mass. The Roman divines teach that, altogether apart from personally communicating, a special grace is to be derived from a personal presence while the priest celebrates. For the same reason it is the custom to reserve the consecrated wafer in a "tabernacle" upon the altar, and devout people are encouraged to "visit the Blessed Sacrament" thus enshrined; in other words, to visit God present upon the altar. An extraordinary outflow of divine grace is held to be thus poured upon the adoring soul.

But no such theory can possibly be held by Protestants. There is no more virtue in prayers offered up in a church than in a private house. God is not more present within the walls of a consecrated building than in the fields, or in one's own private dwelling. Undoubtedly there is a superstition current among Protestants that it is not so. There is a popular vague idea that in some mysterious manner God answers prayers more readily in public worship than in the privacy of the closet, or when we are occupied in our business or amusement. But it is a superstition, and a very mischievous superstition, for it lessens our conviction of the perpetual presence of God

at all times and in all places, and of his readiness to hear our prayers at every moment. We go to church on Sundays, not because God is to be found in church more intimately than in our homes, but because our imagination is stirred by the presence and sympathies of a congregation, both in the praying and the singing; and also, emphatically, for the sake of the sermon. The modern fashion of decrying the sermon as the least important part of a Sunday service, is, indeed, without any warrant. In reality, the sermon is the most important part; for people can pray at home, but they cannot hear sermons at home. United prayer and thanksgiving, especially when sung, is an excellent thing; but that which specially moves the heart and instructs the mind, and makes men better Christians, is preaching; and the spiritual and enlightened condition of a religious community is to be estimated not by the amount of church-going, but by the quality of the sermons that its members habitually hear.

Think, then, of the waste of valuable time that is involved in obliging a clergyman to read the morning and evening service every day in church. Including the going to and fro, the breaking into other occupations, and the time spent in the vestry, it must compel the loss, taking one man with another, of at least one hour and a half daily, that is of nine hours every week. In other words, putting a man's real powers of *bonâ fide* work at six hours a day, daily morning and evening service involves the loss of one whole day and a half every week, all which time might be devoted to his personal cultivation and to remedy the defects of his original education as a thinker and a theologian. If in any parish there are really a few persons—they will be chiefly women with nothing to do—who desire daily prayers, why should they not be read by a layman? What a wonderful regulation is this Anglican rule which permits nobody but a clergyman to read the prayers! As it is, laymen can read the lessons, and where there is a choral service, at least half is taken by laymen. But still there is this extraordinary Act of Parliament which forbids the reading of the whole service by any one who is not in orders. We think nothing of setting a youth who can barely construe the Greek Testament, and knows nothing of its nature and history, and nothing of the laws of evidence, to teach the world on the most momentous of all subjects, and at the same time we forbid any one else to take that part in the public services of the Church which can just as well be taken by any man who can read tolerably well, and is free from vulgarity. The clergy, as a body, do not read better than the laity. The gentlemen who read family prayers at home, read them quite as well as ordinary clergymen read the prayers in church. Often they read them better, because they are more natural, and are freer from the dreadful wish to read them impressively."

Supposing, then, that the moving powers in the Church should ever determine upon a thorough reorganization of her system, with a view to ensure efficiency, rather than numbers, in her clergy, their first aim would be to make them better reasoners, and to compel them to think, before they presumed to teach others. And in this prosecution of their studies into the grounds of their belief, they would immediately find that there is one subject of study which is of the profoundest practical moment, and which yet is generally absolutely overlooked; that is, the different degrees of certainty or probability which may be attainable in regard to the fundamental doctrines of religion. With such awful consequences as attach to the adoption of serious error, one would naturally suppose that every man who possessed the power of close and exact thinking would take nothing for granted into which he had the power of inquiry. He would ascertain why he believed in God, and on what grounds he believed in the attributes currently ascribed to the Divine nature, and he would try to learn what was the character of this belief; that is, whether it is certainly true, or only probably true, that God exists. So, too, in his biblical studies. He would labour to acquire a knowledge of the facts as to Biblical authenticity and history, and to learn how far what the Bible says is certainly true, or only probably true; and whether the historical value of the different writings of which the Bible is made up, is precisely the same; whether, for instance, the value of the earliest books of the Old Testament, which were unquestionably "edited" in the days of Ezra, is equal to that of the first Epistle to the Thessalonians, which was the earliest of all the Christian writings, and was in all probability written about twenty years after the death of Christ.

Consider again the immense practical importance of this discrimination between that which is certain, and that which is highly probable, and that which is wrapt in obscurity, in connection with the various facts concerning the New Testament which bear upon the great Eucharistic controversy of the day. In the Gospels we have three narratives of the Last Supper, which all differ from one another as to what Christ actually said to his disciples. From these discrepancies it is clear that we have no real knowledge of the words that Christ did actually utter, and that to build upon these narratives the structure of such a doctrine as the Real Presence in any of its modifications is like building a house upon a quicksand, and is an abuse of the Gospel narratives by turning them to a purpose for which they could not, in the course of Divine Providence, have ever been intended. Then turn to the first Epistle to the Corinthians, where we have the earliest historical account of the method in which the Christians of the Apostolic period celebrated the Supper. The authenticity of this letter is unquestioned by the severest of Biblical critics; that is, there is no rational doubt that St. Paul did write that

letter between twenty and thirty years after the death of Christ. It is true that here we have only the teaching of the disciple, while in the Gospel we have the teaching of the Master. But then as a record of fact, we do positively know what the disciple wrote, while we have no positive knowledge of what the Master said.

And it is because I see that the whole Evangelical system rests upon this abuse of the New Testament, that I desire to point out to those who think with Mr. Wynne what is its historical value. The New Testament was never designed to be a storehouse of texts from which to derive the dogma of justification by faith only, or any kindred dogma. Christianity was not propagated by the New Testament, and its writers never dreamed of this later employment of their writings. Can any man, who is not under the dominance of some terrible superstitious terror, imagine that St. Paul ever looked forward to such an astounding use of his letters? If it were possible to attribute anything like caution to that vehement nature, whose very writings, until he grew old, were of the nature of urgent, overpowering rhetoric, is it conceivable that he would have written as he did write, and would have left behind a storehouse of passages, in the interpretation and reconciliation of which future ages would have exhausted all their subtleties of imagination and all their rage of recrimination? Surely such a supposition will not bear a moment's close examination.

Holding then, as I cannot help doing, that this dogma of justification by faith only is tantamount to the consecration of immorality and to the setting up of a false god for our worship, I am surely more than justified in calling attention to the logical worthlessness of the theory on which alone it is supposed to rest. Those who believe in it have nothing to rely on but a collection of texts, torn from their context, and not to be depended on as accurately recording the words of Christ. They use the Bible for a purpose for which it was not designed; and the result is a theological theory which I have made bold to speak of as idolatrous. It is the substitution of an imaginary being for the one true God, and the falling down and worshipping this fiction of the imagination. It is not an act of that material handiwork by which the old Pagans cut out a god out of a block of wood or stone, to which they then attributed their own passions, and offered sacrifices to it by way of appeasing its wrath. But severely judged it is worse. According to the old Pagan notions, the idols whom they worshipped were all of them inferior deities. Even the god Jupiter, or Zeus, himself, was a local god, a *primus inter pares*, as the Pope was regarded in the earlier days of his encroachments. Now, indeed, the Pope is absolutely deified, and a man is venerated as possessing the attributes of the One Eternal and Omniscient God, whenever he chooses to speak as the Divine vicegerent. And so it was with the idol-worshipping of old. Human passions and human

infirmities were regarded as the special personal peculiarities of various inferior divinities.

But the deity whom the Evangelicals worship is, professedly, the One Infinite, Eternal, and Almighty Lord of Heaven and Earth, from whom all created things take their origin, and by whose sole and irresistible will this world, with all its perplexities, sorrows, and sins, is what it is. Theoretically speaking, therefore, it is the most terrible of idolatries, and tends to obscure and denounce the worship of the One Eternal God, as He is in his own perfect and adorable nature. What I maintain is this, that the god of the Evangelicals is a false god, because he condemns to eternal misery the creatures of his own hand, who cannot by any possibility commit any sin deserving of infinite punishment, because they are finite creatures; and further, because in adopting the fanatic idea of justification by faith only, they cut up by the roots the elementary doctrines of morality, and allege that the All-true and All-wise bestows eternal life on his creatures by adopting a legal fiction, and by closing his eyes (so to say) to the actual facts of the case. Excellent men like Mr. Wynne, who live only among persons who think with themselves, and who read little beyond their own class of books, have no conception of the horror with which their dogma of eternal punishment is regarded by religious men who repudiate it. I can assure him that no terms can be too strong to represent the sense of blasphemy which is awakened in them, when they hear this frightful conception attributed to the God whom they adore and love. It is quite true that Mr. Wynne and his friends know not what they do. They have so little realized the nature of the ideas which they have formed concerning God, that these ideas are easily put out of sight, and they fix their thoughts on certain other vaguely comprehended "attributes" of God, which awaken in them just those returns of love and gratitude and adoring humility which Mr. Wynne says are awakened in himself by this dogma of theirs.

Nor do I for a moment suggest the suspicion that he, and many others, are not thus happily moved by certain thoughts concerning God, which they hold in conjunction with their characteristic dogma. Only, I reply, that if their love and gratitude and humble rejoicing are thus kindled by their meditation upon the acts of a cruel, capricious, and tyrannical deity, what would not be their depth and fervency if they could come to believe in a God who is just, and true, and loving to all his creatures? If they can thus love a fearful Being who calls millions and millions of miserable wretches into being, and then regards them as "children of wrath," because their first father ate an apple which he was forbidden to touch, and consigns all of them to eternal damnation, except a small minority whom He chooses, by a legal fiction, to regard as "saints" and "believers," what would not be their love if they could understand what they mean by an

eternity of love and of sin, and what an awful thing it is to suppose that a God of holiness and justice can, of His own will, ordain *the eternity of sin*. For the two results must go together. An eternity of suffering implies an eternity of sin. The Evangelical doctrine means that God decrees the undying guilt of His creatures; that because they have not turned to Him during these few miserable years, they shall hate him for ever, and that his Omnipotence shall be employed in upholding the weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth of myriads of souls for whom he has decreed an undying rebellion against his will. Is it not too horrible to think of? Is this the God whom Jesus claimed as his Father? Is this He to whom Jesus said, "Father, into Thy hands I commend my spirit?" No! As the Jews who murdered Christ on the cross knew not what they did, so it is with those who thus call themselves the followers of the Crucified. They know not what they are doing, when they attribute to an Almighty, Just, and Holy God, the eternal perpetuation of sin against Himself and the undying anguish of the helpless sinner.

As to this notion of the dogma of forensic justification, which is expressed in the technical phrase, "justification by faith alone," every well-informed student of Church History is quite aware that until it was distinctly formulated by Archbishop Anselm in the twelfth century it was to a great extent a novelty in the Church. There is no trace of it in the teaching of Christ as we have it in the New Testament. And in all the patristic writings, it is plain that the modern distinctions between "justification" and "sanctification" were unknown. For this very reason it is that the writings of the Fathers have always been distasteful to writers of the Evangelical school. They could not find what they call "the Gospel" in them; the fact being that those old theologians identified obedience to God with a filial relationship to Him. "Faith in Christ" was held to be the characteristic of the Christian mind; but then "faith in Christ" was not separable from love for Christ and for God. Few things are more curious than the ineffectual efforts of Church historians like Milner to establish the existence of a continuous body of "believers" in all times, from the days of the Apostles till the time of Luther, all through the "unenlightened" period of the Fathers, and the "hopelessly dark" Middle Ages which succeeded it. In truth, their favourite doctrine was practically unknown; and even after Anselm's days, it was long before it obtained recognition in the Church of which he was one of the ablest and most acute teachers. To this day the Evangelical dogma is not taught practically in the Roman Church itself.

What I would ask, then, of intelligent and liberal-minded men like Mr. Wynne is, not that they should sit down contented, thinking that they have solved the mysteries which perplex them, by persuading themselves that they "want no theories of inspiration

or of atonement," but that they should grasp the full significance of the undeniable truths which modern science and criticism have made known. Here will be found the real solution of the tremendous mystery of life, and the key to the problem of our future existence. Religious minds, of nearly all classes, have been stricken with terror when they have learnt that it is impossible to fix any date for the first appearance of man upon earth, and that all that is known is that it was at a far distant period, defying all the calculations of physical science. We can only trace backward the phenomena of epochs separated perhaps by millions of years, until at length we recall a time, when, so far as we can judge, man did not exist.

In company with these truths, which are very different things from those misty dreams which Mr. Wynne accepts in preference to definite and intelligible "theories of atonement and inspiration," another momentous doctrine has been taught, associated with the name of Mr. Darwin, which goes by the name of Evolution. Whether this doctrine is literally true or not, the method by which man and the universe have attained their present condition has unquestionably been a succession of developments or growths, by which the nobler, the stronger, and the more perfect have been produced and perpetuated out of the humbler, the weaker, and the more imperfect forms. Far back in the bygone ages, this work began. Imagination cannot conceive, and numbers cannot compute, the distance of that moment when the wonderful work began. No man can conceive the actual character of the minute elements (if such elements exist, except in our sensations), out of which the first strivings of this organic action were accomplished. No man can tell what preceded those elementary beginnings of life, whether this present existence is the result of an evolution as eternal as God Himself, or whether other worlds were evolved before our own. All we know is, that no mortal intelligence can reckon or conceive of the first beginnings of the life of which man, as he is, is the final existing development.

In presence of this mighty discovery, the religious mind of England, so far as it is capable of thinking seriously, has stood aghast. Many, at last, have learnt to acknowledge that it is by no means incompatible with the acknowledgment of the existence of the Divine Creator, and that it can be held even in harmony with much of their previously cherished theological creed. Whether man was first formed out of some lower animal or not, it is not, they think, necessary to decide. Physiologists may assert that judging by the bones of a man's body, he probably was born from an ape. Others, judging by a different test, allege that in the dog they discern the true elements of the human soul; that he is capable of the sentiments of duty, of love, of fidelity, of intense sorrow, and of the first processes of reasoning; that, in fact, he is essentially a religious being, only that man is his

god. And surely it cannot be denied that there are millions of human beings, many of them in this very land, who are practically lower in the scale of being than an intelligent, obedient, and tender-hearted dog. Still, it is not to be doubted that this doctrine of Evolution is at this moment an object of intense terror and even hatred to the large body of Englishmen who long for some settled conviction as to their life hereafter.

Yet, in reality, when we have once got rid of the frightful dogma of eternal damnation and its kindred falsehoods, this truth of development gives a life to all our hopes, and a clearness of certainty to all our convictions concerning the destiny that awaits us all. What will be the acts of God through the eternity that is to come, must be learnt from what He now does, and from what have been His acts through the eternity that is past. We have nothing else to guide us in our interpretations of the Bible records, or in our own abstract speculations as to what would be His probable treatment of ourselves. In the application of the doctrine of development to the future life of each individual soul, we find the key to the problem of the future, just as the same doctrine has explained the mode of the growth of the universe of the past. God is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. He acts by what we, in our poor way of speech, call fixed laws; not only because He is in His Essence unchangeable, but because were it not for our knowledge of these unchanged laws, we could not in our present state, know of His unity, and even existence. It is the untutored savage, or the half-cultivated multitude, which has learnt nothing of the unchanged laws of what we term Nature, that fills the world with a crowd of gods and goddesses, unstable as the wind, and subject to all the storms and caprices of human passion. But the God of Nature whom we adore is One God, who cannot change, because from the contemplation of the unity and unchangeableness of His works, we have learnt, in our measure, to adore Him, and to understand the truths involved in the conception of the One Almighty and Eternal Being.

To each one of us, then, the recollection of the past law which God has adopted in the formation of this world is a pledge of the eternity that is before us, during which God will be to us what He has ever been. It is nothing to me by what stages I came to be what I am. I am now a thinking, suffering, loving, hoping being; conscious, with all my failures, of the possession of faculties, both reasoning and emotional, which never find their free and full employment here, and with a strong desire to know God Himself more intimately, and to love Him with a more fervent joy than here is ever granted to me. Besides this, I have not only a horror of personal annihilation, but I know that, from philosophical considerations, it is impossible. *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. Out of nothing it is impossible that anything should come. This is one of those elementary and undeniable truths which

are involved in the conception of existence and non-existence. But the converse is also necessarily true. As "nothing" cannot become "something," so "something" cannot become "nothing." This is a truth which is not popularly recognized; but it can no more be doubted than its converse, *ex nihilo nihil fit*. As I must exist, therefore, for ever, what will be the eternity that is before me? Will it be the absorption of my personality into the personality of God, with a total loss of conscious life, such as is usually conceived to be the Nirwana of Buddhism? * Or will it be the continuation of my present existence under new conditions more favourable to my growth of self-discipline, until I reach the highest perfection of which my nature is intrinsically capable?

How can I doubt, with the eternity of the past behind me? The great and mighty God who has evolved all this complexity of being, during the bygone ages, is *my* God. Amidst every unsolved perplexity, here am I, as He fashioned me. All my capacities, all my loves, all my sorrows, all my hopes, all my longings, all my power of conceiving of His all-glorious existence, are of His making. Can it be possible that He has made me thus, only to doom me to an utter extinction of conscious personal life? Am I destined for nothing better than this wretched existence? It cannot be. It is impossible. There must be as complete an organic connection between the life that is to come and the life that now is, as there is between the life that now is and the life that is past. God has not made man for nought. We live under the reign of law, and that law is one of perpetual progress, in which nothing is lost, but all is preserved in the production of fresh and more perfect life, for ever. Death, the mere cessation of animal vitality, when the body begins to be resolved into its mineral elements, by slow chemical change, is the commencement of a new stage of my own personal existence, and not the arbitrary abolition of the law which has hitherto governed the formation of my inner character. Everything that we have learnt of the method of the Divine Government of the universe tends to show that God does not work *per saltum*, by sudden interruptions of the growth of the manifold world that has derived its being from His own infinite and eternal Being. How, then, can I suppose that having gone thus far in making me what I am, with all the boundless possibilities of thought and love and joy, which I now possess, He should suddenly change His course, and doom me to a practical annihilation, instead of continuing the wonderful work, until I have attained that full development of which I know that I am capable?

In thus forecasting the future, again, are mixed none of those questions

* In thus speaking of the Buddhist Nirwana, I do not venture on any opinion as to the truth of its ordinary European interpretation, as I am quite incompetent to judge on the matter. At the same time it seems to me impossible that by preaching such a doctrine Buddha himself could have made such a multitude of converts.

about merit and free grace which perplex the minds of many good men of the Evangelical class. I repudiate all thought of merit altogether. I only say that we are the creation of infinite power and wisdom; and this, notwithstanding the awful problem of the existence of misery, leading apparently to no good results in this life. Before that problem I bow my head in silence. It is a secret which God has not made it possible for us to comprehend on this side the grave. But in the case of those in whom the cultivation of a character corresponding to their in-born capacities has at least begun, the idea of personal deserts is utterly set aside. It is those who believe in eternal damnation who introduce the notion of merit. They say that sinners will be damned for ever because they deserve it. I reply that this dogma is impossible, because it is impossible that a finite being can deserve infinite misery, under any system of rewards and punishments. But in that which I hold to be the only true religious and the only Christian system, we have no concern whatever with rewards and punishments, after the Evangelical sense. All goodness is the gift of God; and the more perfect is the character which the soul attains, the more ardent and intelligent is her cry, "My God, I am all Thine, and I myself am nothing." We can no more deserve an eternal heaven than we can deserve an eternal hell. We are placed here in the possession of what is popularly termed "free will;" that is, with a certain power of choice between different courses of action, and which we can practically employ, though its nature eludes our closest analysis. Such a power of choice is necessary to the very existence of all morality, as such, and to the development of that completeness of character of which we are conscious that we are capable. But of that claim to merit at the hands of God, which the Evangelical school imputes to every religious theory which is not based on its own dogma of justification by faith only, I know nothing. The world exists for the glory of God, with all its mysteries and all its darkest shadows; and so it is with us who are feebly striving after our way to fulfil His will in ourselves. We are nothing; He is all in all.

J. M. CAPES.



THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF TOLERATION.

ONE of the most marked peculiarities of recent times in England is the increased liberty in the expression of opinion. Things are now said constantly and without remark which even ten years ago would have caused a hubbub, and have drawn upon those who said them much obloquy. But already I think there are signs of a reaction. In many quarters of orthodox opinion I observe a disposition to say, "Surely this is going too far ; really we cannot allow such things to be said." And what is more curious, some writers, whose pens are just set at liberty, and who would, not at all long ago, have been turned out of society for the things that they say, are setting themselves to explain the "weakness" of liberty and to extol the advantages of persecution. As it appears to me that the new practice of this country is a great improvement on its old one, and as I conceive that the doctrine of Toleration rests on what may be called a metaphysical basis, I wish shortly to describe what that basis is.

I should say that, except where it is explained to the contrary, I use the word "Toleration" to mean toleration by law. Toleration by Society of matters not subject to legal penalty is a kindred subject on which, if I have room, I will add a few words, but in the main I propose to deal with the simpler subject, —toleration by law. And by toleration, too, I mean, when it is not otherwise said, toleration in the public expression of opinions. Toleration of acts and practices is another allied subject on which I can, in a paper like this, but barely hope to indicate what seems to me to be the truth. And I should add that I deal only with the dis-

cussion of impersonal doctrines. The law of libel, which deals with accusations of living persons, is a topic requiring consideration by itself.

Meaning this by "toleration," I do not think we ought to be surprised at a reaction against it. What was said long ago of slavery seems to be equally true of persecution,—it "exists by the law of nature." It is so congenial to human nature, that it has arisen everywhere in past times, as history shows; that the cessation of it is a matter of recent times in England; that even now, taking the world as a whole, the practice and the theory of it are in a triumphant majority. Most men have always much preferred persecution, and do so still; and it is therefore only natural that it should continually reappear in discussion and argument.

One mode in which it tempts human nature is very obvious. Persons of strong opinions wish, above all things, to propagate those opinions. They find close at hand what seems an immense engine for that propagation; they find the *State*, which has often in history interfered for and against opinions,—which has had a great and undeniable influence in helping some and hindering others,—and in their eagerness they can hardly understand why they should not make use of this great engine to crush the errors which they hate, and to replace them with the tenets they approve. So long as there are earnest believers in the world, they will always wish to punish opinions, even if their judgment tells them it is unwise and their conscience that it is wrong. They may not gratify their inclination, but the inclination will not be the less real.

Since the time of Carlyle, "earnestness" has been a favourite virtue in literature, and it is customary to treat this wish to twist other people's belief into ours as if it were a part of the love of truth. And in the highest minds so it may be. But the mass of mankind have, as I hold, no such fine motive. Independently of truth or falsehood, the spectacle of a different belief from ours is disagreeable to us, in the same way that the spectacle of a different form of dress and manners is disagreeable. A set of schoolboys will persecute a new boy with a new sort of jacket; they will hardly let him have a new-shaped penknife. Grown-up people are just as bad, except when culture has softened them. A mob will hoot a foreigner who looks very unlike themselves. Much of the feeling of "earnest believers" is, I believe, altogether the same. They wish others to think as they do, not only because they wish to diffuse doctrinal truth, but also and much more because they cannot bear to hear the words of a creed different from their own. At any rate, without further analyzing the origin of the persecuting impulse, its deep root in human nature, and its great power over most men are evident.

But this natural impulse was not the only motive,—perhaps was not the principal one of historical persecutions. The main one, or a main one, was a most ancient political idea which once ruled the

world, and of which deep vestiges are still to be traced on many sides. The most ancient conception of a State is that of a "religious partnership," in which any member may by his acts bring down the wrath of the Gods on the other members, and so to speak, on the whole company. This danger was, in the conception of the time, at once unlimited and inherited; in any generation partners A, C, D, &c., might suffer loss of life, or health, or goods—the whole association even might perish because in a past generation the ancestors of Z had somehow offended the Gods. Thus the historian of Athens tells us that after a particular act of sacrilege—a breach of the local privileges of sanctuary—the perpetrators were compelled "to retire into banishment;" that those who had died before the date he is speaking of were "disinterred and cast beyond the borders." "Yet," he adds, "their exile continuing, as it did, only for a time, was not held sufficient to expiate the impiety for which they had been condemned. The Alkmoónids, one of the most powerful families in Attica, long continued to be looked upon as a tainted race, and in cases of public calamity were liable to be singled out as having by their sacrilege drawn down the judgment of the Gods upon their countrymen." And as false opinions about the Gods have almost always been thought to be peculiarly odious to them, the misbeliever, the "miscreant," has been almost always thought to be likely not only to impair hereafter the salvation of himself and others in a future world, but also to bring on his neighbours and his nation grievous calamities immediately in this. He has been persecuted to stop political danger more than to arrest intellectual error.

But it will be said,—Put history aside, and come to things now. Why should not those who are convinced that certain doctrines are errors, that they are most dangerous, that they may ruin man's welfare here and his salvation hereafter, use the power of the State to extirpate those errors? Experience seems to show that the power of the State can be put forth in that way effectually. Why, then, should it not be put forth? If I had room, I should like for a moment to criticize the word "effectually." I should say that the State, in the cases where it is most wanted, is not of the use which is thought. I admit that it extirpates error, but I doubt if it creates belief, at least, if it does so when the persecuted error was suitable to the place and time. In that case I think the effect has often been to eradicate a heresy among the few, at the cost of creating a scepticism among the many; to kill the error, no doubt, but also to ruin the general belief. And this is the cardinal point, for the propagation of the "truth" is the end of persecution; all else is only a means. But I have not space to discuss this, and will come to the main point.

I say that the State power should not be used to arrest discussion, because the State power may be used equally for truth or error, for

Mohammedanism or Christianity, for belief or no-belief, but in discussion truth has an advantage. Arguments always tell for truth as such, and against error as such; if you let the human mind alone, it has a preference for good argument over bad, it oftener takes truth than not. But if you do not let it alone, you give truth no advantage at all; you substitute a game of force, where all doctrines are equal, for a game of logic, where the truer have the better chance.

The process by which truth wins in discussion is this,—certain strong and eager minds embrace original opinions, seldom all wrong, never quite true, but of a mixed sort, part truth, part error. These they inculcate on all occasions, and on every side, and gradually bring the cooler sort of men to a hearing of them. These cooler people serve as quasi-judges, while the more eager ones are a sort of advocates; a Court of Inquisition is sitting perpetually, investigating, informally and silently, but not ineffectually, what on all great subjects of human interest is truth and error. There is no sort of infallibility about the Court; often it makes great mistakes, most of its decisions are incomplete in thought and imperfect in expression. Still, on the whole, the force of evidence keeps it right. The truth has the best of the proof, and therefore wins most of the judgments. The process is slow, far more tedious than the worst Chancery suit. Time in it is reckoned not by days, but by years, or rather by centuries. Yet, on the whole, it creeps along, if you do not stop it. But all is arrested, if persecution begins, if you have a *coup d'état*, and let loose soldiers on the Court, for it is perfect chance which litigant turns them in, or what creed they are used to compel men to believe.

This argument, however, assumes two things. In the first place, it presupposes that we are speaking of a state of society in which discussion is possible. And such societies are not very common. Uncivilized man is not capable of discussion: savages have been justly described as having "the intellect of children with the passions and strength of men." Before anything like speculative argument can be used with them, their intellect must be strengthened and their passions restrained. There was, as it seems to me, a long preliminary period before human nature, as we now see it, existed, and while it was being formed. During that preliminary period, persecution, like slavery, played a most considerable part. Nations mostly became nations by having a common religion. It was a necessary condition of the passage from a loose aggregate of savages to a united polity that they should believe in the same gods and worship these gods in the same way. What was necessary was that they should for a long period—for centuries, perhaps—lead the same life and conform to the same usages. They believed that the "gods of their fathers" had commanded these usages. Early law is hardly to be separated from religious ritual; it is more like the tradition of

a Church than the enactments of a statute-book. It is a thing essentially immemorial and sacred. It is not conceived of as capable either of addition or diminution ; it is a body of holy customs which no one is allowed either to break or to impugn. The use of these is to aid in creating a common national character, which in aftertimes may be tame enough to bear discussion, and which may suggest common axioms upon which discussion can be founded. Till that common character has been formed discussion is impossible ; it cannot be used to find out truth, for it cannot exist ; it is not that we have to forego its efficacy on purpose, we have not the choice of it, for its prerequisites cannot be found. The case of civil liberty is, as I conceive, much the same. Early ages need a coercive despotism more than they need anything else. The age of debate comes later. An omnipotent power to enforce the sacred law is that which is then most required. A constitutional opposition would be born before its time. It would be dragging the wheel before the horses were harnessed. The strongest advocates both of Liberty and Toleration may consistently hold that there were unhappy ages before either became possible, and when attempts at either would have been pernicious.

The case is analogous to that of education. Every parent wisely teaches his child his own creed, and till the child has attained a certain age, it is better that he should not hear too much of any other. His mind will in the end be better able to weigh arguments, because it does not begin to weigh them so early. He will hardly comprehend any creed unless he has been taught some creed. But the restrictions of childhood must be relaxed in youth, and abandoned in manhood. One object of education is to train us for discussion, and as that training gradually approaches to completeness, we should gradually begin to enter into and to take part in discussion. The restrictions that are useful at nine years old are pernicious at nineteen.

This analogy would have seemed to me obvious, for there are many most able persons who turn the matter just the other way. They regard the discipline of education as a precedent for persecution. They say, "I would no sooner let the nation at large read that bad book than I would let my children read it." They refuse to admit that the age of the children makes any difference. At heart they think that they are wiser than the mass of mankind, just as they are wiser than their children, and would regulate the studies of both unhesitatingly. But experience shows that no man is on all points so wise as the mass of men are after a good discussion, and that if the ideas of the very wisest were by miracle to be fixed on the race, the certain result would be to stereotype monstrous error. If we fixed the belief of Bacon we should believe that the earth went round the sun ; if we fixed that of Newton, we should believe "that the Argonautic expedition was a real event, and occurred B.C. 937 ; that Hercules

was a real person, and delivered Theseus, another real person, B.C. 936; that in the year 1036 Ceres, a woman of Sicily, in seeking her daughter who was stolen, came into Attica, and there taught the Greeks to sow corn." And the best is, that the minds of most would-be persecutors are themselves unfixed; their opinions are in a perpetual flux; they would persecute all others for tenets which yesterday they had not heard of and which they will not believe to-morrow.

But it will be said, the theory of Toleration is not so easy as that of education. We know by a certain fact when a young man is grown up and can bear discussion. We judge by his age, as to which every one is agreed. But we cannot tell by any similar patent fact when a State is mature enough to bear discussion. There may be two opinions about it. And I quite agree that the matter of fact is more difficult to discover in one case than in the other; still, it is a matter of fact which the rulers of the State must decide upon their responsibility, and as best they can. And the highest sort of rulers will decide it like the English in India,—with no reference to their own belief. For years the English prohibited the preaching of Christianity in India, though it was their own religion, because they thought that it could not be tranquilly listened to. They now permit it, because they find that the population can bear the discussion. Of course most Governments are wholly unequal to so high a morality and so severe a self-command. The Governments of most countries are composed of persons who wish everybody to believe as they do, merely because they do. Some here and there from a higher motive so eagerly wish to propagate their opinions, that they are unequal to consider the problem of toleration impartially. They persecute till the persecuted become strong enough to make them desist. But the delicacy of a rule and the unwillingness of Governments to adopt it, do not prove that it is not the best and the right one. There are already in inevitable jurisprudence many lines of vital importance just as difficult to draw. The line between sanity and insanity has necessarily to be drawn, and it is as nice as anything can be. The competency of people to bear discussion is not intrinsically more difficult than their competency to manage, though perhaps a Government is less likely to be impartial and more likely to be biassed in questions of discussion than in pecuniary ones.

Secondly, the doctrine that rulers are to permit discussion assumes not only, as we have seen, that discussion is possible, but also that discussion will not destroy the Government. No government is bound to permit a controversy which will annihilate it. It is a trustee of many duties, and if possible, it must retain the power to perform those duties. The controversies which may ruin it are very different in different countries. The Government of the day must determine in each case what those questions are. If the Roman Emperors who

persecuted Christianity really did so because they imagined that Christianity would destroy the Roman Empire, I think they are to be blamed not for their misconception of duty, but for their mistake of fact. The existence of Christianity was not really more inconsistent with the existence of the Empire in the time of Diocletian than in that of Constantine, but if Diocletian thought that it was inconsistent, it was his duty to preserve the Empire.

It will be asked, "What do you mean by preserving a society? All societies are in a state of incipient change; the best of them are often the most changing; what is meant, then, by saying you will 'preserve' any? You admit that you cannot keep them unaltered, what then do you propose to do?" I answer that, in this respect, the life of societies is like the life of the individuals composing them. You cannot interfere so as to keep a man's body unaltered; you can interfere so as to keep him alive. What changes in such cases are fatal is a question of fact. The Government must determine what will, so to say, "break up the whole thing" and what will not. No doubt it may decide wrong. In France, the country of experiments, General Cavaignac said, "a Government which allows its principle to be discussed, is a lost Government," and therefore he persecuted on behalf of the Republic, thinking it was essential to society. Louis Napoleon similarly persecuted on behalf of the Second Empire; M. Thiers on behalf of the Republic again; the Duc de Broglie now persecutes on behalf of the existing nondescript. All these may be mistakes, or some of them, or none. Here, as before, the practical difficulties in the application of a rule do not disprove its being the true and the only one.

It will be objected that this principle is applicable only to truths which are gained by discussion. "We admit," such objectors say, "that where discussion is the best or the only means of proving truth, it is unadvisable to prohibit that discussion, but there are other means besides discussion of arriving at truth, which are sometimes better than it is where it is applicable, and sometimes go beyond it and attain regions in which it is inapplicable, and where those more efficient means are applicable it may be wise to prohibit discussion, for in these instances discussion may confuse the human mind and impede it in the race of those higher means. The case is analogous to that of the eyes. For the most part it is a sound rule to tell persons who want to see things, that they must necessarily use *both* their eyes, and rely on them. But there are cases in which that rule is wrong. If a man wants to see things too distant for the eyes, as the satellites of Jupiter and the ring of Saturn, you must tell him, on the contrary, to shut one eye and look through a telescope with the other. The ordinary mode of using the common instruments may, in exceptional cases, interfere with the right use of the supplementary instruments." And I quite admit that there are such

exceptional cases and such additional means ; but I say that their existence introduces no new difficulty into the subject, and that it is no reason for prohibiting discussion except in the cases in which we have seen already that it was advisable to prohibit it.

Putting the matter in the most favourable way for these objectors, and making all possible concessions to them, I believe the exceptions which they contend for must come at last to three.

First, There are certain necessary propositions which the human mind *will* think, must think, and cannot help thinking. For example, we must believe that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other,—that a thing cannot *both* be and not be,—that it must *either* be or not be. These truths are not gained by discussion ; on the contrary, discussion presupposes, at least some of them, for you cannot argue without first principles any more than you use a lever without a fulcrum. The prerequisites of reasoning must somehow be recognized by the human mind before we begin to reason. So much is obvious, but then it is obvious also that in such cases attempts at discussion cannot do any harm. If the human mind has in it certain first principles which it cannot help seeing, and which it accepts of itself, there is no harm in arguing against those first principles. You may contend as long as you like that things which are equal to the same thing are *not* equal to each other, or that a thing *can* both exist and not exist at the same time, but you will not convince any one. If you could convince any one you would do him irreparable harm, for you would hurt the basis of his mind and destroy the use of his reason. But happily you cannot convince him. That which the human mind cannot help thinking it cannot help thinking, and discussion can no more remove the primary perceptions than it can produce them. The multiplication table will remain the multiplication table, neither more nor less, however much we may argue either for it or against it.

But though the denial of the real necessary perceptions of the human mind cannot possibly do any harm, the denial of alleged necessary perceptions is often essential to the discovery of truth. The human mind, as experience shows, is apt to manufacture sham self-evidences. The most obvious case is, that men perpetually “do sums” wrong. If we dwell long enough and intently enough on the truths of arithmetic they are in each case self-evident ; but if we are too quick, or let our minds get dull, we may make any number of mistakes. A certain deliberation and a certain intensity are both essential to correctness in the matter. Fictitious necessities of thought will be imposed on us without end unless we are careful. The greatest minds are not exempt from the risk of such mistakes even in matters most familiar to them. On the contrary, the history of science is full of cases in which the ablest men and the most experienced assumed that it was impossible to think things which are

in matter of fact true, and which it has since been found possible to think quite easily. The mode in which these sham self-evidences are distinguished from the real ones is by setting as many minds as possible to try as often as possible whether they can help thinking the thing or not. But such trials will never exist without discussion. So far, therefore, the existence of self-evidences in the human mind is not a reason for discouraging discussion but a reason for encouraging it.

Next it is certainly true that many conclusions which are by no means self-evident and which are gradually obtained, nevertheless, are not the result of discussion. For example, the opinion of a man as to the characters of his friends and acquaintances is not the result of distinct argument but the aggregate of indistinct impressions: it is not the result of an investigation consciously pursued, but the effect of a multiplicity of facts involuntarily presented; it is a definite thing and has a most definite influence on the mind, but its origin is indefinite and not to be traced; it is like a great fund raised in very small subscriptions and of which the subscribers' names are lost. But here again, though these opinions too were not gained by discussion, their existence is a reason for promoting discussion, not for preventing it. Every-day experience shows that these opinions as to character are often mistaken in the last degree. Human character is a most complex thing, and the impressions which different people form of it are as various as the impressions which the inhabitants of an impassable mountain have of its shape and size. Each observer has an aggregate idea derived from certain actions and certain sayings, but the real man has always or almost always said a thousand sayings of a kind quite different and in a connection quite different; he has done a vast variety of actions among "other men" and "other minds"; a mobile person will often seem hardly the same if you meet him in very different societies. And how, except by discussion, is the true character of such a person to be decided. Each observer must bring his contingent to the list of *data*; those data must be arranged and made use of. The certain and positive facts as to which everyone is agreed must have their due weight; they must be combined and compared with the various impressions as to which no two people exactly coincide. A rough summary must be made of the whole. In no other way is it possible to arrive at the truth of the matter. Without discussion each mind is dependent on its own partial observation. A great man is one image—one thing, so to speak, to his valet, another to his son, another to his wife, another to his greatest friend. None of these must be stereotyped; all must be compared. To prohibit discussion is to prohibit the corrective process.

Lastly, I hold that there are first principles or first perceptions which are neither the result of constant, though forgotten, trials like

those last spoken of, nor common to all the race like the first. The most obvious seem to me to be the principles of taste. The primary perceptions of beauty vary much in different persons, and in different persons at the same time, but no one can say that they are not most real and most influential parts of human nature. There is hardly a thing made by human hands which is not affected more or less by the conception of beauty felt by the maker ; and there is hardly a human life which would not have been different if the idea of beauty on the mind of the man who lived it had been different.

But certainly it would not answer to exclude subjects of taste from discussion, and to allow one school of taste-teachers to reign alone, and to prohibit the teaching of all rival schools. The effect would be to fix on all ages the particular ideas of one age on a matter which is beyond most others obscure and difficult to reduce to a satisfactory theory. The human mind evidently differs at various times immensely in its conclusions upon it, and there is nothing to show that the æra of the persecutor is wiser than any other æra, or that his opinion is better than anyone else's.

The case of these variable first principles is much like that of the "personal equation," as it is called in the theory of observations. Some observers, it is found, habitually see a given phenomenon, say the star coming to the meridian, a little sooner than most others ; some later ; no two persons exactly coincide. The first thing done when a new man comes into an observatory for practical work is to determine whether he sees quick or slow ; and this is called the "personal equation." But according to the theory of persecution the national astronomer in each country would set up his own mind as the standard ; in one country he would be a quick man, and would not let the slow people contest what he said ; in another he would be a slow man, and would not tolerate the quick people, or let men speak their minds ; and so the astronomical observations—the astronomical *creeds* if I may say so—of different countries would radically differ. But as toleration and discussion are allowed no such absurd result follows. The observations of different minds are compared with those of others, and truth is assumed to lie in the mean between the errors of the quick people and the errors of the slow ones.

No such accurate result can be expected in more complex matters. The phenomena of astronomical observation relate only to very simple events, and to every simple fact about these events. But perceptions of beauty have an infinite complexity : they are all subtle aggregates of countless details, and about each of these details probably every mind in some degree differs from every other one. But in a rough way the same sort of agreement is possible. Discussion is only an organized mode by which various minds compare their conclusions with those of various others. Bold and strong minds describe graphic and definite impressions : at first sight these impressions seem wholly

different. Writers of the last century thought classical architecture altogether inferior to Gothic ; many writers now put it just the other way, and maintain a mediæval cathedral to be a thing altogether superior in kind and nature to anything classical. For years the world thought Claude's landscapes perfect. Then came Mr. Ruskin, and by his ability and eloquence he has made a whole generation depreciate them, and think Turner's altogether superior. The extrication of truth by such discussions is very slow ; it is often retarded ; it is often thrown back ; it often seems to pause for ages. But upon the whole it makes progress, and the principle of that progress is this :—Each mind which is true to itself, and which draws its own impressions carefully, and which compares those impressions with the impressions of others, arrives at certain conclusions, which as far as that mind is concerned are ultimate, and are its highest conclusions. These it sets down as expressively as it can on paper, or communicates by word of mouth, and these again form data which other minds can contrast with their own. In this incessant comparison eccentric minds fall off on every side ; some like Milton, some Wordsworth, some can see nothing in Dryden, some find Racine intolerably dull, some think Shakespeare barbarous, others consider the contents of the *Iliad* "battles, and schoolboy stuff." With pictures it is the same ; some despise one great epoch, some another. Each epoch has its violent partizans, who will listen to nothing else, and who think every other epoch in comparison mean and wretched. These violent minds are always faulty and sometimes absurd, but they are almost always useful to mankind. They compel men to hear neglected truth. They uniformly exaggerate their gospel ; but it generally *is* a gospel. Carlyle said many years since of the old poor law in England :—"It being admitted then that outdoor relief should at once cease, what means did great Nature take to make it cease ? She created various men who thought the cessation of outdoor relief the one thing needful." In the same way it being desirable that the taste of men should be improved on some point, Nature's instrument on that point is some man of genius, of attractive voice and limited mind, who declaims and insists, not only that the special improvement is a good thing in itself, but the best of all things, and the root of all other good things. Most useful, too, are others less apparent ; shrinking, sensitive, testing minds, of whom often the world knows nothing, but each of whom is in the circle just near him an authority on taste, and communicates by personal influence the opinions he has formed. The human mind of a certain maturity, if left alone, prefers real beauty to sham beauty, and prefers it the sooner if original men suggest new charms, and quiet men criticize and judge of them.

But an æsthetical persecution would derange all this, for generally the compulsive power would be in the hands of the believers in

some tradition. The State represents "the rough force of society," and is little likely to be amenable to new charms or new ideas; and, therefore, the first victim of the persecution would be the original man who was proposing that which in the end would most improve mankind; and the next would be the testing and discerning critic who was examining these ideas and separating the chaff from the wheat in them. Neither would conform to the old tradition. The inventor would be too eager; the critic too scrupulous; and so a heavy code of ancient errors would be chained upon mankind. Nor would the case be at all the better if by some freak of events the propounder of the new doctrine were to gain full control, and to prohibit all he did not like. He would try and try in vain to make the inert mass of men accept or care for his new theory, and his particular enemy would be the careful critic who went with him a little way and then refused to go any further. If you allow persecution the partizans of the new sort of beauty will, if they can, attack those of the old sort; and the partizans of the old sort will attack those of the new sort, while both will turn on the quiet and discriminating person who is trying to select what is good from each. Some chance taste will be fixed for ages.

But it will be said, "Whoever heard of such nonsense as an æsthetical persecution? Everybody knows such matters of taste must be left to take care of themselves; as far as they are concerned nobody wants to persecute or to prohibit." But I have spoken of matters of taste because it is sometimes best to speak in parables. The case of morals and religion in which people have always persecuted and still wish to persecute is the very same. If there are (as I myself think there are) ultimate truths of morals and religion which more or less vary in each mind, some sort of standard and some kind of agreement can only be arrived about it in the very same way. The same comparison of one mind with another is necessary; the same discussion; the same use of criticizing minds; the same use of original ones. The mode of arriving at truth is the same, and also the mode of stopping it.

We now see the reason why, as I said before, religious persecution often extirpates new doctrines but commonly fails to maintain the belief in old tenets. You can prevent whole classes of men from hearing of the religion which is congenial to them, but you cannot make men believe a religion which is uncongenial. You can prevent the natural admirers of Gothic architecture from hearing anything of it, or from seeing it; but you cannot make them admire classical architecture. You may prevent the admirers of Claude from seeing his pictures, or from praising them: but you cannot make them admirers of Turner. Just so you may by persecution prevent minds prone to be Protestant from being Protestant; but you will not make men real Catholics: you may prevent naturally Catholic

minds from being Catholic ; but you will not make them genuine Protestants. You will not make those believe your religion who are predisposed by nature in favour of a different kind of religion ; you will make of them instead more or less conscious sceptics. Being denied the sort of religion of which the roots are in their minds and which they could believe, they will for ever be conscious of an indefinite want. They will constantly feel after something which they are never able to attain ; they will never be able to settle upon anything ; they will feel an instinctive repulsion from everything ; they will be sceptics at heart because they were denied the creed for which their heart craves ; they will live as indifferentists because they were withheld by force from the only creed to which they would not be indifferent. Persecution in intellectual countries produces a superficial conformity, but also underneath an intense, incessant, inplacable doubt.

Upon examination, therefore, the admission that certain truths are not gained by discussion introduces no new element into the subject. The discussion of such truths is as necessary as of all other truths. The only limitations are that men's minds shall in the particular society be mature enough to bear the discussion, and that the discussion shall not destroy the society.

I acknowledge these two limitations to the doctrine that discussion should be free, but I do not admit another which is often urged. It is said that those who write against toleration should not be tolerated ; that discussion should not aid the enemies of discussion. But why not ? If there is a strong Government and a people fit for discussion, why should not the cause be heard ? We must not assume that the liberty of discussion has no case of exception. We have just seen that there are, in fact, several such. In each instance, let the people decide whether the particular discussion shall go on or not. Very likely, in some cases, they may decide wrong ; but it is better that they should so decide, than that we should venture to anticipate all experience, and to make sure that they cannot possibly be right.


It is plain, too, that the argument, here applied to the toleration of opinion, has no application to that of actions. The human mind in the cases supposed learns by freely hearing all arguments, but in no case does it learn by trying freely all practices. Society as we now have it cannot exist at all unless certain acts are prohibited. It goes on much better because many other acts are prohibited also. The Government must take the responsibility of saying what actions it will allow ; that is its first business, and the allowance of all would be the end of civilization. But it must, under the conditions specified, hear all opinions, for the tranquil discussion of all, more than anything else promotes the progressive knowledge of truth, which is the main-spring of civilization.

Nor does the argument that the law should not impose a penalty

on the expression of any opinion equally prove that society should not in many cases apply a penalty to that expression. Society can deal much more severely than the law with many kinds of acts, because it need be far less strict in the evidence it requires. It can take cognizance of matters of common repute and of things of which everyone is sure, but which nobody can prove. Particularly, it can fairly well compare the character of the doctrine with the character of the agent, which law can do but imperfectly, if at all. And it is certain that opinions are evidence of the character of those who hold them, not conclusive evidence, but still presumptive. Experience shows that every opinion is compatible with what every one would admit to be a life fairly approvable, a life far higher than that of the mass of men. Great scepticism and great belief have both been found in characters whom both sceptics and believers must admire. Still, on the whole, there is a certain kinship between belief and character; those who disagree with a man's fundamental creed will generally disapprove of his habitual character. If, therefore, society sees a man maintaining opinions which by experience it has been led to connect with actions which it discountenances, it is justified in provisionally discountenancing the man who holds those opinions. Such a man should be put to the proof to show by his life that the opinions which he holds are not connected with really pernicious actions, as society thinks they are. If he is visibly leading a high life, society should discountenance him no longer; it is then clear that he did not lead a bad life, and the idea that he did or might lead such a life was the only reason for so doing. A doubt was suggested, but it also has been removed. This habit of suspicion does not, on the whole, impair free discussion; perhaps even it improves it. It keeps out the worst disputants, men of really bad character, whose opinions are the results of that character, and who refrain from publishing them, because they fear what society may say. If the law could similarly distinguish between good disputants and bad, it might usefully impose penalties on the bad; but of course, this is impossible; law cannot distinguish between the niceties of character; it must punish the publication of an opinion, if it punishes at all, no matter whether the publisher is a good man or whether he is a bad one. In such a matter, society is a discriminating agent: the law is but a blind one.

To most people I may seem to be slaying the slain, and proving what no one doubts. People, it will be said, no longer wish to persecute. But I say they *do* wish to persecute. In fact, from their writings, and still better from their conversation, it is easy to see that very many believers would persecute sceptics, and that very many sceptics would persecute believers. Society may be wiser, but most earnest believers and most earnest unbelievers are not at all wiser.

WALTER BAGEHOT.



EMANUEL DEUTSCH.

A MEMORIAL.

A VOLUME of the late Emanuel Oscar Menahem Deutsch's literary remains has just appeared. To an immense outside public Mr. Deutsch was simply the gifted author of the *Quarterly Review* article on the Talmud, which made such a sensation in 1867; but to a very large social circle he was known as a man of deep sympathies, keen wit, rare humour, immense range of brilliant conversation, encyclopædic knowledge, and not only the finest living Semitic scholar, but the most genial and true-hearted of friends.

For nearly two years before his death, he had practically disappeared from the world, and for one year at least he was hardly seen by some of those who had been his most intimate associates. As he passed the greater part of that sad time in my house, I cannot refuse to accede to a request which has frequently been made to me, and I now send a few pages written some months ago, believing that much of the following account will not only give a sad satisfaction to many of his friends, but will be read with interest by that wider circle who are about to be made acquainted with his literary remains.

I feel that I shall best perform my task by putting together the following brief summary of words, incidents, letters, and reflections. And I will begin from the time when I first knew Mr. Deutsch, about 1865.

I was in the habit of meeting him occasionally at Sydenham, soon after the appearance of his famous Talmud article. He was then stout and well and full of spirits, passing from the absorption of

study to the relaxation of society with an ease and thorough enjoyment which was highly characteristic of him. The whole man was in every action and word—nor was there any action or word unworthy of the whole man. This was his thoroughness. His light flow of spirits was amazing, his ready wit and simple geniality boundless and unfailing. But even at this time, the immense strain of work was beginning to tell upon him, and strange to say, the immense success of his Talmud article began to oppress and sadden him. The article had been thrown off—a colossal fragment indeed, but a mere foretaste or hint of the general character of that special work which he believed would some day culminate in an important contribution to the literature of the world. The Talmud article would have been the Preface to that work.

He told me with what mingled excitement and fear he first became aware of the sensation which this fragment was producing. At first when it was upon all men's lips he felt inclined to hide himself and avoid the public praises which followed him. There was something to him premature and incommensurate about the stir which he had himself created. The exceptional genius, the years of absorbed enthusiasm and research could, indeed, no longer be hid away from the world; but still he was jealous of himself, he did not wish to be judged on the Talmud article, careful and thorough and masterly as he knew it to be; and he was oppressed at having awakened so soon expectations that it would take him years of health and labour to realise. There were times when he bitterly regretted, for this and for other reasons, ever having written it. So completely at sea then was the first *Times* paragraph—which appeared in the week of his death, and which hinted that, encouraged by the success of his Talmud article, he contemplated writing a larger work. He was encouraged by nothing, and he was discouraged by nothing. He had his own work—not the cataloguing of books at the British Museum, but the work he was specially born into the world to do,—he knew what this work was, and no applause would have encouraged, and no official worry been able to turn him aside from that his mission—more sacred to him than anything else on earth.

Of this work it is not my intention here to speak particularly. The immense gap which no scholar now living can fill up, must be dwelt upon by others. The irreparable loss to literature will be felt and acknowledged sooner or later throughout the civilized world. The publication of a few of the letters received by him from the greatest living scholars in all parts of the world, would soon settle for the general public the question of Mr. Deutsch's absolute supremacy in his own sphere. For this supremacy he had been slowly fitted by nature and culture. He has often told me how, when he was a little boy, his father would read out to him passages of the Talmud and explain their touching import, unfolding to him their deep

connection with Jewish modes of thought and character, until the barest ceremony would stand out full of tender spiritual meaning, and the boy often melted into tears as the ancient page became lit up for him once more with that sacred charm which made every letter of it so dear to the Jews of old. To the Talmud and the Rabbinical literature from boyhood he thus brought a peculiar insight and enthusiasm, allied to unrivalled powers of application and combination—sympathies of an almost universal reach, which enabled him to bind the Past and the Present together, and to interpret the one by the other,—to express in terms of to-day the secrets of other ages, to trace the unity of human thought and passion, the common springs of human delusion, the common sources of human aspiration. These and other rare qualities of the poet, the critic, the linguist, the philosopher, and the *littérateur* met in one, and made Mr. Deutsch so especially fit to rehabilitate the transition period of the Jewish history, to lay bare the mental condition of the Eastern world at and previous to the time of the coming of Jesus Christ, and to trace the subtle relations which existed between the religions of the old world and the religions of the new. But nothing of this can strictly belong to my personal narrative of him.

It was, I think, late in the summer of 1869 that I first spoke seriously to Mr. Deutsch about the state of his health. We met at a country house, and after dinner I walked up and down the lawn with him alone for about an hour, and instead of listening to him as I was always glad to do, I talked almost incessantly. I missed in him the spontaneous light-hearted flow of spirits, his gaiety seemed more forced, he was excited and restless, he looked worn and anxious. He told me he got no sleep, and I then had a very strange and strong presentiment that all was not right—so strong, that, although a mere acquaintance, I charged him with over-working himself and implored him to rest in time. We spoke of some eminent men who had lately broken down under the strain of work. I found that he was in the habit at times of writing all night; the three famous *Times* articles (amongst the Remains) for which he was paid £100, were produced under enormous pressure. Throughout he was determined that neither his special studies nor his literary work should interfere with the exact discharge of his official duties at the British Museum; and the morning often found him still pen in hand after a night spent in sleepless toil. Then he would hastily swallow some breakfast, and appear at the British Museum at the regulation hour. There his mid-day meal was often neglected or omitted altogether; he was trading madly upon an iron frame.

When something of all this burst upon me, I wondered that his friends were not more anxious about him. But he was still so merry and brilliant, that I suppose every one was thrown off their guard. I remember urging him to marry, and I then became

acquainted with his peculiar view upon the subject, which he has often repeated to me since. Never to marry was a settled principle in his life. He thought it at all times a hazardous experiment for two people to make, especially in a country where legal separation was very difficult. Personally, as regarded himself, he was extremely open and explicit, and I never knew him waver; he said,—“I should never marry, if I lived a hundred years. I don't want to be a ‘happy man.’ My mother longs so for me to find a wife, but a man either marries or becomes great. The more diverse his interests the worse for what ought to absorb his whole life—his work;” and when the cases of illustrious married men were quoted, his wit, readiness, and encyclopædic knowledge, supplied him with a torrent of ready answers. Socrates married to learn patience; Napoleon tried it twice and failed; Nelson, Byron, Shelley, were other apposite cases; if a man had been great and happy married, still he might have been greater single. His own father, he would say, would have been a most remarkable man had he never married, and that had been a lesson to him.

His view of women was quite Jewish—he regarded them as distinctly inferior to men, although he was full of tenderness and respect towards them; nor did he in the least underrate the genius of many illustrious women of his acquaintance—exceptions which he did not care to account for—still nothing could reconcile him to the woman's rights movement; woman's sphere was home, and his talk upon this matter would have pleased the “oldest inhabitant,” a joke of which he was particularly fond. Yet he was a sturdy advocate for the better education of women—it was the platform woman he hated.

He was a great favourite with women, and full of sweetness and high-minded chivalry towards them; only to them he was the Sir Galahad of *Savans*, they never turned him away for one moment from the Holy Grail of his ardent pursuit. He took pleasure in their society, with the ease and simple unconstrained pleasure of a child; in this way he was on intimate terms with several, but in no other way, and over the rumours of his being in love, or intending marriage, which were sometimes abroad, he himself laughed heartily, though he never contradicted them. Those who knew him at all would not believe them, and as for the rest, he did not care; “Let them clank,”* said he, with his peculiar haughtiness and serene pride and confidence in his own character. At bottom he was a Hebrew of the Hebrews, a Pharisee of the Pharisees, with a true Pharisee's contempt for the weaknesses of common men, and for tittle-tattle. He had the most genuine loathing for immorality of any man I ever knew, but it did not partake of the nature of saintly asceticism in him at all. It was merely the taste of a scrupulously clean man who would not touch pitch. He once said to his doctors he would never stoop to pick even

* Artemus Ward.

health out of a dung-hill. This was his egotism. In some circles, he was often twitted upon the serene nature of his attachments. He was not hard upon others,—he thought them weak, he seldom believed them to be bad,—but of himself he would say with an intensely Jewish, and what some will call an extremely anti-Christian pride—“I am I.”

This pride of integrity marked him from an early age. He told me that when he first became his own master, some meddling friend, or some mistake, made his parents suspect him of irregular conduct. He was deeply hurt, but too proud to explain or deny; it was to him inconceivably galling to be misunderstood by those whom he loved, and who loved him. He absented himself from them, he would not speak to them, he was miserable, his affectionate nature longed for reconciliation, but the wrong done to his integrity was too bitter, and those who had wronged him were compelled to make the first move. He carried this kind of reticence to an extreme length in after life—he seldom contradicted a rumour—hardly ever refuted a lie—some things were too mean for him to notice, others were too dirty for him to touch: “Let them clank,” “I am I.”

Mr. Deutsch slowly, very slowly awakened to the fact that, with a few exceptions, he was officially surrounded by men, not only mentally, but, with a few exceptions, morally smaller than himself. He entered upon his official duties eighteen years ago with a light heart, a burning enthusiasm, an immense constitution, and such qualities for the attainment of supreme results as rarely meet in any one student. He had ambition, but his ambition was of the noblest order, not to achieve, but to deserve fame—he, therefore, of all men was content to wait, and he did wait—and work in happy obscurity for eighteen years. He was the most joyous, the most helpful, the most generous, the most guileless of men. Right and left he was used by scholars and students; if anything was wanted in the Museum, Mr. Deutsch was the man; if any other department was in difficulty,—an insoluble problem, an illegible inscription, characters that no one could read, books no one could catalogue, references no one could make out,—Mr. Deutsch was applied to, and never applied to in vain. He did not seem to notice that men unworthy of him often sucked his brains; he was never jealous that others should get the credit of work done by him. The work was done; “The cause, the good cause,” he would often say, referring to the advance of his own special studies, “had been helped on.”

“What does it matter?” was his constant reply, when I remonstrated with him for allowing himself to be pumped right and left. But when in one moment he leapt into fame with the Talmud article; when constant inquiries for him at the British Museum brought his obscure name perpetually before his superiors; when an official invitation to the opening of the Suez Canal arrived from the Viceroy of Egypt

to Mr. Deutsch, of the British Museum; when it was known that a public banquet had been given to him at Edinburgh; that flattering invitations had reached him to visit the United States and deliver lectures; when the Royal Institution opened its doors to him for the same purpose; when one of our Royal Princesses considered herself fortunate in securing the first MS. page of the Talmud article; when Mr. Deutsch became, against his will, the Lion of a London Season, an honoured guest at the table of the Prime Minister, and even a stock subject of public comment at the popular entertainments of the day; when, in short, *Savans* arrived to see him at the institution where he was a mere subordinate, and letters of gratitude and eulogy reached him from all parts of the civilized world, from those who were themselves masters in his own department of learning; when the Talmud article was published in an "*édition de luxe*" by the French Academy des Bibliophiles, and translated into German, French, Italian, Dutch, Russian, Danish, Swedish, and even Icelandic,—things began to change.

It was discovered, for the first time, that Mr. Deutsch was too valuable a public servant to be spared to go to the opening of the Suez Canal. The authorities began to have in Mr. Deutsch's case, a high sense of what was due to the public service, and their scrupulous integrity was summarily vindicated at his expense. In fact, no personal feeling was allowed to interfere with what they doubtless conceived to be their duty as administrators of a great public trust. They carried the principle so far, that when a document numerously signed, by the Dean of Westminster, Lord Strangford, Rawlinson, Lane Layard, and others, (every one of whom stood at the head of his own department in special learning,) petitioning parliament to appoint Mr. Deutsch keeper of Semitic antiquities at the British Museum, was handed to the authorities of that institution, to be through them presented in due form to the trustees, the document being slightly inaccurate in its technical terms of address, was quietly shelved and never presented at all.

Mr. Deutsch was very slow to take in the bearing of all this. It was difficult for him to believe that others were actuated by motives too exalted to influence him, or even to enter his head. He retreated inch by inch from any friendship, intimacy, or tie once contracted—it took him a long time to reverse the whole temper and tone of his conduct to those by whom he was daily surrounded, and from having been the most open, generous, good-natured, and amiable of men, to become at last the most reserved, cold, cautious, and suffering of the subordinates in the British Museum. But I am anticipating.

A letter, dated March 22, 1870, in answer to an invitation, gave us the first definite warning of that dreadful storm which took three years from that time to shatter his life. "Alas! I am invalided, and

my *Æsculapius* makes a wry face at the very notion of my ever getting out of his soft clutches again." A month or so later came a similar letter, in which he says, "If I can crawl (or take a crawler to do it for me) to the festive board—I cannot dispose over my next few hours without a groan and a D.V. (which shall be explained orally—it differs slightly in my version), I yet shall do my little utmost to come."

At the end of the summer we went abroad, and the next note I received from him, in December, 1870, was dated from 47A, Welbeck Street, only a few doors from my own house. A kind and devoted friend employed like himself at the British Museum had at last literally dug him out of his lodgings and brought him, at the command of his kind medical attendant, Sir Henry Thompson, within easy reach of his constant aid. He underwent there some test operation. "I marvel," he writes, "that I live to tell the tale. I now am opiated, and hoccussed, and stupefied."

Being utterly unfit for work, after a considerable amount of negotiation and haggling, he obtained, in addition to a temporary absence, some months of sick leave. Other obscure men had had it for the asking, but the interest of the country demanded more caution in Mr. Deutsch's case. I at once stepped over to see him. I could not gather how ill he was all at once. His rooms were generally full of visitors. Some brought him flowers—others fruit and delicacies. With one or two exceptions those who knew of his whereabouts came to see him, and a few were in almost constant attendance upon him. Amongst these was Sir Henry Thompson, to whom and to his wife Mr. Deutsch's gratitude was unbounded. He would often say, "I owe Sir Henry Thompson what I can never repay—he has been as tender and good to me, and as gentle, as a woman." Such expressions of gratitude were rare from Mr. Deutsch, for although no man felt more deeply what was done for him, he seldom spoke of it—he knew his friends would understand a look or pressure of the hand better.

One night I found him alone in great suffering,—he never seemed to know what to do, or how to do it—a life of robust health had left him absolutely awkward and helpless in sickness, so that he was thankful for my aid. He shrunk from ill-health—he could not bear to be touched—fomentations and blisters were horrors to him, not because of the pain, but because of the unnatural and miserable processes involved,—of all which things he had a peculiar loathing; he was also intensely, with all a Jew's sensitiveness, open to physical pain. All this must be remembered when we think of the last three years of his life, which consisted of nothing but a series of medical and surgical appliances, some of inconceivable horror, and a succession of protracted bodily agonies, disappointments, and bitter humiliations which those who were witness of can never remember without tears.

One night I left him after administering the usual opiates, and the next morning I found him before his untouched breakfast. I saw that no casual care could now help him through, however kind and devoted. He could not eat—his bell was incessant—the lodging-house, now little but a thoroughfare for Mr. Deutsch's friends, began to be up in arms—his meals were worse cooked—his bell unanswered—he was left at times at night in a dead swoon on the floor in his struggles to pull a bell which no one heeded. I wondered that none of his friends took him in to nurse him. I think some asked him to stay, but as he had concealed his state from as many as he could, he naturally declined; besides none lived near enough to Sir Henry Thompson. I lived in the next street. I did not think that such a man ought to be left to die so.

With Sir Henry's leave, he came over—just across the way—to our house. I took him for a little turn in the sunshine, one morning at twelve o'clock; he seemed full of a gush of hope and spirits. We got as far as Regent Street; he chatted cheerfully—looked already better—came back to our house to lunch—ate and drank well for the first time for weeks, and from that day never went back to his lodging over the way.

I wish now to be particularly explicit, for the sake of Mr. Deutsch's numerous friends and acquaintances—for it was from the time that he first took up his abode with us (January 13th, 1871), that he first began to be invisible to most of the incessant callers.

Mr. Deutsch had a little private sitting-room near the street door, downstairs, to which his friends might have ready access when he desired; he also had the use of the adjoining dining-room for the same purpose. He slept upstairs, within call. We never took the responsibility of seeing any of his friends without exact and special directions from him of what we were to say. He gave his own directions to the servants, with which we never interfered.

I say this to show how completely his relations with his friends to the last were independent of us. It is not possible to deny that more and more he refused to see the people that called, and from those who did gain access to him he tried to conceal carefully his real state. For this secrecy there were valid reasons. He was watched, and any rumour of his being permanently disabled would, he knew, lead to a summons to resign his only means of subsistence; and in such a state to seek any other was out of the question;—that state had, therefore, to be concealed as carefully as possible. On his reappearing at his post, a medical certificate was insisted upon, quite contrary to precedent, certifying that he could do his work. But all this concealment made my position a very difficult one. My office, however, was merely to deliver his messages and keep his counsel, and I never stirred an inch beyond my commission. The troubles, small and great, that overwhelmed him in connection

with the British Museum, I of course could not be a stranger to—but of this later.

We could not tell at first, from one moment to another, how he would be. Sometimes unexpectedly for an hour he would be almost without pain—then prostrate. Any change did him good for the moment, and his immense energy gave him hope. He would, when able to see us at all, laugh and joke with flashes of his old manner, but a deep depression had settled upon him, and he began to feel that his respite from work was doing him no permanent good. It soon became evident that the most skilled physicians and surgeons could not touch his malady, and towards the spring of 1871 he longed wearily for a change of air. He left us and went down to Bournemouth by himself.

"How do I sit solitarily!" he writes. "Moses on the ruins of Carthage and Alexander in the old Thames Tunnel are really not to be compared to my state. As to that state . . . I shall prefer a mother's care to both the landscape and the mineral waters. Ahimé! I didn't know that I could again be longing to such an extent for some of my fellow-creatures—*some* only, I beg to add at once!—my pen is as weary as my poor body."

At his own urgent entreaty, we joined him at Bournemouth. He came out of the hotel to welcome us, with that quick, light step which he retained up to the last few months of his life, when his walk became a mere agonized crawl. We took him into lodgings with us after a battle-royal over the monstrous hotel bill, in which he fought the whole of the hotel single-handed with incomparable energy, until he had cowed them into something like honesty. Our rooms overlooked a pine wood—our window opened low on to a green lawn. There was one bird kept singing all day the same note, for which we invented sundry meanings, he supplying generally the comic ones. This change seemed to do good. He kept drinking some new bottled water, which for two days had a wonderful effect on him; then came the usual relapse. We left him in about a week, with a feeling that no real good had been done, and he soon came back to us. In that summer he made a few of those prodigious efforts at mastering his malady that were to me so astonishing, and which certainly had the desired effect of completely blinding his friends.

Once or twice he took his seat at our table with a mixed company and talked as brilliantly as ever. Several times he went out with us to dinner, and got through his evenings somehow. He then seemed always in wild spirits—laughing and joking. He told me afterwards that he dared not stop—his agony was so great; but he kept it under until he got home, to pass those fearful nights of which perhaps he and I alone knew all the horrors. Under the heaviest opiates he could never sleep more than half an hour or three-quarters at most; he was then hunted up by his agony, and had to go through

by himself in a drowsy and stupefied state a difficult surgical operation, the pain of which no doubt roused him thoroughly, and which had to be repeated sometimes ten times a night. This was his life day and night for the last two years—whether at home or abroad—here or in the midst of work at the British Museum.

In the autumn of 1871 we left him at 16, Welbeck Street, and went to Scotland, and then to Venice. His letters to us are always the same curious mixture of satire, wit, and despair which continued down to the last.

Aug. 26th, 1871.—"No further excitement from S—: I have told every one that 'I'd come when I could,' and since I couldn't and shall not could, for some time—there is no more to say."

Aug. 24th.—"I am in a state of blind drunkenness owing to a few quarts of laudanum taken overnight."

Sept. 2nd.—"Who turned up the other day but the lonely?—he gave a bachelor dinner, and wanted me, which I however politely yet firmly decline. I wonder whether *anything* will ever take me out into those regions again."

Sept. 21st.—"I am simply engaged in shivering and shaking all day long. I am not quite so bad as when you left."

His leave was up in June; and, infinitely worse than when he began it, he braced himself up to return to his duties at the British Museum. I did not think it was possible that he could survive this many weeks, and we watched the effect it produced upon him with intense anxiety. But this change at first seemed, like so many others, actually to do him good. Friends, when he re-appeared, noticed that he looked worn and thin—he refused to go anywhere or see any one, but beyond this few saw much amiss; nevertheless, his life was even then as I have described it above. But he was determined not to break down.

After one of his terrible nights he would rattle off in the morning in a cab which shook him to pieces, go through his tale of bricks, and return about half-past four. I dreaded to meet him on these occasions. His face appeared sunken and cadaverous, with a pitiful, almost savage look of dull pain fixed upon it; he seemed after the strain to lose all control over his features, and the muscles relapsed and fell anyhow. For the next hour or two the reaction was complete. Sometimes he was fiercely hungry, but could eat nothing, his digestion being already half-destroyed with opiates. At others he would lie down in a kind of shivering fit, and fall into almost deathly insensibility, from which he awoke in dreadful pain. About eight or nine in the evening there would often be a short respite; he would sit up, and we would join him—he would smoke and chat, and forget himself and take a little tea. With the slightest respite his spirits and courage returned, together with his considerateness for me—his regret for a hasty word wrung from him by pain—his hope that he might pull

through—then suddenly in the midst of merriment, “Go,” he would say, waving his hand, and his face would fall, and we left him alone with his dark enemy to prepare himself for another night of opiates and agony. Latterly no opiates seemed to touch him; opium had then to be introduced externally at short intervals. Still he obstinately opposed all suggestions of hired attendants, and had the utmost horror of strangers about him.

He complained bitterly, like many others, of the ventilation and heating of the British Museum. One day every one was oppressed with the closeness and heat; the next every one was shivering with cold. He complained that he was kept needlessly standing in draughty passages; was refused the use of a screen where he sat all day in a draught; suffered from cold feet, his mat having been removed for several days. The books it was his speciality to catalogue, were taken from him, and hack work, well paid for as he would say at £40 a year (his own salary was £300), was given him to do; indeed, he said that an attempt had been made to take him from his place and set him to work with clerks of an inferior official grade. At this he rebelled successfully. But after all, was not Mr. Deutsch bound to do as he was bid, and was it the business of the authorities to attend to his comfort more than to that of any one else? Such paltry complaints, such mere official details, could hardly be made public; if they were, they could be explained, and it could always be said, as it was said, that he *imagined* things. This, I think, was the most bitter pill he had to swallow. Even some of his friends told him that every one wished him well at the British Museum, that the persecution was quite imaginary. He imagined that certain persons had signed a document about him which had been shelved; he imagined that fitting work was taken from him, and unfitting work given to him; he imagined the draughts and the bad air. He imagined, too, that after serving the country for eighteen years, he ought to have had some kind of recognition as well as many others who had served it for less; he imagined that there was some difficulty in getting even a paltry rise of £20 a-year at the last; he imagined that some who were his friends to his face, were his enemies behind his back; in short, there were no limits to his imagination.

No, Mr. Deutsch’s imagination was not quite so active as that of some of his friends; at all events, I, who from day to day witnessed his sufferings, could not be quite blind to some of the paltry, but not imaginary, details which aggravated those sufferings tenfold, and destroyed the little peace which might have been his.

At last he could bear the journey no longer, and we were glad to think that, in taking lodgings close to the British Museum, he passed practically under the care of another devoted friend. We were still his constant, and I think, only visitors; but his own words and letters, and some notes made by my wife, will now best continue the

narrative :—"It was in the midst of the trouble and persecution at the British Museum," writes my wife, "that Mr. Deutsch first told me how utterly hopeless he was ; we were standing by the window, and he was in great pain and worried to death ; we were talking about things in general, and I was trying to comfort him by holding out hopes of a speedy change. He became much agitated. 'It is useless to deny it, or to be blind to it, I am dying, and they are hunting me down in every way they can devise.'"

Days now passed when he was unable to see even us—every now and then he took out parts of what he grimly called his "holidays." The "day's holidays" were the days when he was in too much pain to quit his bed. The "week's holidays" were when he was to be kept unconscious for days at a time. This meant undergoing some new operation or treatment ; the greatest physicians and surgeons having given him up, he not unnaturally tried a weary succession of wild experiments which exhausted his slender exchequer and left him rather worse. We got letters from him, sometimes almost illegible, nearly every day.

Oct. 18th, 1871.—"The bottled lobster is grateful, though he is to be treated with care being very fragile, in his relation to myself, I mean. I know you (*my wife*) went out toiling in the sun to get it for me, and that would be quite enough to set me eating it till daybreak. . . . I am as lively as a cat to-night ; but the night cometh. . . ."

The next morning, 19th.—"Woe is me, Alhama ! what a night ! These intervals of 'balmy rest' now form the most maddening part of my existence."

Dec. 9th.—"I'll do my extremest to come (*to see us*), though having experimentally worked the arsenic shaft (*a medical joke*) to-day, and intending to do so to-morrow, I know not what my state may be."

Dec. 9th.—"I am a little easier to-day ; but oh ! so weak and prostrate, and my back refuses to write. There is a band outside playing, and rather well, old German tunes, to which I used to be young and merry once. . . . If I can crawl I'll crawl to you on Christmas."

Dec. 13th.—"No, woe is me, I cannot come. I'm doing the 10 to 4 (*at the British Museum*) like a one-er, and my state when I return, and for hours after, is something piteous. Even I begin to commiserate my case. Lying down in absolute helpless dumbness with three backbiters on me (mustards, you know,) is my only chance. Then I rally towards the foods, chiefly the drinks . . . and then I collapse bedwards, preceded by a train of bottle-bearers. Meanwhile you *shan't* fret . . . or I promise to get much worse, and you know my powers of will."

He had to write to his family, from whom he had to conceal his

EMANUEL DEUTSCH.

state, as he told us his aged parents would break their hearts to hear of it. He was greatly troubled to invent excuses for omitting his customary biennial visit; his motives were naturally misconstrued, and the letters which he received from home grieved him.

Jan. 16th, 1872.—"There are rocks ahead in my family circle, if I don't account for my absence in a more satisfactory way."

Jan. 19th.—"I verily do begin to believe that my course is not yet run—quite. There be casual flashes—I mean as of life again . . . but hush! likewise all the more cotton wool. It would be great larks if the monomaniac reappeared on the stage again to receive the homages of the whole crew."

Jan. 22nd.—"I fear I crowed a little too early. I have had another knock-down blow, and am still staggering. The doctor is permanent every afternoon now, staying hours, and his assistant spends part of the night with me. But I'll conquer yet!"

Jan. 27th [Very badly written].—"I'm not quite 'the thing' yet, and am muchly shaken. To-morrow, uninterrupted bed; but give me time."

The following gives his own description of his days:—

Jan. 31st.—"Again have I entered the dark recesses—with a vengeance. And vastly as I yearn to see you and R., I don't see how it can be accomplished in my very faint state. I get home at four; lie down utterly helpless till about five, when the doctor comes, who sits an endless time, evidently trying to lay the demon, or at least find out where he is at work. At half-past six my meal comes up, and as regularly goes down again. The assistant often stays till I am in bed, where I stay and drowse away by half-hours till eight next morning, when I rise well beaten and sore distressed. Nobody has been let near me for about twelve days now, as I am in permanent acute misery and pain. I can scarcely see what I write. The morphia deprive me now, alas, of the fulness of my sight. There is dimness and diminution and veiling over all objects. . . . P.S.—Do you know of a respectable dog with a frill? for I really seem now to grow blind and blinder."

Feb. 14th.—"It was an ugly episode, but I did not miss half-an-hour of my British Museum time."

Feb. 16th.—"I am more anxious to see you than I can say. I think the murderers will be gone to-morrow by six."

Feb. 20th.—"I did get to the concert and heard one Beethoven—"

The following is a specimen of the kind of messages that he charged us to deliver to his friends:—

March 15th.—"I am 'not quite well' just now; but this is quite private information. As to ——— it would be best to taboo my name utterly, or to 'change the conversation.' Yes, mention the promotion—quite casually as a thing got for me by my friends just a year and a quarter after its being due to me. Also that I

have made my peace all round now with the British Museum, and am no longer a 'grievance'—rather the contrary. As to my health it was very good with a 'little care' . . . never missed half-an-hour . . . the which prevents my going out much, or receiving friends here—which I *never* do . . . That's all the information for *him*."

April 2nd.—"These roses are passing sweet and beauteous, and if I were of a cryable nature, I'd howl now. Life has precious few allurements left for me, but when I think of one or two things . . . the sight of roses or palm trees somewhere about the Phœnician coast, I could blubber or break somebody's bones in impotent rage. But ho! hi without! we are observed! let's dissemble. Who's afraid? and I wish you wouldn't make the thought of departure bitter in my mouth by caring."

About this time he had what he calls one of his worst and longest paroxysms. In one letter he speaks of his sufferings as so unexampled, that a book ought to be written about it all. He complains that not all medical and surgical art could at this time give him half-an-hour's respite.

Soon after this he actually turned up at the Royal Academy, and tried to look at the pictures.

June 10th he writes,—“There is nothing left but an agonized bundle of bone and nerve,” but the rest of this letter is merely comic.

The summer vacation was now at hand. He meant to make an effort to go abroad. We wanted him to come to us. *August 10th*, (very badly written)—“Can't—doctor—very low—opium—bed—so sorry.” He soon afterwards went abroad. We heard from him several times from Brussels and Spa. The letters were full of entreaties to us to join him there, and as we were going to Holland, we went out of our way and joined him at Spa.

Spa was crowded with visitors. I found him with difficulty in one of the large, dirty, noisy hotels—a wretched little stuffy room, full of mosquitoes, tawdry hangings, and his innumerable medicine bottles. I lost no time in packing his things, and my wife walked him off to some lodgings we had taken apart from the town. Quiet, delicious air, overlooking a green valley, within sight and hearing of mountain springs, and within view of noble pine woods. Before he went he had one of his battles-royal with the hotel folk; indeed, the cheating at the Spa hotels surpassed anything that I have ever met with in France, Italy, or Germany; the extortion was simply monstrous. They threatened to lock him into his room; they threatened this dying man with the police; but they were at last cowed by his terrible and trenchant invective. Even at such absurd moments the force of his character broke out. One after another shrunk away from him as he stood at bay with his little black bag

full of nothing but bottles and instruments of torture; and I verily believe that, weak and staggering as he was, he would have kicked the whole crew downstairs, had they not left him in undisputed possession of the field. I confess that I went into such convulsions of laughter that I could hardly finish the packing.

The air at Spa seemed to revive him. We all walked about incessantly; he walked as much as we did, and drank a great deal more Spa water; but the change only lasted a day or two. All the symptoms returned, and then we noticed with pain the development of an excessive irritability which at times made it impossible to know what to do or to say. He was bound to go to the Rhine; we were bound for Holland. He now used every effort to induce us to accompany him and change all our plans. There were reasons which made it impossible for us to agree to this, my wife's health amongst others: He seemed to forget that we had already come out of our way to be with him, and his disappointment led him to accusations of fickleness and unkindness which we could not feel that we had deserved. In referring to this, my wife writes in her notes, "It is necessary to record this, to show that two years of incessant suffering had left their mark on even a character of singular beauty, bravery, and patience. It seems to me now that this was a turning point in his illness: the last smouldering remnants of hope and resolution to conquer which irritated and maddened him. The evil spirit seemed to tear him before leaving him. He had never been so irritable before; he never was afterwards." His letters to my wife in Holland are full of regrets; full of unimpaired affection for both of us, though our parting had been so unsatisfactory. After all, it was only for a few weeks, and we required breathing time ourselves from a certain incessant wear and tear. Touching these things he wrote sadly from Baden-Baden—"You *must* not mind me; I am not always a responsible agent now."

From that time a significant change came over him, he was no longer to be taken in by any respites. His bitterness to those whom he thought had neglected him, or injured him, vanished; he felt the game was up; he was beaten, and the time to forgive the British Museum and every one else, had arrived. Of one and another who had spoken ill of him, or forgotten him, or worked against him, he would say, "He is a droll," "He is a weakling," "He is a chatterbox." When he met people whom he knew, abroad or elsewhere, he ceased to avoid them. Some one wrote to him "all of a sudden" with much affection: "I answered him," he writes, "in the same strain." Not that to the end he ever changed his opinions of things or people; his significant words about them were always "Go down;" after which, however bland his speech or conciliatory his letters to them, they never rose again.

When he returned to his work at the British Museum, he was

absolutely without hope and without anger. He told me that latterly he had nothing to complain of there—all persecution was at an end. They let him alone. He was even thankful that the work given him was trivial, absurdly trivial. There was no longer any doubt about his appearance. His face was shrunken and drawn with pain, and he could now hardly walk. It was tolerably evident to every one at the British Museum that he was dying, and meant to drop at his post. He was not likely to decipher any more inscriptions, or write any more Talmud articles, or give any more trouble.

Days and days passed now, and we stayed away at his own request. We only knew that his horrors were increasing.

In one of his lucid moments he said to my wife, "Do you know, mother," that was his name for her, "there is a frightful curse—a nameless curse—laid on the man who touches or divulges certain sanctities in the Talmud, and I, the first man for hundreds of years who could read the secrets, have done it, and the curse is come upon me."

His studies to him were so sacred he would hardly ever speak of them. Inwardly we knew he was constantly brooding over his unfinished work. On this my wife writes:—"The long protracted agony of three years' suspense and perpetual pain, with all one's life before one; the consciousness of rare and unlimited powers and nothing done, seemed to him an inexpressibly hard lot. The death of shame, too, came at the end, for to his mind a world-wide reputation based only on possibilities, and a name raised up on high with little or nothing to show for it, all eyes expectant of what never came, seemed to him a shame and a reproach." Latterly his celebrity maddened him. When he went abroad he found his "name in every little dirty French, Swiss, Italian, and even Egyptian sheetlet"—so much so that he "felt like a runaway forger." "I have done nothing," he would say. "What is it all for? I will not have my name held up as a rebuke."

One night after long silence, his noble courage and manly endurance well-nigh forsook him. My wife, who was sitting by him, said she had never seen him mentally at so low an ebb. Any expression of weakness or giving in was usually abhorrent to him. Scarcely a groan ever escaped him; now, he said, "I am so low and shaken, so weak, that I shall weep presently." I cannot bear to trace, even for the eyes of his friends, many other touching details. But strangely, at other times, down to the last, he could never resist a joke or a repartee. One Sunday, to rouse him from some depressed train of reflections, my wife said, "How you do moralize; you ought to keep a Sunday-school." "So I do," he answered, "that is why I have no fire to-day"—looking at the cold ashes. "What do you mean?" "I have no fire in order that I might keep my Sundays cool." When he said this he had become almost insensible with acute pain.

At last he began to feel that further work at the British Museum was impossible, and just at this terrible and anxious crisis he received unexpectedly leave to go to Egypt for his health. Influence had been used in high quarters unknown to him; but although he had always had powerful and willing friends, partly because they did not know, partly because it was hard to see quite what to do, everything that was done came too late. Three years ago Egypt, which he pined for, might have saved him—he now merely hastened there to his grave.

Very sad was my last farewell to him. I think he was then busy destroying his papers; he desired to leave nothing incomplete that could be published. Scattered articles of priceless value he left in print. Whether any MSS. of value escaped I do not know. He was very quiet and collected and business-like that afternoon. He had no ill-word for anyone left; no sneer, even at the British Museum. He wished to be at peace with all men. He was very hopeless. He told me he had paid all his debts, torn up his letters, and settled his affairs, and I bade him farewell with tears, feeling sure that I should never see him again, and remembering the months and now the years that he had been uppermost in my thoughts.

Unexpectedly he called on the very day he left for Egypt, but I missed him, and he bade my wife farewell. No one living could have tended him with more care and forethought than she had done, and he knew this and felt it deeply. He was very dejected, and though meaning only to stay five minutes kept lingering till the afternoon was nearly gone.

He should think of us much. He should hope to meet us on his way back. He asked for our little boy, of whom he was extremely fond, for he loved little children—even little gutter children delighted him. The little fellow, two years old, ran up to him and kissed him, and kept saying over and over again, "Poor Uncle Deutsch! poor Uncle Deutsch." It seemed to my wife like a fatal omen "revealed to babes."

"You'll come back," she said half lightly, "and you won't care a bit for us; after six months' absence you will have wholly forgotten us." He said very earnestly, "No, I shan't." I do not think he believed in any recognition or re-union beyond the grave. And after this the last personal link was severed and nothing remained to us of him but the letters he wrote to us from abroad.

We heard from Paris and Turin; he wrote in good spirits. We heard from Rome, two long letters, very closely and clearly written; his disease was playing him the old trick—he was better. At this time he says of Sir Henry Thompson again, "I do owe him a great debt."

In one letter there is a touching allusion to the spells of enjoyment which divided his spells of agony, and which shows how little his nature was soured by his disappointments and sufferings.

"ROME (last day of 1872.)

"I am like one not in a dream, but tumbling from Heaven into Heaven, and my soul is one shout of Gloria and Hallelujah. What a blessing this cursed illness has been to me! I shan't describe or tell—I can't. It's like several ninth symphonies piled one atop of the other. . . . Had I not strictest orders to go and seek a tomb among the stuffed crocodiles, here I'd remain, and if the end came I'd choose a spot I wot of (where I copied some strange inscriptions yesterday), and where the birds sing and the red flowers wave their heads gently, and where I'd mix with ashes nobler than anywhere else in the wide world. I can't fall in, though I have tried, with the notion of the futility of life, which is supposed to come over you so very strongly here. I am now a staunch believer in immortality, in the goodness and in the unfathomable greatness of man, and out of those golden links that riveted the tender beauty of Hellas to the iron will of Rome, and to the graceful strength of the Renaissance (until the full blaze of this day has made one harmony of them all), there arise to my ear sounds as of distant melodies, half-broken, yet passing glorious.

"God bless us—what crooked ways I had to be led to this consummation! Had I not lain groaning for nigh three years in dark misery, this sun would not appear to me half as golden, nor would my mind have been wrought to such morbidly swift and almost painful sensitiveness, that it feels and hears and sees and laughs out of ten millions of pores which were blocked up before."

And now the strange fascination which the East always seemed to have for him made him forget himself, even in his last extremity—it was the last yielding up of his mind to the scenes and emotions which were most dear to him, most inseparably connected with what had been his life-work.

"CAIRO—MOONSHINE, Jan. 11.

"Ya Lélé ya chabibi,—I have not gone mad, nor is the above German or Irish. It only means, 'O night, O beloved,' and is the burden of every Arab's song. Indeed, their Nile repertoire consists chiefly of these words. It would have done your little heart good to sit at the feet of a wild, illegitimate kind of violin, played by a blind old patriarch, together with a small drumlet that tinkled, and an elegiac fife, that went piercing your body and soul, with *me*, that is—for I have just returned from an incoherent ramble through the gleaming white city of Kahira the stupendous, swimming in a flood of mellow moon. . . ."

"CAIRO, Jan. 16.

" . . . I think I had better make friends with old Sphinx, who wagged her battered old nose audibly at me this time, and they have not much time before them to whom she beckons. *Soit*—I had within the last few days such vile pains again, that I first groaned for you, and then looked out for a bath of chloroform and opium, and between them I got the howl under, after three days' and nights' helpless misery and forlornness. And how I loathe that night raven who hawls out that prayer is better than sleep!"

After this we got a letter dated Jan. 18, three o'clock a.m., from Cairo, and written in the middle of the grand ball given on the occasion of four royal weddings, full of glowing description that reads like the "Arabian Nights." At this time he seemed pretty well to his friend Mr. Lang, from whom, hitherto, he appears to have concealed the mortal nature of his disease.

I give the few following extracts from letters addressed to my wife:—

“Feb. 1.

“Talk of the glories of the East, I would have sold the whole of that decoration for one ha’porth of peace in the midst of the drizzliest fog that ever darkened Tavistock; but *nous avons changé*, and so forth. I am better again and in tolerable cue. One more day, and I drop up the river. . . . I smoke more than is good for me; but then everybody must work, you know, so I make cigarettes, and smoke them all day and many a long night, when only I and the moon and the dogs and the holy cads on the minarets are awake. It is a queer atmosphere to make a man dream away his little span of woe-begone life. . . . The stars are out, a-shining like young dollars, but much bigger and merrier, and there is a young crescent against a green-blue sky, and the palm hands stretched out against the transparent darkness,—sentimentally, beseechingly—and then comes (it’s a fact) a Schubert Impromptu floating in on the back of a caressing little windlet all violet and wild jessamine fragrance. Dead as I am, I rise to it like a silly old salmon. . . . Ahimé! what life there is in the old skeleton yet. . . . There are fireworks ‘away’ in the Regal Gardens, and I see the rockets going up and bursting into ten millions of green and blue and golden suns and moons and stars, and the distant sound of cymbals and trumpets strikes melodiously, like a far-away hunt on my ears, and it all feels somehow like an early German spring, all softness and caress, and no school this afternoon, with a full sixpence to spend freely on lollipops. I often wonder (Hamlet-like) whether it was better to give me this last ‘fillip’ before the curtain fell. . . . However, the gods be praised for what I have got, whatever and whenever the end be. . . .”

“Luxor, which is Thebes, somewhere about the twentieth of February. . . . The Nile and the temples and the mountains of Lybia and the desert and I, we look at each other, and there is none to interfere with our silent communings, morn and noon and star-time, save, perhaps, a palm or two that will come between with uplifted tender hands, beseeching, blessing. . . . I have bought you some baskets, and hope to bring them safely back. Likewise myself. And here’s the rub. I have not got on quite so fast as I hoped. . . .”

The last autograph letter we got from him is dated Cairo, 31st March. There he was dangerously worse, but, thoughtful to the last, he did not tell us this, and I feel certain that he himself believed that he would be able to get back in time to die with us,—a thought which was uppermost in his mind when he left us.

“Your letters have gone on to a place in the desert, whence I shall most likely never recover them. I was too eager for them, and telegraphed, as I came down, from a desert station where there was an unclad savage playing at wires, and he has done accordingly.”

He then describes how all has gone wrong with him, even in this letter enforcing silence on us by his customary “hush,” and how, for the moment, he is better again, and concludes,—

“O that I could have you to take a little care of me I have no lack of friends here. . . . But it’s hard work. . . .”

"I would not let the mail go without sending you however small a token of life and affection, and endless fond greetings to the dear ones (myself and our little boy).—ADDIO, thy shadowy Δ."

Mr. Deutsch was soon after this removed to Alexandria. Leaning on the arm of his good friend, Mr. Lang of the Ottoman Bank, he managed to walk to his carriage and drove straight to the Hospital of the Prussian Sisterhood, which he was never destined to leave. There he had every comfort, and the details of his last days are now, through the kindness of Mr. Lang, in the hands of his friends. Into these it is needless for me to enter here at length. Suffice it to say, that from that time Mr. Deutsch began to sink rapidly. When at last he became convinced that his end could not be far off, with his usual extraordinary mental energy he resolved to get "home," and a cabin was actually engaged and his passage paid. It was then that, too ill to write himself, he dictated a few lines to Mr. Lang for my wife. Even then our suspicions were not fully aroused, so carefully was the message worded so as not to alarm us. He was going to start for Southampton,—we should hear again,—and we were to meet him there.

The full import of this last message is clear enough now. He thought he might be able to struggle just so far. When we received his last message he was already dead—and dead amongst strangers. That was his last disappointment. So eager had he been to get back to us, so fully had he made up his mind that he would not die there, that he refused to give any messages or instructions until too weak even to speak.

To the last his mind was clear; to the last he was dignified, and calm, and patient to an astonishing degree; so much so that on feeling the approach of death he would not doze off under opium as he was glad to do at other times, but kept himself with great effort awake that he might not, as he said, die in his sleep.

Such was the dignified close of his most blameless life. Much remains to be said of his work, his character, and his opinions; but I could not, at present, bring myself to discuss any of these, even were I competent to do so. It is as much as I have been able to do to record here the fate of the most gifted, the sweetest, the gentlest, and bravest of men, whose friendship I enjoyed too late and lost too soon.

H. R. HAWES.



LETTERS FROM ELIZABETH BARRETT BROWNING

TO THE AUTHOR OF "ORION" ON LITERARY AND
GENERAL TOPICS.

IV.

WITH how fine a temper, and how generous a spirit Miss E. B. Barrett bore all the objections made to her new theory of English Rhymes, has only been slightly shown in the previous instalment of these papers. Provoking as some of the strictures must have been to one who had not accidentally fallen into what would be commonly regarded as lyrical heresies, but who had systematically intended, and laboured to do, the very things most demurred to—she passes them over in the note about to be given, with only a remote reference; playfully speaking of her dog "Flush," then touching upon the "Dead Pan," then turning to other objects of literary interest, with a nobly expressed admiration of Miss Martineau:—

"Saturday night (no other date).

"NEVER in the world was another such a dog as my Flush! Just now, because after reading your note, I laid it down thoughtfully without taking anything else up, he threw himself into my arms, as much as to say—'Now it's *my* turn. You're not busy at all now.' He understands everything, and would not disturb me for the world. Do not tell Miss Mitford—but her Flush (whom she brought to see me) is not to be *compared* to mine!—quite animal and dog-natural, and incapable of my Flushie's hypercynical refinements. There is not such a dog in the world as he is, I

must say again—and never was, except the one Plato swore by. I talk to him just as I should do to the ‘reasoning animal on two legs’—the only difference being that he has four supererogatorily.

“I am very glad to hear of Miss Martineau and ‘Orion.’ She has a fine enthusiasm and understanding, or rather understanding and enthusiasm, for poetry,—which shows a wonderful and beautiful proportion of *faculties*, considering what she is otherwise. I do not say so because she fancied my ‘Pan’—which you may not think worthy of such praise—and which she very probably was pleased with on account of its association with her favourite poet Schiller—such associations affecting the mind beyond its cognizance. My ‘Pan’ takes the reverse of Schiller’s argument in his famous ‘Gods of Greece,’ and argues it out.

“No,—nobody has said that ‘the paper was the work of a private friend,’” [alluding, probably, to some critique I had written about her poetry] “but everybody with any sense must have thought it.

“Ever and truly yours,

“E. B. R.”

“Oh—do not put me in despair about ‘times and seasons.’ The book must and *shall* come out this season.”

The next is a fragment found in the same envelope, the first leaf having gone astray:—

“Fragment.”

“Think of my stupidity about Leigh Hunt’s poem of ‘Godiva!’ The volume I lent has just returned, and most assuredly there is no such poem in it. His late republication may contain it—and that also I have lent. You shall have it in time.

“I hear rumours of greatness in respect of a Mr. Patmore’s new volume of poems just advertised. They are said to be ‘only second to Tennyson’s by coming secondly’—which, however, makes a difference! Tell me, if you see them, what you think of them. He is said to be quite a young man—that is, a very young man.

“Oh, no—I promise to try not to kill myself,” [with over-work] “but I am very busy and anxious, and can’t help being both.”

We now come to the question of Versification—an Art quite fixed and final if we keep to the old classic system of counting feet, or syllables,—and a most eel-like subject, chameleon-like, lustrous, dove’s breast-like, chromatic sprite and sylphid, when, boldly diverging from the old, well-known tracks and measurements, poets take to the spiritual guidance of “airy voices” dictating euphonious accents, pauses, beats of time, wavy lilts and pulsations, often not amenable to any laws except those of musical utterance and emotion. These varied measures, numbers, utterances, when an attempt is made to force them within the confines of special laws, are very apt, in many instances, to find their spirit evaporate, and nothing but a *caput mortuum* remaining in its place. Perhaps the greatest difficulty in

forming a settled judgment of these new forms of versification arises from the fact that one good ear will frequently be found to differ from another good ear, with regard to the effect of the same rhythmic music. In short, one can *read it* musically, and another cannot. One is delighted with it—the other denounces it. A remarkable instance of this will appear in the next of Miss Barrett's letters which I am about to give. It will be found interesting, as well as curious, from a peculiar circumstance. In the previous instalment of this series, a note is mentioned which had been addressed to Miss Barrett's cousin, Mr. John Kenyon,—shown to her,—lent to me, and returned—referring admiringly to her bold experiments in novel rhymes. This note, which I had fancied to have been written by Landor, I have since found was written by Mr. Browning. The Letter I am now about to give has special reference to Mr. Browning's poetry. It will thus be discovered that two poets who had never seen each other at this time, were already intimate in imagination and intellectual sympathy;—that one appreciated the other completely, while the other (*viz.*, Miss Barrett) took a sweeping exception to a special phase of the genius she so well estimated in all other respects. And in this exception she was, as I considered, only justified in certain respects.

The note begins with an amusing reference to something *outré* which had been written to Miss Barrett by somebody, whose name I was endeavouring to guess; then touches briefly on the poems of Mr. Trench, and passes on to Mr. Browning with a striking commentary:—

“ May 1st, 1843.

“ YOUR over-subtlety, my dear Mr. Horne, has ruined you! Suspecting me of man-traps and spring-guns, you shoot yourself with the hypothesis of a spring-gun—which takes its place at once among ‘remarkable accidents.’

“ For—I stated the bare fact when I said ‘a man.’ Man it was—no woman it was!—man it was, and man it ought to be. Yes, and it *wasn't* Leigh Hunt either, I make oath to you! I wish it *had* been Leigh Hunt.

“ No man would have ventured to say such a thing? Ventured!—why, you are quite innocent, Mr. Horne. I won't tell you the name; but I affirm to you that those words, as I quoted them, were written by a man, and to me. And, by no means in jest or lightness of heart, as a woman would have written them—nor in arch-mock at the infirmities of our nature, as Leigh Hunt might have written them, but in grave naïveté,—in sincere earnestness, and without the consciousness of saying anything out of the way.” [My last guess was that it came from America.] “ Now, I wouldn't tell you the name for the world.

“ At the end of your last note you attempt an impossible application of a quotation which won't be applied in such a manner for two separate reasons. ‘I prythee do not mock me.’

"You are quite right. 'Anybody can be severe.' As to Mr. Trench, I have only such knowledge of him as extracts in your article and other reviews can give; and although he has probably more faculty than many who are facile and copious, he seems to be dry and limited, and without impulse in the use of it,—and meets, I should think, with liberal justice at your hands. Browning, however, stands high with me. I want very much to know what you mean by his worst fault, which you have not touched upon? Will you tell me in confidence, and I will promise never to divulge it, if you make a condition of secrecy? Mr. Browning knows thoroughly what a poet's true work is;—he is learned, not only in profane learning, but in the conduct of his genius; he is original in common things; his very obscurities have an oracular nobleness about them which pleases me."

I cannot help pausing an instant to remind the reader that the above critique was written in 1843, when only a very special class had made similar discoveries, and that the writer had never seen the poet; so that we may fairly regard this as a striking proof of her genius in discerning, and her generosity in the full admission of what she recognized. Miss Barrett thus continues:—

"His passion burns the paper. But I will guess at the worst fault—at least, I will tell you what has always seemed to me the worst fault—a want of *harmony*. I mean in the two senses—spiritual and physical. There is a want of softening power in thoughts and in feelings, as well as words; everything is trenchant—black and white, without intermediate colours—nothing is tender; there is little room in all this passion, for pathos. And the verse—the lyrics—where is the ear? Inspired spirits should not speak so harshly; and, in good sooth, they seldom do. What?—from 'Paracelsus' down to the 'Bells and Pomegranates'—a whole band of angels—white-robed and crowned angel-thoughts, with palms in their hands—and *no music!*"

The too sweeping assertion of the last words I distinctly remember contesting in my next note. Admitting all the fair critic had said as to the frequent obscurities of meaning, and involutions, or harshness of style, I reminded her that almost any schoolboy—without selecting Lord Macaulay's model one—who had some natural faculty and a good scholastic drilling, could write "smooth verses," and where this was not done by those who were evidently masters of the Art of Poetry, there was a reason for it. Nobody should regard it as attributable to carelessness, or even indifference. On the other hand, the lady was referred to several striking instances of rhythmic music, and particularly among the "Bells and Pomegranates." It was difficult to resist a dancing emotion as one read how all the children and townspeople went dancing after the "Pied Piper of Hamelin," while every horseman must have accompanied the riders in the *ride wit*

"the good news" to Ghent. I was so impressed with this at the time—and never having known what could be done in that way, as I subsequently experienced in the Australian bush—that I remember asking the poet if he could "tighten his girths while at full speed," as I had felt while doing this, with his poem, that I had more than once just lost my balance. In short, I only partially agreed with the fair critic about the music. And this question directly brings us to Versification; but as the mere synopsis of such an Essay would occupy several pages, and, so far, interrupt the course of the Letters, it has been considered advisable to postpone the discussion till the close of these papers. We will therefore do no more at present than touch upon the question of Versification with reference chiefly to Miss Barrett, and incidentally to the Laureate and one or two other poets, commencing, of necessity, with Chaucer.

It has been seen that Miss Barrett was a true admirer and student of the Father of English Poetry; but from the influence of early habit, it seems probable that his admirable variations of the euphony of heroic couplets, so as to correct the monotony of their ten-syllable regularity, and systematic pauses, were not specially noticed by her, unless, in some cases, as objectionable. The method adopted by Chaucer to obtain variety of harmony in this measure was not, however, so much with respect to the position of pauses and accents in the line, as in the rhythmical embodiment of an eleventh syllable. He also, on special occasions, breaks up the couplet-system, by ending a poetical paragraph with the first word of the rhyme and a full stop. And then takes it up again, with its proper rhyme in the first line of the next poetical division or paragraph. Two or three examples of the former will make the principle clear enough:—

"He mote be dedde—a king as well as a page," &c.—*The Knight's Tale*.

"I speake of many an hundred year ago," &c.—*Wife of Bath's Tale*.

"Thy temple in Delphos wol I barfote seke," &c.—*The Frankelin's Tale*.

"At Orliaunce in studie a booke he seie," &c.—*Ibid.*

"Where was your pitie, O people mercilesse," &c.

Lamentation of Mary Magdaine.

"Her nose directed straight, and even as line," &c.—*The Court of Love*.

With these, and similar variations, the poems of Chaucer abound. Read in accordance with the early training of most of us, the reader will exclaim—"It won't come in!" Of course it will not; but the foregoing lines will all be found perfectly harmonious if the words which cause the difficulty are treated like a *turn* in music, so that they come "trippingly" off the tongue. Thus, "as well as," being

read *as well's*—"many an," *man'y'n*,—"temple in," *templ'in*,—"studie a," *studi'a*,—"pitie, O people," *piti-o'-peopl'*,—"even as," *ev'nas*, &c. For such explanations, to all those who do not in the least need them, the writer begs to tender every proper apology. The desire to make this matter perfectly clear must be his excuse. These *harmonious* variations* were dropped by nearly all the poets during many years after Chaucer.

In *lyrical* verse, and more especially in the octo-syllabic measure, the first great innovator—not precisely the discoverer, but certainly the first great master—was Coleridge. In the "Vision of Pierce Ploughman," in Lidgate's and several other old English and Scottish Ballads, similar musical variations occur, but apparently without intention, and by happy inspiration, though not with the numerous forms of variety introduced by Coleridge. It is said that he once exclaimed with glee—"They all think they are reading eight syllables,—and every now and then they read nine, eleven, and thirteen, without being aware of it."

But to take a general and broad view of English versification, I find the following Letters from Leigh Hunt carefully fastened to the Letter from Miss Barrett upon the same subject. Although they bear no date of the year upon them, the allusions show that they were written mainly in comment, with a mild infusion of controversy, on a certain paragraph in my Introduction to the volume of "Chaucer Modernized," and also in reply to some comments I had made upon the versification of his "Legend of Florence." Differing with Mr. Leigh Hunt so widely on certain points of theology and social ethics as did Miss Barrett (which will be displayed fully and "argued out" in one of her future Letters), I yet feel sure she would have been highly gratified had she known that her views on the Art of English Poetry had been so specially conserved for so many years, even in

* As a somewhat extreme illustration, I hope the following anecdote will be pardoned. "I notice," said Tennyson (this was long before he became Poet Laureate), "that you have a number of lines in 'Orion' which are not amenable to the usual scanning." "True; but they can all be scanned by the same number of beats of time." "Well; how then do you scan—mind, I don't object to it—but how do you scan—

"The long, grey, horizontal wall of the dead-calm sea?"

Now, as this was the only instance of such a line, the engineer fancied he was about to be "hoist with his own petard;" however, he proposed to do it thus—

The | long | grey | hori | zont'l | wall | o' the | dead | calm | sea.

It could easily be put into an Alexandrine line: and, by a different arrangement of the beats of time, the line might even, be brought into eight beats:—

Thě | lōng | grey | hōri | zōnt'l | wall-o' the | deād-calm | sēa.

The poet smiled, and apparently accepted the scanning—at any rate, the first one. Some of the variations, however, subsequently introduced by Leigh Hunt in his beautiful play of "The Legend of Florence," would have to be tried, like those of Beaumont and Fletcher, by yet more unorthodox principles of harmony.

literary entombment, with one of the most accomplished and elegant of the *illuminati* (using the term in its best sense) of his time.

"Kensington, November 24.

"MY DEAR HORNE.—I should have written by return of post, but had something to finish by tea-time which I could not delay.

"The English prosodists have generally proceeded, I believe, upon the assumption that their heroic measure is a particular mode of iambics, with a variation of spondees, trochees, &c. I therefore, if I distinctly see the drift of it, doubt whether your paragraph can stand exactly as it does; but it is impossible for us now to exchange talk on this subject by letter, and as I am coming to Montague Street, to-morrow (Wednesday), would it not be as well for us to have our Bosterisms out at once *viâ voce*? For then, you see, we can have as many as we please in a good long chat, and so do what we can with this perplexing matter finally; for in truth, it is a *very* perplexing one, and has scratched the fingers of everybody that has approached it. I will also bring you another book, expressly on the subject—at least comprising it.

"The 'Ancient Mariner' did much, no doubt, in the poetical circles in which it was almost exclusively known," [How sad is this record of neglect of living genius, which thus incidentally drops from the pen of one of the poet's contemporaries!] "and Coleridge, I should say, is unquestionably the great modern master of lyrical harmony. But what the Percy Reliques achieved in the *gross*, was a general simplification of the poetic style, and the return to faith in nature and passion. We will have a good set-to upon these matters to-morrow, if you think fit; and you shall have, in the course of a good plump half-hour, all I have to say about them.

"Ever heartily,

"LEIGH HUNT."

Unfortunately, something prevented the proposed conversation, but here is another note on the same subject written during the same month:—

"Kensington, November.

"MY DEAR HORNE.—This is merely one or two more marginalia which, on recollection, I intended to have scribbled. The fact is, that as to 'spectacle'" [To which, apparently, I had demurred, as being too harsh a word in a certain line] "it is 'harsh,' uttered by a harsh man; but what if Chaucer had said it, thou Horne! To this I suppose you will say 'impossible.' Well, but suppose you find it in him some day? or something equivalent?" [The logic of this is exquisite, and so like Leigh Hunt in a case of friendly controversy, where the shades of the earnest and the humorous continually ran into each other.]

"This is nothing. But now as to—"

The poet now refers to several very remarkable lines in his "Legend of Florence," but this examination must be deferred for the reasons previously given.

To come at once to our own time. The peculiar variety which we have been discussing scarcely ever occurs in any of Miss Barrett's earlier poems ; but latterly it is to be found :—

“ Or, as noon and night
Had clapped together, and utterly struck out
The intermediate time, undoing themselves
In the act.” *Aurora Leigh.* Book III.

“ Be sure 'tis better than what you work to get.”—*Ibid.*

“ So, happy and unafraid of solitude,” &c.—*Ibid.*

“ Except in fable and figure : forests chant,” &c.—*Ibid.*

“ To a pure white line of flame, more luminous ;
Because of obliteration, more intense
The intimate presence carrying in itself.”—*Ibid.*, Book IX.

It is possible that some readers may not have been prepared for this ; and still less for the same Chaucerian variation (which many persons may have fancied rough, and antiquated, merely from having been trained to a regular syllabic mode of reading) to be found continually, and, of course, gracefully, adopted by the Laureate. Here are three or four illustrations taken quite at random, or quite as much so as usual with such takings :—

“ He crept into the shadow : at last he said,” &c.
Enoch Arden.

“ How merry they are down yonder in the wood,” &c.—*Ibid.*

“ Had rioted his life out, and made an end.”
Aylmer's Field.

“ Strike thro' a finer element than her own ?”—*Ibid.*

“ Which rolling o'er the palaces of the proud,” &c.—*Ibid.*

“ And oxen from the city and goodly sheep,” &c.
Trans. Iliad.

“ Sat glorying ; many a fire before them blazed.”—*Ibid.**

The “ Experiments ” (in versification) published by the Laureate at the end of the volume containing “ Enoch Arden ” and “ Aylmer's Field,” should be studied by all who take an interest in the progress of English poetry in these respects. The experiment entitled “ Boädicéa ” will be regarded as a success after a second reading, and the poem on “ Milton ” (in *alcaics*) at once. Somehow, it seems to be precisely the right kind of measure to adopt with regard to

* In the above specimen of a translation from the *Iliad*—truly a model for all future translators—those who like to have as close a translation of a great poet's

Milton. The "Hendecasyllabics" will require more readings than may be consonant with an admission of success in a metre of Catullus. Still, there are some lines which at least render the cause quite hopeful. Canon Kingsley's "Andromeda" is also a meritorious experiment.

The variations derived from the octo-syllabic measure of the old Ballads, as brought to perfection by Coleridge, and carried into other perfections, I submit, by Tennyson, and lastly by Swinburne, have now been, more or less, adopted by lyrical poets in general,—by some as conscious students and followers, by others from the almost unconscious influence which leading spirits invariably exercise upon contemporaries of less originality and power. In the variation upon the octo-syllabic measure we may observe several who have been very successful, more especially among poetesses—from Jean Ingelow, "Sadie," and Miss Rossetti, to the last graceful appearances in the lyrical form, of Jeanie Morison (Mrs. Campbell, of Ballochyle), and Mrs. Emily Pfeiffer.

In the previous instalment of these papers it was remarked that all young poets have commenced their songs in a bird-like manner. They have scarcely ever had any more thought of the classical terms and technicalities, and the various laws of the Art, than the bird on the bough, who "warbles away," with no idea of such things as crotchets and quavers, *appoggiaturas* and the *nachschlag*—the trochaic or the iambic rhythm—the dactylic, anapaestic, or amphibrachic rhythm. The illustration is of course only figurative, and rather one-sided, but true in spirit. The poetesses who have appeared during the last few years—commencing with Jean Ingelow, and closing (for the present) with Jeanie Morison and Mrs. Emily Pfeiffer, are all instances of this, more especially the two last-named ladies, who run most gracefully into several melodious measures, as by a spontaneous impulse. But

words as can be poetically given, will feel surprised at the Laureate's preference for—

"And champing *golden* grain, the horses stood
Hard by their chariots, waiting for *the dawn*,"

instead of his more literal—

"And eating *hoary* grain and *pulse*, the steeds
Stood by their cars, waiting the thronéd morn."

The first is of the usual sort, and has nothing of the close truth of the description of the dry *mealy* corn, together with the green herbage. Also the word "chariots" instead of "cars," has lost us the grand suggestion of the embattled host looking upward to Eos on her Throne, an hour or so afterwards! The very same kind of error is committed by Mr. Gladstone, who prefers giving the common-place "*sharp-tipped* lance," to the original "*copper-tipped*." (See *Con. Rev.*, Feb., 1874.) For what possible reason, of a good kind, should we not have that piece of insight into the arms and armourer's work of the Homeric age? Besides, the very fact of the lances being tipped with copper, will account for many a man's life being saved by the point turning before it had passed through his shield or breast-plates.

while we are admiring this simplicity and artless ease, we must be yet more impressed with the force of poetical idiosyncrasy which shall enable those who have passed through the *curriculum* of studies for the Art, with all its laws and technicalities—like Canon Kingsley, Robert Buchanan, and George MacDonald—to return to nature and first principles in the charming and bird-like freedom of their Songs for Children—thus happily superseding the horrid bare-faced depravities and vulgar doggrels of the very great majority of our early Nursery Songs and Rhymes.

It has been previously stated in these papers, that the work entitled “A New Spirit of the Age”—being critiques on the writings of contemporaries in 1844—was edited, and partly written, by the transcriber of these Letters; and that he was assisted by the contributions of three or four eminent authors. The principal, and most valuable of these, was Miss E. B. Barrett. One of the critiques, and certainly one of the best, was mainly written by that lady. It was forwarded in two Letters, which were carefully transcribed. As the second edition of the work has been out of print these thirty years in England (though I am aware that at least three “unauthorized” editions were subsequently printed in America), I venture to think the readers of the present day will not be indisposed to welcome a few extracts from Miss Barrett’s Letters containing her contributions,—now for the first time acknowledged,—and in especial those just alluded to, which are almost exclusively devoted to a review of the writings of Walter Savage Landor.

It was preceded by a few biographical and other remarks, founded upon communications forwarded to me by Mr. Landor. The spirit of a Greek epigram written by him on Napoleon the First (and which we will subsequently transcribe) will be understood by the following interesting episode in the author’s private history:—

“Mr. Landor went to Paris in the beginning of the century, where he witnessed the ceremony of Napoleon being made Consul for life, amidst the acclamations of multitudes. He subsequently saw the dethroned and deserted Emperor pass through Tours, on his way to embark, as he intended, for America. Napoleon was attended only by a single servant, and descended at the Prefecture, unrecognized by anybody excepting Landor. The people of Tours were most hostile to Napoleon; as a republican politician, Landor had always felt a hatred towards him, and now he had but to point one finger at him, and it would have done what all the musquetry, artillery and ‘infernal machines’ of twenty years of wars and passions had failed to do. The tigers of the populace would have torn him to pieces. Need it be said that Landor was too noble a man to avail himself of such an opportunity. He held his breath, and let the hero pass. Possibly this hatred on the part of Landor, like that of many other excessively self-willed men, was as

much owing to exasperation at the commanding successes of Napoleon, as at his falling off from pure republican principles. Howbeit, Landor's great hatred, and yet 'greater' forbearance are hereby recorded."

The remark having been made by me that, as a general rule, the originality of a man—say and do what he may—is necessarily in itself an argument and reason against his rapid popularity, Miss Barrett's Letter proceeds as follows :—

"In the case of Mr. Landor, however, other causes than the originality of his faculty opposed his favour with the public. He has" [the date of this letter is 1844, Landor being then alive] "the most select audience, perhaps—the fittest, the fewest—of any distinguished author of the day ; and this of his choice. 'Give me,' he said in one of his prefaces, 'ten accomplished men for readers, and I am content.' And the event does not by any means, so far as we could desire, outstrip the modesty, or despair, or disdain, of this aspiration."

In reply to an adverse criticism in a certain quarterly journal, he offered the critic "three hot penny rolls" for his luncheon, if he could write anything as good. This was not exactly the way to make friends with the tribe. Miss Barrett thus continues,—

"He writes criticism for critics, and poetry for poets ; his drama, when he is dramatic, will suppose neither pit nor gallery, nor critics, nor laws. He is not a publican among poets—he does not sell his Amreeta cups upon the highway. He delivers them rather with the dignity of a giver to ticketed persons ; analyzing their flavour and fragrance with a learned delicacy, and an appeal to the esoteric. His very spelling of English is uncommon and theoretic. And as if poetry were not, in English, a sufficiently unpopular dead language, he has had recourse to writing poetry in Latin ; with dissertations on the Latin tongue, to fence it out doubly from the populace. *Odi profanum vulgus et arceo.*"

In a private note to me, in acknowledging the reception of a copy of my one-act tragedy ("The Death of Marlowe") he wrote,—"I had *redd* it before with greater pleasure than," &c. ; but nobody must imagine from this that he favoured the adoption of a phonetic system of spelling ; rational as such a system would be. As to the word "*redd*," its adoption would really be an advantage.

"Mr. Landor is classical in the highest sense. His conceptions stand out clearly cut and fine, in a magnitude and nobility as far as possible removed from the small and sickly vagueness common to this century of letters. If he seems obscure at times it is from no infirmity or inadequacy of thought or word, but from extreme concentration and involution in brevity ; for a short string can be tied in a knot as well as a long one. He can be tender, as the strong can best be ; and his pathos, when it comes, is profound. His descriptions are full and startling ; his thoughts self-produced and bold ; and he has the art of taking a common-place under a new aspect,

and of leaving the Roman brick, marble. In marble, indeed, he seems to work ; for there is an angularity in the workmanship, whether of prose or verse, which the very exquisiteness of the polish renders more conspicuous. You may complain, too, of hearing the chisel ; but after all you applaud the work—it is a work well done. The elaboration produces no sense of heaviness ; the severity of the outline does not militate against beauty ; if it is cold, it is also noble ; if not impulsive, it is suggestive. As a writer of Latin poems he ranks with our most successful scholars and poets ; having less harmony and majesty than Milton had—when he aspired to that species of ‘ Life in Death ’—but more variety and freedom of utterance. Mr. Landor’s English prose writings possess most of the characteristics of his poetry, only they are more perfect in their class. His ‘ Pericles and Aspasia ’ and ‘ Pentameron ’ are books for the world and for all time, whenever the world and time shall come to their senses about them ; complete in beauty of sentiment and subtlety of criticism. His general style is highly scholastic and elegant ; his sentences have *articulations*, if such an expression may be permitted, of very excellent proportions. And, abounding in striking images and thoughts, he is remarkable for making clear ground there, and for lifting them, like statues to pedestals, where they may be seen most distinctly, and strike with the most enduring, though often the most gradual, impression. This is the case, both in his prose works and his poetry. It is more conspicuously true of some of his smaller poems, which for quiet classic grace and tenderness, and exquisite care in their polish, may best be compared with beautiful cameos and vases of the antique.”

There are two of Landor’s works which are probably known to less than half-a-dozen people of the present day. One of them is entitled “ Poems from the Arabic and Persian.” They are as full of ornate fancy, grace, and tenderness, as the originals from which they appeared to be translated, and were accompanied by a number of erudite critical notes, likely to cause much searching among Oriental scholars. And the search, after all, was certain to be in vain, as no such poems really existed in the Arabic or Persian. The other *brochure* was “ A Satire upon Satirists,” a copy of which Mr. Landor sent to me. It was a scathing piece of heroic verse, and a brief extract may, perhaps, be given at the close of this series.

Allusion having been made to Landor with reference to “ Napoleon the First,” an extract from one of Miss Barrett’s private Letters will prove interesting in the shape of a fragment of literary vengeance which the poet bequeathed to the Conqueror :—

“ Your ” [Life of] “ ‘ Napoleon ’ touched me very much ; and what I estimated was that we are not suffered in this, as in some other animated narratives, to be separated from our higher feelings without our consciousness. I like the tone of thought distinguishable through, and from, the cannonading,—the half sarcasm dropped, as unaware, among the pseudo glories which are the subjects of description. ‘ The dead say nothing.’ There are fine things, too, more than I can count, particularly with the

book out of sight. The Duke d'Enghien's death has haunted me, with the concluding words on human power—that 'effluence of mortality already beginning to decay.' The book's fault is its inequality of style; in fact, that you didn't write it all; and I am consistent enough not to complain of that. Did you ever see Mr. Landor's epigram upon Napoleon? He was so kind as to give it to me, the only evening I ever spent in his company,—and here it is :—"

*Τίς ποτε, Ναπόλεον, τὰ σὺ πρῶτα καὶ ὕστατα γράψει
Ἔργα; Χρόνος τέκνων αἵματι τερπόμενος.*

Receiving this epigram while on a visit with a mutual lady-friend in the country, I requested her the next time she called on Miss Barrett to hand her the following paraphrastic translation,—

Napoleon! thy deeds beyond compeers,
Who shall write, thrillingly?—
The Father of Years!
And—with the blood of children—willingly.

Feeling that there was another side to the question, I requested the same lady to hand also another epigram to the fair secluded classic,—

Holy Alliance!—Time can scarcely tell
To heaven or hell,
What blood and treasure sank into the void
Of husht-up night,
For "Divine Right,"—
Which that one man destroyed!

This subject naturally leads to recollections of the first great French Revolution,—to Carlyle's wonderfully graphic work on that subject,—and to several Letters from Miss Barrett concerning Carlyle, which were printed in the critical work previously mentioned. But the following Letter was *not* printed, having arrived some days too late. The references to theological dogmas are characterised by the writer's usual independence of thought, and force of expression :—

"It is impossible to part from this subject without touching upon a point of it we have already glanced at by an illustration, when we said that his object was to discover the sun, and not to specify the landscape. He is, in fact, somewhat indefinite in his ideas of 'faith' and 'truth.' In his ardour for the quality of belief, he is apt to separate it from its objects; and although in the remarks on tolerance in his 'Hero Worship' he guards himself strongly from an imputation of latitudinarianism, yet we cannot say but that he sometimes overleaps his own fences, and sets us wondering whither he would be speeding. This is the occasion of some disquiet to such of his readers as discern with any clearness that the *truth itself* is a

more excellent thing than our *belief* in the truth ; and that, *à priori*, our *belief* does not make the truth. But it is the effect, more or less, of every abstract consideration that we are inclined to hold the object of abstraction some moments longer in its state of separation and analysis than is at all necessary or desirable. And, after all, the right way of viewing the matter is that Mr. Carlyle intends to teach us something, and not everything ; and to direct us to a particular instrument, and not to direct us in its specific application. It would be a strange reproach to offer to the morning star, that it does not shine in the evening.

"For the rest, we may congratulate Mr. Carlyle and the dawning time. We have observed that individual genius is the means of popular advancement. A man of genius gives a thought to the multitude, and the multitude spread it out as far as it will go, until another man of genius brings another thought, which attaches itself to the first, because all truth is assimilative, and perhaps even reducible to that monadity of which Parmenides discoursed. Mr. Carlyle is gradually amassing a greater reputation than might have been looked for at the hands of this Polytechnic age, and has the satisfaction of witnessing with his living eyes the outspread of his thought among nations. That this Thought—the ideas of this prose poet, should make way with sufficient rapidity for him to live to see the progress, as a fact full of hope for the coming age ; even as the other fact, of its first channel furrowing America (and it is a fact that Carlyle was generally read there before he was truly recognized in his own land), is replete with favourable promise for that great country, and indicative of a noble love of truth in it passing the love of dollars."

The following *fragment* of a Letter was not intended for the work previously mentioned, but might very well have been included in it—although I should have proposed here and there to interpolate an adverse word :—

"FRAGMENT.

"I have been reading Carlyle's 'Past and Present.' There is nothing new in it, even of Carlyleism—but almost everything true. But tell me, why should he call the English people a silent people, whose epics are in *action*, and whose Shakespeare and Milton are mere accidents of their condition ? Is that true ? Is not this contrary—most extremely, to truth ?" [Indeed, I do think it very true.] "This English people—has it not a nobler, a fuller, a more abounding and various literature than all the peoples of the earth, 'past or present,' dead or living, all except one—the Greek people ? It is 'fact,' and not 'sham,' that our literature is the fullest, and noblest, and most suggestive—do you not think so ? I wish I knew Mr. Carlyle, to look in his face, and say, 'We are a most singing people—a most eloquent and speechful people—we are none of us silent, except the undertaker's mutes.

"Most truly and loquaciously yours,

"E. B. BARRETT."

Had I been challenged so stoutly—nay, charged home, at the point of the pen—in our present day, I should certainly have taken

side with Thomas Carlyle. By a "singing people" must be meant either poets or vocalists, and in both cases, especially the former, the men of genius have always been exceptions. We all know how Shakespeare and Milton were regarded in their own day; and if such men now lived, we see clearly how they would be treated by managers of theatres, and by nearly every living publisher—for the good business-reason that "they wouldn't sell." Meantime a noble Duke the other day gave £2,000 for a bull! To keep up our breed. Most cattle-spirited and praiseworthy, of course. The epics in action, alluded to by Carlyle, would find their audience in the sedulous readers of Abyssinian wars, and Ashantee wars,—not to speak of the insatiate and inexhaustible readers of the deeds of the "hero" of the late Tichborne wars! For speechful eloquence, are not Mr. Disraeli and Mr. Bright remarkable *exceptions* among English people;—Mr. Gladstone also, standing upon a waggon for a couple of hours without his hat—and allowed by twenty thousand people to stand thus uncovered—on a pitiless windy day, pouring out "speech" like any "Christom child"—who shall say that such things, because they are the common property of England, are the common capacities of the English people? As to "siltness," even among each other, does not everybody know this at home and abroad?

With reference to Miss Barrett's claiming for us so full, and noble, and varied a general literature, it is no doubt a just eulogy, although one might demur to the term "suggestive," as it would seem far more applicable to the literature of Germany. Yet, again, the *exceptions* among us are undoubted, even in the face of German idealities,—one striking instance of which, among many that could be adduced, will be manifest when I place before the reader Miss Barrett's suggestions for the lyrical drama of "Psyche," previously mentioned.

R. H. HORNE.



THE SPECULATIVE METHOD.

THE distinction between the Understanding and Reason has long been recognized among Metaphysicians,—the Understanding being the faculty by which the mind arranges and compares the objects given by observation and experience, and forms concepts (or notions) by the operation called reflection,—Reason being the power of the mind to apprehend Ideas, by grouping together the notions supplied to it by the labour of the Understanding, proceeding synthetically, as the Understanding proceeds analytically. Ideas are not the product of the mind, they are the component elements of the mind itself; the power of apprehending them is potentially contained in the mind, and to become conscious of them is the end and the object of its activity. The mind only knows by the means of ideas, and where there is no idea there is no thought.

In the pursuit of Truth the human mind can only be guided by the autonomy of its own method, and can acknowledge the authority of no other method, however high its pretensions. That method is Logic, which is both a science and an art, and is the only method which is adequate to its own object. Hegel has shown how the logic of intelligence and the logic of the physical Cosmos are the same, both are parts of the same Universe, and the Object and the Subject World have one general logic in common. All science is based on the assumption that the physical Cosmos is intelligible: faith that it is possible to understand and to explain the phenomena

of Nature, sustains the scientific man in his labours; the most determined of Agnostics is compelled to be inconsistent by a rational necessity, and Science is slowly evolved in the self-perception of Thought. The success of Science in explaining some of the natural phenomena has been sufficiently great to encourage us to persevere in our work. Now, every phenomenon we observe has a real and an ideal side, or what might be called a tangible and an intelligible element, and it is the intelligible element alone which our mind can assimilate, and which contributes to expand its knowledge and power. After every experiment in the laboratory there remains a residuum, an unknown quantity, which we reserve for future investigation, with a hope that it may not always remain inexplicable. But we can only understand what is intelligible, and we can only comprehend what is comprehensible. It is of great importance to hold fast this truism. It is the true meaning of Aristotle's profound saying, that reason can only have reason for its object, or as Mr. Lewes has recently expressed the same idea in a more popular form in his "Problems of Life and Mind," (p. 5), "No problem which is irrationally stated can receive a rational solution."

The mind can only assimilate the intelligible, the logical element in each phenomenon.

Der Geist will sich, to use the language of the school of Hegel. The mind is only satisfied when it recognizes itself in the process of Nature, and not till then.

It is contrary to the spirit of true Science to endeavour to draw a line between the Knowable and Unknowable, as Positivists and Agnostics would have us do; that line cannot be drawn. No dogmatic division can be set up between the legitimate problems of Science and the problems which are never to be solved. The Unknown of to-day is not the same as the "Unknowable" of the Middle Ages. The Unknown must always remain the problem of Science, and siege operations to reduce it to transparent, intelligible thought must be unceasingly carried on. It has been grandly said that the ideal which Science pursues is the conversion of the whole Universe into Thought. The phenomena of Nature are either reducible to thought, or can be brought into harmony with thought, or not, but we can only test thought by the means of thought, and consequently, if thought be originally defective it can never trust the results of its own inquiry into its own self. Hegel, therefore, recommends us just to set about thinking without further ado. And that advice is followed in practice by all his most determined opponents in theory.

The active mind which seeks Logic in the sequence of phenomena (or in other words which seeks itself) can never rest satisfied with a catalogue of disconnected observations collected by the experimental method. "The scientific mind can find no repose in mere registra-

tion" (Prof. Tyndall). And Comte himself admits that our "*besoin d'idéalité*" requires satisfaction.

All our knowledge begins by perception, experience, observation, and reflection. Then comes a time, among those at least who think at all, when a desire to establish order, and to find the bond of Unity in Diversity, takes hold of us, because the mind is compelled by its own nature and in obedience to its own laws, to seek for Unity in the variety of phenomena, to discover what is permanent in the midst of change, to trace effects to their causes and to reduce these causes to the fewest possible number; this craving the speculative method seeks to satisfy. It was I believe, R. Rothe who said, that the speculative method seeks to understand the *internal* connection of things, while the experimental method observes their *external* relations to each other, but science can only advance by the co-operation of both methods. "In allen Wissenschaften bedarf die Spekulation des empirisch gegebenen Stoffes, und die Empirie der spekulativen Beseelung."—(Überweg's "Logic.")

Careful and laborious observation of facts is obviously the first condition of Knowledge, but these facts when grouped, derive the ideal character which alone raises them to the dignity of sciences, from intellectual labour, from thought, which imparts to them all their value by connecting their disjointed fragments. And this result is obtained by another method than the experimental method.

"The vocation of the true experimentalist may be defined as the continued exercise of spiritual insight, and its incessant correction and realization. His experiments constitute a body, of which his purified intuitions are as it were the soul."—Tyndall, "Fragments of Science," p. 111.

The exclusive Empiricist, who denies that there can be any other starting point but experience alone, is under a delusion, since he starts with an assumption which he has not derived from experience. It is a delusion that ideas are dispensed with in the experimental method, ideas are the starting point and the end of all true science, and they are supplied to the collected observations, from within, by the laws of thought.

The great difficulty which besets the labours of the speculative thinker is the imperfection and inaccuracy of our philosophical terminology. In that respect the Germans—whose scientific language has been carefully elaborated during a century by an uninterrupted succession of patient thinkers—have a great advantage over us, though it must be admitted, the barbarous jargon of Hegel has not been improved by his disciples, who for the greater part are content to repeat *verba magistri*.

The speculative metaphysician is obliged to reason mentally, and then to seek for words which will express the result of his reasoning, in a language originally formed for other purposes, and doubt is cast

by those who have no aptitude for this intellectual labour whether it is possible to reason mentally without having words in the mind at our command, which accurately represent the subject of our reasoning. Notions, in order to become distinct and clear, must be defined, but if language is impotent adequately to express new ideas, it by no means follows that these ideas are grounded on illusions.

We feel instinctively when we begin to observe, that the Universe is a system—that is to say, that the parts which compose the Universe form one organic total, and the progress of knowledge confirms the truth of this belief. The speculative method which is intent only on the intelligible side of phenomena, must therefore be systematic, it must result in thoughts which form a *reasoned system*, in ideas which are led up to by those which come before them, and which by the process of thought and the constitution of the human mind we are carried on into connecting by logical necessity with other ideas, not originally contained in them, but flowing from them, by the process of thought, moving in obedience to its own laws.

A speculative system can never pretend to be anything but a hypothesis, an approximate solution of the problem of the Universe, but, as was said above, it supplies an imperative want of the human mind. The many disastrous wrecks which strew the path of metaphysical science have brought the speculative method into discredit, but no warnings against the futility of constructing new hypotheses will stop the human mind in its pursuit of knowledge, and in its desire to explain and to understand. It is a common popular prejudice that the speculative metaphysician proceeds with a superb indifference to facts, and the extravagance of many speculative thinkers has done much to confirm this prejudice. "*Tant pis pour les faits*" is generally supposed to be the metaphysician's motto. But the mistakes of individuals prove nothing against the speculative method itself. Mistaken inductions have not unfrequently been based on the experimental method.

And I here wish to warn against another popular delusion: that questions, namely, such as whether the axioms of geometry or the principles of arithmetic, hold good in every part of the Universe, are subjects fit to occupy speculative metaphysicians. Paradoxes of this kind, by which some thinkers so-called seek to show greater depth or superior originality, have nothing in common with healthy science or sound logical speculative method; an inquiry, for example, whether two parallel lines may not meet under certain conditions or enclose a space on some distant planets, belongs to the same order as the subjects of disputation in the Mediæval Schools, such as whether angels could live *in vacuo*; and I repeat with Mr. Lewes, that no question can receive a rational answer which has been irrationally asked. A long and legitimate reaction against the excesses of metaphysical speculation in the natural sciences, without

the indispensable correction of experience and observation, followed the publication of Oken's "Philosophy of Nature."

It is interesting and instructive to observe how often the most determined disbelievers in the speculative method unconsciously make use of words which derive their only meaning from the labours of speculative thinkers, and have become generally current in the language of science. On a previous occasion, for example, I pointed out how Professor Huxley spoke of "the *potential* existence of the world in the primitive nebulosity,"* a purely speculative idea, which has not been obtained by the empirical method. It would be easy to add other examples.

The most consistent supporters of the experimental method are constantly compelled to do homage to the speculative method, because without it their labours would be wanting in that intelligible, ideal element which alone gives them the character of sciences. I may quote Dr. Carpenter's words from his Address to the British Association at Brighton:—"While the instincts of humanity and the profoundest researches of philosophy alike point to mind as the one and only source of power, it is the high prerogative of science to demonstrate the Unity of the Power which is operating through the limitless extent of the universe." Or the following striking passage from Professor Huxley's Essays (p. 347):—"If I were compelled to choose between absolute materialism and absolute idealism, I should feel compelled to accept the latter alternative."

Professor Tyndall in his "Fragments of Science" has described and acknowledged the necessity of the Speculative method, though unfortunately without much logical accuracy; and by employing the word *imagination* to define it, he has done much to confirm the popular error that arbitrary conjecture and poetic fancy are the same as Speculative method. The speculating metaphysician is bound above all to keep his imagination under severe control and not to permit his fancy to run away with him, and it is the frequent neglect of this salutary rule that has brought the speculative method into disrepute.

"It was found," says Professor Tyndall, (p. 73):—

"That the mind of man had the power of penetrating far beyond the boundaries of his five senses; that the things which are seen in the material world depend for their action upon things unseen; in short, that besides the phenomena which address the senses there are laws, and principles, and processes which do not address the senses at all, but which must be, and can be, spiritually discerned.

"Bounded by co-operant reason, imagination becomes the mightiest instrument of the physical discoverer;" (p. 131) "there is in the human intellect a power of expansion—I might almost call it a power of creation—which is brought into play by the simple brooding over facts."

That Professor Tyndall admits and understands the Objective Logic of the Universe in the Hegelian sense is evident from the following passage (p. 62):—

* CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, June, 1871, p. 347.

"What is it that binds the consequent with its antecedent in Nature? The true scientific intellect can never attain rest until it reaches *the forces* by which the observed succession is produced. . . . Not until this relation between *forces* and phenomena has been established is *the law of reason rendered concentric with the law of Nature*, and not until this is effected does the mind of the scientific philosopher rest in peace."

Every student of Hegel will recognize in the passage I have just quoted, the doctrine of the Master, and the *forces* of which the Professor speaks will never give rest to the scientific intellect, if they be not intelligible forces,—that is to say, Ideas in the sense of Plato and of Hegel.

"Io veggio ben che giammai non si sazzia
Nostro intelletto, se il Ver non lo illustra,
Di fuor dal qual nessun vero si spazia.
Posasi in esso, come fiera in lustra,
Tosto che giunto l'ha: e giugner puollo;
Se non, ciascun disio sarebbe frustra."

Dante, "Paradiso," iv., 124.

The same feeling was not unknown to the Ancients:—

"Hæc tractanti animo existit illa a Deo Delphis præcepta cognitio, ut ipsa se mens agnoscat conjunctamque cum divina mente se sentiat, ex quo insatiabili gaudio completur."

Cicero, "Tusc." v. 25.

One more passage from Professor Tyndall's "Fragments of Science" will suffice, I believe, to show the unconscious Hegelianism which pervades his Essays. Quoting Hegel's theory of Ideas, at second hand, he says (p. 113):—

"It was the American Emerson, I think, who said that it is hardly possible to state any truth strongly without apparent injustice to some other truth. Truth is often of a dual character, taking the form of a magnet with two poles; and many of the differences which agitate the thinking part of mankind are to be traced to the exclusiveness with which partisan reasoners dwell upon one-half of the duality in forgetfulness of the other. The proper course appears to be to state both halves strongly, and allow each its fair share in the formation of resultant conviction."

Mr. Lewes, after spending many years of his life in warning men against the study of metaphysical problems as "idle and mischievous," has now discarded "the cardinal position of the Positive Philosophy," which he finds to be arbitrary and injudicious ("Problems of Life and Mind," p. 62), and has adopted the Objective Logic of Hegel (p. 73). That so fervent a Comtist should have been able to extricate himself from an untenable position, through the course of his own studies, is certainly an interesting occurrence in the development of the English school of metaphysics.

"I propose to show," says Mr. Lewes (p. 5):—

"That metaphysical problems have, rationally, no other difficulties than those which beset all problems; and when scientifically treated they are capable of solutions not less satisfactory and certain than those of physics.

"Should these pages fall into the hands of readers who on former occasions have given me their attention, they will doubtless feel some surprise at this announcement of my present aim. I may seem here to be unsaying what it has been the chief purpose of my labours to enforce. But this is not really so. I have, indeed incessantly, for some thirty years, tried to dissuade men from wasting precious energies on insoluble problems; that purpose still animates my efforts. But, although formerly I regarded problems as insoluble which I now hold to be soluble, there has been no other change than this, that I now see how problems which were insoluble by the Methods then in use, are soluble by the Method of Science. This is not a retreat but a change of front."

This is more than a change of front.

Mr. Lewes honestly admits that during thirty years he has given his readers unsound advice, and that "the cardinal position of the Positive philosophy" is untenable. Far be it from me to wish to exult over Mr. Lewes' candid admission. Every student of philosophy knows at what price alone Truth can be pursued, and by the frank surrender of what the Germans call an "*überwundener Standpunkt*" Mr. Lewes has given proof that he possesses one of the first virtues of a philosopher.


I cannot refrain from quoting at length the following eloquent passage from the "Problems of Life and Mind," in support of the views I have advanced:—

"It is surely more philosophical to bring metaphysical problems under the same speculative conditions as all other problems than to exclude them altogether, since our ignoring them will not extirpate them. The problems exist and form obstacles to research. Speculative minds cannot resist the fascination of metaphysics, even when forced to admit that its inquiries are hopeless. This fact must be taken into account, since it makes refutation powerless. . . . Contempt, ridicule, argument, are all in vain against tendencies towards metaphysical speculation. . . . Although its doctrines have become a scoff (except among the valiant few) its Method still survives, still prompts to renewed research, and still misleads some men of science. In vain History points to the unequivocal failure of twenty centuries; the metaphysician admits the fact, but appeals to History in proof of the persistent passion which no failure can dismay, and hence draws confidence in ultimate success. A cause which is vigorous after centuries of defeat is a cause baffled, but not hopeless, beaten but not subdued. The ranks of its army may be thinned, its banners torn and mud-stained, but the indomitable energy breaks out anew, and the fight is continued. Nay—instructive fact!—even some great captains of Science, while standing on triumphal cars in the presence of applauding crowds, are ever and anon seen to cast lingering glances at those dark avenues of forbidden research, and are stung by secret misgivings lest after all those avenues should not be issueless, but might some day open on a grander plain. They are not quite at ease in the suspicion that other minds, confessedly of splendid powers, can deliberately relinquish the certain glories of scientific labour for the nebulous splendours of Metaphysics. They are not quite at ease lest what to their unaided vision now appears a nebula may not one day of aided vision resolve itself into stars."

Observation shows that most men, even those whose studies have led them to take an interest in the problems of metaphysics, find an

insuperable difficulty in understanding that, in proceeding by the speculative method, spiritual facts must be spiritually discerned, and that the ideal side of the world has no material existence whatsoever. This arises from the natural habit of the human mind to attempt to facilitate the conception of abstract ideas by assimilating them to images taken from the sensible world. The Germans call this tendency *Vorstellung*. It is an endeavour to form some picture, some representation taken from the analogy of our experience, an attempt to embody an idea in a visible form, a form which shall be visible, at least, to the eye of imagination, to help ourselves in forming an image of that which by its nature can only be thought. Rather than admit that the mind has no material existence, we conceive the spirit to be an unknown, imponderable substance, to which we ascribe the functions and faculties of the human soul. The progress of the natural sciences is incessantly undermining this mode of conceiving the spirit, but we cling to it with desperate tenacity, fearing to be led either into "soul destroying materialism," or else into a vacuum in which all life and all thought will be impossible,—whereas in truth it is only a materialistic conception of Mind we are asked to surrender. The spirit is nothing but *actus purus*, as the Schoolmen say. But this we will not admit, because we feel as if the ground were giving way under our feet. From this dilemma there is no issue, until we get to a clear and distinct understanding that the ideal side of Nature has no material existence whatever, that the existence of thought can only be proved by thinking, that the contents of the mind are not physical, and that spiritual facts must be spiritually discerned by the speculative method, which is the self-perception of thought.

ARTHUR RUSSELL.



THE TORY PRESS.

THERE is a strong fascination about political journalism. Its immediate and almost visible effect upon public opinion, the scope which it affords for that keen epigrammatic style in which most lovers of composition for its own sake take delight, the mystery in which it is enshrouded, and the sense of power which it imparts, constitute very potent attractions, the charm of which has been acknowledged by some of the greatest writers in the language. To see one's own article reflected in the face of the man to whom one sits opposite in the railway, to hear it summarized at a dinner party, or plagiarized in a Parliamentary debate, is a subtle and intoxicating kind of flattery which even actors never taste: for since none of his critics can possibly be aware of the authorship, the journalist knows it is disinterested. It is strange that in spite of all this, in spite, too, of such names in journalism as Swift, Addison, Bolingbroke, Fielding, Burke, Junius, Canning, Fonblanque, Giffard, Thackeray, journalism is not a calling which commends itself to the upper classes of society. The feeling which still exists upon the subject is admirably described in one of Mr. Trollope's novels, "He Knew he was Right." And though Sir Marmaduke Rowley may be considered a foolish old man who did not know what the best intellectual society thinks upon the subject, that was not the case with another character in the story, his son-in-law Trevelyan. Nor, as far as I can see, is there much difference of opinion about it, either in the higher or lower stratum of what is called good society.

The prejudice, we own, is waxing fainter. But it is evenly distributed. It is not felt less strongly by a literary peer than it is by a fox-hunting squire. And the prejudice and the profession act and react upon each other. There is much, I am sorry to say in the latter which partially justifies the former, while the existence of the former is partially responsible for the latter. The prejudice keeps men out of journalism who would adorn and elevate it, and then those who disseminate the prejudice complain of the absence of the men. That journalism is slowly but surely rising into a much better social position than it has occupied for the last hundred years, I sincerely believe. But its position even for the last twenty has been anything but satisfactory; though it is not altogether an unwelcome reflection that those who have been the chief offenders have also been the chief sufferers.

In the reign of Queen Anne, from which modern journalism dates, and for many years afterwards, the press was on the Tory side. Addison and Steele were no match for Swift: nor did the reign of George the Second yield any one who could pretend to cope with St. John, Arbuthnot, and Pulteney. With the reign of George the Third the tide began to turn. Wilkes, Francis, and Burke—for Johnson we can scarcely call a journalist—were heavier metal than anything the Tories could produce, though no doubt in lighter composition the superiority was the other way. The *Anti-Jacobin* is almost a classic: the *Rolliad* is almost forgotten. But with this exception the literary preponderance of the Whigs, fostered to a large extent by the patronage of Holland House, has been upon the whole sustained down to the present day. Among the quarterly publications of the century, one only has been dedicated to the service of Toryism. Among the monthly magazines, *Blackwood* and *Fraser* for a time maintained the superiority. But *Blackwood* now stands alone. Among the weekly and daily journals, the *Morning Chronicle*, the *Examiner*, and the *Spectator* were *facile principes*. *John Bull* of course was very good: but not so good as its contemporaries: less scholarly, cultivated, and polite. During the government of Sir Robert Peel, the *Times* befriended the Conservatives. And at an earlier period the *Standard*, edited by Dr. Giffard, a strong Anti-Catholic journal, was vigorously written. But there could be no question which party on the whole bore off the palm in journalism. Nor can it be said that at the present moment there is any great change in the relative merits of the two. As I shall presently proceed to show, the Conservative Press has of late years been unduly, perhaps by some ungratefully, depreciated. But the conductors of it will scarcely feel aggrieved with me for saying that it is still deficient in materials which it has never attempted to supply.

The recent revolution in the fortunes of the Tory Party naturally draws one into thinking of its relations with the public press. The

Party up to the present time has received the most valuable assistance from newspapers which call themselves Liberal. But that assistance was confined to perpetual castigation of their rivals ; and it was impossible not to observe the ostentatious avoidance of anything like a word of approval for the Conservatives themselves, which distinguished the able leading articles of the *Pall Mall Gazette*. The *Times* likewise coupled its censures of the late Government with many a side-long sneer at the expense of the Opposition. Still, as might naturally be expected, the repeated blows of the club produced a far greater effect than the occasional application of the toe. And people naturally reasoned that journals conducted by men of sense and responsibility, would not contribute to the destruction of one Government unless they thought that adequate materials existed for the formation of another. Consequently the indirect support which these journals afforded to the Tories was enormous, and could not fail to eclipse what they received from their avowed organs. This result was only in a minor degree attributable to any difference of ability exhibited by their respective articles. It was the spontaneous desertion of the Liberal Government by a journal of indisputable liberality like the *Pall Mall Gazette* which created the most powerful sensation. It was the moral effect of this change rather than the literary effect of political essays, great and well merited as it was, which was really most damaging to ministers. And it was impossible, of course, for the Tory Press to exercise this particular kind of influence had Burke, Junius, and Macaulay risen from the dead to write it. But the question must occur to everyone who thinks upon the subject, to what extent and upon what terms this support is to be expected in future. The *Times*, indeed, as far as parties are concerned, is the Bishop of the Press, and gives an independent support to the ministers of the Crown, be they blue, green, or yellow. Still like the occupants of the Right Reverend Bench, it is but human, and has, like them, its peculiar passions and predilections, which it can only be expected to subordinate to the public good within reasonable limits. As these predilections, like the principles on which the *Eatonswill Gazette* was conducted, are "decidedly buff," the Tory Party must remember that in all the praise which the *Times* may bestow upon their new Government, it is doing force to its own inclinations ; and that its friendship cannot be expected to bear the weight of any great strain. The *Times*, in fact, will afford to the Conservative Government the same kind of assistance which a manufacturing member once promised to Lord Melbourne. He undertook to support him on all popular questions. "But what I want," said his lordship, "are men who will support me on all unpopular questions." This kind of friend the Tories will not find in the *Times*. Will they find it in the *Pall Mall Gazette*? I write without the slightest

information, direct or indirect, with regard to the intentions of that Journal; whether having accomplished its object and overthrown the late dynasty, it will take the oaths to the new one and settle down into a loyal subject; whether having found the sport of cabinet killing so exciting and popular, it will, after a decent interval,—a kind of “close time” for political game,—resume its double barrel, and proceed to knock about the Tories; or whether it will essay that most difficult of all parts for public writers to sustain, a purely critical attitude, and discuss every question on its merits without reference to Trojan or Tyrian.—Which of these courses it may contemplate, if it contemplates any, I say again that I have no means of judging, founded on the slightest acquaintance with its present views. But this much may be said, that a Journal which claims to represent a highly intellectual political creed, which had too nice a stomach for the policy of its own party, which will not stoop to the compromises or endure the blunders which no Government can avoid, is not likely very long to remain the friend of any. I would not, therefore, recommend the Tory Party to build on the past support which they have received from the *Pall Mall Gazette*. If they lean upon the staff of that journal, ten to one but it will go into their hand and pierce it. And here I must hasten to say that I mean no slur on the candour and straightforwardness of that excellent newspaper. I mean exactly the reverse. I mean that the Tory Party may possibly have mistaken its alacrity in attacking Mr. Gladstone for willingness to support itself; whereas the greater probability is that it will adhere if it can to the part of a simple censor, and regard all official persons as *prima facie* objects of suspicion. Supposing it possible to maintain this attitude, and discharge these functions without any unconscious bias to one side or the other, I should be glad to see it done. And certainly there can be no question about the perfect honesty, as well as the true dignity, belonging to the position. The drift of these remarks will probably ere this have become visible. What is meant is, that if the Tory Party is to rely for support at all on the countenance of the press, it must rely in the long run on its own. And this being granted, the sources of its alleged inferiority, and the best means of removing it, is a subject which ought to be, if it is not, of paramount importance and interest to all who, like the present writer, call themselves Tories. I say its *alleged* inferiority, because I do not believe that it is half so bad as it is painted; that it is due rather to sins of omission than of commission; that what it at present undertakes to do, it does well; and that where it fails is in leaving ground uncovered which ought to be occupied, which on the Liberal side is occupied, and which, at the same time, is more important to Conservatives than to Liberals. The inquiry, moreover, on which I propose to enter is one of great public, as well as of merely party, interest. Journalism

is a branch of literature ; and as a mere piece of literary history, its fortunes possess national significance. The neglect, moreover, of political journalism, if neglect there be, by a great political party, will probably be found to be connected with traits of national character and the influence of particular habits, which deserve attention and reward it. Last, but not least, the inquiry may perhaps help us in calculating the probable depth and duration of that great political change which the country has undoubtedly undergone.

The first reflection which strikes one upon approaching the subject is this, namely, that popular opinion and a strong press are of necessity almost inseparable. You need not trouble yourself, we may be told, with any elaborate investigation. If the Tories represent public opinion, the public press will speedily represent the Tories. That is a fair test of the Conservative re-action. If there is a genuine and healthy Conservative opinion circulating in the veins of society, it will show itself in the press, as certainly as the sap which creeps through the branches of the tree shows itself in the buds. Leave the thing to Nature. You will soon know. A mere hot-house Tory Press will do more harm than good, for it will only reveal the natural poverty of the soil. There is force in these remarks, no doubt. *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. If there is no Conservatism in the people it cannot very well come out of the people. But the converse proposition is not, perhaps, equally true, namely, that if no Conservatism comes out of the people, therefore there is none in them. There may be a good deal of opinion which is only so much wasted force for want of somebody or something to condense, regulate, and direct it. And Conservatism is, in the nature of things, less enterprising and less prone to self-assertion than Liberalism. I am not, I think, far wrong in suggesting that, whereas the latter creed may very safely be left to the hands of Nature, the former does require a little assistance from the hands of Art—"Take care of the beautiful, for the useful will take care of itself." Nor is it any great stretch of imagination to suppose that the prose and the poetry, the utility and the beauty, of politics are represented respectively by the theories of Radical and Conservative. There is nothing, therefore, derogatory to the Tory Party in supposing that the Conservative Press may be a somewhat less hardy plant, and more likely to suffer from neglect than its Liberal sister, though the instincts to which it responds may be none the less deeply seated, and none the less widely distributed. No doubt, as a general truth, the dominant opinion of a nation at any given period of its history will be found reflected in its literature. But some dominant opinions are more easily reflected than others ; that is to say, more naturally accommodate themselves to the conditions of public discussion ; and can "be made more of" by writers for the public press. Liberalism, in this respect, has the

advantage of Conservatism ; an advantage which Conservatives should endeavour to counterbalance by additional care and vigilance bestowed upon their own journalism. It is now, however, time that we descended into closer particulars. We have spoken of public opinion and the public press marching hand in hand, and the one being a warrant for the other. We must now consider how far the existing Conservative press does represent Conservative opinion ; how much it leaves unrepresented ; and to what cause the omission is assignable.

It is evident that between the objects of Conservative and of Liberal Journalism there is a necessary difference, which accounts to some extent for the literary qualities of each. It may be taken for granted that the large majority of the wealthy and educated classes in the country are, and have been for a long time Conservative : Conservative, that is, in the sense of believing that they are very well off as they are ; and that organic changes, social or political, are equally undesirable. Of course there is a small minority who think otherwise. There is the "University Liberal," that notable product of modern times, who believes in nothing but Bismarck and Comté, unless it is in the uselessness of Greek and Latin. There is the discontented millionaire, who does not get into society. And so forth. But, on the whole, it is as we say. The wealthy and educated classes are so far Conservative that they do not need to be converted. Consequently Conservative journalism has addressed itself to those who do. It has been the main object of its promoters for the last twenty years to speak to the working classes. For this purpose paper after paper has been started in the large towns, of which the price, the news, and the leading articles have all been adapted to the purse, the taste, and the comprehension of the lower orders. When the *Standard* assumed its present shape, in 1857, its proprietors and directors looked mainly, if not exclusively, to its influence on that class. On this object skill, money and energy were freely lavished. From that day to this no effort worth speaking of has been made in any other direction. And the last-born child of the Conservative press, the *Sun*, is more expressly than its elders dedicated to the same purpose. Whether the Conservatives have been wise in their generation or not it is, perhaps, too soon to judge. But it must, in justice, be allowed that a press which has been studiously directed to one object for nearly twenty years, the emancipation, namely, of the popular mind from the exclusive tyranny of Liberal ideas, ought not, in the teeth of late events, to be pronounced inefficient. In that conversion of public opinion which has been manifested chiefly among the working classes, a large share must, in common honesty be allowed to the exertions of the press which was trained to that especial work. Dissatisfied Tories and fastidious Liberals forget this when they grumble at Conservative Journalism. There is nothing to grumble

at. Conservative Journalism has done its appointed work. And whatever might have been said upon the subject three years ago, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. But of course, from a press established for the above purpose, and animated by the above ambition, the same literary excellence was not to be expected, as appeared upon the Liberal side. In their popular penny papers the Conservatives did well; better in my opinion than the Liberals. But as long as the Conservative party confined its exertions to the means of acquiring a hold upon the working men, the excellence of the *Spectator*, the *Pall Mall Gazette*, and the *Saturday Review* was not to be thought of. The Liberal press, on the other hand, having rather to contend with the apathy of lettered indolence, or the timidity of cautious wealth, than with the ignorance and prejudices of an uneducated and simple-minded multitude, was naturally drawn to composition of a very different character. It could leave the necessary work of inflaming the passions of the multitude to very inferior instruments, and devote its best energies to please the tastes of an intellectual audience. This is one cause of the difference between the two. The one required a finer and more highly tempered instrument, the other a stouter and simpler one. But the latter has been good of its kind, and Conservatives should have the fairness to say so. The two different divisions of the press in fact had two sets of materials to work upon. The object of the one was to counteract the dislike of a highly luxurious class to have their leisure disturbed by schemes of political improvement, and the tendency of a highly intellectual class to regard them with cynical indifference. The object of the other was to explain to a very ignorant class the true meaning of our institutions, and to counteract the selfish aims of demagogues and patriots. This has been the mission of the Conservative Press, and if the writers engaged in fulfilling it have been less prolific than their rivals of elegant periods, polished irony, and philosophic reflection, it is because they had less occasion for them. Except in London, this alleged inferiority of the Conservative Press is little seen. The Provincial Conservative Press is quite equal to the Liberal. And on the whole it may be said that, of one very large and influential section of the Conservative public the Conservative Press is a genuine and able representative. The ground which it covers it covers well. But it leaves a large space without a single newspaper upon it. The Conservative Party has no organ in the press capable of giving effect to the more intellectual and philosophic side of its creed; capable of supplying those classes, to which the best Liberal papers appeal, with an effective answer to them. Nor is this all. The Conservative Party has no means of access to that large class of political Gallios who care for none of these things, but who care a good deal for being amused and interested. Such men, however, have votes as well as other people, and they will give them to the

party which seems, on the whole, to be the cleverer party of the two. Such men may be taken by an epigram who would listen unmoved to the most touching appeals on behalf of the British Constitution. Now the Conservative Press has nothing to offer to such men as these. The work it has hitherto been doing has, as we have already said, made it somewhat careless of the niceties of composition. Conservative journalists have got into the habit of thinking more of matter than manner; a great deal more of what they say than of how they say it. French journalism runs into the opposite extreme. But there is a middle course which all writers who desire to keep journalism a branch of literature, and consequently a connection of the Fine Arts, should always set before themselves. It has been the misfortune rather than the fault of the Conservative Press that of late years it has somewhat neglected this duty. But the time has now come when it has no longer an excuse for doing so; when it may fairly be expected to study elegance as well as clearness; and to pay attention to those little points, such as the distribution of paragraphs, the arrangement of topics, and the structure of sentences, which are to leading articles what finished manners and a pleasant voice are to individuals; no necessary evidence of any sterling merit underneath, but a considerable inducement to make us believe that it may be there. Men, as a rule, do not make a study of newspapers. They take up one just to pass away a quarter of an hour. If the few first sentences of a leading article strike their attention, they read on, and if it does not sooner or later, run to wool or sawdust, they read it through. But that is the most you can expect. Sometimes the mere look of an article—if the type is clear and firm, the paragraphs of even length, and a sentence which serves as the key-note placed at the head of each—will attract the attention of an idle or fastidious reader. As a practical exponent of Conservative views for an uncritical and unlearned audience, the Conservative Press has played its part well. It must now, however, take a step in advance and consult the taste of those classes who desire, the one a scientific, the other a literary, treatment of Conservative principles.

We have said that the difference of the materials on which the Conservative and the Liberal Press had to work was one explanation of the different results produced. But that is only one. Other causes have been at work, at all events since 1846, to damp the zeal of Conservatives, in the pursuit of a higher class of journalism. It is very probable that these conditions have been greatly modified of late, if they have not totally disappeared; and that Conservatism will hereafter rest upon a broader basis than it did even under Peel. But the results of such a change cannot be expected to show themselves all at once. Three or four years will not undo the work of

twenty. And we are now contemplating Conservative journalism as it stood after the completion of the period which lies between the repeal of the Corn Laws, and the passage of the last Reform Bill. The corn law quarrel sliced off from the Conservative party almost its whole city element. During the whole interval we have mentioned the Tories and the Liberals were divided from each other, as the Town and Country Party. It was almost impossible it should be otherwise. The battle of free trade was a battle between Town and Country, and as the latter was represented by Conservatives, so the former came of course to be identified with Liberalism. Now, although the assertion may seem strange at first sight, it is nevertheless strictly true that the Conservatism of country gentlemen, and of country people in general, if we except perhaps a certain class of farmers, is not nearly so much a mere party creed as it is in large towns. It is more ethical, sentimental, and unconscious. In the country there are no municipal rivalries, no perpetual administrative quarrels to keep the two parties face to face with each other, and to feed the spirit of contention. The country gentleman left to himself is like Enceladus before the giganto-machia—

As tame and mild
As ox unworried in the grazing meads.

Many such men are exceedingly well read. But the clash and bustle of town life, the collision of mind with mind which seems to strike sparks out of the very stones, is foreign to their nature. The battle of journalism which is watched with such feverish delight by other people is to them of little interest.

Chanteth not the brooding bee
Sweeter notes than calumny?
Let them rave!

This moral repose, this dignified indolence, this inability to take any deep interest in alien squabbles, is at once the vice and the virtue of this kind of Conservatism. Subjectively it is doubtless the latter, but objectively it is as certainly the former. To exercise an influence over their fellow men, people must often stoop to take an interest in matters which they cannot help despising, and to use the same instruments in warfare as are used by their antagonists. It is easy to see that this habit of mind which, during the period we have mentioned, was dominant in the Conservative Party, was not favourable to journalistic enterprise. Seated in his easy chair, his *Times* or his *Quarterly* in hand, looking out upon his park and his fish-ponds, with the tower of the village church just peeping through the stately elms, what does Sir Walter Vivian care for his party being called "stupid?" In London a man has to face the banter of rival politicians every morning of his life. In the counting-house, or the Stock

Exchange, in Westminster Hall, in Pall Mall or St. James's Street, at his Club or his Tavern, the demon dogs his footsteps, and gives him no peace.

Agricola incurvo terram dimovit aratro.

The country gentleman is secure from all this worry. And supposing him to be a Member of Parliament, he brings his *hōs* to town with him, and is not there long enough to expose it to any serious injury. We do not blame the country gentleman. Perhaps we might, all of us, be the better for a little less of that fractious and captious spirit which journalism engenders, for a little less of that sham indignation and mock earnestness which so frequently disfigure it. Still we must take the tares with the wheat: Journalism is a necessity of the age. No political party can afford to dispense with its services. And the better they treat it the better will the class of men be who undertake its duties, and less frequent the presence of the evils we have just described. Those who would fain do without it, will go their own way of course. They must be allowed to be the best judges of their own interests. With the many generous and noble traits which distinguish country gentlemen as a class, there is a strong element of shrewdness intermingled. Better men of business don't exist. And on this point, therefore, I shall consider that I have said quite enough. Moreover, since Conservatism has once more lifted up its head in cities, the fortunes of Conservative journalism are perhaps likely to be cared for by a class more interested in the subject. I shall watch the result with curiosity. A sincere conviction on the part of the mercantile and trading classes in favour of Conservative principles will soon begin to show its fruits. It used to be reported a dozen years ago in literary circles, that when gentlemen dissatisfied with the then condition of the Tory Press, carried their suggestions for improvement to the Carlton Club, they were met by the rejoinder that if a new paper was not likely to answer as a pecuniary speculation, the "Party" were unable to afford it; if it was, projectors had nothing to do but to go into the City, and get a hundred thousand pounds at once. If the story is true, this was an unkind way of receiving such suggestions I must say. But as the City has now become Conservative, it will, perhaps, be ready to take the initiative in reinforcing the Conservative Press. At the best way of doing so, we will glance hereafter. But I may say at once that I do not believe in the multiplication of penny morning papers. Two are quite enough. And there is no earthly reason why the *Standard* should not be made all that a new daily paper might be made, with less outlay and no injustice. A word, however, ere quitting this portion of the subject with those who put pecuniary profit so forward in their estimate of journalism. There is surely nothing to be ashamed of in spending money on the pro-

pagation of one's principles. To make money by doing so ought not to be a first consideration. Unfortunately few individuals can afford to spend the necessary sums without looking to the profit. But a party can. An individual may not be able to spend any portion of his income in propagating his political principles. But a party can. And a tithe of the sum spent on electioneering would suffice to establish journals that would render half of it unnecessary. Private enterprise may *now* perhaps do for the Tory Press what it has done for the Liberal. But I have long desired to protest against a doctrine which puts the cart before the horse ; and supposes you are not to send out missionaries till there are converts ready to maintain them.

We now come to a more delicate, and we should perhaps add, more dangerous part of our task. We have hitherto considered our subject chiefly under the head of demand. We must now look at the supply. It is needless to say that first class-journalists, in whatever party we look for them, are not as plentiful as blackberries. If we consider what such a man ought to be, we shall be overwhelmed with the multiplicity of his requirements. He must be a good scholar, or he will be unable to season his articles with those classical allusions, and occasional classical quotations, which all English gentlemen love, nor will his writings carry with them that indefinable air of culture which is seldom or never attained without a classical training. He must be well acquainted with modern history, and English parliamentary history, and must have such a knowledge of Continental politics, as will enable him at all events, to detect any remarkable coincidence between foreign and domestic ones. To this end he must be sufficiently familiar with modern languages to be able to read the newspapers of the leading European capitals. He must possess the power of throwing his thoughts into language with extreme rapidity, and be able, at the same time, to compose in a style at once terse, trenchant, and perspicuous. He must be prepared to work up till three or four o'clock in the morning three or four times a week, and go home at that hour from close and heated rooms through all weathers. He must possess the virtues of punctuality, sobriety and discretion. He must have a large fund of common sense to neutralize the wounds on his self-esteem, which he is certain to receive in the discharge of his duties. Add to this that he will certainly not be a first-class journalist unless he has both wit and humour. And all this to be had for from four to five hundred a year ! No wonder men with such qualities who are willing to sell them for the price are few and far between. There are compensating features in journalism which go some way to redress the balance. Some we have already noticed. A regular contributor to a first-class journal, on such a scale as to make five hundred a year by it, is a much greater man than one who makes only the same income by medicine or the bar. He is engaged

in a work of incomparably greater dignity than any of the regular professions except the Church. He is helping to form the public opinion of his own generation ; nor is it possible to place any limit on the extent of his influence, or to say what word of his written in the hurry of midnight, may not germinate in congenial soil, and lead to vast results hereafter. Journalists who take a pride in their calling may console themselves with this reflection for many of the ills which they endure. What would be thought of an author who had a hundred thousand readers every day ? Yet the journalist has this and more. We are not, of course, forgetting the editor's share in the result. But he can do little more than prescribe the subject and lay down two or three leading considerations which should govern the treatment of it. All that gives it life, warmth, and colour, is the writer's own. Is the man who writes a hundred such essays in the year, which are greedily devoured by thousands, less worthy of general recognition than the novelist, historian, or poet, of corresponding rank ? If journalists found that the true character of their labours was frankly recognized ; and that like many other authors they were paid in fame for what they missed in coin, would not the whole tone and character of journalism be raised at once ; and many of the vices imputed to it be heard of no more ? If it is said that this is impossible because journalists are anonymous, I reply that this argument goes a very little way ; for it is known perfectly well that such and such a man is on the staff of such and such a journal, though it is not known exactly what articles he writes. I trust I shall not be supposed by these remarks to offer any countenance to that foolish touchiness and irritable vanity on the part of "literary men," which the late Mr. Thackeray rebuked. There is nothing more contemptible. Let the man of letters go his own way and do his own work, and take such distinction as may come to him without undue exultation. I only say, give the journalist the same chance. But, after all, compensation such as this does not go a great way. The inequalities which are discernible in Liberal and Conservative journalism, are next after the causes set forth in the previous portion of this article, traceable to more vulgar sources. Not to mince matters, excellence in journalism is like excellence in many other things, a matter very much of pounds, shillings, and pence. The highest bidder commands the best workman. And it is idle to suppose you can get as good an article in the long run for three pounds a column as you can for five. There may be men, of course, to whom money is no object, who will write as well for the one sum as for the other. But then the same men probably would write just as well for nothing. Nor can you for a daily paper rely upon the same class of men who are found adequate to the wants of weekly ones. It used to be a theory of "country cousins," and credulous travellers, that the *Times* leaders were all written by

young barristers, who eked out their incomes by literary occupation in the intervals of legal work. I should question very much whether any single newspaper in London relies on such sources for its regular supply of matter. That numbers and numbers of men who are practically journalists are nominally barristers, of course, I know. But then these men, to all intents and purposes, make journalism a profession, live by it exclusively, and do not use it simply to "eke out" an income derived from other sources. I lay stress on this fact, because to a man who does eke it out in that way, and contemplates relinquishing his pen as soon as he can afford to do without it, the amount of remuneration he receives is not so important as to one who makes it his livelihood, and has nothing else to depend upon. Moreover, the increased dearness of living affects journalists as much as other men. Yet the remuneration which they receive, has not, to the best of my knowledge, been altered for the last quarter of a century.

We have now assigned three reasons for the alleged inferiority of the Conservative Press, namely, its dedication for so long a time to a species of work which, not requiring great literary excellence, naturally led to the neglect of it; secondly, the remoteness of rural Conservatism from those moral and mental habits which stimulate and flatter journalism; and thirdly, a drawback which, with one or two exceptions, is common to the whole press, insufficient remuneration. We will now glance briefly at the existing metropolitan journals which uphold Conservative principles, and conclude with a rough outline of what is required to supplement them.

The *Standard* was established as an Evening Paper in 1827 under the editorship of Dr. Giffard, its object being to supply the vacancy occasioned in the Anti-Catholic Press by the defection of the *Courier*. It was conducted with considerable ability, and maintained its position as a first-class evening newspaper for a great many years. It is unnecessary to follow the various steps by which it was gradually transformed into its present shape. It is sufficient to say that by slow degrees it superseded and absorbed the *Morning Herald*, and became known as the one accredited organ of the Conservative Party in the daily press. I have already given my own version of its subsequent history, and from this my readers will perceive that instead of echoing the complaints which have frequently been made against it, I conceive it to have been eminently successful. The *Standard* set itself to the task of making the English working classes Conservative; and Conservative the English working classes now are. So far, *cadit questio*. But what all men, Conservative or otherwise, interested in the subject will now desire to know is, whether having accomplished that task, the *Standard* is ready for another, and as it has beaten the penny Liberal papers on their own ground, it is prepared to tackle the higher priced ones. I have spoken of the points in which I think the *Standard* is

deficient. But it has not got so very much ground to make up. The *Times* has a great name; and people scarcely venture to criticize the composition of its leaders. No doubt there is about them that air and manner which comes of long assured supremacy; and one sees in it fewer bad articles than in any other paper extant. But one sees plenty for all that. This, however, is not the point. What is the aggregate effect of the four or five *Times* leaders every morning compared with the aggregate effect of the four or five *Standard* leaders? There is no occasion to make any other comparison; for the *Times* and the *Standard* are far away the two best Morning Papers. Well, the difference seems to be simply this, that the *Times* has more money to spend, or chooses to spend more, in setting the ability which it has at its command in the fairest light. The peculiar literary ability of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, *Saturday Review*, and *Spectator* we shall consider presently. But between the mere literary ability of the *Times* and the *Standard* there is not so very much to choose. I have the highest respect for the ability displayed by the leading journal. The leading journal it is, and the leading journal it is likely to remain. But it would be the height of injustice to the *Standard* to deny that, after all allowance has been made for the operation of the causes we have mentioned, it presents its readers every day in the week with at least one leader of very considerable merit. What strikes one most is the literary ability which seems to run to waste in its columns. It is not made the most of. The present writer remembers very well being told, he thinks in the year 1863, by a very distinguished Oxford man of letters, himself an advanced Liberal, that several times a week he saw in the *Standard* at least one article of sterling merit. It might not be so nicely finished as the *Times* article. But it showed equal brains, and was equally well entitled to the attention of educated and thoughtful men. What the *Standard* lacks, however, is articles suited for men who are educated without being thoughtful. The "literary loungers" to whom the form of an article is everything, the substance nothing, and whose voice is potential in determining the pretensions of a new journal. No doubt articles have appeared in it recently which seem to show a consciousness of this need, and no inconsiderable ability for supplying it. By all means let it persevere in the same path. But even then, there will be plenty of room left for papers of a different stamp. Nobody supposes that the *Pall Mall Gazette* interferes with the circulation of the *Times*; and as little is it to be supposed that a Tory *Pall Mall Gazette* would interfere with the circulation of the *Standard*. Of the remaining Conservative papers it is unnecessary to say a great deal. The *Hour* is conducted by a gentleman with whose name much of the success of the *Standard* is associated in the public mind, and if wrongfully, nobody has had the truth explained

to them. He is aided by good writers, and may possibly make his mark. But up to the present time the *Hour* is so much an echo of what the *Standard* used to be, that it is unnecessary to discuss it at any great length. The *Globe* is a capital newspaper; one of the best to ask for at a railway station; but beyond that we fancy its managers do not aspire. Two attempts at least have been made since it was purchased by the Tories to make it something more. But from want of perseverance we fancy, rather than from anything else, both attempts failed. But those who wish to take home to their wives and families the latest news of the doings of the Conservative Party had better buy the *Globe*. The *John Bull* having survived many rivalries, is the weekly Conservative organ. The *John Bull* is strong on ecclesiastical subjects, and is conducted with respectable talent. But not its best friends would attempt to compare it with the *Saturday Review* or the *Spectator*. And the question which preys on the vitals of many anxious Conservatives is, why papers displaying the merits of the two last-mentioned journals do not appear on their side.

Hitherto we have confined ourselves to newspapers. If we look to magazines and reviews, the Conservative Party is worse off still. With the *Quarterly* and *Blackwood* our tale is told. The political articles in both are superior to the *Edinburgh* or *Fraser*. But what are two amongst so many? And what is more, the political writing in both is purely combative and litigious. As clever and cogent as can possibly be required. But not instructive; not supplying "the weak and wandering brother" with a reason for the faith that is in him. On the other side the name is legion. The *Edinburgh*, the *Westminster*, the *British and Foreign*, *Fraser*, the *Fortnightly*, the *Contemporary*, *Good Words*, to say nothing of other publications of less pronounced opinions, but whose bias is equally manifest. And these bring us back to that very important consideration at which we have already glanced, namely, the moral effect of this numerical and intellectual superiority upon men perhaps who never read a line. To have a paper talked about as clever, though it does not pay its expenses, is a great advantage to a party as showing that the cleverness is not all on one side. And, indeed, a great deal of the influence of the press is of this kind. There are thousands of people who, though they read the news, rarely scan a leading article, and, perhaps, would not understand it if they did. But they hear that the *Times* is written by very able men, they know it is on the Liberal side, and the Liberal side therefore gets all the credit of their ability. It is not enough for a political paper to be good. It must be good enough to be talked about. People must ask each other after dinner, "Have you seen that capital article" in the *Sceptre*, or the *Mitre*, or the *Bludgeon*, as the case may be? Eminent persons must write to the editor, begging for a small allowance of his valuable

space to refute what some other eminent person has said to their disadvantage. The *Spectator* is full of such correspondence. The *Pall Mall Gazette* has its share. Of the *Times* it is needless to speak. But who—well it is unnecessary to prolong this part of our article, and we are anticipating what we have to say in our concluding pages.

There is no doubt then that since journalism has appropriated to itself so much of the ground which was formerly occupied by pamphlets, essays, and treatises, Conservative journalism has begun to lag behind Liberal. Up to a certain point we see no great difference between them. In attack and defence, upon particular questions, the Tory weapon bears as sharp an edge and is wielded by as deft a hand as the Liberal. It is only when we rise to broader views, and a more general survey of political subjects that we detect a difference. I don't mean to say that the Conservative papers attempt this kind of thing and fail. I mean they don't attempt it at all. A morning paper perhaps, especially a penny one, is not the best vehicle for such articles. But a vehicle should be found for them somewhere. Without such an organ the Tory Press is incomplete, like a man with only one leg. In fact this is what we should say of the Tory Press. It is not so much weak as imperfect. One of its compartments, so to speak, which ought to be well filled is left totally empty. It walks by the side of the Liberal press, not exactly a worse figure, but a foot shorter. Now, why is this? Why is the ground which ought to be covered by the philosophy of Toryism left unoccupied? Is there any other reason for it than these we have already adduced to account for the inferiority, such as it is, of the Tory Press in general; and may the recent Tory triumph be expected to cause this as well as other imperfections to be remedied? This is a nice question. We must not forget that Liberal journalists when they approach the higher questions of political science do so at a great advantage. They have Mill and other prophets from whom to draw inspiration. The Liberal Press could hardly be what it is without a scientific literature at its back to leaven, educate, and prompt it. Now the philosophy of Conservatism, or Toryism, for though the two words mean very different things sometimes, they mean the same thing for the present purpose, is a subject in search of an author. The nearest approach to it is the Republic of Plato. And second to that the work on "Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality," of Mr. Fitzjames Stephen. But it is needless to insist on a fact so well known as that there is nothing in Conservative literature corresponding to the voluminous works of the Utilitarian philosophy on the other side. Still without such assistance it must be possible we should think for Conservative writers to set forth the great principles on which aristocratic institutions, monarchies, and hier-

archies are based, so as to interest cultivated readers. We don't mean, of course, that they are to compose set essays on the subject. But then they should seize opportunities of appealing to them, and sometimes devote half a column to explain or elucidate some one of them. There is also another means by which educated men may be attracted to particular journals, and that is by a first-rate literary department. But if you want to see a really good review of an important book now, where are you to go for it? To the same journals we have been obliged to mention over and over again. The *Times*, the *Pall Mall Gazette*, the *Spectator*, and the *Saturday Review*, have almost a monopoly of criticism. A daily paper is not the best vehicle of literary criticism very likely. But that only shows the more clearly the necessity for another journal. If this country is to be ruled by the Conservatives for a term of years, as seems not improbable, it is greatly to be hoped that the Conservative Press will be enlarged till it includes journals such as those we have already mentioned. Every time that some novelty has been hit off in journalism, Conservatives have said to themselves afterwards, "Why didn't we do it?" When the *Saturday Review* was established, they mourned over a lost opportunity. Just before the establishment of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, a new Conservative evening paper of much the same character was actually under consideration, and was abandoned, no one knew why. Probably because the Tory Party thought itself too poor to afford it. That writers were not forthcoming is not true. For they were; and several who afterwards found ample employment on the *Pall Mall Gazette* itself, as well as on the *Saturday Review*. But when it came to the point, the Conservative Party could not screw up its courage, and then when the *Pall Mall Gazette* was actually started, they saw the mistake they had committed. And now another good opportunity has arrived, unless they think they have done all that is necessary by the establishment of the *Sun*—a very good little paper, by-the-bye—and marvellously cheap. Of course I may be asked why I say so much about the Conservative Party establishing a newspaper, when private enterprise is for so many reasons so much better, and when the very papers which I set up as models were so established? My answer to this is, that there is all the difference in the world between defensive politics and aggressive. The supporters of existing institutions are too much inclined to rely upon the *vis inertiae*, a tendency in which they are dexterously encouraged by their opponents. When the next house is on fire, a Conservative is only too glad to be assured that his own is fire-proof, and that he needn't be the least afraid. He is always being laughed at for an alarmist by those who know only too well what cause he has for alarm. It is, moreover, a remarkable thing that almost all the Tory papers which have been established *de novo* in the present century, have been established for special

purposes, and not in defence of general principles: the *John Bull* to write down Queen Caroline; the *Standard* to resist emancipation; the *Press* to write down the coalition; the *Day* to write up the Cave. The fact is, that by all but a very few Conservatives the cardinal principles of their creed are accepted as axiomatic propositions too true to be defended. And by all Conservatives alike it is seen that the defence of existing institutions lies within a narrow compass, and depends on a few leading considerations which it is difficult to invest with any novelty. There is sufficient truth in this view of the subject to make it difficult to find people willing to start papers on general Conservative principles without any speciality to bait them. And the Conservative party has been for so many years a despondent and trodden down party, that this innate disposition has, of course, been considerably aggravated. Besides, when one talks of the Party one doesn't mean the Government, or the half-dozen statesmen who are its leaders. And a journal founded by the exertions of a certain number of noblemen and gentlemen has many of the characteristics of a private enterprise about it, though not so exclusively of that character as one belonging to a publisher. But the Walters, Perrys, and Rintouls of the Conservative party have yet to show themselves.

Whether decidedly party-papers of the calibre, say of the *Spectator*, independent of official aid, are within the reach of the Conservatives, we will not undertake to say. The Conservatism which wins elections, carries the Government, and appeals to the middle classes, is so essentially practical, that journals dealing ably with details seem sufficient for its purpose. This essentially practical character of the bulk of the party is both its strength and its weakness. It is its strength, because it is so thoroughly English; and men like to act with a party of which they can say that "There is no nonsense about it." On this point the Conservative Party just now contrasts very favourably with the Liberal; and is in full enjoyment of all the credit to be obtained by its freedom from fussiness and cant. It is its weakness because it fosters a tendency to neglect first principles. Every great party must have a theory in the background, or some day it will rue the want of it; and Tories, moreover, should not be afraid of appealing to the softer, more picturesque, and more poetical aspects of their creed, instead of relying solely on that hard-headed, perhaps rather cynical, common sense, which just now seems in public estimation to be the queen of the virtues. It is an admirable working quality, and, as we have said, it is eminently English, and will do more in the long run to keep a party at the head of affairs than much more brilliant attributes. But we are now talking of journalism; and just a dash of romance, the rose in the button-hole of business, improves its literary costume amazingly. We should say that a high-class evening paper, or weekly paper representing

not purely party politics, but the Conservative sentiment which seems for the present to have regained possession of the people, would be an excellent commercial speculation. Such a journal would approach questions of detail without prejudice, but imbued with the Conservative tradition. Just, for instance, as other papers we have mentioned, often treat questions of detail in a Conservative fashion, though imbued with the Liberal tradition. What Toryism wants is a paper which shall stand in the same relation to itself as the *Pall Mall Gazette* and the *Saturday Review* once stood in to Liberalism. Tory principles require to be inculcated by journals independent of official assistance, direction, or inspiration. These last must always be the backbone of a political press; and, for reasons already stated, more especially so in the case of the Conservatives. But they are not enough by themselves. And, in fact, we may confidently anticipate that the existing Conservative Press will shortly have an increase to its strength, unless the political situation of affairs at the present moment is entirely delusive. It may be that Conservative journalism is not capable of being made quite so good as Liberal. Neither the business-like energies of practical Conservatism, nor the mellow beauty of historical traditions, adapt themselves so readily to the style of modern journalism as the tentative spirit of Radical criticism, and the dazzling visions of political speculators. The strength of Conservatism lies in that craving for repose and continuity of associations, "that longing for confirmed tranquillity," which is, after all, more natural to mankind than the love even of progress and improvement. A Conservative Press to be as good as the Liberal must touch those instincts, and whether it is in the power of ordinary journalism to do so—whether it is not the work rather of literature than of journalism—is the question to be solved.

ARTHUR MURPHY.



THE REPLY OF ACHILLES TO THE ENVOYS OF AGAMEMNON.

PREFACE.

THE Greek hexameter, under the hand of Homer, is in my opinion the most efficient and flexible of all known metrical instruments. Meeting every need, surmounting every difficulty as it proceeds, it presents to our view the most comprehensive and varied range of beauties. For this among other reasons it is that his translators, as I am but too conscious, lag so wofully behind him: they have no vehicle at their command in the slightest degree comparable to his. They may have their favourite measures, and each of them, nowadays, may gallantly break a lance for his own; but it is, after all, a Dutch auction, every one of them bidding downwards for the smallest degree of failure. For my own part, with reference to this business of rendering Homer in another tongue, I have involuntarily conceived of the Poems as a fortress high-walled and impregnable, and of the open space around as covered with the dead bodies of his Translators, who have perished in their gallant but unsuccessful efforts to scale the walls.

I do not mean to imply that on this account the attempt should no more be made. On the contrary, it seems that if any such endeavour can carry into another language, and into the minds of those who speak it, some few rays of light not before transmitted, the attempt, though humble, and as to the chief aim ineffectual, is justified by the result.

On account, however, of the necessarily narrow limits of success in such an undertaking, there is, as I think, more to be said for the daring and celebrated experiment of Pope, than could have been urged in justification or apology if he had been practising upon any other author. He has done to the text of Homer what the French Government of 1848 said it would do for the Treaty of Vienna—he has taken it for his point of departure: he has built upon that text, line by line, a different, and of course immeasurably inferior, but yet a remarkable poem of his own, into which he has transfused much Homeric light. Or perhaps it should be said that, casting the materials of Homer into the crucible of his own mind, he has both mechanically and chemically readjusted them, and has produced them to the world in a mould, and with a tissue, altogether peculiar to himself. The result, however, is that, while his is perhaps the most inexact and licentious translation in existence of any poem, it is likewise perhaps the most successful. It has taken a place in literature, from which it seems reasonable to prophesy that it will never be deposed. It fastens itself alike on the imagination and the ear, both of childhood and of maturity. Was there ever so signal a testimony rendered to the power of a work purporting to be a translation, as that of Mr. John Stuart Mill, who states, in his *Autobiography*,* that, when a boy, he perused it from beginning to end between twenty and thirty times! Nor is it possible to conceive a contrast more discouraging to virtuous drudgery, than that which may be drawn between the brilliant literary libertinism of Pope, and the patient industry of Voss—

Qui verbum verbo curavit reddere fidus
Interpres,

who assists the student line by line and word by word, like a commentator; and whose translation is, like a posthumous cast, an exact image of the Poem, except the life of it.

In the case of the Speech of Achilles, the version of Pope is throughout polished, forcible, and splendid; though diffuse in parts, it is succinct upon the whole, and it is full of an interest which never flags. But the main question is, does it give to the English reader as much of Homer, and as little that is not Homer, as the case admits? And here the answer must be in the negative. The simplicity and thoroughly natural directness of Homer's manner disappear, and are replaced by a pervading tone of exaggeration. For the ebb and flow of passion, so marked in the original, is substituted an uniform Virgilian loftiness of march, a continuity of effort which is somewhat like a strain. Declamation, made to run all through the powerful sarcasm, much weakens its effect. At the same time a liberty reaching to lawlessness, both of insertion and of omission, may be observed. For the careful and stately courtesy of

* P. 10.

the introductory verse, which gives Odysseus his full titles, together with a most characteristic epithet (*πολυμήχανος*), is substituted the single familiar vocative "Ulysses" (v. 307). Except as to the one word "to-morrow," verse 357 is skipped over. The line, "fighting with warriors on account of wives of theirs," i.e., of the sons of Atreus (v. 327), is at once clipped, enlarged, and mistranslated, into

For thankless Greece such hardships have I braved,
Her wives, her infants, by my labours saved;

As if Troy had been an invading power. Into the simple request that Phoenix may remain for the night, to sail in the morning, is foisted a very indifferent compliment to the still vigorous elder:

His tedious toils and hoary hairs demand
A peaceful death in Phthia's friendly land.

But I can hardly choose a better testing passage than the six fine lines relating to Thebes:

Not all proud Thebes' unrivalled walls contain,
The world's great Empress on the Egyptian plain,
That spreads her conquests o'er a thousand states,
And pours her heroes through a hundred gates,
Two hundred horsemen, and two hundred cars,
From each wide portal issuing to the wars.

Setting aside minor variations from the text, we may observe that it makes no mention of horsemen at all; and that the whole of the second and third of these lines, except the single word Egyptian, are an exaggerative interpolation. Or take the line—

The ruddy gold, the steel, and shining brass.

But Homer's *χαλκός* is not brass, nor is it shining; his *πόλιος σίδηρος*, grey iron, is not steel; and his gold, which has no epithet attached, is not ruddy. All these errors, except the common misrendering of *chalcos*, are Pope's own.

These observations on Pope, which would apply to his version very extensively, are in truth in the nature of an apology for treading ground once trodden by so great a poet:

Per quem magnus equos Auruncæ flevit alumnus.

And moreover generally, I feel the necessity of an apologetic tone in presenting an effort, which may possibly be censured both as ambitious and as feeble. One, however, of the points, in which Homer seems to me to have been least worthily appreciated, is that of his vast oratorical power. This point should be one of special interest to every native of these islands; because that oratorical power is not vague or declamatory, but lies specially in the line of debating oratory—where complication and continuity of structure are to be combined with promptitude of conception and expression, and where every word, as it issues, should go straight as an arrow to its mark. This

oratorical temperament of Homer was closely associated with the free political organization of the early monarchies of Greece; and it may be traced even in some expressions of his that seem casual, and perhaps odd, but that are, if I mistake not, truly characteristic, and because characteristic, interesting. In my opinion, the stock phrase of *ἔπεα πτεροέντα*, winged words, is not meant to set forth the slight and transitory character of human speech, which so commonly

In vento et rapidâ scribere oportet aquâ.

It is not the mere feather, but the wing, which is described. It is not a random, but a carrying force. The word is a weapon, and bears its mission through the air. So again in the quaint remonstrance—

πῶϊόν τοι ἔπος φηγεν ἔρκος ὀδόντων;

“What expression is this, that has escaped the barrier of your teeth!” The meaning is, “You have let slip part of your treasure, you have misused a mighty instrument, you have wasted power: what should have been a great thing, you have made a mean thing.” It would be easy to multiply proofs of the high estimate in Homer’s mind of the faculty of organized speech. I will add only two or three easy illustrations. One is, that the epithet of *speaking* men, which he so frequently employs, is not with him, as it would probably be with us, a commonplace: it describes man by the attribute which was for our Poet not only the most obviously characteristic, but also one of the very noblest. Next, the gorgeous epithet *κυδιάνειρα*, glory-giving (but this rendering is weak), is jealously confined by Homer to the two arenas, the only two in which man could then grow great—the Battle and the Assembly. Lastly, when the Horse of Achilles speaks by a special gift, this is felt to be such a violation of the natural order (how different were the conceptions of the Oriental tales), that the Erinûs, or Vindictress, promptly interferes, and arrests the action of the voice. (Il. xix. 418.)

As debating oratory is distinguished by the closeness and minuteness of its applications, so perhaps for the full appreciation of its exhibition in the Poems, and especially in the Iliad, is required that close and minute handling of the text which, until recent times, was almost unknown, and in which we are still so greatly deficient. Hence it may be that our translators in general seem neither to have caught, nor to have been caught by, the specific character and the extraordinary merit of the Homeric speaking. They commonly seem to plod or gallop, as the case may be, alike through the Speeches and the ordinary text; as if such marvellous efforts, as the finest among them must be held to exhibit, were after all part indeed of the 15,711 lines of the Poem, and were nothing more. But in the great speeches, a spirit seems to seize the Bard which, according to the grand expression of Longinus, *φοιβάζει τοὺς λόγους*—we seem to have the fire among the ships carried into the Poet’s mind. In

lifting thus high the standard of trial, I may be preparing my own doom; but I think there may be a better chance of seizing and presenting the specific character of one among these orations, when it is approached singly, and its elevation can in some degree be measured, than when it is taken in the ordinary course, and approached upon the level.

To the Speech of which a version is here offered, I have prefixed a title as "The Reply of Achilles." And what a Reply! I know not where to look for its equal, in comprehensiveness, in force, in splendour, in sarcasm, and in subtlety.

Something, however, has to be said as to the moral groundwork of such a Speech, in order to secure its due appreciation. If I admit that Revenge is its dominant idea and aim, I seem to give up the case, so far as moral elevation is concerned. But here I come upon two main causes of misunderstanding, which must be brought into clear view. First, we suffer from the inveterate habit of judging Homer, not from himself, but through the later tradition. Secondly, we must remember that Christianity has practically shifted the poles of human life, and has brought down all the passions associated with pride to a different and lower level.

In the later tradition, the Wrath of Achilles is a hard and brutal, if not a sordid wrath; embodying a keen insatiable vindictiveness, and nothing else. But, in the *Iliad*, Achilles has the deepest heart, and the most refined and courteous manners, united with his tremendous energy of passion. And the Wrath, which only by its excess becomes wrongful, is fundamentally a reaction against wrong.

And here I come upon the change, which Christianity has wrought. From the time when the Redeemer of Mankind on the one hand glorified humility, suffering, and forgiveness, and on the other hand promulgated definitely and clearly to the world at large the doctrine of a ruling and a reckoning Deity, Revenge's occupation has been gone, and it has become not noble but simply bad and base. But in the days when the veil had not been lifted, and the belief in the Providential order was but weak and vague, each man was for himself the vindicator of the moral order; and those can never understand Achilles or the *Iliad* who do not keep this great law of his action in view. The fine gold of a strong determination to uphold the law of right against a base and sordid, as well as a violent invasion, is not the less truly precious, because to it there adheres some merely human dross.*

Now let us proceed to consider the situation of affairs which forms the framework of the Speech. The Achaian force, in the absence of Achilles from the field, has suffered heavily, is driven back upon the ships, and, at a melancholy nightfall, anticipates for the morrow a

* Perhaps the finest case of revenge in our English literature is that of Othello: and it may be worth remark that he is a Moor.

renewed, which may be also a fatal, attack. An Embassy to the quarters of Achilles is decided on. Ajax and Odysseus are chosen to be the Envoys, as being the two Chiefs most acceptable to the mighty warrior; Ajax probably on the two grounds, first, of relationship, and secondly, of a valour signal and splendid, but cast in a mould of blunt and almost animal simplicity, which can in no possible way vie with that of his great cousin; Odysseus, because a man with the mind of Achilles could not but do homage to the one transcendent Intellect of the Army.

They find Achilles in his encampment, singing the feats of bygone heroes to the music of his lyre, which he had reserved from the spoils of the city of Eëtion. After a courteous welcome, and the usual preliminary entertainment, business is opened by Odysseus in a long and a most skilful speech.

Beginning with a health to Achilles, and an allusion to his liberal hospitality, he proceeds to present a touching contrast in the dismal condition of the Army. He exhorts the great hero to interpose before it shall be too late. Afraid of assuming directly the office of a censor, he ingeniously introduces a tale, according to which Peleus had admonished his son, when about to set forth, to be on his guard against his own haughty overweening spirit. Following up this adroit stroke, and reckoning on its effect, he proceeds to detail in imposing series the gifts offered by Agamemnon (ix. 262—99); but offered, we must remember, without any confession of his fault, such as at the final Reconciliation he has to offer (Il. xix. 134—9). In them is of course included the restoration of Briseis; and there is added a proposal that he shall choose, among the three daughters of the Sovereign, whichever of them he prefers to be his wife. Having thus by varied means done all he can to soften the obdurate soul, he makes his final appeal (300—5) in the name, and on behalf of the other Chiefs and of his fellow-countrymen at large, whom Achilles ought to distinguish from the guilty King; and makes it, lastly, in the name of the rich prize, the capture and destruction of Hector, which is sure to be his, inasmuch as that warrior will now, such is his present daring, not fear to come into the way of danger.

That wrathful Achilles, of whom some conceive only as of a big spoiled child, has reined himself in during this prolonged address; and now, opening the sluices of his eloquence, meets Odysseus at every turn, and beats him with his own arms. First, disclaiming all the arts of rhetoric, and blasting liars as with a thunderbolt, he slily hits at his astute opponent by setting forth the merits of truth and directness in speech (I). He then sets out the case in a homely, business-like, matter-of-fact way (II.): how can it answer to him, as a rational man, to have all the work and none of the pay; his energies tasked to their utmost, and then their great results overlooked in the day of distribution? Nay, not only overlooked, but

while all other prizes are respected, he has been foully robbed of his. And here he comes in contact with the topic which sets his soul on fire. They who tore this prize, a woman, from him, are the very same who, for a woman's sake, in whom they were interested, have called all the children of Hellas to war and to banishment from home (III). Is it possible to deal with men on such terms? He at least will not, now that he knows them: "forewarned is forearmed." And why, he asks with stinging sarcasm, should Agamemnon want Achilles, when he has been able to build and dig and fortify so much without him? But, as the appeal of Odysseus had described the forwardness of Hector, he is now reminded how little forward Hector was when Achilles used to take the field.

In this state of things he will depart next morning (IV.). Moreover, Odysseus may come and see him go, if he likes! And, on the whole, he will be able to get on very well, in peace, at home. Such is the message he has to send; and he desires it may be given publicly before the Achaian Chiefs, that their indignation too may be at length aroused. This is his admirable, not too sharply pointed answer, to the appeal of Odysseus on behalf of the Army apart from Agamemnon. In expressing the hope that their indignation may be awakened, he reminds them that it ought to have been stirred before, when they stood by in silence, and saw him foully wronged.

All this time he keeps pent up within him a torrent of passion. He had passed through one climax of emotion, when it found vent in the contrast between his case with Briseis, and the case of the Atridai with Helen. He had closed the door again; but the flood rolled and swelled within him; and, as it rises, he is reduced, in the effort of repression, to abrupt and broken sentences (vv. 370-7). He sums up as to the person of Agamemnon, dismissing him with lofty scorn; and then he arrives at his other climax, in touching on the proffered Gifts (V. VI.). The wonderful lines which follow form the second climax of the Speech; and the two passages are, in very truth, the two summits of Parnassus. But still, while the Wrath rushes in streams of scorching lava, the subaltern action of sarcasm has its climax too. The word *Basileus*, which we render King, is one of singularly distinctive force and emphasis in the Iliad. In the great contention of the First Book (v. 186), Agamemnon had reminded Achilles of the superiority of his own station. And it was his boast and claim to be more royal, more a King than other chiefs. (II. ix. 69, 160.) In this hour of his exulting resentment, Achilles remembers all this, without too pointedly showing his remembrance, and suggests that Agamemnon shall confer the honour of the proposed alliance not on him but on some other Achaian, who is more a king than he.

He had met the sad description of the condition of the invading army by indications that it was likely to be worse; but he has not yet replied to the insinuation of Odysseus, so dexterously conveyed,

respecting his haughty and unruly spirit. This he now proceeds to do by drawing a domestic picture (VII.) of a marriage for himself at home; this is all, he says, that is necessary to satisfy his haughty, his unruly mind (VIII.); so that, in the midst of towering pride and over-boiling passion, he is enabled to take credit for a quiet, unambitious, and contented disposition. So the close of the Speech is marked by a gradual but rapid fall of temperature. He advises that all should do as he does, all go home, and spare themselves what may be the chance of utter ruin, and must be at best ineffectual pains. He again refers the business of extrication from the dilemma to the Chiefs in general, who, by a blameworthy silence, had been its cause: and then, as if to show how completely he is reined in, he ends by a courteous invitation to his friend and old tutor Phoinix to be his guest for the night, and accompany him homewards on the morrow; that is, if he be wholly willing, for, as to constraint, such a thing is not to be thought of for a moment.

Let us now pass to the speech itself; or so much, or so little of it, as can be seen in my translation.

THE REPLY OF ACHILLES.

I.

God-born offspring of Laertes,

Warrior rich in all resource:

It behoves me now in answer

Out to speak my blunt discourse;

How I mean, and how 'twill happen,

Be it well, or be 't amiss;

That ye buzz no more about me,

One from that man, one from this.

For I hate with perfect hatred,

Hate him like the gates of Hell,

Who within him one thought harbours,

While his lips another tell.

Not so mine. I plainly utter

What I truly hold for best.

Nor, I trow, will Agamemnon

Nor the Chieftains, move my breast.

II.

Pitilessly warring alway
 On the foe, it likes me not.
 He that fights with might and main, and
 He that tarries, one their lot. 20
 Equal honour crowns the caitiff
 And the brave. The busiest fare
 As the sluggard ; death befalls them.
 With the herd in all I share
 Save the battle's daily peril,
 And the soul that in me bleeds ?
 As the bird, with all she gathers,
 Still her callow offspring feeds,
 Careless though her plight be evil,
 Ill her plight and sharp her needs ; 30
 Even so I, times unnumbered,
 Wore my sleepless nights away,
 And in fight from morn to nightfall
 Spent as oft the bloody day ;
 All to win for them a woman,
 Men, and brave men, smiting down.
 Peopled cities twelve, with vessels,
 Seawards have I overthrown :
 Inland, over deep-loamed Troiè,
 Have I sacked eleven more. 40
 Well ; the heaps of precious chattels,
 Won from each, I ever bore
 For a gift to Agamemnon,
 Son of Atreus. He, that still
 Lagged beside the wingèd vessels,
 Took them with a ready will,
 Some assigned to Kings and Chieftains,
 But the most himself retained.
 Every King and every Chieftain,
 All he got, he holds it still ; 50

Me, alone of the Achaïans

Me, to plunder was his will,
And he holds the wife I cherished :
Let his greed, then, have its fill.

III.

Ay ; but why should we Argeians
Wage with Troy the deadly war ?
Why did he, the Son of Atreus,
Bring the gathered folk from far ?
Is it not for bright-haired Helen,
Trojan with Achaïan strives ?
What ! Of speaking men, do none, save
Sons of Atreus, love their wives ?
Every good man, every steadfast,
Loves and cares for his ; so her
Loved I from my soul, and cherished.
War-won captive though she were.
Since, then, he hath once entrapped me,
When he seized my prize amain,
Let him try no more, Odysseus.
Now, I know him. 'Tis in vain.
Let him rather, with thy counsel,
And the Kings, thy brethren, search
How he best may from the vessels
Ward the foeman's blazing torch.
Nay, but he hath wrought without me
Much and well. His wall he made,
Dug his broad deep foss around it,
In the foss his palisade
Firmly set. Yet all too feeble
Murderous Hector's sweep to stay ;
Who, so long as with th' Achaïans
I, Achilles, faced the fray,

60

70

80

Never cared to bring the battle
 From the sheltering walls away,
 Scarcely to the Skaian gateway
 And the oak his sally made ;
 There once met me, and mine onset
 Nearly with his life he paid.

IV.

Now, 'tis changed. With royal Hector,
 Mark, I combat not again. 90
 But, to Zeus and all Immortals
 Victims first devoutly slain,
 I to-morrow charge my vessels,
 Haul and launch them on the main.
 Thou may'st see them—if thou willest,
 If thou car'st for such a sight—
 Over Helle's swarming waters
 Bound along in morning's light,
 And their crews of hardy rowers
 Ply the oar with eager might. 100
 Then if great Ennosigaios *
 Grant good passage o'er the foam,
 Three short days will serve to bring me
 To my fruitful Phthian home.
 Wealth abides me there, that, hither
 Senseless drawn, I left in store :
 More of gold and ruddy copper,
 Slender-waisted women more,
 Iron grey, I carry with me ;
 All that lot had given before. 110
 But my prize ! that Agamemnon,
 Son of Atreus, Lord, assigned,
 Insolent he ravished from me.
 Therefore, tell him all my mind
 In the face of all, I charge thee.

* One of the titles or names of Poseidon ; signifying Shaker of the Earth.

Indignation so shall rise
 In the soul of each Achaian,
 If again his tricks he tries.—
 Truly he is ever clad in
 Shamelessness.—Dog, though he be, 120
 Look me in the face he dares not.—
 I forswear his company
 Both in counsel and in action.—
 Once he duped, once wrought me ill ;
 Words of his no more can cheat me.—
 Long enough he works his will.
 Pass he to his doom ; for surely
 Zeus hath done his wits to nought.
 And in sum, I hate his presents ;
 Him I prize not at a groat. 130

V.

Gave he ten times, gave he twenty
 What he gives, it would be vain ;
 If the wealth of all the wealthiest
 To appease me he could rain ;
 Could Orchomenos, could Thebai
 Their inflowing riches yield ;
 Egypt's Thebai, in whose mansions
 Matchless treasures lie concealed,
 And she boasts an hundred portals,
 And from every portal wide 140
 Twice an hundred horsèd chariots
 Twice an hundred warriors guide.
 Ay, and were his offerings countless,
 Like the dust and like the sand,
 Not by them should Agamemnon
 Win my soul to his command,
 Of the biting shame he did me
 Till the price in full be got.

VI.

With a child of Agamemnon,
Son of Atreus, wed I not. 150
If with golden Aphrodite
She can match for Beauty's prize ;
If with flashing-eyed Athenè
In her skill of toil she vies ;
No, not then will I espouse her.
Let him some Achaian try,
That is nearer to his liking,
And is more a KING than I.

VII.

Should the kindly Gods deliver
And my safe returning grant, 160
Peleus will be there, to find me
And to give the wife I want,
Bevies of Achaian maidens
Hellas, ay and Phthia, bear,
Sprung from chiefs the best and bravest,
Wardens of their cities fair.
I can surely, if so please me,
Make a loving bridal there.

VIII.

Yes ; that haughty mind within me
Much inclines at home to wed, 170
And with fitting mate united,
Partner of my lawful bed,

Live at ease upon the riches
 That mine aged Sire did gain.
 What is all this flourished * City,
 All the gates of Troy contain,
 Were it as in peace she boasted,
 Ere Achaians crossed the main ;
 What is all, that great Apollo,
 Archer Phoibos, safely locks 180
 In his stone-built fane's recesses,
 Mid the beetling Pythian rocks,
 Weighed against a life ? A foray
 Oxen yields, and fleshy flocks ;
 Store of caldrons, traffic earns, and
 Many a crest of chesnut horse ;
 But the soul of man returns not,
 Not by bargain, not by force,
 Once it passes from the gateway
 Of his lips.—My mother saith 190
 (Thetis, Goddess, silver-footed,)

That unto the bar of Death
 Either Fate of twain may bear me.
 Home shall never greet mine eyes,
 If I still beleaguer Ilios ;
 Yet my glory never dies.
 But, if homeward I betake me
 To my own dear land again,
 Perishes my wealth of Glory
 From the thoughts and lips of men ; 200
 Only, Death's dark goal receding,
 Length of days shall crown me then,—
 Yea, for all it is my counsel,
 Travel homeward o'er the wave ;
 Never shall ye see an ending,
 Since that, Ilion's height to save,
 Wakeful Zeus his hand outstretches ;
 And its folk is waxen brave.


* " Out—through the fresh and flourished lusty vale." From the beautiful poem of Dunbar, "The Merle and the Nightingale."

IX.

Go then, tell the news ye carry,
 Speak as only Elders can, 210
 To the Chiefs of the Achaians ;
 Bid them shape another plan,
 And a better, which may save them,
 Fleet and men alike, from bale,
 Throngèd by the shapely Vessels ; *
 Seeing this may nought avail
 Which they fashioned ; I resenting
 Still. For Phoinix, I would pray
 Let him bide with me till morning,
 Then to his dear land away 220
 In my ships, if so it likes him,
 Free to go, or free to stay.

W. E. G., 1874.

* I have advisedly adopted this rendering of *γλαφυρῆσι* as referring to the shaped and finished or "carven" form of the ship rather than to its context. It is surely more in conformity with the later uses of the word.



ROCKS AHEAD;

OR, THE WARNINGS OF CASSANDRA.

THE part of Cassandra can never be a pleasant one for any man to play. It makes others uncomfortable and himself unpopular. It is always annoying both to individuals and nations to be warned, with irritating pertinacity and lucidity still more exasperating, of dangers imminent or future which may be unavoidable, and which will probably be fatal if not averted. The more unanswerable the prophet, the more hated he is sure to be, and the more neglected he is likely to be. People detest, and usually resent, being told of impending peril or catastrophe, especially if they see no remedy and no escape, and if the menaced ruin can be laid at no door but their own.

Yet this unwelcome and ungrateful part is sometimes the only one left to the lover of his country, and one from which, if the love be true, he will not shrink. In modern days, too, the condition of a nation, advanced in civilization, still sound at the core, and full of citizens at once wise and faithful, can seldom be so absolutely hopeless as to warrant those who foresee dangers in taking refuge in a lazy, timid, or selfish silence. To the last it must be the duty of the look-out man at the masthead to warn the steersman of the shoals and breakers he discerns, though the steersman may refuse to put up the helm, or the ship may have too much way upon her to be checked or turned aside in time. If the vessel of the State profit by the warning, the effort and the obloquy will be of small account indeed. If not, the saddened and unheeded patriot will quit the scene of his failure with the less regret.

Lubenter quiesceremus libertate partâ;
Quiescimus, amissâ, perlubenter.*

"Willingly would we have died to liberate our country—not having been able to liberate her, we die still more willingly."

Now, it is my conviction that there are three especial dangers hanging over the future of England—three "Rocks ahead" on which the dignity and well-being of the country and the happiness of its citizens may not improbably be wrecked. They may be distant, yet perhaps not very distant, for they are distinctly visible to an observant and forecasting mind. People in general think little of them, or scarcely believe in them, because they do not as yet *force* themselves upon the vision. We are a busy race and much engrossed with the present hour; Englishmen never did look far before them, too occupied with the cares and needs of to-day, to take anxious heed for the to-morrow—still less to speculate on the pregnant possibilities of the day after: we are a sanguine race, moreover, and prone to trust that "something is certain to turn up" to save us from what we dislike or dread; and, in spite of our political instincts and practical training, we have an astonishing faculty for sowing seeds of the most surely germinating and prolific sort, without actually realizing in our own minds that, in the fulness of time, they must ripen to an inevitable harvest, and without any grave consideration as to what sort of a crop we shall then be called upon to reap. Now I wish, not only to signalize those dangers which I seem to see coming, but to force my countrymen to look them in the face, however unpleasant the sight may be; to decide whether they are real or imaginary, and, if the former, how they may be met, mitigated, or averted.

The three national dangers I allude to, to state them very broadly, are—

- I. The political supremacy of the lower classes.
- II. The approaching industrial decline of England.
- III. The divorce of the Intelligence of the country from its Religion.

There exist, no doubt, many minor perils, but these are vital;—and of these the first is *political*, the second *economical*, the third *intellectual and moral*; and all of them may be termed *social* in a serious degree. In dealing with them I will endeavour most sedulously to state no facts or premises that are doubtful, and to draw no inferences that can be controverted; so that no question can arise as to my conclusions unless new elements or opposing influences are called into existence to overthrow the calculation.

I. If an orator or historian were to speak of "The Revolution of

* Walter Savage Landor's epitaph on the defeated Spanish Patriots; quoted in "St. Clement's Eve," by Sir Henry Taylor.

1867," few would understand what he meant ; and as soon as they did understand, nearly every one would charge him with extravagance and hyperbole. Yet in that year a transformation was effected in the political constitution of these islands, so complete and thorough that few revolutions in modern times have been more sweeping. But because it was wrought with customary legal forms—because the process was accompanied by no bloodshed, no violence, no disturbance even, and but small excitement—because there was no change of dynasty—and most of all, perhaps, because the transformation, though total, was gradual and not sudden, we have failed to recognize its revolutionary character. The medicine—or the poison—may be slow to operate ; but, once taken, the ultimate effect is certain ; and in this case there is no antidote known to the political Pharmacopœia.

The Revolution we speak of consists in this. The Reform Bill of 1867 takes the command of the representation out of the hands of the propertied classes, and puts it into the hands of the wage-receiving classes. It gives it over from the upper and middle ranks of the community to the lower ranks. It transfers electoral preponderance—that is, in fact, electoral supremacy—from property to proletarianism, from capital to labour. And it does this not one whit the less undeniably and irretrievably, in that it does it (thus far) only potentially and prospectively. It does it in virtue of three provisions—household suffrage in boroughs, household suffrage in counties, and vote by ballot,—the first and last are *faits accomplis* ; the second has been announced by the chiefs of both parties as forthcoming to complete the edifice. Now, in round numbers the population of this kingdom may be divided into *eight* millions of persons who hold realized property of some sort, and *twenty-four* millions of persons who hold no property, but subsist by the labour of their hands. These twenty-four millions—or the householders among them, who may be reckoned at one-fifth—have now votes, or will have very shortly, or may have when they please ; and they *can*, therefore, when they please outvote and overpower the householders among the eight millions, who may be reckoned at one-fourth. That is, to put it broadly, there are or may be, and soon will be, *five* millions poor electors against *two* millions of well-to-do electors ;—and each vote of one class counts for just as much as each vote of the other. It is idle to argue that the working classes will not pull together, nor the poor be thus in a mass pitted against the rich :—probably not yet ; possibly not as a rule ; almost certainly not except on class questions of a social character. But sometimes they will, and at any time they may ; and the broad indisputable fact remains, that the lower class of voters are far the most numerous, are preponderant in the proportion of five to two ; and that in consequence when they are all registered and whenever they choose to draw together, they will be despotic at the poll, and have

the command of the representation in the House of Commons. Now, the House of Commons, as we all know, is all but omnipotent.

But this is not all. These poorer voters may be not only preponderant, but supreme. They may name not only *three-fifths* of the members, but *the whole of them*. They may absolutely exclude those whom they outnumber at the polling booths from any share whatever in the representation. Nay, more; unless we have a supplementary and most decisively intelligent Reform Bill, they will assuredly do this. Only the "cumulative vote," or universal "three-cornered constituencies," or Mr. Hare's plan, can avert the probability of this extreme result. The operation of our unscientific and undiscerning system of representation enables the party which preponderates in any constituency, even by a minute fraction, to monopolize all the members; while it is only the extremely heterogeneous character of our electoral divisions (a characteristic which will not long survive unmodified) which prevents this anomalous and inequitable result from extending to the whole country. If we ever have equal and *similar* electoral districts, the barest majority of the nation may become not only *preponderant* in the House of Commons (which is right), but *omnipotent and absolute* (which would be iniquitous and monstrous). It is, therefore, always on the cards that the lower classes *might* not only overpower opposition and discussion, but absolutely *exclude* both.

We are warranted in calling this state of affairs "revolutionary"—not only because it is startling, but because it is altogether new; and this point demands special attention. We have had "Representative Institutions" for a score of generations. We have never had "Popular Representation," as Transatlantic and Continental nations understand it,—that is, *the representation of the numerical majority*—till now. We have inaugurated an entirely novel and untried experiment, in prognosticating the working and results of which the Past can be no guide whatever. The reform may have been just, may have been wise, may have been unavoidable—as to these questions opinions differ, and we need not discuss them. But there can be no difference as to the fact that the change is not a carrying out, a completion, a perfectionation of our former system, but a reversal of it;—that we have not "crowned the edifice," but rebuilt it in a different style and on a fresh foundation. It is curious that so undeniable a truth should have been so little realized or dwelt upon. So far as I know the only concise statement of it appeared in the "Quarterly Review" a couple of years ago:—

"Previous to 1832,—in those old times when England was so great and paramount a nation, when we were so proud of our institutions, when we were so exceptionally free,—Representation was not a reality in the sense in which we have made it so now. Classes were represented; property was represented; education was represented; guilds—i.e., industries were represented; but individuals, numbers, the masses of the

people were not. The House of Commons pictured and reproduced the nation in a sort of general and often faithful fashion,—that is, it shared and reflected the opinion of the important, motive, influential classes of the community; but popular representation, in the sense in which it is now understood and carried out,—in which Rousseau and Sièyes understood it; in which France and America understand it,—did not exist. It was prevented from existing by four things :—By the limited suffrage, which gave votes only to proprietors, leaseholders, burghers, freemen, and graduates; by close and rotten boroughs, which gave members to extinct towns, and refused them to thriving cities; by the influence of peers and landed proprietors, which practically placed the votes of the tenants at the disposal of their landlords; and by party management, which largely overrode individual preferences. That representative system, which we were so proud of, which answered so well in the past (illogical and bristling with anomalies as it was), which surrounding nations admired and envied, and fancied they were going to imitate, has been swept away. What we have installed now, under the same name, is something wholly different, something quite new, something as yet untried and problematic. It is no more the same thing, than Mr. John Smith the manufacturer is of the same family as Mr. Algernon Sydney, the extinct feudal gentleman, because he has purchased his estate and lives in his ancestral manor-house; nor can it be any more expected to act in the same way. In fine, we hitherto have lived under representative institutions *nominally* only,—that is, under such restraints, modifications, inconsistencies, almost denials, as made them yield most of their good and little of their evil operation. Other nations have lived under them *really*, in their bald and naked truthfulness, and we are now about to do the same. The ‘sham’—to speak broadly—did succeed to us on the whole wonderfully. Will the actuality succeed as well? We cannot tell, and have no desire to vaticinate; as yet we have only foreign analogies, always imperfect, to guide our conjecture. Certainly, unrestricted suffrage, thoroughly popular representation, cannot be said to have succeeded—indeed may be said to have deplorably failed—in France and the United States. During the Restoration, from 1815 to 1847, Parliamentary Government worked fairly in France: so it did in America up to about forty or fifty years ago; so it did in Switzerland till a generation since; so it does in Italy at present. But in all these cases, and up to these dates, they had kept clear of anything like Universal Suffrage. In France, under Louis XVIII. and Louis Philippe, the electors scarcely exceeded 250,000, and there were nearly 600,000 Government appointments to divide among them. In Italy, the franchise qualification is not high, but the entire constituent body scarcely reaches a quarter of a million. In Prussia, all men have votes, or nearly so; but there the thoroughly anti-democratic system of double election is in practice.”

Who, then, and what, are the classes to whom we have thus undeniably handed over electioneering preponderance—that is, the supreme political power in the State in ultimate resort? For, that those classes, the numerical majority in the country, do possess this power and preponderance *potentially*, and may possess it, and are nearly certain ere long to possess it *actually*, and are already assuming it *gradually*,* is not to be disguised by the fact that they have not

* We have no recent returns to guide us in determining the actual numbers of the wage-receiving classes already on the register, but the following comparison may afford some intimation. It would seem as if Mr. Disraeli's Reform Bill had more than doubled the number of electors, who now amount to 2,156,000, or about 40 per cent. of the adult males in the kingdom. The Reform Bill of 1832 only added 54 per

as yet fully realized or greedily taken up their inheritance. It is there waiting for them whenever they choose to qualify and register ; and their leaders will not be many years before they have stirred them up to do this. The numerical majority are henceforth virtually our masters ; will not *be*, but will nominate, sway, indoctrinate, or rather inoculate, our rulers ; and the numerical majority consist, and to all appearance will long consist, of the wage-receiving classes, of those who depend on weekly earnings, and live in an overwhelming proportion by the labour of their hands. Now, what will be in the main their party predilections, whether Tories or Liberals most possess or are most likely to win their support, is a question which concerns us little. The essential point at issue is whether they are fit, or can be made fit, to exercise righteously and wisely the responsible duties imposed upon them by the power which has been given to them. Without echoing for a moment—indeed, while repudiating with infinite disgust—the insincere flattery which has been heaped upon them by candidates of all colours, we may fairly admit that the working-classes of this country are on the whole more intelligent, more fair, more sober-minded, and, but for their drinking propensities, more respectable than those of most other lands. They are, we believe, sound at heart—they are not envious, and they are as a rule both energetic, industrious, and of an independent spirit. Properly trained, properly led, properly dealt with, we are satisfied they would make out and out the best Proletariat in the world. Our only charge against them in regard to our present topic is that, labouring with their hands from morning to night, and living from hand to mouth, they are not necessarily *very* poor or *very* ignorant, but necessarily the *most* ignorant as well as the poorest, because the least instructed and the least leisurely of all sections of the community.* They are not perhaps actually or always the worst off, but they often feel themselves to be so, and may easily be represented to themselves as being so. They are not, we suspect, the most discontented class ; but it is to their credit that they are not so, and there are not wanting orators and agitators who seek incessantly to make them so. At all events, they are the least richly provided with cent. in 30 years. The Reform Bill of 1867 has added upwards of 100 per cent. in five years.

ELECTORS IN ENGLAND AND WALES.

	1832-3.	1862-3.	1869.	1873.
Counties . . .	370,000	534,000	792,000	801,000
Boroughs . . .	285,000	478,000	1,203,000	1,356,000
Total . . .	655,000	1,012,000	1,995,000	2,157,000

Household suffrage for the counties will in time add probably half a million to the rural constituencies.

* "Any government that gives absolute preponderance to the many is hostile to intellect, for intellect is necessarily confined to the few. Now intellect is the most revengeful of all the elements of Society. It cares not what the materials through which it forces its way to its seat."—LORD LYTON, *Parisians*.

the good things of this life, and *inevitably* the most poorly endowed with political knowledge while the most amply endowed with political power. They are not a whit more selfish than other classes ; * they are not a whit less honest or probably less fair ; they are simply less educated, less sagacious, and less well-informed ; and, therefore, obviously less competent to decide political questions, to choose political guides, to wield political power. And they are all this from no fault that we can reproach them with, but from the nature of the case,—because from the cradle to the grave they have less leisure and fewer advantages for knowledge, reflection, and mental discipline.

No one can deny the strict accuracy of the statement. No one can be blind to the manifest dangers of the position. The science of government is never a simple one even in the best and easiest of times. In modern days, "Society"—"the State"—has become strangely, almost fearfully complex, influenced by a hundred causes, encompassed by a hundred perils, wrought upon by a hundred agencies—often slow in their operation, often hidden in their sources, often difficult of discovery even by the trained eye, often difficult of estimation even by the instructed mind. The welfare, even the safety, of a community like ours depends upon the thorough comprehension of a multitude of concurrent or conflicting influences, some economical, some moral, some legal, which would task any ability and

* The following were among the latest utterances of perhaps the wisest, fairest, and most candid Radical of our times—Mr. Grote : "I have outlived," he said, "three great illusions. First, I always held that if supreme power were held by the people, it would be exercised more righteously than when entrusted to one person or a few. But this I have now found to be a mistake. Secondly, I always maintained that Ireland might be made contented and loyal by governing her in the same way as England, and for that reason I constantly opposed, when in Parliament, the enactment of Coercion Bills, and all exceptional legislation in reference to the sister kingdom. But I grieve to say that I have now come to a different conclusion. Thirdly, I cherished the persuasion that as the people advanced in intelligence and material prosperity, they would esteem it a duty and a privilege to educate their own children, without invoking the assistance of the State or any other body. But this I find to be the greatest delusion of all, and I must add that the rich have done their best to instil into the people the notion that the education of their children belongs to others.

"I have outlived my faith in the efficacy of Republican government regarded as a check upon the vulgar passions of a majority in a nation, and I recognise the fact that supreme power lodged in their hands *may* be exercised quite as mischievously as by a despotic ruler like the First Napoleon. The conduct of the Northern States, in the late conflict with the Southern States, has led me to this conclusion, though it cost me much to avow it, even to myself.

"I have come to perceive that the choice between one man and another, among the English people, signifies less than I used formerly to think it did. Take a section of society, cut it through from top to bottom, and examine the composition of the successive layers. They are much alike throughout the scale. The opinions, all based upon the same social instincts : never upon a clear or enlightened perception of *general interests*. Every particular class pursuing its own, the result is, a universal struggle for the advantages accruing from *party* supremacy. The English mind is

any experience; years of discipline and study are barely sufficient for the work, as those feel most who have watched it closest; it demands, as we habitually recognize (in words at least), *the best wisdom* and the *best virtue* of the nation. How is this best wisdom and best virtue to be discerned, selected, and preferred, by the especially unthinking and uninformed? Grant that the masses will honestly desire to choose the best and the wisest men to rule them, by what test can they possibly discover them? by what instinct can they possibly appreciate them? The very depth of a true statesman's sagacity, the very forecast of a true statesman's vision, will alienate from him the sympathies of the average elector. We can all guess what would happen in war were the common soldiers to choose their generals. Yet government is a more complicated affair than war; and the common soldier has at least a professional training, which the proletarian householder has not.

But to stop at these general propositions would be to take a very inadequate and unimpressive view of the specific dangers which surround us. Let us come a little closer to the facts of the case. Our House of Commons is composed of a number of politicians eagerly competing for the suffrages of uninstructed and toiling men—mostly poor, sometimes suffering under a sense of wrong, often groaning and sinking under the burden of labour and care. These men understand nothing of the art of government, nothing of economic science, nothing of policy in general. But they have a lively sense of their own wants, and a strong feeling of their own grievances. They naturally wish to mend their own condition and redress what seem to be their wrongs; they wish this more vehemently than anything else; and they have no notion of not using their electoral power to achieve those objects; naturally, therefore, they will be prone to give their votes to those who engage to promote these objects. That is, their favoured candidates will as a rule be those who most fall in with their ideas, share or flatter their prejudices, promise to work for their interests. Now what are the objects which the working men, the wage-receiving classes, have notoriously and inevitably most at heart—must have most at heart—cannot for a moment be blamed for having most at heart? Clearly, higher wages, shorter hours, more power of dictating conditions of work, and less strictness in the interpretation of contracts;—and all these things *more or less directly through the instrumentality*

much of one pattern, take whatsoever class you will. The same favourite prejudices, amiable and otherwise; the same antipathies, coupled with ill-regulated, though benevolent efforts to eradicate human evils, are well-nigh universal: modified naturally, by instruction, among the highly educated few: but they hardly affect the course of out-of-doors sentiment. I believe, therefore, that the actual composition of Parliament represents with tolerable fidelity the British people. And it will never be better than it is, for a House of Commons cannot afford to be above its own constituencies, in intelligence, knowledge, or patriotism."

of legislation. They wish for two other things beside,—relief from all taxation which in any way increases the cost of living, and increase in those sorts of public expenditure which create a demand for their labour. Now, in all this there is no ground for reproach to them, but much ground for apprehending danger to the country. There is no ground for reproach to them, because it is inevitable that uneducated men should be more swayed by personal interests than by political considerations;* they understand, or fancy they understand, the one—they do not understand, and usually do not pretend or aspire to understand, the other; the first touch them very closely—the second only remotely and intermediately; indeed, the very highest species of training is required (a training at once intellectual and moral) to recognize in the first place that the interests of each class must be postponed to the general well-being of the community; in the second place, that these interests are in the end best served through the community being well organized and governed in the interests of all; and in the third place, that nearly all evils and grievances complained of are to be remedied, not by a Parliamentary decree that they shall not exist, but by careful and searching diagnosis, by a patient investigation of the often remote causes, economic or other, in which they have their source. The more uninstructed and unintelligent an electorate is, the more will it regard special and individual objects and interests in preference to questions of general policy; the less able will it be to perceive how general policy bears upon particular interests; the more prone will it be to attack evils and grievances in their symptoms rather than in their sources; and to insist on their immediate removal without any power of perceiving or any disposition to consider the secondary consequences, however mischievous, which may result from their removal. Now, the *average* intellectual training and capacity of our constituencies is lowering year by year, and must be lowering continuously, as larger and larger numbers of the poorer class of householders are placed upon the register; and it is impossible that the standard of representative intelligence should not lower also, though it may be more gradually and at a considerable interval.†

Higher wages, indeed, we do not suppose will be sought through direct legislative action: but shorter hours (which practically mean, or are designed to mean, higher wages) will be, and, as we all know, are so sought; and sought, too, without any perception of the

* "The difference between an arbitrary and a limited monarchy vanishes, when compared with the difference between one meal a day and three meals a day. It is a poor consolation to a man who has had no breakfast, and expects no supper, that the king does not possess a dispensing power, and that troops cannot be raised in time of peace without the consent of Parliament."—*Edinburgh Review*, June, 1827.

† I am not disposed to under-estimate the political education of our constituencies through the process of the electoral speeches made to them in such abundance by

inevitable consequence—viz., that the cost of production becomes enhanced as labour grows less productive; that the price of articles rises, and living becomes more expensive, as house-rent is swollen by combinations in the building trades, and by combinations among colliers, and so on. Power on the part of operatives to dictate conditions of work to their employers by threatened strikes and Trade Union regulations is already sought directly by legislative enactment and legislative repeal, with entire blindness to the remote effect of those measures in ultimately placing British industry at a disadvantage with that of other countries where similar interferences are not permitted. The mischief will be done blindly—in ignorance, not with ill intention; but when once done will be irreparable, and (as I intend to show in the next section) the result may be something nearer ruin than mere calamity. And how can it be expected that a Legislature preponderatingly selected by working men, or a Government appointed by that Legislature, will be firm in resisting the unwise demands or repressing the immoral violence and disorders of working men?—that is, in controlling the special errors and dangers into which the majority of their constituents, their masters and creators, are most prone to fall? The relief of the wage-receiving classes from taxation has already been inaugurated, and for many years has been steadily progressing; the tendency is not to be regretted, and we are by no means inclined to pronounce that as yet it has been pushed too far. The necessities of life have long been exempted from all fiscal contributions; taxes upon articles of general consumption, which may be termed the poor man's luxuries, such as coffee, tea, and sugar, have been repeatedly and largely reduced; and "a free breakfast-table," whenever achieved, will have completed his exemption. The liquor-tax will be the only one he will still be called upon to pay; and that is so far voluntary that he may pretty much regulate it for himself. The crusade against indirect taxation—the only taxation that *can* ever practically be levied on the wage-receiving classes*—in our judgment a thoughtless, inequitable, and pernicious crusade—is supported by too many respected names in the political world for its success not to be highly probable, to say the least;—and when a Legislature chosen in the main by working

their members or the candidates who seek their suffrages. Experienced politicians, I know, speak of the progress and influence of this species of instruction as astonishing and re-assuring. Still the fact remains that the classes brought under this kind of instruction as the suffrage lowers are the least able to profit by it, from want of previous educational preparation. The symptom, no doubt, is a hopeful set-off against gloomier prognostics; but it must be remembered that it is only the electioneering speeches of candidates decidedly above the average in wisdom, honesty, and independence, that can truly educate a constituency, and that the number of such candidates is likely to fall off year by year.

* Some fiscal authorities, we are aware, dream of levying a stamp-tax on wages;—but no employers of labour, or persons qualified by experience to form an opinion, will endorse the impracticable scheme.

men, shall have relieved their principal constituents from all contribution to the revenue, what prospect will there be of economy in the outlay of that revenue, which must be in so large a measure spent in the employment of labour? Taxation, levied exclusively on the rich, and expended mainly in subsidising the poor, is certain to be lavish and oppressive, when the classes who vote it and profit by it pay no portion of it—or human nature would not be what it is.

Again, to advert to questions more strictly political, what would be the prospects of our Indian Empire if ever the English masses began to interest themselves upon the subject, and to attempt to form, and fancy themselves competent to form, an opinion upon the score or two of difficult and complicated matters connected with that anomalous dependency which are constantly cropping up for decision,—each requiring thorough acquaintance with the peculiar condition, surroundings, and characteristics of a wholly alien race? Is it not a daily matter for congratulation on the part of every experienced and qualified statesman, with scarcely an exception, that Parliament has hitherto taken so rare and so faint an interest in Indian questions—that their management has virtually been left to men who can appreciate the marvellously delicate handling they require? Even with the actual House of Commons, if every member believed himself as competent to help to govern India as he does to govern Ireland, and made it as habitual a topic for discussion and for party controversy, how long could we retain our hold, or maintain there that “Roman Peace,” which, amid all our mistakes, has proved so signal a blessing to the heterogeneous nations and classes which we overrule? But if that House of Commons were elected by still more ignorant constituencies—constituencies unaware of their ignorance precisely in proportion to its totality—and peculiarly liable, in consequence of that very ignorance, to be excited and misled by any fanatical declaimer, would not the extra difficulty, the extra cost, the extra danger, become something passing calculation? Or, in the domain of foreign policy, if we had a House of Commons dependent on the suffrages and reflecting the sentiments of uneducated and therefore susceptible millions, of good impulses probably, but of the most superficial views, and utterly unskilled to comprehend hidden connections or foresee secondary results—without the first rudiments of absolutely indispensable information,—how long could we stave off Continental or Transatlantic hostilities, or those “strained relations” which are almost as noxious as actual war? Fancy a Foreign Policy, dictated by an ignorant democracy—usually almost asleep, sometimes waking frantically—paying no taxes, yet disposing of a boundless revenue—and inspired with an absolute conviction alike in the righteousness of their cause and the supremacy of their strength!

In writing as we have done, have we mis-stated or over-stated a single fact, or drawn a single questionable inference? Are not the

wage-receiving classes *potentially* already, and about to be *actually*, ere long, the majority of the electoral body? Must they not ultimately—can they not whenever they please—predominate at the Poll in the ratio of nearly five to two? Must they not—however good, however improved, however well-intentioned as a rule—always, from the necessity of the case, constitute the *least* instructed, the *least* intelligent, the *least* leisurely, if not also the least contented portion of the community; and therefore *the least competent to judge political questions or to choose political guides and rulers*? Are not foreign questions and Indian questions almost absolutely and inevitably out of their range of capacity—though alas! it may be feared, not out of their reach of interference? Are they not certain, in the main, to be swayed rather by urgent class interests than by wide principles of public policy? Must not a general lowering and vulgarizing in the maxims of our legislation and administration, and in the character of our statesmen and politicians, be the almost inevitable result? Is it not consonant to all experience that, having preponderating power, they, like others, will use and direct that power towards the promotion of their own fancied interests rather than towards the general good—which, indeed, they will not be qualified thoroughly to estimate? Is it not more than probable that in pursuit of this end, they will from sheer want of knowledge, foresight, and intelligence, fall into economical and political blunders which may be fatal to their own cause, though the fatality may not be discovered in time? And may it not be predicted with nearly absolute confidence that, having on various plausible pleas—plausible enough really to deceive and satisfy willing minds—relieved their own class from all fiscal burdens, the public expenditure, nothing of which will be drawn from them, and most of which will be divided among them, will undergo marvellous inflation? Men of property will pay the taxes, while labouring men will vote them and determine how they shall be spent. It appears to me that not one of these questions can be answered in the negative;—and that the sum-total is somewhat appalling.

“But,” it will be replied, “all these gloomy prognostics assume that we are dealing with an uneducated population, and our people will soon be no longer so. We are taking Mr. Lowe’s advice, and have set to work in earnest to ‘educate our masters.’” Build no sanguine hopes of escaping the Rock ahead on a delusion such as this. Instruction, such as we are giving, can do little, and comes too late. As has been truly said:—

“We have given the masses power *suddenly*; we are giving them education only *by slow degrees*. We have given them *much* power: we can give them only *little* education. Nay: we give them *supreme* power, with at best a most *superficial* and probably *transient* education. Finally, we give the power to the *existing* generation; we propose to educate the *next*. We

give the votes on which are to turn, and may at any crisis turn, the destinies of the country, to the untrained adults between twenty-one and seventy-five years of age; we *intend to train* in the capacity to know how to vote the children between six and fourteen. And we plume ourselves upon being a just and sagacious, and above all a 'practical,' nation!

"But this is not all. *Can we 'educate our masters?'* What sort and amount of that education which alone could fit them to understand political questions, to decide in political difficulties, to choose between political candidates and guides, can we bestow upon them? The great mass of them must go forth to earn their own living at the age of thirteen or fourteen, and toil hard ever after. The mere rudiments of knowledge are, therefore, all that can be drilled into them at any school. The larger number will have learned to read and write imperfectly, and will soon lose even that imperfect acquisition. A certain percentage will learn to write well, to read with fluency and ease, to take pleasure in what they have acquired, and will probably retain much of it, and take what opportunities fall in their way afterwards of adding to it. But is that an education which will render them competent to exercise the electoral franchise with discretion; to distinguish the demagogue from the statesman; to detect the nonsense of the popular fallacy, and the insincerity or ignorance of the fluent tribune; to turn away from the plausible socialistic delusion, and pounce upon and hold fast the dry economic truth? In short, is it possible—by any kind or degree of school training which is within reach or can be brought within reach of those who, from the age of fourteen onward, must be striving toilsomely for their daily bread—to make them as competent to choose good representatives, to support wise rulers, and to insist upon sound measures of legislation and administration, as those from whom you have taken the prepotent voice in these matters?"

It is simply discreditable to deceive ourselves as we are trying to do in this great matter, and it may be fatal. It may be at once admitted that the style and standard of the education given at our primary schools—the only ones attended, or that probably as a rule ever will be attended, by the great body of the labouring class—is improving slowly year by year. It is confidently hoped that ere long nearly the entire population will be passed through those schools. But when that is done, what does it all mean? The facts on which our attention has to be fixed are these. *First*, that above two-thirds of the children "leave school at ten years of age, and learn nothing more as long as they live;" *secondly*, that, as a general fact, those alone who remain till thirteen or fourteen, and reach "the fourth standard," retain in after life what they have acquired, and that the number who remain thus long and reach this standard are only an insignificant fraction of the whole;* and *thirdly*, that the "sixth

* The figures for 1872 are these for England and Wales, in primary schools:

Total numbers of children between 6 and 13 years, or 8 and 15 years (about)	3,600,000, of whom belonging to the classes in question probably	2,700,000
Number in average attendance at school		1,336,000
" examined		661,600
" examined in Standards IV. to VI.		118,800
" passed		68,800

standard," which scarcely any attain, is the lowest which embodies the degree or character of education requisite to qualify its recipient to continue his training for himself in after life, or to judge fitly of the political considerations which come before a Parliamentary elector. "It is obvious" (writes one Inspector—and we believe all his colleagues would agree with him)—"that unless a child can show an amount of knowledge something like the higher standards of the Code, he holds out very meagre promise that any permanent effect will follow from his school career." Mr. Mundella told the House of Commons in March, 1870, "that the English sixth standard (Revised Code), *our highest*, is below the lowest Saxon, Prussian, or Swiss standard, even for country schools. We had never yet passed 20,000 in a population of 20,000,000 to the sixth standard in one year; whereas Old Prussia (without her recent aggrandisement) passed nearly 380,000 every year." Dr. Lyon Playfair might well say:—"What we call education in the inspected schools of England is the mere seed used in other countries; but with us that seed, as soon as it is sprouted, withers and dries up, and never grows into a crop for the feeding of the nation."* Looking, therefore, at all these things, is it not deliberate self-deception to hope that our primary schools can ever succeed in giving to the country anything in the remotest degree approaching to an educated electorate, unless the standard of instruction should be enormously raised, the whole class of teachers enormously improved, the period during which and the age up to which children remain at school greatly changed, and provision made for their continuance under instruction in later life? Who can expect that in a country so populous, so hard-working, and so hard-pressed as ours, children generally can be kept at school till the age of fourteen? And who can hope to make them qualified for the supreme political power we have conferred upon them unless they are? An educational franchise adopted years ago might have solved the problem and given us what we want in time. But it is too late for that now.

A very plausible argument is, however, often urged against the validity of the above reasoning. "Granted," it is said, "that the education of the electoral masses not only is at present very defective, but in comparison with that of the ranks higher in the social scale must always remain so;—granted that it can never become such as in any great degree really to qualify them to pronounce on

That is, of the total number who ought to have been at school, only 50 per cent. were actually under instruction; of the number instructed only 50 per cent. were tested at all; and of all at school only about 5 per cent. were found to have received an education really worthy of the name, and such as they were likely to retain.

* "The Struggle for National Education," by John Morley, *passim*. Reports of the Privy Council, 1873.

general questions of policy, to decide the more difficult social and economic problems, or even to choose the best means to good ends ; still it does not necessarily follow that they may not be fully qualified to exercise electoral functions, or that mischief will ensue in consequence of their being entrusted with electoral power in preponderating measure. What they have to determine at a general election is not this or that political or legislative proceeding, this or that social or economic principle or line of action, but which candidate on the whole they most esteem and can most confidently trust ; and a very moderate amount of education will enable them to do this. They have to judge men—not measures ; and for this mere ordinary sagacity and observation, mere native shrewdness, mere common sense in a word, is all that is required. Nay, more : it may even be argued that, in such numerous popular constituencies as ours, that sort of bucolic ignorance and conscious incapacity which will induce them and oblige them to trust blindly to their superiors in political matters will be far safer than such imperfect and superficial education as alone we can give them, and which would merely delude them into a pretension of judging for themselves. The old original conception of the electoral function was a selection of wise and good representatives, legislators, senators, rulers—not a *plebiscitum* on principles of policy or particular enactments ; and the more we can return to that original conception the better. Let the people fix upon honest leaders, qualified candidates, men they know and can trust, in short, and all will be well. This, working-men electors can do readily enough without ever reaching the sixth standard, and even without remembering anything they learned at school."

Very well : there is much truth in these considerations, though I contest their relevancy here. I may, perhaps, request reference to a previous argument of mine printed in this REVIEW,* where I pointed out as one of the great evils accompanying the Democratic form of Government, that large popular constituencies can never or very seldom think or decide for themselves in political matters, but will always as a fact get the thinking done for them, and the choice virtually taken out of their hands ; that the more numerous the electoral body, the more wide and despotic will be the influence of wire-pullers and electioneers ; and that democracies have a natural and irresistible tendency to become oligarchies—and oligarchies of the worst sort. But none the less is there an increasing tendency to make elections turn, not upon the choice of particular men, but upon the popularity of special measures. The thinking, it is true, is still done by the few for the many ; but the few labour to excite the many in behalf of their especial crotchets, and sometimes with ominous success ; so much so that we may live to see the House of Commons

* "The Mistake of Honest Democrats," CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, January, 1871.

degenerate from an Assembly consisting of political *parties* divided from each other by lines of general policy distinct in tone, if not in principle, into an assemblage of *cliques*, representing each an interest, a fanaticism, a social aim. The mischief has not yet gone deep, but the symptoms of it are plain enough to augur danger in the future. To say nothing of the uncomfortable electoral influence exercised by the Railway interest, and the Brewing or Publican interest, we have had electioneering wire-pullers of incredible dogmatism and activity insisting that no candidate shall be returned, whatever his political creed, who will not vote for the Permissive Bill; for the Repeal of the Contagious Diseases Act; for the Repeal of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, or the Masters' and Servants' Act, or the Mine Regulation Act; for Home Rule; for the Repeal of all Indirect Taxes; for the abolition of the great Direct Tax; for the establishment of secular education, and so on:—all in turn endeavouring to hold the balance of parties, to force their own pet fanaticism or interest upon the country, and to make the election turn, not on the welfare of the Empire, but upon the success of their peculiar crotchet. Most of these men are honest, all of them are earnest, the aims of some of them are unquestionably important; but they are all men of *glimpses*, not men of *views*. They are fanatics, not statesmen, and scarcely politicians; and all alike appeal to the ignorance and excitability of an untrained electorate on behalf of schemes and doctrines which would be laid before the sober sense of an educated electorate in vain. All alike—which is our present point—seek to make the election turn, not on the choice of competent men, but on preference for particular opinions or a special question. They alike insist on the constituency forming a judgment on a given topic, or accepting *their* judgment.

But, further, we entirely dispute the main position of our objectors—namely, that no education, nothing beyond average common sense—is necessary to qualify the mass of electors to follow good leaders and choose good representatives. Possibly, if they were let alone, ordinary sense and feeling might suffice. Possibly they would then choose, in preference to ranting demagogues, the landlords who had been considerate and beneficent, the employers who had been just and kindly, the candidates favoured by the clergyman who had tended them in sickness and comforted them in sorrow, the neighbour who had helped them in trouble or advised them when in perplexity, or whom they had known for years as a model of wise and steady philanthropy. But they never are let alone. There are always at hand, now that they have become a power in the State, agitators, demagogues, and leaders who desire to wield that power for their own purposes, and to indoctrinate the electors in their own views; who persuade them (too truly, often) that they are ill-off, and (often very falsely) that they (these advisers) will make them better off;—

that their landlords are selfish and exact too high a rent; that their employers are grasping and oppressive, and pay them too scanty wages; that their clergyman is a deceiver, in league with their superiors, who humbugs them about a future world to keep them quiet in this, and that their benevolent neighbours do not do half enough for them, and so on. There may be truth enough in these representations to hide from the ignorant hearers the preponderance of falsehood they contain; this at all events is certain, that more than ordinary moral training, besides some disciplined intelligence, is required to enable an elector to prefer the man who preaches unwelcome wisdom to the man who tickles his ears with alluring nonsense—the man who seeks to moderate his hopes to the man who labours to excite and flatter them—the man who labours to instil content to the man who tries to stimulate ambition—the moralist who points to temperance and thrift as the ways to competence, rather than the orator who expatiates on the easier and more attractive path of higher earnings and more liberal allowances. It is so easy to deceive those who have never been taught to reason, discriminate, or sift; who do not and cannot know, in five cases out of six, which of the statements confidently told them are true and which are false, nor which of the arguments are valid and which are simply futile and shallow. We fully admit that the result we foresee has not yet appeared in our Parliamentary elections; that few bad men have been chosen, and that few fallacious or dangerous cries have succeeded at the hustings. But this is because the uneducated portion of the constituencies are as yet in a minority on the register. If we wish to realise to ourselves how easily the working classes are misguided in their choice of leaders, and how much harm they do suffer and might inflict in consequence, we have only to study the recent history of Trade Union action; bearing in mind, as we study, that here—if ever—we are dealing with subjects which working men might be expected to understand, and with leaders whom they ought to be able to see through.

It may be worth while to notice here a slow and subtle change in the class of members on whom the choice of popular constituencies has a tendency to fall, which dates probably from the first Reform Bill, but which has become more marked with every fresh extension of the franchise, and which bids fair to influence the constitution and character of the House of Commons in a direction little suspected at the outset. It seems probable that our various democratic moves may produce effects the very reverse of democratic, opening wider and wider the doors of political life to rank and wealth, especially to hereditary wealth, and closing them more and more to mere talent when unsupported by these adventitious aids. Previous to 1832 the chiefs of both the great parties in the State watched eagerly for dawning genius at the Universities and elsewhere, promptly encouraged and enlisted in the service of the State young men of

and capacity, introduced them into Parliament by means of and thus gave them an opportunity at once of showing their powers, as well as of learning betimes the administration. When once they had won their spurs in the field, and publicly justified the expectations formed of them, when once they became known to the electorate and to the public in general, it was comparatively easy for them to maintain their position as tried politicians and to obtain seats for open and populous constituencies. Now, youthful ambition, if without wealth or high connection, finds no such opening to a coveted career. Counties and boroughs look out for tried and known candidates, and these poor men of capacity and promise cannot get a trial and have no means of making themselves known. If they inherit great wealth, constituencies will often choose them for their fathers' sake; if they are scions of noble families they can be brought forward and pushed on by the influence of their connections. Now, unendowed, impoverished, struggling ability is essentially democratic in its temper, and generally in its aims;—yet it is precisely this unendowed ability which is being elbowed out of public life in England *in limine*, by the secondary and unanticipated operation of the lowering of the electoral franchise. But this is not all. There is an increasing tendency in the larger cities and the more populous boroughs to prefer candidates of local reputation, who have become favourites with their fellow-citizens either from the respect due to their character or for services rendered to the town. These are often men of wealth, of sense, of ability, and richly deserve the distinction awarded to them. But they are nearly always, by the necessity of the case, past middle life;—they have *acquired* their local influence, not inherited it,—and influence of this sort is only acquired by the steady toil of years;—they have been trained to business, not to politics or to administration, and it is too late for them, in the vast majority of cases, to go to school in a new profession. Moreover, they are as a rule, and almost *ex vi termini*, men of regular and quiet habits, and a change at the age of fifty and upwards from these habits to the late hours and exciting atmosphere of the House of Commons is fatal to them.* Occasionally, no doubt, a few men of this description, such as Mr. Forster, Mr. Stansfeld, and Mr. W. H. Smith, gain their position while still in the prime of life, and not too stiff to work in official harness; but these are exceptions, and political training is not easily begun even at the age when they entered the House of Commons. Mr. Goschen sat for London while still a young man; but his firm ranked very high among the mer-

* The majority of these men are Liberals, for usually the strength of the Liberal party lies in commercial and manufacturing constituencies. In the last session it is said the Liberals lost *thirty-nine* members by death, and the Conservatives only *sixteen*. The average age of the members for London, Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, Leeds, Bradford, Edinburgh, Bristol, and Sheffield, is at present *fifty-nine* years.

chants of the City for wealth and reputation, and the City is not precisely a popular constituency.

Now the effect of these several influences, it would appear, must almost certainly be in the end that, whatever section of the community preponderate at the poll, whoever may be "the governing classes," the actual members of the Government, the Parliamentary Rulers of the country, will become more and more the men of *inherited* rank or wealth, members in some sort of the aristocracy in short. It has not been so hitherto, I fully admit; but the indications that it will be hereafter would appear to be unmistakable.*

Perhaps we may even go a step further, and predict that a larger proportion than hitherto of Ministers, especially of Cabinet Ministers, will in future be Members of the Upper House. Already it is thought by some that the preponderance of political ability, of trained political ability at least, even of political wisdom and sagacity perhaps, lies with the House of Lords. The active Members of that House gain their education in the Commons; they are constantly recruited from the Commons and often from the *élite* of the Commons; they start in public life with vast advantages, and they start as a rule much earlier. But whatever may be the case relatively, we should be disposed to predict that in time, and no long time, the positive average capacity, the average political experience of the Upper House will increase while that of the Lower House will decline. Probably even the average age of the Commons will increase till it passes that of the Lords—of the *Senators* par excellence.† In any case the practical *working* rulers and administrators of the country will be chosen more and more from those who begin their public life from a vantage ground—from the aristocracy or the plutocracy in short. It is impossible that a combination of influences such as these should not largely modify the operation of our political system, and perhaps even go some way to counteract the menacing dangers which it is the object of this Paper to point out.

Many, I am aware,—especially "rurals," who take their ideas from the mental atmosphere that prevails about their ordinary residences—are inclined to make light of all timid or gloomy auguries, trusting to the *power of Property*, and the respect that

* The new House of Commons contains 149 members belonging to or immediately connected with the aristocracy, and we believe more millionaires or sons of millionaires than any preceding House.

† It is the impression of experienced eyes that the present House looks decidedly younger than its predecessor; which, as it may be regarded as a *reactionary* House, is a confirmation of this notion. The actual figures bearing on this subject are as follows:—

Average age of present House of Commons	. . .	48½ years.
" " late " "	50½ "
" " House of Lords in 1874	54½ "

hitherto has always been paid to men of property in England. No doubt the strength derived from vast possessions is still great in this country. It is upheld partly by mere snobbism, partly by a well-grounded conviction that, somehow, wealth has extraordinary facilities in general for obtaining what it wishes, which poverty has not, partly from undefined but still very influential sentiments which have descended to us from the feudal times. Property, it is fancied, in the future as in the past will overawe voters and will guide, or command votes. As long as property is safe from attack, political power in the hands of poverty, it is thought, need not be feared. I believe this to be a perilous delusion, though, looking merely at the outside and surface of affairs, I am not surprised at its being so confidently entertained. No doubt the sacredness of the rights of property is still one of the strongest sentiments of Englishmen. No doubt property has still vast influence, regular and irregular, legitimate and illegitimate, direct and circuitous, over those who have it not. No doubt any direct, distinct, and avowed attack upon the rights of property would be promptly and easily defeated; but rights may be undermined as well as assaulted in front, and there is sure to be much sapping of foundations before any face attack is ventured on. In a fair fight, unquestionably, the Propertied Classes *versus* the Proletariat would have a quick victory now:—they will have an easy victory, if they open their eyes and close their ranks in time. But will they do this, and are they doing it? The sapping and mining process has been already commenced, in practice as well as in theoretical teaching, and the full scope of neither has yet been fully comprehended. This theoretical teaching may not be unsound, and it certainly is plausible; the practical action as yet may have done no harm. But the work is begun: the influence is in operation. Railways have established the doctrine that a man's property, especially landed property, may be forcibly taken from him for public objects. Exemption of small incomes is the thin edge of the wedge—the line by which a graduated income-tax is first approached. The clamour, supported by many financiers and by some arguments not wholly bad, for abolishing indirect taxation, and virtually placing all fiscal burdens upon realised property, is another ominous indication. The claims put forward by J. S. Mill, for the confiscation of the "unearned increment" of land, to the coffers of the State, is a movement in the same direction more serious still. The entirely new and very decided provisions of the Irish Land Bill (their justice or wisdom I do not now discuss) gave up the entire *principle* of the sacredness of property, and may be said to have conceded and canonised the doctrine (possibly a true one) that *all* property may be confiscated, if only a strong case, or an equally strong case, can be made out in favour of the scheme. Yet all these things were done in the green tree, before Household Suffrage was enthroned, or at least before it had fairly grasped its

sceptre. But why dwell on these things? Why do we always forget that, *potentially* if not actually, the power of Property, the rights of property, the sacredness of property, *have been given away already?* Do not the Poor Laws virtually *give to the Poor a first mortgage on all the property of the Rich?* And how will it fare with us when the masses—preponderating at the poll, selecting the House of Commons, swaying the Lawyers, dictating the laws, nominating the rulers—shall be in a position to determine how the Poor Laws shall be administered?

All these are extreme results, it will be said, wholly speculative, monstrous and impossible. I admit that they are extreme, but they are logical. They are improbable, but by no means impossible. I do not anticipate their realization; on the contrary, I feel sanguine hope that they will be averted. But I am sure of this, that logical consequences from causes already put in action will be realized, and will not be averted, unless some modifying and counteracting agencies of adequate cogency are brought to bear, and brought to bear in time.

I seem to see the quarter whence salvation from the dangers I have indicated is to come—if it come at all. It is not difficult to point out the counteracting influences and agencies to which we must appeal. It may be very difficult to get those agencies to work, and to work with sufficient energy, and to work widely enough, and to work before it is too late. The power of the masses and their preponderance on the electoral register are augmenting annually and rapidly; the social and moral changes to which we have to trust to make them exercise that preponderant power for the public good, march at a fearfully slow pace in comparison. The inertia of all existing things is almost incalculable. Still this inertia, if a difficulty, is also a source of safety. If the masses are slow to be elevated, institutions are also slow to be upset or undermined. The late general election, not only in its main results, but in its detailed features, is full of hope and promise. It has shown that the country is still sound at heart; that the *instincts* of the people—however inarticulate their utterances, however confused their reasoning, however mixed their elements—are on the whole healthy. It has, by inaugurating (for it inaugurated rather than established) the operation of the ballot, broken the neck of two tyrannies, far more onerous and mischievous than the special tyranny against which it was originally directed—the tyranny of Party and the tyranny of Trades Unions. Men have been able to give expression to their honest feelings and convictions without dread of being reproached, by their associates or punished by their fellow workmen. Unskilled labourers, who are a large majority, have caught a welcome glimpse of possible emancipation from the cruel oppression of skilled and organized minorities, who, at their caprice, or for their imagined interests, so

often deprived them of employment, but rarely contributed to their maintenance. More than all, by canvassing, public meetings, and electioneering gatherings, the election has advanced the political education of the constituencies to a degree which those most qualified to judge declare is most encouraging, and which almost seems to indicate that, if candidates and members do their duty with courage and capacity, a vast amount of enlightenment and instruction may be disseminated even among those who have never known the benefits of school.

For the future, our main security will be in the *wider diffusion of Property*, and in all such measures as will facilitate this result. With the possession of property will come Conservative instincts and disinclination for rash and reckless schemes. It is not in itself a political education, but it forms an excellent basis for it. Peasant-Proprietorship, held out as an economic panacea, appears to me (as I have elsewhere argued at length*) to involve a distinct fallacy. But where it arises naturally, and not as an artificial product of legislation directed to a special end, it may be, and usually will be, a political and social influence for good. We trust much, therefore, to the rural population becoming *Proprietors*, and to the urban population becoming *Capitalists*. And it is to be hoped that the two processes may go on *pari passu*, so as to avoid the mischief so salient in France—severance and class hostility, as well as utter discrepancy of ideas and temperaments, between town and country, between citizens and cultivators. Now, is this process (the acquisition of property by our labouring classes) going on? What are its prospects? And how best can it be hastened and secured? It will be seen that the outlook, though not exactly bright, can scarcely be considered as discouraging.† We give here the merest summary of the facts, the details of which may be sought in the writings referred to below.

The agricultural population present obviously the greatest difficulty. For them to become proprietors without the assistance, without indeed the continued countenance and forbearance, of land-owners, would seem nearly impossible. They are scattered, and cannot readily combine, like town artisans, for any purpose that requires the co-operation of numbers to work it out. They are sparsely strewed over the country; they must live near their work, mostly on their employer's farms, and therefore cannot readily profit by building societies or similar institutions. They cannot (even if they

* "Essays on Political and Social Science—'Laing's Peasant Proprietorship.'"

† Fuller elucidation of the subject may be found in the *Quarterly Review*, No. 263: "Proletariat on a Wrong Scent."—*Edinburgh Review*, No. 281: "Savings of the People."—*Fortnightly Review*, Feb. 1874: "Prospects of Co-operation," by Henry Fawcett.—"Political Problems," by W. R. Greg.—"Trade Unions and Partnerships," p. 132.—"Agricultural Labour," by Sir Baldwin Leighton, Bart.

have saved the means) buy land in small lots, surrounding or adjacent to their own cottages, unless their masters or the large proprietors in the neighbourhood are willing, as a kindness and with the patriotic view of raising their labourers in the social scale, to sell them such small lots out of their own estate. Nor unfortunately is there any security that, if every cottager had given to him, or had purchased, an acre or a couple of acres near his own dwelling, he would retain it for a single generation, or for more than a few years, unless prevented from selling it by law or by contract; for, land being limited and greatly coveted, rich men will always be found ready to offer him twice or ten times its actual *value* for his small possession.* But there is no reason why wealthy and enlightened landowners should not do this great thing for the peasants on their property; nor why others, less rich and enlightened now, should not ere long follow their example. Still less why adequate allotments should not be awarded to every cottage, on the careful and judicious plan expounded in Sir Baldwin Leighton's pamphlet, and tested by his experience. Or why other benevolent and sagacious gentlemen should not try the scheme essayed by Mr. Brand (the Speaker of the House of Commons) of making his labourers virtually partners in the profits of his farm. Or why the analogous experiments† at Assington and else-

* "When you have given the peasant his acre, or his five acres, or his ten, *how are you to secure that he shall retain it?* Short of a jubilee year like that which the Israelitish legislator is said to have enacted—short of declaring this peasant's farm inalienable, sacred from any claim, untouchable for any debt, unforfeitable for any negligence, misuse, or drunken incapacity, indivisible among any heirs—how is he to keep it? We once had a race of small proprietors in certain counties of England. They have all died out, drunk themselves out, been bought out. When common lands have been inclosed, what has always become of the few acres allotted in actual property to the commoners adjoining? In every case they have been sold to tempting bidders or forfeited for debts. Why shut our eyes to the fact that in densely-peopled countries land (like jewels) becomes a luxury only attainable to, or retainable by, the rich; it can only be purchased or possessed by those who have spare means, and can afford themselves a superfluity. The rich man can afford to be satisfied with 2 per cent. for his money (and land rarely yields more); the poor man must have 5 or 10 per cent. The peasant has inherited a farm worth £100 in fee simple, or he has given £100 for it, or a land society has enabled him to pay £100 by difficult instalments. He is proud of it, and attached to it. But a neighbouring proprietor, or a retired tradesman who wants a villa and a garden, offers him £250, £350, £500, for it—is he likely to refuse the offer? Ought he to refuse? Men will always be at hand to give him for his acres more than they are worth: they want them for pleasure, not for profit. They desire them, as they desire jewels, for fashion, for beauty, not caring the least for the return they yield. Five hundred pounds an acre to the millionaire is nothing—to the peasant owner, it is wealth. Therefore, we say that, create as many peasant properties as you please, they will all be swallowed up in a few years by the natural process of sale—unless either peasants become fewer and better paid, and possessed therefore of a superfluity, able to afford themselves a luxury, and an *ostensibly bad or inferior investment*—or unless you actually forbid the sale of such properties:—that is, add a new and more stringent restriction to those which these very enthusiasts are seeking to remove—tie up land in a stricter settlement than any of those against which their clamour is just now so righteously directed."

† Sir Baldwin Leighton, p. 15.

where of co-operative farming should not be introduced on a more extensive scale. Since it is certain that a County Household Suffrage will shortly make the majority of peasants voters, and since the ballot will make them independent voters, it is plainly the interest of every landlord as of every farmer, to raise and educate his labourers as well as to conciliate and attach them. Small allotments, small properties even, would not render the men independent of wages; while most assuredly they would render their feelings more friendly, and in time also their labour more intelligent and therefore more efficient. And the comfort of a labourer's position can be so largely affected by the goodwill of his employer in a score of ways, that wide-spread alienation or marked success of Union leaders could scarcely exist in any district where every peasant has fair wages and his rood or two of land, either in occupation or in fee. We have no more doubt that it would be a wise benevolence on the part of landowners to secure these advantages to every cottager on their estate, than we have that these cottagers, without such sagacious and kindly aid, can never secure them for themselves. But on the whole there is a good deal to warrant hopes of a great improvement in the agricultural labourer's* position; migration and emigration are fast becoming familiar ideas to him, and wages are irresistibly rising in consequence; frugality in the expenditure of those earnings he has already learned; and a vote, with the shield of the ballot, will make it the interest of his employer and his landlord to befriend him.

As regards the skilled or half-skilled artisans, the case is far clearer. The acquisition of property, the accumulation of capital, is already in their power, and legislation has but few further facilities to give or obstacles to remove. Their earnings are now so large that only soberer habits and sounder sense are needed to make them independent capitalists in less than half a lifetime. The following passage places the matter in a clear light.

"Among the colliers of South Wales, for example, a man can earn 6s., and even 8s. a day, and even more in special cases. The family income, therefore, cannot be estimated at less than 3*l.* a week, or, say, 150*l.* per annum. If it were not for the exhausting, unnecessary, and (as will presently be seen) noxious drafts made upon the means of these people by the Union funds—perhaps even *with* this drawback,—a man might easily lay by 50*l.* a year, and live in comfort on the remainder. A skilled operative in various branches of the iron trade can earn also 3*l.* a week, with the aid of an assistant (often his own son), to whom he pays 10*s.* or 15*s.* In the cotton trade, the more skilful and industrious hands can often earn 30*s.* or 40*s.* a week; and, as three or four of a family are often employed, their aggregate income often reaches 50*s.* or 60*s.* or more. And so on. Now in all these cases—and, though we do not say they are *average* specimens, they are assuredly very frequent and widely attainable ones—the workman might in ten years have 500*l.* in the bank; and twenty such men, combining their savings, would be able to commence business or to join other

* Sir Baldwin Leighton, p. 15.

industrials with a capital of 10,000*l.*, and a credit, owing to their character and their funds, which would readily command 5000*l.* more at least. It is, therefore obviously in the power of industrious, steady, skilful, and frugal workmen to become capitalists before middle age; and it is their own fault if they do not.

"So much for direct proof. Now for still more irrefragable and convincing circumstantial evidence. We have seen what operatives might save. We will now show what they do waste. The annual expenditure of the population of the United Kingdom in fermented liquors and tobacco exceeds 100,000,000*l.*; that in beer and spirits only reaches 75,000,000*l.* In England alone, the consumption of intoxicating liquors would allow an expenditure of 10*l.* 15*s.* 6*d.* to each adult male. Now, according to the best estimates that can be formed, the expenditure of the working classes alone in drinking and smoking is not far from 60,000,000*l.*—of which 40,000,000*l.* is mere extravagance and excess. Every year, therefore, the working classes have it in their power to become capitalists (*simply by saving wasteful and pernicious expenditure*) to an extent which would enable them to start at least 500 cotton mills, or coal mines or iron works, *on their own account*, or to purchase at least 500,000 acres, and so set up 50,000 families each with a nice little estate of their own of ten acres, in fee simple. No one can dispute the facts. No one can deny the inference. After this, what must we think of the sense or honesty or morality of the Proletaires who wish to confiscate the land or the capital of others, or of the leaders who would persuade them it would be right and wise to do so? Were we not warranted in saying that the fate and future of the working classes, their salvation or their ruin, lie in their own hands,—and in no others?"—*Proletariat on a False Scent.*

This shows what might be done. The papers to which we have referred give us some indication of what has been done. Already the savings of the operatives, invested in Building societies, Friendly societies, Co-operative stores and industries, amount to many millions, besides the accumulations in Savings' banks.* The Quarterly Reviewer shows that, under the present condition of the retail trade, the working classes as a rule pay at least 10 per cent. more for the articles they consume than they would do under a sounder system; and Professor Fawcett gives excellent reasons for estimating this loss at nearer 20 per cent. Messrs. Chambers (than whom there are few higher authorities in these matters) estimate what they call the mis-expenditure of the working classes at a total of upwards of *one-third* of their income, or not less than a *hundred millions* annually.† If then, taking the data furnished by the sources already referred to, we add together the sums which the working classes actually do save, the sums which they waste in noxious or excessive indulgences, the sums lost by unskilful purchasing and housekeeping, and in unsafe and unprofitable investments, their power under wiser auspices of

* *Savings' Banks* £60,000,000, much in the hands of working men; *how much* we do not know. *Co-operative undertakings*, capital invested £7,000,000. *Friendly Societies* estimated at £15,000,000. *Building Societies*, large sums, but amount unknown.

† The author of "The Proletariat on a False Scent," brings out an almost exactly similar result.

becoming capitalists cannot be gainsaid. And Capitalists and Proprietors may not always be sagacious or generous politicians, but they are usually Conservative, and never revolutionary.

When all is said, however, when every due allowance has been made for counteracting and mitigating influences, the chief fact is still undisputed and the chief peril remains to be confronted. The State may do its little all to discourage drinking, to facilitate good investments and discountenance deceptive ones;—schools will do something, and election speeches and penny newspapers will do much to enlighten the ever extending and renewing Constituencies;—the more general acquisition of property will in time diffuse its far more effectual teachings;—experience will instruct and disappointment will warn many;—and wise and just legislation, it may be hoped, will emancipate the unskilled labourer from the cruel oppression of his skilled brethren. But these saving processes of elevation and moralisation are inevitably slow, while the multiplication of men is alarmingly rapid, and that of voters more rapid still, and (what must never be forgotten) the multiplication of the poorer and less educated voters far more rapid than that of the more trained and qualified. It is true that the *personnel* of Parliament may be little changed; few illiterate candidates or mere artizans may find their way into the House of Commons, and the rich and noble may in future preponderate there as much as ever; the new and altered Constituencies may not *discard* their old representatives, but they will *demoralise* them—far the worst evil of the two—by lowering the tone, contracting the scope, and warping and diverting the objects of their policy. For assuredly, if you fancy that you can lower the average intelligence of an electoral body without lowering the average wisdom and character of the representatives that body will return, you are dreaming that foolishlest of all dreams—that you can establish a cause and yet escape the consequence. And that an electoral body in which the uneducated largely, unavoidably, and increasingly outnumber the educated—and in which the more refined, thinking, and timid of that educated minority retire from the conflict in which they feel themselves habitually overpowered, as its terms grow harder, its warfare rougher, and its rewards more scanty—that such a set of constituencies—(as compared with constituencies of selecter elements)—*must* decline in intelligence and tone and range of view, though possibly not in selfishness of aim, would seem to be absolutely certain.* Let us not be deceived or lulled to sleep—encouraged we may well be—by the unexpected issue of the late election. A number of causes contributed to that

* France, Switzerland, and Belgium afford us experimental confirmation, and the United States more significantly still. See especially a paper published in the *National Review*, April 1861, entitled, "Three Men and Three Eras."

result, which can scarcely operate again—not, at least, in combination. The wage-receiving classes had not yet established their numerical majority on the register; the growing uneasiness of the propertied classes at the vaguely-menacing prospect before them had become almost alarm; the ballot enabled every one—the labourer oppressed by Trades' Unions, and the liberal indignant at the radicalism towards which he felt he was being dragged—for the first time to express his honest sentiments;—disgust and scorn at the Home-Rule intrigue, which it was feared might become serious if a Liberal Government were in office—and in difficulties—touched a new chord of patriotism in Tory and in Whig alike;—while the peculiarly rasping fashion in which the economising fanaticism of the Liberal Chiefs had been carried out by their subordinates had irritated every section of the Civil Service into not unnatural hostility and rage; and, to crown the whole, the best friends of retrenchment had been alienated from a ministry which caricatured and discredited their doctrines, and which could not perceive that “when taxation ceases to be oppressive, parsimony ceases to be popular.” But a general election six years hence may give a very different answer to a ministerial appeal;—unless, indeed, the interval be so employed by a sagacious government as to satisfy the new constituent masses that their interests have formed its steady, resolute, and earnest aim.

It will be objected that if the views promulgated in these pages be correct, the prospect before the civilized world is the reverse of cheerful. If the progress of democracy do indeed logically lead to the conclusions I have pointed out, if the practice of handing over political power and the command of legislation increasingly to the less enlightened classes must operate to render Government and laws less sagacious and beneficent,—then, since the tendency of circumstances is decidedly set in this direction in nearly every country both in Europe and America, we can foresee little in the future but progressive decadence in all the higher elements of national life.—I cannot gainsay the inference. I cannot see that the advances of democracy during the last fifty or seventy years in France, Spain, Switzerland, Belgium, the United States, and elsewhere, have offered results which invalidate the argument; I cannot at present discern the quarter from which reaction or rescue is to come, or the *Deus ex machinâ* who is to intervene; and there is more faith than philosophy in our vague trust that harvest will not follow seed-time, and that causes, which in all previous history have been relentlessly fertile, will hereafter become preternaturally barren. It may be that the education of schools, the education of life, the education of penalty and failure, may in time so tell upon the minds of the less competent and less instructed classes as to induce them voluntarily to divest themselves of functions which

others are more fitted to discharge. But of the dawn of that better day no prelude ray, however faint, is as yet visible in the clouded sky ; and if it should come—as I with others hope in trembling—neither writer nor reader will survive to share its sunshine ; it will come in the fulness of time, when all of us shall be mute, and most of us forgotten ; when (to quote the words of far the greatest master of political wisdom that our country has produced),—“when the grave shall have heaped its mould on our presumption, and the silent tomb shall have imposed its law upon our pert loquacity.”*

W. R. GREG.

* Burke.



THOMAS BINNEY.

AMONG the notable "institutions" of the City of London during the last generation, the ministry of Thomas Binney occupied a prominent and honourable place. The King's Weigh House Chapel has a flavour of City life and City interests about its very name; but there are few nooks of the world where Englishmen are scattered abroad, in which the Independent preacher who made it famous was not known and honoured, nor would it be easy to find anywhere a settlement of his countrymen, some of whom had not at some time listened to his stirring and strengthening words. The chapel inherited its name from the ancient building in Eastcheap, on the ground floor of which was the "King's beam," where foreigners who brought their goods to the City of London were compelled, "for the greater security of the citizens," to submit them to the scales. On the upper floor was the old Weigh House Chapel, where a Nonconformist congregation had been wont to assemble, which could trace its history to the birthday of modern Nonconformity, St. Bartholomew's Day, 1662. The widening of Eastcheap compelled the erection of a new edifice, shortly after Mr. Binney became the pastor of the church in 1829. A site was obtained and a chapel was built at the top of Fish Street Hill, at a cost of £16,000; and thither the church and congregation migrated. It remained, throughout Mr. Binney's ministry of nearly forty years, the leading Nonconformist place of worship in the City, and was the source of no small part of that vital influence which has quickened the dry bones of the Georgian Non-

conformity, and has brought our churches into the full current of the life and progress of our times. The City in those days was a place of habitation as well as of business ; and the minister of the Weigh House Chapel had round him just the class of men whose industry, energy, and commercial sagacity have made the City of London the focus of the trade of the world. And never were a man and his surroundings better mated. Mr. Binney was emphatically a City preacher, made to command a hearing and to become a power in the busiest haunts of men, and to bring the truth which he drew from the Bible to bear on those who were occupied heart and soul with the practical cares and duties of business life. His moral grasp was singularly powerful ; he *could* lay hold on men and compel them to hear. And his lot was cast, one would say, just where he could most fully develop such faculty for intellectual and spiritual influence as was in him, and make a strong mark on "the genial youth" of this great city, which is itself making its mark broad and deep enough on the great world.

Mr. Binney was what is called a self-made man ; like many, nay, I may say like most, of our Independent preachers. It is sometimes the occasion of a sneer against us, which we little care to answer. It is our crown of honour and our spring of power. One of the noblest functions of the mediæval Catholic church was to open to "self-made men" a worthy sphere of influence and power. The order of secular society kept men mainly in the strata in which they were born. The Church pierced through the strata, and opened a free course to capacity. It continually brought young blood, that is new energy, new genius, to the front, and bade it work for men. Any system which opens to men who have the capacity to "make themselves" a path to positions of influence and honour, has its recognised place among the powers which are moving forward the progress of society.

There is a significant bit of autobiography, showing the stuff of which young Binney was made, which is full of interest now that his career is nobly closed.

"Mr. Binney, addressing a number of young men connected with the Weigh House congregation, and seeking to stimulate them to such self-education as they could achieve in that portion of their time which was not devoted to business, referred to some remarks on education which had been made in public, not long before, by the Right Hon. Robert Lowe, the present Chancellor of the Exchequer. Mr. Lowe had said, that for two years he was thought to be very idle as to Latin and Greek, but that during this idle time he was reading as hard as he could the best English authors, and acquiring a thorough knowledge of English. He added, that he referred all his success in life, as a public man, to what he had done during those two years. 'Now,' continued Mr. Binney, after quoting these facts from Mr. Lowe, 'encouraged by such a statement from such a man, I may mention something of the same sort, pertaining to myself, as small things may be likened to great. You are young men engaged in business, but have to improve your minds as best you can in your leisure hours. Well, I was

once in the same position. I was seven years in a bookseller's concern, and during that time my hours were, for two years from seven to eight, and for five years from seven to seven; under great pressure, I have sometimes been engaged from six till ten. But somehow, all the time, and especially from my fourteenth to my twentieth year, I found opportunities for much reading and a great deal of composition. I did not shirk, however, my Latin and Greek, for I went for some time, two evenings in the week to an old Presbyterian clergyman, to learn the elements of the two languages, and could read *Cæsar* and *St. John*; but my great work was English. I read many of the best authors, and I wrote largely both poetry and prose; and I did so with much painstaking. I laboured to acquire a good style of expression, as well as merely to express my thoughts. Some of the plans I pursued were rather odd, and produced odd results. I read the whole of Johnson's '*Rambler*,' put down all the new words I met with—and they were a good many—with their proper meanings, and then I wrote essays in imitation of Johnson, and used them up. I did the same with Thomson's '*Seasons*,' and wrote blank verse to use his words, and also to acquire something of music and rhythm. And so I went on, sometimes writing long poems in heroic verse; one on the '*Being of a God*;' another, in two or three '*books*,' in blank verse, in imitation of '*Paradise Lost*.' I wrote essays on '*The Immortality of the Soul*,' sermons, a tragedy in three acts, and other things, very wonderful in their way, you may be sure! I think I can say, I never fancied myself a poet or a philosopher; but I wrote on and on to acquire the power to write with readiness; and I say to you, with a full conviction of the truth of what I say, that having lived to gain some little reputation as a writer, I attribute all my success to what I did for myself, and to the habits I formed during those years to which I have thus referred."

Men who can steal time from constant toil to "make themselves" after this fashion, are likely to leave some mark behind them on their age when they pass to their rest. There were manifold buddings of faculty in this young bookseller's lad, who trained himself thus severely for that higher work, the longing for which was already swelling within him, while the form which it would take was as yet but dimly understood. Many who knew Mr. Binney well, believe that there was far higher intellectual power in his great brain than the work of his ministry ever developed. Had circumstances allowed him to devote himself to intellectual labour, he had, perhaps, brain power enough to have become one of the foremost men of the time. But the constant claims of a large London congregation on time and thought, leave little to spare for the higher literary toil; and so he became, as the years passed on, less and less the scholar, the thinker, the writer, and more entirely the preacher. Perhaps, too, his great popularity, the ease with which his striking original power could enchain an audience and produce a profound effect, tended to withdraw him from that constant, intense, and methodical study, out of which alone great works of intellect can grow. A popular preacher among us has but little opportunity for the highest culture of his powers; but he has, if he be a large-minded, manly, and vigorous man like Mr. Binney, a rich compensa-

tion, in the multitudes whom his words arouse to nobler aims and to godlier methods of living, and in the stimulus to effort, aspiration, and achievement which he radiates around him wherever he moves.

It may seem to some a hasty dictum, considering Mr. Binney's constant activity as a writer, that authorship fell quite into the background, while preaching occupied the whole foreground of his life. But it is worth noting that most of his works grew out of a lecture or a sermon, amplified and elaborated, but only a long lecture or sermon still. His books, instead of being wrought out from a central theme to a fair and rounded completeness, were mostly the expansion of thoughts thrown off as it were through the accident of the occasion; and, though full of point and charged with force, were wanting in that breadth and scope which characterize works with which the intellect has travailed, and which bear the fruit of the patient years.

Altogether his most popular and in a worldly sense successful book bore the title "Is it possible to make the best of both Worlds." From a publisher's point of view nothing could be happier than the title. The book sold at the rate of 100 a day during many months; it was translated into several languages, and was the object of keen censure and extravagant praise. And it grew out of a lecture at Exeter Hall, and is a lecture still. It is an excellent specimen of the style of address of which he was so great a master. Pithy, pungent, stirring; full of dramatic dialogue to chain the attention, and of vigorous homethrusts to the conscience and the heart. But whether the core of it be sound Christian philosophy may well be questioned. One seems bound to believe that the best life for that world, must in the very nature of things be the best life for this world, and for every world in which Christ is King, whatever may be its fortune—there can be but one "best" for all the worlds. The book presents the average Christian of these easy times as generally "a substantial, comfortable, and well-to-do sort of man." The fighting, struggling, suffering times are mainly over, and our type of Christian in these days, we are told, is the "staid, quiet, 'douce,' orderly burgher of the Book of Proverbs—who is regular in his attendance at the Temple, diligent in his business, prosperous in his affairs, of repute among the elders, with daughters doing virtuously, and a wife that has his house decked with coverings of tapestry, while her own clothing is silk and purple." Well, it may be so, and Mr. Binney may have painted an over-true picture of the religious life and aspiration of our times. But the question haunts us, when and how the meaning died out of some of the deepest passages of the New Testament Scripture; and the thought intrudes, that the very man who painted the picture of the "douce, orderly burgher of the Book of Proverbs," was believed to have lived, if the author of Ecclesiastes may be trusted, the saddest life which was lived in his generation amid all his splendour.

and to have written "*Vanitas vanitatum, omnia vanitas*," as the epitaph on his brilliant success.

But it is not at all by his books, we believe, successful as many of them were, that the name of this great preacher will live. He leaves little behind him in print as his legacy to the future, commensurate with his great natural endowments; and yet it must be said that he did on the whole the work which he was best fitted to do, and in which he found the freest and the most joyful exercise of all his powers. He loved his work as a preacher with intense devotion, and he felt the joy of the well-trained soldier, in wielding "the Sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God." Few men of the past generation wielded it more mightily, few could open the Scripture more ably, and press home its truths and appeals more forcibly on human consciences and hearts. And yet he was far from eloquent; his style rarely rose above the tone of lofty and earnest conversation; his rhetoric was of the simplest, if, indeed, he can be said to have used any; his voice had a certain sharpness in its higher tones, which would have marred the oratorical effect of his discourses to a critical ear; while his power of preaching indifferent sermons, was, as he often heard with great composure, and perhaps with a little quiet satisfaction, of a very high order indeed. Many great preachers are endowed with this faculty in a very remarkable measure; the preacher of the Weigh House was hardly behind the greatest of his brethren in this endowment also. But despite all this, it may be doubted whether any preacher of his time excelled him in the power of impressing a congregation of earnest, intelligent men, of which class his hearers to a large extent consisted, and of holding a great audience spell-bound while he leisurely developed his thoughts. Without fluent oratory, without passionate declamation, he knew how to rivet the attention of his audience, and to hold it breathless through a long discourse; while he knew a yet deeper secret, how to touch the inner springs of thought and purpose in his hearers, and to kindle their aspiration after a manlier and godlier life.

The spring of this power lay in the vigour of his moral manhood; large, strong, massive, and charged with intense vitality. Life with him was strong in the springs, and it flashed out force at every pore. The whole spiritual vigour of the man went into his preaching; full of thought as his sermons were, of keen insight, of wise sayings, often proverbial in their brevity and roundness, and of pungent remark, they were fullest of all of life. In his early days and in his prime he was a preacher of almost a new order, so striking was the contrast which he presented to the able and popular preachers who had the ear of the world when he was young. The old, hard theology, and the venerable classification of men, were still in vogue in our churches. But both were beginning to wear out. Some larger thought of the

ways of God was shaping itself; some more human notion of the way in which the good and the evil mingle both in the saints and in the sinners, and the tender love of the great Father is alike our all. There was a great shaking among the dry bones of the Georgian Church and State, when he was young. A new age had been proclaimed, and a few bright spirits had caught and echoed the proclamation. It was not without meaning that about the year 1830 there was so much thought and talk about the end of the world. It was the end of a world, though in another sense than that of which the prophets dreamed. The founders of the school of philosophic Radicalism in politics, Turner, Carlyle, Maurice, Ruskin, were either at work or getting to work on the soul and conscience of society. A manifest uprising of the human in humanity was at hand. An intense longing seized on the higher natures after the reconstruction of human relations upon a nobler and broader basis; and with it a conscious courage and a newborn sense of power to build a fairer temple of Life. Carlyle was at work in Mr. Binney's young years, shaking, scathing the "inaneities" and the "shams" amidst which the world seemed to be walking or nodding, calling up the manhood in men to take possession of the stage and to keep possession, and to play its part faithfully there, whatever might befall. And Maurice was at work, and others earlier than Maurice, tracing in new forms of gospel benediction the relation of that humanity to God. With this new spirit of the time Mr. Binney, partly consciously, partly unconsciously, struck in. He was more profoundly in tune with it than he knew; for he always to the last had a certain dread of the theology of the school with which all the instincts of his nature and all the habits of his life were in deepest accord. He did not throw himself into the work of restitution or reconstruction. His theological system was that of his sect, in its more intelligent and progressive, but still thoroughly orthodox members. In truth he was through life a somewhat timid theologian. His sympathies and "notions," his fragmentary thoughts, his gleams of intuition, his stirring, startling words, were always somewhat far in advance of his systematic theological ideas.

He struck in with this advancing current of thought and life by the broad, honest, earnest manliness of his tone of thinking and of preaching. He hated the shams as much as Carlyle did, and groaned over the dulness. When he was in the pulpit his great concern was to shake the dulness and the deadness out of men; to make men of them, honest, vigorous, and faithful, above all tricks and lies, as the very first step towards making anything Christian of them at all. And his preacher's power, which rose almost to genius, lay in the strength of his grasp on the moral manhood of his hearers, whereby he was able by God's help to lift them to a more manly, real, and vigorous life. Enlarge a man's manhood, make him understand how

much more of him there is than he thought, and how much more God has to do with him than he dreamed, and he will enlarge his theology for himself in time. Mr. Binney's business was mainly with the manhood, the moral enlargement, elevation, and quickening of all who came under his spell; it was for others rather than for him to widen the bounds of the theological fold whose pasture was to nourish them, and to work out the scheme of Christian doctrine to that breadth and fulness, to which, by means of men like Mr. Binney, working in with more profound and complex agencies, God had enlarged the life of the Church.

And here we touch the secret of the remarkable power which Mr. Binney wielded over young men. Young men of business, many of them in town for a few years' professional or commercial training, formed the staple of his congregation. And his word wrought in this class mightily. There is hardly a town in England in which some manly, high-spirited, generous, and Christian men of business may not be found who were members of the Weigh House congregation in their young days, and who gathered the inspiration which made their lives a blessing to themselves and to their fellows, humanly speaking, from his lips. A preacher who can lay so firm a hold on this class of young men, and can put it to such lofty use, must have in him some very high elements of power. Those who train the earnest and thoughtful youth of a generation to manly, liberal, unselfish ideas of life and duty, and who rest the culture, as Mr. Binney never failed to rest it, on "the grace of God which bringeth salvation," are rendering to society the very noblest service, and are sowing seed whose godly harvest coming generations will reap on earth, when the sowers have passed to the rest, whither "their works do follow them," on high.

Closely connected with the same great qualities was Mr. Binney's most impressive conduct of that portion of our service which he hated to hear called "introductory," and which was to him altogether the most solemn part of the occupation of a congregation in the House of the Lord. Extempore prayer was on his lips a power; he seemed "to have power with man and with God," and to "prevail." Deeply reverent and deeply filial and trustful, it was as though he entered with those whose supplications and intercessions he uttered, "into that which is within the veil," to lay bare their hearts and his own to the Divine teaching and quickening, coming forth as a man who had been with God to the exposition and enforcement of His Word. None who have joined with Mr. Binney in prayer, can ever forget the intense reality and earnestness of spirit which breathed through his words, and lifted the heart to a nearer fellowship with God. He, too, first of our men of mark, set in a higher and purer key the musical portion of the service in our churches. Though not a man of much artistic culture, he had something of the poet's eye

and tongue. His hymn, "Eternal Light, Eternal Light," is one of the noblest in our hymnals; and his little book, again but an expanded sermon, on "The Service of Song in the House of the Lord," began that reformation of our psalmody which is in progress now, and which promises in time some high results.

One characteristic feature of his ministry must be noted; it was rarer than it is now in the days when he was young. He believed firmly in the essential holiness of the secular life of men. He lived much abroad in the world. Wherever anything of interest was going on his lofty form and massive brow were sure to be seen. And his congregation were sure to hear of it. It was one of his great aims to wed men's religion to their daily secular life and its interests. He had always something telling to say from the pulpit about all notable public matters. But he was not in the faintest degree what is called a sensational preacher. Always his tone was reverent and religious. "After all," I once heard him say, "I think that what men care most for in preaching is religion." He rarely read his sermons, and when he did, much of the power and charm was lost. He was emphatically an extempore preacher, and though he prepared himself carefully, much of the form of what he said was left to the impulse of the moment. As he stood there, tall, massive, with a lordly brow, a keen, penetrating eye, and with the burden of the Lord upon him, men listened with bated breath—they knew, they did not want a bishop to tell them, that he had a message from God to their souls. One seemed almost to see the wrestling of the thoughts in his brain as they strove for utterance. He was working it out, sometimes with sore strain and effort, before their eyes. They saw what it cost him, of what toil it was the fruit, and as he cast it before them they took it reverently, and lodged it in their hearts. His gesture was far from graceful, but it was strenuous and impressive. It all wrought in with the force with which the word came from him; at times he seemed to wrestle with men's consciences, so intense was his earnestness, as though he would not let them go till they took with them the lesson which he was bent on impressing, and yielded their hearts to the sway of the truth. He was a man, like one of old, "full of the Holy Ghost and of faith," "apt to teach," "mighty in the Scriptures," "a workman not needing to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth."

But he was a Nonconformist and an Independent, as well as a great preacher of the Gospel. He was widely known as a keen controversialist, an able and trusted leader of his party in those ecclesiastical conflicts, the clamour of which was always around him, and in which he took the deepest interest to the hour of his death. Curiously enough, as we shall see, Mr. Binney, soon after his settlement in London, came to be regarded as the most bitter and determined of the adversaries of the Established Church. There were

two societies in those days which may be regarded as the Nonconformist propaganda—The Society for the Protection of Civil and Religious Liberty, and the Society for the Diffusion of Ecclesiastical Knowledge. There were five gentlemen connected with these societies, who were sometimes called the five stinging bees in the controversies of those times, as their names happened to begin with B. Mr. Binney never could understand how he came to be numbered among them, as he thought himself, on the whole, a moderate Nonconformist. And with justice. Far from being a blind and virulent assailant of the Church of England, as was constantly represented, he did more than any Nonconformist of his day to direct attention to all that might be urged in favour of the Church of England and of the principle of Establishment, and to infuse into the controversy that tone of mutual consideration and charity which, to some fair extent, it at present maintains.

That we may understand this better, it must be noted that there are mainly two schools of thought among us Evangelical Nonconformists, corresponding fairly to the High and the Broad Church parties in the Establishment. The High Nonconformist party takes its stand on Primitive Christianity. It finds the Model Church system developed in the New Testament, and holds that there is no room for comparison of claims or advantages between Episcopacy, Presbytery, and Independency, for there is a clear right in the matter. The commandments of God are not to be modified by human expediency; our duty as Christians is clear; we have to find out from the New Testament what a primitive church was like, and to set up the closest imitation of it in our power. Episcopacy has its "Divine right," Presbytery has its "Divine right," and there has always been a school of High Independents who regarded their Church platform as resting with absolute firmness on the Word of God. Mr. Binney began life with that idea. In his controversy with the Bishop of Adelaide he says, "The bishop, I expect, began life as a High Episcopalian. I did so as a High Independent. I believed that a modern Independent Church was fashioned after the form of the primitive model, and was in exact adjustment with it as far as circumstances would permit." But there was another school, a limited one in those days, though far from limited now, which was disposed to rest the right of Independency to be recognized as a Christian Church system, on its general conformity with the principles of the New Testament, and its adaptation to the needs and conditions of Christian society. It was prepared to allow that there may have been times in the history of the Church when other forms of organization were desirable, to meet special difficulties and dangers; but it was quite sure that in an advanced state of society like ours, in a country in which full civil and religious liberty is enjoyed, and in which, in all political and social affairs, the people are expected and

qualified to think and to act for themselves, Independency is the best system, the simplest, the freest, the least encumbered with wealth and apparatus, and the most harmonious with the spirit and tendencies of modern society.

Mr. Binney, as we have seen, began life as a "High Independent." But he adds immediately, "A very few years served to modify these views." He became a very decided Broad Nonconformist; he was the leader, nay I may almost say the founder, of that party; and he continued to be its most distinguished advocate until his death. How he came so early to look at things in this new light may be described in his own words. The quotation is from a pamphlet which made a great stir at the time, called *Dissent not Schism*, published in 1835.

"I do not argue the present question from the Divine right of some other system in opposition to Episcopacy. I do not assert that 'Dissent is not Schism,' because dissenting Churches are alone true and apostolical, and Independency the only thing that is safe for man and acceptable to God. I do not say this because I do not believe it. Taking the three great forms of Church government, Episcopacy, Presbytery, and Independency, I should proceed thus: These three systems of discipline, brought honestly and impartially to the test of Scripture, are all right, and all wrong, though right and wrong in different degrees. There is something in the record in favour of all, but the book is not the exclusive property of any one. While, therefore, I have my own personal convictions of what, in my view, is most in accordance with primitive usage, and most agreeable to the spirit of the Gospel, and most adapted to universality, yet I believe that all systems, if worked by spiritual men, and for spiritual purposes, will be acceptable to God, and their societies, churches, and their advocates and adherents, 'heirs together of the grace of life.'"—*Dissent not Schism*, p. 63.

Now here, it will be seen, by no means high ground is taken. Mr. Binney rests his Independency mainly on a judgment as to what is most accordant with primitive usage, with the Spirit of the Gospel and with the tendencies of society. And his Nonconformity, *quoad* the principle of Establishment, was of no severer type. In a passage written about ten years ago, and which may be accepted as the expression of his mature judgment on the matter, he says—

"The religious grounds of Nonconformity to the Church of the Prayer-Book are, as I think, far more intelligible and convincing to the common mind, and perhaps I might say far more serious in themselves, than the grounds, theoretic or practical, of Dissent properly so-called, regarded simply as a protest against an Establishment, irrespective of the tenets of the Church Established—although these are by no means inconsiderable, especially in an advanced state of society, and in a nation like our own, in which liberty of thought and action is secured."—*Churchship in Australia*, p. 29.

Here again no high ground is taken. The advanced state of society is one of the strongest reasons urged against Establishment, and the injustice which it inflicts in a free country like ours. And these ideas would be regarded as very broad, broad even to Latitu-

dinarian broadness, by the High Nonconformists of Mr. Binney's early days.

One other point, a special characteristic of Mr. Binney, must be noted, as it makes the vehement antipathy of the Church party of those days to the very name, more strange. No Controversialist of our time was more truly solicitous to do thorough justice to his adversary's belief on matters in controversy between them. Mr. Binney was quite singular, I think, in the thoroughness of his appreciation of the various aspects of a controverted subject; and in his power to state his opponent's case as he would have stated it himself, before bringing forward his arguments against it. He was a man of conspicuous fairness, and able beyond most men to see what might be honestly thought and said in favour of ideas, which on the whole did not commend themselves to his judgment as right. A remarkable instance of this is to be found in his well-known discourse on "Conscientious Clerical Nonconformity," perhaps the ablest and the most influential of his controversial works. He devotes eight pages to the statement of the reasons which might "attract an individual towards the Establishment." And they are stated with startling force. He treats the argument dramatically; he puts himself in the position of various persons, and says what seems to be appropriate to each. He was fond of speaking through imaginary characters; it enabled him to develop ideas in which he found a certain attraction, without defining with precision his own attitude with regard to them. It is a favourite method with men of his class generally; men, if I may say so, of stereoscopic minds, who do not see objects only on the flat, but see also a little round them, and behind. Those who see somewhat round men and things, see much which, while it enlarges, perplexes and suspends their judgment; they are glad to betake themselves sometimes to the dramatic art, and to say, under cover of an imaginary person what they do not see their way to affirm themselves, but which has a certain power over their minds, and ought, they think, to be taken into full account.

In this pamphlet Mr. Binney states the case for Conformity so forcibly that it is evident that the attraction was strong on his own mind and heart. Whence then the character of a bitter enemy of the Establishment which so long clung to him, seeing that few of its advocates could have stated its case more ably, or shewn a more earnest desire, if possible, to conform? Two things contributed mainly to the misconstruction under which he suffered. In the first place a celebrated dictum as to the influence of the Established Church, which need not here be repeated. It was published on the occasion of the laying of the first stone of the new Weigh House Chapel. He wrote it with the history of the Georgian Church before him; students of the ecclesiastical life of the eighteenth century in

England, will be able to tell us what measure of salvation could grow out of such an institution; while, strangely enough, the dictum was bitterly resented by men who held, and proclaimed in cathedral pulpits, that the ministry of Mr. Binney, and of men like Mr. Binney, could be fruitful of little else than the ruin of souls. But his chief offence, I believe, in the eyes of his Established critics was the terribly stern and emphatic words with which he closes his discourse on "Conscientious Clerical Nonconformity."

"My nature, in its highest essence, would be injured. My moral sense would be sacrificed or seduced. I CANNOT DO IT. I will not. This, too, would be '*great wickedness and sin against God.*' It would be sin against myself. I never will consent to pay such a price for the advantages which clerical conformity can confer. I see them all. I feel their attraction. Principle as to some—preference as to others—taste, habit, association, as to most—strongly induce and impel me towards them. I could wish them mine. I should be glad to secure them. I would give for them anything consistent with honour. It should not be heroism to refuse that. I determine to refuse it. To all the inducements to enter the Establishment, I oppose one thing, and but one. With my predilections, I have little else; but *with my opinions* I ought to have *that—a living conscience.* By God's help I will strive to retain it. It shall be kept by me and kept alive. It and I must part company, if I offend it by deliberately doing what is wrong. God of my strength, preserve me from this; '*let thy grace be sufficient for me;*' '*keep back thy servant from presumptuous sin;*' with the light which Thou, I trust, hast poured into my soul, and the love with which Thou hast replenished my heart, I dare not permit myself to sanction and to say, what I feel I must, if I consent to use these forms and offices. '*A good conscience*' is to be found only in withholding that consent. I am determined to withhold it. I go nowhere unless conscience can go with me. I am satisfied to remain wherever it remains. This is my feeling; and on account of this, and of this only, I here resolve to refuse orders."

Those words produced a very deep impression on conscientious Evangelical Churchmen. The argument of the discourse was powerful, the demonstration complete. It placed Mr. Binney in the fore front of the ecclesiastical conflict, and it was certainly one of the influences which led to the agitation concerning the terms of subscription, which has issued in the relaxation which the new act secures. Not that in the judgment of Nonconformists the relaxation is so great a relief as it seems. Men who have to *use* the offices surely express in the most solemn form their entire belief in their doctrine, and consent to the words that they are true, not in the sense which a subtle casuist might put upon them, but in the clear, honest meaning which they must seem to bear, to the simple men and women for whom the clergy undertake to be mouthpieces to God.

But Mr. Binney was in the main rather an Anti-Sacerdotal than an Anti-State Church Controversialist. He strove strenuously for the validity of his "orders"; he held them to be "the orders of the Holy Ghost." When he was in Australia in 1858, the Bishop of

Adelaide unfolded to him the rule of the Church of England, "a tradition of eighteen centuries, which declares your orders irregular, your mission the offspring of division, and your Church system—I will not say schism—but dichostacy." In the controversy which ensued the question of orders and of comprehension was keenly debated. On "orders" Mr. Binney utters these noble, impressive words—

"I do not myself attach much importance to 'orders,' as they are termed. I look more to prophetic impulse, to that gift and call which the Church of England recognizes, in requiring every candidate for ordination to express his belief that he is 'moved by the Holy Ghost to take on himself the ministry of the Word.' A solemn and wonderful declaration that! One which, when a reality, indicates something impressive and sublime. It stamps a man with the Divine seal; sets him before us as inwardly impelled to do a divine thing. Office in the Church is not to him a 'profession,' but a vocation; it is not something which he chooses for himself, but for which he is chosen;—which he does not advance to because he will, but because he *must*. The man is not at liberty to decline the call of God. Such men are the men to do something for the world."—*Australia*, p. 47.

Schemes of comprehension he regarded with little favour, nor had he the faintest hope of their success. In Dissent not Schism he writes:—

"To make uniformity of government the criterion of the Church, and the basis of reciprocal intercourse and communion, is to put Church-order in the place of Christ. Christ must be first, fellowship next, and *then* as much uniformity as will follow from the two. This is the principle and the spirit of Evangelical Dissent; and hence, *instead of being schismatical*, IT HAS LESS OF SECTARIANISM AND MORE OF CATHOLICITY THAN ANY OTHER SYSTEM WHATEVER."—*Dissent not Schism*, p. 70.

And yet his soul pined for fuller, freer, and closer communion. "There is nothing," he writes, "for which I pray with more frequency and fervour than that all Christians who agree in the fundamental principles of the Gospel, may be brought to understand, advocate, and practise universal communion." Strong as he was, and independent, he was of generous nature and tender heart; a man whom it was not difficult to touch to tears, and full of thoughtful, helpful care for brethren in need. He could say hard, sharp things on occasions, as when he answered one curtly who complained that he could not understand him, "I cannot give you both brains and truth." But he was most genial and kindly in daily intercourse, and a hearty lover of all good men. His aim was ever to draw men forth from their selfishness and narrowness to holy fellowship and blessed concert, for the Master's service and the good of mankind.

Had he lived on I think that he would have watched with some sadness that tendency of churches to "retire on their centres" which is so strange yet so marked a characteristic of our times. Romanism retires on the infallibility of her Pontiff, and refuses to

mix with the order of society. And the tendency runs through the whole scale. The cry is everywhere for closer order, more complex organization, and more elaborate mechanism for the accomplishment of the work. Priestly rather than Christian ideas, under such conditions, are inevitably in the ascendant. Despite the softening influence of culture, and the expansion of Christian beliefs and sympathies which the last generation has witnessed, the signs are ominous in all churches of a period of ecclesiastical reaction. We may have stronger systems, harder dogma, more zealous ministries, and with them weaker life and poorer truth.

J. BALDWIN BROWN.



INTERFERENCE OR NON-INTERFERENCE WITH RAILWAY COMPANIES.

VERY recently, two events have happened of considerable importance to the "Railway Interest," as the phrase is—and also to the public: the issue of the well-known and sensational *Circular of the Board of Trade* to the Railway Companies, and the sitting of the new *Court of Railway Commissioners*.

Liabile to be confounded together by hostile and unreasonable persons, who applaud all restrictions placed on unpopular corporations, the two have very different significance, and the Circular and the Commissioners deal with very different subjects. The first relates to the safety of the public, which nearly all schools of politicians agree may most properly form the subject of State Interference. The second has been called into existence as a portion of a system to regulate the earnings, the working, and the development of a branch of Trade, the distribution of its profits, the curtailment of its freedom. This is a most delicate, not to say dangerous, exercise of authority on the part of any department or delegate of the State, and is generally considered undesirable in relation to commercial matters. However, it has long been pronounced, and is still considered, to be absolutely necessary and highly beneficial, in the case of *Railway Companies*. I propose in the following pages to discuss this latter subject at some little length, assuming in my readers a certain amount of familiarity with the forms and the working of the present system.

The celebrated Circular has been fully answered, and debated on elsewhere. An extremely feeble reply of the Board of Trade amply illustrates the injustice of general and sweeping charges, applied to different bodies, with separate systems. At the utmost, it shows that, in a few cases, the Board of Trade has been right, without explaining how often its officials have been wrong, and without giving credit to the Companies for having done infinitely more for the safety of the public than the officials have ever dreamed of suggesting. It could serve no useful purpose, one would think, thus to humiliate and anger nearly the whole Inland Carrying Trade of the United Kingdom. Far better to have left to a portion of the Press (which is nothing loth) to sweep into one common net of condemnation and obloquy great and small fishes alike, for the sake of startling effect ! Nevertheless, Railway Companies must remember that Control, so far as the safety of the public is concerned, is inevitable and must be submitted to ; but the Interference ought to be temperate and just, as well as active. It is scarcely edifying to find that an official, who has constantly obtruded opinions, that the only chance of efficient management lies in the purchase of Railways by the State,* should be a judge in cases of alleged default ; and I may mention that one of Mr. Malcolm's most laboured points has received an answer from the Railway-servant point of view, in a recent paper published in the *Fortnightly Review*. The writer, who is most hostile to Railway Companies, prints in italics as below :—"The driver, feeling that because the line is worked on the absolute block system, *he is perfectly safe, scarcely troubles himself to look ahead*, until he approaches the next signal ; consequently, if the preceding train should have broken down between the stations, a far more terrible collision ensues than if the block system were altogether unknown on the line." Mr. Malcolm himself gave some interesting evidence in 1872 as to the comparative loss of life and accidents on the English and some of the foreign Railways, which might well have been noticed in the Circular, together with the following passage from the Report of a distinguished foreign official, for a translation of which I am indebted to the *Railway News* of the 31st January last :—

"Notwithstanding the much greater density of traffic in England, which is three times as large in that country as in Prussia, and four times as great as that of Austria, the total loss in life and injuries is comparatively less than with us.

"The traffic of large English Stations is colossal to an extent of which people on the Continent can have no idea. For example, at each of the two London stations called *Charing Cross* and *Cannon Street*, there go and come daily more than six hundred trains, and at the great crossing station at Clapham Junction, there passed on the Derby Day of 1871, no less than 1,023 trains within twenty-four hours. Compare this with our traffic. There is not one station in all Austria or Germany which can boast of more

* Captain Tyler.

than two hundred trains per diem, the average maximum being about 120, and yet (repeats Herr Von Weber) there are fewer accidents of all kinds in England than with us."

Much more might be written, for fairness' sake, on this subject, but this Paper is not intended to deal with Railway Accidents, or Government Interference regarding them; a few pages, however, might, I think, be well devoted to that system of *General Interference* with the Trade concerns of Railway Companies, of which the appointment of the new Railway Commissioners is the last phase and development. No doubt, when Railways were first conceived, the authorities of this country might have adopted and dealt with them as a department of Government. It is almost idle now to consider how far a policy of that kind would or would not have been beneficial. The opportunity was lost, and most people believe, for ever. That being so, a system of Interference, a system of double Government, so to say, has been built up, and it is this system of which I wish to show the consequences—and the failure. My view will doubtless be unpopular, and perhaps be met with derision; but the authorities I shall quote will be admitted to be respectable, and, whenever I can, I shall use their language, rather than my own.

For myself, although I think that the time has arrived for reconsidering and condemning the present system, I fear that the public voice is quite the other way, and is strongly in favour of severer and closer control—more and more of the double Government. To show how far these sentiments and the expression of them have been carried, I may quote the "Suggested Regulations," as given in the Report of the Joint Committee of both Houses on Railway Affairs, which sat in 1872. They are:—

1. Equal mileage rates.
2. Rates to be fixed according to cost of carriage, after adding a certain profit on capital.
3. Determination of terminal charges.
4. Immediate reduction of rates and fares.
5. Subsequent periodical revision of rates and fares.
6. Absolute limitation of dividend.
7. Reduction of rates after dividend has reached a certain percentage, so as to divide extra profit between the company and the public.
8. Classification of rates.
9. Publication of rates.
10. Consolidation of Acts.
11. Workmen's trains.
12. Arrangement of districts.
13. Construction of branch lines.
14. Interchange of traffic, through rates, and running powers.

15. Revision of fares for conveyance of troops.
16. Additional facilities to Post-Office.
17. A Railway tribunal.

I have difficulty in conceiving how interference could be pushed much farther.

These "Suggested Regulations" must not be supposed to have been suggested *by* the Joint Committee, but *to* them; nor do they give any adequate representation of the present system. They are merely quoted to show the views of a certain school, which is extremely popular at the present moment, and which would try to persuade us that Railway Companies require sterner and stricter control. Such reasoners would seem generally to base their opinion on the assumption that *Railway Companies are Monopolies*, and even to rely on the virtue of the magic formula, that "Corporations have no souls."

Practical men have declined to entertain or carry out the greater portion of the suggestions; yet the notion seems inveterate, that a system of minute Interference must be kept up, in some shape or other; and such a system is accordingly fully and laboriously maintained. Interference with trade generally is acknowledged to be bad and dangerous; but then Railway Companies, it is said, carry on no ordinary trade. The best authorities write, "We are averse to legislation on Railway matters, if it can be avoided, and particularly with regard to the details of Railway management;"* but this is neutralized by such utterances as the following:—"The roads of a country, from the very nature of things, are public concerns; they are as necessary to a people as the air they breathe."† It is difficult to find fault with either of these sentences. The real difficulty is to reconcile them, as a practical matter—to give freedom to the Railway Companies, and yet to persuade the public that they need not fear.

Interference in this case should be tried, as other things are, by the test of—success or failure. I admit that *à priori* there is a strong and plausible case for interference; but if history and experience and high authority show the fruitlessness or mischief of such a system, why should we be afraid to face and give fair consideration to another? Circumstances have strangely changed since Sir Robert Peel and Lord Dalhousie laid down their principles with regard to Railway Companies. The railways of to-day are very different from what was anticipated: prophecies have been curiously falsified. It is idle to defer to antiquated doctrines, the fears, and, I may add, the follies, of the past. We ought to be very glad if we can now-a-days make out a case for *Non-Interference* in the place of *Interference*; if, after our many failures and endless trouble, we may

* "Quarterly Review."

† Report of a Parliamentary Committee.

safely leave Railway Companies alone, to manage their own affairs in their own way, get rid of exceptional legislation, of what Chief Justice Erle called "semi-paralyzed contracts," of frictions, ill-feelings, jealousies, struggles in and out of Parliament; if we may safely interfere with Railways but little more than we do with Factories, seeing to the physical safety of the subject, but leaving all bargains to be settled as seems best between the parties themselves, and by the ordinary law of the land.

May this be? To assist in the solution of this question, a little time may well be devoted to the consideration of what measure of success has been achieved by a system of *Interference*, and how far a system of *Non-Interference* need alarm the public, or is likely to injure the public interest.

But a few words by way of introduction.

The history of Interference with Railways is, in many respects, curious. Railways were at first regarded, by a large portion of the community, not merely as foolish novelties, but as destructive and offensive nuisances. In early days no one suspected that Railways were about "to turn man into a bird, and enable him to fly longer and quicker than a Solan goose,"* to say nothing of the transmission of the comforts, necessities, and luxuries of life. That Railway promoters should have the power of depriving an owner of his land, was tolerated only under protest, under severe restrictions, for a heavy price, and in exchange for privileges wrung from helpless companies. The view maintained by the public was, that the Railway Companies must pay dearly, in every shape, for a transcendent favour. This was reasonable enough, when it was doubtful how far Railways would succeed, or prove a boon to the country. It is ludicrous to find this obsolete and absurd theory still preserved and embalmed in every discussion and all legislation on the subject, in days when landed proprietors may be said to be on their knees to Railway Companies, beseeching them to take portions of their territories, and so immensely increase the value of the residue and the convenience of a whole neighbourhood.

Again, the magnificent ideas of coming wealth and enormous dividends, under the influence of which much interfering legislation was conceived, have never been realised. Maximum Rates, Special Taxation, and other clogs on a too great potentiality, sprung, to a great extent, from brains crammed with pictures of opulent shareholders, Railway Kings, demoralized constituencies, bloated corporations. Nay, a panic set in, lest Railway Companies, out of very wantonness, should buy up half the land of the kingdom, and become vast land-jobbing associations; and an outcry was raised to restrict and confine them in their purchases. The consequence has been, that

* Sydney Smith.

they have had to pay, over and over again, for value, imparted by themselves, to adjoining lands. The panic subsided, but the traditional jealousy remained; and Baron Bramwell had to combat it not so very long ago. "Which mischief," he asked, "is the more likely to happen, and the more necessary to be guarded against, the unlawful wasteful purchase of land by Railway Companies, or the exaction of a rapacious or capricious proprietor?" Railway Companies have passed through every stage of impecuniosity, but the habit is confirmed on the part of the public, to provide against unduly distended exchequers and unreasonably large profits. We see this exemplified in three of the "Suggested Regulations" already quoted, those three being perhaps the least cheerful for shareholders:—

4. Immediate reduction of rates and fares.
5. Subsequent periodical revision of rates and fares.
6. Absolute limitation of dividend.

With such suggestions before him we need not wonder that Lord Salisbury asked a witness, who insisted on a "reasonable reduction"—"By *reasonable*, do you mean making a good dividend, or making no dividend at all?"

Again, many of the existing restrictions were imposed, and many of the existing Railway Acts (said in the aggregate to number more than 3000) were passed under an entire misconception of the functions which Railway Companies would have to perform. It is well-known that at first Railway Companies were regarded, and treated, not as carriers at all, but as mere constructors of lines of road, along which any one of the public might pass with his own vehicles, as he could along the turnpike roads and canals. Thence, legislation in many respects analogous to that applied to turnpike roads and canals was applied to Railway Companies. The mistake was soon found out, but the mischief was not repaired. To this day the old legislation is enforced and repeated under the new circumstances. The old garment is patched and varied, stretched, strained, and turned, in frantic endeavours to fit it to the new individual. A very good illustration of this occurred recently before the new Commissioners. The *Pall Mall Gazette*, commenting on the occurrence, traced the mischief back to its source, and the "characteristic muddle" of railway legislation.

Again, the bogey of "*Monopoly*," a term which, as applied to Railway Companies, Chief Justice Erle has often protested against, conveyed an intelligible meaning in the early days of railway enterprise; but it is applied to-day, when there are 16,000 miles of railway, as freely and glibly as when the first stage-coach was driven off its old line of road. Mr. Justice Blackburn has said that he fears Railway Companies do not get impartial justice from juries, and I fear that railway witnesses obtain but scanty credence when their evidence is quoted; but I will give, for what it may be worth, the statement of Mr. Cawkwell, the general manager of the London and North-

Western Railway Company:—"There is no monopoly of railway traffic now," he says; "I do not think that we have a town on the London and North-Western Railway of any great consequence, where we have not competition; at least I scarcely know of one."

Once more, the unusual severity of the ordinary law, as affecting Common Carriers, was little understood, and is still little understood, by those who have been, and are, crying out for protection against Railway Companies. That law makes Common Carriers insurers of the safety of goods entrusted to them, and requires the goods to be carried at a *reasonable* rate, and within a *reasonable* time. How exaggerated then is much of the declamation about extortion, swindling, prohibitory rates, helplessness of the public! Ignorance may often be the excuse; but sometimes a cry is raised under different influences, which betray themselves in the evidence, for instance, of Mr. Richard Walker, late Chairman of the Bury Improvement Commissioners. He tells the Committee of 1872:—

"Speaking honestly, the view at Bury is that the amalgamation will not make very much difference to them, but the inhabitants look upon it in this light, that, inasmuch as two powerful Companies are coming to get great advantages from Parliament, we have a perfect right to intervene, and ask Parliament to give us some *protection* under the circumstances; that is really the honest truth of the feeling of the trading population and the community of Bury generally.

"*Chairman.*—Protection against what?

"Against excessive charges, and *we want some part of the advantages* which the Companies will derive from the new powers which Parliament will confer upon them. . . . The object of the inhabitants of the town and the object I am here to advocate to-day, so far as I may be permitted to do so, is this, that in the *mêlée* and scramble for improved position, *the rights* of the inhabitants may be a little considered by Parliament."

And this leads me to point out lastly, that there has always been in the public mind a certain amount of soreness and regret at what many think the lost opportunity of most successful speculation on the part of the State for the benefit of the community at large. Railway Companies do not yield great profits, but this is put down to mismanagement, and may certainly be partly attributed to the expensive system forced on them by the Legislature. Such expense, such mismanagement, it is assumed, would not have occurred, had railways been secured and worked by the State from the outset. The fact that private persons risked their money to bring about the most important public improvement of modern days is lost sight of in a feeling of disgust and disappointment. Thus the tendency is strong to condemn—to be bitter—to attempt to regain advantages lost, or at least to intercept a portion of the shareholders' profits. Many years ago Sydney Smith wrote:—

"The country are very angry with themselves for having granted the monopoly, and very angry for the instances of carelessness and oppression which have appeared in the working of the system. The heaviest fines are

inflicted by coroners' juries, the heaviest damages are given by common juries. Railroads have daily proofs of their unpopularity. If Parliament get out of temper with these metallic ways, they will visit them with Laws of Iron, and burst upon them with the high pressure of despotism."

And quite recently the Chairman of the Committee of 1872 put it to Mr. Price (now one of the new Commissioners) :—

"*Of course*, the public ought to get some portion of that expense, which is saved by amalgamations?"

To which query Mr. Price very naturally replied :

"I do not see that that follows."

I.

And now to show what measure of success has attended the present system of Interference with Railway Companies. No one supposes that *some* interference must not always be exercised, with respect to the acquisition of land for example; but is the principle of the future to be, to minimize, or to maintain, or even to increase, existing checks and control? The nature of the present system will be broadly displayed in the following pages, for it is impossible of course to enter into details, which might fill a volume, but enough may, I think, be said to shake the faith of even the strongest advocates of the policy of Interference.

In the first place, is the present system popular, or does it satisfy the public? We know what the newspapers say. Mr. Galt, the veteran advocate of the purchase of railways, describes the general tone of the witnesses examined before the Committee of 1872 :—

"As regards the conveyance of merchandise, the working of our Railway system was bitterly complained of throughout the whole of the country by almost every class engaged in mercantile transactions."

I will give a few examples. A merchant from Liverpool says :—

"I think that the present system is so absolutely bad, that it would be impossible to have a worse."

Another merchant :—

"I think it is hardly possible to imagine that things can remain as they are. I think we are now in a position when we must either get up or down. We must either get assistance from Parliament, or matters must be allowed to drift into utter confusion."

Another :—

"We could not be worse, that is very certain."

I quite agree that vague complaints of this sort do not prove, of themselves, a system to be bad, especially when they are followed by naïve admissions of this sort :—

"I anticipate your further question by saying that I have no defined plan for carrying that out. I think, as the last witness has stated, that should be left to the wisdom of Parliament, rather than for us to come here, and to dictate to Parliament."

The complaints may be merely the utterances of those whom a

Railway Chairman called "regular grumblers;" or they may spring from a vague notion of a right to "general protection" from what the complainants can scarcely define; or they may be the creatures of a system which has taught people to fancy that they have no chance of driving fair bargains with Railway Companies without minute assistance, which has made children of them, and taught them to cry for the moon—in which case, I suppose, they must cry on, till the system is altered. But that a policy of Interference, built up on the recommendations of a series of Committees and Commissions, should be thus spoken of by those for whose protection it was devised, seems to go some way towards a condemnation of the policy itself.

In the next place, is the present policy based on just assumptions, and are its measures successful?

The principle of the policy may be shortly defined as a dread of the so-called *Monopoly of Railway Companies*, and a determination to check and control it. I shall presently deal with the different modes adopted, but I must say a few words as to this doctrine of *Monopoly*, in the language of a very high authority indeed.

In a case, commonly called *M'Manus' Case*, Chief Justice Erle is reported to have said:—

"It is true that railway proprietors have produced accommodation so excellent, that the public prefer it to every other; but that, for that reason, the prejudice against monopolies should be brought against railways, is not right. In monopolies, the seller of a bad article, by virtue of a grant, compels the buyer to pay too much; here, the buyer chooses an article on account of its goodness, and claims to compel the seller to take too little."

And in another case, Baron Bramwell said:—

"We have on this, as on all other occasions, had a good deal said about monopoly in Railways: as to such arguments, I refer to the judgment of Erle, C. J., in *M'Manus' Case*."

I am bound to add that other judges have taken other views, and that the term "Monopoly" has come to be accepted as a proper description of railway trade, and is generally allowed to pass "sub silentio," although Mr. Price, when examined before the Committee of 1872, protested against the expression, "abuse of a Monopoly," as applied to the subject of inquiry; and surely the opinions quoted above are entitled to much respect.

But one of the most important witnesses examined before that Committee, Mr. Farrer, Permanent Secretary of the Board of Trade, assuming the monopoly, showed how absurd was the dread of it. He said:—

"I think the advocates of Monopoly have had the better of the advocates for competition before this Committee. When it has been stated that advantages have been given to the public by means of competition, they have been fully answered by the advocates of monopoly, who have shown that, by monopolizing districts, the facilities given to the public have been increased."

Exactly so ; and Mr. Price gave the reason to the Committee :—

“ I think that, as a rule, the interests of the public and of the Companies must be the same. I do not mean to say that Railway Companies may never pursue their own objects irrespective of the interests of the public ; they do sometimes, under the influence of passion or prejudice or various motives, but, as a rule, whether they like it, or whether they do not, or whether they have the public interest in view, or whether they have not, in either case, I believe that, as a rule, the public interest and that of the Company go together in the long run ; and, if the Railway Companies are engaged in fighting a battle, of course, in the long run, it is the battle of the public.”

If this is so, the Anti-monopoly policy would seem likely to be about the most mischievous policy that could be adopted. But how has it worked ?

For instance, an artificial system for promoting Competition has been a favourite scheme for checking Monopoly. What has been the result ? The Report of the Committee of 1872 gives an answer :—

“ In looking back to the History of Parliamentary Inquiry and Legislation from 1840 to 1872, it is evident that the predominant idea in the mind of the public has been that competition, which is so powerful a regulator of most commercial affairs, would also suffice to regulate Railways ; whilst, nevertheless, by a slow and gradual process of experiment, one form of competition after another has proved to be inadequate.”

And yet, strange to say, this very Committee points with confidence to effectual competition by sea, and partial competition by canal, and recommends especially that the former “ should be guarded by preventing Railway Companies from obtaining control over public harbours.”

I have already shown what Mr. Farrer thought of the comparative value to the public of *Competition* and *Monopoly*. Mr. Farrer, it must be remembered, is, of all officials, the one most likely to speak with thorough knowledge of this subject. While the Parliamentary Chiefs of the Board of Trade change frequently, the Permanent Secretary guides them all alike, and is the principal depositary of official knowledge, and therefore his evidence is extremely valuable ; especially when he disparages the effect of Interference, which is mostly intrusted to his department.

As long as this dread of Monopoly remains paramount, so long of course *Amalgamation* between rival Railway Companies, or between any Railway Companies at all, will be viewed with jealousy, and be discouraged by the Legislature. We have seen that Mr. Richard Walker thought “ the mêlée and scramble for improved position,” in other words, application to Parliament to allow two Railway Companies to amalgamate, was a fitting opportunity to put in his claim for something ; and the Chairman of the Committee thought the privilege at all events should be sold dearly. What, then, has been the effect of Interference for the purpose of

checking Amalgamation? The Report of the Committee puts it very low :—

“How small has been the effect of the principles laid down in these Reports” (against Amalgamation) “may be seen from the history of the great companies given in the returns furnished.”

And then it is shown that, in spite of all resistance, amalgamations have gone on at a surprising rate :—

“*Chairman*.—Supposing that Parliament were to set its face against amalgamation, and say, we will have no more of it, what do you think would be the result?”

“*Captain Tyler*.—I think that the result would be that the Companies would set to work to see how they could amalgamate without the leave of Parliament.

“*Chairman*.—Do you think they would succeed in that?”

“*Captain Tyler*.—Yes, I think so; if they are determined to work together they can do it somehow or other.”

Mr. Farrer says :—

“You have had committee upon committee, and commission upon commission, reporting against amalgamation, and in spite of all these reports, amalgamation has gone on in an increasing ratio. Amalgamation upon amalgamation immediately after reports against amalgamation.”

And see what follows :—

“*Chairman*.—How would you carry out what must be the most difficult and desirable object—namely, securing general justice to be done to the public by this huge monopoly?”

“*Mr. Farrer*.—I do not see any way of doing it.”

He is then asked if he is a “Pessimist, altogether,” but his answer is, “By no means” :—

“I look on the ultimate amalgamation and monopoly of the great Companies rather as a political danger than a *commercial* danger.”

And, on referring back to a passage in the Report of the Committee, no one need wonder at this opinion. The Report states :—

“Few cases have been adduced in which amalgamations already effected, have led to increased fares or reduced facilities, whilst, on the other hand, there is evidence that the most complete amalgamation which has hitherto taken place has been followed by a lowering of fares and rates, and increase of facilities, as well as by increased dividends.”

And again :—

“Past amalgamations have not brought with them the evils which were anticipated.”

And Mr. Farrer speaks out as strongly :—

“I do not think that hitherto amalgamation and monopoly have tended to the inconvenience or prejudice of the public.”

Passing on to another form of Interference, sanctioned by the present system, I come to the scheme of *Maximum Tolls, Rates,*

and *Fares*; and in these, thinks John Bull to himself, there must be great virtue. Let us consult the authorities; and first the public, in the person of Mr. Richard Walker. He says:—

“The Railway Companies can perpetrate any kind of injustice under and within the limits of what are called *Maximum* rates.”

Next the Board of Trade: Captain Tyler says:—

“The attempt to limit rates and fares by the principle of framing a Maximum has always failed in practice, and is almost always likely to fail.”

And Mr. Farrer:—

“The Statutory Maxima go for very little.”

But his reason is not Mr. Walker’s reason. It is:—

“Companies seldom increase their rates; they are always diminishing them.”

And he seems to object to the whole system of interference with rates, for he says:—

“All the witnesses have been falling back upon some natural rate that Companies ought to charge, as if there were any means of getting at such a rate.”

As to the Committee, it states that,—

“The actual legal maxima are rarely charged in the case of goods.”

So much for Maximum Rates, on the word of those who ought to know something about them. The Companies bitterly complain of them, as well as of Statutory Classification, as tending to restrain their liberty without any real benefit to the public, and also as often causing vexatious litigation. Mr. Price, on a recent occasion, called attention to the ludicrous classification of “Rocking Horses” and “Live Rats;” and Mr. Childers, who was a member of the late Committee, provoked the following dialogue:—

“*Mr. Childers.*—And you disregard altogether the classification in the Acts of Parliament, except that you do not exceed the Maximum?”

“*Mr. Cawkwell.*—The classification in the Act of Parliament is very limited; there are very few articles enumerated: the traffic has entirely altered since that classification was established.

“*Mr. Childers.*—In fact it is obsolete, altogether?”

“*Mr. Cawkwell.*—Yes, it is obsolete.

“*Mr. Childers.*—But it is still brought forward in every Bill?”

“*Mr. Cawkwell.*—Yes.

“*Chairman.*—Then it is useless and delusive?”

Turning now to the Board of Trade’s interference with the Railway Companies—an interference which may be exercised under

various Acts of Parliament, and in many ways—we find Mr. Farrer admitting:—

“I think the interference of the Board of Trade absolutely useless.”

Again, with reference to certain powers given by Parliament to the Board of Trade, which, it appears, have never been exercised:—

“It is so extremely difficult to say what are public interests and what are private interests, and upon what sort of application the Board of Trade is to interfere. Is it to interfere upon the application of a single trader, or the Chamber of a particular town, or a rival Railway Company, or a Canal Company? Nothing can be more difficult.”

With regard to the Board of Trade's Reports on Bills, the intervention being supposed to be on behalf of public interests, the Committee relate the history of Lord Dalhousie's “Board within the Board,” and its egregious failure. Mr. Farrer explains the discontinuance of Reports altogether, and the consequence.

“*Mr. Hunt.*—Since the discontinuance of these reports, have you found that provisions detrimental to the public interests have found their way into Bills which did not find their way before?”

“*Mr. Farrer.*—Not that I am aware of.”

I cannot of course go through all the matters treated of before the Committee, but I may give a few more illustrations of the manner in which Mr. Farrer regarded the Interference of the Board of Trade:—

“I should mention that the Board of Trade are required in this case by Act of Parliament to approve of the times of arrival and departure of certain trains, but practically they have found themselves helpless in the matter. The Companies know so much more about their correspondences and about the times at which they can conveniently run their trains, that the Board of Trade *find it much better to leave them to themselves.*”

Again, as to Workmen's Trains:—

“I cannot help thinking that if it is a desirable thing, and if there is a great demand for it, it will be done sooner or later *without compulsion.*”

“I think the Railway Companies are acted upon so much now by popularity, and by other motives than those of immediate profit, that it would be very difficult indeed for them to draw back at all from a boon of that sort once given to the poor. I think that the force of public opinion would be a long way towards compelling them to maintain it.”

Captain Tyler's evidence is not very different:—

“As long as Railways are in the hands of Joint-Stock Companies, the less any attempt is made to interfere with the details of their finance, their management, or their working, the better, as a general rule, alike for the companies and for the public.”

Thus have we not in fact the Board of Trade condemning its own *Interference*, and giving very strong evidence indeed in favour of a policy of Non-Interference?

And now a few words as to the powers of *exceptional* Interference of the Courts of Law, now partially transferred to the new Railway Commissioners. Lord Lyndhurst and Lord Campbell, on behalf of all the Judges, save one, protested against the exercise of such interference. Lord Campbell said :—

“He confessed he was wholly unacquainted with railway management as well as the transit of goods by boats : he knew not how to determine what was a reasonable fare, what was undue delay, or within what time trucks and boats should be returned.”

The jurisdiction, however, was forced upon the Judges, and the exercise of it has brought about the most curious scene of confusion and contradiction imaginable, a system of “semi-paralyzed contracts,” of absurd doctrines that Railway Companies “are not to favour themselves,” &c., &c., and the only persons who seem to have benefited by it at all are the lawyers and the *Packed-parcel Carriers*.

Take, as an instance of the difficulty abounding in this field of judicial activity, the following passage from a judgment of the present Lord Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench :—

“It is extremely difficult to put any construction, which will be conclusively satisfactory to one's own mind, upon an enactment, the phraseology of which is so confused and perplexed, that it almost leads one to suppose that the obscurity was studied and designed.”

And when the construction had been put by the Judges, it scandalized Mr. Farrer.

This is not a legal journal, and therefore my illustrations must be very general. As to the “Railway and Canal Traffic Act,” the Report of the Committee of 1872 states :—

“It is notorious that (as concerns the convenience of the public) the Railway and Canal Traffic Act has been inoperative.”

As to the “Semi-paralyzed Contracts,” Baron Bramwell says :—

“It is very much to be regretted that any one should be allowed to say, ‘True, I have entered into a contract, but it is unreasonable, and, by a little colouring of the case, I can make the Company pay.’”

And again,—

“The matter is decided by the House of Lords that a particular contract, no matter under what circumstances it may be made, may be reviewed by a judge before whom it comes, who is to say whether it is reasonable or not. I confess I cannot understand this, and I do not see very well how it is to be applied. I cannot understand how one can say a general condition in reference to all mankind is reasonable, or how you can go into the question whether a bargain between two people is reasonable or not. However, for better, for worse, the matter is established.”

And Lord Chelmsford :—

“Why, if owners are willing, upon terms which they consider advantageous to themselves, to undertake the risk of all goods sent by Railway, even including the negligence of servants of the Company, and agree with the Company to bind themselves by a special contract duly signed to that

effect, should a judge be invested with authority to say, 'Whatever you may think, I consider your contract not just or reasonable, and however willing you may be to be bound, I release you from your engagement.'

And Chief Justice Erle :—

"Now as the profits from carrying depend much on contracts for carrying . . . an intention to make Railway contracts uncertain appears to have the evil of taking from this property a security which belongs to all other property in trade."

And so strongly did this last-named most eminent Judge feel that the system pressed harshly and heavily on Railway Companies, that he could scarcely persuade himself that it was law at all, and thus expressed his doubts :—

"A decision which accords with the best interests of the community governs undisputed in like cases ; but a decision *which does violence to common sense of right* becomes the subject of perpetual contest, till it is overruled. The decision has been many times contested by Railway Companies—by the Great Western Railway Company, the Great Northern Railway Company, the Eastern Counties Railway Company, and the South-Eastern Railway Company. In each case, this litigation has been unsuccessful to the Companies on the various grounds of fact, on which the Court, performing the functions of a jury, have given their verdict. But it has been constantly renewed on a principle which probably will ultimately prevail—viz., that service must be paid for according to contract."

Again, as to the "Equality clauses," prohibitions of undue preference, &c.—it would be difficult to compress into a paragraph the conflict and uncertainty these have brought about. A Scotch decision, one way ; an English decision, the other way. The use of the word "*Undue*" implying that there may be "*due* preference," the eternal question as to what is *due* and what *undue*—the decision of the Court of Common Pleas, after "very considerable doubt," that the fair interests of the Companies *may* be taken into account—the difficulty, which the Board of Trade found, in saying what is "a grievance," or what is meant by "like circumstances"—are some few of the difficulties and questions which have occurred. The absurdity of the notion that Railway Companies are not to be allowed "to favour themselves" seems apparent, and the injustice of the rule expressed as follows, by the Committee with complacency, seems no less so :—

"In order to insure fair treatment to those who travel by the Companies' steamers, but not by their railway, Parliament has also provided that such persons shall not be charged higher fares for the sea passage than those who do."

In other words, a large customer is to have no benefit over a small customer *in this respect* ; and yet, in a well-known case, it was decided that a customer who supplies a great quantity of coal, to be carried, *might* be *duly* preferred to one who supplies a small quantity.

No one need be surprised to hear that those who have benefited by this interfering system of law have not been members of the public, but the two classes mentioned above. I will say nothing of the lawyers; but as to the Packed-parcel Carriers, and their interests, I will quote Chief Justice Cockburn:—

“I must confess I have always felt that the *packed-parcel* system operates hardly upon the Railway Companies.”

And Chief Justice Erle:—

“The Judges seem to have thought that a supposed liability to several actions of trover, in case of the loss of a packed parcel, was the only grievance of which the Companies had to complain in respect of such packing; whereas the real grievance is, the loss of large sums of money which are received for the carriage of parcels—a loss constantly increasing in amount as the process of packing is better understood, and the numbers of intercepting carriers multiplied; and a loss, accompanied both with hindrance in the conduct of business, and also with much litigation, if the Companies make any effort to save a portion of the sums due for the carriage of parcels from being intercepted.”

And again,—

“The quantity of his business is no ground for depriving a carrier of the hire he stipulates for, still less is it a reason for granting it to another.”

As to the interests of the general public in these matters, it seems clear that the public does not understand them. When the subject is pressed home, we get such answers as these, the first of which was given to the Committee by a complaining manufacturer of Lancashire:—

“We have no complaint to make against the Railway Companies in our district, neither ourselves nor our neighbours, of any personal favour or disfavour; but it is simply a sort of mechanical operation: when it gets into the lawyers' hands it is treated mechanically and dryly, and the policy of the Company is enforced by all available means.”

The other answer was a complaint of the Rates; not that they were *partial*, but that they were *unscientific*.

It is not easy to satisfy such strange and vague requirements, which, it will be observed, no “Equality Clauses” can gratify. As a fact, the existing law is not necessary for the protection of the public, and, equally as a fact, the public do not avail themselves of its provisions. Informers, packed-parcel carriers, and those who make a trade or amusement of litigation, are the persons generally in hot water with the Companies. A witness before the Committee is asked,—

“That is the law at present, is it not?”

His answer is:—

“Whether the Railway Companies are compellable or not, I do not know; but nobody compels them.”

Again,—

“Have you ever tried to act upon that clause?”

Answer: “Never.”

This part of the subject might, I think, be summed up in the words of Chief Justice Erle:—

“The notion that the customers of Railways require protection on account of incapacity to resist oppression is not more true than the notion that, against a large proportion of customers, Railway Companies stand in need of every aid the law can afford.”

And a very fair conclusion would be, I venture to suggest, to leave both to the *ordinary law of the land*.

Under the newest scheme of all, the three Railway Commissioners now divide with the Law Courts the duty of administering the system I have been thus describing. The three gentlemen who form the new Court are eminently qualified to succeed, if success could be attained by ability, experience, and learning; but all these must fail in bringing order out of chaos, where Interference itself is the cause of confusion. As a Court of Arbitration, the Commissioners may succeed, but as a Court of Interference, they merely reproduce old evils. Mr. Farrer, under the persuasion of his chief, can scarcely be got to say a word in their favour. “If there is to be any tribunal to deal with questions of this kind at all,”—is the cold way in which he alludes to the proposal; and again,—

“Supposing competition to have ceased altogether, and there to be one body managing the whole carrying traffic of the country, the functions of this Tribunal would by that time have very nearly come to an end, because it would be their interest to develop the system harmoniously.”

And again,—

“I think that the most immediate problem is how to make the Companies work harmoniously together; at least, that is the only immediately practicable problem.”

Captain Tyler speaks out plainly:—

“I do not think that you can construct any department, or erect any tribunal, which shall be able to deal satisfactorily with the regulation and supervision of rates and workings of Railways, so long as they are in the hands of the great Companies.”

The Report of the Committee of 1872 contains the following passage:—

“It is to be observed that the Railway representatives, whilst many of them are anxious for a special tribunal to settle differences between different Railway Companies, almost all of them deprecate any similar tribunal to settle differences between the Railways and the public.”

Mr. Price was one of the deprecating witnesses, and it is to be hoped that he will enforce his opinion, so far as his new duties, and his colleagues, will permit.

And now may I not venture to sum up the results of the system of "Interference" in one word—Failure? If the Report of the Committee of 1872 be carefully studied, it will be found, I think, to suggest most plainly such a conclusion. I began by saying, and I conclude by saying, that one of two things ought to be. The Government ought to regulate the Railways, or the Railway Companies ought. A mixed system of carrying on the trade, a double Government in the fields of Commerce, can produce nothing but confusion, irritation, expectation on the part of the public, which cannot be gratified, an unfair condition of uncertainty on the part of shareholders, and discontent, from the Bench downwards to the humblest passenger, who is taught to believe the Companies are "fair game." After the most elaborate attempts to restrain and fetter the Railway Companies, nobody seems to know what the law really is; Judges shrug their shoulders, or, in the language of Chief Justice Erle, as applied to some of them, "seem to think it just that the Railway Company should always pay for every damage or loss;" Juries, of course, in this respect, go further than the Judges; witnesses before Committees, in the words of Lord Salisbury, have "an idea, that when the trade is bad, the Companies should take the loss, and when the trade is good, the public take the advantage;" Newspapers cry aloud and spare not; and Mr. Richard Walker may well be excused for describing the present system as "a *mêlée*, and a scramble."

Shareholders, in the meanwhile, think that they are unfairly dealt with. "Somebody," says Sir Edward Watkin, "has said that no shareholder's property is safe while Parliament is sitting." Sir Edward does not go so far himself; but warns Railway Companies against reminding Parliament of their existence; a system of secrecy and mystery is often maintained merely from an instinct of self-preservation; traffic arrangements are hampered, facilities are checked, liberality is discouraged by a feeling of soreness and grievance, and a dread of what may be the next move on the part of the authorities; and a mischievous rivalry and semi-warfare are encouraged:—

"*Marquis of Salisbury*.—In the past, have not the Managers of the Railway Companies generally had the best of it in their transactions with the Board of Trade?

"*Mr. Morrison, M.P.*—I have always understood that they have, and that is the view of the public.

"Do you think that the mere multiplication of new regulations would establish an equilibrium of intelligence between traffic managers and the Board of Trade?

"I should think that the permanent staff of the Board of Trade would become educated in the course of time."

II.

Space forbids my doing more than quote a few authorities to

show that the public need not dread, as they are accustomed to do, a system of *Non-Interference* with Railway Companies. It has been the fashion to anticipate all sorts of evils: let the experiment at least be made, under the sanction of the opinions I have quoted and am about to quote. Mr. Farrer says:—

“One sees that there are all sorts of suspicions of unfair favour on behalf of traders, but in almost every case, when it comes to be sifted, it is shown that there is very good reason for what is done.”

And, as to the facilities offered of their own accord by the Companies to the public:—

“I imagine there are greater facilities in this country than in any other for merchandize.”

We have already seen that he thought “desirable things” would be granted without compulsion, and that, if left to themselves, the Railway Companies would find it “to be their interest to develop the system harmoniously.”

The Committee itself gives credit to the Companies for having themselves originated “the important” system of the Railway Clearing House, and although it shrinks from acting upon the following facts, it states them clearly:—

“It is the interest of the Companies to develop traffic wherever that traffic will produce them profit. It is their interest to encourage new and promising traffic, even if the immediate profit may be little or none; it is their interest to foster new routes and to maintain them against existing competition; to develop new ports or harbours; and to promote competition between distant seats of trade or manufacture by neutralizing the distances which nature has placed between these seats and the various markets for their products. In all these cases, the wealth and resources of the Companies enable them to incur present loss for the sake of future advantage; and although in so doing, they may be exposed to the charge of making some parts of the system pay for others, their action is probably, on the whole, advantageous to the public, as well as themselves.”

There is, of course, a “but” after this; but the admissions are important. Again,—

“The directors and principal officers of these great undertakings are often men of high standing, who feel that their position is something different from that of mere managers of a trading concern, and become in a certain sense amenable to public opinion, and especially to its ‘expression in Parliament.’”

What do these Directors say for themselves? Mr. N. S. Thompson, Chairman of the North-Eastern Railway Company, is asked by the Chairman of the Committee:—

“If you had no inducement to lower the fares in consequence of competition, what were your inducements in the case?”

His answer is:—

“The strongest inducement is the same which induces a farmer to manure his farm in order to increase his returns. Laying out money to

improve a district and reducing the charges stimulates production and develops the resources of the district. We do not hold that we are patriots, who are to give away money, but we believe that the best course to be taken is to consider the wants of the district and to help to increase its resources. This is the most profitable policy in the long run for any Railway Company, *which has the sole possession of a district.*"

Mr. Childers asks Sir Edward Watkin :—

"And you think that the possibility of constructing new lines between the great centres of traffic is such, that that weapon can be really held over the heads of the great Companies?"

Sir E. Watkin answers :—

"I do; but I trust rather to their own enlightened self-interest than to anything else.

"*Mr. Childers.*—Their self-interest, I suppose, would be to make as much as they can both presently and prospectively?

"*Sir E. Watkin.*—Wisely and safely; just as a tradesman fixes his prices, not for the customers of to-day—not to squeeze the last farthing out of the customers of to-day—but to establish a connection and to extend it."

In 1845, Mr. Saunders, the well-known Secretary of the Great Western Railway Company, told a Committee :—

"I do see certainly, *to my astonishment*, an enormous increase of traffic as the fares of the Railways are brought down."

What Mr. Saunders viewed with astonishment has now become a truism; although, of course, there is a "starvation point" to which the lowering must not be carried. Even a hostile witness admits to the Committee that he

"Thought Directors of Railway Companies, as a whole, now believed that their own interest and the public interest are the same."

Another hostile witness is gracious enough to say of the internal working of Companies :—

"I do not say that the Railway system, as it is at present, is badly managed. On the contrary, it is very well managed."

Another, more gracious still :—

"I have always been received with great courtesy by the Railway officials: I certainly must do that justice to them."

Mr. Pease, M.P. for South Durham, says :—

"I have always thought that the first protection was the Company's own interest in getting as large a traffic at as remunerative rates as it could. Then there is a very considerable protection in the popular voice; and also in the press, which may be said to be part of the popular voice; and then there is a great protection in the shareholders. The shareholders who attend the general meeting are always those who are living in the district, and have a much larger interest in anything that adds to their comfort and to the prosperity of their immediate district than they have in their dividends even; and then there is also the fear of competition; because I do not believe that competition itself is advantageous because it so soon becomes combination."

My last quotation must be the following:—

“Earl of Derby.—I do not understand you to say that the Companies have abused the powers that they possess, but only that there is a possibility that they might do so?

“The Secretary of the General Post Office.—Quite so ; they do not hamper us at all.”

In conclusion :—I trust that some of my readers will carefully consider the above quotations. This article is necessarily simply suggestive. Has the time arrived or has it not, for a fair and attentive consideration of the question—“May not Railway Companies in this country be gradually treated more and more as ordinary branches of Trade?”

JAMES HENRY MANGLES.



ON DOGMA AND DOGMATIC CHRISTIANITY.

IN a former paper I sketched what appeared to me a prevalent tendency towards "Dogmatic Extremes." My paper was originally addressed to students in divinity who are well versed in the meaning of "dogma," and I was not careful, therefore, to define what I meant by this expression. Probably I should have done so, considering what an open field Theology has now become, and how many clever and intelligent writers there are who know so much about it, and who are continually watching for the failings of professed theologians. The views which I expounded seemed to me of a very trite and familiar kind. They have been so long familiar to my own mind that I probably underrated their significance to minds unaccustomed to Theological thought. I have been well warned certainly that I have reason to ponder what I said, and acute critics have pointed out to me the various meanings of the word "dogma," and asked with an intensity more passionate than polite, what I could mean when I reprobated "dogmatism," and the present passion for "Dogmatic Extremes."

Especially has the idea of any separation betwixt Dogmatism and Christianity been treated as absurd. Christianity, is nothing, it is said, if not dogmatic. One might as well speak of the Claimant as not exactly Sir Roger Tichborne, and yet as not having altogether committed perjury, as speak of Christianity not being a set of definite propositions, and yet not being an imposture. "To be a Christian is to start from a dogma of the most tremendous kind. . . . Unsectarian means unchristian; unsectarian Christianity can no more

exist than can a triangle which is neither scalene, nor isosceles, nor equilateral.* This is what it has come to with writers of a certain school, from Strauss to those in this country, who, with little or none of his Theological knowledge, have sought to imitate his "strong" hand. One could bear it somewhat from the great Master of Modern Unbelief, when one remembered the struggles through which he had passed, and the imploring pathos of those searching eyes (now closed in death) which had sought in vain for any truth within the Church whereon to rest. But it astonishes me, I confess, to find that this tone should impose upon any who have ever really exercised their minds on religious questions, and that it should be thought not only a clever manner of retort, but a grave process of argument to put to a Theological writer the first proposition of the Nicene Creed, or the second paragraph of the Apostles' Creed, and ask him, in a trenchant voice, what is true and what is not true in either. Are not the statements in both cases as plain,—as clear as words can make them?—and you must either accept them and be a Dogmatist, or reject them and be an infidel. There is no alternative—and any attempt to explain the growth of dogmatic propositions (of which these two articles are considered types), or to separate what may be accidental in them from what is essential, is to palter with words in a double sense. It is contemptible and barely honest for a Christian teacher to examine the worth of religious tradition which he is paid for teaching. He had much better let religious thought alone, and take to some philanthropic work; "hold his tongue," and not attempt to "define his Theological position."

It is impossible not to feel humble under such a rebuke as this, and it is in a spirit of reflective humility that I desire to pursue the subject a little further. If hard words do no other good, they make one pause a little, and consider one's bearings; and there is some advantage in seeing how a certain sort of mind, of much vigour and acuteness in other directions, may misconceive a subject for which it has little aptitude, and certainly has had no adequate training. The misconceptions of such a mind are no doubt significant of a world of misconception on the subject.

I.

First as to "Dogma" and "Dogmatism." It need hardly be said that I did not use the word "Dogma" in the sense in which Roman Catholic writers use it. I am a Protestant, and I was writing for Protestant hearers and readers. It would have been absurd, therefore, for me to fall back upon a meaning of the word which has been

* The words are originally those of Mr. Leslie Stephens, in his "Essays on Free Thinking and Plain Speaking." But they are quoted by a writer in the *Saturday Review* (Feb. 21), in reference to my paper as "giving utterance to an incontrovertible truism."

long unknown to the Protestant intelligence. When the Roman Catholic Theologian speaks of dogmas he means the authoritative utterances or decrees of his own Church. It is the essential principle of Catholicism to recognize in reference to all moral and religious ideas a living authority whose deliverance is binding upon the mind and conscience. To the Catholic, "dogma" is the expression of this authority, and this may have been the original meaning of the word. But the word has no less become the property of Protestant Theology in a quite peculiar and intelligible sense. To the Protestant, dogma is not any mere authoritative or accepted statement of Divine Truth, but *the reasoned expression or formulated statement of this Truth*. In other words, it is Divine Truth in a deductive or logical form—we might say in a scientific form if we did not wish to avoid controversy as far as possible. Religious Truth may or may not be reducible to strictly scientific form. No one can possibly doubt that it is capable of being put into a logical or propositional shape different from that which it appears in Scripture, or in the popular religious consciousness. Nor can any one who knows anything of the subject fail to know that this is what is meant when a Protestant Theologian speaks of religious truth as dogma. There is nothing new or even modern in this sense of the word. It is clearly acknowledged by Hooker as quoted by Mr. Matthew Arnold, and adopted by him; and Mr. Arnold's authority may have more influence with some of my critics than that of his original, or of any professed Divine. Speaking of Hooker with approval, he says that according to this great writer, Church Dogma "is not written in black and white in the Bible: it has to be collected from it; it is, as we now say, a development from it. This and that dogma," in Hooker's words, "are in Scripture nowhere to be found by express literal mention, only deduced they are out of Scripture by collection."*

It is in this argued out, or inferential form that the ideas of Scripture or of Christianity became Dogmas. This and this alone is the sense in which the word is understood amongst Protestant thinkers. It may or may not be the right sense—it is the well understood sense. Protestant Theology must be allowed to have its terms as well as any other branch of study, and I may say without any challenge, that there is not a single Theological writer in Protestant Germany, France, or England, to whom this use of the word is not at once familiar and intelligible. It is, indeed, the only sense in which they think of the word. Having left behind them the living authority of the Catholic Church, dogma is to them not this or that decree or voice of Divine authority, but the peculiarly human, because fallibly deduced form, into which the Divine fact or thought in Scripture or in Christian consciousness has been resolved.

Be it observed that it is the essential conception of dogma in this

* "Literature and Dogma," Preface, xxi.

Protestant sense that it embraces a human or fallible element. It is not the Divine in its revealed form, but in the deduced or drawn-out form which Christian thought has elaborated from revelation. I direct attention to this because there are those who, while agreeing so far with the Protestant view, yet fail to see how far this view necessarily carries them. "What is Dogma," for example they ask, "but a formal statement of some known truth. If there is to be no dogma, there can be no ascertained truth. If we admit ascertained truth we admit dogma—for the two things are strictly equivalent." Not at all equivalent, we say, in Theology or anything else. Ascertained truth is strictly equivalent to *the verity of things*, the real being or relations of natural and divine facts. But dogma is the human explanation or rational statement of such facts. Take any view you like of the genesis of dogma, it cannot be denied that it is not the original, but a derivative form of Divine Truth—an expansion or development of it—and that this process of expansion or development has taken place under the ordinary laws of reason or thought. It is impossible for a Protestant to hold any other view than this, or at least to hold any other view intelligently. Supposing Scripture is to him an infallible authority, yet dogma is not Scripture, but only a deduction from it, and fallibility necessarily cleaves to every process of human deduction. It may or may not accurately express the Divine Truth. And yet a truism like this has seemed an astounding statement to make. It is easy to be astonished when one refuses to think.*

I have tried to speak as plainly as I can, and to avoid as much as possible mere theological nomenclature. Let me try to make my meaning still more unequivocal by a few illustrations. Among the most characteristic dogmas of Christianity, are those of the Trinity and the Atonement, to which I formerly alluded. Take the former as contained in the Nicene Symbol or the Athanasian Symbol. Is it possible for any student of the history of Christian thought, not to recognize the difference betwixt the Nicene Creed and the statements of Scripture. Every significant word of the Creed more or less indicates the difference. It bears upon it the dint of controversial association and discussion during two centuries. It gives more or less a definition or explanation of the general language of Inspiration. In other words, it translates that language into precise, scholastic terms,

* Any of my readers who are specially interested in the subject, may be referred to a discussion of What is Dogma? in Herzog's "Encyclopädie für Theologie," under the general article *Dogmengeschichte*. The answer, like so many German answers to Theological questions, is not very quotable in a summary form. But after dwelling upon the representative and authoritative character of dogma, as the expression of the general Christian consciousness, or the consciousness of the Christian community, the writer proceeds to show that, besides this element of authority, it always embraces an element of definition or intellectual elaboration. Is this element essential? he asks—and decides in the affirmative, on the express ground of the familiar usage of the word to denote the contents of a dogmatic system, or Science of Christian Belief.

and designs to interpret its meaning for us in a summary or monumental form. This is the object of all creeds, and the reason for all dogmas—that men have wished to collect into brief, or at least summarily articulated propositions, the main ideas of Scripture—the cardinal thoughts of Christianity. And the thought of God in Christ being supreme before all others in the early Church, this was the great thought which was necessarily first articulated or expressed in dogmatic form. In the estimation of the Catholic, this was done under divine or infallible guidance. The Nicene Creed is to him consistently quite as much an expression of Divine Truth as the language of Scripture. But to the Protestant such a view is untenable. He may reverence the Nicene Creed, or even the Athanasian Creed, as truly as the Catholic. He may hold that both the one and the other accurately express Divine Truth—and the Truth thus expressed may be as dear and vital to him as to the Catholic—but the *dogmatic form* of the Truth, Nicene or Athanasian, can have to him no Divine authority. It is nothing more than the work of men fallible as himself and as liable to error. In this case they may not have erred—their deduction may have been made with rigorous accuracy—and so the Protestant may come to the same practical conclusion as the Catholic, and agree with him that the dogma of the *Homoousion* is the very truth of God. And yet it cannot be so *per se* to him, but only because he has satisfied himself that it is the true meaning of Scripture.

And all this applies equally to any other dogma, and with more apparent force to most others, because the harmony of theological assent soon begins to break down, and what is dogma to the Catholic ceases to be dogma to the Protestant, or what is dogma to one Protestant, is no longer dogma to another. Take the other example which we happened to cite. We have not in this case the advantage of comparing with the language of Scripture, any such Catholic statement or definition of doctrine as in the former case. But why so. Simply because the idea of the Atonement was not elaborated, or set forth in a dogmatic form till a much later period in Christian history—after the Eastern and Western Churches had separated. The former may be said never to have advanced beyond the Nicene Theology. The latter, with its higher mental activity, continued the elaboration of Christian thought in many directions; and amongst others in the direction of defining Christ's work as well as His nature, and His relations to the Father. And from the time of St. Anselm onwards, we find various systematic definitions of the Atonement. It may be said that the true dogma of the Atonement is something independent of any of these human definitions or theories, and is to be gathered directly from the pages of Inspiration. Even if this be admitted, it is still not in these pages "in black and white," as Mr. Arnold says, but has to be gathered or collected from

them. And is not the process of collection a purely *human* process liable to error? Is a certain imperfection not of its very nature?

I say nothing now of the mysterious nature of the subject, necessarily transcending on this account, adequate statement or definition. I cannot expect some of my readers to follow me in this line, although I thought that the transcendental element in all Christian dogma was almost a commonplace since Coleridge's famous essay in his "*Aids to Reflection*."* Apart from the inscrutable character of such subjects as the Trinity and the Atonement,—against which all human definition breaks,—is it not obvious that the very process by which the conclusive dogma in these and other cases is formed, renders it, we do not say—uncertain—but fallible? It may contain every side of the truth expressed with perfect accuracy. We are not now concerned with the soundness of any given doctrine. But it may not do so. On the Protestant principle there can be no guarantee that it does so. Even common assent is no such guarantee. No combination of voices can strengthen an inference which may be weak in itself. In other words—for this is plainly what it comes to—every dogma has to prove itself in the light of that Revelation from which it professes to be drawn. It is liable to be constantly revised in this light, and "purified and idealized" in its higher vision.

If this is not good sense as well as Protestantism, I do not know what sense is. And yet some of my English critics have called it "nonsense." They can admit no hesitation about dogma. It is either true or false—all true or all false. Because certain forms of language are intelligible, or seem intelligible to them—for it is evident that the language of even such simple propositions as they quote is not, with all their cleverness, fully understood by them—they will allow no criticism of terms, or pause of mind. Probably the poor Theologian is quite at one with them after all. But, unhappily he is a Theologian, and his function has taught him to see more in the words than they see; to trace in their face their long descent of meaning, and mentally to estimate how far they are true to their original, before he takes them into his confidence.

This is true even of such simple statements as those of the Apostles' Creed, which is the favourite one with my critics—Their dogmatic studies have evidently not carried them much beyond this well-known symbol. I might urge that there is hardly one of the articles of this Creed which does not involve meanings more subtle and difficult than they seem to dream of.† But I am not bound to argue

* Vol. i. 257, et seq. Pickering, 1848.

† Take for example, as suggested by a friendly critic, the word "Father," in the first clause. Is that word to be understood in its ordinary secular sense—or if not, in what precise sense? Is its full meaning not something beyond our intelligence? Or take the further words of the clause, "Maker of Heaven and Earth," not added till a late period in the development of the Creed. This phrase was not originally a

this point with them, for the simple reason that I did not use the word dogma in the sense of such statements as those of the Apostles' Creed. This Creed is a summary of popular faith which grew up in the early Church, with a view to the administration of Baptism. It grew clause by clause, not under any impulse of deliberately-directed thought, such as that under which the Nicene symbol and no doubt also the Athanasian symbol were prepared, but under the impulse of the popular intelligence to embrace in a convenient form the great supernatural facts to which popular belief was pointed. It is neither more nor less than the expansion in this way of the original formulary of Baptism, "I believe in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost,"—an expansion which did not reach its present complement till probably the middle of the eighth century.* Its statements accordingly are not definitive, or at least not designedly so. They are affirmations of a series of supernatural facts, without any explanation or theory of those facts; and whether you call them dogmas or not, it should have been plain to any intelligent reader that I did not and could not mean such statements when I spoke of the character of dogma as I did in my last paper. I was speaking quite clearly not of matters of fact, but of theological principles. That our Lord "suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead, and buried, and rose again the third day from the dead," are matters of fact to be determined upon evidence. The very absence of "haze" or mystery from them shows how entirely they belong to a different category from the dogmas of which I spoke. I am not going to quarrel about a word. My critic may, if he likes, call such facts dogmas, and the assertion of them dogmatism. It is not the less true that no one could have read my previous paper with intelligence and candour, and supposed for a moment that in condemning dogmatism I had any reference to such matters. Why, the very object of my paper was to vindicate Christianity from the extravagances of those who, on the one hand, refuse to look fairly at the evidence for the facts lying at its basis, and those, on the other hand, who overlay those facts with dogmatic theories. I wrote in favour of having the question of the truth of Christianity looked at on its own merits, apart from dogmatic preconceptions on the one side or the other,—on the side of science or of faith. And yet I am made to suggest to the innocent reader that it may or may not be

mere popular commonplace—as it now reads—but was introduced in opposition to the views of the Gnostic thinkers regarding the innate corruption of matter.—See "The History of the Creeds," p. 169 (1873), by J. R. Lumley, B.D., late Fellow of Magdalene College, Cambridge.

* "It was not for 300 years or more after the death of Augustine that the (Apostles') Creed was expanded to its full dimensions, and the last clauses added thereto are on the 'Descent into Hell,' the 'Communion of Saints,' and finally the addition of the words 'Maker of Heaven and Earth' to the first Article."—"The History of the Creeds," cited above.—P. 173.

true that Christ rose from the dead ; that "if people like to believe in the resurrection they may, and if not they may let it alone;" that the whole matter is enveloped in haze, and that nothing can be distinctly made of it. It is so easy to make a smart reply when you have both the statement, or rather the misstatement, of the case, and the reply in your own hands.

Writers like my critics very well illustrate what I intended by "dogmatic extremes." I spoke of "haze" or indefiniteness as a characteristic of Christian dogma. I meant what I said—that divine verities are beyond the full grasp of human intelligence ; that let us look at them as steadily as we can, we yet only see them as "through a glass darkly;" or, in other words, that they partly lie beyond our clear sight and comprehension.* Can there be any doubt of this? Is it not a saying so common as to be a commonplace? And yet it is either so unintelligible or so mistaken by my critics that I am made to say over and over again that Divine truths are partly true and partly false. I am tossed from one horn of the dilemma to another. Is then an object imperfectly seen falsely seen? Is a truth imperfectly uttered a falsehood? Does not the falsehood only arise when we insist on regarding the imperfectly seen object as seen in all its parts, or the imperfectly uttered truth as completely known? Surely, so long as we continue in this mortal state we can only "know in part." We can never have an adequate conception of the Divine. Our dogmas, therefore, can never fully express it. They bring it near to us, and help us to understand it, and so every reverent mind will regard them with reverence and learn from them with humility. But so to use dogmas as to silence thought, to turn them either into absolute equivalents of the Divine or summarily to reject them as mere human inventions, or "scholastic phrases representing nothing at all except antiquated metaphysics," this is Dogmatism—the dogmatism of the bigot on the one hand, the dogmatism of the sciolist on the other. The dogmatist is the man who knows at once what is true and what is false about everything. He will allow for no *nuances* of thought, or uncertainties of inference, or complexities of meaning—in a word, for no modesties of statement. He must have all in "black and white," line upon line, in blocks of hardened logic. He must have question and answer, and you are a poor creature if you cannot answer as glibly as he can question on the most sacred topics. Who does not know, who has any insight at all, how unsuited such a cast of mind is to the apprehension of the deepest thoughts of religion, and how ignorantly it misreads the

* The very expression "haze," seems to have been used by the present Baird Lecturer, Dr. Crawford, in speaking of the "mysterious doctrines of Christianity, the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement." Such doctrines as these—he is represented as truly saying—are beyond our full knowledge "as much from our limited means of acquaintance with them as our mental incapacity to comprehend them."—*Edinburgh Courant*, March 2, 1874.

true history of religious ideas? There was a time when it was customary to put Christianity on its trial as a claimant at the bar, and give sentence after cross questioning of the Old Bailey kind, but I had thought it now generally admitted that this was not the best method of reaching the truth as to the origin of a great spiritual movement, or of sifting the marvellous combination of facts and ideas out of which it has sprung.

II.

But the further question deserves attention by itself—Is Christianity necessarily dogmatic, and unsectarian Christianity a mere misnomer—words without meaning? This question possesses an interest far beyond our present controversy, and enters, indeed, vitally into many of our present modes of thought, political and educational, as well as religious. It has become a favourite style of argument with certain theorists here as elsewhere, standing at extreme points and stretching forth their hands to each other in a strange fellowship, that religion is nothing unless embodied in some sectarian creed, and enforced by some sectarian authority. The Catholic and the Secularist, the Traditionalist and the Indifferentist—the men who believe everything taught by their clergy, and the men who believe nothing—are here agreed. Alike they scout the idea of religion being anything beyond what the churches teach, or the catechisms systematize. It is remarkable how the advance of what men continue to call Liberalism should have landed us once more on the verge of the old falsehood of a priestly caste whose special business is supposed to be religion, and in whose hands it is thought best to leave it. For who knows what it is out of their hands? Unless they give it form and colour, we are told that it has neither tangibility nor effect. The right thing, therefore, is for the political life of the nation to clear itself of this troublesome quantity, and leave the sects to wrangle over it, and make use of it in their own way. And so the Secularist helps the Dogmatist, and despair or indifference about any truth in religion tends to commit it to the custody of those who make a profession of it, and who are necessarily more occupied with the success of their own views than with any investigation into its truth or purity. This may be a necessary development of modern society. In any case its gravity should be fairly seen and acknowledged.

The truly Protestant, and I think the truly liberal idea—recognized as such till recently—has been that religion was a grave reality in our private and public life. Our best thinkers looked upon it as something embodied in creeds no doubt, and for the teaching of which it was well to have a body of men professionally cultured; but as something also higher and more original than any creeds, and which any

man might learn for himself, especially in the pages of the New Testament. They held it to be the business of every man to be able to give a reason for the hope that was in him, and to search the Scriptures whether these things were so which were told him by his teachers. Synods or councils, creeds or catechisms, were acknowledged for what they were worth, but nothing more. They were "not to be made the rule of faith or practice, but to be used as an help in both." I quote from that venerable document which my Southern critics remind me that I have subscribed, and which is to them something dreadful I fear in proportion to their ignorance of it. Intensely dogmatic as the Westminster Divines were—and I have so often said what I think of them in this respect, that I need not repeat it here—they would have been astonished at the modern "liberal" idea, that religion was a thing only of creeds or catechisms, and as such to be banished from our common national life, to the keeping of the clergy. Few men understood better than they what dogmas were, or Dogmatic Christianity; but with all their dogmatism none would have resented more than they the thought that Christianity was not something more—something higher—than their dogmatic system; or, in other words, that there was not a religion of the New Testament independently of the creeds or summaries of dogma which men have made out of it. They were far too good Protestants to be dogmatists in this sense. They would have held—the wisest of them certainly—not less clearly than Charles Dickens,—the opinion expressed by him in his remarkable will in reference to his children, that they should "humbly try to guide themselves by the teaching of the New Testament in its *broad* spirit, and to put no faith in any man's narrow construction of its letter here or there."*

But the religion of the New Testament, my critics may say, is sufficiently dogmatic. No doubt it is so in their sense. It affirms certain facts and makes many statements bearing upon belief and conduct as beyond all question, and if you chose to apply the term dogma to the announcements of the Apostolic teaching, I have only to say again that it is no business of mine. I did not use the expression in that sense, nor would I think of doing so. The Apostolic teaching is in the highest sense authoritative, but it is not theological. It is popular and not formal or systematic.† It lies before the reader here and there without order or concatenation—in solution I might say, applying the very language used disparagingly by one of my critics—and not in solid blocks. And just because it does so theologians have made dogmas and dogmatic systems out of it. The history of Christian theology is the history of those systems—the gradual evolution of what are distinctively known as Christian dogmas. It may be possible for the mind that looks at the outside of religion and re-

* "Foster's Life," vol. iii., Appendix, p. 817.

† What Theologians call *κῆρυγμα* rather than *δῶγμα*.

gards it mainly as a powerful police-force to keep men in order, with a dark cell below for the permanently refractory, to ignore all this intellectual growth of religious thought, and to confound the seed with its development.* The police view of religion is a quite intelligible view, and has its value for morals and society. But it is not the highest view, nor is it that which the theological teacher can be expected to take. It is his business to look at many sides of the subject, and above all to get inside of it, if he can, and trace what is essential in it from what is accidental, what is derivative from what is original, what is a true development from what may be a false. He may start from what my critic† contemptuously calls, "an accretion of religious tradition." I would rather say,—from some fixed point in the development of religious thought. He can no more help doing this than he can help being a fixed point himself. But so far from proceeding to explain away and still less to treat with disrespect the ideas with which he starts, his true and only aim is to *explain them*—to make them intelligible as parts of a great speculative and historic whole on which many minds have exercised themselves from the beginning. This may or may not be a worthy aim in these days of enlightened and strong opinions, but it is surely not a dishonourable one. There is no wickedness in it so far as I can see. And yet the language of the *Pall Mall Gazette* and the *Saturday Review* leave an impression as if it were of very doubtful morality. It is described as a process of "creeping out" of the true character of the Christian religion—of "intellectually creeping through the key-hole,"‡ whatever that may mean. "It cuts at the root of all religious systems, for it miscalculates or ignores the religious element in human nature."§

It would be hardly possible I think to find so much arrogance and narrowness combined save in a certain class of English writers. Whatever is unfamiliar to their modes of thought, although it may be on subjects of which they have made no special study, they regard with contempt. Especially they are impatient of any scientific treatment of religion, as if this were mere Germanism or nonsense. Religion is good as a thing of the Prayer-book or the Parish—as a tradition or a social interest. It is true in their sense of it, or false. But to turn it into a scientific study, or to endeavour to estimate the value of its ideas as a great branch of knowledge, is absurd. Christianity

* To treat Christianity in this manner, says one of the most distinguished of the modern Dutch divines, "is as illogical as it would be to pass a judgment upon the philosophy of Plato, founded not upon Plato himself, and his authentic writings, but upon the later Neoplatonism, or to gauge the words of Aristotle by the conception of his meaning current in the Middle Ages."—Scholten upon Strauss and Christianity, "Theological Review," 1873, p. 201.

† *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 8.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ *Saturday Review*, February 21.

is what they have been accustomed to think it—or nothing. The popular Creed is their embodiment of the “religious element in human nature,” and to lift the vision any higher is to “ignore or miscalculate” this element. To other minds it seems strange beyond measure how any attempt to explain the growth of religious systems or to indicate how the mixed factors of Divine Revelation and human thought have combined to form them, should be esteemed derogatory to religion or in any sense hostile to it. It is the very strength of the religious element moving human history from the commencement which the study of these systems reveals. No man can calculate so nicely the force of this element, or for the most part prize it so justly as the student of religious dogma. Just because he is not a slave to any single form or expression of the religious principle—but the Student of all, he appreciates its true power and proportions. He learns to reverence religion all the more that he does not confound it with any of its intellectual developments, or accept it as a mere master of sentences. A religion which bows before authority because it is authority, which asserts its divine origin mainly by brow-beating human reason and holding in chains human passion, is after all an ignoble religion, as unlike Christianity as it can well be. True religion, on the contrary, as Benjamin Whichcote says in his remarkable Aphorisms, “is intelligible, rational, and accountable—not a burthen, but a privilege. . . . There is nothing so intrinsically rational as religion. . . . The more false any one is in his religion the more fierce (the more dogmatic) in maintaining it—the more mistaken, *the more imposing*.”

It is, indeed, a sad pass to which modern thought would bring us, that we cannot have religion without Sectarianism—“Unsectarian means Unchristian.” Does it? Yes, perhaps, to the man who knows Christianity only by its restrictive embodiments—in whose inner thought its sweet reasonableness has not been revealed, nor its power blossomed into the excellent fruitfulness of all his natural faculties. But “those that are acquainted with the power of it,” says John Smith, “find it to be altogether sweet and amiable”—“and they that live most in the exercise of it shall find their reason most enlarged.” I make bold to say that not only is Christianity not Sectarian, in the common and well understood acceptation of the term, but that Sectarianism only exists in so far as our popular Christianity falls short of its divine ideal. If men only cared for Christian truth as much as for their own opinions about it,—accepted often without either insight or examination,—Sectarianism would rapidly abate and a genuine Catholicity take its place. It is the absence of vital Christian faith, and not its presence, that makes Sectarianism. The less Christian men are, in other words—the less they have of that mind which was in Him whom they call Master,—the more “imposing,” dogmatic, and Sectarian they become. I am, of course, using “Sect” and “Sectarianism” in their

ordinary sense as distinguishing parties and party-objects within the Christian Church. It is possible that in the language of "free-thinking and plain-speaking" Christians themselves are considered a Sect in contradistinction to Mahomedans, or Buddhists, or Free-thinkers. In this unwonted sense Christianity may no doubt be called Sectarian, just as the belief in a Personal God is called a Christian dogma. I might say much of such an abuse of language, and show how far it misrepresents the true spirit of Christianity. But it is needless here or anywhere to fight over words. With the man who speaks of Christianity in its essential and original conception—in other words of the Christianity of Christ—as Sectarian, I have no occasion to argue. His thoughts move in a different plane, and his language is of a different fashion from mine—that is all. It is only because his language covers a well understood meaning which is grossly misleading, and characterizes Christianity not only wrongly, which in any case I think it does, but mischievously—that it appears to me worthy of attention. Sectarianism, in common English speech, is the base stamp of party divisions within the Church—each division with its own set of dogmas striving for the mastery; and the evident intention of many writers at present is to maintain that Christianity and its teaching is necessarily bound up with the inculcation of one set or another of these dogmas—that it has no meaning apart from them. With all my soul I believe that it has, and that it is possible to teach the Christianity of the New Testament without any formal theology, and still more without any Sectarian dogmatism. To maintain the contrary appears to me a vulgar and pernicious error, inconsistent both with facts and with the true character of Christian Theology.

Long before Christian Theology took its rise in the schools of Alexandria, or its primary dogma was formulated in the Nicene symbol, Christianity not only existed, but was more of a living power than it has been ever since. Its dogmas then lay in that very state of "solution" which has been spoken of with so much contempt. They had not been worked into a "definite creed" universally accepted. This has been the peculiar business of Theology, and is something quite distinct from the original simplicity that is in Christ. The one is the product of the intellect seeking after worthy definitions of the Divine—an inevitable task imposed both by the development of Christian thought and the rise of anti-Christian error. The other is the fruit of faith, the life within the soul cleaving to a higher Life and a Perfect Sacrifice, even where knowledge is obscure and dogma lacking. To any one who has studied closely the origin of Christianity, the idea of associating it with a definite Creed, in any such sense as we now know creeds—especially as the secret of its strength—is singularly absurd. Was the Jewish Church,—the Church of St. James,—with all its creed-deficiencies, less really Christian than the Churches of St. Paul or St. John. It was

less perfectly Christian we may admit, because it stood on a lower stage of development—and its members sought to combine their old ordinances with their new faith. But were the hearts of these Jewish Christians less really given to Christ, or their devotion to His cause less intense, or their sufferings for His sake less willing and triumphant. There is no reason for thinking so; and if it be true that the early Jewish communities sunk out of sight and perished in the Catholic growth of the Church, this was just because they turned their imperfect knowledge into dogma, and refused to advance. They became dogmatists—as so many churches have done since—without the capacity of Catholic thought or the patience of Divine anticipation. But faith in Christ Himself, and not dogma, was their creative origin, and the creative origin of the Church as a whole: love, and not knowledge, was its inspiring and conquering impulse. Dogma is the after-growth, and not the moving spring of the Christian spirit. And dogmatic Christianity is the Christianity of the Schools, and not that Gospel which is “the power of God.”

III.

I have exhausted my space, otherwise I should like to say something more of the *animus* of this cry for dogma in certain quarters, and this disparagement of any attempt to distinguish Christianity from the dogmatic systems into which it has grown. None who reads below the lines, however slightly, can doubt whence the cry comes. It is the mere echo in this country of the voice of Strauss. This is the good we are told that Strauss has done. He has “unmasked a host of shams, if he has put nothing better in their place, and has made the elaborate, however unconscious subterfuges of such teachers as *Semler*, *Schleiermacher*, and *Paulus*,” (the combination is exquisite to any one who knows even the rudiments of German theology) “for ever impossible in the future.” Nothing is so obnoxious to this school as the attempt to *understand Christianity*, to trace it through all its dogmatic folds to its original, and so to bring it as a spiritual movement into intelligible relation with the general movement of human thought and life. This, the great task of Modern Theology from the time of *Schleiermacher*, is denounced as a mere dream or imposture. Strauss never ceased to inveigh against it. *Schleiermacher* and *Neander* became with him special names of opprobrium, and his anger continued to grow with the neglect of his own labours and the success of the great school of Christian Science which these names represent. Nothing is so provoking to a school of mere negation as a new growth of Christian thought, a new testimony to the eternally living power of

that Christianity which they have pronounced dead long since and only fit to be buried out of sight. A Strauss always and necessarily hates a Neander—and the two forces cannot be better incarnated than in those two great names now both become historical. In a future paper I may venture to draw out the contrast betwixt them, and to vindicate more fully the function of scientific inquiry in Theology, as the only true antidote to Superstition on the one side, and Unbelief on the other.

JOHN TULLOCH.



MR. BROWNING'S PLACE IN LITERATURE.

NO writer has aroused in his own time and within his own sphere a more positive interest than Mr. Browning. He has been sincerely loved and cordially disliked. For many persons, both men and women, his works have possessed the support, the sympathy, and the suggestiveness of a secular Gospel; whilst with others they have become a bye-word for ambiguousness of thought and eccentricity of expression. He has been abundantly reviewed in each isolated poem; isolated aspects of his genius have been strongly appreciated and even subtly defined; nevertheless, he has been writing for forty years, and the public are more than ever at issue concerning the fundamental conditions of his creative life; the question is more than ever undecided whether he is what he professes to be, a poet, whose natural expression is verse, or what many believe him to be—a deep, subtle, and imaginative thinker, who has chosen to write in verse.

The fact is, perhaps, less strange than it appears. Either opinion may be supported by reference to his writings; whether either is absolutely true can only be discovered through a complete survey of them; and a survey complete enough for such a purpose is by no means easily obtained. Mr. Browning's collective writings are not too voluminous to be read, but their substance is too solid to be compressed into a written review, and with all its variety, too uniform for the species of classification by which reviewing is generally assisted. As a poet, he has had no visible growth; he displays no divi-

sions into youth, manhood, and age ; no phases particularly marked by the predominance of an aim, a manner, or a conviction. His genius is supposed to have reached its zenith in "The Ring and the Book," because nothing he has written before or since has afforded so large an illustration of it, but we have no reason to believe that his writing it when he did, instead of before or afterwards, was due to anything but its external cause ; and we might reverse the positions of "Paracelsus" and "Fifine at the Fair," his first known and his latest original work, without disturbing any preconceived judgment of promise in the one or finality in the other. In their actual relation, each appear in its right place. We see in "Paracelsus" the idealism of a young and lofty intelligence ; in "Fifine" the semi-material philosophy which comes of prolonged contact with life ; but if "Fifine" had been written when its author was twenty-two, it would have seemed full of the sophistry of a youthful spirit, dazzled by the variety of life, and striving to combine incompatible enjoyments and to reconcile incompatible feelings. And if "Paracelsus" were published now, we should hail in it the final utterance of a mind wearied by its own eccentricities and giving in its solemn adherence to the time-honoured methods of human labour and human love. "Fifine at the Fair" exhibits one sign of a riper genius in the tone of satire which does not spare even itself ; but "Paracelsus" bears a still fuller stamp of maturity in its complete refinement of imagery and expression. It shows the touch of a master hand.

We do not mean to assert that during Mr. Browning's long literary career the manner of his inspiration has undergone no change. It has changed so far, that if we compare the first twenty years with the last we shall find emotion predominant in the one period and reflection in the other ; but reflection is considered to have acquired a morbid development in "Sordello," and flashes of intense feeling occur even in the coldest of his later works. The change has been too gradual to draw a boundary line across any moment of his life ; and though it is in the nature of things that a change so gradual should be permanent, there is something in Mr. Browning's nature that prevents our feeling it as such. It appears too restless to crystallize.

To exist thus as a haunting presence in the literary world, never old and never young, always distinctly self-asserting, never thoroughly defined, is to possess the prestige of mystery which Mr. Browning is by some persons wrongly supposed to covet ; and it is precisely because we believe that he does not covet it, that his mysteriousness lies in no intentional involvement of his thoughts, but in the complex individuality which is probably, though in a different way, as mysterious to him as to us, that we do not think his literary reputation has much to gain by any possible solution of it. To those for

whom he is a poet, he appeals in the manner of "deep calling unto deep" in that infinite sense of sympathetic existence which needs no explaining; to those for whom he is not, his mode of self-manifestation will remain uninteresting or obnoxious, whatever its principles may be. But every writer has a certain number of responsible critics whose function is not merely to endorse such impressions, but to determine their causes and in some measure to judge them. No true critic can dispense with all knowledge of the genesis of the ideas which he is called upon to judge; and Mr. Browning's critics can be true neither to themselves nor to him till they have taken the evidence of his collective works on this one great question of what he is and what he has striven to do. We think that, if rightly questioned, their answer will be unequivocal.

We have said that Mr. Browning's genius had no perceptible growth, because it was full-grown when first presented to the world. This does not imply that it had no period of manifest *becoming*; and there is evidence of such a phase in a fragment called "Pauline," which became known much later than his other works, but in the last edition of them occupies its proper place at the beginning. The difference of manner and conception which divides it from "Paracelsus" gives the rate of the progress which carried him in three years from the one to the other, whilst the comparative crudeness of the earlier poem affords a curious insight into the yet seething elements of that almost colossal power. We cannot judge how far "Pauline" was a deliberate product of the author's imagination or a spontaneous overflowing of poetic feeling; but this does not affect its relation to his other creations of an equally esoteric kind, and in thought, though not in expression, it is essentially a youthful work. It is the half-delirious self-revealing of a soul maddened by continued introspection, by the irrepressible craving to extend its sphere of consciousness, and by the monstrosities of subjective experience in which this self-magnifying and self-distorting action has involved it. The sufferer tells his story to a woman who loves him, and to whom he has been always more or less worthily attached; and ends by gently raving himself into a rest which is represented as premonitory of death, and in which the image of a perfect human love rises amidst the tumult of the disordered brain, transfusing its chaotic emotions into one soft harmony of life and hope. The same fundamental idea recurs in "Paracelsus," but in a more subdued and infinitely more objective form. We find there the same consciousness of intellectual power, but with a stronger sense of responsibility; the same restless ambition, but directed towards a more definite and more unselfish end. There is also the same acceptance of love as the one saving reality of life, but the earthly adorer of Pauline has become the exponent of the heaven-born, universal love; and we shall see in one of Mr. Browning's more recent poems how the final

expression of these two modes of feeling may be imaginatively resolved into one. "Pauline" is strongly distinguished from its author's subsequent works by an excessive luxuriance of imagery, employed, not as the illustration of a distinct idea, but as the spontaneous embodiment of a complex and intense emotion. It resembles them in its very delicate and powerful rendering of the passion of Love. One passage especially breathes a perfect aroma of tenderness:—

"—— I am very weak,
But what I would express is,—Leave me not,
Still sit by me with beating breast and hair
Loosened, be watching earnest by my side,
Turning my books or kissing me when I
Look up—like summer wind! Be still to me
A key to music's mystery when mind fails—
A reason, a solution, and a clue!"

The one quality of Mr. Browning's intellectual nature which is at present most universally recognized is its casuistry—his disposition to allow an excessive weight to the incidental conditions of human action, and consequently to employ sliding scales in the measurement of it. The most remarkable evidence of this quality, supplied by his later works, is to be found in "Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau." It is displayed with more audacity in "Fifine at the Fair," with larger and more sustained effect in "The Ring and the Book." But "Fifine at the Fair," though very subjective in treatment, verges too much on the grotesque to be accepted as a genuine reflection of the author's mind; and "The Ring and the Book" represents him as a pleader, but at the same time as a judge. It describes the case under discussion from every possible point of view, but does not describe it as subject to any possible moral doubt. "Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau" is a deliberate attempt on the author's part to defend a cause which he knows to be weak, and as such is a typical specimen, as it is also a favourable one, of his genius for special pleading. It places in full relief the love of opposition which impels him to defend the weaker side, and the love of fairness which always makes him subsume in the defence every argument that may be justly advanced against it; and it also exhibits that double-refracting quality of his mind which can convert a final concession to the one side into an irresistible last word in favour of the other. It is unfortunate that a slight ambiguity in one or two passages obscures the drift of the poem, and disinclines its readers for taking the otherwise small amount of trouble required for its comprehension, for this supposed soliloquy of the ex-Emperor of the French is in every respect a striking expression of the non-pathetic side of its author's genius. Both narrative and argument have a coursing rapidity which rather fatigues the mind, but they are vivid, humorous, and picturesque, carry some serious

thought in solution, and leave behind as their residue a distinct dramatic impression of the easy-going Bohemianism which they are intended to depict. Some objection has been taken to the *mise en scène* of the monologue, and the introduction of the Lais of Leicester Square is, indeed, a violation of good taste which could only be accepted on the ground of entire poetic fitness. But there is even more than poetic fitness—there is historic truth in this ideal approximation of the princely exponent of hand-to-mouth existence to its typical embodiment in the lowest social form.

The Emperor is supposed to describe or imagine the leading actions of his reign under three different aspects—as they appear in the light of his own conscience, as they would have been if they had conformed to a general rule of right, and as they must have appeared to those who measured them by such a rule. He begins by admitting and defending his wavering policy as dictated by the highest expedience; and then proceeds to enumerate the acts and motives which eulogistic historians of the Thiers and Hugo type would impute to him; opposing to this ideal version step by step the rejected suggestions of sagacity, which depicts his actual thoughts and deeds in the obvious shallowness of their temporizing worldly wisdom. The argument which occupies the first half of the book is an elaborate vindication of the policy of leaving things as they are, saving only such improvement as implies no radical change. A piece of paper lying close to the speaker's hand supplies him with an illustration. The paper has two blots upon it, and he mechanically draws a line from one to the other; it does not occur to him to make a third, but it does occur to him to correct the two already made. That he does this and no more is typical of his conduct through life. He has not been gifted with the genius that could create, but he has been gifted with the sober intelligence which appreciates the risk of destroying. The great renewing changes of life are wrought by special agencies and under special conditions, as in the physical world,

" New teeming growth, surprises of strange life
Impossible before a world broke up
And re-made, order gained by law destroyed.
Not otherwise in our society
Follow like portents, all as absolute
Regenerations : they have birth at rare,
Uncertain, unexpected intervals
O' the world, by ministry impossible
Before and after fulness of the days."

And he is convinced that the highest wisdom of a non-inspired ruler is to assist those who are subject to his rule to live the life into which they were born, trusting to the deeper laws of existence to vindicate good through evil, and perfection through imperfection. He too has recognized the destroying folly of sects and opinions;

but he has seen that to suppress the one would be to give predominance to the other, and has thought it best to leave truth to assert itself in the balance of error; he has thought society best saved by being left alone. He too has had dreams of a higher utility, dreams suggested by the

"——— Crumbled arch, crushed aqueduct,
 Alive with tremors in the shaggy growth
 Of wild-wood, crevice-sown, that triumphs there,
 Imparting exultation to the hills!
 Sweep of the swathe when only the winds walk,
 And waft my words above the grassy sea,
 Under the blinding blue that basks o'er Rome,—
 Hear ye not still— Be Italy again?"

But with the time for action had come a new sense of responsibility; nearer duties to fulfil, more urgent needs to satisfy; mouths craving food, hands craving work, eyes that begged only for the light of life—and he has worked first for these. In this strain he continues.

It would be difficult to do a more equal justice than Mr. Browning has done to the abstract truth of the case, and to the concrete circumstances by which such truth might be suspended; nor could anything be more philosophical than his appreciation of the conditional nature of all earthly good, and the fruitlessness of Utopian attempts at reform. Nevertheless, we scarcely ever feel during this first part of the book that we are standing on quite firm ground. Its idea of preservation floats between that intelligent protection of an existing social order which strengthens the good and weakens the evil contained in it, and the mere "*laissez-faire*," which implies no judgment on the present, and invites the deluge for the future; and the speaker nowhere clearly distinguishes the divine mission to work in a certain groove from the natural inclination to do so. It appears to us that he defends from a religious point of view ideas which are the natural outcome of an Atheistical philosophy; and it is the habit of thus interfusing—confusing we cannot call it—principles which other minds keep apart, or in strict subordination to each other, which is so characteristic of Mr. Browning's reasonings upon life. At the end of the book he drops the balance altogether in an appeal, half playful, half pathetic, from the vanity of words to the incommunicable essence of individual truth.

"Bishop Blougram's Apology" is still more sophistical in tone, and though the author represents it in his conclusion as a possible course of argument rather than a just one, it leaves a certain misgiving as to the extent to which he endorses it. It would not be necessary to adduce this monologue in support of the impression conveyed by that of "Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau," but that it derives a fresh significance from its much earlier date, which proves the co-existence of

this casuistic mood with the most poetic phase of its author's imaginative life.

The Bishop excuses himself for having accepted the honours and emoluments of a Church of which he does not fully believe the doctrines, on the plea that disbelief is of its nature as hypothetical as belief, and that it must be not only wise but right to give oneself both temporally and spiritually the benefit of the doubt. He does not say, "My belief is too negative to justify me in renouncing the power for good which I derive from the appearance of belief; or too negative to give me the courage to renounce the good it affords to myself." But he implicitly says, "I am *not* gifted with positive opinions; I *am* gifted with a positive appreciation of the refinements of life and a positive desire for them. I am clearly violating the intentions of Providence if, whilst rejecting a possible truth, I refuse to the one part of my nature that for which I can find no compensation in the other." This palpable confusing of belief with conformity, the higher wisdom with common expediency, worldly profit with spiritual gain, scarcely provokes discussion; and Mr. Browning's concluding lines appear at first sight to value such reasoning at its worth; but we cannot overlook the fact that, while he has put sound objections into the mouth of the Bishop's opponent, he considers the Bishop's unsound arguments to have been a match for them; and the tone of the whole discussion implies at least toleration of the theory that temporal good and spiritual gain are not disparate ideas, but different aspects of one and the same.

There is one poetical passage in this tissue of sophistry, and one true one—that which asserts the frequent shallowness of religious unbelief:—

"Just when we are safest, there's a sunset touch,
A fancy from a flower bell, someone's death,
A Chorus ending from Euripides,—
And that's enough for fifty hopes and fears
As old and new at once as Nature's self,
To rap and knock and enter in our soul,
Take hands and dance there, a fantastic ring,
Round the ancient idol on his base again,—
The grand Perhaps!"

The author takes no account of the many minds in which the disbelief in certain things has assumed the positive character of belief, but his lines are a noble tribute to the tenacity of religious association, even where regret for the displaced idol has no longer power to reinstate it.

If we observe the variety of speculative opinion to which Mr. Browning considers all questions of human conduct to be subject, together with the frequent reference in his works to a Supreme Being in whose will alone lies the absolute solution of such questions, we cannot avoid the inference that the religious sense is far stronger in

him than the moral sense. It is evident at least that his mind naturally subordinates the general laws of morality to the specialities of circumstance, and to a feeling of the distinctive position of every human soul. This belief in a special and continuous relation of the human and the divine, or simply in special Providence, is the mainspring of his religious writings, and sceptic as he is, the material mysticism of Low Church Christianity has seldom found amongst its own disciples a more faithful and earnest exponent. But Christianity is based upon a revelation which he does not profess to acknowledge, and whilst the existence and omnipresence of God are proved to him by the nature of things, he recognizes in nature no distinct expression of His will. It is easy, therefore, to conceive that to a mind at once so sensuous and so poetic, so strongly impressed with the connection between the lowest experiences and the highest consciousness of humanity, sanction will appear everywhere stronger than prohibition, and the very belief in a divine ordaining become, in some measure, the equal justification of the varied possibilities of life. Mr. Browning considers all things as good in their way. The more familiar aspects of this idea are illustrated in the Introduction to "The Ring and the Book," in a passage which gives also some insight into the natural connection between the author's æsthetic impressions of existence and his moral judgments upon it.

" ——— Rather learn and love
 Each facet-flash of the revolving year !—
 Red, green, and blue that whirl into a white,
 The variances now, the eventual unity,
 Which make the miracle. See it for yourselves
 This man's act, changeable because alive !
 Action now shrouds, now shows the informing thought ;
 Man, like a glass ball with a spark a-top,
 Out of the magic fire that lurks inside,
 Shows one tint at a time to take the eye :
 Which, let a finger touch the silent sleep,
 Shifted a hair's breadth shoots you dark for bright,
 Suffuses bright with dark, and baffles so
 Your sentence absolute for shine or shade."

The empirical morality which recommends itself to so many less religious minds is the more remote from his conception that he cannot accept the "greatest happiness" standard on which it is based. An objective standard of happiness derived from the natural exercise of natural human activities is as unmeaning to him as a natural morality to be discovered in the balance of them ; and as little as he accepts the greatest happiness test of the truth of a philosophic belief, so little would he recognize a general-misery proof of the non-existence of God or His malevolence. Happiness is with him something eminently subjective ; as far as possible removed from a net result of determinable conditions ; to be defined in its permanent form as a courageous struggling between

aspiration and circumstance; in its more intense expression as a fugitive balance of the two. He rejects every enjoyment that brings with it a sense of finality as the negation of all spiritual and intellectual life. "Be our joys three parts pain," says his Rabbi ben Ezra. In one of the religious poems, "Easter Day," are the lines:—

"How dreadful to be grudged
No ease henceforth, as one that's judged
Condemned to earth for ever, shut
From Heaven!"

Every serious expression of Mr. Browning's casuistry appears to point to some singular union of belief in the subjectivity of all feeling and conviction with that belief in transcendent existence which always implies the recognition of fixed standards of truth; and this double point of view is so frankly assumed in "Fifine at the Fair" as to give to that eminently fantastic poem a philosophic significance which its more serious predecessors do not possess. Its sensualistic conceptions are expressed with the greatest poetic power, but it asserts with equal distinctness the material unity of consciousness and the separate existence of the soul; and though both ideas may be reconciled by a religious theory of creation, Mr. Browning cannot deny that in accepting the one he cuts away all rational foundation from the other. The morality of "Fifine at the Fair" would be even more eccentric than its philosophy, but that its reasonings are neutralized in this direction by the dramatic impulse under which they were carried out; whether or not the author intended it so. The leading figure of the poem is a hard-working social outcast, whom the author had probably seen, and who appears to have suggested to him some idea of the virtues which reside in self-sustainment and of a moral good that may come of immorality, and the whole resolves itself into a series of speculations on the precise mixing of the fruits of experience that may best conduce to the higher nourishment of the soul. These questionings assume the form of a battle within the hero's mind between Fifine, the vagrant, and Elvire, the symbol of domestic love, and unfortunately the one is conceived as an individual, the other only as a type. Elvire is invested in the beginning with enough of the substance of a loving and loveable wife to give prominence to her husband's arguments in favour of an occasional Fifine; but as the story advances, and its fundamental mood becomes more pronounced, she fades into a pallid embodiment of mild satisfaction and monotonous duty, and by the time Mr. Browning has brought her and her companion back to their villa-door, he cannot resist the delight of making her the subject of a trick which his sense of justice sufficiently disclaims to make him display it in all its heartlessness. His Don Juan proves, in spite of himself, that in individual

life disorder does not naturally lead to order, nor a simply erratic fancy rise to the abstractions of universal love.

We should naturally infer, from the temper of Mr. Browning's mind, that the warmth of its affections would belie the indifferentism of its ideas, and we constantly find it to be so. An innate veneration for moral beauty, of which we find scarcely any trace in his philosophizing poems, asserts itself in all those of a more emotional character, and so various is his mode of self-manifestation that the evidence contained in his collective works of his belief in the necessary relativity of judgment is not a whit stronger than their indirect advocacy of courage, devotion, singleness of heart—in short, of all the virtues which are born of conviction. His imagination is keenly alive to every condition of love; but its deepest and most passionate response is always yielded to that form of tenderness which by its disinterested nature most approaches to the received ideal of the Divine. This feeling attains its highest expression in "Saul," where the anthropomorphism so often apparent in the author's conception of God is justified by historic truth and ennobled by a sustained intensity of lyric emotion which has been rarely equalled and probably never surpassed. It is the outpouring of a passionate human friendship gradually raised by its own strength to the presentiment of a divine love manifest in the flesh, and to which in its final ecstasy the very life of nature becomes the throbbing of a mysterious and expectant joy. The love of love is the prevailing inspiration of all such of Mr. Browning's poems as even trench on religious subjects, and it often resolves itself into so earnest a plea for the divine nature and atoning mission of Christ, that we can scarcely retain the conviction that it is his heart, and not his mind, which accepts it. His romance of "Christmas Eve" presents itself as a genuine confession of Christian doctrine, and the poet is at least speaking in his own name, when he judges the German philosopher who has discarded the doctrine as still subject to its hopes and fears. Nevertheless, the poem proves nothing more than a sympathetic adoption of a certain point of view, and a speculative desire to reason it out; and as illogical as we must regard its attack on the consistent non-believer, so unanswerable appears to us the conviction it expresses of the religious uselessness of any conception of Christ falling short of literal belief. "Christmas Eve" is in every respect a striking manifestation of Mr. Browning's muse, for it combines, as does also its companion poem, his most earnest continuousness of thought with his most deliberate abruptness of expression. Its ideas and images succeed each other with the jolting rapidity of categorical enumeration, and though this manner is well calculated to convey the rugged realities of a Dissenter's meeting, it is singularly discordant with the impressions of the abating storm, and of the lunar rainbow, flinging its double arch across the silent

glories of the night; and with the gradual exaltation of soul and sense, in which the speaker finally realizes the actual presence of Christ.

Mr. Browning is supposed to be taking refuge within the outer door of a Dissenting Chapel on a rainy evening just as the service is going to begin. The congregation, recruited from the slums of the neighbouring town, are hurrying in one by one. The porch is four feet by two, the mat is soaked, every new-comer who edges past flings a reproachful glance at the intruder; the flame of the one tallow candle shoots a fresh grimace at him at every opening of the door. He thinks he had better go in; but within there are smells and noises; the priest is all ranting irreverence, the flock all snuffling self-satisfaction; and in a very short time he plunges out into the pure air again. Alone, in the silent night, the spirit of his dream changes: Christ stands before him; repentant and beseeching he clings to the hem of His garment, and is wafted first to St. Peter's at Rome, where religion is smothered in ceremonial, and next to the lecture-room of a German philosopher, where it is reasoned away by the received methods of historical criticism, and after following through a long course of reflection the successive phases of religious belief, he arrives at the certainty that, however confused be the vision of Christ, where His love is, there is the Life, and that the more direct the revelation of that Love the deeper and more vital its power,—and he awakens in the chapel, which he had only left in a dream, with a quickened sense of the presence among its humble inmates of a transforming spiritual joy, and a more patient appreciation of the coarse medium of expression through which it finds its way to their souls.

The originality of the thoughts contained in this poem lies entirely in their minor developments, which so bare an outline cannot even suggest; but "Easter Day," which forms the sequel to it, is in part the expression of an idea more entirely Mr. Browning's own—the idea of the religious necessity of doubt. He enters with considerable subtlety into the difficulties and conditions of belief, and proves, it appears to us with complete success, that an unqualified faith would defeat its own ends, neutralizing the experiences of the earthly existence by an overwhelming interest in the heavenly, and that a state of expectancy equally removed from the calmness of scientific conviction, and the indifference of scientific disbelief, is the essence of spiritual life. We follow this doctrine with the more interest from its congeniality to our prevailing impression of Mr. Browning's mind; we know how dear to his imagination are the shifting lights, the varied groupings, the curiously blended contrasts of subjective experience; how habitually it recoils from the rigidity of every external standard of truth; and in this implied declaration that he adores in the possible Saviour rather the mystery and the message of

love than the revealing of an articulate Will, we see also the reserve under which his most dramatic defence of Christian orthodoxy must have been conceived. "Easter Day" resolves itself into a Vision of Judgment, in which the man who has been blind to the workings of the spirit in the intellect and in the flesh is threatened with spiritual death; he awakens to a grateful consciousness that this terrible doom has not gone out against him, that he may still go through the world—

"Try, prove, reject, prefer;"

still struggle to "effect his warfare."

In speaking of the religious poems, we cannot leave unnoticed "A Death in the Desert," the finest of the "Dramatis Personæ." St. John the Evangelist has fled from persecution into a cavern of the desert, and there for sixty days been at the point of death; but the care of the Disciples has restored to him for a short space the power of speech, and in a supreme effort of the expiring soul, he bears witness to the presence of the revealed Love and to the coming reign of Doubt, through which its deeper purposes shall be attained. This slow and solemn extinction of the last living testimony to the mysterious truth already fading beneath the hand of time, brooded over by the silence of the desert, yet sustained by the tender reverence of those who watch at the head and feet and on either side of the dying man, fanning the smouldering life into its last brief outburst of prophetic flame, forms a strangely impressive picture; and some of the lines, in which the poet has expressed the clairvoyance of approaching death, have a very noble and pathetic beauty:—

"I see you stand conversing, each new face
Either in fields, of yellow summer eves,
Or islets yet unnamed amid the sea;
Or pace for shelter 'neath a portico
Out of the crowd in some enormous town,
Where now the lark sings in a solitude;
Or muse upon blank heaps of stone and sand,
Idly conjectured to be Ephesus:
And no one asks his fellow any more
Where is the promise of his coming? But
Was he revealed in any of His lives;
As power, as love, as influencing soul?"

Setting aside the points on which it necessarily reflects the common ideas of Theism, or the common experience of rational minds, it appears to us not only that Mr. Browning's conception of the æsthetic and religious life is essentially imaginative and poetical, but that the analysing tendency which is so disturbing an element in his poetic genius is itself overborne and even conditioned by it; that his writings, if not always inspired by poetic emotion, are inva-

riably marked by that conception of life which distinguishes a poet from a pure thinker.

A thinker, as such, will always eliminate what is secondary or incidental from his general statement of a case. With Mr. Browning, thus to simplify a question is to destroy it. The thinker merges the particular in the general; Mr. Browning only recognizes the general under the conditions of the particular. The thinker sees unity in complexity; Mr. Browning is always haunted by the complexity of unity. It is true that a specious reasoner is often a narrow one, and that an excess of imagination is considered synonymous with a deficiency of logic. But we cannot impute narrowness of mind to one whose imaginative powers are coextensive with life; and Mr. Browning's logical subtlety needs no vindication; that it rather works in a circle than towards any definite issue is the strongest negative proof of the presence of an opposing activity, and we believe that nothing short of a profound poetic bias could possess such a power of opposition.

The dominant impression that all truth is a question of circumstance, and consequently all picturesque force a question of detail, explains Mr. Browning's every peculiarity of form and conception. It explains more or less directly everything that charms us in his writings and everything that repels us. His minutest works no less than the greatest, are each marked by a separate unity of image or idea, but this unity is the result of a multitude of details, no one of which can be isolated or suppressed. He evidently imitates the processes of nature, and strives at unity of effect through variety of means; and the principle is no doubt a sound one; but there is in his department of art a manifest obstacle to its application. He sees as a group of ideas what he can often only express as a series, and however he may endeavour to subordinate the parts to the whole, it is almost impossible that in his argumentative monologues he should always succeed in doing so; we do not think he does always succeed. Every successive reading of these works brings us nearer to their central inspiration, gives greater prominence to their leading idea, a more just subordination to their details; but we do not catch the inspiration at once, and it is natural that the minor facts and thoughts which its warmth has so closely transfused within the author's mind should drag themselves out in ours to a somewhat disjointed length, that the variety of proof should somewhat obscure the thing it is intended to prove. This minute elaboration of his ideas has done much, we are convinced, towards giving to Mr. Browning his reputation for the opposite defect of indistinctness in the statement of them. It is easy to mistake a strain on the attention for a strain on the understanding, and in his case the strain on the attention is the greater that, whilst he never condenses his thoughts, he habitually condenses his expression, and thus conveys to

much of his argumentative writing the combined effect of abruptness and length. It is just to admit that, most of all on these occasions he stimulates his reader's mind, lashing it up to its task with the exhilarating energy of a March wind, but the sense of being driven against an obstacle generally remains. We have the wind in our teeth.

From the same intellectual source arises the deeper sense of remoteness which he is so often said to convey. He never employs an ill-defined idea, or a vague or abstruse expression; but his belief in the complexity of apparently simple facts constantly shows itself in the forcing them into new relations, or extracting from them fresh results; and for one person who is capable of following out an abnormal process of thought, and recognizing its individual value and its relative truth, there are a hundred, not wanting in intellectual gifts, to whom it will remain unintelligible or unreal.

Proportionably great is the success of this realistic mode of treatment with all subjects of a pictorial or dramatic nature. The beauties of most of Mr. Browning's minor poems are generally known and appreciated, and it would be difficult to make a just selection from the great number of those which convey an idea, an image, or an emotion, through a succession of minute touches, each in itself a triumph of vivid fancy or incisive observation. The colossal power of "The Ring and the Book" lies less in the exposure of the various lights in which the same action may be regarded by a diversity of minds, than in the author's unlimited imaginative command of the minor circumstances and associations which individualize the same action for different minds. "Red-cotton Nightcap Country" exhibits, on a smaller scale, the value of descriptive minutiae in producing a general effect; and though the poet in this case has had to deal with ready-made personages and events, he retains the credit of having recognized their artistic capabilities and done justice to them. He has not only presented to us the fact that a tragical eruption took place in the midst of an apparently peaceful atmosphere, but by dwelling on the smallest details of its repose he has created the idea of the calm which invites the storm, and the mental stagnation in which passions when once aroused rage unresisted. The story is told in a succession of *genre* pictures, and it is through the realistic accumulation of detail that we gather the ideal force of its catastrophe. In the monologue on the Tower, Mr. Browning has reversed the method, which he pursues with unimportant exceptions throughout the narrative, of presenting its incidents as an ordinary human witness would conceive them; and though we cannot desire to see omitted that part of the poem which contains almost all its pathos and some of its finest poetry, we think that if he had aimed at mere dramatic effect he would have omitted it. He would have left to fancy, speculation, and the balance of probabilities, what real life

could explain in no other way ; as it is, he has given to Mellerio's death the dramatic force of a prolonged preparation and a sudden fulfilment, but he could not resist the speculative pleasure of retracing its mental as well as its actual antecedents, and writing out the deed in the completed thought, which might impart to it a higher significance. His stand once taken *within* the man's mind, his habitual realism asserts itself, and he shows us by how simple a chain of everyday experience the human spirit may be raised to the white-heat of a supreme emotion. Setting aside the minor question of its perfect artistic consistency, we need only compare this monologue, in which thought, anxious and intense, is slowly quivering into deed, with the finest passages of "Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau," to feel how necessary is an emotional, and therefore a poetic subject, to the thorough display of Mr. Browning's genius. In no other is it just to itself. Philosophic discussions, which are mainly intended to prove the infinite refrangibility of truth, must sacrifice breadth to subtlety, and the large insight on which they are based has its only adequate expression in the full creativeness of poetic life. It is not as the "idle singer of an empty day," but it is as poet in the deepest sense of the word, that he has stirred the sympathies and stimulated the thought of the men and women of his generation.

It is of course one thing to accept this view of the essential quality of Mr. Browning's inspiration, and another to place him in any known category of poetic art ; and the place he claims for himself as dramatic poet is open to dispute if we accept the word Drama in the usual sense of a thing enacted rather than thought out. He has written few plays ; in the last, and not least remarkable of these, thought already preponderates over action, and the increasing tendency of his so-called dramatic poems to exhibit character in the condition of motive, excludes them from any definition of dramatic art which implies the presenting it in the form of act ; but he is a dramatic writer in this essential respect, that his studies of thought and feeling invariably assume a concrete and individual form, and the reproach which has been so often addressed to him of making his personages, under a slight disguise, so many repetitions of himself, appears to us doubly unfounded. He is always himself, in so far that his mode of conception is recognizable in everything that he writes. But there never was a great artist with whom it was not so. Nobody cavils at the fact that Shakespeare is always Shakespeare, or that Sir Joshua Reynolds's most life-like portraits are conceived in a manner which stamps them unmistakably as his ; and it is a truism to repeat that it is precisely this subjective conception of the idea to be treated which insures the vitality of the treatment, and which distinguishes the artistic reproduction of nature from a vulgar or lifeless copy-

ing of it. Mr. Browning has, it is true, a verbal language of his own, which is distinct from this finer manifestation of himself; a compound of colloquialisms half eccentric and half familiar, which must be congenial to him, first, because he has created it, and secondly, because he apparently makes opportunities for its employment. It has its strongest expression in parts of "The Ring and the Book," to which it gives a flavour of mediæval coarseness not always inappropriate, but always unpleasing; and we find it in a modified form wherever he is either arguing or narrating from a point of view which we may imagine to be his own; but he never attributes this language to any person who would be by nature unlikely to use it. It is spoken in "The Ring and the Book" by the Roman lawyer and the Roman gossip, but it is not spoken by Pompilia in the outpourings of her pure young soul; nor by Capon Sacchi as he relates his first meeting with her, and the successive experiences which reveal to him, as in the vision of a dream, the depth, the pathos, and the poetry of life; nor by the Pope, as he ponders in solemn seclusion the precarious chances of human justice and the overwhelming obligations of eternal truth. Mr. Browning does not speak it himself, when he tells us how he stood in the balcony of Casa Guidi on one black summer night, "a busy human sense beneath his feet;" above the silent lightnings "dropping from cloud to cloud," and with his bodily eyes strained towards Arezzo and Rome, and his mental vision towards that long past Christmas Day, saw the course of the Francheschini tragedy unroll before him. To every actor in this tragedy he has restored his distinctive existence, and not the least individual amongst them is the man in whom he has most strongly caricatured his own caprices of expression—Don Hyacinthus de Archangelis. He is so unpleasantly real, that, whilst we cannot imagine the history of the case as complete without a statement of the legal fictions that were brought to bear upon it, we scarcely understand Mr. Browning's impulse to clothe a mere representative of legal fiction in this very material form. We can only imagine that in his strong appreciation of the natural unfitness of things, he has found a fantastic pleasure in identifying the cause of the saturnine murderer with this kindly-natured old glutton, whose intellect elaborates the iniquities of the defence, whilst his whole consciousness is saturated with the anticipation of dinner, and the thought of the little fat son whose birth-day feast is to be held. The humanity of the characters in "The Ring and the Book" has, in fact, never been questioned, nor could we do more than allude to it in so merely suggestive a survey of the author's works; but we think there is one part of this extraordinary composition the dramatic importance of which has been somewhat overlooked—Count Guido's second speech. We might say its artistic importance, because this expression

of the central figure of the poem gives to its wide-spreading structure a support which nothing else could give it ; but it is the triumph of Mr. Browning's dramatic inspiration to have felt that this man alone was talking behind a mask ; and that the mask must be torn off ; and to have restored even to this villain in the torments of his last hour, in the hope which sickened into despair, and the despair which ran through every phase of rage, scorn, and entreaty, the sympathy which life even in its worst form commands from life. The concluding cry,

"Pompilia, will you let them murder me ?"

has an almost terrifying power.

Not only are Mr. Browning's men and women complete after their kind ; but as we have already said, he has impressed the fulness of individual character even on his descriptions of isolated mental states. Bishop Blongram has a quite different personality from the Legate Ogniben, though both are easy-going Churchmen, and one probably as convinced as the other that life in the flesh was given us to be enjoyed. Both are distinct from Fra Lippo Lippi, and all are equally so, from the Bishop who is ordering his tomb in St. Praxed's Church. Lippi is the most original of the four, in his mingled candour and cunning, his joyous worship of natural beauty, and his sensuality, as simple and shameless as that of a heathen god. But the last-mentioned Bishop is a mixed product of nature and circumstance, and as such even more powerfully conceived. He is not a genial satirist like the Legate, nor an artistic enthusiast like Lippi, nor a combination of cynic, sophist, and epicurean like Bishop Blongram ; but a childish, irascible old man, with a conscience blunted by self-indulgence, and a mind warped by a life-long imprisonment in ceremonial religionism ; a scholar, a sensualist, and, in his own narrow way, the greatest Pagan of them all. As Mr. Browning depicts him, he is lying very near his end, curiously imagining that he and his bed-clothes are turning to stone, and he is becoming his own effigy ; and as fitful recollections of his past life blend with the thought of death and the presentiment of monumental state, all the luxurious materialism that is in him becomes centred in the details of his tomb ; the gorgeous aggregation of basalt and jasper, and warmly tinted marbles, beneath which he shall lie through coming ages, in a semi-carnal repose, nourished by low sounds and heavy perfumes, and quickened by the triumphant sense that the "Gandolf" who envied him his Love in life, lies envying his magnificence in death. There is something grotesquely pathetic in his petulant entreaties to the sons who inherit his wealth, to impose no stint on that magnificence ; above all, not to defraud it of the lump of Lapis-lazuli of which he robbed the Church for that very purpose, and in the final surrender to the inevitable :—

"Well go! I bless ye. Fewer tapers there;
 But in a row; and going turn your backs
 —Ay, like departing altar ministrants,
 And leave me in my Church, the Church for peace,
 That I may watch at leisure if he leers—
 Old Gandolf at me, from his onion stone,
 As still he envied me, so fair she was!"

Cleon's lament for the largeness of human aspiration, and the limitations of human existence so eloquently resumed in the one line, "It skills not, life's inadequate to joy," conveys the whole image of the pagan artist and philosopher, the man eager for knowledge, but more eager for happiness—who rejects the immortality of his works as consolation for his own mortality, and deprecates all fame and power and learning that cannot contribute to the conscious fullness of life. Andrea del Sarto's whole life and character are embodied in the address to his wife, "You beautiful Lucrezia, that are mine." In the exquisite and mournful tenderness which at once acknowledges and deplures his degrading love for an unworthy woman, the letter of Karshish, the Arab physician, represents the most interesting phase of the scientific mind, with a moral individuality peculiar to the man. Karshish is travelling through Palestine and discovering new physical products, new diseases, and new cures, but he has also seen Lazarus after his reported raising from the dead, and his imagination is haunted by the mental transfiguration of the man, who in his own belief has brought back into time eyes that have looked upon eternity. He condemns the Legend with scientific conviction, and yet dwells on it with a mysterious awe; then suddenly checks himself in words which contain the very climax of the idea of the poem:—

"Why write of trivial matters, things of price,
 Calling at every moment for remark?
 I noticed on the margin of a pool
 Blue-flowering Borage, the Aleppo sort
 Aboundeth, very nitrous."

Mr. Browning has felt kindly towards the earnest seeker for truth, or he would more distinctly have satirized this inverted reflection of the relative greatness of things.

Caliban, in his musings upon Setebos, is an inimitable portrait of the sly, greedy, cowardly, imperturbably practical monster he is supposed to be. He is picturesquely introduced as saying to himself:—

"Will sprawl now that the heat of day is best
 Flat on his belly in the pit's much mire
 With elbows wide, fists clenched to prop his chin."

And being thus both comfortable and secluded, he betakes himself to speculation on the nature and origin of things. The system

which he evolves combines the heretical idea of a secondary creator or demi-urgos with a perfectly Christian anthropomorphism; but he is too great a philosopher to accept the common teleological alternative of a divinity who is in his large way an entirely good man, or an entirely bad one; his system is, in fact, quite *à priori* and unencumbered by evidence of any definite creative purpose whatsoever. He imagines that Setebos being by his nature excluded from bodily pains and pleasures, may have liked to give himself the spectacle of things which felt them, may alternately be moved to satisfaction at his work, and to jealousy of those reflected powers in which his creatures, by reason of their very limitations, surpass himself, and will make or mar, help or hinder, according to the mood which is upon him. If he is ever accessible to a motive beyond the natural impulse to do anything that you happen to have strength for, it will probably be jealousy, and Caliban reminds himself that, with an instinctive appreciation of this condition of the creative mind, he habitually suppresses in his own life all appearance of prosperity; only dances on dark nights, and howls and groans when he is in the sun. He tests these various propositions by references to his own experience, and finds them borne out. Nevertheless, he votes Setebos a nuisance, and hopes that some day he may fall asleep for good, or be absorbed into those colder and more inactive regions of existence which constitute the atmosphere of the Moon.

Mr. Browning has no Caliban amongst his women, but his female studies are almost as various as his studies of men. Pompilia, in her exquisite combination of guileless girlhood and perfect maternity—the queen, in the poem entitled “In a Balcony,” dragging through a hopeless existence, the full-grown burden of a passionate and lonely heart—the Southern-blooded heroine of the “Laboratory,” watching the preparation of the poison which is to destroy her rival with a fierce, eager delight, half-childish, half-demoniacal—the sensitive, intellectual introspective “James Lee’s Wife,” are all so many palpable and distinct creations.

Amongst the Dramas, we find two which detach themselves from the rest as possessing remarkable dramatic qualities, but failing, more or less definably, to realize the exact conditions of a Drama. The earlier of these—“Pippa Passes”—is rather a philosophic romance, since its various scenes are imagined in illustration of a given idea and have scarcely any connection beyond their common relation to it. It wants the coherent interest of a play. We have, however, the full benefit of this loose adjustment of parts in the latitude which it gives to the author’s imagination; and except in his poem of “Women and Roses,” its realism has nowhere so nearly assumed the fantastic richness and haunting intensity of a dream. The slight extravagance of genius which characterizes “Pippa Passes” might mark it, if Mr. Browning’s

works admitted of being so marked, as one of his earlier productions; but there is full-grown dramatic power in its vividness of personation, depth of humour, and the sense of contrast which is with him so unfailing an element of expressive force, and which could scarcely be more forcibly expressed than in the approximation of Pippa's sparkling innocence to the lurid flashings of Ottima's impassioned soul. The idea of the poem is the dependence of the greatest events on the minutest causes, or the most prominent on the most obscure, and it would have been sufficient to sustain a larger and more complicated work, because its value is essentially dramatic. The philosophic importance of the fact which it represents lies in the force of predisposing conditions; and for this reason the objection which has been raised to the effect of Pippa's songs, that they are too insignificant to justify it, appears to us of all objections the most unfounded. This comparative insignificance was needed to show at how slight or indirect a touch a long train of feeling will occasionally culminate or collapse. The little singer herself, in her happy combination of gentle birth and plebeian breeding, of sturdy independence and innocent trust, possesses quite enough individuality to exercise a more direct influence, if such were required. Pippa's day is an idyll in itself, and its picturesque distinctness gives at least an artistic unity to its straggling events. We see it stride in, in triumphant joyousness, in the lines:—

"Day!

Faster and more fast,

O'er night's brim, day boils at last."

And we hear the little holiday-maker bemoan its gloomy close as she lies down to rest sighing out a vague mental weariness, which appears to us at once a natural result of the unaccustomed idleness and a mysterious reflection of the unseen shadows that have encompassed her. The entire poem is written in alternate prose and verse, and is as fitful in expression as in fancy, but there is a playful grace in parts of Pippa's soliloquy which Mr. Browning has nowhere surpassed. And magnificence of imagery can rise no higher than in Ottima's words to her lover:—

"Buried in woods we lay, you recollect;
Swift ran the searching tempest overhead;
And ever and anon some bright white shaft
Burned thro' the pine-tree roof, here burned and there,
As if God's messenger thro' the close wood screen
Plunged and replunged his weapon at a venture,
Feeling for guilty thee and me; then broke
The thunder like a whole sea overhead—"

"The Soul's Tragedy," composed five years later than "Pippa Passes," is more strictly dramatic in form, and its principal personage, the Legate Ogniben, who trots into the insurgent town humming "*Cur fremuere gentes*," with the evident feeling of having

a nursery full of children to slap and put to bed, is one of Mr. Browning's most delightful creations, both as an individual and a type; but it is no less intellectual in motive, and in its own way no less fantastic in conception. Its two acts entitled, one "The Prose," the other "The Poetry," of "Chiappino's Life," exhibit with great force and subtlety, two opposite moral states and their natural connection with each other—a sudden inspiration to virtue, and a gradual relapse from it. But the second phase becomes chiefly known to us through the interposition of the Legate, who humours and then exposes Chiappino's weakness, in order to make him the more ashamed; and his discussing of the question tends to merge it so entirely in a comic philosophy of life, that all its seriousness disappears. It turns out that no real harm has been done, every one slips into his right place; Chiappino is invited to seclude himself for a short time, and as the Legate and his mule trot out again we ask ourselves whether we are intended to recognize in this double episode the lasting tragedy or the mere temporary mishap of a human soul. We think Mr. Browning meant to be tragical, but as all extremes of feeling are nearly allied, the spirit of fun got the better of him, and if we dared look for anything like internal significance in the caprices of dramatic inspiration, there would be considerable significance in the fact, that the keenest satire of this play is directed against casuistry, though perhaps of a coarser kind than that which its author has elsewhere displayed.

The exclusion of these two irregular compositions from the list of Mr. Browning's dramas, reduces their number to six; a number too small to be in itself a proof of any decided impulse towards that kind of production; and knowing as we do that in his later studies of life the interest of action is entirely subordinated to the importance of thought, we are tempted to attach a perhaps undue significance to the deep reflectiveness of "Luria," and to the fact that the "Soul's Tragedy," which is full of *intention*, appeared immediately before it. Purely external circumstances may, however, have induced Mr. Browning to leave off writing for the stage, and the question to be determined is, not why he produced no greater number of plays, but whether those which he did produce bear witness to a depth and breadth of dramatic inspiration sufficient for a larger result. It appears to us that they do. The one defect which may possibly be urged against them is that their action is occasionally hurried—insufficiently prepared by those minor developments of purpose and incident which break the shock of a catastrophe, and yet add to its power. We notice this in some degree in "Strafford," more still in "The Blot in the Scutcheon," most of all in "King Victor and King Charles," where for want of this kind of padding the main outlines of the situation are sometimes indistinct; but in this particular case the author may have been hampered by the scantiness of historic

material. In no case have we reason to attribute the sketchiness of execution to any haste or immaturity of design. Maturity of design is in fact the primary characteristic of Mr. Browning's Plays. Every actor in them reveals his character as far as this is possible in his first words; their action is invariably foreshadowed in the first scene; and we may add that, however intricate it may become, and in "The Return of the Druses" it is notably so, its dramatic unity remains unbroken.

Next to the vividness of Mr. Browning's dramatic conception, we remark its pathos; a pathos equally removed from sentimentality and from passion, and which is never morbid nor excessive, but always penetrating and profound. We find this tenderness of emotion in the very earliest of his dramatic works; and the time of its appearance makes it the more striking. Mere passion or sentiment is not unnatural to youth, because either may be the assertion of a still undisciplined self; but tenderness is the finer essence which is only crushed out of it by the continued bruising of life. Mr. Browning must have known passion, but he cannot have known tenderness at the age at which he wrote "Strafford." Barely, perhaps, when he wrote the "Blot on the Scutcheon." That he has conceived as a poet what he cannot have experienced as a man creates for his writings an indisputable claim to the high places of dramatic art.* Lastly, his half-dozen tragedies are all distinctly unlike each other, as a slight sketch of them may be sufficient to prove.

The first of them, "Strafford," is historical in the full sense of the word, though its best known incidents are so vividly conceived that they have almost the force of novelty. Its main interest is centred in the character of Strafford and his relation to the King, and the young poet has displayed a peculiar sympathy for this proud, sensitive, and impatient man, who recoiled from every proof of his master's treachery to himself, and yet anticipated its worst results in a scarcely interrupted flow of tender self-sacrificing pity. The scene in the prison affords the strongest illustration of the nature and extent of this devotion. Charles, in disguise, accompanies Holles to the presence of Strafford to announce to him the judgment for which a lingering belief in the King's sincerity had left him unprepared. He refuses at first to believe in it, but as the King's emotion gradually reveals his identity, and as Holles completes the avowal by the solemn adjuration "to him about to die"—

"Be merciful to this most wretched man!"

the deep spring of pitying love wells up again, and he forgets his own grievous wrong in the yearning to comfort and protect the

* It has been said on a former occasion that Mr. Browning's manner was picturesque rather than pathetic, and this remark holds good whenever his work is a narration, not an impersonation.

weakness that could inflict it. His whole affection for the man is in the words which so powerfully attest his utter worthlessness.

"STRAFFORD. You'll be good to those children, sir? I know
You'll not believe her, even should the Queen
Think they take after one they rarely saw.
I had intended that my son should live
A stranger to these matters: but you are
So utterly deprived of friends! He too
Must serve you—will you not be good to him?"
Or stay, sir, do not promise—do not swear!"

The transformation of opinion which converts Strafford's early friends into inexorable foes, and the rhetorical denunciations of the rival courtiers into an indignant protest against his attainder, are displayed in all the force of contrast; and the words of the unnamed Puritan who breaks upon the excitement of the small Council-chamber, and the bustle of the Ante-room of the House of Lords, in the portentous language of Biblical prophecy and condemnation, though somewhat automatic in their recurrence, give a heightened colouring to the scenes into which they are introduced, and appear to herald the catastrophe with the intermittent tolling of some solemn bell. The love which renounces life is not more forcibly interpreted than the love which can slay, than the dark enthusiasm by which Pym is driven to cause the death of his early friend, believing that this one condition of England's safety is also the salvation of Wentworth's soul. Unutterably tender and solemn is the meeting of the judge and the condemned at that gloomy gate through which there was yet hope of escape, but which opened in fulfilment of a fatal dream, not on the friendly boat and its protecting crew, on silence and on flight, but on dark figures of executioners and on the roar of distant voices howling for blood. There Pym tells of the early affection which might come to no better end, and bids the friend whom he is sending on before await him there, whither he hopes soon to follow. But Strafford's soul is rapt away from all thought of self. He has suddenly become conscious that his own fate foreshadows that of the King. Sinking on his knees he implores immunity for him:—

"No, not for England now, not for Heaven now—
See, Pym, for my sake, mine who kneel to you!
There, I will thank you for the death, my friend!
This is the meeting; let me love you well!"

And when Pym replies:—

"England—I am thine own! Dost thou exact
That service? I obey thee to the end,"

he sends forth a cry which resumes all the anguish of the thought, and the thankfulness that he need not live to bear it:—

"O God, I shall die first—I shall die first!"

The love *à outrance*, love without reward and without hope,

which is so strongly illustrated by the friendship of Strafford, and subsequently by the devotion of Luria, appears as the ideal conception of the attachment of man to woman in one of the "Dramatis Personæ," entitled "The Worst of it." "The Worst of it" is the lament of a husband forsaken by his wife, not for his suffering, but for her dishonour. A cry of bitterness, not against her by whom he has been wronged, but against himself, who has been to her an occasion of wrong. A cry of sorrow, not for his own life blighted on earth, but for hers excluded from heaven. It is the outpouring of a love that would sacrifice time and eternity to secure the salvation of the object, but would shield her even from remorse, if salvation could be effected without it. The utter pathos of this appeal is scarcely apparent on the first reading, as its verse has a monotonous abruptness which is more suggestive of agitated reflection than of impassioned feeling, but when once the emotion is understood it becomes the more vivid from this mode of rendering. It gains all the force of compression.

"King Victor and King Charles" is the reproduction of a little known episode in Piedmontese history, and has all the curious interest which attaches to it, but its poetic merit is greatest there where it departs from strict historical truth. Victor Amadeus I. had involved himself in danger and perplexity by the many iniquities of his reign, and when the danger had reached its climax, he cast it upon his son, Charles; a youth whom he had always ill-used and depreciated, by a solemn transfer of the crown. The young king prospered beyond his hopes. In the course of a year, his justice and humanity had gained for him the allegiance of his subjects and placed them in a position to encounter their foreign foes; and Victor then emerged from his seclusion, and attempted to repossess himself of the throne. The historic Charles caused his father to be arrested and confined for the remainder of his life. Mr. Browning's hero gratifies the old king's desire to recover the regal honours in a pious impulse to withdraw him from the intrigues by which he is seeking to attain that end, and the old man dies, recrowned in his son's palace after two scenes of alternate command and entreaty, in which he himself deprecates his craving for the symbols of royalty as a senile mania created by the disturbing shadows of death. The pathetic strangeness of this termination casts a glamour of romance about the whole drama, whilst the author skilfully retains the historical version of the king's end by causing him in the penitent dreaminess of the last scene to suggest such a story as the one best calculated to preserve his son's dignity against the outrage by which he is threatening it. Something of remorse and gratitude steals over the dying soul, and the transformation is rendered the more striking by the leap in the socket of the old wickedness and fury which appear in his last words.

"You lied, D'Ormea! I do not repent!"

In the "Return of the Druses" we have the large outlines, the vivid action, the strong local colour of a semi-historical drama combined with all the special interest which a sympathetic conception of the Eastern nature could impart to it. The Druses were a peaceful Syrian sect, associated by tradition with the name and sovereignty of a Breton Count de Dreux, and which once sought refuge against the Turks in a small island adjacent to Rhodes. They here placed themselves under the protection of the Knights, and after enduring many wrongs at the hands of a Prefect of the Order found themselves on the point of being transferred to the authority of Rome. According to Mr. Browning's story, a child saved from the murder of the Druse Sheiks and their families, by which the new reign of the White Cross had been signalized, had fled into Brittany to spend his youth in concealment, and to reappear amongst his people as the mysterious Saviour who would lead them back to Lebanon, and who, on the day of their return, would fulfil the ancient prophecy, which restored to the flesh their long-dead Caliph and Founder Hakeem. The scene opens with the morning of the day on which the "Return of the Druses" is to take place. In a few hours the Papal Nuncio will have arrived to take possession of the island, and Venice, to whom, on their side, the Druse occupants have surrendered it, will have sent her ships to cover their retreat. The Prefect will have expired by Djabal's hands, and Hakeem's reign will have begun. Initiated Druses are assembled in the Hall of the Prefect's palace, quarrelling for its expected spoils with that eagerness of the Eastern mind to which no subject of contention is too small; whilst the vivid Eastern fancy flashes forth from each in the rapid remembrance of some grievous domestic wrong, or some glorious vision of the coming deliverance. The second act presents the reverse of the picture, the shame and remorse of Djabal, the self-defined Frank schemer and Arab mystic in whom the love for a Druse maiden first awakened the thought of accomplishing a daring human deed, under the semblance of superhuman power. Anael had sworn only to give her love to the saviour of her race; to her, an initiated Druse, the Saviour, and Hakeem were one; and Djabal, enthusiast as much as deceiver, feigned himself Hakeem that he might win that love, and vaguely hoped that its possession would transform him to the reality of what he pretended to be; but the hope has proved fitful, and the desire of confession weighs heavily upon him, quickened no less than repelled by the glowing veneration of Anael, now his promised wife, and by the simple worship of Khalil her brother. Anael, too, has her struggles; her reverence for Djabal the saviour is inextricably bound up with her passion for Djabal the man, and in the clairvoyance of her highly strung nature she doubts the belief which can thus appeal to her in the tumult of an earthly love. An interview with the man whom but for Djabal she

probably would have loved, proves to her that her feeling for Djabal differs from her feeling for other men much less in kind than in degree, and in her desire to expiate the imperfectness of a faith which possesses her intelligence but cannot transform her life, she herself murders the common enemy, the Prefect. The moment of this deed was to be that of Djabal's transfiguration. It prostrates him at her feet in agonized confession of his fraud. She cannot at once disbelieve, she clings to him for refuge against the newly awakened sense of crime, she entreats him to "exalt" himself, and let her share in the exaltation; but at length the knowledge of his helpless humanity is borne irrevocably in upon her; she gives utterance to one brief passionate burst of scorn, and then the liberated earthly love wells up triumphant through the ruins of her faith, and she gathers the shamed existence the more absolutely into her own.

Side by side with this fierce conspiracy runs a friendly plot which we have not space to describe, strongly illustrative of the manner in which the natural course of events often tends towards a result which fraud or violence are made to bring about. In the last act the living personages of the drama are assembled in the same Hall of the Prefect's palace, brought together by the news of his death. The Nuncio denounces, the Druses waver, the finer nature in Djabal triumphs. A solemn and sorrowful confession cast round him a sudden halo of redeeming glory. With a cry of "Hakeem!" the overstrained life of Anael passes away, and Djabal, still vaguely adored by the astonished people, whose future he entrusts to the true heart and unswerving will of Khalil, falls, stabbed by his own hand, thus completing the atonement for his guilt and the union with her, whom her love, not his deed, has exalted.

Of the many fine passages in this tragedy the last lines, spoken by Djabal, are perhaps the finest; they are addressed to a young knight of the Order of Rhodes, the son of his protector in exile and his constant friend.

"DJABAL. [raises Loys.] Then to thee, Loys! How I wronged thee, Loys!

—Yet wronged, no less thou shalt have full revenge

Fit for thy noble self, revenge—and thus,

Thou, loaded with such wrongs, the princely soul,

The first sword of Christ's sepulchre—thou shalt

Guard Khalil and my Druses home again!

Justice, no less—God's justice and no more,

For those I leave!—to seeking this, devote

Some few days out of thy knight's brilliant life:

And, this obtained them, leave their Lebanon,

My Druses' blessing in thine ears—(they shall

Bless thee with blessing sure to have its way).

—One cedar blossom in thy ducal cap,

One thought of Anael in thy heart,—perchance

One thought of him who thus, to bid thee speed,
 His last word to the living speaks! This done
 Resume thy course, and, first amid the first
 In Europe take my heart along with thee!
 Go boldly, go serenely, go augustly—
 What shall withstand thee then?"

"A Blot on the Scutcheon" is a domestic tragedy, but of almost historic magnitude. It stands alone amongst Mr. Browning's dramatic works, as conveying tragic impressions under that purely objective form, which is derived from no subtle, individual, slowly-ripening fatality, but from the rapid and distinct collision of the Elemental forces of the human soul. Three out of five of its principal actors fall victims to love, revenge, or remorse, and it is characteristic of the author's manner, that whilst this work gives so much scope to the more violent emotions, its tone seldom exceeds the expression of a profound and concentrated sorrow. We notice this especially in the case of the heroine Mildred, a very young girl, whose self-condemning grief has something of the introspectiveness wrongly imputed to all Mr. Browning's characters, and we think detracts a little from the tragic simplicity with which the story is otherwise conceived. Her death, which is immediately caused by the murder of her lover, is perhaps also an overstraining of natural possibilities; but this event was necessary to carry out the dramatic idea of a short fierce tempest and a sudden calm. The tender brotherly love so terrible in its revulsion but so truly asserted in the Earl's self-inflicted death, is expressed with great delicacy and power in the passage in which he himself defines this form of affection. It is unfortunately too long to be quoted. Mertoun's words of comfort to his grieving child-love are also very touching and heartfelt.

" — Have I gained at last
 Your brother, the one scarer of your dreams,
 And waking thought's sole apprehension too?
 Does a new life, like a young sunrise, break
 On the strange unrest of our night, confused
 With rain and stormy flaw—and will you see
 No dripping blossoms, no fire-tinted drops
 On each live spray, no vapour steaming up
 And no expressless glory in the East?
 When I am by you, to be ever by you,
 When I have won you and may worship you,
 Oh, Mildred, can you say this will not be?"

"Colombes' Birthday" is the slightest in conception of Mr. Browning's plays, and the only one which is somewhat theatrical in its effects, but it contains much genuine poetry and some genuinely dramatic scenes. The reputed heiress of two duchies finds herself suddenly called upon to surrender her honours or to retain them by marriage with the rightful heir, who, on coming to dispossess her, is struck by her beauty and dignity, and bethinks himself of this

compromise as likely to be advantageous to both. He opens his negotiations through Valence, an advocate, a devoted adherent of the young Duchess and her unconfessed lover, and Valence is so conscientiously afraid of disposing her against his rival that he says everything he can in his behalf. He cannot plead the ardour of the Prince's attachment, for the young aspirant to a possible empire imagines himself a cynic, and has not included his heart in the offer of his hand; but he sets forth, in a glowing discourse, the mystical glories of a career of prosperous ambition as the prize which she is invited to share; and though this exordium is a tribute not to merit but to success, and therefore its very solemnity a satire, it is one of the finest passages in Mr. Browning's collective works.

"He gathers earth's whole good into his arms;
 Standing, as man now, stately, strong and wise,
 Marching to fortune, not surprised by her.
 One great aim, like a guiding star, above—
 Which tasks strength, wisdom, stateliness, to lift
 His manhood to the height that takes the prize;
 A prize not near—lest overlooking earth
 He rashly spring to seize it—nor remote,
 So that he rest upon his path content:
 But day by day, while shimmering grows shine,
 And the faint circlet prophesies the orb,
 He sees so much as, just evolving these,
 The stateliness, the wisdom, and the strength,
 To due completion will suffice this life,
 And lead him at his grandest to the grave,
 After this star, out of a night he springs;
 A beggar's cradle for the throne of thrones
 He quits; so, mounting, feels each step he mounts,
 Nor, as from each to each exultingly
 He passes, overleaps one grade of joy.
 This, for his own good:—with the world, each gift
 Of God and man,—reality, tradition,
 Fancy and fact—so well environ him,
 That as a mystic panoply they serve—
 Of force, untenanted, to awe mankind,
 And work his purpose out with half the world,
 While he, their master, dexterously slipt
 From such encumbrance is meantime employed
 With his own prowess on the other half.
 Thus shall he prosper, every day's success
 Adding to what is he, a solid strength—
 An æry might to what encircles him,
 Till at the last so life's routine lends help,
 That as the Emperor only breathes and moves
 His shadow shall be watched, his step or stalk
 Become a comfort or a portent, how
 He trails his ermine take significance,—
 Till even his power shall cease to be most power
 And men shall dread his weakness more, nor dare
 Peril their earth its bravest, first and best,
 Its typified invincibility.
 Thus shall he go on greatening, till he ends—
 The man of men, the spirit of all flesh,
 The fiery centre of an earthly world!"

Such a speech stands in admirable contrast to the business-like simplicity evinced by the hero himself, when he accepts the title-deeds to the Duchy and resigns Colombe to her obscure admirer, at the same time admitting that though he has himself no tendency to romance, a life in which it has no place appears to him rather more dreary than before.

"Lady, well rewarded! Sir, as well deserved
 I could not imitate—I hardly envy—
 I do admire you! All is for the best!
 Too costly a flower were this, I see it now,
 To pluck and set upon my barren helm
 To wither—any garish plume will do!
 I'll not insult you and refuse your Duchy—
 You can so well afford to yield it me,
 And I were left, without it, sadly off!
 As it is for me—if that will flatter you,
 A somewhat wearier life seems to remain
 Than I thought possible where . . . faith, their life
 Begins already—they're too occupied
 To listen—and few words content me best!"

The play is also enlivened by a continuous flow of good-humoured satire on the morality of court-life and its rewards.

The tragic interest of *Luria* is entirely psychological, though its external elements are derived from history. It is the latest of Mr. Browning's tragedies, the most pathetic, and perhaps the finest in the impression it conveys of deliberate creative power. Its protracted action has all the excitement of suspense, whilst the lengthened monologues which characterize the last act form a fitting prelude to the quiet mournfulness of the catastrophe. The central figure is *Luria*, a Moorish condottiere, who has led the Florentine army against that of Pisa, and whose noble qualities have won for him the admiration of both. *Luria* has served Florence not only faithfully but lovingly. Her æsthetic refinement appeals to every aspiration of his soul, and he believes, as men so often believe of women, that the outward charm is the sign of an inward grace. He is convinced that "his Florentines" are good, and though the delicate instincts of his race warn him that whatever friendship they may profess, their nature has no sympathy with his, his large heart rejects all suspicion of their gratitude. He has yet to learn that Florence knows gratitude only in the form of fear, only knows a protector as a potential tyrant and foe; and whilst his devotion is, day by day, deepening her mistrust, his guilelessness is as constantly sending forth some careless word to bear witness against him. The hostile general *Tiburzio*, in whom he has gained a friend, becomes the means of warning him that the day of his expected victory is also to be that of his trial and condemnation. *Luria* probes his situation sadly but deliberately. He sees that his judgment is fixed. The Florentine army is in his hands; the Pisan troops are offered to his

command; he has no natural alternative but to perish at the hands of Florence, or to save himself through her destruction, and true to the end, he swallows poison, the one refuge against possible misfortune, which he has brought from his native East. He dies, surrounded by the repentant captain, commissary, and other citizens of Florence, aroused too late by the fervent testimony of Tiburzio, combined with their own latent belief in the nature they could so little understand, each tendering in his own way, love, gratitude, and obedience to the friend whom they have in one supreme moment found and lost.

The restless intrigues of Florentine life are powerfully symbolized by Husein, the condottiere's one Moorish friend, in words of warning to him.

" Say or not say,
So thou but go, so they but let thee go !
This hating people, that hate each the other,
And in one blandness to us Moors unite—
Locked each to each like slippery snakes, I say
Which still in all their tangles, hissing tongue
And threatening tail, ne'er do each other harm ;
While any creature of a better blood,
They seem to fight for, while they circle safe
And never touch it,—pines without a wound,
Withers away beside their eyes and breath.
See thou, if Puccio come not safely out
Of Braccio's grasp, this Braccio sworn his foe,
As Braccio safely from Domizia's toils
Who hates him most ! But thou, the friend of all,
. . . . Come out of them !"

Against its shifting background of craft and hatred and mistrust, the image of Luria, living as it is, assumes an almost monumental character; it dwells upon the mind as a great conception of all lasting greatness and purity.

To the testimony of the Dramas we may add this fact, that at the age of twenty-two, Mr. Browning conceived from slender historic materials the character and career of Paracelsus—the apostle of natural truth, still hampered by the traditions of a metaphysical and mystical age; his high hopes and crushing disappointment; the lapse into more doubtful striving and more anomalous result; and the death-bed vision which blended the old, fitful gleamings of the secret of universal life into the larger sense of a divine presence throughout creation in which every abortive human endeavour is alike anticipated and subsumed. "Paracelsus" is considered the most transcendental of Mr. Browning's poems. It certainly combines the individuality which with him has so often the effect of abstruseness with a sustained loftiness of poetic conception, and we find in it a faithful reflex of the desire of absolute knowledge and the belief in the possibility of its attainment. But it is no less remarkable for its humanity; for the sympathy it evinces with the complex strug-

gling, misguided soul, which begins by spurning all human aids and breathes out its last and finest essence under the fostering warmth of affection; and its appreciation of the craving for unbounded intellectual life is even less abnormal as expressed by so young a poet, than the tribute it contains to the ideal of human existence which rests upon limitation.

"Power—neither put forth blindly, nor controlled
Calmly by perfect knowledge; to be used
At risk, inspired or checked by hope and fear:
Knowledge—not intuition, but the slow
Uncertain fruit of an enhancing toil,
Strengthened by love: love—not serenely pure
But strong from weakness like a chance-sown plant
Which, cast on stubborn soil, puts forth changed buds
And softer strains, unknown in happier climes;
Love which endures and doubts, and is oppressed
And cherished, suffering much and much sustained,
And blind, oft failing, yet believing love,
A half-enlightened, often chequered trust."

These lines form part of the dying confession which is probably so well known that we need not regret being unable to quote it at length.

The one peculiarity of Mr. Browning's verse through which his character of poet is most generally impugned is its frequent want of melody, and his known contempt for melody as distinct from meaning would be sufficient to account for the occasional choice of subjects that excluded it. But he thus admits the more fully the essential unity of matter and form; and the unmusical character of so much of his poetry is in some degree justified by the fact, that its subjects are in themselves unmusical.

"So I will sing on fast as fancies come;
Rudely, the verse being as the mood it paints," *

His actual ruggedness lies far more in the organic conception of his ideas than in the manner of rendering them, whilst his rapid alternations and successions of thought often give the appearance of ruggedness where none is. In beauty or the reverse his style is essentially expressive, and when, as in "Pauline," "Paracelsus," almost all the Dramas, and most of the minor poems, there is an inward harmony to be expressed, it is expressed the more completely for the rejection of all such assistance as mere sound could afford. He has even given to so satirical a poem as "The Bishop orders his Tomb in St. Praxed's Church," a completely melodious rhythm, its satire being borrowed from the simple misapplication of an earnest and pathetic emotion. If he ever appears gratuitously to rebel against the laws of sound it is in his rhymed and not in his blank verse; and there might be truth in the idea that his contempt for the music of mere iteration is excited by the very act of employ-

* Pauline.

ing it, but that so many of his grandest and sweetest inspirations have been appropriately clothed in rhyme.

There is a passage in "Pauline" in which the speaker describes himself, which accords to so great an extent with the varying impressions produced by Mr. Browning's mind as to present itself as a possible explanation of them. He has deprecated, perhaps unnecessarily, the execution of this poem in an explanatory preface to it, and if he admitted it to contain so much of permanent truth he might more justly deprecate the manner in which it was conceived. But the lines to which we refer have a deliberate emphasis which impresses us with the idea that the young poet was speaking of himself, and that what he said may in some measure have remained true.

"I am made up of an intensest life,
Of a most clear idea of consciousness
Of self, distinct from all its qualities,
From all affections, passions, feelings, powers ;
And thus far it exists, if tracked in all :
But linked in me, to self-supremacy
Existing, as a centre to all things,
Most potent to create and rule and call
Upon all things to minister to it ;
And to a principle of restlessness
Which would be all, have, see, know, taste, feel, all—
This is myself, and I should thus have been
Though gifted lower than the meanest soul."

Whatever this passage may or may not mean, it can only confirm the one significant fact that a life-long reputation for self-conscious poetic power might have rested unassailed on this the author's very earliest work.

A. ORR.



A SCHEME FOR THE GRADUAL DISESTABLISHMENT OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

TO those who have given thought to the matter, it will not appear an extravagance to assert unhesitatingly that the relations of the Established Church to the various nonconforming religious bodies in England and Wales must shortly undergo an entire revision. The Nonconformists, constituting as they do a clear majority, will not, and ought not, to be contented with anything less than absolute religious equality. The term "toleration," so long used, is felt to be a term implying inferiority; it is therefore felt to be, as it is in fact, an insult: but Nonconformists have hitherto shown that they are eminently reasonable, and they will (I doubt not) be willing still to exercise patience and self-denial, notwithstanding the intensity of their determination to have their rights recognized; and they will, I venture to say, give their assent and support to any scheme which promises such recognition, even though the performance may necessarily be delayed for many years to come. It is with these views that I have sketched out a scheme which I think on its merits ought to meet with the approval of the moderate of all parties: it may be open to objection on the ground of its delay in doing that which is just; but it will not be forgotten that we have to deal, not only with facts in relation to an Institution hitherto closely connected with the political history of our country requiring careful and temperate handling, but with prejudices naturally resulting from mistaken and long-fostered views of personal rights and privileges.

In dealing with a subject so large I am not sufficiently presumptuous to suppose that I have successfully met or even appreciated every difficulty that is likely to arise; but if I have sketched out, in outlines however rough, a plan which may tend to concentrate thought on this subject, with a view to its practical elucidation, my labour will not have been in vain, even though my suggestions should be found impracticable or insufficient; and it may be that, already, schemes may have been propounded more or less similar to the present one; if so I am unaware of the fact, and I refer to it merely for my own satisfaction, to shield myself from the possible charge of having adopted the views of others without proper acknowledgment. To avoid misapprehension, I commence with the following propositions:—

1. All existing legal rights and privileges (other than those strictly fiduciary) should be carefully preserved or, if extinguished, duly paid for.
2. Respect should be shown to private endowments so far as may reasonably be done.
3. The change in existing arrangements should be gradual, but such as ultimately to insure *absolute Religious equality* to all; and with this view I eschew any attempt at a "compromise" or enlarged "toleration"—nothing less than absolute equality will settle the question. I also abandon all idea of "comprehension"—the thing is hopeless.
4. Every Parish Church is a Building erected within a certain District for the worship of Almighty God for the convenience and benefit of those dwelling within such District; it belongs to no special sect or body of Christians—it is, in fact, the Church of the Parish.
5. All Cathedrals and, so called, Church property belong to the State, and may and ought to be dealt with according to the exigencies of the living race of men, whatever may have been the views and wishes of men or women of former ages.

With these views before me I propose—

1. That all Archbishops, Bishops, Deans, Rectors, Vicars, and others holding any Office or Living, or entitled to any rights or privileges, shall retain the same, and all emoluments in relation thereto for their respective lives.

This will relieve us (substantially) from all difficulty in relation to compensations; and, although it will postpone the final settlement of the matter for many years, it will ensure by natural events the gradual and tranquil extinguishment of rights which could not be otherwise extinguished or curtailed without excitement and pecuniary compensation. I propose—

- 2ndly. That no further appointment of any Archbishop, Bishop, Dean, or other Ecclesiastical Officer heretofore appointed

or nominated by the Crown shall be made, it being however open to all religious denominations to appoint their own Ministers and Officers in such manner and with such designations and duties as they shall think fit without State interference.

3rdly. That no compensation shall be made to the Crown in respect of any rights withdrawn from it by virtue of the preceding provision, or in respect of any Ecclesiastical patronage heretofore exercised by it.

4thly. That no presentation or nomination shall (from a day to be named) be made by the Crown or any Ecclesiastical or Lay Corporation, or any Individual having Church Patronage, to any Rectory, Vicarage, Perpetual Curacy, or other Benefice in respect of any Advowson, or Right of Presentation, or other Patronage.

As a matter of course all persons beneficially entitled to any Advowson or Right of Presentation heretofore saleable must be compensated for the extinction of their rights. I propose therefore—

5thly. That the fair market value of all Advowsons and Rights of Presentation belonging to any lay Patron be ascertained and paid over to him, regard being had to any trusts which may have affected the Advowson, &c. Advowsons or Rights of Presentation belonging to any College connected with the Universities to be valued, and the amount to be paid over to the Treasurer of such College for the general purposes thereof, subject to Parliamentary control as regards all or any of such purposes; but no compensation to be made to the Crown, or to any Ecclesiastical or Ecclesiastical Corporation in respect of any Patronage belonging to them in their official capacity.

The distinction here made is necessary: the Laws recognize an Advowson or Right of Presentation when in the hands of a layman, or an Ecclesiastic in his private capacity, as legal property liable to sale, but the exercise of patronage by an Archbishop, Bishop, &c., is always supposed to be strictly a mere ministerial proceeding exercised for the public good. Inasmuch as that Advowsons belonging to Colleges are deemed College *property*, it seems advisable to act on that idea, and to allow compensation for the same, care being taken that the proceeds shall also be deemed College property for the advancement of Education on such conditions as Parliament shall from time to time sanction. I propose—

6thly. That the moneys necessary for compensation for Advowsons, &c., shall be provided out of the Consolidated Fund, to be repaid with interest, as after mentioned.

7thly. That Regulations be made providing for the gradual extinction of Advowsons, &c., so as to meet the exigencies of

the Public Exchequer; but so, that under any circumstances the Owner of an Advowson shall be paid its value, at the latest, forthwith after the death of the Incumbent.

It will not be necessary, as a rule, that the payment of compensation for an Advowson should be delayed until the death of the Incumbent; probably it would be found convenient that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should in his Budget for each year appropriate a certain sum for the extinction of Advowsons, so that a certain number may be extinguished in each year, and the extinction will be gradual, covering a period of (say) thirty or forty years.

It will be necessary to provide a Public Officer or Body, responsible to Parliament, who shall supervise the arrangements necessary for carrying the present scheme into execution. I propose, therefore,—

Sthly. That Commissioners be appointed to regulate all proceedings in relation to the sale of Advowsons, and also the sale of Glebe Lands, &c., after referred to; such Commissioners to form a Tribunal for settling all controversies and questions which may arise in Parishes after the death of the Incumbent.

Under the foregoing provisions the interests of all Owners of saleable Advowsons, &c., will be effectually protected—the State will determine *when* it will extinguish and pay for the same; but inasmuch as that the value of an Advowson depends on the probable duration of the life of the Incumbent, such value will of course increase daily, and the longer the delay in paying for the same the greater will be the sum to be paid; besides which, the Owner of an Advowson will not necessarily be debarred from intermediate dealings with it, inasmuch as that he will be able to dispose of it by way of sale, devise, &c., subject of course to the right of the State to extinguish and pay for it at its market value at some future time.

Having thus provided for the interests of existing Incumbents, and the rights of Owners of Church Patronage, let us advance a step and see what would be done in a Parish on the death of the Incumbent; and I will take as a type a Parish having one Church only, as from this elementary example or unit we shall be able to develope our principle so as to cover more complicated cases.

I have assumed as a fundamental principle that the Parish Church belongs to no Sect or special religious body, and that it ought to be open for the worship of God to all dwellers in its District under reasonable regulations. If any body of men feel conscientious objections to worship in a building in which others worship, they will, of course, attending to their conscience, abstain, and provide a building for themselves; but the Parish Church must be open to all, care being taken that no sect or denomination shall have power to erect any altar, or put up any ornament therein, or do any other act which

may reasonably interfere with the religious convictions, feelings, sentiments, or even prejudices of other worshippers. This restriction will not interfere with any special peculiarity in any religious worship, such as processions, &c., provided they are confined to the time allotted to the particular body adopting the same for its religious worship. The following provision in an ordinary Parish would easily be carried into effect without wounding the reasonable susceptibilities of any man or woman therein,—and unreasonable susceptibilities ought, I submit, to be gratified at the sole cost of those who possess them. I propose, therefore,—

9thly. That as soon as a Parish Church shall become vacant by reason of the death of the present Incumbent, a Parish Church Board shall be elected by the Parishioners (under general rules to be settled by the Commissioners), which Board shall have the entire control of the Church, and shall appropriate it for the religious services of the Parishioners, so as that all religious denominations in the Parish, having a certain number of members (say twenty-five), shall have the use of it at stated times, arranged so as to meet, as far as possible, the convenience of all, regard being had to the relative importance of each religious denomination from a numerical point of view—the most important body (in numbers) having its conveniences first studied, but so that each denomination shall be fairly treated. The Church to be kept in substantial and ornamental repair by the Church Board, who shall see that it is properly warmed, lighted, cleansed, and fit for general use.

The Churchyard, or ground enclosed with the Church, to be kept in good order by the Church Board. The costs incurred by the Church Board for the above purposes to be defrayed primarily out of the proceeds of the sale of the Parsonage and Glebe as after mentioned, or in default thereof, by a Parish Rate, or other fair contribution from the respective religious bodies who may use the Church—an appeal in all cases of dispute lying to the Commissioners in London.

No persons using the Church to have power to alter or interfere with the building or its internal arrangements, except with the consent of the Church Board, and in case of question in this matter an appeal to lie to the Commissioners in London.

Forthwith, after the appointment of the Parish Church Board, it shall take a Census of the Parish in order to learn with exactness the relative numerical importance of the respective religious denominations therein. The

Commissioners will lay down general regulations as to this Census, which shall be renewed periodically (say every five years). In taking the Census, all children over (say) five years shall be counted. Parents to answer for all children under (say) fifteen—all persons over fifteen to answer for themselves as regards their religious denomination.

It becomes necessary in the next place to make provision for the disposal (after the death of the Incumbent) of the Rectory, Glebe Lands, and Tithes. I propose, therefore, to provide,—

10thly. That upon the death of the Incumbent (a reasonable time being allowed for the arrangements of his family) the Parsonage and Glebe Lands shall be sold under the direction of the Commissioners, and the proceeds shall be applied as a primary fund, first, in or towards repayment to the State of the amount paid to the Owner of the Advowson for the extinguishment of his rights as Patron, with interest at 3 per cent., and any surplus to be invested as a primary fund towards payment of the expenses incurred by the Parish Church Board in the discharge of its duties before referred to. It is not probable that any surplus would remain, but should there be such it may accumulate to meet special requirements of the Church Board. As regards the Tithe Rent charges, *referring only to those received by the deceased Incumbents*, the same to be sold, and the proceeds applied (in aid of the primary fund before referred to) first, in or towards repayment to the State of the sum paid for the extinguishment of the Patron's rights, and interest—the remainder to be invested, and the annual income thereof applied in or towards payment of the annual expenses incurred by the Parish Church Board, and the residue (if any) in aid of the Poor Rates of the Parish.

Having thus disposed of our typical Parish with its one Church, let us proceed a step further, and consider the case of a Parish having not only a Mother Church, but Chapels of Ease or District Churches, other than those specially endowed, and hereafter dealt with under the class "special endowments." There are many Chapels of Ease which are strictly what their name implies, ancillary buildings to the Parish Church, and served by the Incumbent of the Parish or by a Curate; these will follow naturally the fortunes of the Mother Church, and all the provisions applicable to such Church will, on the death of the Incumbent, apply to them; and it is easy to see how the arrangements of the Church Board may be facilitated where there are several Churches under its management, inasmuch as

that a specific building may, conveniently and with common benefit, be allotted exclusively to some special denomination, and this idea may be carried out still further, and made applicable to large towns consisting of several parishes, obviously to the benefit and convenience of all. I would therefore provide,—

11thly. That all Chapels of Ease, and District Churches in the nature of Chapels of Ease, shall, upon the death of the Incumbent of the Parish, come within the jurisdiction of the Parish Church Board, and be dealt with in such and in the same manner as before is mentioned with reference to the Mother Church, and that provision should be made for the consolidation of Parishes in Towns, so as to place the whole of the Churches therein under one Board for the benefit of the whole Town.

We come now to a class of cases which will require special consideration. There are very many Churches which have been built at the cost of private individuals, and endowed by them. It is clear that, within a reasonable limit, the special intentions of those who built and endowed these Churches should be respected, but it is also clear that this principle ought not to be carried too far—a line must be somewhere drawn, and cases of hardship on each side of this line may occur. This is a necessary evil, but it may, I think, be reduced within narrow bounds. In dealing with the Irish Church a limit of about seventy years was adopted by the Legislature, and it was enacted that Churches built at the private cost of an individual should belong to him, if living, or to his representatives if he died since the year 1800; this is about equal to two generations of men, and probably no better rule could be adopted. I would, therefore, propose,—

12thly. That in all cases where a Church has been built at the cost of an individual, whether the same has or has not been formed into a District Church, the same shall revert to such individual if living, or if he shall have died since the 1st of January, 1800, then to his legal personal representatives, as his or their own property; the same principle to apply to any Endowment of such Church, and to any Endowment of a Church not built at the sole cost of an individual, but in the last-mentioned case the Church itself to be deemed a Chapel of Ease (subject of course to the rights of the present Incumbent), and be subject to all the provisions before referred to relating to Parish Churches and Chapels of Ease.

There are many cases in which Churches have been built or substantially restored by private subscriptions, and it would be but fair that these should be dealt with specially, having regard to the intentions of the parties who subscribed. I would, therefore, propose,—

13thly. That in all cases where a Church (other than and except a Parish Church) shall, within twenty-one years, have been built, restored, or substantially repaired by private subscription, it shall, for the space of twenty-one years from the passing of the Act, be exempted from its operation, and in the meantime shall be placed under the management of a Committee, to be nominated by the congregation worshipping therein; on the expiration of such last-mentioned twenty-one years, the same to be deemed a Chapel of Ease, and to be dealt with as such by the Parish Church Board.

There may be cases in which Churches have been built or repaired under such circumstances as may bring them equitably, though not literally, within the principles recognized by the two last preceding clauses. I would, therefore, propose,—

14thly. That the Commissioners have power to take special cases into consideration, and to frame regulations in relation thereto, so as that justice may be done, having regard to the general principles and intentions of the Act, their decision in each case to require the sanction of the Privy Council on a statement of facts prepared by the Commissioners.

The scheme here sketched out has the following features in its favour:—

1. It will remove that feeling of antagonism and irritation which one half of the people feels towards the other: the Dissenter smarts under the conviction that he is not fairly treated: he sees that the immense revenues of the Church of England are appropriated by a body consisting of less than one-half of the entire people of this country; it is not, therefore, likely, it is not possible—it is not desirable were it possible—that the larger half of a free people should tranquilly submit to such an injustice, and a scheme by which the cause of such an enormous amount of dissatisfaction would be removed is one which well merits consideration.

2. It interferes with the rights of no man or woman; vested interests will be protected; the change will be gradual, opportunities will be given from time to time for amendment and improvement in details should experience show such to be needful; all may be done without commotion, irritation or excitement, and the Nonconformist will see that, although a great amount of patience must on his part be exercised, the equality to which he is entitled will eventually be acquired.

3. The crying scandal of money dealings with Church preferment, which right-thinking men of all classes so much deplore, will be at once removed.

4. The members of the existing Established Church will be placed

in a state of freedom which they have never hitherto enjoyed ; they will have the management of their own religious arrangements free from State control, and they will have the gratification of feeling (and to right-minded men it ought to be a gratification) that on their own efforts must depend the advancement of the religious doctrines which they hold to be sacred ; they will learn that it is a privilege and pleasure to make sacrifices in support of their religious views, and they will have the satisfaction of feeling that their privileges are no longer a source of just annoyance to a large mass of their fellow men.

These are objects of immense importance, and the chance of attaining them by legislation whilst it can be done tranquilly, and without undue heat or excitement, is one which ought not to be lightly thrown away.

Of course there will be some dissentients. We shall doubtless hear much about the intentions of " Pious Founders," especially from those who are deriving incomes which these " Pious Founders " never contemplated would be perverted, as they have been ; but I will honestly avow that the " Pious Founder " argument never had much weight with me, and I do not think it is entitled to any. I respect William of Wykeham, Cardinal Wolsey, Edward the Sixth, and other founders of Colleges and other charitable institutions as much as any man, but I say that it is the living race of men who have cast on them the responsibilities and difficulties of life ; they know better, they must know better, what is good and advisable in this their day than those who lived centuries ago, and they may be trusted to act as well in their day as their forefathers acted in theirs. It is high time that we should throw off this absurd sentimentality about the wishes and intentions of men who have left this world hundreds of years ago, and who, sensible men as they were, would have changed their views fifty times had they lived on into our time. We must " act in the living present " according to our lights, as our children must act according to theirs when we are gone. There are others who will argue that when the artificial support of tithes is withdrawn, the interests of religion will suffer and languish. If this be so, it says very little in favour of those who have hitherto been the recipients of these emoluments, a great deal in favour of that great half of the people who have hitherto supported their Ministers and places of worship voluntarily. If, when the Churchman is thrown on his own resources he should feel in a difficulty, let him go to his Nonconformist neighbours, who have had a very long experience, and they will tell him where to find a substitute for tithes.

There may be, however, graver arguments as to the ultimate destination of the surplus tithes. I have suggested that they should go in aid of the Poor-rate, and I think there are weighty reasons for this. The relief of the poor, sick and aged, cannot, *primâ facie*, be considered an unrighteous application of these funds, and if, at the same

time, it affords local relief of taxation, so much the better. Doubtless the owners and occupiers of lands will derive some benefit from the reduction of the poor-rates; but then it must not be forgotten that they will have imposed on them the burden (to many of them new) of supporting their own Ministers of Religion; and it must also be remembered that the agricultural labourer is making himself heard, and will insist on higher rates of wages than those which he now receives, and which in very many cases the Farmer can hardly afford to give, having regard to existing burdens in the shape of rent, tithes, rates and taxes; but the ultimate appropriation of the surplus tithes under the Scheme now under consideration does not practically affect its principle, and therefore further discussion thereon may be dispensed with.

I hear some say, "But how about the Curates?" What is to become of them when the Parish Church Board take possession of the Church after the death of the Incumbent? Let me on this head put a few questions. What becomes of a Curate now when his Rector dies? What becomes of the Manager of a Bank, or other commercial establishment, when it ceases to transact business? What becomes of the Clerks of a Solicitor when he dies? The simple answer is, that they all seek employment elsewhere, and the Curate will do so likewise; and he will have a much better chance of advancement before him on the death of the Incumbent than he now has, because the Congregation worshipping at the Parish Church will, as a matter of course, require a Minister, and the Curate, if he is worth anything, will be there to their hand, and open to any reasonable engagement that may be made between them.

This Scheme would be imperfect were it to omit a reference to the Cathedrals of England, and the Estates held by Deans and Chapters in relation thereto.

I start confidently with this assertion, viz., that the Cathedrals are national property, and are looked at by the Nation, whether Conformist or Nonconformist, with pride as national Monuments, and that any scheme which did not provide for their maintenance in their full architectural glory would be almost universally rejected. I think also that the principle applicable to our Parish Churches is also applicable, and may easily be applied, to Cathedrals. I would, therefore, propose,—

15thly. That until the death of the existing Dean no change whatever shall be made in our Cathedral arrangements, but that on his death the Cathedral shall be under the management of the Department which now regulates our Palaces, Castles, and Public Buildings, and that it shall be responsible for the same, so far as regards its due preservation. That the Dean and Chapter Estates shall, with all reasonable diligence, be sold by auction, the

proceeds thereof to belong to the State absolutely, the State of course taking upon itself the entire cost of all repairs and restorations of the Cathedral. All annual payments to which any Member of the Chapter, or any Officer of the Cathedral may have been entitled for life to be paid to him during the remainder of his life out of the Consolidated Fund, a fair deduction being made in all cases where services heretofore performed (other than strictly religious services) shall no longer be required.

The foregoing arrangement might be varied by providing that the proceeds of the sale of the Cathedral Estates should be paid to a separate fund as a special restoration fund ; but this would multiply accounts and officers needlessly. Once adopt the principle that the Cathedrals are public property, and that the State takes them in charge as such, there is no reason whatever why a separate system should be adopted ; let the entire matter come within Parliamentary cognizance annually as an item in the Budget of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and you have the best practical security that can be suggested for a due application of the funds. I have suggested an absolute sale of the Cathedral Estates, instead of handing them over to Government management : it is better that the lands, &c., should be in lay hands, free to change owners as ordinary property, rather than that they should be managed by a Board with an expensive staff, and be kept out of the general circulation. One word as to the purposes for which Cathedrals shall be applied. I think that the principle hereinbefore adopted with reference to Parish Churches may well be applied to Cathedrals, with necessary modifications ; and I assume that these national buildings may well be applied to the purposes to which they have been heretofore applied (except exclusive religious services), and that the Cathedral of a District may well be used by all Religious denominations for Religious festivals, and for Musical performances in aid of Religious or Charitable Works. This being so, I would propose,—

16thly. That on the death of the existing Dean, the Cathedral, so far as the user thereof, shall be under the management of a Cathedral Board (say 20 members) to be elected by delegates from every Parish in the District comprised within the present Cathedral District, with the addition of (say) 5 members to be appointed by the Justices of the Peace at Quarter Sessions ; that this Board should make proper arrangements for permitting all Religious denominations to have the use of the Cathedral, as their occasions may require, all parties applying for permission to state clearly the objects they have in view and their intended mode of carrying them into effect, and depositing with the Treasurer of the Board a sum of money

sufficient to meet all the expenses which the Board may incur for general or special superintendence, and giving, if required, security against injury to the Building, the object of the Board being to act fairly towards all Religious denominations, having a regard to their importance numerically ; all general rules of the Cathedral Board to be laid before the Privy Council, and to receive its sanction before coming into operation.

I think that I have now sketched out a scheme which is based on honesty, and which may be made to work well and easily. I do not assume that I have met every case of difficulty which may arise, but I know that I have touched upon the principal matters in relation to this great controversy, and the gradual proceedings which I have suggested will enable the legislature to make amendments in details from time to time as occasion may require ; and if I shall have been instrumental in any way in furthering a settlement of this question, I shall deem myself well repaid for any trouble which I have taken.

JAMES HOPGOOD.



THE MOVEMENT FOR CORPORATE REUNION:

A PAGE IN THE MODERN HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CHURCH.

SINCE the religious changes of the sixteenth century two attempts have been made, at different periods, to bridge over the chasm between the Church of Rome and the Church of England. One was in the seventeenth, the other in the eighteenth century. When the first was projected, under Charles I., some of the parents of those then living might have personally known Englishmen who had remembered their country before the final break with the rest of Western Christendom. Buckley, the last surviving monk of Westminster, had died only fifteen years before King Charles ascended the throne. So that, at that period, the tradition of Visible Unity—though blotted, blurred, and marred—had by no means passed away or perished. No surprise need be felt, therefore, that such propositions as those mentioned should have been, in all serious earnestness, attempted, though they practically turned out marked and melancholy failures.

A third endeavour at pacification has been made within the last fifteen years, which some believed might have had a different result from those of old. This, too, as far as the authorities at Rome are concerned, has proved an equally signal failure; though the character, position, principles, and policy of the High Church party in the Church of England, and indeed of the whole Church, have been made far more familiar to foreign Christians of the Latin rite, because of this last attempt on behalf of Unity, than was ever the case in previous centuries.

Before a brief historic record of the more recent action be here provided, it may be well to glance at the two previous attempts already referred to.

I. During the latter part of the reign of King James I. the influence of the theological school of Bishop Andrewes became more than considerable. This was a natural re-action from the sharply-defined Calvinism, so abundantly imported from abroad, of the two preceding reigns. Political necessities likewise exercised some influence in the public change of taste. As regards King Charles I.—who, in conjunction with Laud, became in aftertime the chief promoter of the new policy—he no doubt gained many of his facts and certain of his principles from the exiled Archbishop of Spoleto, Antonio de Dominis, who had been installed Dean of Windsor by a mandate from James I., and became for some years one of the theological lions of the period and a constant attendant at Court. An archbishop, personally known to Aldobrandini, sometime Pope Clement VIII., to Leo X., and to Paul V., who had gained great experience, both ecclesiastical and diplomatic, and had formerly received confidences from the highest Papal authorities, was exactly the instrument for impressing upon a high-minded, pure, and devout prince, such as the first Charles, the need of endeavouring to repair the breaches already wide, and threatening to become wider, which existed between the people of England and the Court of Rome. And, notwithstanding his conformity to the Church of England, so it turned out. Nothing is more marked in the history of that great but unfortunate monarch than the untiring energy which he devoted to the cause of ecclesiastical peace. Of course his marriage would naturally help on the project. But the original cause, in great probability, lay in his close intimacy as a youth with the foreign Dean of Windsor, and the beneficent impressions he received from that intercourse.

Pope Clement VIII. is known to have lamented over the stern and harsh policy regarding England which his official predecessors had put into practice. And Pope Urban, his immediate successor, a prelate of great breadth of view, appears fully conscious of the evils of disunion; if he did not actually see his way to minimize or endeavour to remove them. At all events, it is certain that some of the most active diplomatists on the Papal side were Englishmen who apparently desired a formal reconciliation between the estranged and separated Churches, and who earnestly endeavoured to bring this about. In the spring of 1632 came hither for this purpose Father Leander of St. Martin, as his name stood in "religion," with the full knowledge of Mr. Secretary Windebank, and with the King's sanction and patronage. For coadjutors and co-operators he had with him Fathers Preston and David—two tried and trusty members of the Benedictine order. They came with the avowed intention of

settling certain disputes which had existed for some years amongst the persecuted and sorely-trying Anglo-Romans, regarding the form of ecclesiastical government best calculated for them under their then existing difficulties. They were also specifically commissioned to inquire accurately and carefully into the general state of religion in the National Church, and to report thereupon in due course to the authorities at Rome. This was done, and done fairly, as the Report, still in existence, proves. And they were still further to sound the more influential English bishops upon the great question of Corporate Reunion. Plans were made, principles laid down, and formal "Instructions for Reconciliation" drawn up. Later on, Dr. Christopher Davenport and his literary allies responded in print to the amicable and promising propositions of Laud, Montagu, and Goodman—propositions which it was asserted found active favour with all the English bishops save three. Afterwards a second envoy from Rome came hither to continue the work which Father Leander had so hopefully commenced. This was Gregorio Panzani, a priest of the Oratory, who had procured the formal patronage of Cardinal Barberini, and was received by the Queen Consort with every due consideration. On both sides quite a Literature on Reunion was formed—many allusions to which are found in the biting satires of Prynne and his less scrupulous Puritan allies. But the hopes of the Court of Rome, which seemed to be at once genuine, honest, and sincere, were soon doomed to disappointment. Internal disaster, social disorder, and eventually civil war and rebellion, rendered England an unsafe place for Papal plenipotentiaries and peace-desiring envoys. The throne was overturned, the altar defiled, and Faction for a while triumphed, so that any Corporate Reunion of the Churches became practically impossible. The times were sorely out of joint: a well-intended attempt utterly collapsed. Religious hopes were rudely dissipated. The day of restored intercommunion had not yet dawned.

II. In the early part of the eighteenth century a second attempt was made—this time mainly from the side of the Church of England and in the person of her chief ecclesiastical ruler, not with the Roman curia, but with the French Church. It was commenced and carried on by William Wake, Archbishop of Canterbury. Far less formal and complex than that made under King Charles I., it nevertheless exercised considerable indirect influence upon the Church of France, and was favourably looked upon by many in England. The doctors of the Sorbonne had always been noted for their extreme moderation, as well as for their vast, deep and varied learning. Under their influence, Bishop Bull, the renowned author of the treatise on the Nicene Creed, had been formally thanked for his masterly defence of a principle very dear to all who accepted and revered the ancient and commonly-held Vincentian rule. And now, some at least were ready to receive and consider propositions

for an ecclesiastical truce. If the separated Churches could only be led to agree upon a principle of action allowed by each to have been current and common in earlier ages, surely the authorities of the Roman Church could not deny her unalterable character; so that what she taught in the eighteenth century, she had likewise previously taught in the eighth, and *vice versâ*; so that "things which were equal to the same thing were equal to one another." And so it was thought, and reasonably thought, that a common basis for operations had been happily found. Wake, however, at all times most valiantly stood out for the position that the Church of England was a true part of the One Family of Christ—an independent national communion; and that the See of Canterbury was in every respect equal in dignity, rank, repute, and antiquity to any Sees of the French Church.

"My task is very hard," wrote the Archbishop to M. Beauvoir, "and I scarce know how to manage myself in this matter. To go any further than I have done in it, even as a divine only of the Church of England, may meet with censure; and as Archbishop of Canterbury I cannot treat with these gentlemen. I do not think my character at all inferior to that of an Archbishop of Paris: on the contrary, without lessening the authority and dignity of the Church of England, I must say it is in some respects superior. If the Cardinal (De Noailles) were in earnest for such an union, it would not be below him to treat with me himself about it. I should then have a sufficient ground to consult with my brethren, and to ask His Majesty's leave to correspond with him concerning it. But to go on any farther with these gentlemen will only expose me to the censure of doing what in every station ought not to be done without the King's knowledge, and it would be very odd for me to have an authoritative permission to treat with those who have no manner of authority to treat with me."

Such were the principles and such was the policy of Archbishop Wake. In no respect or degree did he compromise his brethren, nor propose to alter the recognized and allowed standing-point of the Church of England. But nothing came of his propositions and scheme; while his prominent position rendered it difficult for him to take any further action. His death on January 24th, 1737, put an end to the movement.

Sixteen years prior to this date, another school of English religionists, the Nonjurors, had passively co-operated with their Scottish brethren in endeavouring to obtain actual recognition by, and some kind of intercommunion with, certain Eastern bishops. There were divers propositions set forth on the Scottish side, and several very pertinent criticisms in reply sent back from the Orientals—the interchange of which was then a matter of some time and difficulty. But, as in previous attempts, so in this,

failure marked and complete was the only direct and immediate result.

III. In England, during the past thirty years, notwithstanding previous failures, a deep desire for Corporate Reunion with the rest of Christendom has once again grown up and widely ramified. This has been so in the National Church, as well as amongst Roman Catholics and what are termed "Orthodox Dissenters." Sermons, essays, tracts, treatises, and books of prayer, all bearing on this subject, are very numerous—more so than is generally believed. About thirty years ago the late Mr. Keble compiled a short book of devotions for Unity, which was largely used by his friends and followers. On the Roman Catholic side Dr. Wiseman, then a bishop *in partibus*, had done the same. Notwithstanding keen discussions and many hard sayings, in spite of theological tournaments and the floating of sectarian banners, the desire for peace grew apace, and eventually gained considerable influence. At the special suggestion of Mr. de Lisle, of Grace Dieu Manor,—one of the most distinguished and able Roman Catholic laymen, the "Eustace Lyle" of Mr. Disraeli's *Coningsby*—Bishop Wiseman addressed a most remarkable "Letter" to John, Earl of Shrewsbury, which contained the germ of Reunion principles, in future years so naturally developed. But Dr. Newman and other most devoted promoters of the Oxford movement, soon afterwards solved the question of Reunion as far as they themselves were concerned, by personally submitting to the Church of Rome. Though the plant was thus rudely nipped by winds and sorely marred by frost, it still lived. Its enemies predicted for it certain death, but they turned out false prophets. For in due course it gave large signs of vitality, as the following narrative will show.

In the autumn of the year 1857 a select but influential meeting was held of members of the Church of England, of the Church of Rome, and of the Oriental Church, with a view of founding an Association for Prayer that Visible Unity might be restored to the Christian Family. No plans for promoting the object were entertained, no schemes discussed: all that was attempted was the discovery of some common basis for action which members of the above-named communions might conscientiously be able to accept. This was found in united prayer. Those persons who were present represented a most influential circle. Roman Catholic bishops as well as English sent their informal representatives, and considerable interest was excited in the movement at some foreign courts. On all sides it was felt that a union for prayer, and nothing but a union for prayer, should be attempted; and that any further proposal, if adopted, might only tend to introduce discord and dangers. The following resolution consequently was unanimously adopted:—"That a Society to be called the Association for Promoting the Unity of Christendom, be now

formed for united prayer that Visible Unity may be restored to Christendom; and that the paper now before this meeting be sanctioned, printed, and circulated as the basis upon which this Society desires to act." Of course this and other technical resolutions were discussed with great earnestness and power by men eminent in their respective churches, and dealt with in a spirit of large-hearted charity seldom equalled, and perhaps never surpassed. A simple but efficient machinery, in due course, distributed the programme,—translated into Latin, Greek, French, Italian, German, Spanish, Russ, and Portuguese,—throughout the whole civilized world. It was freely circulated by tens of thousands. Local secretaries were appointed at several important centres of religious activity; and, wherever a footing could be gained, work for the object of the Society began in earnest. The present Pope, at the outset, approved of the idea, and gave his formal blessing to the scheme, as he had done to one of a similar character for Russia, originated by M. Pitzipios. A former Patriarch of Constantinople sent his blessing and good wishes to the promoters. "Other Eastern prelates," it was formally and authoritatively announced, "have approved of the Association, and so likewise have several bishops, both Anglican and Roman Catholic, as well on the continent as in America." Mr. de Lisle, the distinguished Roman Catholic layman already mentioned, backed up by the approbation and confidence of many of his leading co-religionists, thought it his duty to put on record to the Roman authorities a fair and faithful account of the movement in England. Accordingly, having just written a most learned and powerful Essay on the subject, which was published in London, he addressed a Letter to the Cardinal Prefect of the Congregation *de Propagandâ Fide* with this object. He first pointed out that a scheme had been duly set on foot, under favourable auspices, for the organic and Corporate Reunion of the Anglican with the Roman Church, and that though there was no immediate prospect of any practical result, still that the party in the Church of England who advocated such a union was steadily increasing, while the old High Church school, on whose co-operation they would ultimately rely for assistance and success, constituted a majority of the English hierarchy and clergy. Mr. de Lisle went minutely into details, explaining the carefully-collected and ably-arranged facts upon which his statements were grounded; and concluded his letter by asking whether such a scheme would be likely to meet with the approval of the Holy See.

In the meantime, however, Mr. de Lisle's Essay, though received with an unusual amount of interest and attention by the bishops and clergy of the Church of England, was attacked on the side of his co-religionists with an ungenerous vindictiveness and unfair criticism eminently painful to read. Several communications were sent to Rome earnestly imploring the authorities there formally to condemn

its principles and to put the treatise on the Index. But Rome sometimes acts with caution and care; and this was a case in point. Cardinal Wiseman and at least three of his suffragans, diplomatically interposed advice by which the prayer of those who had asked for the condemnation of the Essay in question was in due course refused. For the inculpated author had but set forth anew the very self-same principles as those which had been of old embodied in the *Letter to Lord Shrewsbury* of Dr. Wiseman. The result was that Mr. de Lisle not only held his own, on behalf of the influential school of which he was the acknowledged lay-representative, but renewed his appeal for peace, and successfully defended his previous propositions.

On the Anglican side neither time nor energy were spared. The movement, commencing on but a small scale, gradually increased and enlisted fresh supporters almost daily. Within a year from its first foundation nearly seven hundred members had joined the new organization, which has steadily and regularly enlarged itself ever since by an average of about twelve hundred additional members each year. Having originated in England, it is natural to find that a large proportion—*i.e.*, about twelve out of fifteen thousand belong to the Church of England, or Churches united to or visibly allied with her. About two thousand Roman Catholics have joined, and nearly half that number of members of the Oriental Churches. "These names," the public is officially informed, "have been obtained by a systematic circulation of the formal Prospectus of the Association in English, Latin, Greek, German, Spanish, French, and Italian, &c. More than 200,000 such papers have been distributed all over the world, and there are members of the Association belonging to the three great portions of the One Christian Family in almost every civilized part of the globe."

At the same time, quite independent of the Society itself, its leading Anglican supporters and allies lost no time in making public their desire for a Corporate Reunion of the separated Churches on some basis to be agreed upon by those who desired such action, and prayed and laboured for its success. Public organs of opinion took up and handled the subject—in most cases unfavourably, but yet in a manner which stimulated inquiry and brought many new friends. Volumes of Essays and Sermons were projected, and in due course published—with contributions, both from theologians and laymen, of considerable interest. In addition to these, a serial was started called the *Union Review*, which for the first six years of its existence made the subject of Corporate Reunion its distinctive speciality. Roman Catholics, both Liberal and Conservative, became frequent contributors to its pages, and it did something in giving *esprit de corps*, coherence and consistency to the new school of thought. But at last events occurred of serious moment, and soon afterwards a crisis. Scattered up and down the country, more numerous in Lancashire and

Scotland than elsewhere, though also having representatives over the metropolis, there were many Roman Catholic clergymen of the well-reputed type of Berington, Gandolphy, Kirk, and Lingard, who viewed with amazement and sorrow the particular Italian innovations of that extreme Roman school, whose members had been considerably augmented by hyper-fervent converts from the Church of England. The former were sufficiently bold to express their honest and respectable opinions on this and other correlative topics in a Church-of-England serial. Some not only plainly advocated Corporate Reunion, as both desirable and possible, but argued for vernacular services, the Mass in the vulgar tongue, and a relaxation of the ruling custom concerning clerical celibacy. Others, writing in favour of parochial independence, pleaded that parish priests ought not to be removable by a stroke of their diocesan's pen, and argued earnestly for the introduction of Canon Law, instead of episcopal autocracy, into the Roman Church in England. All this, as may be readily imagined, was gall and wormwood to the Italian party, and not particularly palatable to the bishops. National independence, like "the appeal to History," is treason and traitor-like to the powers that be—clerical celibacy the strongest link in the existing chain.

On this account, and because of such co-operation by the authors of the communications in question, it was resolved not only to place the *Union Review* on the Index, but to formally condemn the Association for Promoting Unity. Irons were at once put into the fire by a few enthusiastic fanatics, so that both these actions might in due course be taken with effect and success. Against this policy, as has been credibly stated, the late Cardinal Wiseman frequently protested, on the obvious ground that having already been the first to introduce the subject to the English public, His Eminence should be the last to endeavour to put it down by force, and not by argument, when it had assumed the practical shape which for so long a time he had desired it to take. Others, however, thought differently. "So wide a use had been made of the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff," wrote a Roman Catholic prelate, a suffragan of the Cardinal, "and of the Catholic episcopate, that neither Rome nor the bishops could longer remain silent, without appearing to countenance or share in what they could not sanction. Besides which every effort was being made under the plea of that high sanction to draw both Catholic priests and laity into the Society." Consequently the programme of the Society was duly examined at Rome; and, notwithstanding that it had been mainly drawn up under the advice of Roman Catholics, and every word weighed with care, deliberation, and wisdom—solemnly condemned. This occurred on September 16, 1864.

The document in which the condemnation was embodied was a Letter signed by Cardinal Patrizi to the English Roman Catholic Bishops, sent forth from the office of the Inquisition.

To this Letter, which contained several very profound and startling misconceptions of the Association's aim and object—unintentional no doubt, but equally unfortunate, notwithstanding—a certain number of the English clerical members resolved soon afterwards to send a Reply. Nearly two hundred clergy, "Deans, Canons, Parish Priests, and other Priests" appended their signatures. The Remonstrance, for such it was, couched in carefully-chosen and dignified language, and treating wholly of facts and principles, was forwarded to Rome through Monsignor Talbot, and duly received by Cardinal Patrizi. Some delay arose in its consideration; but eventually a formal and final Reply, the rough draft of which was said to have been seen in London some months before its formal issue at Rome, reached the then Secretary of the Association for Promoting Unity. Its tone was lofty and dignified, its arguments singularly weak and beside the point. Throughout, the question was begged with a happy and elevated indifference to the true facts of the case. No further rejoinder was made. It was sufficient for the Anglican members that a fair and faithful statement of their principles and position had been dispatched by them to Rome, and that copies of the correspondence were officially circulated throughout the whole of Latin Christendom. This would truly set forth all that for the present they required; and serve to secure for them a hearing in quarters that no mere Anglican influences could reach. In truth, this publication of the correspondence resulted in the hearty adhesion of many foreign Catholics to the Reunion movement. In Germany this was particularly the case.

Contemporaneously with this action, the work of increasing the school and defending the position at home, was steadily, silently, but most successfully carried on. Both the press and the pulpit were efficiently utilized, and in due course exercised the desired influence. It was no hard task to English clergy of the second order in favour of the movement. But it was otherwise with the Bishops. Some amongst them uttered condemnations, formed on an imperfect knowledge of what was being attempted: others, on the other hand, heartily but cautiously supported it. Apart, however, from actual contributions in the shape of published opinions in its favour, in Charges or Sermons, much was evidently accomplished, as the altered and elevated tone of "the religious world," so-called, ere long evidenced.

The leading promoters on all sides were tolerably well agreed both as to principles and needs. The passing of individuals from one communion to another their souls abhorred. This latter process would only tend, as they maintained, to prolong divisions and make the existing lines of demarcation harder and more marked. If those zealous to make proselytes in any cause or direction were confined in their action to individuals only, and never extended to communities

or Churches in their corporate aspect, a few stray sheep might be securely trapped on any side, but isolation and division, as regards the separated communions, would only increase and extend.

Then as to the varied evils of division, it was not difficult for an ordinary advocate to make out a good case. The schism and divisions of Christendom, it was truly asserted, had robbed Christendom of its distinctive character, and rendered a Christian policy impossible in Christian countries. It was forcibly asked: How can there be Christian legislation on the matter of secular education so long as the community is subdivided into so many contending communions, each anathematizing the other? The indifferentism of modern legislation is obviously a great evil, but how can it be remedied—as the question was put,—where nations are split up into a variety of conflicting sects? The unbelief of the present generation, increasing every day, is an evil greater and darker still; but who can wonder at it, when the foundations of all beliefs are undermined by the recriminations and furious controversies of contending Christians? Who can wonder, it was further most pertinently asked, at the continued increase of immorality and crime, when Christians disagree about the very fountain from which alone any intelligible distinction between Right and Wrong can flow? What else is the true secret of the anti-social and revolutionary principles of the present day? And, on a larger scale, to what else are we to attribute the utter disregard of public right, or the sanctity of treaties, and of international obligations, which manifestly spring from the weakening of the religious principle, as the weakening of that has itself sprung from the anarchy of religious division?

Such reflections, and they were found capable of large amplification, and almost general application, went home to the minds of the thoughtful, and served to extend and deepen the already wide-spread interest in the movement itself. Hence it is found to have spread very considerably, and is now not beneath the notice of leading statesmen on both sides of the two Houses of Parliament. In fifteen years a marked progress is visible. The day for practical work has not yet dawned. How soon its advent may be upon us appears uncertain. But the seed, steadily scattered, is taking root downward and bearing fruit upwards. Apparent failures are truly not real, and may not impossibly lead up to success.

Quite recently, in discussing the wisest manner of meeting the demands of the Internationalists, one of our leading organs of opinion put on record the sound conviction that Christianity with concentrated simplicity, new vitality, and more intense fervour, alone can stem the widening torrent of augmenting danger, or satisfy the increasing needs of the restless. "Need we remind our readers," says the writer in question, who treats the subject most practically, "that no congeries of distinct and antagonistic tests can ever do this most blessed work,

even if the division and antagonism do not choke and destroy the vitality of Christian faith in such ? The Church Catholic, if it were but One, would be really the true International Society, supplying a bond deeper and wider than those of National Unity. All movements towards Unity, therefore, should be looked upon, even in this light, as of incalculable importance : all indications of true sympathy with the masses of men, of shaking off any adhesion to class or vassalage to the great in this world, must be fostered as essential to the salvation of society. There is in truth urgent need to pray and strive for a deeper religious spirit and for truer religious unity, as for other reasons so for this—that these may be the secret of victory in the impending struggle against Socialism, against its oppressive tyranny and its universal destructiveness.”

FREDERICK GEORGE LEE.



CÆSARISM AND ULTRAMONTANISM.

IN the March number of this Review I wrote an article under the above title which avowedly formed part only of what I had to offer on the subject. For reasons of which I have no right to judge, but of the result of which I am certainly not disposed to complain, Archbishop Manning thought it desirable, before my argument was complete, to interpose an answer to what I had published. Before I proceed, I must notice his interruptions.

I understood Archbishop Manning, in his lecture on Cæsarism and Ultramontaniam, to claim for the Roman Catholic Church supremacy over all governments whatever within a sphere to be defined by itself, but including faith and morals. Such a claim I said ought not to be admitted unless it was proved beyond all reasonable doubt; and I then proceeded to give my reasons for thinking that every element of which it was made up was more or less open to doubt, that the very existence of God could not be said to be more than probable; that the truth of the facts stated in the Apostles' Creed rests upon hearsay evidence which can no longer be tested though innumerable points in it show the necessity of further inquiry or of continued doubt; and that even if the general truth of the history of Christ be granted, there is no sort of proof that he ever established a Church with the constitution and powers which Archbishop Manning claimed for his Church; or that if he did, the Roman Catholic Church is the Church so established. My general inference from this was, that whether or no a man might be justified in believing in Christianity as a matter of private opinion,

it was impossible to justify the claim made by Archbishop Manning on behalf of the Roman Catholic Church to universal spiritual sovereignty.

To this Archbishop Manning replies that he had hoped to find in my article a specimen of close reasoning, but that he was disappointed, inasmuch as "the case argued is not mine," "the whole issue had been changed." He says in substance, though not in so many words, that his paper was addressed to those only who agree with him so far as to regard as certain both the existence of God and the historical truth of the statements in the Apostles' Creed, and he accordingly "dismisses from this contention" so much of my paper as referred to these topics, with a few brief remarks. He admits the relevancy of the rest of it.

My answer is, that the cardinal proposition of the whole paper on Cæsarism and Ultramontaniam is in these words:—

"This is Ultramontaniam, the essence of which is that the Church being a Divine institution and by Divine assistance infallible, is within its own sphere, independent of all civil powers; and as the guardian and interpreter of the Divine law is the proper judge of men and of nations in all things touching that law in faith or morals."

This surely asserts, not only that Christianity and Ultramontaniam are identical, but also that Ultramontaniam is true. Indeed about half of the paper consists of denunciations of what the author calls revived paganism, and modern German legislation on ecclesiastical subjects.

My article answered this by alleging in substance that the Church was not a divine institution, which allegation I supported by showing that the evidence to prove that it was is unsatisfactory. Archbishop Manning considers this allegation irrelevant. He compares my argument to the case of a lawyer insisting upon the Tichborne trial on discussing the Mosaic cosmogony. I think I can help him to a much more appropriate illustration. Suppose that Colonel Lushington, who was the nominal defendant in the action of ejectment, had claimed Tichborne Hall, not as tenant to Sir Alfred Tichborne's trustees, but in his own right—Would it have been irrelevant if his counsel had said to Arthur Orton, Not only are you not Roger Tichborne at all, but if you were, you would have no right to this house? This is precisely what I have said to Archbishop Manning. Not only are you not the representative of the Church, but if you were, that body is not what you represent it to be.

Apart from this, can anything be more paltry than to resort in a matter of this kind to questions of special pleading? By what rule was I bound to confine my observations strictly to a contradiction of the particular matters which he alleged? If what I assert is true, Archbishop Manning must himself admit that his claims fall

to the ground, whatever else falls with them. Let him show or try to show that what I said is not true. If he refuses to do so, he makes a claim to universal spiritual sovereignty, and is unable even to try to justify it except as against people who go half way with him. When confronted by a person who does not go half way with him, he has not a word to say. To threaten the weak and to turn away from a real antagonist with—"I was not speaking to you," is not generally considered courageous; nor does it make it much better if the aggressor, as he turns away, affects to smile with good-natured superiority, observing to his baffled opponent, "Poor fellow, you know you are not the man you were. I pity your weakness and will not annihilate you just at present; my business lies elsewhere."

Archbishop Manning speaks of my paper as valuable because "it reveals the position of a small number of minds amongst us," and a passage follows, the point of which is that I overrate the importance of the views which I hold, and the extent to which they prevail. I shall not argue the question whether Archbishop Manning's judgment as to the importance of these views is correct. If so, it is singular that Archbishop Manning himself should be of opinion that in these days politics and science have fallen away from the faith; and that the Pope should have found it necessary to issue the Syllabus, and to fill the world with lamentations over the defection from his principles of every country in Europe. For my own part I can hardly believe in the sincerity of an educated man acquainted with the course of speculation for the last century and a half, and more particularly for the last generation, who affects to believe that dissatisfaction with theological doctrines is confined in these days to an insignificant minority, and who can say with easy, almost jaunty, self-confidence, "Surely at this time of day the onus of proving it (Christianity) to be false or doubtful, rests upon those who refuse to believe it."—"The Christian world is in possession."

There is a process in legal procedure called taking out a summons for further and better particulars, the nature of which is sufficiently explained by its name. If it could be employed in controversy it would be curious to learn specifically from Archbishop Manning what he understands by Christianity and by the Christian world, what by being in possession, and of whom or of what Christianity and the Christian world, as so defined, are in possession, in the sense to be so stated? Are England, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, North America, South America, parts of the Christian world? and if so, in what sense is Christianity in possession of them? Is a Unitarian a Christian? Are the laity in Paris, in Berlin, in Vienna, Florence, Rome, Madrid, and especially the more intellectual part of them, usually quite convinced of as much theology as is believed say, by Mr. James Martineau, or even by Mr. Francis Newman? Is Christianity in possession of the British Empire in India or of the

University of Oxford? Is the Christian world in possession of politics and science? If no, what does it possess? If yes, why did Archbishop Manning say, in 1865, that they had fallen away from the faith? Have they come back since? I need not pursue this. I quite agree with Archbishop Manning in one point, "*Securus judicat orbis terrarum*." If we judge by its conduct, it does not at present, at least, intend to put him, and people like him, 'in possession' of its destinies; at least if it does, it has an odd way of showing its intentions.

So much for the general principle of Archbishop Manning's reply to me. By way of appendix to it he refers to the extracts which I gave from Bellarmine about the *limbus infantum* and purgatory, and to a short parody in which I compared Bellarmine's discussion about certain visions to the summing up of a mad judge to an imaginary jury. This, he says, was "not intended for argument." He adds, "When a writer has declared that Christianity is not yet proved to be true, and that the existence of God is doubtful, I think I may postpone my answer as to what I believe of infants dying without baptism." He must use his own judgment about that; but what I wrote was intended for serious argument, and I can hardly believe that Archbishop Manning really missed its point. The argument was this: One of the principal doctors of your Church attributes to God inconceivably brutal and cruel conduct to little babies. He illustrates and confirms what he says by arguments so grotesquely absurd, that my humble efforts to hold them up to ridicule by a parody which did not exaggerate them, were very probably inadequate to the occasion. You call the Church which honours this man as one of its principal defenders against heretics, an infallible guardian and interpreter in the matter of faith and morals, a corporate incarnation of the Holy Ghost. How, I ask, could it represent anything but ignorance, presumption, and cruelty, when it did not disown and stigmatize this wicked nonsense according to its demerits? I appeal to any one who reads them whether Bellarmine's views are not, as far as truth goes, on a par with the speculations of augurs as to chickens' entrails and calves' livers, and whether, as far as morals go, they do not charge God Almighty with stupid cruelty? Whether I have succeeded or not in my attempt to hold them up to the ridicule which they deserve is a question which it does not become me to argue. Be this how it may, Archbishop Manning will find it no easy matter to deny that it is only by finding a refuge in contempt that they can avoid the horror which they are so well calculated to excite. If Archbishop Manning believes in Bellarmine's nonsense, or in some emasculated version of it, he is beneath my notice. If he frankly throws it overboard and excuses it on the ground of the ignorance and education of the writer, he must show where he draws the line. The *limbus infantum* has so strong a family likeness to transubstantiation, that it will be

very hard to disown the one and to save the other. A Catechism authorised by the Archbishop expressly declares that *limbo* is "a place of rest where the souls of the just who died before Christ were detained," also that it is "a part of hell."

I will now notice certain remarks which Archbishop Manning says he "cannot refrain from making" on those parts of my argument which he regards as irrelevant. One of them only is important enough to deserve detailed notice. He says that I have "failed to state correctly the method of proving the divine origin of Christianity, and the divine foundation of the Church;" that I have "treated it as a question of evidence from Scripture," whereas he says, "surely it is a question of facts. The documents of the New Testament may be offered in proof at a certain stage of the argument; but assuredly not at the outset." Archbishop Manning misrepresents me. Any one who looks at my article will see that I distinctly did treat the question as a question of facts. I arranged the evidence of the truth of the Christian history under three distinct heads, to each of which different considerations applied. To treat it as a question "of evidence from Scripture," would have been to put myself in direct opposition to my own principle, which is, that Scripture depends for its value upon the evidence which may be produced as to its authenticity and as to the age when it was written.

The Archbishop proceeds to say that I write as if the onus of proving Christianity to be true rests upon those who believe it; whereas "at this time of day the onus of proving it to be false or to be doubtful, rests upon those who refuse to believe it." It is a common error in controversy to apply legal principles improperly. In an action at law the question upon whom the burden of proof rests may be extremely important, because the object of such a proceeding is the taking of a definite course about some particular thing. The rule that when a person is in possession of anything he ought not to be disturbed except by some one who can show a better title to it, is not a rule of logic but a rule of convenience. Its reason is obvious. Any other would lead to violence and bloodshed. I can understand a person who says that opinions and religious beliefs ought to be put on the same footing as property, and that no one should be permitted to attack his neighbour's opinion unless he had satisfied some established authority that he ought to be allowed to do so. Under such a system, the question whether a given man was in possession of a given opinion might be very important. But when it has once been decided to be expedient that opinions should be freely discussed, all such questions are at an end. The fact that a given opinion is "in possession"—that is, that it is commonly held, is irrelevant to its truth, unless, indeed, any one is prepared to maintain that every opinion held by any considerable number of persons is true, or that the probability of an opinion is to be measured by the number of people who hold it—a view which

I suppose would establish Buddhism as the most probable of religious systems, and which would, beyond all doubt, be accepted with delight by devout Hindoos, if they were allowed to poll India. If Archbishop Manning must have a legal axiom on this subject he ought to take "*affirmantis est probare*." Every belief upon every subject rests upon some grounds or other, which those who hold it should be prepared to state. Rules about the burden of proof have nothing to do with the matter. To take a specific instance: How can any rule about the burden of proof affect the truth or the importance of my remark, that many statements in the four Gospels, as we have them, suggest the importance of cross-examining the persons who made them, and the necessity for continued doubt upon the points to which those statements refer, in the absence of opportunities for cross-examination?

Archbishop Manning proceeds to state what he regards as the true method of proving the truth of the Christian history.

He says the Church "is a visible fact, as palpable as the British Empire." "As the British Empire has its succession of Sovereigns, its unwritten and written laws, its legislature, and its tribunals, its customs and traditions of public and private life, its documents and records: so has the Christian Church, more widely known, more profuse in evidence, more open to every kind of test."

I never heard of any question as to what the British Empire means, but when we hear of the Church, it is impossible not to ask which? Do you mean the Roman, the Anglican, the Greek, the Church of England as by law established, the Church of Ireland, the Church in South Africa, or the Presbyterians? Does Archbishop Manning admit of an invisible Church? If so, he is in opposition to all the greatest divines of his own communion. Does he reject an invisible Church? If so, a very large, and much the most intelligent part of the Christian world, rejects the "tribunals, customs, and traditions," to which he appeals, as the proof of Christianity, and appeal to the Bible alone as their religion.

We learn next that, "like the British Empire, the Church has a corporate identity and living consciousness, which is traceable up to the time of its founder." What does this mean? If any one was to get together a French Canadian, a London shopkeeper, a Hottentot from the Cape, a Zulu Caffre, a Sikh from Peshawur, a Bengalee Baboo, a Spaniard from Trinidad, and an Australian savage, and to tell them that they all shared in the living consciousness of the British Empire, and that if they wanted to know what that was, it was very like the living consciousness of the Church, I doubt whether they would be much the wiser. I do not see very much difference myself between the two consciousnesses, nor much resemblance, for neither can be traced in nonsense.

The Archbishop proceeds: "Its" (the Church's) "account of itself" (different parts of it give different and conflicting accounts of its origin, nature, and powers) "rests upon a history which cannot be

rejected without shaking all evidence except the personal eye-witness and ear-witness of each man for himself. If we are to believe nothing but what we have seen, heard, and touched, the human mind would dwell in a blank isolation. The Divine origin of the Christian Church rests upon a history which cannot be shaken without shaking the foundations of all moral certainty. It rests upon a legitimate authority of direct evidence, the most explicit and uninterrupted to be found in all history. It claims our belief on the maximum of historical certainty. If its history is not to be believed, all history would be shaken." The Archbishop then proceeds to explain what he means by the "legitimate authority of direct evidence." He means by "authority" "the motive of our belief or source of evidence." He tells us that "no witnesses have authority but those who are competent and veracious." He then introduces several remarks about the importance of believing history. Next he says:

"Again, the visible fact of the Christian world proposes to my reason the maximum of evidence for the events upon which it rests. That evidence is the evidence of eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses. It is a part of their autobiography; their testimony was an adequate motive of credibility to those who heard them; the expansion of that testimony throughout the world, and its continuity through all ages, if it has not added to the *intrinsic* certainty of the facts, has in no way lessened it. But it has proportionately increased the *extrinsic* evidence by way of corroboration and accumulation, reaching up to the moment of the facts alleged. I affirm, therefore, that this authority is both competent and veracious, and therefore legitimate; and that its action upon the human reason is not by way of imperious command, but of the proposition of evidence. It comes and speaks to us, clothed with the evidence of its testimony.

"Authority is, therefore, not an imperious act substituting command for reason, *Sic volo sic jubeo stet pro ratione voluntas*; but it is reason and evidence speaking by a legitimate voice. Authority and evidence are thereby identical and convertible."

All this seems to me strangely confused and intricate. The Archbishop is not even consistent in his use of words. He says first, that by "authority" he means "the source of evidence," and afterwards, that authority and evidence are convertible. How can evidence be the same as the source of evidence? Again, substitute either of these definitions of evidence for the word "authority," which is said to be convertible, and the leading propositions into which that word is introduced become nonsense. The divine origin of the Christian Church, we are told, "rests upon a legitimate *authority* of direct evidence," *i.e.*, upon a legitimate evidence of direct evidence. Then again we are told that no witnesses have *authority* but those who are competent and veracious. What is the sense of saying that no witnesses have *evidence* except those who are competent and veracious? Again we are told that the authority on which Christianity rests, is "both competent and veracious, and therefore legitimate." Substitute evidence for authority and this becomes, "the evidence on which Christianity rests being veracious is legitimate;" or, "true evidence

is legitimate." This is not, perhaps, nonsense, but it is very near it. If evidence is true, what do you gain by calling it "legitimate?" Lastly, we get the following marvellous proposition. "It" (authority) "comes and speaks to us, clothed with the evidence of its testimony," *i.e.* Evidence comes and speaks to us clothed with the evidence of its evidence. This has as much meaning as the following: "Dress clothed in the garment of coat, waistcoat, and trousers." Once more, "Authority" "is reason and evidence, speaking by a legitimate voice." This makes a contradiction in terms. Evidence is reason and evidence speaking by a "legitimate voice." That is, Evidence is Evidence, and a good deal more. The truth seems to be that in this as in other passages which I could mention, if necessary, Archbishop Manning has entangled himself in a network of words, which, at best, to use Lord Macaulay's expression, mark time instead of marching, and sometimes trip themselves up instead of marking time.

Setting aside obscurities of language, the substance of the passage referred to seems to be as follows:—

Historical events which competent and veracious witnesses say that they saw ought to be believed to have happened:

But competent and veracious witnesses say that they saw the historical events which are mentioned in the Apostles' Creed:

Therefore we ought to believe that those events happened.

If this is what he means, can Archbishop Manning refer to one single statement now before the world which purports to be a statement by an eye-witness of the main historical facts stated in the Apostles' Creed, and which is proved beyond all reasonable doubt to be authentic? The statements in the Epistles to the Corinthians and Galatians are no doubt authentic, but Paul does not profess to have seen any of the events in question himself. The author of the Gospel according to St. John professes to have been an eye-witness of circumstances closely connected with some of the events in question, but whether St. John was the author of the Gospel which goes by his name is a very doubtful matter indeed.

However, if I apprehend Archbishop Manning's principle correctly, my article did not attack it. It pointed out a limitation essential to the application of the principle which may be stated thus. The importance of a witness's testimony depends absolutely on his means of knowledge, and, to a great extent, on the intrinsic probability of what he says, and on the opportunities which exist for sifting and examining his evidence. I pointed out how these limitations affected the evidence now in existence as to the truth of the Christian history. How can this argument be affected by commonplaces about the importance of not confining our belief to what we actually see and hear (a course which I suppose no one was ever so childish as to propose), and utterances about the identity between "evidence" and "legitimate authority?"

It fills me with astonishment that in these days any one should be found to assert that a man who is not convinced of the resurrection, must, in consistency, refuse to believe in any historical event whatever. It would be not one whit more absurd to say that every statement in Livy must either be rejected or believed, or that all or none of the prisoners indicted at a given assize ought to be convicted. People who disbelieve the Christian history do so on the plain ground that the evidence is not strong enough to prove the miracles which form part of it. What inconsistency is there in their belief of ordinary events attested by stronger evidence? Would Archbishop Manning himself say that no direct assertion is ever to be disbelieved, or that the improbability of a story is not a ground for doubting it? If not, where does he draw the line? His argument implies that I said or thought that human history in general was not proved, or proveable. The suggestion is absurd. What I said was, that certain specific evidence for particular incidents was open to certain specific objections. Why does not he try to answer this? He does in a sort of way.

The evidence of the Christian history, he says, "is the evidence of eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses?" Who are they? What are their names? Where is their evidence?

"It is a part of their autobiography." What eye- or ear-witness of the Christian history wrote any autobiography at all?

"The expansion of that testimony throughout the world, and its continuity through all ages, if it has not added to the *intrinsic* certainty of the facts, has in no way lessened it, but it has proportionally increased the *extrinsic* evidence by way of corroboration and accumulation." I think I understand what the Archbishop means by "intrinsic certainty," though I should not use the phrase. No doubt when evidence has once been recorded anyone can judge of its value, and, subject to some allowance for the changes of habits and circumstances, the mere lapse of time does not affect its weight. It is about eighteen years since Palmer was hung for poisoning Cook. Anyone who reads his trial now can form as good an opinion of his guilt as he could have formed on the same materials ten years ago, and the same remark will apply fifty years hence. But what is extrinsic probability? How can the force of existing evidence ever increase unless new evidence is discovered? How can the "extrinsic probability," for instance, of Palmer's guilt be increased? A. tells B. that he saw something happen; B. believes A., and tells C.; C. believes B., and tells D.; and so it goes on to Z. The extrinsic probability of the story, according to Archbishop Manning, is "proportionally increased by way of accumulation and corroboration" when it reaches Z. It appears to me, on the other hand, that all that Z. can possibly say is that Y. says that X. says that W. says that U. says that, &c.; till we arrive at that B. says that A. told him that he, A., saw this or that. Surely B. is in a better position to prove whether the event

happened than C., D., and the rest all put together, unless indeed you increase a fraction by enlarging the denominator. If you do, how very true Buddhism and Brahminism must have grown by long keeping and earnest belief!

Any one who considers Archbishop Manning's arguments attentively will find, that like most others on the same subject, they are an attempt to avoid the application to the evidence of Christianity of that close criticism which is expected of every historian who deserves the name, and which answers to cross-examination in legal proceedings. "What can you have," he asks, "beyond the testimony of a competent and veracious witness?" I reply, you can have the same testimony duly criticized, checked, and compared with the testimony of other witnesses, and with the known course of human events and conduct. Lady Tichborne was surely competent and veracious, so were the whole mass of soldiers and officers who positively swore that Arthur Orton was Roger Tichborne, yet no sensible person can doubt, in spite of the oaths of these competent and veracious people to a plain matter of fact, that Roger Tichborne had been dead for nearly twenty years when they swore he was standing alive before them.

So much for Archbishop Manning's reply to what he regards as the irrelevant part of my article. I now pass to what he admits to be relevant.

I said that in order to prove his case he must establish four propositions, the third of which was as follows:

"Jesus Christ established a Church with the constitution and powers which Archbishop Manning claims for his Church." "This," he says, "is my thesis, and this has been attacked. This I am in duty bound to defend, and with this only I have now to do." I think I shall be able to show that the argument thus introduced is open to the following objections:—

First, it shows a total incapacity to understand the meaning of proof and evidence.

Secondly, it is based on ignorance or forgetfulness of the most notorious facts.

Thirdly, it aims at establishing a proposition totally different from the one advanced in "Cæsarism and Ultramontanism."

Fourthly, the proposition which it defends is inconsistent, if true, with the whole policy of the Roman Catholic Church for three hundred years, and forms its severest condemnation.

First, I say that Archbishop Manning's argument shows a total incapacity to understand the meaning of proof and evidence. He has to prove that Jesus Christ established a Church with a certain constitution and power. His evidence of this proposition consists of extracts from books which, as he supposes, show that various Anglican divines, the established Church of Scotland, and the different dissenting Protestant bodies, are of that opinion. He fails

to show anything of the sort ; but suppose he succeeded, what have the opinions of ecclesiastical writers to do with the subject ? What did any of them know about the proceedings of Jesus Christ except what is written in the New Testament ? The whole of their writings are simply commentaries on a few texts of the Bible, and discussions of what was said and done by councils and theological speculators long subsequent to Christ. The way to prove that Jesus Christ founded a Church with a given constitution, is to produce documents, written by Christ, or recorded words spoken by Christ, purporting to found that Church with that constitution. A whole library of such quotations as Archbishop Manning's do not advance one step towards such a proof, nor would any one who had the most elementary notions about evidence suppose that they did. Half a dozen expressions in the New Testament form the foundation upon which all these speculations, and tons of others of the same sort, rest. Archbishop Manning indeed is committed to this in the strongest way, for the Catechism which the Roman Catholic bishops approve "for the use of the faithful" in England and Wales, contains this question and answer : "Q. How do you prove that Christ appointed St. Peter to be the head of the Church ? A. Because he said unto him, 'Thou art Peter,' &c." To which I go on to ask : How do you prove that Jesus Christ said any such thing, or if he did, that he attached to those words any such meaning ? I asked these questions pointedly in my last article, and the Archbishop does not try to answer them. He obviously feels the force of what I said upon the real value of the obscure and ill-authenticated metaphor which contains all that Christ is said to have said on the subject ; and he tries to bolster up the imperceptible foundation by pointing out the monstrous size of the superstructure. People could never, he argues, have written such big books, and put forward such enormous pretensions, upon no foundation at all. There must be a pot of gold to support such a big and bright rainbow. Well, where is it ? Surely the real truth is obvious. The power of the Church was really founded upon broad historical causes. The arguments alleged for it are childish excuses addressed to an ignorant and uncritical age. "Tu es Petrus" has about as much real importance as the donation of Constantine or the Constitutions of the Apostles. Yet there is absolutely no other evidence whatever of the doctrine alleged to be true.

Secondly, I say Archbishop Manning's argument is based on ignorance or forgetfulness of the most notorious facts. The title of his last article is "Ultramontaniam and Christianity," and he repeats again and again that "no man can deny that the authority of the Church is separate from all civil powers, and within its own spiritual sphere supreme, without renouncing his Christian name or the coherence of his reason." He thinks that he establishes this by proof that different Christian communities have put forward the

doctrine in question in their various confessions of faith. In using this argument he shows that he has no right to assume that every Protestant agrees with the articles of the Church of which he is a member. Every Protestant body without exception holds that it is fallible, and that differences of opinion as to theological doctrines, and, above all others, as to everything connected with the Church, are by all Protestants regarded as the natural and not undesirable results of the exercise of the right of private judgment. What proportion of the lay members of the Established Church of Scotland does Archbishop Manning suppose to believe in the divine right of presbytery in the present day? Why should they believe in it on the authority of the Church to which they belong (if, indeed, that Church affirms it, which I do not think it does), when the Westminster Confession distinctly says—"The purest Churches under Heaven are subject both to mixture and error, and some have so degenerated as to become no Churches of Christ, but synagogues of Satan."

As to the Church of England (which distinctly affirms that many churches have erred), Archbishop Manning himself says—"I do not forget that a large latitudinarian and rationalistic section of its members would, in practice" (he ought in fairness to have said, and in theory) "refuse its spiritual office and authority," but he thinks that the other section have the better case. Be this as it may, does he really mean to say that all the large section mentioned must either renounce the title of Christians, or the coherency of their reason? It is a singular conclusion to arrive at, to say the least, that the great bulk of the laity of the Church of England are either "incoherent," or not Christians at all. What "incoherency" is there in the opinion that the history of Jesus Christ, as related in the Gospels, is substantially true, but that it does not appear that he established any particular organization for the purpose of preserving and interpreting his doctrines, preferring, for whatever reason, to leave the doctrines to produce their own effect, and the question of organization to settle itself? This opinion may be right or wrong, but it is perfectly coherent, and it is notoriously the opinion of a large proportion of that small number of Protestants, both clerical and lay, who can be said to have formed any opinion on the subject. If I were to add that it appears to me to be held by a considerable section of Catholics as well, I should say nothing very rash.

Thirdly, I say that in his last article ("Ultramontanism and Christianity") Archbishop Manning tries to establish a proposition totally different from the one advanced in his first article, "Cæsarism and Ultramontanism."

In his first article Archbishop Manning said—

"It" (the Catholic Church) "has established upon earth a legislature, a tribunal, and an executive independent of all human authority." "Obedience to the Church is liberty; and it is liberty because the

Church cannot err or mislead either men or nations. If the Church were not infallible, obedience to it might be the worst of bondage." After some further explanation, he says, "This is Ultramontaniam, the essence of which is, that the Church *being a Divine institution, and by Divine assistance infallible*, is within its own sphere independent of all civil powers; and as the guardian and interpreter of the divine law, is the proper judge of men and of nations in all things touching that law in faith and morals."

These were the passages with reference to which I said—prove that Christ ever instituted any Church with the power of infallibility, which you claim, and without which, as you justly observe, "obedience to the Church might be the worst of bondage." Archbishop Manning's way of complying with what he admits to be a relevant question is by referring to the opinions of a number of Churches, none of which claim infallibility, and some of which expressly and in terms disclaim it; and he sums up the effect of his evidence in these words:—

"I therefore affirm again that every Christian, who believes that Christianity is a Divine Revelation, must also believe that a Divine Revelation is independent of all civil authorities, and is dependent upon the authority of God alone, whether that Divine Authority make itself known by its own action in the isolated conscience of each individual man, or in the assembly of each Christian sect, or in the congregation of a Presbytery, or by the acts of an Episcopate, or by the voice of the Visible Head of the Universal Church. The forms, indeed, are different; the principle is one and the same. The Revelation of God is sustained and promulgated to the world by the authority of God Himself, in independence of all civil authorities, and in supremacy over them all.

"This is the claim I have, therefore, made for the Catholic Church, abstracting from all forms of visible order and external polity; and I submit that Mr. Stephen's third thesis is maintained explicitly by the Anglican Establishment, the Established Kirk, the Free Kirk of Scotland, and by all Nonconformists in both countries: namely, that 'Jesus Christ established a Church with the constitution (visible or invisible) and powers which I claim for my Church.' The answer, 'We ought to obey God rather than men,' carries the whole claim of Divine authority."

Who changes the issue now? I deny and require proof of the establishment by Jesus Christ of an infallible Church. Archbishop Manning, who had asserted it, replies that all Christians believe that a Divine Revelation is independent of all civil authorities.

I deny and require proof of the establishment by Jesus Christ of an infallible Church, the guardian and interpreter of the divine law, and the proper judge of men and nations in all things touching faith and morals. Archbishop Manning replies that all that he really meant to say was that every Christian who believes Christianity to be a Divine Revelation, must believe that revelation to be dependent upon the authority of God alone—a Divine Revelation must be of Divine Authority.

If that was what he meant to say, it is a pity that he does not

know better how to express his meaning. How was I to know that when he alleged that every Christian must believe in an infallible Church, and that obedience to the Church was liberty, because the Church was infallible, he meant that a man might be a very good Christian without believing in any Church at all, fallible or infallible, so long as he believed in the voice of God speaking "in the isolated conscience of each individual man?"

Fourthly and lastly, I say that Archbishop Manning's amended proposition is inconsistent with the whole policy of the Roman Catholic Church for three hundred and fifty years at least, and forms its severest condemnation. If, as he now says, it is true as regards Roman Catholics, the Church of England, Presbyterians, and Protestant Dissenters, that "the forms, indeed, are different, the principle is one and the same," it will follow that the most bloody wars, civil and foreign, the most hideous massacres, the most unrelenting and cruel persecutions by which the world has been disgraced, were the instruments by which the Church of Rome, when really powerful, tried to prevail upon a point of form over those whose principles were its own. There may be something imposing in the spectacle of a Church out of harmony with the age nailing its colours to the mast and sinking by inches without renouncing one of its claims. But when the representatives of defeated tyrants try to curry favour with the representatives of those whom their predecessors would, if they could, have exterminated by fire and sword all over the world, they present a lamentable spectacle. What language can be worse than this from the successor of Bonner and Gardiner, to the successors of their victims—"Beloved fellow-Christians, the forms of our belief are, indeed, different; the principle is one and the same: just as the wicked English nation once persecuted you, so it persecuted us, and the wicked Germans are doing the same. Help us, brethren, at all events weep and pray for us, as the injured and harmless champions of liberty of conscience—true liberty, of course, obedience to the infallible Church, in which, under a slightly different form, you believe quite as devoutly as we."

If any one wants to know how much sincerity there can be in such language, I would advise him to recollect the Albigenses, the Lollards, the revolt of the Netherlands, the massacre of St. Bartholomew, the Spanish Armada, the Inquisition, and the whole history of Ireland from the massacre of 1641 downwards. Let him compare these events with the doctrines of the Syllabus and the decrees of the Council of 1870, and let him remember that the distinctive feature of the Church of Rome is its claim to be infallible and immutable; but for which obedience to it would "be the worst of bondage."

Having disposed of Archbishop Manning's interruption, I resume the course of my argument, and proceed from what he says of Ultra-

montanism to consider what he says of Cæsarism, by which he appears to mean an exaggerated estimate of the powers and qualifications of temporal governments.

His own view of the State is that within its own sphere it is "a delegation from God himself," but that "since the Incarnation," the whole inner life of man has been withdrawn from its sphere. "It cannot" (which in Archbishop Manning's language means ought not) "command his intellect, it cannot control his conscience, it cannot coerce his will." Intellect, conscience, and will are all free, subject always to the claim of the Church to absolute obedience in every matter which it regards as being included within the sphere of faith and knowledge. Cæsarism, as he understands it, denies this, and claims as a right "all power, religious, political, legislative, and civil,—in a word, omnipotence in all things and over all things." After dwelling at great length upon this, he observes at last, "Let it be clearly understood that in these assertions" (*i.e.*, a variety of assertions about what the Church and the State respectively "can" and "cannot" do) "I am vindicating to the Church her divine rights. I am not denying to the State its power to violate every Divine right upon earth. It may abuse its power at the license of its will—Imperial, Royal, Bureaucratic, Democratic. I deny only its right. *Id potest quod jure potest.*"

Lastly, he quotes for the purpose of denouncing it, a statement made by the *Pall Mall Gazette*, of which the following is the most important part:—

"A nation as such is essentially a better thing than a Church: it is, in fact, of all positive human institutions at present known to us, the most sacred, the most deeply rooted in human nature, and the best fitted to engage the affections of a rational man."

This statement, says Archbishop Manning, is "Paganism revived." I do not care what he calls it, but, whether pagan or not, I adopt it as the expression of my own views, and I propose to justify it on the ground that it is true.

Archbishop Manning's own views seem to me to be open to every sort of objection. I will mention two of the most prominent of them, and I will then proceed to give my own opinions upon the matter to which they relate as being the shortest and most satisfactory way of explaining the grounds on which I dissent from them.

In the first place, Archbishop Manning's doctrine about the sphere of the State is either incomplete and misleading, or else it stands in direct and glaring opposition to the whole policy of the Roman Catholic Church at the most critical and characteristic periods of its history. He says that "since the Incarnation" the State has had no right to "command the intellect, control the conscience, or coerce the will" of its subjects. Throughout the greater part of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the one object of the Roman Catholic

Church was to get the Roman Catholic States to do all this to the point of extermination and by the unsparing use of the most revolting cruelties, and to a very great extent it succeeded in its efforts. If the State as represented by Philip II. and others acted within its sphere, what are we to say to Archbishop Manning's principle? If it overstepped its sphere, what are we to say of the Church at whose instigation and with whose warm approval it did so? It seems to me that a person must be wilfully blind who does not see that when a Roman Catholic Archbishop puts forward such a theory as the one in question, he is either in direct opposition to the institution to which he belongs, or else, to serve a temporary purpose, he is putting forward principles in which he does not believe. The principle on which Archbishop Manning's theory really depends ought to be stated thus:—The State has no right to control men's consciences and opinions unless it thinks that it is desirable to do so in the interests of the Catholic Church, or unless it is required to do so by the Catholic Church, in either of which cases it may and ought if necessary to employ whatever means are required for that purpose, war, judicial torture, and the incitement of Catholic mobs to massacre Protestant populations, all included.

In the next place it appears to me that in his denunciations of "Cæsarism," Archbishop Manning is attacking an imaginary opponent. I know of no writer who maintains the monstrous proposition that "Cæsar finds the law in himself and creates right and wrong, the just and the unjust, the sacred and the profane."* The authorities to which the Archbishop refers, are four. 1. An account given by Terrasson of the *Lex Regia* which, as I shall show in a moment, is utterly absurd; 2. The article in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, which I have already quoted and propose to justify; 3. Two phrases employed by Dr. Falck in proposing the laws to which the Archbishop so much objects. Dr. Falck said (according to Archbishop Manning), "if the State and the Church are equal in the domain of moral power, the State must always have the supremacy in the domain of law." Is this equivalent to the assertion that Cæsar "creates right and wrong, the just and the unjust?" 4. Archbishop Manning repeatedly quotes a maxim "*cujus regio ejus religio*;" but he gives no authority for it, and its character must entirely depend upon the connection in which it is used. This will appear from what I have to say on his remarks on "*Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem*."

Let us now see how he deals with his authorities.

He says "the sovereignty of Cæsarism is absolute and dependent

* Hobbes uses language which has a superficial resemblance to this view of the matter; but I think that if justice were done to his theories, it might easily be shown that this was not his opinion. I must not, however, diverge into an inquiry into the views of one of the very greatest and most hardly-used of English writers.

on no conditions;" "Cæsar finds the law in himself, and creates right and wrong, the just and the unjust, the sacred and the profane." "Law, morals, politics, and religion all come from him and all depend upon him." "Quod Principi placuit legis habet vigorem," and "cujus regio ejus est religio," are the axioms of Cæsarism. He goes on for two pages more in the same vein, and then proceeds to a third-hand quotation of the maxim last mentioned. He refers to Gaume as his authority for saying "Terrasson describes the Lex Regia in these terms: All power, religious, political, legislative, and civil, in a word omnipotence in all things and over all things, the people and the Senate transferred to Cæsar when the republic passed into the Empire. And this took place in virtue of the Lex Regia, of which Ulpian speaks in these words: 'Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem utpote cum Legia Regia quæ de imperio ejus lata est, populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem conferat.'" This imperial power was therefore absolute, exclusive, unlimited, and omnipotent.

Before I show the absurdity of this, I may observe that even if Archbishop Manning never happened to have read the first page of the Institutes, he ought to have been protected against the error into which he has fallen by his own theory. He is not writing of forms of government. His argument is not directed specially against absolute monarchy. He says expressly "this supreme power need not be held in the hand of one man. It may be a People or a Senate, or a King or an Emperor. Its essence is the claim to absolute and exclusive sovereignty." He also points out the well-known fact that the Lex Regia simply transferred to the Emperor the powers of the different public bodies of Rome, and did not even purport to confer upon him any powers which had not been previously exercised by other authorities. This ought to have shown him that the Lex Regia was in itself totally foreign to his subject, and that he proved nothing unless he could prove that according to the theories of Roman Law and Roman lawyers, the Senate and the other authorities of the Republic in their time, and the Emperors afterwards as their successors, were not merely sovereign, in the political sense of the word, but also "found the law in themselves, and created right and wrong, the just and the unjust, the sacred and the profane." Now if he had read the first and second titles of the first book of the Institutes, (in which the sentence "Quod Principi placuit, &c.," occurs) he would have learnt not only that the Roman lawyers said no such thing, but that they said the very opposite, and laid down in the broadest and most emphatic language the distinction between *jus*, which is not very different from what we mean by morals, and *lex*, or law in the technical and proper sense of the word. Ulpian would no more have said, "Quod Principi placuit *juris* habet vigorem," than Austin or Bentham would

have said that an Act of Parliament could change the moral quality of treachery or falsehood.

The maxim which appears to him so dreadful is in reality as true and as harmless as it would be to say, that the Viceroy of India and his Council have a power to legislate for the whole of British India, limited only by the restrictions contained in the 22nd section of the Indian Councils Act.

The first title of the first book of the Institutes is headed, "*De Justitiâ et Jure.*" Justice it defines as "*constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi.*" It does not expressly define *Jus* (though in the Digest it is strikingly described as, "*ars æqui et boni*"), but it observes "*Juris præcepta sunt hæc: honeste vivere, alterum non lædere, suum cuique tribuere,*" which is very like the explanation in the Catechism of our duty to our neighbours. The second title elaborately distinguishes "*Jus naturale,*" "*Jus gentium,*" and "*Jus civile.*" It then proceeds to the "*Jus civile*" of Rome specifically, and after defining and explaining the manner in which "*Jus*" flows from and depends upon human nature itself, it goes on to written laws. "*Scriptum autem jus est lex, plebiscitum, Senatus consultum, Principum placita, magistratum edicta, responsa prudentum.*" Each of these six terms is then explained technically. *Lex* is thus defined: "*Lex est quod populus Romanus Senatorio magistratu interrogante (velut Consule) constituebat.*" "*Plebiscitum*" differs from "*lex*" and is thus defined: "*Plebiscitum est quod plebs plebeio magistratu interrogante (veluti tribuno) constituebat.*" The *Senatus consultum* was a decree by the Senate. The chapter goes on to say, "*Sed et quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem; quum lege Regiâ quæ de ejus imperio lata est populus ei et in eum omne imperium suum et potestatem concedat.*" This is simply a statement of the well-known fact that the emperors of Rome obtained legislative power by the *Lex Regiâ*. The prætors' edicts, and the *responsa prudentum* are then referred to as sources of law, just as an English law-book would refer to the decisions of the Courts of law and equity, and the chapter ends as it began, with a reference to *Jus*, which the writer distinctly sets above *lex*. "*Sed naturalia quidem jura quæ apud omnes gentes peræque observantur, divinâ quâdam providentiâ constituta, semper firma atque immutabilia permanent, ea vero quæ ipsa sibi quæque civitas constituit sæpe mutari solent vel tacito consensu populi, vel aliâ postea lege latâ.*"

The result is that the passage which Archbishop Manning quotes and requotes with pious horror as the gospel of blind tyranny and despotic irresponsible power, forms in reality part of a lawyer's exposition of the meaning of a variety of technical terms, and is introduced into the midst of a passage which begins and ends by laying down in the most explicit manner an ethical theory of law,

often put forward as the exclusive property of the Christian Church, but in fact derived from the Stoic philosophy.

Apart from this specific instance of the value of the Archbishop's speculations, his whole method of discussing moral and political questions appears to me to be fallacious. It is simply the old and, as I had hoped, exploded method of laying down broad general propositions which strike the fancy of the person who makes them, calling them first truths, and arguing downwards from them to particular results. It is a method which labours under the incurable defect, that it will prove anything whatever. All that it requires is that a man should know what conclusion he wants to establish. This being settled, it is only necessary for him to state as first truths the propositions which will serve as premisses for the conclusion, and the argument is complete. A great mass of speculation which in its time was eminently popular, is nothing more than an exemplification of this process, and it is the one upon which Archbishop Manning's paper has been constructed. We are told quietly, and as an indisputable matter of fact, "By this Divine fact" (the Incarnation), "the *Lex Regia* was abolished for ever;" a proposition of which the preceding remarks show the absurdity, and which the Christian emperors, from Constantine downwards, would have regarded as high treason. We are then informed that "Pope St. Gelasius," Constantine at Nicæa, St. Bernard, and Thomas Aquinas, all laid down certain doctrines as to the relation between the Church and the State (p. 25—31), and the same theory in an expanded form is stated over again by Archbishop Manning himself (p. 32—38 and elsewhere), but there is no sort of attempt to prove it to be true, that is to say, to show that it follows from actual facts or admitted principles. Of course, if the pamphlet is meant only as an exposition of the views of the Roman Catholic Church on these subjects, this is unobjectionable, but it hardly seems likely that this should be the case, inasmuch as the paper ends with a denunciation of the Falck laws based upon the supposition of the truth of the principles stated in the earlier part of the paper, and it would be strange to make an attack upon the German Government which, upon the whole, resolves itself into this: The German Government legislates in regard to the Roman Catholic Church on principles as to the relation between Church and State, of which the Roman Catholic Church does not approve.

Perhaps the most instructive passage in the whole paper, in so far as this point is concerned, is one which I have already quoted, in which Archbishop Manning says that by cannot, he means ought not. "I am not denying to the State its power to violate every Divine right upon earth. It may abuse its power at the license of its will—Imperial, Royal, Bureaucratic, Democratic. I deny only its right. *Id potest quod jure potest.*"

It appears to me that this confusion of "can" with "ought," the notion that it is possible to lay down a scheme of divine rights pertaining to the Church and State respectively, so that the expression "*id potest quod jure potest*" may be rational, is fatal to all accurate thought upon the higher problems of law, politics, and morals. It involves the deification of particular theories which may happen to strike the fancy of particular men or bodies of men, and reduces inquiry upon such subjects to an arbitrary formation of systems divorced from fact, and incapable of being proved on the one hand or refuted on the other. Any number of coherent systems of law and morals may be devised by ingenious persons, and those who adopt any one of them may, to the end of time, denounce those who do not as impious tyrants infringing the first principles of natural justice; nor do I see upon what principle the controversy between them is ever to be decided unless the fundamental terms of the subject, and the nature of its connection with actual matters of fact, are clearly defined. The great merit of the later English writers who have dealt with these subjects, writers of whom Hobbes was the first, and Mr. John Austin one of the latest, appears to me to be that they have recognized this necessity, and that instead of adding to the number of baseless ideal systems upon the subject, of which there are too many already, they have to a considerable extent taught people to speculate not about ideal States and Churches or ideal laws, like those of Hooker and Suarez,* but about actual institutions and actual laws, in relation to which we can start from real premisses and arrive at real conclusions. I think that a great part of what Archbishop Manning calls Cæsarism, revived Paganism, and so forth, is simply the result of the application of this method to the subject of the relations between Church and State.

It appears to me to be mere waste of time to begin political inquiries by laying down general propositions like those of the Archbishop. The proper course is to begin with a statement of facts, and then to proceed to examine the questions which they suggest. Now, the facts out of which all political inquiries ought to grow, though in some senses complicated to the highest degree, fall into a few well-marked general groups, of which it is easy to give a broad general description sufficiently correct for practical

* Hooker's rhetorical description of law is well known, and considered as rhetoric is very fine. It is not unlike a passage from Chrysippus, quoted in the Digest I. tit. iii. 2, *ὁ νόμος πάντων ἔστι βασιλεὺς θέων τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, πραγμάτων—κ.τ.λ.* Suarez says of law, "*proprie et simpliciter loquendo sola illa quæ est mensura rectitudinis simpliciter, et consequentiâ, sola illa quæ est regula recta et honesta potest lex appellari.*" This is a good instance of that determination to try to say several things at once which is the bane of all attempts at accurate thought. If no law is law unless it is "right and honest," there can be no such thing as a bad law, and we want a new name for acts of parliament which are not "right and honest." Archbishop Manning himself writes about the Falck *laws*, and complains of them bitterly.

purposes. In every part of the world with which we need concern ourselves, we find men collected together into societies of various kinds, which societies are in every instance governed by laws. The laws by which they are governed differ in every respect. They aim at different objects, they are enforced by different sorts of sanctions, they are applied to particular facts in all manner of different ways, they are enacted, or supposed to be enacted by different sorts of law-givers; but wherever men live in society, and whatever may be the nature of the society in which they live, their laws will, in all cases, be found to fall within the following definition. A law is a command to pursue or abstain from some course of conduct under the penalty of some evil to be inflicted in case of disobedience. This definition will be found to apply equally to the wildest and most irrational customs of a tribe of savages, to the moral theology of the Church of Rome, to English Acts of Parliament, and to the rules of a secret society banded together for the purposes of political revolution, or, if you please, social crime.

This idea of law does not, and indeed cannot, stand alone. It involves as its correlatives the ideas of sanction, right, duty, and sovereignty. The necessary effect of a legal command is (speaking generally, for there are certain exceptions which I pass over for the sake of simplicity) to impose duties and to confer rights, which are the same thing looked at from different points of view. "Let the eldest son inherit his father's land," is the command of the law of England. The effect of it is to give to the eldest son the right to possess his father's land as his property, and to impose on all the rest of the persons subject to the law the duty of not interfering with him. "When a traveller is murdered, the property found on him shall be divided into three equal parts,—one for the person who decoyed him into our company, one for the assassin, and one for the general purposes of the Society," might be the law of a community of Thugs. This command would be addressed by all the Thugs collectively to each Thug individually. It would give a right to each of them to his share in the plunder, supposing the case to occur, and impose a duty on the rest to concede his right to him. All the parties in the meanwhile would be under a duty to the law of the land to abstain from murder altogether, and each of their victims would by the same law have a right to security against personal violence. The one set of rights and duties would be sanctioned by the threat of murder by the Thugs, the other set would be sanctioned by the threat of hanging by the Government, but in each case there would be laws prescribing rights and duties, and a Sovereign whose law created them.

One more idea completes, as it were, the skeleton of every human society, whatever may be its nature and purpose. This is the idea of sovereignty. The sovereign is the person, or body of persons,

who impose the laws by which a given society is constituted, and whose commands those laws are, and the essential peculiarity by which he is distinguished is that he is, as a matter of fact, habitually obeyed by his subjects. His will, so long as he is obeyed, is the cause of the acts or omissions which flow from it. When he ceases to be obeyed he ceases to be Sovereign.

These five terms—Sovereignty, law, duty, right, sanction—denote relations which form the skeleton of all human societies ; they are a framework by the help of which all political questions may be stated, in a systematic form, and may be solved in so far as they are soluble ; and in this they resemble the principles of applied mathematics, political economy, or any other study, the elements of which have been duly defined and settled. In order, however, to make them fruitful we must go a good deal further. When, for instance, we know that the Roman Catholic Church is a society with a constitution and a sovereign of its own, and that it can make laws which impose duties and confer rights, we know a simple matter of fact, which is equally true of the British Empire, the German Empire, and every other nation in the world, to say nothing of other religions, and of gangs of robbers.

Men and mice are both vertebrate animals, and have as such much in common ; but there are great differences between a man and a mouse, of which the knowledge of the fact that each is a vertebrate animal leaves us uninformed. In the same way, a Church, a nation, and a secret society of criminals resemble each other in the circumstance that each can make laws, impose duties, and confer rights, sanctioned by hell, the gallows, or the dagger respectively. But to know this is to know little. If we wish to know what a reasonable man will think of the Church, the nation, and the secret society respectively, up to what point he will obey each, and which he will prefer if their commands conflict with each other, we must go beyond the sphere of analysis altogether. Such a man must leave behind him the question of laws, rights, duties, and sanctions, and rise to a higher point of view, from which he can consider the nature of the laws, rights, duties, sanctions, and sovereigns by which he is surrounded. He must say to himself, What is this life of mine ? What are its objects ? What are my deepest and most abiding wishes ? How shall I attain them ? When once a man has made up his mind about that, he can set their proper value on the laws of Churches, States, and secret societies ; he can take the measure of the rights and duties which they confer and impose, and estimate the importance of the sanctions which constitute their power. If he thinks them wise and good, he can honour and obey them. If he thinks otherwise, he can say to the secret society, You can make it my duty to you to commit a crime, and this duty you can sanction by the threat of murder. I would rather

be murdered ten times over than obey you, and I will resist to the death and take the chance of being assassinated. He can say to the nation, You can impose upon me a legal duty to go and worship a wafer on the pain of burning alive. I had rather be burnt alive than worship a wafer; and you and your law may do your worst. He may say to the Church, You threaten me with hell fire to all eternity unless by elaborate and painful efforts I distort my whole mind into the attitude of believing a mass of what my unperverted judgment declares to be poisonous nonsense and lies, and I admit that you impose a duty upon me to believe all this or dare your threat. Well, I will dare your threat and violate your duty. I will call a lie a lie, and take the chance of whatever may come of it in any world whatever, present or future. The recusant in each of these cases breaks a law and disregards a duty; but whether he does well or ill depends on the further question whether the law is good or bad, and whether the duty is one which a good man will disobey. Law, right, and duty are relative terms. Cæsar, being stronger than I, can make any law, impose any duty, confer any right, set up any standard of justice or injustice, he pleases; but Cæsar can no more make ingratitude or treachery morally good than he can make small-pox or typhus fever healthy. Ingratitude and treachery are bad, because human nature is so constituted that where they prevail they produce universal and widespread misery, and prevent the growth of many forms of happiness. It might be a man's legal duty to practise those vices, just as it might be his legal duty to diffuse small-pox and typhus fever; but any one who imposed such a law or discharged such a legal duty would be an enemy to the human race, all laws notwithstanding.

A world in which the devil was supreme ruler; in which every law aimed at the promotion of general misery; in which every right conferred and every duty imposed by every law, contributed to the production of that result; and in which the whole system was administered with inflexible justice or impartiality, would realize the idea of hell. Its legal system, however, would be just as perfect, just as capable of being represented logically as that of a world which realized the idea of heaven. Law, right, duty, and justice retain their specific character, whether they are applied to good objects or bad ones, just as the principles of mechanics apply equally to the erection of a robber's castle and to the erection of a court of justice.

Hence the real question between Churches and States is like all other questions between conflicting authorities. The question is, Which of the two sorts of institutions is the better, the healthier, the wiser? Which has most of a hold upon the principles upon which political and social life depend, and which every good Government, whether ecclesiastical or lay, must recognize and depend upon? I say States for the follow-

ing reasons: They are more honest than Churches. The objects at which they aim are more rational. The means of which they dispose are better in every respect. Their leading men are, as a rule, abler and wiser than the leading men in Churches. The results which they produce admit of being from time to time tested by visible results. They have in every way less nonsense about them.

I need not repeat what I have said on the unsatisfactory nature of the foundation on which theology rests, or dwell at length upon the fact, for such it is, that nearly the whole of it consists of confident assertions about matters of which the men who make the assertions really know nothing at all, and have no means of acquiring any knowledge whatever. I may, however, shortly point out one striking proof of this. Of late years English writers on theology have usually considered the strength of their case to lie in the circumstance that many objections to theological dogmas may be shown to be ill founded. This would be important if the arguments in their favour were strong, but it has another bearing. When you show that a given proposition can neither be proved nor disproved, surely it follows that nothing is known about the matter to which it relates. I would ask any one to look at the recent history of ecclesiastical bodies in general, and in particular at the history of the Church of Rome, and to say whether the true result of the controversies which began three hundred years ago is not that the whole subject-matter of the controversy is one on which men are densely ignorant, and on which they are driven either to be silent or to content themselves with more or less reasonable conjectures. When men claim to know more than their neighbours on other subjects, they justify their claims either by stating their principles or by an appeal to experience. Anyone who pleases may study law, medicine, engineering, or astronomy for himself, and judge of its value, but if he does not, he can test it in another way by its results. The lawyer wins your case or loses it. The physician cures you or does not cure you. The engineer constructs a machine which will answer its purpose or else he fails. The astronomer predicts eclipses which actually occur—but what does the priest do? He claims to know what is infinitely more important than all the knowledge of all the other persons mentioned put together, and he requires you to take on trust both his principles and his results. In fact he proves each by the other. The results are good because the principles are true, and the principles are true because the results are good. You must admire asceticism because it flows from the principles of the Church, and how can you doubt that a Church which produced the monastic life is divine? He is like a mathematician who can neither explain the principles on which he proceeds, nor appeal to facts to verify his conclusions. Generally he condemns the facts. Especially if he is a Roman Catholic, he wants you to

believe that the whole world is wrong, and has been so for three hundred and fifty years. Can any one who studies the subject seriously believe that this is so, that the true account of modern history is, that whereas the Kingdom of God had actually been established on earth in the Middle Ages under the auspices of the Popes, all the changes which have taken place since, have been in the nature of a rising against God, and a work of the Devil? Can any one, for instance, who looks at the histories of England and Spain since the middle of the sixteenth century, believe that all the most characteristic actions of England have been mutiny and rebellion against a divine and holy institution, which the Spaniards faithfully served and devoutly believed in, till it suddenly occurred to them, about forty years ago, that the system was one which they might as well attempt to get rid of at the expense of throwing themselves into a condition of hopeless anarchy and chronic civil war? Can any one draw from French history, from the sixteenth century to our own times, the inference that the people who were wholly in the right throughout were the Jesuits in all their manifold phases; that it was a blessed and holy work to establish the League; to stir up the French mobs to the massacre of the Protestants in every part of France; to murder Henry III.; to incite Louis XIV. to revoke the Edict of Nantes, and to convert the Protestants by dragonnades; to set up the thin varnish of devotion which prepared the way for the Regency; to persecute the Jansenists, and to destroy Gallicanism, because it interfered, however awkwardly, with the despotism of the Pope; and to pursue in our own days the course of policy which cost their thrones to Charles X. and Louis Napoleon, and contributed in no small degree to bringing the Germans to Paris? To me it is utterly impossible to read history in that manner. In former times, the vices of the clergy were the great and successful argument against their claims. It was impossible to recognise the representatives of God upon earth, in proud, ambitious, and sensual priests. Nobody in these days would bring such charges against the clergy, but I think they are open to others which make it almost more difficult to submit to them. Wolsey and Richelieu were no saints; but to me, at least, it would be far less difficult to regard either of them as the representative of God upon earth, than to view in that light a male old maid, clever, charitable, and good after his fashion, and as long as he has his own way, but totally devoid of real wisdom and force, either of mind or of character, and capable, when thwarted, of any amount of spite, falsehood, and gentle cruelty.

The impression of the impossibility of accepting as absolute truth any theological solution for life becomes, if possible, stronger when we bear in mind the fact that there are many such solutions, each of which is inconsistent with all the rest. If it is really true that all men

owe allegiance to some definite set of priests, it will follow that either the Buddhists, or the Brahmins, or the Mahomedans, or the Thibet Lamas, or the Ultramontane Roman Catholics, or the English High Churchmen, or the extreme Presbyterians, represent God upon earth. Look at the matter from the theological point of view, assume that there is and shall and must be a divinely established Church somewhere, and it is hardly possible to decide between the conflicting views. To say nothing of the question between Mahomedans or Brahminists and Christians, and to confine our attention to our own island, Dr. Newman's account of his religious opinions gives me the impression that he never quite gave up the notion that the Anglican theory was, upon the whole, the most perfect as a theory, though he could not make it square with a certain part of the facts. Many people of learning and ability still maintain it. The Particular Baptists again have a great deal to say for themselves from their own point of view. Much may be said by anyone who believes the whole Bible to be absolutely true in favour of the notion that the Church consists of persons who have been spiritually and consciously converted from sin, and baptised after such conversion, and of no others. Once decide that some theological solution of society is true absolutely, and the questions, what theological principles are true? and which Church represents them? are insoluble. The real objection to all these schemes is, that if we take a general view of the world and its history, if we look at the people we know, and the things which are going on around us, it is morally impossible to accept any of them as a true and sufficient account of the world. Not one key of the whole bunch will open the lock. Every considerable religion which has had its full swing has failed to justify its pretensions. Buddhism began with a theory which many people regard as sublime (though I do not), but it ends in a wretched superstition. Brahminism, which has good points about it, falls away into shapes which are simply monstrous. Mohammedanism is in a false position, unless it can conquer the world, which it most emphatically cannot, and it is but a poor thing when it does conquer. Of the forms of Christianity, the Roman Catholic system is either corrupt if it is allied with the State, or intolerable if it stands by itself, and in every case it is incredible, and so generates gross superstition on one side, and absolute scepticism on the other. The Protestant systems have a tendency to become avowedly what they really are, simple speculations and theories. It is hardly possible to state them coherently upon any other principle, and this is their great merit.

Indeed all these systems begin at the wrong end, or rather come before us in the wrong attitude. Regard them as divine revelations and each must be rejected. Regard them as human theories, and all have their merits. Any system of theology, Christian or otherwise, which has sufficient consistency to be called a system, contains an

immense proportion of matter, which it would have been impossible to believe if it had been proclaimed from the clouds in an audible voice, and of which one may usually assert with perfect confidence that it was devised by particular people at particular times, under the influence of particular habits of thought. I do not deny the importance of these speculations. I have often given the reasons why I regard them as necessary, though I do not think they can ever be more than speculations. Men must have some theory of life just as they must have theories of morality, politics, law, medicine, and physical science. Life would be greatly impoverished if people ceased to think on the greatest of all subjects, simply because they cannot attain absolute knowledge upon it, but it seems to me as far from the truth to say that God gave us a ready-made theology, as to say that he gave us any other item of knowledge ready made. I believe that in regard to this as in regard to other subjects, people must use their minds to the best of their ability, and be contented with such conclusions as they are by that means enabled to arrive at. This, indeed, must be the case, whether there has been any special revelation or not, for the question whether such a revelation has taken place, and if so what were its contents, must always be questions of fact to be investigated like any others.

This introduces the few remarks which I wish to make on the subject of the relation of the Church and the State, and the supremacy of the latter. I cannot of course be answerable for what others may have said, but as a passage which entirely expresses my own views was singled out for attack by Archbishop Manning, it is natural to explain myself more fully. I have said that the laity, on the whole, appear to me to be wiser than the clergy, inasmuch as they live in a healthier atmosphere, and are exposed to fewer illusions, but these remarks have a wider application. It appears to me that in the management of all human affairs—government, morals, theological speculation, the study of physical science, or anything else, the very highest authority that is to be had at any given time, is the settled opinion of the best and wisest men who can be found, checked on the one hand by its application to facts and on the other by criticism. When, for the purposes of government, we have got together as wise a body of men as we can find (I am far from saying that our existing methods of performing this operation are the best that could be devised), all is done that can be done, and I do not see how we can go further or rise higher, except by slow and often painful steps. Some authority is absolutely necessary, if for no other purpose, at all events in order to keep the peace, administer justice, and make what laws are wanted. When called into existence, such a body must, *de facto*, be supreme. As Archbishop Manning himself admits, it can do what it likes (if "can" is used in the proper sense of the word), up to the point at which it excites a resistance stronger than the force of which it

disposes, or encounters a natural impossibility. At all events it can, if it is so minded, work its will with religious establishments, and the public performance of religious worship. On the other hand, in the present day individuals can, as a rule (at least in this country), freely remonstrate with the government, and press advice of any kind upon it for its acceptance. I thus view the supremacy of the civil government as a matter of fact to be dealt with like another, and I do not differ from Archbishop Manning upon the question, *What are the facts?*

Translating his views into my language, the question at issue should be stated thus. Ought a looker-on to advise the civil government to recognize in the clergy of any Church infallible spiritual guides, or ought he to advise the civil government to look upon and to treat the clergy simply as members of a particular profession (say like university professors), as to whose position and powers the civil government may, and ought, to legislate as occasion requires? I say that the State ought to look on the clergy simply as members of a profession, because that is their true position. As a general rule, the best course for the civil government to take would, I think, be to leave them alone, and to allow their opinions to find their own level. This, however, is far from being always possible. On several highly important matters, of which marriage, education, and ecclesiastical endowments attract most attention at present, it is absolutely necessary for the civil government to take a side in matters affecting religion, just as when the style was changed in 1752, it was absolutely necessary for parliament to take a side in an astronomical question. When this is the case, I say that the civil government ought to act on its own opinions as to what is right and wise, without deferring to the opinions of the clergy, or to the demands of any theory as to the relations between the State and the Church. In many cases, and particularly in cases in which the civil and the clerical element have been mixed up together, as they were in England in the 16th century, and as they still appear to be in Germany, the determination on the part of the civil government to carry out its views may, of course, involve great changes and excite passionate resistance, but this is the case with all political questions. Moreover, the civil government not being infallible may in such cases be wrong; but these considerations prove only that such steps should not be taken without great consideration, and a deliberate counting of the cost. Like all other political measures, each case must be judged according to its special merits, but in every case the question is one for the nation which it concerns. When the English nation under Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, decided to pull down one Church and set up another, it performed one of the natural functions of a nation, just as much as it did when, at the close of the last century, it decided upon the whole to take the anti-revolutionary side in the great war with France, or when in

our own days it devoted its energies to parliamentary reform and its consequences. A nation must either settle its religious questions for itself as they arise, or must allow somebody else to decide them for it.

The conflicting views on the subject may be stated in a very few words.

Archbishop Manning's theory is, that whereas God Almighty has made the Pope the absolute spiritual master and Grand Lama of mankind, nobody is ever to interfere with any subject that the Pope cares about without his leave.

My theory is, that nations must use the powers which they do in fact possess, at their own discretion and on their own responsibility, in regard to every question which comes before them, whether it be political, religious, or scientific. If they make mistakes so much the worse for them, but no mistake which they can make is so fatal as the mistake of flinching from the responsibility of being supreme rulers and judges, deciding in the last resort on all matters which vitally interest mankind. In short, the sum and substance of my theory is this. Human reason, pure, simple, and undisguised, acting within convenient local limits, through the best representatives of it that can be found, is the best and highest authority we have on all subjects whatever, and, fallible as it is, is most likely to be right. It, and it alone, must decide when, and for what purposes, and in what shape, the legal sanction, or in other words disciplined and systematic physical force, shall be used, and whenever that decision is taken, the last word, the *ratio ultima*, which man can address to man, is spoken. That last word may do infinite mischief. It may be spoken wrongly; it may have to be retracted, and uttered again in an altered form; and this will be the case as often as it violates the principles on which, as a matter of fact, this world is constructed, and which legislators must observe just as much as architects, if they desire their works to stand.

It cannot be too strongly asserted that the end at which laws should aim, and by their attaining which they must be judged, is their conformity with the permanent principles of human nature and society; principles which are antecedent to and independent of all laws whatever, whatever may have been their origin. These, however, are reasons only for caution and care in legislation. Not to make a law which circumstances do require, is just as great an error as to make a law which circumstances do not require. The fallibility of law-makers is only one of the innumerable illustrations of the weakness and poverty of human nature. Men must acknowledge and measure that weakness before they can begin to diminish it, and one of the first steps towards such an acknowledgment is to be found in discarding the quack remedies with which Archbishop Manning and others mock the world.

JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN.

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
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